The Islamic State and U.S. Policy

The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs Rhoda Margesson Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy Alex Tiersky Analyst in Foreign Affairs Matthew C. Weed Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation November 12December 8, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43612 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Summary The Islamic State is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of parts of Iraq and Syria since 2013. It threatens the governments of both countries and potentially several other countries in the region, and has drawn a military response from the international community. . The emerging international response to the threat is multifaceted and includes coalition military strikes and assistance plans. There is debate over the degree to which the Islamic State organization might represent a direct terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland or to U.S. facilities and personnel in the region. The forerunner of the Islamic State (IS) was part of the insurgency against coalition forces in Iraq, and the organization has in the years since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq expanded its control over significant areas of both Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni tribal areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war. Since early 2014, Islamic State-led forces, supported by groups linked to ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and many Sunni Arab tribalistssome Sunni Arabs, have advanced along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, seizing multiple population centers including Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest cities. Since then, IS forces have massacred Syrian adversaries and Iraqiand Iraqi adversaries, including some civilians, often from ethnic or religious religious minorities, and executed two American journalists who the group had captured while they were working in Syria. Islamic State fighters also have come close to capturing a key Kurdish enclave in northern Syria. The American journalists. Islamic State fighters also have launched offensives in Iraq’s Anbar province and against a key Kurdish enclave in north-central Syria. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the ire of the international communityinternational ire, increasing U.S. attention onto Iraq’s political problems and onto the civil war in Syria. On September 10, President Obama announced a series of actions intended to “degrade, and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization. The United States is leading and seeking to expand a multilateral coalition that is undertaking direct military action; providing advice, training, and equipment for partner ground forces in Iraq and Syria; gathering and sharing intelligence; and using financial measures against the Islamic State. The objective of these measures is to progressively shrink the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to the organization. The U.S. effort to show progress against the Islamic State, and the recruitment of regional partners,Islamic State organization. U.S. officials refer to their strategy as “Iraqfirst” and “ISIL-first,” amid criticism by some in Congress that more attention should be paid to the civil war in Syria and more effort should be made to oust Syrian President Bashar al Asad. The U.S. desire to show progress against the Islamic State and in the recruitment of regional partners raises questions of whether the U.S. mission and commitment might expand. The Administration has ruled out deploying combat forces to either Iraq or Syria, but it has not ruled out providing forward aircraft controllers, additional military advisors, or other related ground groundbased military assets. Some experts assert that coalition partners inside Iraq and Syria—Iraqi government forces and select Syrian opposition groups—are too weak to defeat the Islamic State and will eventually require help from U.S. combat troops. Several of the regional coalition members apparently seek an expansion of the U.S.-led mission to include an effort to oust President Bashar al Asad of Syria, arguing that the Islamic State cannot be defeated until the Syrian political situation is altered President Asad of Syria. For details on Islamic State operations in Iraq and U.S. policy toward Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman. For further information on the Islamic State’s operations in Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Contents The Islamic State ............................................................................................................................. 14 Background................................................................................................................................ 25 The Situation in Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 25 Iraq Government Alterations ..................................................................................................... 47 The Situation in Syria ...................................................................................................................... 58 U.S. Responses and Options ............................................................................................................ 7 11 U.S. Strategy to Combat the Islamic State Organization ........................................................... 11 Strikes Against IS Targets and U.S. Military Advisory Efforts ......................................... 12 Training and Equipping Partner Forces.......................... 7 Strategy Evolution and Implementation ................................................... 13 Disrupting IS Financing ................................. 8 Mission to Advise, Assist, Train, Target, Protect Personnel and Facilities, and Gather Intelligence ................................................................... 17 Restricting Flows of Foreign Fighters ......................................... 8 Airstrikes ...................................... 18 What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date?..................................................................................... 10 Weapons Sales to Iraq 19 International Coalition ............................................................................................................. 10 Humanitarian Airdrops ..21 Europe and Other Allies .................................................................................................... 11 Building Up a Local Partner Force in Syria .23 Iranian Involvement in the Iraq and Syria Crises ..................................................................... 11 Combat Deployments? 24 Overview of the Current Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and Syria ................................................... 25 Iraq................................................... 12 What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date?............................................................................... 13 International Coalition .................. 25 Syria.................................................................................................... 14 Turkey ....................................... 26 Overview of the International and U.S. Humanitarian Response .................................................. 27 Iraq...................................... 15 Saudi Arabia ..................................................................................................... 27 Syria................. 16 Jordan ................................................................................................................................ 17 Europe and Other Allies ...................... 29 Policy Debates and Related Legislative Issues .............................................................................. 18 Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis32 Authority for Use of Military Force and the War Powers Resolution ..................................... 32 December 2014 Senate Foreign Relations Consideration .......................................... 18 Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis .............. 34 Ground Combat Deployments? ..................................................................... 22 Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State and the War Powers Resolution...................................................... 35 Maintaining and Deepening Coalition Support ....................................................................... 22 Humanitarian Impact and Response 35 Defining the Way Forward in Syria ......................................................................................... 23 Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens36 Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration ............................................ 25 Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration ............................. 37 Figures Figure 1. Syria and Iraq: Conflict and Crisis Map ....................................... 27 Figures Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest ................................... 30 Figure 2. Timeline: The Roots of the Islamic State .................................................. 20 Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 ..................... 2131 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2839 Congressional Research Service The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy The Islamic State The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the security of both countries and drawing increased attention from the international community. The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni Muslim-inhabited areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the ire of the international community, increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political problems and on the civil war in Syria. Although the Islamic State is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is unclear if it currently poses a significant direct threat to U.S. homeland security. In September 2014, then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen stated that the group poses “a direct and significant threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region and potentially to us here at home.”1 Olsen said that the group’s “strategic goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with governments it considers apostate—including Iraq, Syria, and the United States.” Olsen further said that “we have no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the U.S.,” and highlighted potential threats posed by foreign fighters with Western passports. U.S. officials report that as many as 16,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries have travelled to Syria, including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens, with approximately 12 Americans believed to be fighting there as of September 2014. According to Olsen, U.S. counterterrorism officials “remain mindful of the possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer—perhaps motivated by online propaganda—could conduct a limited, self-directedselfdirected attack here at home with no warning.” However, Olsen noted that, “In our view, any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale.” A CIA spokesperson provided an updated estimate of the IS organization’s size in in September 2014, saying the group could muster 20,000 to 31,500 individuals. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16 that two-thirds of the Islamic State organization’s personnel remain in Syria. U.S. officials report that as many as 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries have travelled to Syria, including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens, with approximately 12 Americans believed to be currently fighting there. Statements and media materials released by the Islamic State reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview and a relentless ambition. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to establish “the Islamic State” and to revive their vision of “the caliphate.”2 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its antecedents have benefitted from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus that started during the 2003-2011 U.S. military presence in Iraq. In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that “the mujahidin have set out to chase the affiliates of your armies that have fled.... You will see them in your own country, God willing. 1 Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014. OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,’” translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013. 2 Congressional Research Service 14 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy The war with you has just begun.”3 In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the United States directly, saying, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting— against your will.”4 English language propaganda and recruiting material released by the group in connection with its recent executions of U.S. citizens James Foley and Stephen Sotloff suggest the group is attempting to portray itself as responding to U.S. aggression, a posture adopted by its predecessors and now rivals in Al Qaeda. Background The Islamic State’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),5 ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent months, Islamic State leaders have stated their view that their group “is not and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”6 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than pledges of obedience. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, under the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region. Additional analysis can be found in CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman. The Situation in Iraq Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government was able to contain an IS-led insurrection in Iraq’s Anbar Province that captured the city of Fallujah and parts of the provincial capital of Ramadi in January 2014. Such forecasts were upended on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic State captured the northern city of Mosul amid mass desertions by ISF officers and personnel. According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be 3 OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes to ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012. OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir Condemning ‘War’ Against Group,” translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014. 5 Al Baghdadi reportedly was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq. 6 OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri, Refusing to Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-12, 2014. 4 Congressional Research Service 25 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy accounted for.7 The Islamic State offensive was reportedly joined by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other Sunni residents.8 The Sunni support for the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the Islamic State’s brutal tactics against opponents and its intention to impose its version of Islamic law, appeared to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki that was then in power.9 After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities, and into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course of the offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a substantial amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and artillery equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.10 Islamic State–led fighters captured the city of Tal Afar west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. In mid-July, IS members in Mosul expelled remaining Christians there from the city.11 Shiite militias mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from elsewhere volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government forces regrouped to some extent and stalled the Islamic State advance on the capital. The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) to capture Kirkuk and large nearby oil fields abandoned by the ISF. The Kurds have long sought to control that oil-rich region, which they claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the province with their autonomous region run by a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On July 11, peshmerga reportedly seized control of two key oil fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled company. Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of Kirkuk and related areas to the central government.12 The peshmerga gains prompted renewed discussion among KRG leaders about seeking outright independence from Iraq. In early July, KRG President Masoud Barzani asked the KRG parliament to plan a referendum on independence.13 However, Kurdish leaders subsequently stated that the crisis the KRG faces from the Islamic State organization has caused KRG leaders to shelve the independence effort, at least temporarily. KRG leaders probably view the independence issue primarily as leverage in disputes with Baghdad, such as those over KRG oil exports and revenue-sharing. The indirect benefits to the Kurds of the Islamic State offensive proved illusory when Islamic State–led forces advanced into territory controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its peshmerga militia fighters in early August. In the face of superior Islamic State firepower, 7 Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014. Tim Arango, “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq,” New York Times, June 19, 2014. 9 “Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014. 10 Mitchell Prothero, “Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent of June Debacle Becomes Clearer,” McLatchey Wire Service, July 14, 2014. 11 Alissa Rubin, “ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians from Mosul,” New York Times, July 19, 2014. 12 Author conversations with expert on the Iraqi Kurds, June-August 2014. 13 For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Insight IN10105, The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman. 8 Congressional Research Service 36 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy the relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces retreated from several towns inhabited mostly by Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis. The Yazidis are mostly Kurdish speaking and practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zoroastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the advent of Islam.14 Fearing Islamic State threats to execute them if they did not convert to Islam, an estimated 35,000–50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain.15 By August 8, Islamic State–led fighters had also advanced to within about 40 miles of the KRG capital of Irbil, causing some flight from the city, and heightening U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and military personnel there. Reports of human rights violations by the Islamic State emerged, including murder, kidnappings, forced conversions, and physical and sexual assault.16 Islamic State–led forces captured Iraq’s largest dam, the Mosul Dam, as well, which Kurdish leaders assert could have been damaged or used by the Islamic State to flood wide areas of northern and central Iraq. Subsequently, U.S. and allied efforts have helped the peshmerga reverse some Islamic State gains, and have helped the ISF limit any further IS advances. Specifics results of U.S. strategy on Islamic State control over territory is discussed belowmajor IS advances. Iraq Government Alterations The Islamic State advance also led to changes in Iraq’s leadership. Elections for the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) were held on April 30, 2014, beginning the process of forming a new government. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the powerful executive post of Prime Minister is held by a Shiite Arab. Even before the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul, several Iraqi factions and some within Prime Minister Maliki’s core coalition opposed a third Maliki term as Prime Minister, despite the strong electoral performance of his “State of Law” bloc. After the Islamic State capture of Mosul, senior Obama Administration officials publicly blamed Maliki for pursuing sectarian politics that generated Sunni support for the Islamic State, and indicated he needed to be replaced. 17 In July, the COR selected as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a Sunni), and two deputies, and veteran Kurdish figure Fouad Masoum as Iraq’s President. On August 11, in line with the constitutional responsibilities of the president, Masoum formally asked Haydar al Abbadi, a 62year old member of Maliki’s Da’wa Party, to become Prime Minister-designate. Al Abbadi’s selection attracted public support from U.S. officials as well as from senior figures in Iran, causing support for Maliki’s initial challenge of the Abbadi designation to collapse. The designation gave him 30 days (until September 10) to form and achieve parliamentary confirmation for a new cabinet. His work program and all but two of his ministerial nominations were approved by the COR on September 8, enabling Abbadi to assume the prime ministership. The two powerful security posts of Interior and Defense Minister were not immediately filled, but Abbadi achieved COR confirmation on October 18 of Mohammad Ghabban, who is linked to a 14Shiite militia organization (Badr Organization), as Interior Minister. That selection could potentially give many Iraqi Sunnis pause as to whether the Abbadi government will prove less sectarian than that of Maliki. The same day, the COR confirmed Khalid al-Ubaydi, a Sunni ex14 Ishaan Tharoor, “Who Are the Yazidis?” Washington Post, August 7, 2014. UNOCHA, “Iraq: OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis—Significant Displacement from Sinjar,” No. 2, August 4, 2014; Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” August 7, 2014. 16 UNAMI, Public Information Office, “UN Gravely Concerned About Situation in Northern Iraq; Calls for Urgent Response,” August 7, 2014. 17 “Kerry Says U.S. Wants Iraqis to Find Inclusive Leadership,” Reuters, June 22, 2014. 