< Back to Current Version

The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Current Status

Changes from August 21, 2014 to January 19, 2016

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.


The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues William R. Morton Analyst in Income Security August 21, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43318 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Summary Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is a social insurance program that provides benefits to insured workers under the full retirement age who meet the statutory test of disability and to their eligible dependents. Unlike some other federal programs, benefit payments and administrative costs associated with the SSDI program are paid not out of the General Fund but from a dedicated Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury. Like the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, which pays for Social Security retirement and survivor benefits, the DI trust fund is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on covered wages and covered self-employment income. The two trust funds also receive income from the taxation of some Social Security benefits and from interest earned on trust fund investments. Occasionally, the OASI and DI trust funds receive income via reimbursements from the General Fund of the Treasury. All trust fund balances are invested in special-issue (non-marketable), interest-bearing U.S. government securities. Each trust fund is a separate account in the U.S. Treasury, and the two funds may not borrow from one another under current law. Increasingly, some Members of Congress and the public have expressed concern over the solvency of the DI trust fund. Total expenditures have exceeded non-interest income since 2005 and have surpassed total income (including interest) since 2009. In 2013, DI income was $111.2 billion and DI expenditures were $143.4 billion. To make up for the shortfall between total income and expenditures, the DI trust fund used some of its asset reserves (investments) and redeemed a net total of $32.2 billion in special-issue U.S. government securities. Under current law, the Social Security trustees project that the DI trust fund will be exhausted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts a similar exhaustion date in early FY2017, which overlaps with the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. Once the DI trust fund is depleted, the Social Security trustees estimate that the SSDI program will have enough continuing tax revenues to pay 81% of scheduled benefits. This percentage rises to a slightly higher level for 2020 through 2040, before declining to 80% in 2088. The declining solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between the fund’s income and expenditures. Over the past 20 years, tax revenues to the DI trust fund have remained relatively flat as a share of taxable payroll, while expenditures as a percentage of taxable payroll have grown markedly. The increase in expenditures stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI. Between 1990 and 2013, the total number of individuals receiving SSDI benefits (disabled workers and their dependents) increased 155.8% (from 4.3 million to 11.0 million). Because benefit payments account for nearly all program spending, the growth in the number individuals receiving SSDI benefits has contributed heavily to the worsening financial condition of the DI trust fund. Most researchers agree that changes in the demographic characteristics of the working-age population account for a substantial share of the growth in the number of individuals on SSDI. Demographic changes include (1) the aging of the baby-boomer generation, (2) the growth in women’s labor force participation, and (3) the overall growth in the insured-worker population. However, there is considerable disagreement among researchers over how non-demographic factors have contributed to the growth in the size of the program, such as changes in opportunities Congressional Research Service Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues for work and compensation, changes to federal policy that altered certain program eligibility criteria, and inconsistency in the disability determination and adjudication process. In recent years, a number of researchers have developed proposals to limit the growth in SSDI enrollment. In the past, Congress has used temporary cash infusions to bolster the asset reserves of nearly depleted trust funds. Typically, the aim of this policy is to improve the financial solvency of a trust fund in the short term, in order to give lawmakers additional time to develop and implement longer-term solutions. For example, Congress could authorize interfund borrowing among the OASI, DI, and Medicare’s Hospital Insurance (HI) trust funds to strengthen the asset reserves of the DI trust temporarily. Additionally, Congress could change the allocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds to provide the DI trust fund with a larger share. According to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) Office of the Chief Actuary, a reallocation of the payroll tax rate to equalize the financial conditions of the OASI and DI trust funds would extend the solvency of the DI trust fund until 2033. However, such a reallocation would also reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund slightly. Congressional Research Service Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 Background on the SSDI Program................................................................................................... 1 Eligibility ................................................................................................................................... 1 Benefits ...................................................................................................................................... 2 The Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund........................................................................... 3 Financing ................................................................................................................................... 3 Current and Projected Financial Condition of the DI Trust Fund ............................................. 5 Trustees’ Projections ........................................................................................................... 6 CBO’s Projections ............................................................................................................... 8 What Would Happen If the DI Trust Fund’s Reserves Were Depleted? .................................... 8 Factors Behind the Status of the DI Trust Fund ............................................................................... 9 Possible Short-Term Solutions....................................................................................................... 12 Interfund Borrowing ................................................................................................................ 12 Payroll Tax Reallocation.......................................................................................................... 14 Potential Rate Schedule to Extend the Solvency of the DI Trust Fund ............................. 16 Possible Long-Term Solutions ....................................................................................................... 17 Figures Figure 1. Actual and Projected DI Trust Fund Ratios, 2000-2023 ................................................... 8 Figure 2. DI Income and Cost Rates, 1990-2013........................................................................... 10 Figure 3. Actual and Projected OASI, DI, and HI Trust Fund Ratios............................................ 14 Figure A-1. Actual and Projected DI Income and Cost Rates with Scheduled and Payable Benefits, 1970-2090.................................................................................................................... 20 Tables Table 1. Social Security and Medicare Payroll Tax Rates ............................................................... 4 Table 2. Annual Operations of the DI Trust Fund, 2003-2013 ........................................................ 6 Table 3. Interfund Loans From the DI and HI Trust Funds to the OASI Trust Fund, 1982 ........... 13 Table 4. Legislative History of Payroll Tax Reallocations Between the OASI and DI Trust Funds .......................................................................................................................................... 15 Table 5. OASDI Payroll Tax Rate Reallocations under the Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-387) ...................................................................... 15 Table 6. Potential Reallocation of the OASDI Payroll Tax Rate, 2015 and Beyond .................... 17 Table A-1. Key Dates Projected for the Social Security Trust Funds as Shown Under the Intermediate Assumptions in Trustees Reports from 1983 to 2014 ............................................ 19 Congressional Research Service Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Appendixes Appendix. Supplemental Tables and Figures................................................................................. 19 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21 Congressional Research Service Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Introduction Some Members of Congress and the public have increasingly expressed concern over the solvency of the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, from which Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits are paid.1 Total expenditures have exceeded non-interest income since 2005 and have surpassed total income (including interest) since 2009. According to the Social Security trustees, the DI trust fund will be exhausted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016 under current law.2 Once it is depleted, the DI trust fund will have enough continuing tax revenues to pay around 81% of scheduled SSDI benefits. This report provides an overview of the DI trust fund and examines potential solutions to improve the DI trust fund’s solvency in the short term. Background on the SSDI Program Enacted in 1956 under Title II of the Social Security Act, SSDI is part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). OASDI is a form of social insurance designed to protect against the loss of income due to retirement, disability, or death.3 Like Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), SSDI replaces a portion of an insured worker’s earnings based on the individual’s work history and career-average earnings in covered employment.4 Specifically, SSDI provides benefits to insured workers under the full retirement age who meet the statutory test of disability and to their eligible dependents. In July 2014, 10.9 million individuals received SSDI benefits, including 9.0 million disabled workers, 152 thousand spouses of disabled workers, and 1.8 million children of disabled workers.5 Eligibility To qualify for SSDI, workers must be (1) insured in the event of disability and (2) statutorily disabled. To achieve insured status, individuals generally must have worked in covered 1 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, First in a Hearing Series on Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 2, 2011, (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 4-5, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76319/pdf/ CHRG-112hhrg76319.pdf. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security: A Fresh Look at Workers’ Disability Insurance, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2014, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 07242014%20Wyden%20Hearing%20Statement%20on%20Keeping%20the%20Promise%20of%20Social%20Security 1.pdf. 2 The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, The 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table IV.B2, July 28, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/index.html (hereinafter cited as “2014 Social Security Trustees Report”). Projections are based on the trustees’ intermediate assumptions. 3 For more information on the concept of social insurance, see Larry DeWitt, “The Development of Social Security in America,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 70, no. 3 (August 2010), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/ v70n3p1.html. 4 For more information on the OASI program, see CRS Report R42035, Social Security Primer, by Dawn Nuschler. 5 Social Security Administration (SSA), Monthly Statistical Snapshot, July 2014, August 2014, Table 2, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (hereinafter cited as “SSA Monthly Statistical Snapshot”). Congressional Research Service 1 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues employment about a quarter of their adult lives before they became disabled and for at least 5 of the past 10 years immediately before the onset of disability.6 In 2013, 150.5 million workers were insured in the event of disability.7 To meet the statutory test of disability, an insured worker must be unable to engage in any Fund: Background and Current Status January 19, 2016 (R43318) Jump to Main Text of Report

Contents

Summary

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) provides benefits to nonelderly workers and their eligible dependents if the worker paid Social Security taxes for a certain number of years and is unable to perform substantial work due to a qualifying impairment. As in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—the retirement component of Social Security—benefits are based on a worker's past earnings in covered employment. In December 2014, SSDI provided disability insurance coverage to more than 151 million people and paid benefits to about 9 million disabled workers and 2 million of their spouses and children.

Benefits and administrative costs for SSDI and OASI are financed primarily by dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of covered workers, which are deposited in the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, respectively. The combined Social Security tax on earnings is 12.40%, which is split equally between workers and employers (6.20% each). Of that amount, 2.37% is allocated to the DI trust fund and 10.03% is allocated to the OASI trust fund. Each trust fund is a legally distinct account in the U.S. Treasury, and under current law, the two trust funds may not borrow from one another.

Over the past few years, Congress has grown increasingly concerned with the financial outlook of the DI trust fund. Cost has exceeded total income since 2009, causing the balance of the DI trust fund to shrink. In their July 2015 report, the Social Security trustees projected that the DI trust fund would be depleted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. Upon depletion of its asset reserves, the DI trust fund was projected to have enough ongoing revenues to pay only about 80% of scheduled benefits. The trustees projected that the OASI trust fund would be depleted in 2035.

The Social Security Act provides no guidance on the payment of benefits once a trust fund's asset reserves have been depleted and current tax revenues are insufficient to meet current cost. Although individuals who meet Social Security's eligibility requirements are legally entitled to disability benefits, a provision in the Antideficiency Act prohibits a federal agency from spending in excess of available funds. Because the Social Security Act stipulates that SSDI benefit payments shall be made only from the DI trust fund, without a change in the law, monthly cash payments to beneficiaries could be delayed or reduced if the DI trust fund were depleted.

The decreasing solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between the fund's income and cost. Over the past 20 years, tax revenues to the DI trust fund have remained relatively flat as a percentage of taxable payroll, whereas cost as a share of taxable payroll has grown markedly. The increase in cost stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries in the program. Between 1995 and 2014, the number of disabled workers and their dependents in receipt of SSDI grew 85%, from 5.9 million to 10.9 million. Because benefit payments account for nearly all program spending, the growth in the SSDI rolls has contributed heavily to the financial difficulties of the DI trust fund.

On November 2, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74). Among its many provisions, the act authorized a temporary reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds to provide DI with a larger share for 2016 through 2018. Specifically, the DI trust fund's share of the combined tax rate increased by 0.57 percentage point at the beginning of 2016, from 1.80% to 2.37%. Because the act did not change the combined payroll tax rate of 12.40%, the portion of the tax rate allocated to OASI decreased by a corresponding amount. This means that OASI's share of the combined tax rate declined by 0.57 percentage point at the start of 2016, from 10.60% to 10.03%. For 2019 and later, the shares allocated to the DI and OASI trust funds are scheduled to return to their 2015 levels (i.e., 1.80% to the DI trust fund and 10.60% to the OASI trust fund).

The Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT) projects that the reallocation will extend the solvency of the DI trust fund from the fourth quarter of 2016 to the third quarter of 2022. Although the reallocation will reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund slightly, OACT estimates that the depletion year for OASI will remain unchanged at 2035.

The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Current Status

Introduction

Lawmakers and the public have expressed increasing concern over the solvency of the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund, from which Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits are paid.1 Until recently, the DI trust fund was projected to be depleted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016, at which time ongoing revenues to the DI trust fund were projected to be sufficient to pay only about 80% of scheduled benefits.2 In November 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74) extended the projected solvency of the DI trust fund by authorizing a reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the DI and the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust funds to provide DI with a larger share. Although the reallocation averted a potential benefit cut in late 2016, without additional legislation action (i.e., revenue increases, cost reductions, or some combination thereof), the DI trust fund is projected to be unable to pay scheduled benefits in full and on a timely basis by the early 2020s.

This report provides an overview of the DI trust fund and its current financial outlook. It begins with background information on the SSDI program and the financing of the Social Security trust funds. Next, the report examines the financial status of the DI trust fund over the past 20 years and the causes of the DI trust fund's financial imbalance. It then discusses the projected status of the DI trust fund under prior law and under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. Lastly, the report provides background information on the use of reallocations by Congress in the past, as well as on a House rules change in the 114th Congress concerning payroll tax reallocations. The appendix of the report provides a congressional rationale for the creation of a separate DI trust fund as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880).

