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Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations

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Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations

August 7, 2014October 17, 2017 (R42580)
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Contents

  • Political Situation
  • Conditions
  • President Jimmy Morales's Administration
  • Links Between Morales's Party and the Military
  • Efforts to Combat Impunity and Corruption
  • Impeachment of Former President
  • Current Political Crisis
  • Judicial Reforms and Efforts to Stop Them
  • Economic and Social Conditions
  • U.S.-Guatemala Relations
  • U.S. Foreign Assistance
  • Regional Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) and Security Initiatives
  • Trade and CAFTA-DR
  • Counternarcotics Cooperation
  • Migration Issues
  • Intercountry Adoption
  • Summary

    Guatemala, the most populous Central American country, with a population of 16.3 million, has been consolidating its transition to democracy since the 1980s. Guatemala has a long history of internal conflict, including a 36-year civil war (1960-1996) during which the Guatemalan military held power and over 200,000 people were killed or disappeared. A democratic constitution was adopted in 1985, and a democratically elected government was inaugurated in 1986.

    In 2015, Jimmy Morales, a political newcomer, won the presidential election with 67% of the vote on an anticorruption platform; he took office in January 2016. The previous president and vice president had resigned and been arrested after being implicated in a large-scale corruption scandal. In what many observers see as a step forward in Guatemala's democratic development, the Public Ministry's recent corruption and human rights abuse investigations have led to the arrest and trial of high-level government, judicial, and military officials. They have also led to a backlash against those reform efforts, and a political crisis involving current President Morales. The Public Ministry is responsible for public prosecution and law enforcement, and works in conjunction with the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to strengthen rule of law in Guatemala. As their anticorruption efforts prove effective, the circle of those feeling threatened by investigations broadens, and attacks against CICIG and the judicial system it supports broaden and intensify as well.

    Guatemala continues to face many other challenges, including insecurity, high rates of violence, and increasing rates of poverty and malnourishment. Guatemala remains a major transit country for cocaine and heroin trafficked from South America to the United States. Although Guatemala recorded record drug seizures in 2016, the lack of law enforcement and/or collusion between corrupt officials and organized crime in many areas enable trafficking of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, people, and other contraband. During Morales's first year, his administration improved tax collection, and the interior ministry reported a 5% drop in homicide rates.

    Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America and in recent decades has had relatively stable economic growth. Despite that economic growth, however, Guatemala's economic inequality and poverty have increased, especially among the rural indigenous population. The Economist Intelligence Unit projects that the country's economic growth rate will likely peak in 2017 at 3.5%, followed by a slowdown. The World Bank calls for rapid economic growth coupled with increased public investment and pro-poor policies to improve social conditions.

    Traditionally, the United States and Guatemala have had close relations, with friction at times over human rights and civil/military issues. Guatemala and the United States have significant trade and are part of the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Top priorities for U.S. bilateral assistance to Guatemala include improving security, governance, and justice for citizens; improving economic growth and food security; providing access to health services; promoting better educational outcomes; providing opportunities for out-of-school youth to reduce their desire to migrate; and improving natural resource management to mitigate the impact of climate change. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is meant to spur development and reduce illegal emigration to the United States. The Trump Administration's proposed FY2018 budget request would cut funds for Guatemala by 36%.

    Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations

    Political Conditions

    President Jimmy Morales, a relative political newcomer, won Guatemala's 2015 presidential election by a landslide with 67% of the vote. During the campaign, as mass protests calling for then-President Pérez Molina's resignation and an end to corruption and impunity grew, so did Morales's popular appeal. Morales framed his lack of political experience as an asset. His campaign slogan was "Neither corrupt nor a thief," and he ran on a platform of governing transparently and continuing to root out corruption.

    Guatemala at a Glance

    People

    Population: 16.34 million (2015, World Bank)

    Life expectancy: men, 71; women, 77

    Ethnic groups: Mixed and European (59.4%); Indigenous Maya (40.3%); other (0.3%)

    Literacy: men, 84.7%; women, 73.9%

    Poverty: 67.7% (2014)

    Economy

    GDP: $63.794 billion (2015)

    GNI per capita: $3,590 (2015)

    GDP composition by sector: agriculture, 13.2%; industry, 23.5%; services, 63.3% (2016 estimates)

    Trade

    Key export partners: United States (36.35%), Mexico (8.74%), El Salvador (7.67%)

    Top exports to the United States (2016): edible fruit and nuts, citrus fruit, or melon peel; apparel articles and accessories; coffee, tea, mate, and spices

    Leadership

    President Jimmy Morales (the president is both chief of state and head of government); President of the Congress Oscar Chinchilla

    Guatemala faces many political and social challenges in addition to widespread corruption and impunity. Guatemala has some of the highest levels of violence, inequality, and poverty in the region, as well as the largest population. Indigenous people, about half of the population, experience higher rates of economic and social marginalization than nonindigenous citizens, and have for decades. Almost half of the country's children are chronically malnourished.

    Guatemala's homicide rate decreased to 27.3 homicides per 100,000 people in 2016, which nonetheless remains one of the highest rates in the region.1 Guatemala has a long history of internal conflict and violence, including a 36-year civil war (1960-1996). For most of that time, the Guatemalan military held power and violently repressed and violated the human rights of its citizens, especially its majority indigenous population. Reports estimate that more than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared during the conflict, with the state bearing responsibility for 93% of human rights violations. More than 83% of the victims were identified as Mayan.2 In 1986, Guatemala established a civilian democratic government, but military repression and human rights violations continued. Peace accords signed in 1996 ended the conflict. The United States maintained close relations with most Guatemalan governments, including the military governments, before, during, and after the civil war.