15 Congressional Research Service 47 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Shiite militia organization (Badr Organization), as Interior Minister. That selection could potentially give many Iraqi Sunnis pause as to whether the Abbadi government will prove less sectarian than that of Maliki. The same day, the COR confirmed Khalid al-Ubaydi, a Sunni exmilitarymilitary officer during Saddam’s rule, as Defense Minister, perhaps partly mitigating the Ghabban nomination. As part of his outreach to Sunnis, on September 10, 2014, in conjunction with a visit by Secretary of State John Kerry, Abbadi proposed to recruit Sunnis to a new “national guard” force that would protect Sunni-inhabited areas that might be taken back from Islamic State control. In early November, Abbadi visited tribal leaders and other notables in overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited Anbar Province, much of which has been captured by Islamic State forces. The Situation in Syria18 Since 2013, Islamic State fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a parallel theater of operations.19 In early 2014, IS fighters reestablished control in most areas of the northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted themselves to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the Islamic State has controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. The Islamic State derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its control.20 The Islamic State also has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual advance towards Mosul. IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the Islamic State and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the supply lines they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. Anecdotal reporting suggests that the group relies on brutality and intimidation to manage communities under its control, and in some areas partnerships with local armed groups appear to facilitate IS control. At some point, the Islamic State’s expandingwide theater of conflict could subject it to overextension. IS IS gains may also motivate the Iraqi and Syrian governments to cooperate more closely in seeking to counter the group, potentially altering the dynamics in both conflicts. Further IS advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to hold ground in contested areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces return home to combat the IS.21 In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted air strikes against IS18 Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard. 19 “Syria War Fueling Attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013. 20 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments, and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014. 21 “Seeing Their Gains at Risk, Shiites Flock to Join Militias,” New York Times, June 13, 2014. Congressional Research Service 5 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy held areas of Raqqah and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi government, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.22 Syria later struck IS targets near a border crossing between the two states and continues to conduct airstrikes on IS positions in Raqqah province. IS fighters in late July and early August escalated attacks on government Army and Air Force bases in northeastern Syria, capturing several, seizing armaments, and executing captured Syrian military personnel.23 It is unclear what impact IS gains in Iraq would have outside of northeastern Syria. At least half of Syria-based IS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian IS defector.24 Like other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas.25 The Islamic State to date has concentrated its forces in Syria’s northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the country’s main urban areas in Syria’s western half. In early August, Syrian rebels who had reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State clashed with Lebanese Armed Forces for control of the Lebanese town of Arsal, 13 km west of the Syrian border. However, some observers note that there is no indication that the group coordinated its attack in advance with IS leadership.26 counter the group, potentially altering the dynamics in both conflicts. Neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of defeating their adversaries in the short term. However, international intervention to degrade the capabilities of the Islamic State appears to be driving speculation among many parties to the conflict that dramatic changes could soon be possible in the dynamics of what has remained a grinding war of attrition. Some opposition forces seek to cast themselves as potential allies to outsiders who are opposed to both the Islamic State and the Syrian government, while others reject the idea of foreign intervention outright or demand that foreigners focus solely on toppling President Asad. Syrian officials have 18 Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard. 19 “Syria War Fueling Attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013. 20 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments, and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014. Congressional Research Service 8 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy stated their conditional willingness to serve as partners with the international community in counterterrorism operations in Syria, a position that reflects their presumed desire to create an image and role for the Asad government as a bulwark against Sunni Islamist extremism. As discussed in more detail below, current relations among opposition groups in Syria and their varying views on cooperation with the United States create a challenging context for pursuing U.S. objectives. Syrian opposition forces are drawn from a broad ideological spectrum. They migrate in and out of cooperative and antagonistic relationships and pursue a range of goals— short and long term, local, personal, and national. By taking limited military action in Syria for narrowly defined purposes, the Obama Administration appears to be seeking to avoid amplifying internal disputes and rivalries among Syrian groups or creating perceptions that the United States seeks to bolster one group or trend over another. A number of variables shape whether U.S.-led military operations can meet U.S. objectives, and some observers voice strong views for or against the potential expansion of these operations. One potential practical effect of U.S. operations (particularly strikes on terrorist targets associated with popular, capable Islamist forces) may be that some Syrians grow more polarized in their views about Syria’s future and the role of outside forces in building it. Perceived U.S. allies in Syria may be drawn further into conflict with anti-U.S. groups or feel more pressure to collaborate with them. This may amplify violence in some areas and could weaken the opposition’s overall ability to place coordinated pressure on the Asad government. Key developments since September 2014 include: • Jabhat al Nusra Targets Rebels. Since late October, the Al Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al Nusra has been conducting offensive operations in northwestern Idlib Province against the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and Harakat Hazm (Steadfastness Movement), two armed opposition groups considered to be elements of the broader Free Syrian Army movement. Both the SRF and Harakat Hazm reportedly have received weaponry from U.S. allies, and Hazm fighters have released video footage showing their use of U.S.-origin anti-tank missile systems since early 2014. The Nusra offensive reportedly has led to the eviction of these groups from their strongholds in central Idlib Province and the defection of some of their fighters. • New Revolutionary Command Council. In late November, more than 70 rebel groups announced the formation of a new Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to coordinate anti-Asad military operations among its secular and Islamist signatories. The council initiative obtained support from several groups reported to have received U.S. military assistance, as well as from groups like Ahrar al Sham, which the U.S. government has characterized as an extremist group. Members of Ahrar al Sham and other select groups would be prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance authorized under the extended “train and equip” authority in H.R. 3979. • New U.S. Strikes on Khorasan Group Targets. On November 5, U.S. military aircraft launched airstrikes against targets belonging to Jabhat al Nusra and the Ahrar al Sham Islamic Movement near the Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey. The crossing is reportedly a key conduit for external military assistance to the SRF, Hazm, and other “FSA” groups, in addition to a humanitarian access point. A U.S. CENTCOM press release denied the strikes were related to recent Nusra attacks on moderate rebels and stressed that the targets were associated with active terrorist plotting by the Khorasan Congressional Research Service 9 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Group, an element of Jabhat al Nusra believed to be dedicated to transnational terrorism.21 Many observers argued that the U.S. strikes would inevitably be seen in the context of recent Nusra-SRF/FSA infighting, and some predict negative effects on the image of the United States and its supporters in northwestern Syria who see U.S. strikes as targeting powerful anti-Asad forces. • Kobane. The United States and its partners have used extensive airstrikes to defend the Kurdish-populated town of Kobane, Syria (also known as Ayn al Arab). The town has been besieged by IS forces since mid-September. The United States on October 19 ordered the air drop of KRG-supplied weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies to Syrian Kurds defending the town.22 • Rebel Offensive Gains in South. Armed opposition groups have consolidated control in southwestern Quneitra and Daraa Provinces in areas adjacent to the borders with Israel and Jordan. Coordinated opposition operations have seen forces from Jabhat al Nusra, the Islamic Front, and various FSA groups including the SRF capture a number of villages and strategic points. This has placed new pressure on the regime’s control of the Nasib border crossing with Jordan and the M5 highway running from the Jordanian border north to Damascus. Social media footage suggests that U.S.-origin anti-tank missiles have been used in some related battles in the area. • Chemical Weapons. Sigrid Kaag, who has led the OPCW-UN joint mission for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, briefed the UN Security Council in a closed door session on November 5. According to UN Security Council head Gary Quinlan, Kaag reported that an OPCW team traveled to Damascus in early November to begin plans for the destruction of 12 chemical weapons facilities, including seven hangers and five underground tunnels.23 The OPCW team in Damascus also intends to draw up plans for the destruction of four CW facilities that were not previously disclosed by the Syrian government, including a ricin production facility, according to Quinlan. The OPCW briefed the Security Council on these sites in October. In addition, allegations remain regarding the use of chlorine gas by government forces. Chlorine is not required to be declared or destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), although its use in warfare is still prohibited under the Convention. Some ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to consolidate its supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. Press and social media reports suggest that IS, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the provincial capital of Dayr az-Zawr, although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime and other rebel groups.2724 Following the IS declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel forces surrendered to the group and withdrew from their positions, further expanding the IS presence in the Dayr az-Zawr countryside.2825 Others resisted the Islamic State’s advance, and were crushed. Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts to disrupt or sever IS supply lines through Abu Kamal or between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could benefit Syrian military and/or Nusra Front forces also operating in the area. Islamic State fighters also remain engaged in operations against Syrian Armed Forces southwest of Raqqah and against a range of armed Syrian opposition groups to the 21 U.S. Central Command News Release #20141105, “U.S. Military Forces Conduct Airstrikes Against Khorasan Group Terrorist Network in Syria, November 6, 2014. 22 For more information on dynamics involving the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (or PYD, whose militia is known as the YPG), which has spearheaded Kobane’s defense, along with the Islamic State, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurds, see CRS Report IN10164, Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic State”: A Unique Dynamic?, by Jim Zanotti. 23 “Security Council hears plan to clear Syria of chemical weapons,” CNN, November 5, 2014. 24 “Syria’s Allies Are Stretched by Widening War,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014. 25 Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour,” July 5, 2014. Congressional Research Service 10 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy crushed. As of early December, Islamic State forces were seeking to capture the Syrian military air field at Dayr az Zawr, which many analysts argued could isolate remaining pro-Asad forces in the area and lead to the fall of the province to the group. U.S. efforts to disrupt IS operations near Abu Kamal or Dayr az Zawr could benefit Syrian military forces also operating in the area. Islamic State fighters also remain engaged in operations against Syrian Armed Forces southwest of Raqqah and against a range of armed Syrian opposition groups to the northeast of Aleppo. Syrian Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (known as the YPG) continue to clash with IS fighters along the border with Iraq and Turkey.29 YPG forces in early August26 In August, YPG forces established security corridors along the Iraqi border, enabling some refugees fleeing IS violence in Iraq to cross into Kurdish-held areas of Syria, according to a Syrian Kurdish aid worker.3027 The Islamic State’s siege in September and October of the Syrian-Turkish border town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab has drawn increasing regional and international attention. More than 150,000 residents of the area 22 “Syria Pounds ISIS Bases in Coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014. Institute for the Study of War, “Syria Update: July 26-August 7, 2014.” 24 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014. 25 “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation, June 27, 2013. 26 Institute for the Study of War, “The Battle for Arsal,” August 7, 2013. 27 “Syria’s Allies Are Stretched by Widening War,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014. 28 Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour,” July 5, 2014. 29 OSC Report EUR2014090645329482, September 6, 2014. 30 OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014 23 Congressional Research Service 6 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy have been driven into Turkey by the fighting, and fears that Islamic State forces would massacre the predominantly Kurdish defenders and remaining residents of the town have grown over time. U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria since September 23 have largely focused on “degrading the capacity of (the Islamic State) at its core to project power, to command itself, to sustain itself, to resource itself.” Subsequent U.S. and coalition strikes against IS forces near and inside Kobane have destroyed some IS vehicles and personnel, but had not fully reversed the group’s gains or broken the siege of the town as of October 22. U.S. Responses and Options As the Islamic State offensive in Iraq progressed and the group beheaded two American journalists it had captured, the Obama Administration asserted that the Islamic State constitutes a threat to U.S. interests that necessitates U.S. intervention. U.S. Strategy On September 10, 2014, following discussions at a NATO summit in Wales during September 45, 2014, President Obama announced a U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State. President Obama stated that that the United States would seek to lead a multilateral coalition to try to “degrade, and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it. Under the strategy, different members of the coalition are undertaking varying measures, including direct military action, support for partner ground forces in Iraq and Syria, intelligence gathering and sharing, and financial measures. Among the major points President Obama announced on September 10 were the following:31 31 • The U.S. intelligence community believes that thousands of foreigners have joined the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria and that these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. The group’s leaders have threatened the United States and its allies, but the United States had not detected specific Islamic State plots against the U.S. homeland. • U.S. strategy will not involve deployment of U.S. combat troops, but will rely on strengthening local partners who are fighting Islamic State forces. • The United States would expand airstrikes in Iraq (strikes began there on August 8) to help the ISF and the Kurdish peshmerga advance against IS-led forces, and might also strike IS targets in Syria (an expansion subsequently undertaken). • The United States would provide an additional 475 advisers (beyond the 300 deployed to that time), and will support Iraqi efforts to establish a “national guard” to help Iraqi Sunni Arabs defend themselves from the Islamic State. (A major expansion of the U.S. advice and training program for the ISF was announced on November 7, as discussed further below.) • The Administration would reiterate a request for Congress to give the Administration authority to train and equip vetted Syrian rebel forces, which White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014. Congressional Research Service 7 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy would serve as the partner ground force of U.S. strategy in Syria. That authority was since provided as part of the continuing appropriations resolution and is likely to be revisited by Congress as part of full year appropriations or authorization legislation. • The United States would not coordinate any actions in Syria with the Asad regime “that terrorizes its own people.” • Working with international partners, the United States would increase efforts to cut off Islamic State finances; improve intelligence on the group; strengthen antiterrorism defenses; counter the Islamic State’s “warped ideology”; and stem “the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East.” • The U.S.-led coalition would continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced by Islamic State offensives, including Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Christians and members of other religious minorities. Strategy Evolution and Implementation U.S. strategy has evolved since September 10 to address events and differing conditions in Iraq and Syria and the recruitment of coalition partners—some of which have different priorities than those of the United States. In Iraq, the United States is working with welcoming, organized, and recognized partners on the ground in the ISF and peshmerga. Syria, on the other hand, illuminates several dilemmas for the Administration—Syrian opposition forces who have been fighting the Islamic State welcome U.S. and coalition assistance in their campaign, but question why the United States does not take military action against the Asad government or more robust action to degrade IS capabilities in Syria. The Administration continues to pressure the Asad government into negotiating with opposition groups and fulfilling its pledges with regard to chemical weapons, while managing concerns that the full scale degradation of Islamic State forces in Syria could produce the unintended consequence of either taking military pressure off the Asad regime or helping other extremist groups such as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra to advance. The U.S. military operation that is implementing the strategy discussed below has been termed “Operation Inherent Resolve.” Retired General John Allen serves as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (Iraq and Iran), serves as General Allen’s deputy senior envoy with the rank of Ambassador. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Lloyd Austin is the lead U.S. officer with respect to implementing the military aspects of U.S. strategy. Mission to Advise, Assist, Train, Target, Protect Personnel and Facilities, and Gather Intelligence President Obama stated on June 13, 2014, after the Islamic State capture of Mosul, that the Iraqi government “needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”32 Since then, about 3,100 U.S. military personnel have been authorized by the President deploy to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces to protect U.S. facilities and personnel, and to assist in targeting U.S. airstrikes there. 32 White House, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” June 13, 2014. Congressional Research Service 8 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Advisers.33 Of the 3,100 total military personnel authorized, a deployment of 1,500 advisers and trainers were authorized by President Obama on November 7, at the request of the Iraqi government. The additional deployments are contingent on congressional approval of a $1.618 billion funding request for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” The funding request is part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-ISF mission for FY2015. The Administration funding request stipulates that 40% of the requested U.S. train and equip funds would not be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that contributed amount is to come from the Iraqi government). The 1,500 additional personnel authorized on November 7 is to include 630 advisers to expand the “advise-and-assist” mission being undertaken by the approximately 600 already there (of an authorized number of 775, as of November 2014).34 The existing advise-and-assist mission operates out of “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.-ISF) and Irbil (U.S.-peshmerga), and additional advisory, and additional centers will be established to provide advice to the ISF and peshmerga at the brigade level. Part of the U.S. advisers’ task has been to assess the quality of the ISF and other Iraqi forces. The advisers reportedly have concluded that only about half of all ISF units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory.35 The definition of “capable,” according to U.S. officials, includes whether an ISF integrates both Sunni and Shiite personnel. Trainers. The November 7 announcement by President Obama stated that the United States and its coalition partners would establish a training mission for the ISF and pershmerga, at several sites around Iraq. Of the 1,500 U.S. personnel authorized on November 7, about 870 will be trainers. DOD media indicated that trainings sites might be located in Anbar, Irbil, Diyala, and Baghdad provinces, depending on the outcome of site surveys. 