Background on SSDI

Enacted in 1956 under Title II of the Social Security Act, SSDI is part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, more commonly known as Social Security. As in OASI—the retirement component of Social Security—SSDI is a form of social insurance that replaces a portion of a worker's income based on the individual's work history and career-average earnings in covered employment.3 Specifically, SSDI provides benefits to nonelderly insured workers who meet the statutory definition of disability and to their eligible dependents. In November 2015, the Social Security Administration (SSA) paid benefits to more than 10.8 million SSDI recipients, including 8.9 million disabled workers, 142,000 spouses of disabled workers, and 1.8 million children of disabled workers.4

Eligibility

To qualify for SSDI, workers must be (1) under the full retirement age (FRA), (2) insured in the event of disability, and (3) statutorily disabled. The FRA is the age at which unreduced Social Security retirement benefits are first payable, which is currently 66.5 To achieve insured status, individuals must have worked in covered employment for about a quarter of their adult lives before they became disabled and for at least 5 years of the 10 years immediately before the onset of disability.6 However, younger workers may qualify with less work experience based on their age. In 2014, SSDI provided disability insurance coverage to more than 151 million nonelderly workers.7

To meet the statutory definition of disability, an insured worker must be unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can beis expected to result in death or last for at least a year.8 The monthly SGA earnings limit in 2014 is $1,070 for non-blind individuals and $1,800 for statutorily blind individuals.9 In general, workers must have a severe condition that prevents them from doing any kind of work that exists in the national economy. Benefits SSDI beneficiaries receive cash benefits after a five-month waiting period from their disability onset date.10 Initial cash benefits are based on a worker’s past average monthly earnings, indexed to reflect changes in average wage levels. Benefits paid to current beneficiaries are adjusted to account for inflation through cost-of-living adjustments (COLA), as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). In July 2014, the average monthly benefit was $1,145.52 for a disabled worker, $308.89 for a spouse of a disabled worker, and $341.13 for a child of a disabled worker.11 Disabled-worker beneficiaries also receive health care coverage under Medicare following a 24month waiting period.12 Furthermore, some SSDI beneficiaries may qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI is a need-based program that provides cash benefits to ensure a minimum income to aged, blind, or disabled individuals with limited income and assets.13 In July 2014, over 1.6 million disabled individuals under age 65 received both Social Security and SSI cash benefits.14 Disabled workers generally maintain their eligibility for benefits as long as they are under their full retirement age, exhibit no substantial medical improvement, and have monthly earnings within the SGA limit. 6 See CRS Report RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by William R. Morton. 7 SSA, Disabled Insured Workers, accessed August 15, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c2DI.html. 8 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1). 9 For more information on SGA limits, see SSA, Substantial Gainful Activity, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html. 10 The first month counted as part of the waiting period can be no more than 17 months before the month of application. For more information, see CRS Report RS22220, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI): The Five-Month Waiting Period for Benefits, by William R. Morton. 11 SSA Monthly Statistical Snapshot, Table 2. SSA may offset cash benefits if a disabled-worker beneficiary also receives workers’ compensation or other public disability benefits. Moreover, cash benefits to spouses and children of disabled workers are subject to certain maximum family benefit limits. 12 Due to the five-month waiting period for cash benefits, Medicare eligibility begins 29 months after the onset of disability. 13 For more information on SSI, see CRS Report 94-486, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by William R. Morton. 14 Monthly Statistical Snapshot, Table 1. The vast majority of SSI beneficiaries under age 65 in concurrent receipt of Social Security draw SSDI cash benefits; however, some SSI beneficiaries under age 65 receive dependents’ benefits from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program. Congressional Research Service 2 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues The Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund A trust fund is an accounting mechanism that records and keeps track of revenues, offsetting receipts, or collections earmarked for the purpose of the specific federal fund.15 Although Social Security (OASDI) is often viewed as a single program, its financing comes from two legally distinct trust funds.16 Whereas the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund finances the benefits of retired-worker beneficiaries and their dependents, as well as survivors of deceased workers, the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund finances the benefits of disabled workers and their dependents.17 Each trust fund is a separate account in the U.S. Treasury, and the two funds may not borrow from one another under current law. For more information on trust funds, see CRS Report R41328, Federal Trust Funds and the Budget, by Mindy R. Levit. For more information on the combined OASI and DI trust funds, see CRS Report RL33028, Social Security: The Trust Fund, by Dawn Nuschler and Gary Sidor.18 Financing The OASI and DI trust funds are financed primarily by payroll taxes levied on covered wages and covered self-employment income. Employees and employers each pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, while Self-Employment Contribution Act (SECA) taxes are borne fully by self-employed individuals.19 As shown in Table 1, the FICA tax rate is 7.65% for employees and employers each (15.3% combined), with 6.2% directed to Social Security (OASDI) and 1.45% directed to Medicare’s Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund.20 Of the 6.2% allocated to Social Security from the FICA tax rate, the OASI trust fund receives 5.3% and the DI trust fund receives 0.9%. The SECA tax rate is 15.3%, with 12.4% directed to Social Security and 2.9% to Medicare’s HI trust fund. Of the 12.4% allocated to Social Security from the SECA tax rate, the OASI trust fund receives 10.6% and the DI trust fund receives 1.8%. Social Security (OASDI) and Medicare tax rates are prescribed in sections 1401, 3101, and 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)21, and 15 See CRS Report R41328, Federal Trust Funds and the Budget, by Mindy R. Levit. 42 U.S.C. §401 (Section 201 of the Social Security Act). 17 For more information on the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, see SSA, Disability Insurance Trust Fund, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describedi.html. 18 See also SSA, Trust Fund FAQs, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/fundFAQ.html. 19 For information on how FICA and SECA taxes are calculated and credited to the OASI and DI trust funds, see SSA, Office of the Chief Actuary, Tax Deposits & Adjustments, accessed August 7, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/ taxflow.html. 20 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) imposes an additional 0.9% tax on high-income workers with wages and self-employment income over $200,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012. The revenues from the 0.9% tax are allocated to the HI trust fund. For more information, see CRS Report R41436, Medicare Financing, by Patricia A. Davis. See also Internal Revenue Service, Questions and Answers for the Additional Medicare Tax, June 24, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Questions-and-Answers-for-the-AdditionalMedicare-Tax. 21 The IRC is Title 26 of the U.S. Code. 16 Congressional Research Service 3 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues the allocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds is set in section 201(b) of the Social Security Act.22 Social Security taxes are levied on covered wages and covered self-employment income up to a taxable maximum of $117,000 in 2014.23 In 2013, payroll tax revenues credited to the DI trust fund amounted to $105.4 billion or 94.8% of total DI trust fund income.24 Table 1. Social Security and Medicare Payroll Tax Rates FICA SECA Employees and Employers, Each Combined Self Employed OASI 5.30% 10.60% 10.60% DI 0.90% 1.80% 1.80% OASDI 6.20% 12.40% 12.40% 1.45%a 2.90%a 2.90%a 7.65% 15.30% 15.30% Social Security Medicare HI Total FICA/SECA Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). a. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) imposes an additional 0.9% tax on high-income workers with wages and self-employment income over $200,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012. In addition to payroll taxes, the OASI and DI trust funds receive income from the interest earned on trust fund investments. When Social Security tax revenues exceed expenditures in a given year, the surplus is credited to the trust funds in the form of special-issue (non-marketable) U.S. government securities.25 These trust fund investments, or asset reserves, accrue interest, which the U.S. Treasury credits to the trust funds semiannually in the form of additional U.S. government securities. In 2013, net interest from the DI trust fund’s asset reserves totaled $4.7 billion or 4.2% of total DI trust fund income.26 The OASI and DI trust funds also receive revenues from the taxation of Social Security benefits. Beneficiaries who file a federal tax return as an individual with provisional income (adjusted gross income, plus nontaxable interest, plus certain income exclusions, plus one-half of Social Security benefits) between $25,000 and $34,000 may have to pay income tax on up to 50% of benefits.27 For beneficiaries filing a joint federal tax return, married couples with provisional 22 42 U.S.C. §401(b). For more information on the taxable maximum, see SSA, Contribution and Benefit Base, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ COLA/cbb.html. Unlike the Social Security tax rate, the Medicare tax rate applies to all covered earnings. 24 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.A2. 25 In the past, the DI trust fund held publicly available securities. For more information on Social Security investment holdings, see CRS Report RS20607, Social Security: Trust Fund Investment Practices, by Dawn Nuschler. 26 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A2. In 2013, the asset reserves of the DI trust fund earned an effective annual interest rate of 4.5%. For more information, see SSA, Effective Interest Rates, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/effectiveRates.html. 27 26 U.S.C. §86. For more information on the taxation of Social Security benefits, see CRS Report RL32552, Social (continued...) 23 Congressional Research Service 4 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues income between $32,000 and $44,000 may have to pay income tax on up to 50% of benefits. Revenues derived from taxing Social Security benefits are credited to the OASI and DI trust funds based on the source of the benefits taxed. In 2013, revenues credited to the DI trust fund from the taxation of benefits totaled $0.4 billion or 0.4% of DI trust fund income.28 Occasionally, the OASI and DI trust funds receive reimbursements from the General Fund of the Treasury for various costs imposed on the two programs.29 For example, in 2011 and 2012, the OASI and DI trust funds received reimbursements from the General Fund to compensate for the loss of revenues from a temporary payroll tax reduction. In 2013, reimbursements from the General Fund to the DI trust fund totaled $0.7 billion or 0.6% of DI trust fund income.30 Current and Projected Financial Condition of the DI Trust Fund The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (hereinafter “the trustees”) presents an annual report to Congress on the current and projected financial conditions of the OASI and DI trust funds.31 According to the trustees, the balance of the DI trust fund (i.e., the amount of accumulated trust fund assets) is declining. Total expenditures have exceeded non-interest income since 2005 and have surpassed total income since 2009 (see Table A-1 in the appendix for more information). In 2013, total DI income was $111.2 billion and DI expenditures were $143.4 billion. To make up for the shortfall between total income and expenditures in 2013, the DI trust fund used its asset reserves and redeemed a net total of $32.2 billion in U.S. government securities.32 As shown in Table 2, the asset reserves held by the DI trust fund decreased from $122.7 billion at the end of 2012 to $90.4 billion at the end of 2013. (...continued) Security: Calculation and History of Taxing Benefits, by Noah P. Meyerson. 28 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A2. 29 The OASI and DI trust funds receive reimbursements from the General Fund for (1) the cost of noncontributory wage credits for military service before 1957; (2) the cost in 1971-1982 of deemed wage credits for military service performed after 1956; (3) the cost of benefits to certain uninsured persons who attained the age of 72 before 1968; (4) the cost of payroll tax credits provided to employees in 1984 and self-employed persons in 1984-1989 by P.L. 98-21; (5) the cost in 2009-2013 of excluding certain self-employment earnings from SECA taxes under P.L. 110-246; and (6) payroll tax revenue forgone under the provisions of P.L. 111-147, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78, and P.L. 112-96. For more information, see 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, p.146. 30 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A2. 31 42 U.S.C. §401(c).The Social Security Board of Trustees is composed of six members: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Commissioner of Social Security, and two public representatives who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for four-year terms. 32 For data on OASI and DI investment transactions, see SSA, Investment Transactions, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ ProgData/transactions.html. Congressional Research Service 5 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Table 2. Annual Operations of the DI Trust Fund, 2003-2013 (dollar amounts in billions) Income Expenditures Asset Reserves Total Expenditures Net Change During the Year Amount at the End of the Year $2.2 $73.1 $15.0 $175.4 78.2 2.4 80.6 10.8 186.2 97.4 85.4 2.6 88.0 9.4 195.6 10.6 102.6 91.7 2.7 94.5 8.2 203.8 96.6 13.2 109.9 95.9 2.9 98.8 11.1 214.9 2008 98.9 11.0 109.8 106.0 2.9 109.0 0.9 215.8 2009 98.9 10.5 109.3 118.3 3.1 121.5 -12.2 203.5 2010 94.8 9.3 104.0 124.2 3.5 127.7 -23.6 179.9 2011 98.4 7.9 106.3 128.9 3.4 132.3 -26.1 153.9 2012 102.7 6.4 109.1 136.9 3.4 140.3 -31.2 122.7 2013 106.5 4.7 111.2 140.1 3.4 143.4 -32.2 90.4 Year NonInterest Incomea Net Interest on Assets Total Income Benefit Payments Admin. Expensesb 2003 $78.3 $9.7 $88.1 $70.9 2004 81.4 10.0 91.4 2005 87.2 10.3 2006 92.0 2007 Source: CRS table based on data from The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, The 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table VI.A2, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/ VI_A_cyoper_hist.html#288797 (hereinafter cited as “2014 Social Security Trustees Report”). Notes: Totals may not equal subtotals due to rounding. a. Non-interest income includes net payroll tax contributions, General Fund reimbursements, and revenues from the taxation of benefits. b. Administrative Expenses include the financial interchange with the Railroad Retirement Board. Trustees’ Projections According to the trustees, a trust fund is solvent if it can pay all scheduled benefits in full and on time.33 One method for gauging solvency is to measure the amount of reserves a trust fund has on hand to cover its expected expenditures over a specified period. A trust fund ratio is a measure of a trust fund’s asset reserves at the beginning of a year expressed as a percentage of actual or expected total expenditures for that year.34 The trustees consider a trust fund ratio of 100% in a given year to be a reasonable contingency reserve to ensure against the risk of insolvency should unforeseen circumstances (such as an economic downturn) quickly draw down a trust fund’s reserves. To estimate the future financial status of the DI trust fund, the Social Security trustees produce short-range and long-range actuarial projections under three sets of economic and demographic 33 34 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, p. 39. Ibid. Congressional Research Service 6 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues assumptions: intermediate, low-cost, and high-cost. Intermediate assumptions represent the trustees’ best estimate of the financial condition of the DI trust fund in the future. The low-cost and high-cost sets of assumptions, on the other hand, depict extraordinarily favorable (low-cost) or unfavorable (high-cost) possibilities for the DI trust fund’s future solvency.35 According to the trustees, actual future costs are “unlikely to be as extreme as those portrayed by the low-cost and high-cost projections.”36 Therefore, projections cited in this report are based on the trustees’ intermediate assumptions, unless otherwise specified. To satisfy the trustees’ short-range test of financial adequacy, the DI trust fund must maintain a trust fund ratio of 100% or more over a 10-year projection period (2014-2023). If the trust fund ratio is under 100% at the start of the 10-year projection period, it must rise to at least 100% within five years (without becoming depleted) and then remain at or above 100% throughout the rest of the 10-year period. To pass the trustees’ long-range test of close actuarial balance, the DI trust fund must (1) satisfy the short-range test of financial adequacy and (2) maintain a trust fund ratio above zero throughout the 75-year projected period.37 As shown in Figure 1, under their intermediate, low-cost, and high-cost sets of assumptions, the trustees project that the DI trust fund ratio will remain below 100% over the entire 10-year projection period. Therefore, the DI trust fund fails both the short-range test of financial adequacy and the long-range test of close actuarial balance under all three scenarios. Under their high cost and intermediate sets of assumptions, the trustees project that DI asset reserves would continue to decline until depletion in the second and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016, respectively. Moreover, the DI trust fund would continue to run annual cash flow deficits under both sets of assumptions.38 A cash flow deficit occurs when annual expenditures exceed tax revenues. Under their low-cost assumptions, the trustees estimate that the DI trust fund ratio would fall to 2% in 2019 and 2020 before increasing to 12% in 2023. However, advance tax transfers from the General Fund would be required to pay all scheduled benefits in a timely manner. Advance tax transfers are payroll tax receipts credited to a trust fund on the first of the month rather than throughout the month to ensure the timely payment of benefits.39 The DI trust fund would subsequently run cash flow surpluses under the low-cost assumptions beginning in 2020. A cash flow surplus occurs when annual tax revenues exceed expenditures. It is important to note that the low-cost assumptions reflect relatively rapid economic growth, as well as immediate and extreme changes to program enrollment and termination rates.40 35 Ibid., p. 220. According to the trustees, the low-cost set of assumptions assumes relatively rapid economic growth, low inflation, and favorable demographic and program-specific conditions. Conversely, the high-cost set of assumptions assumes relatively slow economic growth, high inflation, and unfavorable demographic and programspecific conditions. 