    Figure 1. Guatemala at a Glance

    Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from the Department of State (2015) and Global Administrative Areas (2017).

    Since the late 1980s, Guatemala has sought to consolidate its transition from military and autocratic rule to a democracy. Democratically elected civilian governments have governed for over 30 years, but democratic institutions remain fragile due to high levels of impunity, drug trafficking, corruption, and inequitable distribution of resources. Although state institutions have investigated and arrested high-level officials, including a sitting president, for corruption, high levels of impunity in many cases continue due to intimidation of judicial officials, delays in sentencing, and widespread corruption.

    Morales presented his General Government Policy for 2016-2020 in February 2016. The five pillars of this plan are zero tolerance for corruption, and modernization of the state; improvement in food security and nutrition; improvement in overall health and quality education; promotion of micro, small, and medium enterprises, and tourism and housing construction; and protection of the environment and natural resources.

    One-and-a-half years into his four-year term, however, Morales is in the midst of a political crisis. In August and September 2017, Guatemala's attorney general and a United Nations (U.N.) anti-impunity commission announced they were seeking to lift the president's immunity from prosecution as they investigate alleged violations of campaign finance laws, and bonuses paid to him by the military. The president tried unsuccessfully to expel the head of the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Commissioner Ivan Velásquez. (See "Efforts to Combat Impunity and Corruption" below.)

    A recent opinion poll found that more than 72% of the population has little or no trust in the police, and about 65% has little to no trust in the government.3 Conversely, 83% of the population said they supported CICIG and the Public Ministry—which is headed by the attorney general—making them Guatemala's most trusted institutions.

    So far, the judicial process, protests, and mass mobilizations in the wake of high-level government corruption scandals have remained peaceful. Nonetheless, tensions have heightened since President Morales tried to expel CICIG's commissioner, and the Guatemalan Congress tried to reduce criminal penalties for campaign-related corruption. Renewed public protests have called for the resignations of President Morales and members of Congress seen as protecting corrupt practices.

    While some see the corruption charges as a crisis, others—including many within the Guatemalan government—see an opportunity to make the government more honest and accountable. Nonetheless, continued impunity coupled with the state's failure to provide basic public services to large parts of the population and limited advances in reducing Guatemala's high poverty levels could prolong protests. Military-criminal enterprises and other powerful interests that have benefited from corruption and the status quo have fought against anticorruption and anti-impunity work since it began. Continued prosecution of corruption could provoke violent responses from those whose wealth or power are threatened—public prosecutors, the attorney general, and members of the judiciary continue to receive threats. Powerful interests also use more subtle methods to try to weaken CICIG, the Public Ministry, and groups pushing for political reform. These include tactics such as discrediting the reputations of officials, activists, and their organizations; spurious legal actions that delay trials and drain fiscal and human resources; attempting to change CICIG's mandate or terms; and delays or cuts in the judicial system's budget.

    President Jimmy Morales

    Born in 1969 in Guatemala City, Guatemala, to a family of humble means, Morales entered politics after making a name for himself as a TV comedian. When he lost the mayoral race for Mixco in 2011, Morales joined his current party, the right-wing National Convergence Front-Nation (FCN-Nación), in 2013 and became secretary general of the party. In 2015, FCN-Nación nominated him as its presidential candidate; he drew on his outsider status to distance himself from the historically corrupt political class. Investigations by CICIG and the Public Ministry (MP) have implicated Morales's brother and son in a fraud case. The attorney general is seeking to have Morales's immunity from prosecution lifted so he can be investigated for possible campaign finance violations and payments the military paid to him while president.

    President Jimmy Morales's Administration

    Morales's administration has achieved a few significant accomplishments, such as substantially increased tax collection. The administration developed tax reform policies, covering tax collection, the tax authority administration, and the customs office structure. He placed experienced professionals in key finance, tax, health, and economic positions. The tax administration (SAT), under the new leadership of Juan Francisco Solórzano, has used judicial measures and intervention to increase recovery of unpaid taxes. Solórzano, a former head of the criminal investigation unit at the attorney general's office, had the endorsement of CICIG as well as the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.4 Under his leadership, the SAT collected $297 million in recovered taxes in 2016 compared to $5 million in 2015.5 Following austerity measures in 2016 that limited government spending and decreased the deficit, the Guatemalan Congress passed an expansionary budget for 2017.6

    The interior ministry oversaw a 5% drop in the homicide rate to 27.3 homicides per 100,000 people in 2016, which nonetheless remains one of the highest rates in the region.7

    In response to the high level of violence, a number of municipalities asked for military troops to augment their ineffective police forces; the Guatemalan government has been using a constitutional clause to have the army "temporarily" support the police in combating crime. Recently, Interior Minister Francisco Rivas announced a two-phase plan to remove the military from citizen security operations by the end of 2017. The new plan includes shuffling military currently involved in citizen security efforts to the country's borders to control land routes used by traffickers and gangs.8 This would be a significant effort to comply with provisions of the 1996 peace accord calling on the army to focus solely on external threats. Despite efforts to develop a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to security, the previous five administrations' actions have often been reactive and dependent on the military.

    Morales had already faced criticism for not acting forcefully enough on his pledge to crack down on corruption, and for his links to family and friends under investigation, before he tried to expel Commissioner Velásquez. Both Attorney General Thelma Aldana and the commissioner of CICIG said that the president had not interfered in corruption cases—even those involving his family. But both also expressed disappointment that he had not spoken out in support of them and their anticorruption efforts when attacked by antireform elements. Attorney General Aldana has said she will resign if the president expels the head of CICIG, with whom she has worked closely to prosecute high-level corruption and human rights violation cases.