36A t these sites, a total of nine ISF brigades (about 2,500 personnel) and three peshmerga brigades will be trained over a period of about eight-ten months. The reported intent of the training is to prepare the Iraqi forces to go on the offensive against Islamic State strongholds in Iraq as early as the spring of 2015, although U.S. officials stress that the counter-offensive is being planned by Iraqi forces and will be carried out on the Iraqis’ timetable.37 The U.S. trainers will be supplemented by coalition partners, according to DOD officials. These officials say that about 700 trainers will be supplied by partner countries, such as Denmark which pledged to supply 120 trainers on November 7. One uncertain aspect of the training program involves pro-government Sunni fighters. According to DOD announcements and statements on November 7, the training program might, subject to further discussion, include Sunni tribal fighters “who are under the control of the Defense Ministry.” This would appear to refer to the approximately 20,000 “Sons of Iraq” (also known as 33 Information from DOD press releases and press conference by DOD spokesman Adm. William Kirby. November 7, 2014. 34 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Preapare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help.” New York Times, November 3, 2014. 35 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July 14, 2014. 36 Claudette Roulo. “President Authorizes Additional Troops for Counter-ISIL Effort. DOD News, November 7, 2014. 37 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Preapare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help.” New York Times, November 3, 2014. Congressional Research Service 9 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Sahwa, or “Awakening” Fighters) who were recruited by the U.S. military during 2006-8 and were later integrated into the formal Iraqi security force structure. Including the Sunni tribal fighters in the training program—along with the Iraqi government establishment of a Sunni “national guard”— appears to represent an effort to signal to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs that Sunnis—not Shiites—will control security in areas recaptured from Islamic State forces. Force and Facility Protectors. Of the 3,100 authorized U.S. military personnel for Iraq, about 820 military personnel are securing the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil. Their mission is also to protect evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad, and to operate surveillance aircraft. Airstrikes As Islamic State fighters advanced on Irbil, on August 7, 2014, President Obama authorized targeted airstrikes against Islamic State positions that pose a threat to U.S. personnel or facilities or to alleviate humanitarian suffering caused by the Islamic State. On September 10, President Obama announced that strikes would “go beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions so that we’re hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on the offensive.” It was subsequently reported that airstrikes would be conducted in Syria as well, in order to weaken the Islamic State organization’s ability to support its forces in Iraq. U.S. combat aircraft and armed unmanned aerial vehicles have conducted an average of about five strikes per day in Iraq (since August 8) and Syria (since September 22), joined since September by coalition partners as discussed below. Weapons Sales to Iraq Since the Islamic State–led capture of Mosul in June, the United States has announced sales of over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad. The Defense Department announced on October 17, 2014 that Iraq has asked to buy another 800 of the missiles. Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s and Apaches, purchased in 2011 and 2012, are in their early stages. The aircraft are being delivered in Tucson, Arizona, where Iraq’s pilots will train on the system before taking them to Iraq. Three F-16s will be delivered in December 2014 and then one per month will be delivered through May 2015, completing delivery of the first group of 8 out of the 36 total that were ordered. The F-16s are being delivered in Arizona because their base in Iraq, Balad Air Base, is besieged by Islamic State fighters. The Administration is supplying mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the peshmerga, through the Central Intelligence Agency.38 That channel is a means of adapting to a general policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS, run by the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government. The ISF also has transferred some of its U.S.-supplied weapons to the peshmerga, and the peshmerga, with U.S. assistance, has retransferred some weapons and ammunition to Kurdish forces fighting Islamic State fighters in Syria.39 Kurdish and U.S. officials have said that, as part of a long-term strategy to drive IS forces 38 Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014. U.S. Central Command news release. “U.S. Resupplies Kurdish Forces Fighting ISIL Near Kobani.” October 20, 2014. 39 Congressional Research Service 10 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy back, the peshmerga will require heavy and long range weapons—in part to counter the Islamic State’s use of captured U.S. weapons.40 Several other countries, such as Britain, Germany, and France, have been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga. Humanitarian Airdrops During early August 2014, the U.S. military conducted airdrops of food and water to those trapped on Sinjar Mountain. In late August, the U.S. military airdropped humanitarian aid to the town of Amerli (in eastern Salahuddin Province), inhabited by ethnic Turkmen Shiite Muslims, which was surrounded by ISIS fighters. In October, U.S. forces airdropped medical supplies as well as weapons and ammunition to Kurdish fighters defending the city of Kobane in Syria from an IS assault. Building Up a Local Partner Force in Syria Well before the President’s September 10 speech on an anti-Islamic State strategy, Administration officials had asserted that countering the Islamic State will require dealing in some way with the group’s branch in Syria. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey on August 21 asserted that the group could not be defeated without accounting for its Syrian branch, stating that the group “will have to be addressed on both sides of what is essentially at this point a nonexistent border.”41 As noted above, the U.S. strategy against the Islamic State’s Syria branch appears to center on supporting yet-to-be-vetted Syrians, some of whom may be fighting not only the Islamic State but also Syrian government forces. On September 5, President Obama stated, With respect to the situation on the ground in Syria, we will not be placing U.S. ground troops to try to control the areas that are part of the conflict inside of Syria. I don’t think that’s necessary for us to accomplish our goal. We are going to have to find effective partners on the ground to push back against ISIL. And the moderate coalition there is one that we can work with. We have experience working with many of them. They have been, to some degree, outgunned and outmanned, and that’s why it’s important for us to work with our friends and allies to support them more effectively.42 President Obama’s requests to Congress for authority and resources to train and equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition in support of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State organization—reiterated in the President’s September 10 speech—reinvigorated congressional debate on the subject. Some congressional committees acted to consider the President’s June 2014 request prior to the August congressional recess, and both houses of Congress considered a revised Administration request in the context of the passage of H.J.Res. 124, the short-term FY2015 continuing resolution, in September. The FY2015 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124, P.L. 113-164) authorizes the Department of Defense through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 defense authorization act to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. As enacted, H.J.Res. 124 contains a temporary authorization for the training and equipping of vetted Syrians that differs from the Administration’s June and September requests and from other pending legislation. When Congress returns, Members may be 40 Press briefing by the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. William Mayville. August 11, 2014. Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, August 21, 2014. 42 Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, September 5, 2014. 41 Congressional Research Service 11 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy asked to re-endorse or consider changes to the train and equip authority granted in H.J.Res. 124 during consideration of full-year FY2015 appropriations or defense authorization legislation. For more on this program and related legislation, see CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco.43 Advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposition groups in Syria have argued that the withdrawal or reduction of such assistance would bolster less cooperative or friendly groups. Advocates have further argued that if the United States withdraws or reduces its support, then it may “force” moderate groups to turn to extremist groups for funding and support—thereby increasing the influence of extremists while reducing U.S. leverage. Critics of continued or expanded U.S. support have argued that such assistance risks exacerbating rivalry among opposition groups and reducing the credibility of groups and individuals seen to be aligned with the United States. Critics of support proposals also have pointed to problems in ensuring the identity and intentions of end users of provided support and the uses of U.S.provided materiel or training. The purposes, content, and scope of any expanded U.S. or coalition assistance to armed opposition groups also may be controversial among Syrians. President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.44 Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent such a narrow focus and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State. Combat Deployments? President Obama has repeatedly ruled out deploying ground combat troops to Iraq or Syria to reverse Islamic State gains.45 However, comments by General Dempsey at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 14, 2014 and since have presented a potentially more complex picture of this issue.46 General Dempsey indicated he might recommend that U.S. advisers in Iraq work directly with Iraqi and peshmerga forces on the battlefield, for example if there were a decision to try to recapture Mosul from Islamic State forces. The November expansion of the advisory mission beyond Baghdad and Irbil appears to represent a significant step toward exercising this close advisory support mission, even though the advisors will not work with the ISF below the brigade level. Still, General Dempsey and other Administration officials have distinguished such “close combat advisory” missions from the introduction of U.S. combat units that would conduct operations against Islamic State forces. 43 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget_amendments. The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014. 45 White House, op. cit. 46 Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14, 2014. 44 Congressional Research Service 12 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date? Experts and officials are debating the effectiveness of the strategy. The Administration has argued that the strategy will time—measured in many months, not weeks—to reach its objectives. It asserts that there are distinct achievements, to date. Administration critics argue that the strategy lacks effective partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on the ground and suffers from a basic contradiction in not confronting the regime of President Asad of Syria. These critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives require U.S. or other ground combat troops and expansion of the mission to include pressuring Asad to accept a political solution. Administration officials assert that the accomplishments of the strategy to date include: • In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled the peshmerga and ISF to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain.47 In October, peshmerga forces recaptured the town of Zumar and the border crossing into Syria at Rabia, among other gains. regional and international attention. More than 150,000 residents of the area have been driven into Turkey by the fighting, and fears that Islamic State forces would massacre the predominantly Kurdish defenders and remaining residents of the town have grown over time. U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria since September 23 have largely focused on “degrading the capacity of (the Islamic State) at its core to project power, to command itself, to sustain itself, to resource itself.” Subsequent U.S. and coalition strikes against IS forces near and inside Kobane have destroyed some IS vehicles and personnel, but have not fully reversed the group’s gains or broken the siege of the town as of December 8. U.S. Responses and Options U.S. Strategy to Combat the Islamic State Organization At President Obama’s direction, elements of the U.S. government are leading a multilateral coalition that seeks to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it.28 The United States and other members of the coalition are undertaking various measures, including direct military action, support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts to restrict flows of foreign fighters and disrupt the Islamic State’s finances.29 President Obama and Administration officials have stated their view that the Islamic State’s capabilities, intentions, and potential to support transnational terrorist activities require the United States to act. Retired General John Allen serves as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (Iraq and Iran), serves as General Allen’s deputy senior envoy with the rank of Ambassador. U.S. 26 OSC Report EUR2014090645329482, September 6, 2014. OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014 28 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014. 29 The website of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL identifies five “lines of effort” guiding the coalition’s efforts: 1) Providing military support to our partners; 2) Impeding the flow of foreign fighters; 3) Stopping ISIL's financing and funding; 4) Addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and 5)Exposing ISIL's true nature. 27 Congressional Research Service 11 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Lloyd Austin is the lead U.S. officer with respect to military operations against the Islamic State and other extremists in Iraq and Syria. Administration officials have identified areas where they believe progress has been made in implementing U.S. strategy to date,30 but have stated clearly that it may take months, and in some cases years to achieve the full range of U.S. objectives. In October, President Obama said, “We’re still at the early stages. As with any military effort, there will be days of progress and there are going to be periods of setback.”31 Strikes Against IS Targets and U.S. Military Advisory Efforts U.S. military operations as part of the anti-IS strategy have been termed “Operation Inherent Resolve.” U.S. forces have used combat aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and sealaunched cruise missiles to conduct several hundred strikes in Iraq since August 8 and in Syria since September 22 with the support of coalition partners. The stated objectives of U.S. strikes have evolved: The initial focus was on stopping the advance of Islamic State forces and reducing threats to American personnel and religious minorities in northern Iraq; now it is supporting defensive and offensive military operations by Iraqi military and Kurdish forces and weakening the Islamic State organization’s ability to support its operations in Iraq from its bases inside Syria. Other U.S. strikes have targeted individuals and locations associated with what U.S. officials describe as “the Khorasan Group,” that has reportedly engaged in preparations for transnational terrorist attacks. President Obama has stated that he does not believe the introduction of largescale U.S. ground forces for combat operations is necessary in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Rather, he has stated that U.S. efforts to reverse Islamic State gains on the ground will pair continued airstrikes with expanded efforts to advise and strengthen local Iraqi and Syrian partner forces. Some U.S. military officials have indicated that they are prepared to recommend the introduction of some ground forces if they believe such forces are required to achieve U.S. objectives.32 Late 2013 and early 2014 were marked by growing Iraqi and U.S. concern about the strength and intentions of the Islamic State in northern and western Iraq. U.S. officials, with the support of Congress, responded to some Iraqi requests for enhanced support and expedited expanded weapons transfers. However, U.S. efforts and involvement did not change fundamentally until the Islamic State captured Mosul from Iraqi forces in June 2014. President Obama has since authorized the deployment of approximately 3,100 U.S. military personnel to Iraq for the purpose of advising Iraqi forces, gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, and securing U.S. personnel 30 In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain. Additional strikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic State fighters from Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have used to flood large parts of Iraq. In September, U.S. airstrikes facilitated efforts by the ISF and Shiite militias to break an Islamic State siege of the Shiite Turkmen-inhabited town of Amerli. DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014. 31 Remarks by President Obama After Meeting with Chiefs of Defense, Joint Base Andrews, October 14, 2014. 32 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14, 2014. Congressional Research Service 12 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy and facilities.33 This total includes the approximately 1,600 personnel present in Iraq as of November and 1,500 additional personnel President Obama authorized to be deployed. After undertaking a new assessment of Iraqi military forces, U.S. advisers have concluded that only about half of all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory through the provision of further targeted advisory assistance.34 The definition of “capable,” according to U.S. officials, includes whether an ISF unit integrates both Sunni and Shiite personnel. Some private assessments by nongovernment observers argue that even fewer ISF units are capable of reversing the Islamic State gains, and underscore the continuing role of Shiite militia groups in defending Iraqi-government held-territory and conducting offensive operations against IS forces. Training and Equipping Partner Forces U.S. strategy is implemented differently in Iraq and Syria in light of the different political and military conditions that prevail in each country. In Iraq, the United States has relatively welcoming, organized, and recognized partners on the ground in the form of the ISF and peshmerga commanded by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In Syria, the longstanding U.S. position calling for the departure of Bashar al Asad from power and U.S. concerns about the unity and goals of the armed Syrian opposition presents challenges for U.S. efforts to engage partners on the ground. Iran cooperates closely with and offers support to partner forces in both countries, in pursuit of its own interests. Iraqi Security Forces On November 7, the Department of Defense announced that President Obama had authorized the deployment of up to 1,500 U.S. military personnel to “expand our advise and assist mission and initiate a comprehensive training effort for Iraqi forces.”35 According to the department, CENTCOM “will establish two expeditionary advise and assist operations centers …to provide support for the Iraqis at the brigade headquarters level and above.” Department of Defense Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby said in a related press briefing that up to 630 out of 1,500 U.S. personnel would be engaged in this aspect of the mission. In addition, CENTCOM intends to establish “several sites across Iraq” where the remaining 870 U.S. personnel will engage in a more hands-on building partnership capacity/training mission for 12 Iraqi brigades, specifically nine Iraqi army and three peshmerga brigades (about 2,500 personnel each), with the support of 700 additional personnel contributed by coalition partners.36 These new advise and assist facilities may be located in Anbar, Irbil, Diyala, and Baghdad Provinces. Training will continue over a period of about 8 to 10 months. The reported intent of the training is to prepare the Iraqi forces to 33 Of the roughly 1,600 U.S. military personnel in Iraq as of November, more than 700 were advisers that are assessing the ISF and gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, working out of “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.ISF) and Irbil (U.S.-Peshmerga). Approximately 800 military personnel have been sent to help secure the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil; to protect evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad; and to operate surveillance aircraft. 34 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July 14, 2014. 35 Statement by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, Release No: NR562-14, November 7, 2014. 36 Denmark pledged to supply 120 trainers on November 7. Congressional Research Service 13 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy go on the offensive against Islamic State strongholds in Iraq as early as the spring of 2015, although U.S. officials stress that the counter-offensive is being planned by Iraqi forces and will be carried out on the Iraqis’ timetable.37 DOD leaders have emphasized that U.S. personnel will not accompany Iraqi forces in combat settings as part of the planned expansion of the advisory and training mission. However, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign against the Islamic State progresses and more complex operations are required by Iraqi Security Forces, he could recommend that U.S. personnel accompany Iraqi forces.38 Participant Iraqi brigades are in the process of being identified and site surveys are ongoing. The Administration has requested authority and $1.618 billion in FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operation funding for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” to support the expanded training mission— part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-IS mission for FY2015.39 The Administration funding request stipulated that 40% of the requested U.S. train and equip funds would not be eligible to be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). The current version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 3979) would include this cost-sharing provision, but would also limit the availability of funds for newly authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program and strategy reports to Congress. H.R. 3979 also would require 90-day progress reporting. Under H.R. 3979, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, would be authorized: to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through December 31, 2016, for the following purposes: (1) Defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations from the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and groups supporting ISIL. (2) Securing the territory of Iraq. The United States also has undertaken new efforts to equip existing Iraqi forces. Since the Islamic State–led capture of Mosul in June, the United States has announced sales of over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad. Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s and Apaches, purchased in 2011 and 2012, are in their early stages. 37 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Preapare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help,” New York Times, November 3, 2014. 38 Gen. Dempsey told the House Armed Services Committee on November 13, “I'm not predicting, at this point, that I would recommend that those [Iraqi] forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S. forces, but we're certainly considering it.” 39 Office of Management and Budget, memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB, November 10, 2014, p12. Congressional Research Service 14 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Iraqi and Syrian Kurds In addition to support for the ISF, the Administration also reportedly has begun supplying mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), through the Central Intelligence Agency.40 A number of European countries, such as Britain, Germany, and France, also have been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga. The central government in Baghdad and the KRG have had deep differences over territory, the exportation of oil, Kurdish ambitions for independence, and other issues. However, the threat posed by the Islamic State has led the two to make common cause, and since the crisis began, the ISF has permitted the United States to transfer some of the ISF’s weapons to the peshmerga.41 On December 2, the KRG and Baghdad signed a partial reconciliation agreement under which the KRG would provide up to 550,000 barrels42 per day of oil to Iraqi state authorities in exchange for a restoration of the KRG’s 17% share of national revenues (which will amount to about $600 million per month at current oil prices.)43 In addition, Baghdad will provide the KRG with approximately $100 million per month to pay for peshmerga salaries and weapons purchases. Baghdad reportedly also agreed to facilitate the transfer of some U.S. weapons to the peshmerga.44 The agreement is to be part of the 2015 Iraqi budget, which is subject to approval by the Iraqi parliament. Kurdish and U.S. officials have said that, as part of a long-term strategy to drive IS forces back, the peshmerga will require heavy and long range weapons—in part to counter the Islamic State’s use of captured U.S. weapons.45 Providing these weapons, however, could incur opposition from Baghdad on the grounds that a more potent arsenal might enable the KRG and peshmerga to retain control of the disputed territory of Kirkuk, which the peshmerga seized as the ISF collapsed in June. The Turkish government also may protest the provision of such weaponry. As noted above, the Administration has sought authorization and funding to support an expanded train and equip mission for Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga. The FY2015 NDAA currently under consideration would authorize such assistance (Section 1236), and the joint explanatory statement prepared by House and Senate Defense committee leaders states: We note the significant contribution that Kurdish security forces have made to countering ISIL’s advance. We understand that the administration’s plan includes assistance to train and equip 3 brigades of Kurdish peshmerga. Accordingly, we expect that a significant portion of the assistance under this authority will be provided to meet the requirements of the Kurdish 40 That channel is a means of adapting to U.S. law and policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS, run by the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government, and not to sub-national forces. Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014. 41 The peshmerga, with U.S. assistance, have retransferred some weapons and ammunition to Syrian Kurdish forces battling Islamic State fighters in Syria. U.S. Central Command news release. “U.S. Resupplies Kurdish Forces Fighting ISIL Near Kobani.” October 20, 2014. 42 300,000 from the Kirkuk fields now controlled by the KRG and 250,000 barrels from fields in the KRG itself. It appears that the KRG would be able to itself export any amounts over the 250,000 barrels per day that it is required, under the December deal, to transfer to Baghdad’s control. 43 Ibid. 44 Tim Arango. “Iraq Government Reaches Accord with the Kurds.” New York Times, December 3, 2014. 45 Press briefing by the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. William Mayville. August 11, 2014. Congressional Research Service 15 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy security forces and urge the Secretary of Defense to ensure that such assistance is delivered in a timely manner to such forces. We further expect the Secretary of Defense to keep the congressional defense committees fully informed as this plan is developed and implemented, including any arrangements to ensure that such assistance for Kurdish security forces is promptly delivered to those forces. Iraqi National Guard and Other Local Forces The United States has endorsed Iraqi efforts to establish a “national guard” to help Iraqi Sunni Arabs defend themselves from the Islamic State. Press reports citing unidentified U.S. officials suggest that “two to three brigades or as many as 15,000 troops” could be recruited and trained for such an effort.46 The national guard force, which reportedly will report to the governments of each province, is intended primarily to secure territory that is recaptured from the Islamic State. According to Department of Defense Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby, the planned expansion of the advisory and training missions for the ISF will not initially support the creation of national guard forces, but related infrastructure and personnel could support such a mission in the future if requested by the government of Iraq and authorized by President Obama.47 The Administration’s FY2015 OCO authority and funding request notes that requested funds would be used “to provide material support to tribal elements allied with Iraqi forces.” The current version of the FY2015 NDAA under consideration would authorize the provision of assistance to security forces “of or associated with the Government of Iraq,” as well as “tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission.” According to the defense authorizing committee leaders who drafted the bill, their version of the authorization was amended to specifically: add local security forces with a national security mission to the list of forces authorized to receive assistance under this section. We believe that, for purposes of this section, local security forces should include local forces that are committed to protecting highly vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities in the Nineveh Plain and elsewhere from the ISIL threat. Sunni communities remain suspicious of the ISF, which is dominated by Shiite Muslims, seeing it to some extent as an occupation force. U.S. strategy presumes that having Sunni forces secure Sunni communities would ease this sectarian-based suspicion. Questions remain regarding the willingness of Sunnis to counter the Islamic State in the way many took U.S.-aided action against IS precursor Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007 (the so-called sahwa, or awakening). This may depend largely on whether Prime Minister Haydar al Abbadi and other top Shiite leaders in the central government demonstrate a willingness to share power with or devolve local authority to Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities. Islamic State forces continue to intimidate Sunni Arab communities and deter potential adversaries through mass killings of tribally-organized fighters. 46 Gopal Ratnam, “Washington wants NATO allies to help retrain the Iraqi military,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014. 47 Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, November 7, 2014. Congressional Research Service 16 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Support for Vetted Syrians Engagement with Syrians in combatting the Islamic State presents similar challenges. President Obama said on November 5 that the United States seeks to isolate and reduce the areas where ISIL can operate in Syria in support of the top U.S. priority of rolling back IS gains in Iraq. To date, the Syrian government and Syrian military appear to be acquiescent observers rather than active partners in U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State inside Syria. U.S. officials have notified the Syrian government of certain strikes, but President Obama has said that the United States will not coordinate its actions in Syria with the Asad regime, which he has said “terrorizes its own people” and “will never regain the legitimacy it has lost.”48 U.S. strategy seeks a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Syria and believes that President Asad and some of his supporters must leave office as part of such a settlement. Congress and the Administration have provided nonlethal aid and reportedly provided lethal support to some opposition groups in Syria. By all accounts, Syrian opposition forces remain divided in their goals, varied in their cohesiveness, and limited in their capabilities. In September, Congress endorsed President Obama’s request for authority to train and equip vetted Syrians, in part to develop a partner force for U.S. operations against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups in Syria.49 The current version of the FY2015 NDAA under consideration in Congress (H.R. 3979) would amend and extend this authority through December 31, 2016. The bill and its accompanying explanatory statement further specify the types of assistance to be provided, and would expand reporting requirements, include human rights and rule of law commitment vetting requirements, authorize the provision of assistance to third countries for the purposes of the program, and create a broad waiver authority for the President relative to the assistance program, subject to a 30-day congressional notification period. Some Syrian opposition members and their U.S. supporters have criticized the Administration’s announced plans to train and equip an initial force of 5,400 vetted Syrians as insufficient in size. Others disagree strategically with the president and may believe that U.S.-backed forces should be trained for offensive operations against the Syrian government. For further discussion of these critiques and policy options under consideration, see “Defining the Way Forward in Syria” below. Disrupting IS Financing On October 23, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen identified three components of U.S. policy aimed at reducing the financial resources available to the Islamic State.50 Broadly speaking, the U.S. government and its partners seek to disrupt IS revenue streams, limit the group’s access to formal financial systems, and impose sanctions on the group’s senior leadership and financial facilitators. 48 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014. The FY2015 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124, P.L. 113-164) authorizes the Department of Defense through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 defense authorization act to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. For more on this program and related legislation, see CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco. 50 Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014. 49 Congressional Research Service 17 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Disrupting revenue streams. Cohen stated that the United States seeks to disrupt the group’s revenue streams by targeting those who refine, transport, handle, or sell IS oil. The United States is also working with regional partners to identify cross-border smuggling routes and persons involved in smuggling networks. The United States has urged United Nations (UN) member states to help cut off resources to the Islamic State, and the UN Security Council in September passed resolution 2178 to combat the flow of money and foreign fighters to the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front). In addition to financial and political measures, the United States is also employing military means to target IS funding streams. Since August 2014, U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State have targeted oil facilities, including collection points and mobile refineries. In late September and early October, the United States struck at least 12 out of an estimated 15-20 IS-held modular oil refineries in eastern Syria and rendered them inoperable, according to the Defense Department spokesperson.51 The Defense Department estimates that each refinery had the capacity to produce 300 to 500 barrels a day of refined petroleum. The International Energy Agency in mid-October reported that U.S. and coalition strikes in Iraq and Syria had reduced the Islamic State’s ability to produce, refine, and smuggle oil.52 Restricting access to the financial system. Cohen noted that the United States aims to restrict the Islamic State’s access to the international financial system and to limit its ability to move, store, and use funds it acquires locally. In particular, the United States plans to work with Iraqi authorities, banks’ headquarters, and the international financial community to prevent the Islamic State from using local bank branches in areas under its control. Financial sanctions. The United States also plans to impose sanctions against IS officials and their external financial backers. On September 24, the Department of the Treasury designated twelve individuals for their role in soliciting funds, procuring military equipment, and recruiting foreign fighters, two of whom are based in Syria and are associated with the Islamic State.53 Restricting Flows of Foreign Fighters U.S. officials from the intelligence community, State Department, and other agencies concerned with domestic security continue to assess, monitor, and respond to threats posed by foreign fighters active in Iraq and Syria. Diplomatic and intelligence efforts focus on coordinating with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures.54 In March 2014, the State Department named Ambassador Robert Bradtke as “senior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters.” According to a department spokesperson, “Since then, Ambassador Bradtke has led a comprehensive effort, including marshalling representatives from a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to encourage key European, North African, and Middle Eastern partners to prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adapt to – and prevent – foreign fighters.”55 In December, Ambassador 51 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room, September 30, 2014, and October 3, 2014. 52 International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, October 14, 2014. 53 U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators, September 24, 2014. 54 See White House, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region, September 24, 2014. 55 State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C., August 27, 2014. Congressional Research Service 18 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Bradtke told Congress that “The intelligence community estimates that since January 2012, over 16,000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria from more than ninety countries, including the United States.”56 In August 2014, the U.S. government supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2170, which strengthened international sanctions measures designed to combat the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. The resolution called upon all Member States “to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,” and reiterates Member States’ obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and exchange information on the groups. President Obama led a session of the United Nations Security Council on September 24 focused on strengthening international responses to the threat posed by foreign fighters travelling to conflict zones, especially in Syria and Iraq. The session concluded with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2178, which requires Member States, consistent with international law, to prevent the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts.” In December 2014, Ambassador Bradkte said, “Several countries have already enacted or proposed legislation to permit [prosecution for foreign fighter facilitation]; other countries have stepped up their enforcement of existing laws. We continue to urge partners to meet their obligations under UNSCR 2178, and are offering assistance to partners who may need help in doing so.”57 What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date? Experts and officials are debating the effectiveness of the strategy. The Administration has argued that the strategy will time—measured in many months, not weeks—to reach its objectives. It asserts that there are distinct achievements, to date. Administration critics argue that the strategy lacks effective partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on the ground and suffers from a basic contradiction in not confronting the regime of President Asad of Syria. These critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives require U.S. or other ground combat troops and expansion of the mission to include pressuring Asad to accept a political solution. Administration officials assert that the accomplishments of the strategy to date include • In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled the peshmerga and ISF to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain.58 In October, peshmerga forces recaptured the town of Zumar and the border crossing into Syria at Rabia, among other gains. 56 Ambassador Robert Bradtke, State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters, Testimony before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and the Middle East and North Africa, December 2, 2014. 57 Ibid. 58 DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014. Congressional Research Service 19 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy • In September, U.S. airstrikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic State fighters from Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have used to flood large parts of Iraq. Also that month, U.S. airstrikes facilitated efforts by the ISF and Shiite militias to break an Islamic State siege of the Shiiteinhabited town of Amerli. • With intensive airstrikes and the airdrop of supplies and weaponry to defenders in October, the United States and its partners helped prevent the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited Syrian town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab from capture by Islamic State forces. Still, that town remains an active battle site and the outcome is uncertain. • In October, the ISF recaptured the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, 40 miles south of Baghdad, and have made some gains in Diyala Province, helping secure ISF supply lines to northern Iraq. In November, the ISF claimed to have recaptured most of the town of Baiji, potentially positioning the force to relieve the IS siege of the large refinery outside the town. • In November, DOD announced that a U.S. strike had targeted IS leadership in Iraq, although it is not clear whether any senior IS leaders were killed or wounded. The November 7 announcement of an expanded training and advisory mission for Iraqi forces appeared to reflect Administration optimism that additional U.S. inputs—coupled with the success in replacing Prime Minister Maliki with a more inclusive successor—could produce results. Others interpreted the announcement as an indication that the Administration assesses that Iraqi forces remain highly deficient and require substantially more help. In comments related to the November 7 announcement, President Obama stated: What it [the expanded train and equip mission] signals is a new phase. What we knew was that phase one was getting an Iraqi government that was inclusive and credible, and we now 47 DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014. Congressional Research Service 13 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy have done that. And so now what we’ve done is rather than just try to halt ISIL’s momentum, we’re now in a position to start going on some offense. The airstrikes have been very effective in degrading ISIL’s capabilities and slowing the advance that they were making. Now what we need is ground troops, Iraqi ground troops, that can start pushing them back.4859 Critics of the Administration strategy note some setbacks to the strategy as follows: • That Islamic State forces have continued to gain control over territory in Iraq’s Al Anbar province, including in October seizing the town of Al Hit and capturing or encroaching on several ISF military bases in the province. Secretary of Defense Hagel told journalists in October that “Anbar Province is in trouble. We know that.”4960 • Islamic State gains in Anbar have positioned Islamic State forces to approach Baghdad and to undermine security in the city—as well as the crucial Baghdad 59 President Obama’s comments on CBS “Face the Nation,” as quoted in Eric Schmitt. “Obstacles Limit Targets and Pace of Strikes on ISIS,” New York Times, November 10, 2014. 