36 Ibid., p. 18. In addition, the trustees caution against using the low-cost and high-cost estimates as a range of possible outcomes. 37 Ibid., p. 62. 38 Ibid., Table IV.B1, p. 50. Under both high-cost and intermediate sets of assumptions, the trustees project that the DI cost rate (as a percentage of taxable payroll) will continue to exceed the DI income rate through 2090. 39 Ibid., p. 43. Under current law, advance tax transfers are permitted when the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the assets of the OASI or DI trust funds are insufficient to pay full scheduled benefits for any month (see 42 U.S.C. §401[a]). Advance tax transfers must be repaid to the General Fund with interest. 40 Ibid., p. 220. Congressional Research Service 7 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Figure 1. Actual and Projected DI Trust Fund Ratios, 2000-2023 (asset reserves as a percentage of annual expenditures) Trust Fund Ratio 250% Actual Projected 200% 150% Minimum Level under the ShortRange Test of Financial Adequacy 100% Intermediate 50% 0% 2000 Low Cost High Cost 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Source: CRS graph based on data from the 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Figure IV.B3, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/LD_figIVB3.html. Notes: The trust fund ratio represents asset reserves at the beginning of a year as a percentage of total expenditures for the year. Therefore, projections will indicate a positive trust fund ratio at the beginning of an estimated trust fund exhaustion year. For example, under their intermediate assumptions, the trustees project that the DI trust fund’s asset reserves will be depleted during 2016. However, the trustees estimate that the DI trust fund will have an 18% trust fund ratio at the beginning of 2016 (i.e., $28.4 billion in projected asset reserves to $155.8 billion in projected total expenditures). CBO’s Projections Based on its April 2014 baseline, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the DI trust fund will be exhausted in early FY2017, which overlaps with the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016.41 What Would Happen If the DI Trust Fund’s Reserves Were Depleted? Under current law, the trustees estimate that the DI trust fund will be unable to meet its financial obligations by the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. Although the DI trust fund will continue to receive revenues from payroll taxes and the taxation of benefits, it will be unable to 41 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds—CBO’s April 2014 Baseline, April 2014, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43890-2014-04Social_Security_Trust_Fund.pdf. CBO projects that the DI trust fund will have a balance of $8.0 billion at the beginning of FY2017 (i.e., October 2016). Congressional Research Service 8 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues pay all scheduled benefits in a timely manner. Upon depletion of its asset reserves, the DI trust fund will have enough continuing tax revenues to pay 81% of scheduled SSDI benefits under current law.42 This percentage rises to a slightly higher level for 2020 through 2040, before declining to 80% in 2088 (see Figure A-1 in the appendix for more information).43 The Social Security Act provides no guidance on the payment of benefits once a trust fund’s asset reserves have been depleted and current tax revenues are insufficient to meet current expenditures. Although individuals who meet SSDI’s eligibility requirements are legally entitled to disability benefits, a provision in the Antideficiency Act prohibits a federal agency from spending in excess of available funds.44 Since the Social Security Act stipulates that SSDI benefit payments shall be made only from the DI trust fund, without a change in the law, monthly cash payments to SSDI beneficiaries could be delayed or reduced.45 For more information on Social Security trust fund exhaustion, see CRS Report RL33514, Social Security: What Would Happen If the Trust Funds Ran Out?, by Christine Scott. For a legal analysis of benefit entitlement in the context of trust fund insolvency, see CRS Report RL32822, Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues, by Kathleen S. Swendiman and Thomas J. Nicola. Factors Behind the Status of the DI Trust Fund As Figure 2 illustrates, the declining solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between its income and cost rates (i.e., tax revenues and expenditures, respectively, expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll). Taxable payroll is defined as the total effective amount of wages and self-employment income in the economy that is subject to Social Security taxes. Between 2000 and 2013, the DI income rate stayed relatively constant (from 1.78% to 1.81% of taxable payroll), whereas the DI cost rate grew markedly (from 1.42% to 2.43% of taxable payroll).46 The increase in the DI cost rate stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI. Between 1990 and 2013, the total number of individuals receiving SSDI benefits (disabled workers and their dependents) increased 155.8% (from 4.3 million to 11.0 million).47 During that time, spending on SSDI benefits doubled as a share of the economy, from 0.42% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990 to 0.84% of GDP in 2013.48 Because benefit payments account for nearly all program expenditures, the increase in the number of SSDI beneficiaries drove the DI cost rate upward.49 42 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, p.12. Ibid. 44 42 U.S.C. §423 and 31 U.S.C. §1341. 45 42 U.S.C. §401(h). 46 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.B1. 47 Ibid., Table V.C5. 48 GDP data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Current-dollar and “real” GDP, July 30, 2014, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. DI expenditure data are from the SSA, DI Trust Fund, A Social Security Fund, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4a2.html. 49 In 2013, benefit payments accounted for 97.7% of DI trust fund expenditures. See 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.A2. 43 Congressional Research Service 9 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Figure 2. DI Income and Cost Rates, 1990-2013 (as a percentage of taxable payroll) 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% Income Rate 1.5% 1.0% Cost Rate 0.5% 0.0% 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Source: CRS graph based on data from the 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Figure IV.B1, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/LD_figIVB1.html. Notes: The income rate excludes net interest. The cost rate includes benefits and administrative expenses. The marked increase in the DI income rate in 1994 stemmed from a reallocation of the payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds (see the section of the report titled “Payroll Tax Reallocation”). For DI income and cost rate projections, see Figure A-1 in the appendix. The rise in disability rolls can be attributed to a number of factors.50 First, the overall growth in the working-age population increased the number of workers insured for disability.51 Between 1990 and 2013, the insured-worker population increased 26.0% (from 119.4 million to 150.5 million).52 Second, demographic changes in the composition of the insured-worker population contributed to the increase in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI.53 Most importantly, the aging of the babyboomer generation increased the number of older workers, who are more likely to become disabled than are younger workers.54 In addition, growth in the labor force participation rate of women in the latter half of the 20th century led to more women being insured for disability.55 As 50 See Mary C. Daly, Brian Lucking, and Jonathan A. Schwabish, The Future of Social Security Disability Insurance, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter 2013-17, June 24, 2013, http://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/publications/economic-letter/2013/june/future-social-security-disability-insurance-ssdi/el2013-17.pdf. 51 See David Pattison and Hilary Waldron, “Growth in New Disabled-Worker Entitlements, 1970–2008,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 4 (November 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n4/v73n4p25.html. 52 SSA, Disability Insured Workers, accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c2DI.html. 53 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, pp. 135-136. 54 Ibid. See also Kathy Ruffing, How Much of the Growth in Disability Insurance Stems From Demographic Changes?, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 27, 2014, Table 1, p. 5, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view& id=4080. 55 Social Security Advisory Board, Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials, Table 2b, February 2012, p. 7, http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/GPO_Chartbook_FINAL_06122012.pdf. Between 1980 and (continued...) Congressional Research Service 10 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues the size of the female insured-worker population increased, the enrollment rate of women into the SSDI program grew to near parity with men.56 Third, changes in opportunities for work and compensation induced more individuals to apply for SSDI. According to SSA’s Chief Actuary, economic downturns are associated with a temporary increase in the enrollment rate of insured workers into the SSDI program.57 During the last recession, the number of SSDI awards per 1,000 insured workers increased 17.9% (from 5.6 in 2007 to 6.6 in 2009).58 Fourth, legislative changes to the SSDI program also contributed to the increase in the number of SSDI beneficiaries. For example, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) raised the full retirement age (FRA) for Social Security retirement benefits, thereby increasing both the number of insured workers in their older and most disability-prone years and the duration of benefit receipt for older SSDI beneficiaries close to the FRA. The increase in the FRA also raised the value of disability benefits relative to early retirement benefits, which likely impelled more individuals between the ages of 62 and FRA to apply for SSDI. Furthermore, the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-460), which changed the evaluative criteria used in making disability determinations, contributed to the growth in the number of SSDI beneficiaries with mental and musculoskeletal disorders.59 Because such disorders are less likely to result in death compared to other qualifying impairments, the growth in the share of beneficiaries with mental and musculoskeletal disorders likely increased the average duration of benefit receipt, as well as the total number of individuals on disability rolls. It is important to note that although most researchers agree that changes in the demographic characteristics of the working-age population account for a substantial share of the growth in the number of workers on SSDI, there is considerable disagreement among researchers over how more “difficult to quantify factors” (such as changes in opportunities for work and compensation or changes to federal policy) have contributed to the growth in the program.60 For a more detailed analysis of the factors behind the growth in disability rolls, see CRS Report R43054, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, by William R. Morton. (...continued) 2010, the share of working-age women insured for disability increased from 51% to 68%. 56 Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Work Experience, Social Security Administration, Actuarial Study No. 122, Table 4, May 2011, p. 21, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study122.pdf. 57 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, Johnson Announces Hearing on the Financing Challenges Facing the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, Testimony of Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2013, http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_031413a.html (hereinafter cited as “Testimony of SSA Chief Actuary Stephen C. Goss, 2013”). 58 SSA, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2013, February 2014, Table 6.C7, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ supplement/2013/6c.html#table6.c7. 59 See David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 17697, December 2011, p. 5, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17697. 60 Gina Livermore, David Wittenburg, and David Neumark, “Finding alternatives to disability benefit receipt,” IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 2014, p. 2. http://www.izajolp.com/content/pdf/2193-9004-3-14.pdf. Congressional Research Service 11 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Possible Short-Term Solutions To extend the solvency of the DI trust fund, Congress could consider a variety of legislative changes to increase tax revenues, reduce program expenditures (i.e., alter benefits levels or program eligibility requirements), or some combination thereof.61 In the absence of changes that would restore solvency over the long term, Congress could use temporary cash infusions to bolster the asset reserves of the DI trust fund. Typically, the aim of this policy is to improve the financial solvency of a trust fund in the short term, in order to give lawmakers additional time to develop and implement longer-term solutions.62 This section examines two policy options to shore-up the DI trust fund’s asset reserves in the short term: interfund borrowing and a reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate. Congress has authorized both of these approaches in the past under similar circumstances. Interfund Borrowing The Social Security Act created the OASI, DI, HI, and Medicare’s Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust funds.63 Although the four trust funds currently do not have the authority to borrow from one another, Congress could permit temporary borrowing among specified trust funds as a means of improving the solvency of the DI trust fund in the short term. The last time Congress authorized temporary interfund borrowing was in the early 1980s. In 1981, the OASI trust fund was close to exhaustion with a trust fund ratio (asset reserves as a percentage of total annual expenditures) of 18%.64 To help maintain the solvency of the OASI trust fund, Congress enacted the “Social Security Amendments of 1981” (P.L. 97-123),65 which authorized interfund borrowing among the OASI, DI, and HI trust funds until December 31, 1982.66 Under the 1981 amendments, any trust fund could issue loans to either of the other trust funds. Congress specified that the interest paid on the loans would be equivalent to what the loaned reserves would have earned had the interfund borrowing not occurred. Moreover, 61 For a general estimate of the amount of additional payroll tax revenues or cost reductions needed to prevent the DI trust fund ratio from falling below 20% in the short term (2015-2023), see Letter from the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds to the Honorable John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, July 28, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2014/ 709letter_DI_House_2014.pdf. 62 For example, a 1980 Senate Committee on Finance report accompanying H.R. 7670 (enacted as P.L. 96-403) stated that the reallocation of the payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds “is expected to maintain sufficient reserves in the OASI fund to pay benefits through the end of 1981, giving Congress time to take further remedial action next year.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Reallocation of Social Security Taxes Between OASI and DI Trust Funds, report to accompany H.R. 7670, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., September 16, 1980, S.Rept. 96-946, p. 2, http://www.finance.senate.gov/library/reports/committee/. 63 42 U.S.C. §401, §1395i, and §1395t. Unlike the OASI, DI, and HI trust funds, which are financed primarily through payroll taxes, the SMI trust fund is financed mostly through premiums paid by beneficiaries and general revenues. Because revenues to the SMI trust fund are reset each year to cover expected costs, the SMI trust fund will remain in financial balance indefinitely. For more information on the HI and SMI trust funds, see CRS Report R41436, Medicare Financing, by Patricia A. Davis. 64 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A1. 