    Critics also cited Morales's lack of political ability to build alliances to push reforms through the legislature. President Morales's political power is limited as a result of his own inexperience and his party's weak position in the legislature. Morales's small party, the right-wing National Convergence Front-Nation (FCN-Nación), won 11 of 158 seats in the legislature, and holds no leadership positions on legislative committees. The Guatemalan Congress elected an opposition member to be president of the unicameral chamber. At the beginning of the term, deputies defected from other parties, bringing the FCN-Nación's seat total to 37. People criticized Morales for allowing the deputies to join his party just before the Congress outlawed the practice. The public prosecutor has received complaints alleging that bribery motivated some defections to the FCN-Nación.9

    The FCN-Nación must still rely on alliances to push forward any new legislation, however, which has proved difficult. As a part of its auditing process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is investigating multiple political parties for violations of election campaign finance laws in 2014 and 2015. As a result, the TSE has dissolved two major parties, the Partido Patriota—former President Pérez Molina's party—and LIDER, and could dissolve the ruling party. Such an action would leave Morales with no political party.10 As political protests called for the resignation of legislators who voted to reduce penalties for campaign corruption, Morales appeared to be losing support within the Guatemalan Congress.

    Morales has also come under fire for two contracts with an Indiana lobbying firm that reportedly has ties to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence.11 The firm was hired to improve relations between the U.S. and Guatemalan governments outside of normal diplomatic channels. Guatemalan politicians without the authority to act in foreign affairs signed the contracts. Morales denies knowing about the contract, though one was signed on his behalf, and only he and the foreign ministry are authorized to intervene in foreign affairs.12 Furthermore, observers criticize his reclusiveness with the press: he has removed journalists' access to the presidential palace, and rarely holds press conferences.

    Morales's administration and the secretariat for Social Welfare came under scrutiny after a fire killed 41 girls in a state-run home in March 2017. The director of the shelter, the minister of Social Welfare, and his deputy were dismissed after the fire. Recently, a judge charged the former minister, his deputy, and five additional people (two police officers with abuse, and three senior members of social and child protection agencies with manslaughter or negligence).13

    During the campaign, Morales was criticized for a short governing plan with proposals such as tagging teachers with a GPS device to ensure they attend classes and giving every Guatemalan child a smartphone in exchange for advertising on school walls. U.S. embassy officials expressed concern that Morales's campaign team refused to cooperate with certain elements of Guatemalan civil society, particularly human rights advocates working on the protection of children and trafficking victims, and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex) issues.14

    Links Between Morales's Party and the Military

    Before the current controversy between Morales and CICIG, human rights and other observers expressed concern that Morales's party's ties to former military officers might put pressure on Morales's support of CICIG, as well as limit his government's investigation of military corruption and human rights violations. Before the new government was sworn in, Attorney General Aldana requested legal action against retired army colonel Edgar Ovalle, a key advisor to Morales and a legislator-elect with the FCN-Nación, for alleged civil war-era (1960-1996) human rights violations. After declining the request in 2016, Guatemala's Supreme Court lifted Ovalle's immunity in 2017. Ovalle's whereabouts have been unknown since March.

    Over a dozen other military officers have been arrested on similar charges. Many of them support the FCN-Nación and belong to a military veterans' association, Avemilgua, which Ovalle helped found. Avemilgua members created the FCN-Nación in 2004, and testified in court in defense of former dictator Efrain Rios Montt in 2013. Rios Montt, found guilty in 2013 of committing genocide and crimes against humanity during the civil war, had his conviction effectively vacated a short time later. On January 5, 2016, a judge suspended a retrial, which began again in March. In 2017, a judge ordered Rios Montt to stand trial in a different case for the massacre of 201 people between 1982 and 1983 in Dos Erres.15 Morales reportedly said he did not believe genocide had been committed during the war, but that crimes against humanity had.16

    Attorney General Thelma Aldana and CICIG

    On May 17, 2014, Thelma Aldana replaced former Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz. Some people questioned if Aldana, a former head of the Supreme Court seen as favored by then-President Pérez Molina, would pursue corruption and human rights cases as ardently as her predecessor. Since assuming her role, Aldana has led investigations resulting in the forced resignation and later arrest of Pérez Molina and Roxana Baldetti, then vice president. Aldana is pursuing investigations for alleged illegal campaign contributions by various political parties. She has pushed for special prosecutors' offices to deal with cases involving sexual violence and crimes against women and children. Both the previous and current attorneys general, as well as judges on prominent cases, have received death threats. After receiving multiple death threats, Aldana briefly suspended public activities and left the country in 2016.17

    The United Nations and Guatemala agreed to establish CICIG in 2007. Its mandate is to help Guatemala dismantle illegal groups and clandestine structures responsible for organized crime, human rights violations, and other crimes through investigations and prosecutions, as well as to recommend legal reforms. Many experts agree CICIG has made significant progress in its goals. In 2015 alone, the Public Ministry arrested about 602 public officials for alleged corruption and abuse of office.18 According to public opinion polls, CICIG and the Public Ministry are the most trusted institutions in Guatemala.

    The Defense Ministry recently said that it has been paying President Morales a substantial salary bonus since December 2016 (see "Current Political Crisis" below). Two former presidents, Alfonso Portillo and Alvaro Colom, reportedly said they received no such bonus.19

    Efforts to Combat Impunity and Corruption

    In what many observers see as a step forward in Guatemala's democratic development, the Public Ministry's recent corruption and human rights abuse investigations have led to the arrest and trial of high-level government, judicial, and military officials. They have also led to a backlash against those reform efforts, threats against the attorney general and the head of an international commission, and a political crisis involving current President Jimmy Morales. The Public Ministry, which is headed by Attorney General Thelma Aldana, is responsible for public prosecution and law enforcement, and works in conjunction with CICIG to strengthen rule of law in Guatemala.