60 Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt. “Islamic State Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Stumble,” New York Times, October 18, 2014. Congressional Research Service 20 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy International Airport—through mortar barrages and infiltration by suicide and other bombers. Experts say this encroachment might hinder ISF efforts to take the offensive rather than react to Islamic State maneuvers. Others assert that the ISF, while supported by Shiite militias and unlikely to lose Baghdad entirely, might yet lose parts of the city.50 61 • There has been little evidence, to date, of a significant Iraqi Sunni shift to oppose Islamic State forces directly or to comprehensively assist ISF units in anti-IS operations. Many Sunnis continue to distrust the Baghdad government and its reliance on Shiite militias. Others Sunnis apparently have been cowed by IS massacres of Sunni tribalists and other Sunnis opposed to IS rule. In October, Islamic State fighters reportedly killed more than 300 members of the Albu Nimr tribe for resisting IS advances in western Iraq. International Coalition The outcomes of U.S. strategy might depend on the participation of other actors, both state and non-state. U.S. officials have recruited a coalition of countries to help defeat the Islamic State, in large part to build international legitimacy for a military campaign and enlist Sunni help with coreligionists in Iraq and Syria. The Administration has sought—and received—a range of support from international partners, including participation in airstrikes, assisting and training Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdish forces, arming and training moderate Syrian rebels, increasing intelligence sharing, committing to curb the flow of fighters and resources to the Islamic State, and providing financial support.51 48 President Obama’s comments on CBS “Face the Nation,” as quoted in Eric Schmitt. “Obstacles Limit Targets and Pace of Strikes on ISIS.” New York Times, November 10, 2014. 49 Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt. “Islamic State Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Stumble.” New York Times, October 18, 2014. 5062 The State Department lists 60 countries as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL.” Many of the countries participating have been involved since 2012 in response to the evolving conflict in Syria. The participation of the various coalition members and summaries of some of their contributions are cited below.63 Those in the coalition that are participating in military operations in Iraq and Syria face significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination have exposed rifts among regional countries, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.64 Relations 61 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July 14, 2014. 5162 For a summary of significant foreign contributions to the effort against the Islamic State, see Justine Drennan. “Who Has Contributed the Most in the Coalition Against the Islamic State.” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2014. http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/14/ whos_contributed_the_most_in_the_coalition_against_the_islamic_state?wp_login_redirect=0 Congressional Research Service 14 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy The State Department lists 60 countries as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL.” Many of the countries participating have been involved since 2012 in response to the evolving conflict in Syria. The participation of the various coalition members, and summaries of some of their contributions are cited below.52 Those in the coalition that are participating in military operations in Iraq and Syria face significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination have exposed rifts among regional countries, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.53 Relations 63 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The group last met in Saudi Arabia in late August. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as the London 11, includes the United States, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. 64 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced internal divisions—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014. Congressional Research Service 21 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy between Iraq’s government and the Sunni Arab Gulf states have been consistently strained in the post-Saddam Hussein period, in part because Iraq’s government has been dominated by Shiite factions politically close to Iran. Sunni Arab militaries have to date limited their airstrikes to Syria in part because strikes in Iraq might be seen by their populations as empowering Shiite elements in Iraq. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Syria, according to CENTCOM, are: Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Qatar reportedly participated in some of the first coalition strikes in Syria in September. To date, Western and other non-Middle Eastern allies of the United States, such as Australia, Britain, and France, are undertaking airstrikes in Iraq, and not in Syria—perhaps reflecting a hesitancy among Western allies to be drawn into involvement in Syria’s civil war in any way. In Syria, Sunni coalition partners might assess that the U.S. focus on the Islamic State might not be contributing to the Sunni partner primary objectives of weakening the Asad regime and its supporters (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia). U.S. partners will likely base their calculations of the costs and benefits of their military operations in Syria and/or Iraq on their perceptions of various factors such as the urgency of acting directly, the soundness of U.S. strategy, the level of U.S. commitment, and potential progress toward political solutions (particularly in Iraq) that are more inclusive of Sunni Arabs or less conducive to Iranian strategic goals. The following sections will discuss the role that selected partner countries are playing in the coalition, and examine factors that could potentially constrain their participation. Turkey54 U.S. strategic objectives regarding Turkey, a Sunni-majority country, in connection with efforts to cooperate against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq appear to include: • Avoiding attacks on or the destabilization of Turkey; 52 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The group last met in Saudi Arabia in late August. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as the London 11, includes the United States, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. 53 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced internal divisions—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014. 54 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more background on Turkey’s dealings with Iraq and Syria, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 15 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy • Minimizing the use of Turkish territory by extremists; and • Using Turkish territory and airspace and/or partnering with Turkish forces for military purposes and to further strengthen and diversify Sunni support within the anti-IS coalition. Following the September 20, 2014, release by the Islamic State of 49 hostages associated with the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq,55 Turkish leaders have indicated willingness to consider deeper participation in the anti-IS coalition.56 Turkey’s parliament voted on October 2, 2014, to approve potential military operations in Syria and Iraq launched from Turkey by Turkish or foreign forces. However, a complicated array of considerations arguably affects Turkish calculations regarding direct military involvement or the furnishing of its territory or airspace for coalition use. This includes Turkey’s role to this point in Syria’s protracted conflict, as well as Turkish parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015. For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s policy and actions on the Islamic State issues, see CRS Report IN10164, Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic State”: A Unique Dynamic? , by Jim Zanotti. Saudi Arabia57 Saudi Arabia first participated in coalition airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria on September 22-23 and continues to participate in coalition airstrikes against Islamic State targets. Most recently, U.S. military sources have reported Saudi fighter aircraft participation in airstrikes on October 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, and 19. Some reports suggest that a fighter aircraft contingent of four to six Saudi F-15 aircraft are being used in these strikes, although U.S. and Saudi authorities have not commented specifically on the number or types of Saudi aircraft or ordnance used in these operations. Saudi Arabia also reportedly has agreed to host a U.S. training facility for vetted Syrians as part of the congressionally endorsed program to develop a force to protect Syrians from Islamic State attacks and support conditions that will lead to a negotiated settlement in Syria’s civil war. Saudi Arabia also has made humanitarian contributions to support Syrian and Iraqi citizens, including a $500 million donation in July 2014 to support displaced Iraqis. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has called for international cooperation to combat violent extremist groups in the Middle East, including the Islamic State. In August 2014, Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdelaziz bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al al Shaykh declared “the ideas of extremism ... and terrorism” to be the “first enemies of Muslims,” and stated that all efforts to combat Al Qaeda and the Islamic State were required and allowed because those groups “consider Muslims to be infidels.” The statement, coupled with state crackdowns on clerics deviating from the government’s anti-terrorism messaging, signal the kingdom’s desire to undercut claims by the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their followers that support for the groups and their violent attacks is religiously legitimate. In conjunction with the Saudi government’s expanded efforts to dissuade Saudi citizens from supporting the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Saudi security entities continue to arrest cells of individuals suspected of plotting attacks, recruiting, or fundraising for some terrorist groups. 55 The release reportedly occurred in exchange for Turkey’s release of 180 Islamic State detainees. Turkey already is reportedly allowing the use of its territory and airspace for humanitarian and logistical purposes, and adopting additional measures to curb the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. Murat Yetkin, “Turkey joins anti-ISIL coalition, opens İncirlik for logistics ops,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, September 10, 2014. 57 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 56 Congressional Research Service 16 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Aside from training-related assistance, U.S. officials conceivably could seek intelligence and diplomatic support from Saudi officials and may attempt to leverage the kingdom’s relationships with Sunni Arab community leaders in western Iraq and eastern Syria in conjunction with efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist groups there. The kingdom’s vast financial resources also could be brought to bear in support of displaced Syrian and Iraqi civilians, to influence Iraqi and Syrian armed groups, or to contribute to the costs of U.S. or other countries’ military operations. The Syria-related “train and equip” authority authorized by Congress in September 2014 authorizes the U.S. government to accept financial and material contributions for an assistance or training program for vetted Syrians. Military bases in Saudi Arabia could potentially be used in support of joint operations. However, the presence of foreign military forces in the kingdom historically has been a politically controversial subject. Jordan58 The Obama Administration considers the kingdom of Jordan to be an important part of the antiIslamic State coalition. Jordan is one of the signatories of the recently-issued Jeddah Communiqué that expressed regional Arab states’ commitment to stand united against the threat posed by all terrorism, including the Islamic State. Many Jordanians likely fear that an overt Jordanian presence in Iraq would give the Islamic State or radicalized Jordanian citizens further cause to target the kingdom. The Jordanian Air Force has conducted strikes in both Iraq and Syria. In mid-October, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL General John Allen expressed the Administration’s “support for the targeted airstrikes by the Jordanian Air Force in Syria.”59 Jordan has approximately 85 combat aircraft, including at least 60 F-16s, and its fighters flew alongside U.S. planes in striking the Islamic State’s front lines around the besieged Syrian city of Kobane. However, it is unlikely that Jordanian contributions to any multilateral effort will consist of ground forces.60 Jordan could make other contributions to U.S. efforts, such as intelligence sharing, continued overt training of Iraq Special Forces, and possible clandestine training of Syrian rebels. Jordanian intelligence was reportedly pivotal to the U.S. finding and killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian national who founded the Islamic State’s antecedent, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). Several media reports suggest that Jordanian Special Operations forces assisted U.S. troops in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue American journalist James Foley, who had been held captive by the Islamic State prior to his recent execution. Politically, Jordan has ties to Sunni tribes in Western Iraq who could be valuable partners in the fight against the Islamic State. Currently, approximately 1,700 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Jordan, presumably to bolster its security.61 58 Prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 59 U.S. State Department Press Release, “Remarks to the Press on Countering ISIL,” October 15, 2014. 60 “Allies Vow Support, Offer Few Specifics,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2014. 61 Elements of these forces include Patriot missile systems, fighter aircraft, and related support, command, control, and communications personnel and systems. Congressional Research Service 17 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Europe and Other Allies62 On the sidelines of NATO’s Wales Summit, held on September 4-5, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) co-chaired a discussion on the Islamic State. NATO member countries France, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark, and observer state Australia, reportedly joined the United States and UK in agreeing to coordinate efforts to fight the group.63 The alliance as a whole did not commit to a substantive response beyond stating in the summit communique that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.64 NATO previously conducted a military training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011. France hosted a meeting of foreign ministers from 26 countries (including European and Middle Eastern countries as well as Russia and China), the Arab League, European Union, and U.N. on September 15 that produced further pledges to defeat the Islamic State and provide military assistance to the Iraqi government. Subsequently, various European countries announced specific military commitments and involvement in operations. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Iraq are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As noted above, Western partner countries—including Denmark, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom—have pledged an estimated 700 total trainers plus additional advisers to assist Iraqi forces. France, Germany, and the UK have been providing weapons to Kurdish forces in Iraq, as well as non-lethal equipment and humanitarian aid.65 As in the United States, other Western countries encounter more difficult legal and political questions in relation to military action inside Syria. Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis Apparently pursuing its own interests, Iran has been generally cooperating with U.S. policy in Iraq, but the United States has ruled out formally bringing Iran into any U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. However, on Syria, the United States and Iran have generally been on opposite sides: the United States supports Asad’s ouster in favor of a transition regime, whereas Iran is materially supporting Asad’s efforts to remain in power. Iran apparently views expanded U.S. efforts to provide support and training to Syrian opposition groups as a threat to its interests. On Iraq, U.S. diplomats acknowledge that they have discussed the Islamic State crisis at margins of recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran abandoned its longtime ally Maliki66 and helped compel him to yield power in favor of Hayder Al Abbadi. The U.S. State Department has consistently refuted assertions that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional leverage in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States and its partner countries.67 However, President Obama has acknowledged sending a letter in November 2014 to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, the contents of which have not been released but which was said to focus on the 62 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs. Sam Jones, “NATO States to Form Military Coalition to Fight ISIS,” Financial Times, September 5, 2014. 64 Julian Hale, “NATO Weights Training Mission to Iraq,” Defense News, September 12, 2014. 65 “Hollande Visits Iraq Ahead of Paris Conference on Fighting Islamic State,” RFI, September 12, 2014; Noah Barkin, “Defending Arming of Kurds, Merkel Calls Islamic State a Threat to Europe,” Reuters, September 1, 2014; and UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Iraq: UK Government Response,” September 13, 2014. 66 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State,” Reuters, September 2, 2014. 67 Ibid. 63 Congressional Research Service 18 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy potential for further cooperation against the Islamic State if the issue of Iran’s nuclear program were resolved.68 In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran reportedly has been delivering arms and ammunition to the ISF and the peshmerga. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July 2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.69 Iran reportedly has provided weapons to Syrian Kurds fighting Islamic State forces in northern Syria. Many observers remain skeptical that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran in either Iraq or Syria. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGCQF) personnel into Iraq to advise the Shiite militias fighting alongside the ISF. The participation of the militias has increased tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who live in mostly Shiite-inhabited Baghdad and in mixed provinces such as Diyala. Anecdotal reports indicate that some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis who the militias accuse of supporting the Islamic State. Some of the Shiite militiamen who are fighting in Iraq had returned from Syria, where they were helping President Asad against Sunni-led armed rebels. On Syria, Iran continues to support Asad militarily, thereby countering U.S. efforts to compel Asad to yield power to a transition regime. 68 Michael Singh. “What Obama’s Letter to Khamenei Says About U.S. Policy Toward Iran.” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014. 69 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 5, 2014. Congressional Research Service 19 Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest Notes: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not necessarily areas of current control. CRS-20 Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 CRS-21 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State and the War Powers Resolution70 The Obama Administration has asserted that the President has authority under existing constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the current military campaign against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria. Some have questioned this assertion, and several Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would specifically address the President’s continued use of military force in this situation. The President’s uses of military force are subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). In cases where the President has introduced Armed Forces into active or imminent hostilities, the WPR requires termination of the use of U.S. Armed Forces and withdrawal of those forces 60 days after a WPR report is required, unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the 60day period by law; or (3) cannot meet due to armed attack. The President can extend the deadline for withdrawal for 30 days if he certifies that it is needed to effect a safe withdrawal. The Obama Administration has stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs) authorize ongoing U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria.71 The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40) targets those who perpetrated and supported the 9/11 terrorist attacks, identified as Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but the executive branch has interpreted the authorization to include targeting forces that are cobelligerent with these two groups, so-called “associated forces.” The Islamic State organization, whose antecedents had links to Al Qaeda, might fall within the definition of an associated force, but a public split between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in early 2014 calls this association into question. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State’s long ties to Al Qaeda, its continuing connection to and support from elements within Al Qaeda, and similarity of its brutal tactics and desire to establish an Islamic caliphate to those of Al Qaeda make the Islamic State lawful targets under the 2001 AUMF.72 The President’s notifications to Congress of military operations against IS forces and the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda both state that the 2001 AUMF authorizes such actions.73 Alternatively, it has been argued recently that the Islamic State might be considered not as an associated force of Al Qaeda but instead as former part of Al Qaeda that has now splintered from the original group.74 Under this interpretation, the Islamic State would fall 70 This section was prepared by Matthew Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation. In his previous notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes against the Islamic State, however, the President stated that he was taking military action based upon his powers as commander in chief and chief executive under Article II of the Constitution. 72 See White House, press briefing by press secretary Josh Earnest, September 11, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014. 73 Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq; letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolutionregarding-syria. 74 See Marty Lederman, “Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory [updated],” Just Security, September 11, 2014, at http://justsecurity.org/14804/first-reactions-2001-aumf-theory/. 