65 P.L. 97-123 is titled “An Act to amend the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 to restore minimum benefits under the Social Security Act.” 66 “Interfund Borrowing Under the Social Security Act,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 9 (September 1983), pp. 13-14, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v46n9/v46n9p13.pdf. Congressional Research Service 12 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Congress stipulated that the amount of loan transfers between the trust funds could not exceed the amount required to ensure the timely payment of scheduled benefits for a six-month period.67 With insufficient funds to pay full benefits on time, the OASI trust fund borrowed $17.5 billion from the DI and HI trust funds between November and December 1982 (Table 3). These loans gave lawmakers a short, six-month window (through June 1983) to address the financial imbalance of the OASI trust fund. On April 20, 1983, Congress enacted the comprehensive Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21), which made substantial changes to the Old-Age and Survivors program to improve the balance of the OASI trust fund.68 Table 3. Interfund Loans From the DI and HI Trust Funds to the OASI Trust Fund, 1982 (dollar amounts in billions) Amount Borrowed From Date of Loan Total Amount Borrowed DI Trust Fund HI Trust Fund November 5, 1982 $0.58 $0.58 a December 7, 1982 $3.44 a $3.44 December 31, 1982 $13.50 $4.50 $9.00 Total $17.52 $5.08 $12.44 Source: CRS table adapted from Table 1 in “Interfund Borrowing Under the Social Security Act,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 9 (September 1983), p. 14, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v46n9/v46n9p13.pdf. Notes: Total amounts may not equal subtotals due to rounding. a. Not Applicable. As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Congress reauthorized the previously expired interfund borrowing among the three trust funds until the end of 1987. The 1983 amendments required the repayment of all loans, with interest, by December 31, 1989. However, the borrowing authority under the 1983 amendments was never exercised. The 1982 loans from the DI and HI trust funds were repaid by April 1986.69 To delay the exhaustion of the DI trust fund temporarily, Congress could reauthorize interfund borrowing among the trust funds. In 2013, the HI trust fund had a trust fund ratio of 83%, and the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds projects that the HI trust fund will be exhausted by 2030 under current law (see Figure 3).70 67 Ibid. For more information on the 1983 amendments, see John A. Svahn and Mary Ross, “Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 7 (July 1983), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v46n7/v46n7p3.pdf. 69 SSA, Research Note #4: Inter-Fund Borrowing Among the Trust Funds, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ interfundnote.html. 70 The Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, July 28, 2014, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2014.pdf. Projection is based on the intermediate assumption of the (continued...) 68 Congressional Research Service 13 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Figure 3. Actual and Projected OASI, DI, and HI Trust Fund Ratios (asset reserves as a percentage of annual expenditures) 450% Actual 400% 350% 300% 250% OASI Estimated Exhaustion Year DI: HI: OASI: 2016 2030 2034 Projected DI 200% 150% 100% HI 50% 0% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Source: CRS graph based on data from the Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees, Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports, 2014, Chart E, at http://www.ssa.gov/ OACT/TRSUM/images/LD_ChartE.html. Notes: Projections are based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2014 Social Security and Medicare trustees reports. The estimated exhaustion year is the year during which the balance of the trust fund is projected to fall to zero. The OASI trust fund had a trust fund ratio of 384% in 2013, and the Social Security trustees estimate that the OASI trust fund will be exhausted by 2034 under current law.71 Payroll Tax Reallocation Another option to improve the solvency of the DI trust fund in the short term is for Congress to reallocate the Social Security (OASDI) payroll tax rate. A payroll tax reallocation would change the amount of Social Security payroll tax revenues directed to the OASI and DI trust funds. By increasing the DI trust fund’s share of the payroll tax rate, more income would be credited to the DI trust fund, while less would be directed to the OASI trust fund.72 For the purposes of this report, a reallocation occurs when the overall Social Security payroll tax rate remains the same but the share allocated to each trust fund changes. As shown in Table 4, (...continued) 2014 Medicare trustees report. 71 2014 Social Security Trustees Report. Projection is based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2014 Social Security trustees report. 72 For current and historical Social Security payroll tax rates, see SSA, Social Security Tax Rates, accessed August 15, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/oasdiRates.html. Congressional Research Service 14 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Congress has authorized the reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate several times in the past. Table 4. Legislative History of Payroll Tax Reallocations Between the OASI and DI Trust Funds Public Law Number P.L. 91-172 P.L. 93-233 Name Reallocation Direction Tax Reform Act of 1969 OASI to DI “Social Security Benefits Increase of 1973”a OASI to DI DI to OASI 1980”b P.L. 96-403 “Allocation of Social Security Tax Receipts of P.L. 98-21 Social Security Amendments of 1983 DI to OASI P.L. 103-387 Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 OASI to DIc Source: Table prepared by CRS. Notes: For a chronological history of Social Security legislation, see CRS Report RL30920, Social Security: Major Decisions in the House and Senate Since 1935, by Gary Sidor. a. P.L. 93-233 is titled “An Act to provide a 7-percent increase in social security benefits beginning with March 1974 and an additional 4-percent increase beginning with June 1974, to provide increases in supplemental security income benefits, and for other purposes.” b. P.L. 96-403 is titled “An Act to amend title II of the Social Security Act to make necessary adjustments in the allocation of social security tax receipts between the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund.” c. The 1994 reallocation occurred in three stages. The first and third stages reallocated the payroll tax rate from the OASI trust fund to the DI trust fund, while the second stage reallocated the tax rate from the DI trust fund to the OASI trust fund. The most recent reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax occurred in the mid-1990s (Table 5). At the start of 1994, the DI trust fund ratio was 23% and the trustees projected that the DI trust fund would be exhausted in 1995 under their intermediate assumptions.73 To improve the balance of the DI trust fund, Congress enacted the Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-387). The act changed the allocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate to provide the DI trust fund with an immediate increase in revenues, as well as a larger share of the total payroll tax rate in subsequent years. Table 5. OASDI Payroll Tax Rate Reallocations under the Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-387) Employees and Employers, Each Year OASDI OASI DI Self-Employed OASDI OASI DI Rates Scheduled Under the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) 1990-1999 6.20% 5.60% 0.60% 12.40% 11.20% 1.20% 2000+ 6.20% 5.49% 0.71% 12.40% 10.98% 1.42% 73 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 1994 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, prepared by The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 12, 1994, H. Doc. 103-231 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 14, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trust/1994/1994.pdf. Congressional Research Service 15 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Self-Employed Employees and Employers, Each Year OASDI OASI DI OASDI OASI DI Rates Scheduled Under the Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-387) 1994-1996 6.20% 5.26% 0.94% 12.40% 10.52% 1.88% 1997-1999 6.20% 5.35% 0.85% 12.40% 10.70% 1.70% 2000+ 6.20% 5.30% 0.90% 12.40% 10.60% 1.80% Source: Tabled prepared by CRS. In justifying the reallocation, a House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security report noted that: [T]he reallocation recommended by the Trustees not only secures the funding necessary to keep the DI program solvent in the short run; it also provides two critical opportunities. First, it provides time for a more detailed study of the DI program—one aimed at identifying with a higher level of certainty the underlying causes of its recent growth. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the proposed reallocation would provide additional DI program experience to analyze. Is increased growth a temporary or longer-term phenomenon? What role will a stronger economy play in altering this pattern? Answers to these critical questions can be obtained only through the additional time and experience that can be gained through [a] small reallocation of the Social Security tax.74 In their 1995 annual report, the trustees projected that the boost in revenues from the payroll tax reallocation would extend DI trust fund solvency from 1995 to 2016.75 Potential Rate Schedule to Extend the Solvency of the DI Trust Fund To delay the exhaustion of the DI trust fund, Congress could again reallocate the payroll tax rate to give the DI trust fund a greater share of Social Security’s payroll tax revenues. In July 2014, SSA’s Office of the Chief Actuary prepared a potential rate schedule that is projected to extend the solvency of the DI trust fund in the short-term (Table 6).76 74 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, Social Security Board of Trustees’ Recommendation to Reallocate a Portion of the Social Security Payroll Tax to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., April 22, 1993, H.Hrg. 781-44 (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 7. 75 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 1995 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 104th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 1995, H. Doc.104-57 (Washington: GPO, 1995), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trust/1995/overview.html. 76 SSA Memorandum from Chris Chaplain, Supervisory Actuary, Jason Schultz, Supervisory Actuary, and Daniel Nickerson, Actuary, to Alice Wade, Deputy Chief Actuary, July 28, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/ NA_20140728.pdf. Congressional Research Service 16 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Table 6. Potential Reallocation of the OASDI Payroll Tax Rate, 2015 and Beyond Employees and Employers, Each Year Self-Employed OASDI OASI DI OASDI OASI DI 2014 (current law) 6.20% 5.30% 0.90% 12.40% 10.60% 1.80% 2015-2016 6.20% 4.80% 1.40% 12.40% 9.60% 2.80% 2017 6.20% 4.90% 1.30% 12.40% 9.80% 2.60% 2018-2019 6.20% 5.10% 1.10% 12.40% 10.20% 2.20% 2020-2023 6.20% 5.20% 1.00% 12.40% 10.40% 2.00% 2024 6.20% 5.25% 0.95% 12.40% 10.50% 1.90% 2025+ 6.20% 5.30% 0.90% 12.40% 10.60% 1.80% Source: Tabled prepared by CRS based on SSA Memorandum from Chris Chaplain, Supervisory Actuary, Jason Schultz, Supervisory Actuary, and Daniel Nickerson, Actuary, to Alice Wade, Deputy Chief Actuary, July 28, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/NA_20140728.pdf. Notes: Under this potential rate schedule, SSA’s Office of the Chief Actuary projects that the asset reserves of the OASI and DI trust funds will both be depleted in 2033. Projections are based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2014 Social Security trustees report. Like the 1994 payroll tax reallocation, the potential rate schedule would reallocate a larger portion of the Social Security payroll tax rate to the DI trust fund upon implementation and then would taper the allocation over time. Unlike the 1994 reallocation, however, the potential rate schedule would equalize the financial conditions of the OASI and DI trust funds. In other words, if implemented, the OASI and DI trust funds would both be depleted in the same year—2033.77 Under current law, the trustees estimate that the OASI trust fund will be exhausted in 2034 (see Table A-1 in the appendix). The Office of the Chief Actuary projects that both trust funds would pass the short-range test of financial adequacy under the potential rate schedule. Upon depletion in 2033, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimates that the OASI trust fund would have enough continuing tax revenues to cover 75% of Old-Age and Survivors expenditures (declining to 70% in 2088), and the DI trust fund would have enough continuing tax revenues to cover 88% of SSDI expenditures (dropping to 80% in 2088).78 Possible Long-Term Solutions The last major congressional effort to address the financial status of the OASI and DI trust funds occurred in the early 1980s with the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21).79 Under the 1983 amendments, Congress used a combination of revenue increases and cost reductions to stabilize and eventually improve the solvency of the OASI and DI trust funds. To prevent the 77 Ibid., p.1. Expenditures include scheduled benefit payments, other small payments, and administrative expenses. 79 For more information on the 1983 Social Security Amendments, see John A. Svahn and Mary Ross, “Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 7 (July 1983). 78 Congressional Research Service 17 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues projected exhaustion of the combined OASI and DI trust funds in 2033, Congress could enact similar legislation to ameliorate the long-term solvency of the two trust funds.80 For information on reform proposals that would affect the long-term solvency of the DI trust fund (or the combined OASI and DI trust funds), see the following resources: • the “Proposals Affecting Trust Fund Solvency” and “Individual Changes Modifying Social Security” sections of the Office of the Chief Actuary’s website at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/; • CBO’s 2012 report, Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421; and • CRS Report R43054, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, by William R. Morton. 80 For information on Social Security reform proposals, see CRS Report RL33544, Social Security Reform: Current Issues and Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler. Congressional Research Service 18 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Appendix. Supplemental Tables and Figures Table A-1. Key Dates Projected for the Social Security Trust Funds as Shown Under the Intermediate Assumptions in Trustees Reports from 1983 to 2014 Year of Report Year of Projected Exhaustion OASI Intermediate II-B DI Year That Expenditures First Exceed Revenues Year That Expenditures First Exceed Revenues Plus Net Interest on Assets OASDI OASI DI OASDI OASI DI OASDI Projectionsa 1983 b b b c c 2021 c c 2047 1984 b 2050 b 2021 2012 2021 2045 2038 2044 1985 2050 2034 2049 2019 2010 2019 2032 2020 2032 1986 2054 2026 2051 2020 2009 2019 2035 2017 2033 1987 2055 2023 2051 2020 2008 2019 2036 2013 2033 1988 2050 2027 2048 2019 2009 2019 2033 2016 2032 1989 2049 2025 2046 2019 2009 2018 2032 2014 2030 1990 2046 2020 2043 2019 2008 2017 2030 2011 2028 Intermediate Projections 1991 2045 2015 2041 2018 1998 2017 2030 2011 2028 1992 2042 1997 2036 2018 1992 2016 2028 1992 2024 1993 2044 1995 2036 2019 1993 2017 2030 1993 2025 1994 2036 1995 2029 2016 1994 2013 2024 1994 2019 1995 2031 2016 2030 2014 2003 2013 2021 2007 2020 1996 2031 2015 2029 2014 2003 2012 2021 2007 2019 1997 2031 2015 2029 2014 2004 2012 2021 2007 2019 1998 2034 2019 2032 2015 2006 2013 2023 2009 2021 1999 2036 2020 2034 2015 2006 2014 2024 2009 2022 2000 2039 2023 2037 2016 2007 2015 2026 2012 2025 2001 2040 2026 2038 2016 2008 2016 2027 2015 2027 2002 2043 2028 2041 2018 2009 2017 2028 2018 2027 2003 2044 2028 2042 2018 2008 2018 2030 2018 2028 2004 2044 2029 2042 2018 2008 2018 2029 2017 2028 2005 2043 2027 2041 2018 2005 2017 2028 2014 2027 2006 2042 2025 2040 2018 2005 2017 2028 2013 2027 2007 2042 2026 2041 2018 2005 2017 2028 2013 2027 2008 2042 2025 2041 2018 2005 2017 2028 2012 2027 2009 2039 2020 2037 2017 2005 2016 2025 2009 2024 2010 2040 2018 2037 2018 2005 2015 2026 2009 2025 Congressional Research Service 19 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Year That Expenditures First Exceed Revenues Year of Projected Exhaustion Year That Expenditures First Exceed Revenues Plus Net Interest on Assets Year of Report OASI DI OASDI OASI DI OASDI OASI DI OASDI 2011 2038 2018 2036 2017 2005 2010 2025 2009 2023 2012 2035 2016 2033 2010 2005 2010 2023 2009 2021 2013 2035 2016 2033 2010 2005 2010 2022 2009 2021 2014 2034 2016 2033 2010 2005 2010 2022 2009 2020 Source: Tabled prepared by CRS based on data from 1983-2014 Social Security trustees reports and information provided by SSA. a. From 1983-1990, two intermediate forecasts were prepared (II-A and II-B). The intermediate II-B forecast corresponds more closely to the intermediate forecast in subsequent years. b. Trust fund expected to remain solvent throughout the long-range projection period. c. Not Available. Figure A-1. Actual and Projected DI Income and Cost Rates with Scheduled and Payable Benefits, 1970-2090 (as a percentage of taxable payroll) 3.0% Actual Projected Cost: Scheduled But Not Fully Payable Benefits 2.5% 2.0% Short fall Income Rate 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% Expenditures: Payable Benefits = Income After Trust Fund Depletion in 2016 Cost Rate Payable Benefits as a Percentage of Scheduled Benefits 2013-2015: 2016: 2088: 100% 81% 80% 0.0% 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 Source: CRS graph based on data from the 2014 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.B1 and Figure II.D3, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/index.html. Notes: Projections are based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2014 Social Security trustees report. Figure adapted from Figure II.D3 in the 2014 trustees report. The income rate excludes net interest. The cost rate includes benefits and administrative expenses. The trustees project that, under current law, SSDI benefits will be fully payable at the beginning of 2016 but will fall to 81% of scheduled benefits before the end of the year. When the DI trust fund is depleted, the amount of payable benefits is determined by the level of continuing tax revenues (i.e., expenditures equal income). The shaded area represents the shortfall or deficit between payable and scheduled SSDI benefits once the DI trust fund is exhausted. Congressional Research Service 20 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund: Background and Solvency Issues Author Contact Information William R. Morton Analyst in Income Security wmorton@crs.loc.gov, 7-9453 Congressional Research Service 21 one year or result in death.8 In 2016, the SGA earnings limit is $1,130 per month for most workers and $1,820 per month for statutorily blind workers.9 Disability determinations are based on a five-step sequential evaluation process that takes into account a worker's medical records, age, education, and work experience. In general, workers must have a severe impairment (or combination of impairments) that prevents them from performing any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers.10 Benefits