    Since 2007, CICIG has worked with the Public Ministry and the attorney general's office to reduce the country's rampant criminal impunity by strengthening Guatemala's capacity to investigate and prosecute crime. The government invited CICIG to assist with constitutional reforms and restructuring the judicial system. As a result of collaboration with CICIG, prosecutors have increased conviction rates in murder trials, and targeted corruption and organized crime linked to drug trafficking. The Guatemalan public widely supports CICIG. The United States, other governments, and international institutions have expressed broad support for the work of both Attorney General Thelma Aldana's office and CICIG.

    Impeachment of Former President

    Public Ministry investigations, coupled with mass public protests, forced the resignations of the sitting president and vice president in 2015. Attorney General Aldana and CICIG exposed an extensive customs fraud network, now known as the "La Linea" case, at the national tax agency (SAT), leading to the arrest of dozens of people, including the previous and then-directors of the SAT. After the Guatemalan Congress lifted then-President Otto Pérez Molina's immunity so he could be investigated, the attorney general's office indicted him, Vice President Roxana Baldetti, and other officials, who then resigned. The country proceeded lawfully and peacefully to form an interim government, hold scheduled lawful elections, and elect a new president, Jimmy Morales, who took office in January 2016.

    The related corruption case implicated dozens of high-level government officials and private-sector individuals as well. Attorney General Aldana asserted that the "La Linea" case represented "just a sliver of a sprawling criminal enterprise run by the state," which widely tolerated corruption, leading to impunity and the strengthening of criminal structures within the government.20 The attorney general and other observers have raised concerns about unnecessary delays in the sentencing process due to appeals and other litigation by defense teams. Baldetti and Pérez Molina remain in prison as their cases proceed.

    Following the historic "La Linea" case, more former and current high-level officials in the executive branch, the legislature, and the judicial system have been implicated in corruption cases. Three justices of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) had their immunity removed to face charges of corruption and influence trafficking. In late March 2017, authorities arrested various congressional representatives for corruption. According to Transparency International, Guatemala ranked 136th out of 176 countries on the organization's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2016, the second-worst score in Central America, behind Nicaragua.

    Current Political Crisis

    Two days after the attorney general and CICIG announced they were seeking to lift President Morales's immunity from prosecution, Morales declared the head of CICIG, Iván Velásquez, persona non grata and ordered him expelled from the country. One of Morales's ministers resigned rather than carry out the order, and the constitutional court—Guatemala's highest court—blocked the order. A Guatemalan congressional committee recommended that the president lose his immunity. Two-thirds of the 158-member legislature, or 105 deputies, are needed to remove an official's immunity. On September 11, though, the Guatemalan Congress as a whole voted to protect the president from further investigation; only 25 deputies voted to remove his immunity. About 20% of the legislators are also under investigation, with more likely to become so. The legislature fell one vote short of shelving the request permanently, however, so a member of the Congress may reintroduce the question of lifting President Morales's immunity at a later date.

    On September 13, the Guatemalan Congress passed a "national emergency" bill to reduce penalties for violations of campaign finance laws, and make party accountants—rather than party leaders—responsible for such violations. Public outcry was such that the Congress repealed the bill two days later. Thousands of protesters demanded the resignation not only of Morales, but also of the 107 legislators who voted to weaken anticorruption laws. Legislators have begun to turn away from Morales.21 On September 21, the Guatemalan Congress again defeated a vote to lift the president's immunity. This time, however, the number voting to rescind his immunity had risen to 70. In 2015, public protests contributed to the legislature reversing itself and rescinding the previous president's immunity.

    Morales is losing support within his own government. Several officials were fired or resigned rather than carry out his order to expel Commissioner Velasquez. Three cabinet ministers resigned, saying that as a result of the political crisis, "spaces of opportunity to carry out our work programmes have rapidly closed down."22

    Also in September, Guatemala's federal auditor said that it is investigating a substantial salary bonus that the Defense Ministry has acknowledged paying to the president since December 2016. The monthly bonus increases Morales's salary by more than a third, reportedly making him one of the most highly paid leaders in Latin America.23 Attorney General Aldana has again asked that Morales's immunity be lifted, this time so that her office can investigate his bonus from the army. The Supreme Court will decide whether to allow the request to proceed to the Congress for a vote.

    As anticorruption efforts prove successful, the circle of those feeling threatened by investigations broadens, and attacks against CICIG and the judicial system have intensified.24 The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued a report on March 22, 2017, saying it was "seriously concerned" about threats and attacks against various judicial authorities, including both Aldana and Judge Miguel Angel Galvez.25 The International Commission of Jurists noted concern about efforts to criminalize lawyers, as well as community leaders, human rights defenders, and public employees such as Supreme Court justices.

    Attorney General Aldana and CICIG have made progress in pursuing justice for human rights violations that occurred during the civil war. In March 2016 they tried a historic case known as the "Creompaz case"—the first prosecution for sexual violence committed during the civil war. A Guatemalan high-risk court convicted two former military commanders at the Sepur Zarco military base of murder, sexual violence, sexual and domestic slavery, and enforced disappearances. In March 2017, a judge sent to trial a former military chief of staff and four other high-ranking military officials accused of crimes against humanity, aggravated assault, sexual violence, and forced disappearance. Also in March, the Supreme Court ruled to remove immunity from FCN-Nación deputy Edgar Ovalle for his alleged involvement in the case. As noted previously, Ovalle, a key advisor to President Morales, has since disappeared. Another case dealing with forced disappearances allegedly committed by the Guatemalan military during the civil war took a dramatic turn on March 31 when a judge seized and made public previously unknown documents detailing information about military counterinsurgency objectives, operations, and campaigns from 1983 to 1990. Since the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, the Guatemalan army has repeatedly denied such documents existed.