71 Congressional Research Service 22 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy among the original targets of the 2001 AUMF, and its associated forces could also be targeted, potentially expanding the number of lawfully targeted co-belligerent groups operating in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere. The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (P.L. 107-243) authorizes force in part to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” The original authorization focused on the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of suspected weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, threats long extinguished. The recent successes of Islamic State–led forces in Iraq, however, and its ties to former supporters of the Hussein regime, might be seen as falling within the broad 2002 AUMF authority to counter the “threat posed by Iraq.” The Obama Administration, however, might consider 2002 AUMF authority to extend to countering threats to Iraq as well, whether those threats exist within Iraq or are located elsewhere. In the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to Congress concerning airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq and Syria, the President cited the 2002 AUMF alongside the 2001 AUMF as authorizing strikes against IS forces. Such strikes are described largely in the context of assisting Iraqi forces and “at the request of the Government of Iraq.”75 Although the President has stated that he possesses 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to conduct recent and future military actions against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria, Congress could determine that these authorizations do not apply. Many observers and Members have argued that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs are outdated and that their authorities no longer apply to the current challenges posed both by the Islamic State and by the global threat to the United States from terrorism in general. If Congress determines that the existing AUMFs do not apply, it might assert that the President, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, must (1) withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from and (2) terminate hostilities in Iraq and Syria within 60 days from the date when congressional notification of such actions was required unless Congress enacts a new AUMF. Several Members of Congress have called for a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, and a number of legislative proposals have been introduced recently.76 Humanitarian Impact and Response77 Since January 2014, an urgent humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Iraq, with an estimated 5.3 million people in need of humanitarian and protection assistance. Of these, 1.9 million people are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 1.5 million are in communities that are taking in the displaced (host communities), 1.7 million are in areas under the control of armed groups or impacted by the conflict, and .2 million are Syrian refugees.78 Close to half the newly displaced are thought to be children. Particularly in conflict areas in northern and central Iraq, it is difficult 75 See letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq). 76 For a comparison of these proposals, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed. 77 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy. 78 In addition, there are reportedly more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, there are also over 400,000 Iraqi refugees living in other countries (October 29, 2014.) Although this section is focused primarily on the situation in Iraq, displacements and movement of populations in Iraq are intertwined with the conflict in neighboring Syria. Congressional Research Service 23 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy to monitor and track the mass and sometimes multiple displacements. Consequently, the actual figures remain fluid and difficult to fully ascertain. In January, June, and August of 2014, displacement increased significantly in Iraq as a result of conflict. As of late October, of the 1.9 million IDPs, an estimated 850,000 are seeking shelter in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, mainly in Dohuk governorate, while increased movements to central and southern Iraq are straining the response capacities of host communities in these areas.79 All 18 governorates are hosting families fleeing violence. There are estimated to be over 700,000 displaced in the central region (with almost 400,000 in Anbar Governorate) and 200,000 in the south. The needs of all IDPs in Iraq remain significant, while basic government social services are limited and weak. In addition to winter preparedness, which includes the provision of shelter and winterization kits, there continue to be urgent needs for food, water and sanitation, and health services.80 With the large number of displaced children, emergency education support is also a priority for the humanitarian community. There are concerns about the rise in sectarian tensions across the country made worse by the conflict situation and large numbers of IDPs. An estimated 3.6 million Iraqis reside in areas under the control of IS and other armed groups, and of these, 2.2 million are thought to be trapped in conflict-affected areas, These IDPs lack access to basic services and are considered to be in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.81 National and international humanitarian efforts have been severely constrained in providing assistance and protection to IDPs and others affected by the conflict due to ongoing fighting. In August 2014, the United Nations declared a “Level 3 Emergency” for Iraq to help facilitate mobilization of resources for the humanitarian response.82 With the Level 3 declaration, U.N. and humanitarian partners continue to increase staffing and resources, and they are calling for guarantees of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian staff and in the distribution of relief supplies. As of October 10, 2014, 36 international actors, including the U.N. system, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in the humanitarian operation. There are also approximately 70 national NGOs registered with the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) that are engaged in the relief effort. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is facilitating the humanitarian response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some partner organizations, as well as supporting the coordination efforts of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). UNOCHA launched a revised Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in June, requesting $312.1 million in international funding to include humanitarian support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider geographical focus.83 The SRP was revised 79 As of late October, 2014, Iraq is hosting more than 215,000 refugees from Syria, of which 209,000 are in the Kurdistan region and much smaller numbers are dispersed elsewhere in Iraq, including approximately 4,500 in Anbar province. 80 Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” September 4, 2014. 81 UNOCHA, “Iraq Crisis: Situation Report No. 18,” October 25-31, 2014. 82 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Press Release, “U.N. Declares a ‘Level 3 Emergency’ for Iraq to Ensure More Effective Humanitarian Response,” August 13, 2014. 83 A subset of the SRP for Iraq, “Iraq: Immediate Response Plan (IRP) for the IDP Crisis in the KR-I: 15 September – 15 November 2014) represented a joint effort by the Kurdistan Regional Government and U.N. humanitarian agencies (continued...) Congressional Research Service 24 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy in October 2014 and expanded to cover 2014 and 2015. It identifies total requirements of $2.2 billion for this period, of which $608 million in funding had been received as of mid-October. Total U.S. government humanitarian funding to Iraq in FY2014 and FY2015 (as of October 31, 2014) is more than $202.2 million.84 Systemic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) have reportedly been widespread by all parties to the conflict, including IS. UNOCHA estimates that 20,000 civilians have been killed or injured across Iraq in 2014.85 The U.N. Secretary-General issued a statement on August 7, 2014, condemning the attacks in Iraq and the impact on vulnerable minority communities.86 The members of the U.N. Security Council also issued a statement about attacks directed against a civilian population and urged the parties to enable humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance.87 Amid increasing reports of killings and kidnappings and gross abuses of human rights, on October 31, the members of the Security Council again expressed outrage and stressed accountability, noting that some of these acts may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.”88 Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens89 The crisis has prompted the Administration to undertake a number of measures to ensure the safety of its personnel in Iraq, including direct military action, relocation of personnel, and deployment of additional protective assets. The Department of State has also repeatedly warned U.S. citizens unaffiliated with the U.S. government of the threats to their security. President Obama affirmed on August 9 that the protection of American diplomats and military personnel in the city of Irbil was among the principal justifications for conducting targeted airstrikes against ISIL in the area. He also asserted that the United States would “take action” in response to any further threat to U.S. facilities or personnel.90 A number of diplomatic personnel had previously been moved to the Consulate General in Irbil from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. On June 15, the Department of State announced that while the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily relocated” to Consulate Generals in Basrah and Irbil as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan. The relocations were reportedly carried out by non-military means. The announcement stated that a “substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would remain in place and that, with an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be (...continued) to address urgent humanitarian response priorities ahead of the winter season in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 84 USAID, “Iraq—Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, October 31, 2014. 85 UNOCHA, 2014/2015 Iraq Strategic Response Plan, October 2014. 86 United Nations, New York, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Attacks on Yezidis and Other Minority Groups in Iraq,” August 7, 2014. 87 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11515, IK/683, August 7, 2014. 88 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11625, IK/694, October 31, 2014. 89 Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see CRS Insight IN10090, Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities, by Alex Tiersky. This section was last updated on August 15, 2014. 90 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq. Congressional Research Service 25 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy “fully equipped” to carry out “its national security mission.”91 On August 10, the Iraq Travel Warning was updated to announce that “a limited number” of additional staff had been relocated from the Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate General in Erbil to the Consulate General in Basrah as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan.92 Despite these measures, President Obama on August 9 affirmed that “we’re not moving our embassy anytime soon. We’re not moving our consulate anytime soon.”93 Military assets and personnel have played a key role in securing U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Iraq. News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors were in place at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy.94 Since the crisis began, the White House has announced three deployments to reinforce that number. On June 16, the White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military personnel were being dispatched to Iraq to assist with the temporary relocation of diplomatic personnel, a deployment undertaken with the consent of the Government of Iraq.95 On June 30, the White House announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to provide increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as to reinforce the Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House notification to Congress, provided “consistent with” the War Powers Act, the deployed forces would be accompanied by helicopters and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,” according to the statement, and may/will “remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such that it is no longer needed.”96 The Department of Defense had also previously confirmed that it “has airlift assets at the ready should State Department request them, as per normal interagency support arrangements.”97 On September 2, 2014, the Administration announced that an additional 350 U.S. military personnel would deploy to Iraq for similar purposes. The State Department has also communicated with U.S. citizens in Iraq about threats to their safety. It posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Iraq because of current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their safety to “make plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the Embassy should not be contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that the Embassy “does not offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the Embassy remained open, the statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq would be limited due to the security environment.98 91 Department of State Spokesperson, “Press Statement: Iraq,” press release, June 15, 2014. Department of State, “Iraq Travel Warning,” updated August 10, 2014, http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/ english/alertswarnings/iraq-travel-warning.html. 93 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq. 94 Dan Lamothe, “U.S. companies pulling contractors from Iraqi bases as security crumbles,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2014. 95 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the War Powers Resolution Report for Iraq,” press release, June 16, 2014. 96 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Letter regarding Iraq,” June 30, 2014. 97 “DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014. 98 Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” (continued...) 92 Congressional Research Service 26 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy A number of U.S. citizens working in various other capacities in Iraq have also been evacuated in response to the crisis. For example, on June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number of U.S. citizen contract employees to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by their companies due to security concerns.99 Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration100 What are overall U.S. priorities in the strategy against the Islamic State organization, and how are these priorities shaping the U.S. response? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy against the Islamic State? What successes and failures of the strategy can you point to, to date? What factors could hinder the implementation or effectiveness of the strategy? With respect to Iraq, is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional differences? Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State. With respect to Iraq, what concrete steps has Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi taken to reduce Sunni Arab support for the Islamic State? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate in areas under its control? With respect to Syria, to what extent, if any, is the long-term success of U.S. strategy dependent on any changes in the composition of the Syrian government? How have various Syrian forces reacted to U.S. and coalition airstrikes since September 2014? How has the Syrian government responded, if at all? How, if at all, should the effort against the Islamic State shape congressional consideration of pending authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance? To what extent do the Islamic State’s gains reflect its organizational capabilities? To what extent to these gains reflect the weaknesses, divisions, or limitations of its adversaries? To what extent and how is U.S. strategy assisting locally organized forces in areas under Islamic State control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations? (...continued) press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html. 99 Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ 2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ. 100 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service 27 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy As of December 3, the State Department listed more than 60 countries and organizations as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL.”65 To date, the Administration has sought—and received—a range of support from international partners, including participation in the air campaign against IS forces, financial support, assistance for Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdish forces, offers of support for efforts to arm and train vetted Syrians, increased intelligence sharing, and actions to curb foreign fighter and financial flows.66 NATO and Arab Partners. The NATO alliance as a whole has not committed to a substantive response beyond stating in the September 2014 Wales summit communique that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.67 NATO previously conducted a military training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011. European countries continue to rule out using ground forces in combat operations in Iraq or Syria. 65 As of December 3, coalition members attending a joint strategy meeting included: Republic of Albania, Hungary, Sultanate of Oman, Australia, Republic of Iceland, Republic of Poland, Republic of Austria, Republic of Iraq, Portuguese Republic, Kingdom of Bahrain, Ireland, State of Qatar, Belgium, Italian Republic, Republic of Korea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Romania, Republic of Bulgaria, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Canada, Republic of Kosovo, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Croatia, State of Kuwait, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Latvia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Republic of Lebanon, Republic of Slovenia, Denmark, Republic of Lithuania, Federal Government of Somalia, Arab Republic of Egypt, Luxembourg, Spain, Republic of Estonia, Macedonia, Sweden, European Union, Moldova, Taiwan, Republic of Finland, Montenegro, Republic of Turkey, French Republic, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ukraine, Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Hellenic Republic (Greece), Norway, and the United States of America. 66 For a summary of significant foreign contributions to the effort against the Islamic State, see Justine Drennan. “Who Has Contributed the Most in the Coalition Against the Islamic State.” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2014. 67 Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, NATO Press Release (2014) 120, September 5, 2014. Congressional Research Service 22 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy To date, Western and other non-Middle Eastern allies of the United States, such as Australia, Britain, and France, are undertaking airstrikes in Iraq, but not in Syria. Some Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Jordan are conducting airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria, in conjunction with U.S. forces. U.S. forces alone continue to conduct strikes against targets associated with the Khorasan Group, an element of Jabhat al Nusra engaged in transnational terrorist activity, according to U.S. officials. These strikes have targeted facilities shared with Jabhat al Nusra and other Islamist opposition groups, creating tension among opposition forces. Turkey. Turkish leaders have indicated willingness to consider deeper participation in the anti-IS coalition in the wake of the September 20, 2014, release by the Islamic State of 49 hostages68 associated with the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq. Turkey already is reportedly allowing the use of its territory and airspace for humanitarian and logistical purposes, and adopting additional measures to curb the flow of foreign fighters to Syria.69 Turkey’s parliament voted on October 2, 2014, to approve potential military operations in Syria and Iraq launched from Turkey by Turkish or foreign forces. However, a complicated array of considerations arguably affects Turkish calculations regarding direct military involvement or the furnishing of its territory or airspace for coalition use. This includes Turkey’s role to this point in Syria’s protracted conflict, as well as Turkish parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015.70 Russia, China, Iran, and Asad. U.N. Security Council permanent members Russia and China are not members of the coalition, but Russia has pledged its support for counterterrorism efforts in Syria, while arguing that coalition members should include the Asad government in their efforts. The coalition includes several countries that have cooperated with the United States in joint efforts to support the Syrian people and Syrian opposition movements during the evolving civil conflict, underscoring the challenges of forging a common set of objectives between coalition members and backers of Asad.71 Common cause with Asad and his supporters might also entail risks and drive Sunni opponents of Asad and Iran to undermine coalition efforts. Europe and Other Allies72 On the sidelines of NATO’s Wales Summit, held on September 4-5, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) co-chaired a discussion on the Islamic State. NATO member countries France, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark, and observer state Australia, reportedly joined the United States and UK in agreeing to coordinate efforts to fight the group.73 The alliance as a whole did not commit to a substantive response beyond stating in the summit communique that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and 68 The release reportedly occurred in exchange for Turkey’s release of 180 Islamic State detainees. Murat Yetkin, “Turkey joins anti-ISIL coalition, opens İncirlik for logistics ops,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, September 10, 2014. 70 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s policy and actions on the Islamic State issues, see CRS Report IN10164, TurkeyU.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic State”: A Unique Dynamic?, by Jim Zanotti. 