Cash benefits begin five full months after a beneficiary's disability onset date.11 Initial benefits are based on a worker's career-average earnings, indexed to reflect changes in national wage levels.12 Benefits are subsequently adjusted to account for inflation through cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).13 Monthly benefits payable to the worker and family members are subject to a maximum family benefit amount.14 Benefits may be offset if the disabled worker also receives workers' compensation or certain other public disability benefits.15 In November 2015, the average monthly benefit was $1,166 for disabled workers, $318 for spouses of disabled workers, and $350 for children of disabled workers.16

In addition to cash benefits, disabled workers and certain dependents are eligible for health care coverage under Medicare after 24 months of entitlement to cash benefits (typically 29 months after the onset of disability).17 In 2012, Medicare spending per disabled beneficiary averaged about $9,900.18 Generally, disabled workers retain their benefits as long as they (1) are under the FRA, (2) exhibit no substantial medical improvement, and (3) have average monthly earnings at or below the SGA limit.

The Social Security Trust Funds

Although Social Security is often viewed as a single program, its financing comes from two legally distinct sources known as trust funds. A trust fund is an accounting mechanism that "records the revenues, offsetting receipts, or offsetting collections earmarked for the purpose of the fund, as well as budget authority and outlays of the fund that are financed by those revenues or receipts."19 The Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund finances the benefits of disabled workers and their dependents, and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund pays for the benefits of retired workers and their dependents as well as survivors of deceased workers.20 Administrative costs are also drawn from the trust funds. Each trust fund is a separate account in the U.S. Treasury, and under current law, the two trust funds may not borrow from one another. 21

The OASI trust fund was created under the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379), and superseded the Old-Age Reserve Account established under the original Social Security Act in 1935 (P.L.74-271).22 The DI trust fund was established as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880)—the same legislation that created SSDI.23 The creation of a separate DI trust fund appears to have been a compromise to address concerns of some lawmakers at the time about SSDI's potential cost and potential negative impact on the OASI trust fund and its beneficiaries. For more information on the congressional rationale for the creation of a separate DI trust fund, see Appendix A. Financing SSDI and OASI are financed primarily by dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of covered workers under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 24 and the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA).25 FICA taxes are split evenly between employees and employers, whereas SECA taxes are borne fully by self-employed individuals. As shown in Table 1, the Social Security FICA tax rate for employees and employers, each is 6.200%, with 1.185% allocated to the DI trust fund and 5.015% to the OASI trust fund. On a combined basis, the FICA tax rate is 12.400%, with 2.370% allocated to the DI trust fund and 10.030% to the OASI trust fund. The Social Security SECA tax rate is the same as the combined FICA tax rate. Social Security taxes are levied on covered earnings up to a maximum annual amount, which is $118,500 in 2016.26 Table 1. Social Security Payroll Tax Rates Under Current Law

(as a percentage of taxable earnings)

Trust Fund

FICA

 

SECA

 

Employees and Employers, Each

Combined

 

Self Employed

OASI

5.015

10.030

 

10.030

DI

1.185

2.370

 

2.370

OASDI (Total)

6.200

12.400

 

12.400

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on Social Security Administration (SSA), Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT), "Social Security Tax Rates," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/oasdiRates.html.

Notes: The allocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds is scheduled to change in calendar year 2019. For more information, see the "Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015" section of this report.

The FICA rates for employees and employers are prescribed in Sections 3101 and 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), respectively; the SECA rate is specified in Section 1401 of the IRC.27 The allocation of the tax rates between the OASI and DI trust funds, however, is set in Section 201(b) of the Social Security Act.28 Section 201(b) specifies the combined share of the Social Security tax rate allocated to the DI trust fund for both wages (FICA) and self-employment income (SECA), which, as noted above, is 2.370% (1.185% for employees and employers, each). Section 201(a) states that the combined allocation to the OASI trust fund for both wages and self-employment income is the combined Social Security payroll tax rate set in the IRC less the combined share prescribed in Section 201(b).29 Therefore, the combined allocation to the OASI trust fund is 12.400% minus 2.370%, which equals 10.030% (5.015% for employees and employers, each).

In addition to payroll taxes, the OASI and DI trust funds are credited with income from the taxation of some Social Security benefits.30 The share of Social Security benefits that is taxable depends on whether the individual's provisional income exceeds certain thresholds.31 Provisional income equals adjusted gross income plus otherwise tax-exempt interest income (i.e., interest from tax-exempt bonds), plus 50% of Social Security benefits. Income derived from the taxation of up to the first 50% of Social Security benefits is credited to the OASI and DI trust funds based on the source of the benefits taxed.32 In other words, up to a certain rate, taxes paid on OASI benefits are deposited in the OASI trust fund and taxes paid on SSDI benefits are deposited in the DI trust fund.

Occasionally, the two trust funds receive reimbursements from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury for various costs imposed on the Social Security program.33 For example, the OASI and DI trust funds received reimbursements from the General Fund to compensate for the loss of revenues from a temporary payroll tax reduction in 2011 and 2012.

The final source of income to the trust funds is from the interest earned on investments held by the trust funds. When income exceeds cost in a given year, the surplus is credited to the trust funds in the form of special-issue (non-marketable) securities, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.34 These securities earn interest, which the Department of the Treasury credits to the trust funds semiannually in the form of additional government securities. The accumulated securities held by a trust fund represent its balance.35A trust fund can use its balance, or asset reserves, to pay benefits whenever total program cost exceeds income.

Financial Status of the DI Trust Fund The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds presents an annual report to Congress on the current and projected financial status of the Social Security trust funds.36 The board is composed of six members: the Secretary of the Treasury, who is the Managing Trustee; the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Commissioner of Social Security; and two public representatives, who are nominated by the President for a term of four years and subject to confirmation by the Senate.37 The Board of Trustees (hereinafter "trustees") specifies the assumptions about future demographic and economic trends used in the projections; however, SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary advises the trustees on the assumptions as well as develops and runs the computer models that produce the forecasts. The trustees' latest report was released on July 22, 2015, and is available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/index.html.38 DI Financial Operations in 2014 Table 2 shows the income, cost, and asset reserves of the DI trust fund in 2014. Of the $114.9 billion in total income credited to the DI trust fund, $109.7 billion (about 95%) came from net payroll tax contributions. The interest earned on the investments held by the DI trust fund amounted to $3.4 billion or 3% of total income.39 Income from the taxation of SSDI benefits and reimbursements from the General Fund totaled $1.8 billion or 2% of total trust fund income.

Total cost for the year was $145.1 billion. About 98% of the DI trust fund's cost stemmed from benefit payments totaling $141.7 billion. Disbursements from the DI trust fund for administrative expenses and the financial interchange with the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) amounted to $3.3 billion or 2% of total cost. According to the trustees, "the Railroad Retirement Act requires an annual financial interchange between the Railroad Retirement program and the OASDI program. The purpose of the interchange is to put the OASI and DI trust funds in the same financial position they would have been in had railroad employment always been covered directly by Social Security."40

To make up for the shortfall between total income and cost in 2014, the DI trust fund redeemed a net total of $30.2 billion in government bonds. Consequently, the asset reserves held by the DI trust fund decreased from $90.4 billion at the end of 2013 to $60.2 billion at the end of 2014.

Table 2. Summary of the Financial Operations of the DI Trust Fund in 2014

($ in billions)

Item

DI Trust Fund

Asset reserves at the end of the 2013

$90.4

   

Total income in 2014

114.9

 

Net payroll tax contributions

109.7

 

Reimbursements from the General Fund of the Treasury

0.1

 

Taxation of SSDI benefits

1.7

 

Interest on asset reserves

3.4

     

Total expenditures in 2014

145.1

 

Benefit Payments

141.7

 

Railroad Retirement financial interchange

0.4

 

Administrative expenses

2.9

     

Net change in asset reserves in 2014

-30.2

     

Asset reserves at the end of 2014

60.2

Source: CRS, adapted from U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, The 2015 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 114th Cong., 1st sess., July 22, 2015, H.Doc. 114-51 (Washington: GPO, 2015), Table II.B1, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/II_B_cyoper.html#96807 (hereinafter "2015 Social Security Trustees Report").

Note: Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding.

Figure 1. DI Income and Cost in 2014, by Source

Source: CRS, based on data from the 2015 the Social Security Trustees Report, Table II.B1.

Notes: "Interest" refers to net interest earned on securities held by the DI trust fund. "Taxation of Benefits" includes reimbursements from the General Fund, which accounted for less than 0.1% of trust fund income. "Admin. Costs" include net expenses related to the administration of SSDI, as well as payments under the financial interchange with the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), which accounted for less than 0.3% of trust fund cost.

Recent Experience of the DI Trust Fund Between 1995 and 2004, non-interest income to the DI trust fund exceeded total cost, generating annual surpluses and increasing the fund's balance (Figure 2). Non-interest income includes net payroll tax contributions, revenues from the taxation of SSDI benefits, and General Fund reimbursements. In 2005, total cost started to exceed non-interest income; however, because total income—tax revenues plus net interest on asset reserves—was greater than total cost, the balance of the DI trust fund continued to grow. In 2009, total cost began to exceed total income, requiring the DI trust fund to use some of its asset reserves to cover benefit payments (Table 3). As a result, the balance of the DI trust fund has been declining. At the end of November 2015, the amount of asset reserves held by the DI trust fund was $35.2 billion.41

Figure 2. Operations of the DI Trust Fund, 1995-2014

($ in billions)

Source: CRS, based on data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A2, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/VI_A_cyoper_hist.html#288797.

Notes: "Total Income" includes interest earned on the asset reserves held by the DI trust fund. The amount of asset reserves held by a trust fund represents its balance.

Table 3. Operations of the DI Trust Fund, 1995-2014

($ in billions)

Year

Income

Cost

Asset Reserves

 

Total Income

Non-Interest Incomea Net Interestb

Total Cost

Benefit Paymentsc

Administrative Expenses

RRB Interchanged

Change During the Year

Amount at the End of the Year

1995

$56.7

$54.5

$2.2

$42.1

$40.9

$1.1

$0.1

$14.6

$37.6

1996

60.7

57.7

3.0

45.4

44.2

1.2

e

15.4

52.9

1997

60.5

56.5

4.0

47.0

45.7

1.3

0.1

13.5

66.4

1998

64.4

59.6

4.8

49.9

48.2

1.6

0.2

14.4

80.8

1999

69.5

63.9

5.7

53.0

51.4

1.5

0.1

16.5

97.3

2000

77.9

71.0

6.9

56.8

55.0

1.6

0.2

21.1

118.5

2001

83.9

75.7

8.2

61.4

59.6

1.7

e

22.5

141.0

2002

87.4

78.2

9.2

67.9

65.7

2.0

0.2

19.5

160.5

2003

88.1

78.3

9.7

73.1

70.9

2.0

0.2

15.0

175.4

2004

91.4

81.4

10.0

80.6

78.2

2.2

0.2

10.8

186.2

2005

97.4

87.2

10.3

88.0

85.4

2.3

0.3

9.4

195.6

2006

102.6

92.0

10.6

94.5

91.7

2.3

0.4

8.2

203.8

2007

109.9

96.6

13.2

98.8

95.9

2.5

0.4

11.1

214.9

2008

109.8

98.9

11.0

109.0

106.0

2.5

0.4

0.9

215.8

2009

109.3

98.9

10.5

121.5

118.3

2.7

0.4

-12.2

203.5

2010

104.0

94.8

9.3

127.7

124.2

3.0

0.5

-23.6

179.9

2011

106.3

98.4

7.9

132.3

128.9

2.9

0.5

-26.1

153.9

2012

109.1

102.7

6.4

140.3

136.9

2.9

0.5

-31.2

122.7

2013

111.2

106.5

4.7

143.4

140.1

2.8

0.6

-32.2

90.4

2014

114.9

111.5

3.4

145.1

141.7

2.9

0.4

-30.2

60.2

Source: CRS, based on data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.A2, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/VI_A_cyoper_hist.html#288797.

Notes: Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding.

a. "Non-Interest Income" includes net payroll tax contributions, General Fund reimbursements, and revenues from the taxation of benefits. b. "Net Interest" includes (1) interests earned on the investments (asset reserves) held by the trust fund, (2) interest on adjustments in the allocation of administration expenses between the trust fund and the General Fund for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, (3) interest arising from the revised allocation of administrative expenses among the trust funds, and (4) interest on certain reimbursements to the trust fund. c. Includes payments for vocational rehabilitation services furnished to disabled beneficiaries and reimbursements from the General Fund for unnegotiated benefit checks. d. "RRB Interchange" refers to the financial interchange with the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). For more information, see CRS Report RS22350, Railroad Retirement Board: Retirement, Survivor, Disability, Unemployment, and Sickness Benefits, by [author name scrubbed]. e. Between -$50 million and $50 million. Causes of the DI Trust Fund's Financial Imbalance The declining solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between its income and cost. Figure 3 shows income and cost to the DI trust fund expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll. Taxable payroll is the total amount of earnings in the economy that is subject to Social Security taxes (with some adjustments).42 The ratio of non-interest income to taxable payroll for the year is known as the annual income rate; the ratio of cost to taxable payroll for the year is known as the annual cost rate. Over the past 20 years, the annual DI income rate has remained relatively flat at about 1.81% of taxable payroll, which is roughly the combined share of the tax rate allocated to the DI trust fund for that period plus a small amount of other income. At the same time, the annual DI cost rate has grown markedly, from 1.44% in 1995 to 2.36% in 2014.

Figure 3. Annual DI Income and Cost Rates, 1995-2014

(non-interest income and cost as a share of taxable payroll for the year)

Source: CRS, based on data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.B1, Single-Year Tables, at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/lr4b1.html.