    Civil society groups and elements of the government have called for further reforms to combat impunity. Early in his term, President Morales reached out to policy experts and international donors for advice on fighting corruption. His recent effort to expel CICIG's commissioner, however, has raised serious doubts about his stated commitment to fight corruption. An April report from the International Commission of Jurists found that despite tackling historic cases, Guatemalan courts still show signs of irregularity and impunity, such as many judges' failure to condemn litigation that results in delays of trials. Many of the accused in the La Linea case still await sentencing almost two years after the scandal broke, in part because of litigation filed by their own lawyers in what are widely seen as delaying tactics.

    According to CICIG head Iván Velásquez, CICIG and the attorney general's work has resulted in more than 300 people either in prison, facing trial, or being charged. These include high-level officials such as the former president and vice president, five former cabinet ministers, three former presidents of Congress and various deputies, two former CSJ magistrates, the former president of the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS), two former banking superintendents, and a director of the prison service, among others.26 In April 2016, President Morales formally requested the extension of CICIG until 2019, as its two-year mandate was due to expire in September 2017.

    Morales said previously that before he left office, he would extend CICIG's term again, until 2021.27 In recent months, however, Morales has suggested that he might not renew CICIG. The United Nations and other members of the international community, and many Guatemalan civil society organizations, have expressed strong support for CICIG and its commissioner. Public protests in Guatemala have demanded Morales's resignation.

    Many in the U.S. Congress have expressed concern over President Morales's effort to expel CICIG's commissioner. The House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman issued a statement reading, "The U.S. Congress has spoken with one voice in support of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. We will continue to stand with the Guatemalan people, and especially those in poverty, who are hurt most by corruption."28 The Trump Administration continues to express support for CICIG. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley said that the United States expects the Guatemalan government to allow CICIG to "do its critical work without interference."29

    President Morales spoke before the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2017. He pledged to strengthen and support CICIG, but also said Guatemala was revising the interpretation and application of its agreement with CICIG, and that no institution should interfere in Guatemala's administration of justice.30 That was the same day that three of Morales's cabinet members resigned over the political crisis instigated by his effort to expel CICIG's commissioner.

    Judicial Reforms and Efforts to Stop Them

    Various Guatemalan and international organizations consider judicial reforms necessary to solidify progress against widespread corruption and to strengthen the judicial branch so it can continue consolidating the rule of law in Guatemala. Nonetheless, forces opposed to the reforms have emerged as well.

    The Guatemalan Congress approved changes concerning judge and magistrate selection and requirements. A recent International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) report concluded that reforming the selection process of judges and separating judicial processes from administrative processes could strengthen Guatemala's judicial system. CICIG and others launched a judicial observatory of criminal justice to analyze judiciary rulings and make recommendations to improve the justice system in other ways as well.

    The ICJ found that the Guatemalan state has responded passively to defamation campaigns, attacks on judicial independence, and other forces trying to influence judges, prosecutors, and investigators.31 According to the director of the Guatemalan Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal Sciences, the groups seeking to stop the reforms are the same elements that launched defamation campaigns on social media against CICIG head Iván Velásquez in early 2017.32

    The Guatemalan Congress is considering 60 amendments to its constitution and other laws on judicial reform, but progress has stagnated in recent months. Some observers express concern that the new leaders who assumed office in January 2016 either lack the ability to form the alliances necessary to push the reforms through, or are less committed to doing so due to their links to people under investigation for corruption.33 This latter view was reinforced by congressional actions in September 2017 preserving the president's immunity and trying to reduce penalties for violations of campaign finance laws.

    Economic and Social Conditions

    Guatemala has enjoyed relatively stable economic growth in recent decades, and the World Bank named it a top performer in Latin America. Guatemala has struggled, however, in recent years to address its high poverty rates. The country has the largest economy in Central America, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $63.794 billion and a per-capita income of $3,590 in 2015.34 The World Bank characterizes Guatemala as a lower-middle-income country, and it ranks 125th out of 188 on the 2015 Human Development Index.

    Guatemala's stable growth rates have not been enough to decrease some of the highest levels of economic inequality and poverty in the region. Instead, Guatemala has backtracked. After decreasing the overall poverty rate from 56% to 51% between 2000 and 2006, the rate increased to 59% in 2014, with a rate just over 79% for indigenous people, according to a national survey. Some elements of Guatemalan society and government have tried to bring about equitable development, yet its rural and indigenous populations remain socially and economically marginalized. For rural municipalities, which constitute 44% of the country, almost 8 out of 10 people live in poverty.35 Demonstrating the difference in economic and social conditions, literacy rates for the nonindigenous population were 88.9% for men and 83.7% for women, but rates decreased to 77.7% for indigenous men and 57.6% for indigenous women 15 years and older.36

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that Guatemala met none of the Millennium Development Goals for rural and indigenous populations in 2015 and met only a quarter of them for the country as a whole.37 Furthermore, extreme poverty increased and school enrollment decreased. Nonindigenous children average twice as many years of schooling as indigenous children.38 To improve social conditions, the World Bank calls for rapid economic growth coupled with increased public investment and pro-poor policies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Guatemala's economic growth rate declined to 3.1% in 2016. EIU projects growth will likely peak in 2017 at 3.5%, followed by a slowdown to 2.4% for 2019.39 The EIU concludes that slowed economic growth and rapid population growth will keep per-capita income growth too low to reduce poverty.