71 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as “the London 11,” includes the United States, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Arab members of the group met in Saudi Arabia in August 2014. 72 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs. 73 Sam Jones, “NATO States to Form Military Coalition to Fight ISIS,” Financial Times, September 5, 2014. 69 Congressional Research Service 23 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.74 NATO previously conducted a military training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011. France hosted a meeting of foreign ministers from 26 countries (including European and Middle Eastern countries as well as Russia and China), the Arab League, European Union, and U.N. on September 15 that produced further pledges to defeat the Islamic State and provide military assistance to the Iraqi government. Subsequently, various European countries announced specific military commitments and involvement in operations. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Iraq are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As noted above, Western partner countries—including Denmark, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom—have pledged an estimated 700 total trainers plus additional advisers to assist Iraqi forces. France, Germany, and the UK have been providing weapons to Kurdish forces in Iraq, as well as non-lethal equipment and humanitarian aid.75 As in the United States, other Western countries encounter more difficult legal and political questions in relation to military action inside Syria. Iranian Involvement in the Iraq and Syria Crises Apparently pursuing its own interests, Iran has been generally cooperating with U.S. policy in Iraq, but the United States has ruled out formally bringing Iran into any U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. However, on Syria, the United States and Iran have generally been on opposite sides: the United States supports Asad’s ouster in favor of a transition regime, whereas Iran is materially supporting Asad’s efforts to remain in power. Iran apparently views expanded U.S. efforts to provide support and training to Syrian opposition groups as a threat to its interests. On Iraq, U.S. diplomats acknowledge that they have discussed the Islamic State crisis at margins of recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran abandoned its longtime ally Maliki76 and helped compel him to yield power in favor of Hayder Al Abbadi. The U.S. State Department has consistently refuted assertions that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional leverage in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States and its partner countries.77 However, President Obama has acknowledged sending a letter in November 2014 to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, the contents of which have not been released but which was said to focus on the potential for further cooperation against the Islamic State if the issue of Iran’s nuclear program were resolved.78 In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran reportedly has been delivering arms and ammunition to the ISF and the peshmerga. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July 74 Julian Hale, “NATO Weights Training Mission to Iraq,” Defense News, September 12, 2014. “Hollande Visits Iraq Ahead of Paris Conference on Fighting Islamic State,” RFI, September 12, 2014; Noah Barkin, “Defending Arming of Kurds, Merkel Calls Islamic State a Threat to Europe,” Reuters, September 1, 2014; and UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Iraq: UK Government Response,” September 13, 2014. 76 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State,” Reuters, September 2, 2014. 77 Ibid. 78 Michael Singh. “What Obama’s Letter to Khamenei Says About U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014. 75 Congressional Research Service 24 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy 2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.79 Iran reportedly has provided weapons to Syrian Kurds fighting Islamic State forces in northern Syria, and by all accounts continues to provide material support to Syrian government forces. Many observers remain skeptical that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran in either Iraq or Syria. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGCQF) personnel into Iraq to advise the Shiite militias fighting alongside the ISF. The participation of the militias has increased tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who live in mostly Shiite-inhabited Baghdad and in mixed provinces such as Diyala. Anecdotal reports indicate that some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis who the militias accuse of supporting the Islamic State. Some of the Shiite militiamen who are fighting in Iraq had returned from Syria, where they were helping President Asad against Sunni-led armed rebels. On Syria, Iran continues to support Asad militarily, thereby countering U.S. efforts to compel Asad to yield power to a transition regime. Overview of the Current Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and Syria80 The humanitarian situations in both Iraq and Syria have been described as a “mega crisis” in part because displacements and movement of populations are intertwined between the two countries.81 Taken together, it is estimated that 17.4 million people living in either Iraq or Syria are affected by conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance. In addition, more than 3.2 million Syrians and nearly 0.2 million Iraqis are displaced as refugees. However, the funding streams and operational framework for the international humanitarian response in each country remains distinct, in part a reflection of the unique conditions unfolding in each country. Iraq Since January 2014, an urgent humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Iraq, with an estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian and protection assistance. Of these, over 2.1 million people are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), more than 1.7 million are in communities that are taking in the displaced (host communities), 1.5 million are in areas under the control of armed groups or impacted by the conflict, and 0.2 million are Syrian refugees.82 Close to half the newly displaced are thought to be children. Particularly in conflict areas in northern and central Iraq, it is difficult to monitor and track the mass and sometimes multiple displacements. Consequently, the actual number of affected individuals remains fluid and difficult to fully ascertain. 79 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 5, 2014. Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy. 81 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, “Faced with ‘mega-crisis’, U.N. warns of refugee suffering and security threats,” PBS News Hour, November 20, 2014. 82 UNOCHA, Iraq Crisis, Situation Report No. 22 (November 22 – 28, 2014.) In addition, there are reportedly more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, there are also over 400,000 Iraqi refugees living in other countries (October 29, 2014.) 80 Congressional Research Service 25 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy As of late October, of the 2.1 million IDPs, an estimated 850,000 are seeking shelter in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, mainly in Dohuk governorate, while increased movements to central and southern Iraq are straining the response capacities of host communities in these areas.83 All 18 governorates are hosting families fleeing violence. There are estimated to be over 700,000 displaced in the central region (with almost 400,000 in Anbar Governorate) and 200,000 in the south. The needs of all IDPs in Iraq remain significant, while basic government social services are limited and weak. In addition to winter preparedness, which includes the provision of shelter and winterization kits, there continue to be urgent needs for food, water and sanitation, and health services.84 With the large number of displaced children, emergency education support is also a priority for the humanitarian community. There are also concerns about the rise in sectarian tensions across the country made worse by the conflict situation and large numbers of IDPs. An estimated 3.6 million Iraqis reside in areas under the control of the IS and other armed groups. Of these, 2.2 million are thought to be trapped in conflict-affected areas. These IDPs lack access to basic services and are considered to be in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.85 Syria The ongoing conflict in Syria has created one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the world. Three and a half years into the conflict, as of November 2014, an estimated 12.2 million people inside Syria, more than half the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance, of which more than 7.6 million are displaced inside the country.86 In addition, more than 3.2 million Syrians are displaced as refugees, with 97% fleeing to countries in the immediate surrounding region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other parts of North Africa. According to the United Nations, in 2014, an average of more than 90,000 Syrians per month registered as refugees in countries in the region. The situation is fluid and continues to worsen, while humanitarian needs are immense and increase daily. Access within Syria is severely constrained by violence and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government on the operations of humanitarian organizations. Several million people are estimated to be living in hard-to-reach areas and some have been besieged by either the Government of Syria or opposition forces at different points in the conflict. Reports of intentional policies of starvation in areas under siege by the government, attacks against civilians and indiscriminant use of heavy weapons, and a weak health infrastructure that is often under deliberate attack illustrate the dire conditions under which civilians are trying to survive. On November 14, 2014, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which was established on August 22, 2011 by the U.N. Human Rights Council, issued a report, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria. The Commission’s mandate is to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria. The report describes the 83 In KR-I 18 camps have been established or are in the process of being completed out of a planned 26 camps. As of late October, 2014, Iraq is hosting more than 230,000 refugees from Syria, of which 209,000 are in the Kurdistan region and much smaller numbers are dispersed elsewhere in Iraq, including approximately 4,500 in Anbar province. 84 Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” September 4, 2014. 85 UNOCHA, “Iraq Crisis: Situation Report No. 18,” October 25-31, 2014. 86 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, Security Council Briefing on Syria, November 25, 2014. Congressional Research Service 26 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy systematic atrocities and violations perpetrated by IS, particularly against the civilian populations in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqah, Al-Hassakah, and Dayr Az-Zawr governorates.87 The number of registered refugees (or those awaiting registration) in neighboring countries continues to increase. Experts recognize that some Syrians have not registered as refugees, presumably from fear or other reasons, and have chosen instead to blend in with the local population, living in rented accommodations and makeshift shelters, particularly in towns and cities. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that more than 80% of Syrian refugees are living outside camps in mostly urban settings. The types of assistance and shelter options available to refugees vary in the countries that are hosting them. Winterization assistance, which includes the provision of shelter and winterization kits, is a key priority. The added economic, energy, and natural resource pressures of large Syrian refugee populations weigh heavily, particularly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. The governments of countries hosting refugees have concerns about the potential political implications of allowing displaced populations to remain, especially for a protracted period of time. The impact on many host communities has become overwhelming. Overcrowded schools, inadequate hospital services, impacts on resources such as water, all contribute to the burden for neighboring countries. Urgent priorities include protecting vulnerable refugees from violence and meeting their basic needs. Urban refugees are often invisible and difficult to identify and assist. The United States and the international community have recognized the contribution of those countries hosting refugees and supported their efforts, while encouraging them to keep their borders open to those fleeing conflict in Syria. A conference in Berlin held on October 28, 2014, focused on the further development of a broad regional partnership strategy to address the Syrian refugee situation and impact on host countries. Overview of the International and U.S. Humanitarian Response Iraq National and international humanitarian efforts have been severely constrained in providing assistance and protection to IDPs and others affected by the conflict due to ongoing fighting. In August 2014, the United Nations declared a “Level 3 Emergency” for Iraq to help facilitate mobilization of resources for the humanitarian response.88 With the Level 3 declaration, U.N. and humanitarian partners continue to increase staffing and resources, and they are calling for guarantees of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian staff and in the distribution of relief supplies. As of October 10, 2014, 36 international actors, including the U.N. system, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are 87 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “Rule of Terror: Living Under ISIS in Syria,” November 14, 2014, at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.pdf 88 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Press Release, “U.N. Declares a ‘Level 3 Emergency’ for Iraq to Ensure More Effective Humanitarian Response,” August 13, 2014. Congressional Research Service 27 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy involved in the humanitarian operation. There are also approximately 70 national NGOs registered with the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) that are engaged in the relief effort. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is facilitating the humanitarian response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some partner organizations, as well as supporting the coordination efforts of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).89 UNOCHA launched a revised Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in June, requesting $312.1 million in international funding to include humanitarian support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider geographical focus.90 The SRP was revised in October 2014 and expanded to cover 2014 and 2015. It identifies total requirements of $2.2 billion for this period, of which $653.6 million in funding had been received as of early December. Additional bilateral and other contributions and pledges made outside the SRP total $231 million. In August 2014, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to help coordinate U.S. humanitarian efforts in responding to the needs of newly displaced populations. Total U.S. government humanitarian funding to Iraq in FY2014 and FY2015 (as of November 21, 2014) is more than $208.2 million, which includes U.S. airdrops in support of Iraqi humanitarian efforts.91 Systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) have reportedly been widespread by all parties to the conflict, including IS. UNOCHA estimates that 20,000 civilians have been killed or injured across Iraq in 2014.92 The U.N. Secretary-General issued a statement on August 7, 2014, condemning the attacks in Iraq and the impact on vulnerable minority communities.93 The members of the U.N. Security Council also issued a statement about attacks directed against a civilian population and urged the parties to enable humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance.94 Amid increasing reports of killings and kidnappings and gross abuses of human rights, on October 31, the members of the Security Council again expressed outrage and stressed accountability, noting that some of these acts may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.95 89 On December 2, 2014, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed Lisa Grande of the United States as Deputy Special Representative of UNAMI. She will also serve as the U.N. Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq. 90 A subset of the SRP for Iraq, “Iraq: Immediate Response Plan (IRP) for the IDP Crisis in the KR-I: 15 September – 15 November 2014) represented a joint effort by the Kurdistan Regional Government and U.N. humanitarian agencies to address urgent humanitarian response priorities ahead of the winter season in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. According to UNOCHA, as of November 21, the Kurdistan Regional Government has proposed that a similar operational plan with information about needs and shortfalls through to March 2015, IRP2, be developed. 91 USAID, “Iraq—Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, November 21, 2014. 92 UNOCHA, 2014/2015 Iraq Strategic Response Plan, October 2014. 93 United Nations, New York, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Attacks on Yezidis and Other Minority Groups in Iraq,” August 7, 2014. 94 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11515, IK/683, August 7, 2014. 95 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11625, IK/694, October 31, 2014. Congressional Research Service 28 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Syria The international humanitarian response is massive and complex and struggles to keep pace with urgent developments that have escalated well beyond anticipated needs and continue to do so. Nearly a year ago, in mid-December 2013, the United Nations launched two appeals—taken together its largest appeal in history—requesting $6.5 billion in contributions to meet the ongoing humanitarian needs in Syria and the region. In July 2014, the Syria Regional Response Plan reduced its budget requirements slightly downward to reflect changed refugee population planning figures. Subsequent developments, including fighting in areas such as Kobane along the Turkish border, have led to additional displacements into Turkey of more than 190,000 people and could impact again the planning figures. As of early December, together the appeals are 51% funded. Limited funding for the Syria crisis has had immediate impacts; on December 1, 2014, the World Food Program announced that it was suspending food assistance to more than 1.7 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon for budget reasons. The U.N. Security Council adopted two resolutions in 2014 aimed at increasing humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria. Resolution 2139 (February 2014) demanded that parties “promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” and Resolution 2165 (July 2014) authorized United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to provide cross-border assistance with notification to (rather than consent of) the Syrian government. U.N. officials reporting under mechanisms established by the resolutions have identified some improvements in humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria. However, U.N. officials also report that sufficient aid cannot be delivered in hard-to-reach areas, including areas besieged by government forces, some areas under opposition control, and eastern provinces under Islamic State control.96 In general, violence, insecurity, government and opposition interference, and resource shortfalls continue to hinder aid delivery. The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance and is part of the massive, international humanitarian operation in parts of Syria and in neighboring countries. Beginning in FY2012, through November 24, 2014, the United States has allocated more than $3 billion to meet humanitarian needs using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding. U.S. humanitarian policy is guided by concerns about humanitarian access and protection within Syria; the large refugee flows out of the country that strain the resources of neighboring countries (and could negatively impact the overall stability of the region); and a protracted and escalating humanitarian emergency. The Administration’s original FY2015 budget request sought $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Syria and the region. The President’s June 2014 request for FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations for Defense also included a request for a $1.5 billion Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative (RSI). According to the Administration, if appropriated, $1 billion of the funds for the initiative would be used “to manage the growing spillover effects of the Syrian conflict,” and “to meet identified regional needs for areas contending with refugees.” However, it is not clear what portion of the RSI funding, if any, might be used specifically for humanitarian responses rather than for broader stabilization purposes in host countries. 96 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 29 Figure 1. Syria and Iraq: Conflict and Crisis Map Source: U.S. State Department, Humanitarian Information Unit, Syria Region: Conflicts without Boundaries, October 9, 2014. CRS-30 Figure 2. Timeline: The Roots of the Islamic State Source: Prepared by CRS using U.S. Government Open Source Center reporting and other open sources. CRS-31 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy Policy Debates and Related Legislative Issues Authority for Use of Military Force and the War Powers Resolution97 The Obama Administration has asserted that the President has authority under existing constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the current military campaign against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria. Some in Congress have questioned this assertion, and several Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would specifically address the President’s continued use of military force in this situation. On November 5, President Obama said he intended to engage Congress on a new authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) and said his goal is “to right- size and update whatever authorization Congress provides to suit the current fight, rather than previous fights.”98 The President’s uses of military force are subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). In cases where the President has introduced Armed Forces into active or imminent hostilities, the WPR requires termination of the use of U.S. Armed Forces and withdrawal of those forces 60 days after a WPR report is required, unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the 60-day period by law; or (3) cannot meet due to armed attack. The President can extend the deadline for withdrawal for 30 days if he certifies that it is needed to affect a safe withdrawal. The Obama Administration has stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force authorize ongoing U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria:99 • The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40) targets those who perpetrated and supported the 9/11 terrorist attacks, identified as Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The executive branch has interpreted this authorization to include targeting forces that are co-belligerent with these two groups, so-called “associated forces.” The Islamic State organization, whose antecedents had links to Al Qaeda, might fall within the definition of an associated force, but a public split between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in early 2014 calls this association into question. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State’s long ties to Al Qaeda, its continuing connection to and support from elements within Al Qaeda, and the similarity of its brutal tactics and its desire to establish an Islamic caliphate to those of Al Qaeda make the Islamic State a lawful target under the 2001 AUMF.100 The President’s notifications to Congress of military operations against IS forces and the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda both state that 97 Prepared by Matthew Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation. President Barack Obama, Press Conference, November 5, 2014. 99 In his previous notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes against the Islamic State, however, the President stated that he was taking military action based upon his powers as commander in chief and chief executive under Article II of the Constitution. 100 See White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, September 11, 2014. 98 Congressional Research Service 32 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy the 2001 AUMF authorizes such actions.101 Alternatively, it has been argued recently that the Islamic State might be considered not as an associated force of Al Qaeda but instead as a former part of Al Qaeda that has now splintered from the original group.102 Under this interpretation, the Islamic State would fall among the original targets of the 2001 AUMF, and its associated forces could also be targeted, potentially expanding the number of lawfully targeted cobelligerent groups operating in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere. • The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243) authorizes force in part to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” The original authorization focused on the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of suspected weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The recent successes of Islamic State–led forces in Iraq, however, and their ties to former supporters of the Hussein regime, might be seen as falling within the broad 2002 AUMF authority to counter the “threat posed by Iraq.” The Obama Administration, however, might consider 2002 AUMF authority to extend to countering threats to Iraq as well, whether those threats exist within Iraq or are located elsewhere. In the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to Congress concerning airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq and Syria, the President cited the 2002 AUMF alongside the 2001 AUMF as authorizing strikes against IS forces. Such strikes are described largely in the context of assisting Iraqi forces and “at the request of the Government of Iraq.”103 Although the President has stated that he possesses 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to conduct recent and future military actions against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria, Congress could determine that these authorizations do not apply. Many observers and Members have argued that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs are outdated and that their authorities no longer apply to the current challenges posed both by the Islamic State and by the global threat to the United States from terrorism in general. If Congress determines that the existing AUMFs do not apply, it might assert that the President, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, must (1) withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from and (2) terminate hostilities in Iraq and Syria within 60 days from the date when congressional notification of such actions was required unless Congress enacts a new AUMF. Several Members of Congress have called for a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, and a number of legislative proposals were introduced in September 2014.104 101 Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq; Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolutionregarding-syria. 102 See Marty Lederman, “Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory [updated],” Just Security, September 11, 2014, at http://justsecurity.org/14804/first-reactions-2001-aumf-theory/. 103 See Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq). 104 For a comparison of these proposals, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed. Congressional Research Service 33 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy December 2014 Senate Foreign Relations Consideration More recently on December 4, 2014, Senator Rand Paul reportedly intended to propose an amendment to S. 2946, then under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that declares a state of war between the United States and the Islamic State. The provisions in the amendment are substantially similar to those contained in S.J.Res. 46, which also contains this war declaration and authorizes the President to “use the Armed Forces of the United States to protect the people and facilities of the United States in Iraq and Syria against the threats posed thereto” by such organization. The resolution states that such authorization does not extend to any other organization, affiliated with the Islamic State or otherwise. It also prohibits the use of “ground combat forces” under the authorization except for rescue of U.S. armed forces or U.S. citizens, operations against “high-value targets,” and intelligence gathering. The proposed resolution also includes provisions repealing the 2002 AUMF upon enactment, repealing the 2001 AUMF one year after enactment, and stating that the 2001 AUMF does not authorize the use of military force against the Islamic State. The new authorization would itself expire one year after enactment. Any legislative declaration of war against the Islamic State is likely to be controversial for many reasons. A declaration of war has previously only been enacted with regard to another state, not a non-state actor such as the Islamic State. Some argue that the larger international community’s strategy to delegitimize the Islamic State might be undermined by such a declaration. A declaration of war could have significant consequences under both domestic and international law. U.S. law contains many provisions that a triggered by a formal declaration or other recognition of a state of war involving the United States.105 Internationally speaking, the declaration of war by the United States might have ramifications for relations with other states and international organizations, including the United Nations, as international practice and a number of international conventions reflect the growing rejection of a recognized right of one state to initiate armed conflict. Senator Robert Menendez has reportedly106 recently proposed an AUMF that would authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State and “associated persons or forces,” defined as “individuals and organizations fighting for or on behalf of the Islamic State ... or a closely-related successor entity....” The authorization would prohibit “ground combat operations” except for the rescue or protection of U.S. armed forces or U.S. citizens, intelligence gathering, enabling kinetic strikes, operational planning, and providing assistance to forces fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The AUMF would repeal the 2002 AUMF, and states that the authority contained in the AUMF supersedes any previous authority that could apply to the use of force against the Islamic State. The AUMF’s authority would terminate three years after enactment. A number of additional concerns could be raised concerning both recent proposals (and other proposals containing similar provisions). Proposals that do not extend the authorization to use military force against groups that might fight alongside the Islamic State, or that confine military 105 For more information on domestic law implications of a war declaration, see CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed. 106 See Josh Rogin, "Menendez and Paul Go to War Over Islamic State," BloombergView, December 4, 2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-04/menendez-and-paul-go-to-war-over-islamic-state (embedded link to draft resolution: http://go.bloomberg.com/assets/content/uploads/sites/2/Menendez-2nd-Degree-2-to-PaulAmendment-1.pdf). Congressional Research Service 34 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy operations to protection of U.S. armed forces, citizens, and facilities in Iraq and Syria, could be viewed as too narrow for the likely course of military action in the region. As more groups pledge to fight alongside the Islamic State in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, broader use of force proposals might inadvertently be interpreted to authorize geographical expansion outside its original intent. Both current proposals, in addition, purport to limit the application of the 2001 AUMF to the current IS crisis, but do not repeal or amend the 2001 AUMF. Given the Obama Administration’s continuing reliance on that authorization to conduct the current campaign against the Islamic State, leaving the 2001 AUMF in place without amendment might be a continuing source of confusion and contention concerning presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State, and in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East/North Africa region in general. Ground Combat Deployments? President Obama has repeatedly ruled out deploying U.S. ground combat troops in Iraq or Syria.107 He has stated that intervention by U.S. combat troops is not capable of fixing the underlying political problems that caused the insurrection. However, comments by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 14, 2014, and since have presented a potentially more complex picture on this issue.108 At the hearing and in subsequent press interviews, General Dempsey indicated that he might recommend that U.S. advisers in Iraq work directly with Iraqi and peshmerga forces on the battlefield, for example if there were a decision to try to recapture Mosul from Islamic State forces. Still, General Dempsey and other Administration officials have distinguished such “close combat advisory” missions from the introduction of U.S. combat units that would conduct operations against Islamic State forces. President Obama has not indicated whether he would approve such a close combat advisory recommendation, were it to be put forward. Debate outside the Administration centers on the potential efficacy of military operations without U.S. ground forces and larger questions about what circumstances might require the introduction of such forces in the future. Maintaining and Deepening Coalition Support Past U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria suggest that U.S. policy makers may face challenges maintaining unity of purpose among coalition members, sustaining coalition material and financial contributions over time, and managing the risks and costs to the United States associated with limited or conditional commitments by coalition members or sudden shifts in coalition membership. Potential partners’ calculations about the costs and benefits of participating in coalition efforts might be affected by their views on the urgency of acting directly, the soundness of U.S. strategy, the level of U.S. commitment, and potential progress toward political solutions that are more inclusive of Sunni Arabs or less conducive to their strategic goals. The subset of the coalition that is attempting to coordinate military operations in Iraq and Syria (the United States, some GCC states, Jordan, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia) appears to face significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination regarding Syria’s civil war have 107 White House, op. cit. Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14, 2014. 108 Congressional Research Service 35 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy exposed rifts among regional countries, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.109 Relations between Iraq’s government and the Sunni Arab Gulf states have been strained in the post-Saddam Hussein period, in part because Iraq’s government has been dominated by Shiite factions politically close to Iran and seen as excluding Sunnis. The shift from the leadership of former Prime Minister Maliki to current Prime Minister Abbadi may not be sufficient to resolve related concerns. As coalition militaries carry out strikes in Iraq and Syria, such strikes may be seen by the populations of Gulf countries as serving the interests of Iran or further empowering Shiite elements in Iraq. Iraqi government leaders, like their Syrian counterparts, may question the motives of Sunni Arab coalition members, some of whom reportedly have provided support to armed Sunni opposition groups in Syria. In Syria, Sunni Arab coalition partners might disagree on priorities for bolstering various Syrian forces against the Islamic State and the effect such efforts may have on the relative strength of the Asad regime and its supporters (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia). Defining the Way Forward in Syria President Obama has stated that U.S. engagement in Syria will remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.110 Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent such a narrow focus and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with the U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State. These parties also question why the United States and coalition partners are willing to act militarily to halt Islamic State atrocities but not protect Syrian civilians from attacks by government forces or opposition groups. On November 5, President Obama reiterated that:111 Our focus in Syria is not to solve the entire Syria situation, but, rather, to isolate the areas in which ISIL can operate. … Now, there is a specific issue about trying to get a moderate opposition in Syria that can serve as a partner with us on the ground. That’s always been the hardest piece of -- piece of business to get done. …what we’re trying to do is to find a core group that we can work with, that we have confidence in, that we’ve vetted, that can help in regaining territory from ISIL and then ultimately serve as a responsible party to sit at the table in eventual political negotiations that are probably some ways off in the future. 109 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced divisions among themselves—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014. 110 The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014. 111 President Barack Obama, News Conference, November 5, 2014. Congressional Research Service 36 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy …Remember, our first focus here is to drive ISIL out of Iraq. And what we’re doing in Syria is, first and foremost, in service of reducing ISIL’s capacity to resupply and send troops and then run back in over the Syrian border, to eventually reestablish a border between Iraq and Syria so that slowly Iraq regains control of its security and its territory. That is our number one mission. That is our number one focus. In this context, U.S. strikes against Islamic State targets and other terrorist groups in Syria are illuminating several dilemmas faced by the Administration. On one hand, Syrian opposition forces who have been fighting the Islamic State welcome U.S. and coalition assistance in their campaign, but question why the United States does not take military action against the Asad government or take more robust action to degrade IS capabilities in Syria. The Administration hopes to continue to pressure the Asad government into negotiating with opposition groups and fulfilling its pledges with regard to chemical weapons. However, U.S. officials appear to be managing concerns that a full scale degradation of Islamic State forces in Syria could have unintended consequences. Specifically, U.S. officials may be concerned that a more aggressive campaign against the Islamic State may take military pressure off the Asad regime or create opportunities for other extremist groups such as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra to advance. Some U.S. critics of the Obama Administration’s approach to the conflict and terrorism threats in Syria argue that current U.S. strategy lacks effective partners willing or able to advance against Islamic State and/or Al Qaeda-affiliate-held territory on the ground. These critics suggest the United States should either abandon its efforts to support a vetted partner force in Syria or drastically expand the size and scope of those efforts to create a more formidable partner force. Others argue that U.S. strategy is built on faulty assumptions or priorities because it is not based on an inherently confrontational posture toward the regime of President Asad. These critics argue that Asad’s departure or demise is the key to resolving the underlying conflict that has created opportunity for extremists to thrive. Still other critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives will likely require U.S. or other ground combat troops or an expansion of the planned “train and equip” program for vetted Syrians to focus more aggressively on pressuring Asad to accept a negotiated solution. For the moment, the Administration does not appear to view resolving the underlying conflict in Syria as its top priority and is taking steps in Syria designed to mitigate terrorism threats and advance U.S. goals for stabilizing Iraq. It remains to be seen whether or not this approach will succeed. It could so alienate potential partners in Syria that when the United States decides to give priority to the stabilization of Syria it will find itself bereft of local allies, or will confront stronger Islamist groups and/or an empowered Syrian government. Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration112 What are overall U.S. priorities in the strategy against the Islamic State organization, and how are these priorities shaping the U.S. response? 112 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service 37 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy What are the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy against the Islamic State? What successes and failures of the strategy can you point to, to date? What factors could hinder the implementation or effectiveness of the strategy? With respect to Iraq, is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional differences? Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State. With respect to Iraq, what concrete steps has Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi taken to reduce Sunni Arab support for the Islamic State? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate in areas under its control? With respect to Syria, to what extent, if any, is the long-term success of U.S. strategy dependent on any changes in the composition of the Syrian government? How have various Syrian forces reacted to U.S. and coalition airstrikes since September 2014? How has the Syrian government responded, if at all? How have U.S. actions helped or hurt the Asad government since that time? How, if at all, should the effort against the Islamic State shape congressional consideration of pending authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance? To what extent do the Islamic State’s gains reflect its organizational capabilities? To what extent to these gains reflect the weaknesses, divisions, or limitations of its adversaries? To what extent and how is U.S. strategy assisting locally organized forces in areas under Islamic State control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations? To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States conflict or coincide, with respect to the Islamic State issue? To what extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support Iraq’s government and Shiite militia forces contradict or support those of the United States? Please answer with respect to Iran’s policy of supporting the Asad regime in Syria? What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program? To what extent will the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey support anti-Islamic State entities in areas adjacent to their territory? What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the Iraqi government? What has been the reaction of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to increased U.S. support for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is still aligned with Iran? How has Iran responded, if at all? How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security situation in that area generally and in Iraq specifically? What is the likelihood that the Kurds will implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near future? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG? Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of developments related to the Islamic State? Congressional Research Service 38 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy What are the humanitarian implications of the crisis? Please discuss the situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly those displaced in the last several months. What are the most pressing assistance needs and priorities? What are the challenges for an effective humanitarian response by the international community? How would you assess the international humanitarian operation so far? What action is the U.S. government taking in support of international humanitarian efforts? Author Contact Information Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612 Rhoda Margesson Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425 Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428 Alex TierskyMatthew C. Weed Analyst in Foreign Affairs atierskyPolicy Legislation mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-73674589 Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314 Matthew C. Weed Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589 Congressional Research Service 2839