Notes: The "Income Rate" is the ratio of non-interest DI income to taxable payroll. Non-interest income includes payroll taxes, taxes paid on scheduled benefits, and reimbursements from the General Fund. The "Cost Rate" is the ratio of DI cost to taxable payroll. Cost includes scheduled benefits, administrative expenses, and the net interchange with the RRB. "Taxable payroll" is the total amount of earnings in the economy that is subject to Social Security taxes (with some adjustments).

The increase in the annual DI cost rate stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI. Between 1995 and 2014, the total number of disabled workers and their dependents in receipt of SSDI increased 85%, from 5.9 million to 10.9 million.43 Because benefit payments account for nearly all spending, the increase in the number of SSDI beneficiaries drove the annual DI cost rate upward.

The rise in disability rolls can be attributed to a number of factors.44 First, the overall growth in the working-age population increased the number of workers insured for disability.45 Between 1995 and 2014, the insured-worker population increased 19%, from 127 million to 151 million.46

Second, demographic changes in the composition of the insured-worker population contributed to the increase in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI.47 Most importantly, the aging of the baby-boomer generation increased the number of older workers, who are more likely to become disabled than are younger workers. In addition, growth in the labor force participation rate of women in the latter half of the 20th century led to more women being insured for disability.48 As the size of the female insured-worker population increased, the enrollment rate of women into the SSDI program grew to near parity with men.49

Third, changes in opportunities for work and compensation induced more individuals to apply for SSDI. For example, according to SSA's chief actuary, economic downturns are associated with a temporary increase in the enrollment rate of insured workers into the program.50 During the last recession, the number of SSDI awards per 1,000 insured workers increased 25%, from 5.6 in 2007 to 7.0 in 2010.51 In addition, the value of benefits has made applying for SSDI more desirable than work for some low-wage workers, because such individuals have experienced slower real earnings growth over the past three decades compared with medium- and high-wage workers.52

Fourth, various amendments to the Social Security program played a role in increasing the number of people on SSDI. For example, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) raised the full retirement age (FRA) for Social Security retirement benefits, thereby increasing both the number of insured workers in their older and more disability-prone years and the duration of benefit receipt for older SSDI beneficiaries close to the FRA. The increase in the FRA also raised the value of disability benefits relative to early retirement benefits, which likely impelled more individuals between the ages of 62 and FRA to apply for SSDI.

Furthermore, the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-460), which changed the evaluative criteria used in making disability determinations, contributed to the growth in the number of SSDI beneficiaries with mental and musculoskeletal disorders.53 Because such disorders are less likely to result in death compared with other qualifying impairments, the growth in the share of beneficiaries with mental and musculoskeletal disorders likely increased the average duration of benefit receipt and thus SSDI caseloads.54

Although most researchers agree that changes in the demographic characteristics of the working-age population account for a large share of the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI, there is considerable disagreement among researchers over how more "difficult to quantify factors"—such as changes in opportunities for work and compensation or changes to federal policy—have contributed to the growth in the program.55

The trustees project that the share of the insured population in receipt of SSDI will stabilize in the future, because some of the principal drivers of past growth—namely, the aging of the insured population and the increase in female enrollment rates—have come to pass and are not likely to occur again.56 The 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods—a panel of expert actuaries, economists, and demographers convened by the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to review the assumptions and methods used by the trustees—recently concurred with this assessment.57

Projected Status of the DI Trust Fund

This section examines the financial outlook of the DI trust fund under prior law and under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74). Specifically, it discusses the projected depletion year of the DI trust fund, that is, the year in which the balance of the trust fund falls to zero. When a trust fund is depleted, it no longer has any asset reserves; however, it continues to receive income from payroll taxes and the taxation of benefits.

The Social Security Act provides no guidance on the payment of benefits once a trust fund's asset reserves have been depleted and current tax revenues are insufficient to meet current cost. Although individuals who meet Social Security's eligibility requirements are legally entitled to disability benefits,58 a provision in the Antideficiency Act prohibits a federal agency from spending in excess of available funds.59 Because the Social Security Act stipulates that SSDI benefit payments shall be made only from the DI trust fund, without a change in the law, monthly cash payments to beneficiaries could be delayed or reduced if the DI trust fund were depleted.60

Under Prior Law The trustees estimate the future financial condition of the OASI and DI trust funds individually as well as on a theoretical combined basis (i.e., as if the two trust funds were a single fund). In their 2015 report, which was released prior to the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, the trustees projected that the DI trust fund would be depleted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. The trustees also projected that the OASI trust fund would be depleted in 2035 and the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds would be depleted in 2034. Figure 4 shows the actual and projected trust fund ratios of the OASI, DI, and combined OASDI trust funds under prior law. A trust fund ratio is a measure of a trust fund's asset reserves at the beginning of a year expressed as a percentage of total cost for the year.61

Figure 4. Actual and Projected OASI, DI, and Combined OASDI Trust Fund Ratios Under Prior Law, 1975-2036

(asset reserves at the beginning of the year as a share of annual cost)

Source: CRS, based on data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.B4, Single-Year Tables, at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/lr4b4.html.

Note: Projections based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2015 trustees report.

In its June 2015 long-term budget outlook, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the balance of the DI trust fund would be depleted sometime in FY2017.62 CBO projected that the OASI trust fund would be depleted in calendar year 2031 and the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds would be depleted in calendar year 2029. The Social Security trustees and CBO sometimes project different depletion dates because the two organizations base their forecasts on different demographic and economic assumptions.

Upon depletion of its asset reserves in late 2016, the trustees projected that continuing tax revenues to the DI trust fund would have been sufficient to pay 81% of SSDI benefits.63 That percentage was projected to rise to about 90% in the 2030s and then decline, returning to 81% in 2089 (Figure 5).64 A recent SSA study examined the characteristics of disabled-worker beneficiaries in 2013.65 After accounting for SSDI benefits, the study's authors estimated that 18.5% of disabled workers had family income below the poverty threshold.66 However, if only 81% of benefits had been payable that year, the authors estimated that the poverty rate for disabled-worker beneficiaries would have been 25.5%.

Figure 5. The Projected Share of SSDI Benefits Payable Under Prior Law, 2015-2089

(prior law DI income expressed as a share of the cost of providing scheduled benefits)

Source: CRS, based on data provided by SSA's OACT in Memorandum from Chris Chaplain, supervisory actuary, and Daniel Nickerson, actuary, to Alice H. Wade, deputy chief actuary, "Present-Law OASDI Payable Percentages: Present-Law Revenue as a Percent of the Cost of Providing Scheduled Benefits through Year 2089," August 27, 2015.

Note: Projections based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2015 trustees report.

Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 On November 2, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74). Among its many provisions, the act authorized a temporary reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds to provide DI with a larger share for 2016 through 2018. Specifically, the DI trust fund's share of the tax rate for employees and employers, each, increased by 0.285 percentage point at the beginning of 2016, from 0.900% to 1.185% (Table 4). On a combined basis, DI's share of the tax rate increased by 0.570 percentage point, from 1.800% to 2.370%. The change in the SECA rate mirrors the change in the combined FICA rate. Table 4. Social Security Payroll Tax Rates Under Prior Law and Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015

(as a percentage of taxable earnings)

Year

Employees and Employers, Each (FICA)

 

Self-Employed (SECA)

 

OASDI

OASI

DI

 

OASDI

OASI

DI

Rates Scheduled Under the Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-387)

2015+

6.200

5.300

0.900

 

12.400

10.600

1.800

Rates Scheduled Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74)

2015

6.200

5.300

0.900

 

12.400

10.600

1.800

2016-2018

6.200

5.015

1.185

 

12.400

10.030

2.370

2019+

6.200

5.300

0.900

 

12.400

10.600

1.800

Source: CRS.

Because the act did not change the Social Security payroll tax rate, the portion of the tax rate allocated to OASI decreased by a corresponding amount. This means that OASI's share of the 6.200% tax rate for employees and employers, each, declined by 0.285 percentage point at the start of 2016, from 5.300% to 5.015%. On a combined basis, OASI's share of the 12.400% tax rate declined by 0.570 percentage point, from 10.600% to 10.030%. Again, the change in the SECA rate mirrors the change in the combined FICA rate. For 2019 and later, the shares allocated to the DI and OASI trust funds are scheduled to return to their 2015 levels.

SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT) projects that the reallocation schedule in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 will extend the solvency of the DI trust fund from the fourth quarter of 2016 to approximately the third quarter of 2022 (Figure 6).67 Although the reallocation is projected to reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund by a number of months, OACT estimates that the depletion year for OASI will remain unchanged at 2035.68 Because the reallocation does not change the total amount of Social Security tax revenues, OACT projects that the depletion year for the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds will remain unchanged at 2034.

Figure 6. Actual and Projected DI Trust Fund Ratios Under Prior Law and Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, 1995-2023

(asset reserves at the beginning of the year as a share of annual cost)

Source: CRS, based on the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB), "Did You Know? The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 extended the expected date of the DI trust fund reserve depletion by 6 years to 2022 from 2016," Chart 1, http://www.ssab.gov/Facts-and-Figures/Did-You-Know-Charts/Disability-Trust-Fund-Solvency.

Note: Projections based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2015 trustees report.

CBO projects that the reallocation will extend the solvency of the DI trust fund from FY2017 to FY2021.69 The agency estimates that the reallocation will reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund slightly, shifting the depletion year from calendar year 2031 to calendar year 2030. The depletion year for the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds is projected to remain unchanged at calendar year 2029 under CBO's extended baseline projections (see Table 5). Table 5. Projected Depletion Years for the OASI, DI, and Combined OASDI Trust Funds Under Prior Law and Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, by Agency

Depletion Year Projections—

OACT

 

CBO

 

OASDI

OASI

DI

 

OASDI

OASI

DI

Under Prior Law

2034

2035

2016

 

2029

2031

FY2017

Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015a

2034

2035

2022

 

2029

2030

FY2021

Source: CRS, based on the following sources: the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report; Letter from Stephen C. Goss, chief actuary, to the Honorable John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, October 27, 2015, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/JBoehner_20151027.pdf; U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook, June 2015, p. 55, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50250; and CBO, CBO's 2015 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional Information, December 2015, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51047.

Notes: Unless otherwise stated, years presented in the table are calendar years. The "depletion year" is the year in which the balance of the trust fund falls to zero.

a. OACT's projections for the OASI trust fund and the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds account for the effects of several other provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 in addition to the temporary payroll tax reallocation. CBO's projections do not account for these effects. Use of Reallocations by Congress in the Past As shown in Table 6, Congress has authorized the reallocation of the payroll tax rate multiple times in the past. For the purposes of this report, a reallocation occurs when (1) the overall tax rate remains the same but the shares allocated to the trust funds change proportionally or (2) the overall tax rate changes and the shares allocated to the trust funds change in opposite directions.70 In other words, a reallocation increases tax revenues to one trust fund and decreases revenues to the other regardless of whether the overall Social Security tax rate increases, decreases, or stays the same.

Lawmakers have historically included payroll tax reallocations in major amendments to the Social Security Act in order to put the OASI and DI trust funds on a more or less equal financial footing. However, reallocations have been used at times to extend the solvency of nearly depleted trust funds. Payroll tax reallocations have sometimes benefited the DI trust fund and at other times have favored the OASI trust fund. Reallocation legislation may contain a rate schedule that changes the allocation between the trust funds multiple times and in different directions.

With respect to the "number of times" the payroll tax rate has been reallocated, some people tally pieces of legislation authorizing either a single reallocation or a reallocation schedule, whereas others count each instance in which a reallocation occurred. Because FICA taxes account for nearly all payroll tax revenues to the Social Security trust funds, people generally count reallocations affecting the FICA rate.71

Table 6. Legislation Reallocating the Social Security Payroll Tax Rate

Public Law Number

Name

Date of Enactment

Reallocation Direction

Reallocated the FICA Rate?a Reallocated the SECA Rate?a

P.L. 90-248

Social Security Amendments of 1967

January 2, 1968

OASI to DI

Yes (once)

Yes (once)

P.L. 91-172

Tax Reform Act of 1969

December 30, 1969

OASI to DI

Yes (once)

Yes (once)

P.L. 92-603

Social Security Amendments of 1972b

October 30, 1972

DI to OASI

No

Yes (once)

P.L. 93-233

"Social Security Benefits Increase Act of 1973"c

December 31, 1973

OASI to DI

No

Yes (once)

P.L. 95-216

Social Security Amendments of 1977

December 20, 1977

Both Directionsd

Yes (twice)

Yes (once)

P.L. 96-403

"Reallocation of Social Security Tax Receipts Act of 1980"e

October 9, 1980

Both Directionsf

Yes (twice)

Yes (twice)

P.L. 98-21

Social Security Amendments of 1983

April 20, 1983

DI to OASIg

Yes (twice)

Yes (once)

P.L. 103-387

Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994

October 22, 1994

Both Directionsh

Yes (3 times)

Yes (3 times)

P.L. 114-74

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015

November 2, 2015

Both Directionsi

Yes (twice)

Yes (twice)

Source: Compiled by CRS from the following sources: SSA, OACT, "Social Security Tax Rates," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/oasdiRates.html; SSA, "Social Security History: Legislative Histories 1935-2004," Downey Books, https://www.ssa.gov/history/legislativehistory.html; and SSA, OACT, "Reports from the Board of Trustees," various years, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/.