    Factors that impede economic growth and development include corruption, limited government revenues, weak institutions, and weak transportation and energy infrastructure. Guatemala's persistent failure to deliver services and improve the quality of education and health care contribute to a low-skilled workforce, which also limits growth. According to the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Guatemalan adults had only 3.6 years of education, on average, in 2005, and "if Guatemala had matched the regional average, it could have more than doubled [emphasis in original] its average annual [economic] growth rate between 2005 and 2010."40

    Guatemala has the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in the region at 12.4%, compared to 22.8% for Latin America in 2015.41 This is due in part to the high rate of employment in the informal economy—the Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano found that 70.2% of the population held informal employment in 2014, with higher percentages for rural and indigenous segments of the population.42 Another contributing factor includes the business and elite sectors' historical resistance to paying taxes. While the Morales administration has improved tax collection (see "President Jimmy Morales's Administration"), the IMF has called for a tax revenue rate increase to at least 15% of GDP in order to address social, security, and infrastructure needs.43

    Land conflicts, especially those involving mining, are contentious, and often violent, in Guatemala and elsewhere throughout the region.44 Governments often see mines as a source of revenue, potentially for poverty reduction and social programs. Indigenous populations often object to mining under current conditions, however, because they say it violates their ancestral land rights, removes them from and/or damages their source of livelihood, and/or excludes them from the decisionmaking process as to how mine profits should be spent. Guatemala is a signatory to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, also known as the International Labour Organization's (ILO's) Convention 169. The treaty calls on governments to consult indigenous peoples before permitting exploitation of natural resources on their land. According to a recent report by the ILO, the Guatemalan government granted 367 mining licenses between its ratification of the convention in 1996 and 2014, and held only 60 community consultations, all of which had expressed opposition to the projects.45 The report found that Guatemala's Constitutional Court had found such consultations nonbinding. Guatemala has not developed regulations to govern prior consultations.

    Ongoing conflicts around land use are likely to continue to delay such projects. Other types of land conflicts and evictions are related to biofuels, dams, ranching, and drug trafficking; these are also frequently violent.

    Coffee production and prices recovered from a recent decline, and are expected to help growth in the agricultural sector. Remittances from Guatemalans abroad boost the Guatemalan economy. Remittances grew by over 13% in 2016, to the highest level in any year to date.46 Private consumption accounts for 85% of GDP.

    U.S.-Guatemala Relations

    Traditionally, the United States and Guatemala have had close relations, with friction at times over human rights and civil/military issues. According to the State Department, current U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include supporting the institutionalization of democracy; encouraging respect for human rights and rule of law, and the efficient functioning of CICIG; supporting broad-based economic growth and sustainable development and maintaining mutually beneficial trade and commercial relations, including ensuring that benefits of CAFTA-DR reach all sectors of Guatemalan society; cooperating to fight money laundering, corruption, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, trafficking in persons, and other transnational crimes; and supporting Central American integration through support for resolution of border and territorial disputes.47

    During his confirmation hearings in January 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson testified that the Trump Administration would continue to support CICIG and provide foreign assistance to Central American allies to help combat crime and impunity, and ensure that citizens of those countries have access to a functioning and fair justice system. In February, then-Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly met with President Morales and Commissioner Velásquez in Guatemala, and reiterated U.S. support for the Public Ministry's and CICIG's fight against corruption.48 On the same day, a U.S. court indicted former Guatemalan Vice President Roxana Baldetti and former Interior Minister Mauricio Lopez Bonilla on criminal drug trafficking charges.49 A Guatemalan court approved a request for Baldetti's extradition on June 15, but first she will face prosecution on four charges of corruption in Guatemalan courts.50 Lopez Bonilla must first face three counts of corruption in Guatemalan courts.

    U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, then-Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly, and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin attended meetings with President Morales, as well as his Honduran counterpart and the Salvadoran vice president, in June at the Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America in Florida. Pence said that addressing migration to the United States requires strengthening the sending countries' economies, including through foreign assistance.51 The Trump Administration has proposed cutting aid to the region by 30% compared to FY2017.

    U.S. Foreign Assistance

    The United States has been providing assistance to Guatemala through regional initiatives: the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), for combating narcotics trafficking and preventing transnational crime; the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); and Food for Peace. Currently, U.S. assistance to Guatemala is guided by the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The various programs are integrated for a greater impact in the Western Highlands region of the country, which has the highest rates of poverty and chronic malnutrition in Guatemala. According to the State Department, "The overall objective of U.S. assistance efforts is to create effective structures and organizations sustainable by the Guatemalan government." While some structures, such as the attorney general's office, have greatly improved their effectiveness with U.S. and other support, other institutions remain weak.

    Top priorities for U.S. bilateral assistance to Guatemala include improving security, governance, and justice for citizens; improving economic growth; improving food security and reducing chronic malnutrition; providing access to health services and fostering adoption of healthy behaviors at the household level; promoting better educational outcomes; providing opportunities for out-of-school youth to reduce their desire to migrate; and improving natural resource management to mitigate the impact of climate change.52

    In 2014, the Obama Administration launched the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy), a whole-of-government approach aimed at addressing the root causes of illegal immigration from the region by improving prosperity, regional economic integration, security, and governance.53 Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion for the Strategy. Much of the aid has yet to be delivered, however, and the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration are reassessing U.S. policy in Central America. Through the 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), Congress provided up to $750 million in aid to Central America and placed numerous conditions on aid. The State Department certified that the governments of Guatemala (and El Salvador and Honduras) met Congress's conditions, which included taking steps to combat corruption, prosecute security forces for human rights violations, and other actions. Consequently, FY2016 money began flowing to the region in early 2017. The Strategy complements the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) in the Northern Triangle proposed by the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (see "Regional Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) and Security Initiatives" below).

    Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to Guatemala by Account and Fiscal Year

    (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

      FY2015 Actual FY2016Actual

    FY2017 Estimate

    FY2018Request Increase/Decrease

    Development Assistance

    57,387

    112,000

    110,000

    0
     

    Economic Support Fund

    34,000

    0
     

    NEW IN FY2018: Economic Support and Development Fund (Pre FY2018 DA + ESF, to compare)

    (91,387)

    (112,000)

    (110,000)

    76,900

    (-33,100)

    Foreign Military Financing

    1,000

    1,740

    1,740

    0

    -1,740

    Global Health Programs- USAID

    14,000

    13,000

    13,000

    3,000

    -10,000

    International Military Education and Training

    798

    775

    800

    760

    -40

    P.L. 480 Title II

    5,914

    3,711

    5,000

    0

    -5,000

    TOTAL

    113,099

    131,226

    130,540

    80,660

    -49,880

    Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: FY2015-2018.

    On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), which provides $655 million for the continued implementation of the Strategy, with just under $126 million for Guatemala and $329 million for CARSI.54 The funds appropriated for Guatemala include $110 million for Development Assistance (DA); $1.74 million for Foreign Military Financing (FMF); $13 million for Global Health Programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and $800,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET). The measure also provides at least $6.5 million through Economic Support Fund (ESF) for forensic anthropology assistance in six countries, including Guatemala; at least $6 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for Central America and Mexico to combat human trafficking; $6 million through CARSI to support CICIG; and $11 million mostly through CARSI ($500,000 through DA) to support the attorney general/Public Ministry. The act maintains FY2016 conditions with slightly different language.

    The Administration's FY2018 budget request would cut funds by 36% for Guatemala and 20% for CARSI compared to FY2017. The request includes around $81 million for Guatemala, an overall decrease of almost $50 million from the FY2017 funding estimate (see Table 1). It includes approximately $77 million for Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF); $3 million for Global Health Programs (USAID); and $760,000 for International Military Education and Training. President Trump's preliminary 2018 proposal recommends replacing DA and ESF with ESDF. The budget request for Central America would tip the balance toward security and away from traditional development goals—such as good governance, economic growth, and social welfare.

    The Administration's proposed budget would also eliminate traditional food aid (P.L. 480, Title II), and food aid would be provided only through the International Disaster Assistance account. Some critics are concerned that reducing nonemergency food aid could increase the already high levels of malnutrition and stunting in Guatemala. In addition, a recent study by several major international organizations found that "there is clearly a link between food insecurity and emigration from [Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras]."55

    Regional Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) and Security Initiatives

    The Obama Administration and some Members pressed the Northern Triangle governments (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) to invest more heavily in their own development and security. In response to the Central American immigration crisis in 2014, the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran governments proposed the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle later that year, with the help of the Inter-American Development Bank. The five-year, $22 billion initiative seeks to (1) stimulate the productive sector to create economic opportunities; (2) develop human capital through improved education, job training, and social protections (healthcare, nutrition); (3) improve public safety and access to the legal system; and (4) strengthen institutions and improve transparency to increase public trust in the state.56 Some observers, including some U.S. officials, criticized the initial plan for not focusing on development and poverty-reduction efforts in the poorest regions, from which the highest numbers of people emigrate. The Guatemalan Embassy says that the government has since shifted some of its programs toward those regions.

    In November 2016, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador launched a trinational task force to address the region's security issues. The task force focuses on greater border protection, undertaking operations to dismantle gangs and criminal structures, taking action against human trafficking, cracking down on terrestrial drug trafficking across borders, and stopping the flow of contraband products through the Northern Triangle.57 The initiative includes increased information sharing and cooperation among the three countries' governments, as well as law enforcement and investigative agencies.

    Trade and CAFTA-DR58

    Guatemala and the United States have significant trade relations, and are part of the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), implemented in 2006. Supporters of CAFTA-DR point to reforms it spurred in transparency, customs administration, intellectual property rights, and government regulation. Critics note that the commercial balance between the two countries previously favored Guatemala, and that Guatemala already had duty-free access under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Since CAFTA-DR, the balance has shifted in favor of the United States. The U.S. goods trade surplus with Guatemala reached $1.9 billion in 2016, an 11.9% increase from 2015. From 2005 (pre-CAFTA-DR) to 2015, U.S. exports to Guatemala increased by 107%, whereas Guatemalan exports to the United States increased by only 31% during the same period.59 President Trump has ordered reviews of U.S. trade agreements.60

    Total U.S.-Guatemala trade in 2016 reached $9.8 billion, and U.S. exports to Guatemala amounted to $5.84 billion. Mineral fuels, electrical machinery, articles donated for relief, machinery, and cereals accounted for the majority of U.S. exports. U.S. agricultural exports include corn, soybean meal, wheat, poultry, and cotton. U.S. imports from Guatemala amounted to about $3.9 billion, with knit apparel, bananas and melons, coffee, gold, and woven apparel accounting for the majority. Guatemala was the United States' 43rd-largest trading partner in 2016.

    The U.S. Labor Department initiated a dispute settlement process alleging that the Guatemalan government violated its CAFTA-DR labor commitments, the first labor rights complaint lodged under a U.S. free trade agreement. In August 2011, the U.S. Trade Representative officially requested an arbitral panel. In June 2017, the panel concluded that although it agreed that Guatemala had failed to effectively enforce its labor laws in certain cases, the United States had failed to prove that the lack of enforcement negatively affected trade, as required under CAFTA-DR. The two parties must now agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally conforms to the determinations of the panel. Some observers say the finding could bring into question the effectiveness of labor regulations in U.S. free trade agreements and could affect the renegotiation of NAFTA.