Notes: A reallocation occurs when (1) the overall tax rate remains the same but the shares allocated to the trust funds change proportionally or (2) the overall tax rate changes and the shares allocated to the trust funds change in opposite directions.

a. This column refers to reallocations that were implemented (or are scheduled to be implemented) under each law specified in the table; it does not refer to reallocations that were scheduled and then superseded by subsequent law. b. P.L. 92-603 amended the rate schedule enacted earlier that year under P.L. 92-336, "An Act to provide for a four-month extension of the present temporary level in the public debt limitation, and for other purposes."

c. P.L. 93-233 is titled "An Act to provide a 7-percent increase in social security benefits beginning with March 1974 and an additional 4-percent increase beginning with June 1974, to provide increases in supplemental security income benefits, and for other purposes."

d. The 1977 amendments reallocated the FICA and SECA rates to improve the balance of the DI trust fund in 1978 and reallocated the FICA rate to improve the balance of the OASI trust fund in 1979.

e. P.L. 96-403 is titled "An Act to amend title II of the Social Security Act to make necessary adjustments in the allocation of social security tax receipts between the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund."

f. The 1980 amendments provided for a temporary reallocation of the total tax rate to improve the balance of the OASI trust fund in 1980. In 1982, the change in the tax rates expired and more revenues were directed back to the DI trust fund. g. The 1983 amendments reallocated the FICA and SECA rates to improve the balance of the OASI trust fund in 1983. In 1984, the total tax rate increased and the FICA rate was reallocated again to give additional revenues to the OASI trust fund. h. The 1994 reallocation, which was enacted to improve the balance of the DI trust fund, occurred in three stages. The first and third stages reallocated the payroll tax rate from the OASI trust fund to the DI trust fund, while the second stage reallocated the tax rate from the DI trust fund to the OASI trust fund. i. In 2016, the share of the payroll tax rate allocated to the DI trust fund increased and the share allocated to the OASI trust fund decreased. In 2019, the share allocated to the OASI trust fund is scheduled to increase and the share allocated to the DI trust fund is scheduled to decrease. House Rules Change in the 114th Congress Concerning Reallocations Between the Social Security Trust Funds

At the start of the 114th Congress, the House adopted a rule sponsored by Representative Sam Johnson intended to engender structural changes to SSDI.72 Known as the "Johnson Rule," Section 3(q) of H.Res. 5 allows a point of order to be raised against legislation that would reduce the actuarial balance of the OASI trust fund by at least 0.01% of the present value of projected future taxable payroll over the 75-year period used in the most recent Social Security trustees report.73 However, the point of order would not apply if the legislation, as a whole, were projected to improve the long-term actuarial balance of the OASI and DI trust funds on a combined basis. Therefore, a short-term financing measure (such as a reallocation) could be considered if it also included revenue increases, cost reductions, or both, even if those changes were projected to have very small positive effects on the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds.

In their 2015 report, the trustees project that the present value of future taxable payroll from 2015 through 2089 will be nearly $421 trillion.74 The current threshold, therefore, is $42.1 billion (0.01% of $421 trillion).75 CBO projects that the reallocation schedule enacted in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74) will increase income from payroll taxes to the DI trust fund by $117 billion and reduce income from payroll taxes to the OASI trust fund by the same amount.76

If the reallocation provision in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 had been proposed as a standalone piece of legislation, it could have been vulnerable to a point of order under the new rule because it would have reduced the actuarial balance of the OASI trust fund by more than $42.1 billion. However, because the budget agreement also contained several provisions that are projected to improve the long-term actuarial balance of the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds by 0.04% of taxable payroll, the point of order under Section 3(q) of H.Res. 5 was not applicable during House consideration of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.77

Long-Term Policy Options

To improve the financial outlook of the DI trust fund over the long term, Congress could consider a variety of legislative changes to increase tax revenues, reduce program cost (i.e., alter benefit levels or program eligibility requirements), or some combination of those approaches. The last major congressional effort to address the financial condition of one of the Social Security trust funds occurred in the early 1980s with the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21). Under the 1983 amendments, Congress used a combination of revenue increases and cost reductions to stabilize and eventually improve the solvency of the OASI trust fund.78 Congress could enact similar legislation to improve the long-term solvency of either the DI trust fund only or both trust funds.

For information on reform proposals that would affect the solvency of the DI trust fund (or both trust funds), see the following resources:

Congressional Rationale for the Creation of a Separate DI Trust Fund

The creation of a separate DI trust fund came about during the debate over the establishment of SSDI as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880).79 Since the late 1930s, policymakers had discussed proposals to amend the Social Security Act to provide covered workers with disability insurance.80 However, persistent disagreements among policymakers over how to implement a disability insurance program or whether such a program should be enacted at all derailed most proposals early in the deliberative process.81 Nevertheless, by the 1950s, there was enough support for the creation of a federal disability insurance program for Congress to consider the matter.82

Origins of Social Security (OASDI)

1935 (Old-Age Insurance): The Social Security Act (P.L. 74-271) created a national old-age benefits program, covering nearly all workers in commerce and industry and providing monthly pensions at age 65 for insured workers.

1939 (Survivors Insurance): The Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379) amended Title II of the Social Security Act to provide monthly benefits to eligible dependents and survivors of insured workers. The 1939 amendments also established the OASI trust fund.83

1956 (Disability Insurance): The Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880) amended Title II to provide monthly benefits to insured workers aged 50 to 64 with qualifying impairments. The 1956 amendments also created the DI trust fund.

On July 11, 1955, Representative Jere Cooper (D-TN), the chair of the House Committee on Ways and Means, introduced a bill to amend Title II of the Social Security Act to provide monthly benefits to insured workers aged 50 to 64 with qualifying impairments, among other provisions (H.R. 7225). Under the bill, disability benefits would have been paid from the OASI trust fund and payroll tax rates would have been increased to cover the associated costs. The House report accompanying H.R. 7225 did not discuss the creation of a separate trust fund for the proposed disability insurance program.84 The House passed H.R. 7225, with amendments, by a vote of 372 (169-R, 203-D) to 31 (23-R, 8-D) on July 18, 1955 (R = Republican, D = Democrat).85

Although H.R. 7225 passed overwhelmingly in the House, the bill faced marked opposition in the Senate. One of the main concerns among Members who opposed the bill was the uncertainty over its potential cost. Some lawmakers worried that economic downturns would impel unemployed workers to apply to the disability insurance program, affecting the solvency of the OASI trust fund. Given these concerns, the Senate Committee on Finance removed the disability insurance provisions from H.R. 7225. The Senate report accompanying the 1956 amendments stated,

Difficulties in determining eligibility, and other factors, lead to uncertainty as to the future costs of a cash disability program. Cost estimates in the field of disability benefits, as pointed out by the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, are subject to a wider range of variation than are estimates for other types of benefits. The basic cost estimates which have been presented to the committee were based on high employment conditions; under low employment conditions, the cost would be significantly higher. The old-age and survivors insurance system is on a sound financial basis; your committee strongly believes that it must be kept so and should not be altered by adding a benefit feature that could involve substantially higher costs than can be estimated.86

During Senate floor debate on H.R. 7225, Senator Walter F. George (D-GA) offered an amendment reinstating the disability insurance program along with the tax increase to finance it. To address concerns that a disability insurance program would pose a risk to the solvency of the OASI trust fund, the George amendment provided for a separate trust fund from which disability benefits would be paid. Supporters of the George amendment argued that a separate DI trust fund would isolate the OASI trust fund from any cost increases stemming from the new disability insurance program. For instance, during floor debate, Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. (D-MO) remarked,

The pending proposal, which the senior Senator from Georgia has submitted for himself ... proposes to set aside a separate trust fund for disability, and consequently does not go so far as to include it within the social-security framework. I believe this to be an extremely workable compromise—one which will eliminate any fear that the old-age and survivors insurance fund will be endangered, although I for one never shared this concern.87

Opponents of the George amendment argued that the creation of a separate DI trust fund would not sufficiently address their concerns about the potential cost of the program. Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) noted,

The supporters of this amendment tell us that by setting up a separate trust fund they are not going to jeopardize the actuarial balance of the program of social security. I think it is rather obvious that once this amendment is enacted, there is small chance that the program would be discontinued because of lack of funds. The pressure to provide the necessary funds, either through direct Government grant or through increased taxes on the social security taxpayers, would demand the employment of one of those alternatives.88

The Senate narrowly passed the George amendment by a vote of 47 (6-R, 41-D) to 45 (38-R, 7-D).89 The Senate went on to pass its version of H.R. 7225 by a vote of 90 (45-R, 45-D) to 0 on July 17, 1956.90

In conference, the House adopted the Senate provision establishing a separate DI trust fund.91 The conference report on H.R. 7225 was cleared, without amendments, by voice votes in the House on July 26, 1956,92 and in the Senate on July 27, 1956.93 Following consideration of the conference report, Senator George stated in support of his amendment:

Another feature of our proposal is that the funds for disability payments are earmarked in a wholly separate fund. These moneys will not be commingled in any way with the funds for old age insurance or for widows and orphans. The contribution income and the disbursements for disability payments will be kept completely distinct and separate. In this way the cost of disability benefits always will be definitely known and the costs always will be shown separately.

The disability program is limited to a total of one-quarter of 1 percent of payroll from employers, one-quarter of 1 percent from employees' and three-eighths of 1 percent from the self-employed and disbursements cannot exceed the amount available for this purpose. Thus, the argument that has been made against the original proposal as considered by the Finance Committee, namely, that the cost of the proposal cannot be determined, is met by our amendment. Moreover, another argument that was made against the original proposal that the program eventually may cost more than originally estimated and may thus divert some of the funds from old-age or survivors insurance is also met by our proposal. Senators who have had any doubts about the financial aspects of the proposal can vote for the amendment with complete assurance as to its financial soundness.94

The DI trust fund was established on August 1, 1956—the day President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law the Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880).95

Key Dates Projected for the Social Security Trust Funds Table B-1. Key Dates Projected for the Social Security Trust Funds as Shown Under the Intermediate Assumptions in Trustees Reports from 1983 to 2015

Year of Report

Year of Projected Depletion

Year That Cost First Exceeds Non-Interest Income

Year That Cost First Exceeds Total Income

 

OASI

DI

OASDI

OASI

DI

OASDI

OASI

DI

OASDI

Intermediate II-B Projectionsa

1983

b b b c c

2021

c c

2047

1984

b

2050

b

2021

2012

2021

2045

2038

2044

1985

2050

2034

2049

2019

2010

2019

2032

2020

2032

1986

2054

2026

2051

2020

2009

2019

2035

2017

2033

1987

2055

2023

2051

2020

2008

2019

2036

2013

2033

1988

2050

2027

2048

2019

2009

2019

2033

2016

2032

1989

2049

2025

2046

2019

2009

2018

2032

2014

2030

1990

2046

2020

2043

2019

2008

2017

2030

2011

2028

Intermediate Projections

1991

2045

2015

2041

2018

1998

2017

2030

2011

2028

1992

2042

1997

2036

2018

1992

2016

2028

1992

2024

1993

2044

1995

2036

2019

1993

2017

2030

1993

2025

1994

2036

1995

2029

2016

1994

2013

2024

1994

2019

1995

2031

2016

2030

2014

2003

2013

2021

2007

2020

1996

2031

2015

2029

2014

2003

2012

2021

2007

2019

1997

2031

2015

2029

2014

2004

2012

2021

2007

2019

1998

2034

2019

2032

2015

2006

2013

2023

2009

2021

1999

2036

2020

2034

2015

2006

2014

2024

2009

2022

2000

2039

2023

2037

2016

2007

2015

2026

2012

2025

2001

2040

2026

2038

2016

2008

2016

2027

2015

2027

2002

2043

2028

2041

2018

2009

2017

2028

2018

2027

2003

2044

2028

2042

2018

2008

2018

2030

2018

2028

2004

2044

2029

2042

2018

2008

2018

2029

2017

2028

2005

2043

2027

2041

2018

2005

2017

2028

2014

2027

2006

2042

2025

2040

2018

2005

2017

2028

2013

2027

2007

2042

2026

2041

2018

2005

2017

2028

2013

2027

2008

2042

2025

2041

2018

2005

2017

2028

2012

2027

2009

2039

2020

2037

2017

2005

2016

2025

2009

2024

2010

2040

2018

2037

2018

2005

2015

2026

2009

2025

2011

2038

2018

2036

2017

2005

2010

2025

2009

2023

2012

2035

2016

2033

2010

2005

2010

2023

2009

2021

2013

2035

2016

2033

2010

2005

2010

2022

2009

2021

2014

2034

2016

2033

2010

2005

2010

2022

2009

2020

2015d

2035

2016

2034

2010

2005

2010

2022

2009

2020

Source: CRS, based on data from the 1983 to 2015 Social Security trustees reports and information provided by SSA.

a. From 1983 to 1990, two intermediate forecasts were prepared (II-A and II-B). The intermediate II-B forecast corresponds more closely to the intermediate forecast in subsequent years. b. Trust fund expected to remain solvent throughout the long-range projection period. c. Not available. d. The depletion dates in the 2015 trustees report were projected before the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74).

Author Contact Information

[author name scrubbed], Analyst in Income Security ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Footnotes

1.

For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, First in a Hearing Series on Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 2, 2011, H.Hrg. 112-SS11 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 4-5, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76319/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg76319.pdf. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security: A Fresh Look at Workers' Disability Insurance, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2014, S.Hrg. 113-532 (Washington: GPO, 2015), p. 3, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg92646/pdf/CHRG-113shrg92646.pdf. In addition, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, The Coming Crisis: Social Security Disability Trust Fund Insolvency, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 11, 2015, http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/hearing-schedule?ID=ffb8d0f9-c572-47ee-9165-f5ae4317e82c.

2.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, The 2015 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 114th Cong., 1st sess., July 22, 2015, H.Doc. 114-51 (Washington: GPO, 2015), http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2015/index.html (hereinafter "2015 Social Security Trustees Report"). Projections based on the trustees' 2015 intermediate assumptions.

3.

For more information on Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), see CRS Report R42035, Social Security Primer, by [author name scrubbed]. For more information on the concept of social insurance, see Larry DeWitt, "The Development of Social Security in America," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 70, no. 3 (August 2010), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p1.html.

4.

Social Security Administration (SSA), "Monthly Statistical Snapshot, November 2015," December 2015, Table 2, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (hereinafter "SSA Monthly Statistical Snapshot").

5.

See CRS Report R41962, The Social Security Retirement Age: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

6.

For more information on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), see CRS Report RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by [author name scrubbed].

7.

SSA, Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT), "Disabled Insured Workers," http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c2DI.html.

8.

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1). See also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1504-1511.

9.

SSA, OACT, "Substantial Gainful Activity," http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html.

10.

An impairment (or combination of impairments) is considered severe if it significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. For more information, see SSA, Program Operations Manual System (POMS), "DI 24505.001 Individual Must Have a Medically Determinable Severe Impairment," August 9, 2012, http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0424505001.

11.

For additional information on the five-month waiting period, see CRS Report RS22220, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI): The Five-Month Waiting Period for Benefits, by [author name scrubbed].

12.

See CRS Report R43542, How Social Security Benefits Are Computed: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

13.

See CRS Report 94-803, Social Security: Cost-of-Living Adjustments, by [author name scrubbed].

14.

SSA, OACT, "Maximum Benefit for a Disabled-Worker Family," http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/dibfamilymax.html.

15.

For more information, see SSA, How Workers' Compensation and Other Disability Payments May Affect Your Benefits, No. 05-10018, June 2015, http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10018.pdf.

16.

SSA, Monthly Statistical Snapshot, Table 2.

17.

For more information, see SSA, "Medicare Information," http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/medicare.htm. See also CRS Report R40425, Medicare Primer, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

18.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Medicare & Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 2013 edition, Table 3.4, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/Downloads/2013_Section3.pdf#Table3.4. Figure is per enrollee and includes disabled workers, disabled widow(er)s, disabled adult children, and individuals entitled to Medicare because of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) only.

19.

See U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Glossary, January 31, 2012, pp. 18-19, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42904. See also U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO; now the Government Accountability Office), Federal Trust and Other Earmarked Funds: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, GAO-01-199SP, January 1, 2001, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-199SP.

20.

42 U.S.C. §401. For more information on the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, see SSA, OACT, "Disability Insurance Trust Fund," http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describedi.html. For more information on the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, see SSA, OACT, "Old-Age & Survivors Insurance Trust Fund," http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/describeoasi.html.

21.

See also SSA, OACT, "Trust Fund FAQs," http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/fundFAQ.html.

22.

The OASI trust fund became effective on January 1, 1940. For more information on the origins of the OASI trust fund and the Old-Age Reserve Account, see Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, First Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, January 3, 1941, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trust/tf1941.html.

23.

The DI trust fund was established on August 1, 1956.

24.

Social Security payroll taxes on employees and employers were established under Title VIII of the Social Security Act in 1935 (P.L. 74-271). In 1939, the internal revenue laws of the United States were consolidated and codified under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC; P.L. 76-1). Title VI of the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379) amended Subchapter A of Chapter 9 of the IRC to read "Federal Insurance Contributions Act" (FICA). See 26 U.S.C. §3128.

25.

Section 208 of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 (P.L. 81-734) established Social Security payroll taxes on self-employed individuals under Subchapter E of Chapter 1 of the IRC. The 1950 amendments also coined the term "Self-Employment Contributions Act" (SECA). See 26 U.S.C. §1403.

26.

See SSA, OACT, "Contribution and Benefit Base," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/cbb.html. The taxable maximum is adjusted to reflect changes in average earnings levels in the United States for years in which a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is payable. See 42 U.S.C. §430.

27.

26 U.S.C. §§3101, 3111, and 1401. These sections of the IRC also prescribe the payroll tax rates for Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund. The total Medicare payroll tax rate, which applies to all covered earnings, is 2.90% (1.45% for employees and employers, each). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) imposes an additional 0.90% tax on high-income workers with wages and self-employment income over $200,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012. The revenues from the 0.90% tax are credited to the HI trust fund. For more information, see CRS Report R43122, Medicare Financial Status: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]. See also Internal Revenue Service (IRS), "Questions and Answers for the Additional Medicare Tax," http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Questions-and-Answers-for-the-Additional-Medicare-Tax.

28.

42 U.S.C. §401(b).

29.

42 U.S.C. §401(a).

30.

26 U.S.C. §86. For more information on the taxation of Social Security benefits, see CRS Report RL32552, Social Security: Calculation and History of Taxing Benefits, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

31.

For more information on these thresholds, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions, committee print, prepared by CRS, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2014, S.Prt. 113-32 (Washington: GPO, 2014), pp. 989-990, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113SPRT91950/pdf/CPRT-113SPRT91950.pdf.

32.

The HI trust fund is credited with the remainder of income from the taxation of up to 85% of OASI and SSDI benefits.

33.

The DI trust fund is reimbursed for the following costs: (1) the cost of noncontributory wage credits for military service before 1957; (2) the cost of payroll tax credits provided to employees in 1984 and self-employed persons in 1984-89 by P.L. 98-21; (3) the cost in 2009-17 of excluding certain self-employment earnings from SECA taxes under P.L. 110-246; and (4) payroll tax revenue forgone under the provisions of P.L. 111-147, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78, and P.L. 112-96. See 2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.A2.

34.

In the past, the trust funds held publicly available securities. For more information on Social Security trust fund holdings, see CRS Report RS20607, Social Security: Trust Fund Investment Practices, by [author name scrubbed].

35.

Although government securities held by the trust funds represent assets to Social Security, they are also liabilities to the rest of the federal government. For more information, see CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025, January 26, 2015, p. 145, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49892.

36.

42 U.S.C. §401(c).

37.

The Deputy Commissioner of SSA serves as the Secretary of the Board of Trustees. The two public representatives may not be from the same political party.

38.

For information about the trust funds on a combined basis, see CRS Report RL33028, Social Security: The Trust Funds, by [author name scrubbed].

39.

In 2014, the asset reserves of the DI trust fund earned an effective annual interest rate of 4.5%. For more information, see SSA, OACT, "Effective Interest Rates," http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/effectiveRates.html. For data on OASI and DI investment transactions, see SSA, OACT, "Investment Transactions," http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/transactions.html.

40.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, p. 30. For more information on the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), see CRS Report RS22350, Railroad Retirement Board: Retirement, Survivor, Disability, Unemployment, and Sickness Benefits, by [author name scrubbed].

41.

See SSA, OACT, "Times Series For Selected Financial Items," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/tsOps.html.

42.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table VI.G5. In 2014, taxable payroll was slightly more than one-third of gross domestic product (GDP).

43.

Ibid., pp. 55-56.

44.

Jeffrey B. Liebman, "Understanding the Increase in Disability Insurance Benefit Receipt in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspective, vol. 29, no. 2 (Spring 2015), https://www.aeaweb.org/jep/app/2902/29020123_corr.pdf. See also Mary C. Daly, Brian Lucking, and Jonathan A. Schwabish, The Future of Social Security Disability Insurance, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter 2013-17, June 24, 2013, http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2013-17.pdf.

45.

See David Pattison and Hilary Waldron, "Growth in New Disabled-Worker Entitlements, 1970–2008," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 4 (November 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n4/v73n4p25.html.

46.

SSA, OACT, "Disability Insured Workers," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c2DI.html.

47.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, pp. 137-140.

48.

See Kathy Ruffing, How Much of the Growth in Disability Insurance Stems From Demographic Changes?, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), January 27, 2014, Table 1, p. 5, http://www.cbpp.org/research/how-much-of-the-growth-in-disability-insurance-stems-from-demographic-changes?fa=view&id=4080.

49.

Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Work Experience, SSA, OACT, Actuarial Study No. 123, Table 4, August 2015, p. 22, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study123.pdf.

50.

Testimony of SSA Chief Actuary Stephen C. Goss, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, The Financing Challenges Facing the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2013, http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_031413a.html.

51.

SSA, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2014, April 2015, Table 6.C7, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/6c.html#table6.c7.

52.

See David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan, "The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 2003), pp. 158-205, http://economics.mit.edu/files/579.

53.

David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper no. 17697, December 2011, p. 5, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17697. See also L. Scott Muller et al., Trends in the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income Disability Programs, SSA, August 2006, p. 44, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/index.html.

54.

See Kalman Rupp and Charles G. Scott, "Trends in the Characteristics of DI and SSI Disability Awardees and Duration of Program Participation," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 59, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 3, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v59n1/.

55.

Gina Livermore, David Wittenburg, and David Neumark, "Finding alternatives to disability benefit receipt," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 2014, p. 2. http://www.izajolp.com/content/pdf/2193-9004-3-14.pdf.

56.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, p. 140.

57.

2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, Report to the Social Security Advisory Board, September 2015, p. 44, http://ssab.gov/Portals/0/Technical%20Panel/2015_TPAM_Final_Report.pdf?ver=2015-09-24-113145-693.

58.

42 U.S.C. §423.

59.

31 U.S.C. §1341.

60.

42 U.S.C. §401(h). See CRS Report RL33514, Social Security: What Would Happen If the Trust Funds Ran Out?, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32822, Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

61.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, p. 40.

62.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook, June 2015, p. 55, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50250.

63.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, p.13.

64.

Ibid.

65.

Michelle Stegman Bailey and Jeffrey Hemmeter, "Characteristics of Noninstitutionalized DI and SSI Program Participants, 2013 Update," Research and Statistics Note no. 2015-2, September 2015, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2015-02.html.

66.

Ibid., Table 6B.

67.

Letter from Stephen C. Goss, chief actuary, to the Honorable John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, October 27, 2015, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/JBoehner_20151027.pdf (hereinafter "OACT Letter to Speaker Boehner, October 2015").

68.

OACT's projections for the OASI trust fund and the theoretical combined OASDI trust funds account for the effects of several other provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 in addition to the payroll tax reallocation.

69.

CBO, CBO's 2015 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional Information, December 2015, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51047.

70.

See Kathy A. Ruffing and Paul N. Van de Water, Congress Needs to Boost Disability Insurance Share of Payroll Tax by 2016: Traditional Step Would Avert Trust Fund Depletion, Benefit Cuts, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 31, 2014, http://www.cbpp.org//sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-16-14socsec.pdf. See also Virginia P. Reno, Elisa A. Walker, and Thomas N. Bethell, Social Security Disability Insurance: Action Needed to Address Finances, National Academy of Social Insurance, Brief no. 41, June 2013, https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_041.pdf.

71.

In 2014, FICA taxes accounted for 94% of all payroll tax revenues to the Social Security trust funds on a combined basis. See SSA, OACT, "Social Security & Medicare Tax Data," https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/taxquery.html.

72.

Office of Rep. Sam Johnson, "House Passes Johnson Measure to Protect Social Security," press release, January 6, 2015, http://samjohnson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397616. The House rule was also included in the FY2016 budget resolution (see Section 3301 of S.Con.Res. 11).

73.

For general information on points of order, see CRS Report 98-307, Points of Order, Rulings, and Appeals in the House of Representatives, by [author name scrubbed]. Actuarial balance is the difference between a trust fund's summarized income and cost rates. The summarized income rate is the sum of the present value of non-interest income and the balance of the trust fund at the beginning of the 75-year period, expressed as a share of the present value of taxable payroll for the period. The summarized cost rate is the sum of the present value of cost over the 75-year period and the present value of the cost of reaching a trust fund ratio of 100% at the end of the period, expressed as a percentage of the present value of taxable payroll for the same period. Present value is "a single number that expresses a flow of past and future income (in taxes) or payments (in benefits) in terms of an equivalent lump sum received or paid at a specific time. The value depends on the rate of interest, known as the discount rate, used to translate past and future cash flows into current dollars at that time." See CBO, Social Security Policy Options, 2015, December 2015, p. 91, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51011.

74.

2015 Social Security Trustees Report, Table IV.B6.

75.

SSA's Chief Actuary, Stephen C. Goss, told Politico in January 2015 that the threshold under H.Res. 5 was $38.6 billion. That threshold was based on the present value of projected future taxable payroll in the 2014 trustees report (0.01% of $386.884 trillion is $38.6884 billion). See David Rogers, "Republicans target Social Security disability," Politico, January 20, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/republicans-target-social-security-114382. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, The 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 28, 2014, H.Doc. 113-139 (Washington: GPO, 2015), Table IV.B5, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/IV_B_LRest.html#493472.

76.

CBO, Estimate of the Budgetary Effects of H.R. 1314, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, as reported by the House Committee on Rules on October 27, 2015, p. 5, footnote 2, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50938.

77.

For more information on the effects of other provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 on the solvency of the Social Security trust funds, see OACT Letter to Speaker Boehner, October 2015.

78.

See John A. Svahn and Mary Ross, "Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 7 (July 1983), https://socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v46n7/v46n7p3.pdf.

79.

See Charles I. Schottland, "Social Security Amendments of 1956: A Summary and Legislative History," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 19, no. 9 (September 1956), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v19n9/.

80.

Edward D. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy: American's Programs for the Handicapped (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 41-78 (hereinafter "Berkowitz 1987").

81.

Ibid. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Committee Staff Report on the Disability Insurance Program, prepared by the Staff of the Committee of on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 107-113, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/dibhistory.html.

82.

Ibid. See also John R. Kearney, "Social Security and the 'D' in OASDI: The History of a Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 66, no. 3 (August 2006), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.html.

83.

The OASI trust fund superseded the Old-Age Reserve Account created under the Social Security Act in 1935 (P.L.74-271). The OASI trust fund became effective on January 1, 1940. For more information on the origins of the OASI trust fund and Old-Age Reserve Account, see Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, First Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, January 3, 1941, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trust/tf1941.html.

84.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Social Security Amendments of 1955, report to accompany H.R. 7225, 84th Cong., 1st sess., July 14, 1955, H.Rept. 1189.

85.

"Social Security Amendments of 1955," Congressional Record, vol. 101, part 8 (July 18, 1955), Roll call no. 119, not voting 29, pp. 10798-10799. See also SSA, "Vote Tallies: 1956 Social Security Amendments," https://www.ssa.gov/history/tally56.html. CRS was unable to find any discussion of a separate DI trust fund during the House floor debate on H.R. 7225.

86.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security Amendments of 1956, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., June 5, 1956, S.Rept. 2133, p. 4, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rpt84-2133.pdf.

87.

Sen. Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., "Social Security Amendments of 1956," Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 10 (July 17, 1956), p. 13043.

88.

Sen. Wallace F. Bennett, "Social Security Amendments of 1956," Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 10 (July 17, 1956), p. 13035.

89.

"Social Security Amendments of 1956," Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 10 (July 17, 1956), not voting 4, p. 13056. For background information on the George amendment, see SSA, "Legislative History: 1993 Disability Forum," https://www.ssa.gov/history/dibforum93.html. See also Berkowitz 1987, pp. 73-77.

90.

"Social Security Amendments of 1956," Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 10 (July 17, 1956), p. 13103.

91.

U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, Social Security Amendments Act of 1956, report to accompany H.R. 7225, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 1956, H.Rept. 2936, pp. 25-26, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ConfRpt84-2936.pdf.

92.

"Amending Title II of Social Security Act," House, Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 11 (July 26, 1956), p. 14828.

93.

"Social Security Act Amendments of 1956—Conference Report," Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 11 (July 27, 1956), p. 15107.

94.

Sen. Walter F. George, "Social Security Act Amendments of 1956—Conference Report," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 102, part 11 (July 27, 1956), p. 15108.

95.

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, SSA, Social Security Amendments of 1956 Volume 1, 84th Congress, Downey Books, https://www.ssa.gov/history/legislativehistory.html.