    Counternarcotics Cooperation

    Guatemala remains a major transit country for cocaine and heroin trafficked from South America to the United States. Guatemala's porous borders and lack of law enforcement presence in many areas enables minor poppy and opium production, as well as smuggling of precursor chemicals, narcotrafficking, and trafficking of weapons, people, and other contraband. Unlike former President Pérez Molina, current President Morales opposes legalization of illicit drugs. According to the State Department, an estimated 1,000 metric tons of cocaine are smuggled through the country every year. In 2016, Guatemala recorded record drug seizures, captured high-profile criminals, and underwent leadership changes in most law enforcement agencies. The United States provides assistance in the areas of vetted units, training, and information sharing. The 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) highlighted the above improvements in Guatemala's drug control and border security, but noted the following:

    The Guatemalan government will not succeed in building sustainable counternarcotics mechanisms until it fully implements its laws, reforms law enforcement and judicial institutions, accelerates judicial processes, improves interagency cooperation, and provides adequate financial support to relevant agencies and government ministries.61

    Corruption within the Guatemalan government has enabled illicit drug trafficking. The U.S. Department of Justice requested the extradition of former Interior Minister Lopez Bonilla, who oversaw the Guatemalan police and prisons under the Perez Molina administration. The Justice Department reportedly said that Lopez Bonilla received money from various drug cartels, including the notorious Los Zetas, in exchange for allowing them to operate freely across Guatemala.62

    Migration Issues

    More than 1.3 million Guatemalans live in the United States, of which the Pew Research Center estimates some 525,000 to be unauthorized.63 From the 1970s to 1990s, the civil war fueled some migration. During the 2000s, migration became motivated by socioeconomic opportunities, natural disasters, social violence, and family reunification. Unlike their neighbors in the region, Honduras and El Salvador, Guatemalans have not received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which offers immigration relief from removal under specific circumstances.64 Some Guatemalans benefit from the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) program, which allows people without lawful immigration status who came to the United States as children and meet certain requirements to request deferred removal for two years, subject to renewal.65 The Trump Administration announced plans to phase out the DACA program on September 5, 2017.66 President Trump later tweeted that Congress has six months to legalize DACA, and that if it doesn't, he will "revisit" the issue.67

    From FY2009 to FY2014, the number of unaccompanied migrant children (sometimes referred to as Unaccompanied Alien Children, or UAC) from Guatemala apprehended at the U.S. border rose from 1,115 to 17,057, causing concern among Congress and the executive branch.68 In 2015, the number of unaccompanied minors apprehended at the border decreased, but rose again in FY2016 to 18,913.

    To offer a safer alternative to illegal immigration, the U.S. government launched the Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee/Parole program in December 2014. The program allows children living in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, whose parents reside legally in the United States, to apply for legal entry to the United States. In July 2016, the U.S. government expanded the CAM program to include additional family members. According to State Department data, 30 Guatemalans left for the United States under refugee status and 31 as parolees between the program's start in December 2014 and March 2017. The CAM program will continue under the Trump Administration, but remains subject to the suspension of larger U.S. refugee admissions programs. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 62% of UACs interviewed in 2013 did not mention serious harm as a reason for leaving Guatemala, and 84% cited hopes for family reunification, increased work or study opportunities, or helping their families as motivation for coming to the United States.69

    The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and the Central American Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, were developed in large part as a response to the immigration crisis in 2014. They represent efforts to spur development and reduce illegal emigration to the United States.

    Intercountry Adoption

    U.S. laws and policies concerning intercountry adoption are designed to ensure that all children put up for adoption are truly orphans, and have not been bought, kidnapped, or subjected to human trafficking, smuggling, or other illegal activities. Similarly, the goals of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption are to ensure transparency in adoptions to prevent human trafficking, child stealing, or child selling, and to eliminate confusion and delays caused by differences among the laws and practices of different countries. Both the United States and Guatemala are party to the convention. Because Guatemala has not yet established regulations and procedures that meet convention standards, the convention has not entered into force there.

    In FY2007, U.S. citizens adopted 4,726 children from Guatemala, more than from any other country except China (5,453 adoptions). When the convention went into effect in the United States in 2008, adoptions from Guatemala were suspended because Guatemala was not in compliance with the convention's standards. Since then, the only cases of adoptions by U.S. citizens of Guatemalan children that have been permitted are those that were already in-process on December 31, 2007.70 There were about 3,000 such adoption cases pending at the time. As of November 8, 2016, all but 4 cases had been resolved. The U.S. and Guatemalan governments have continued to work together to resolve the pending cases. Representatives of Guatemalan adoption-related institutions say that their priority is "to strengthen their processes and institutions in support of domestic alternatives for children ... [and that] this needs to occur before they will consider reopening intercountry adoptions." The State Department's Office of Children's Issues supports those efforts, while also advocating for Guatemala to develop intercountry adoption procedures as another option for children who cannot find permanent homes within Guatemala.

    Author Contact Information

    [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Latin American Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

    Acknowledgments

    Meredith Pierce, Research Assistant, contributed immensely to the researching and writing of this report.

    Footnotes

    1.

    Carlos Hernández, "Monitoreo Final de PNC Reportó 258 Homicidios Menos en el País," Ministerio de Gobernacion, January 1, 2017.

    2.

    Christian Tomuschat, Otilia Lux de Coti, and Alfredo Balsells Tojo, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Commission for Historical Clarification,1999, pp. 17, 20.

    3.

    Martín Rodríguez Pellecer, "Encuesta: Pro MP-CICIG y Democracia, y no por Gobierno, Cacif y Ejército," Nómada, March 27, 2017.

    4.

    "Morales Fills a Key Post in Guatemala," LatinNews, March 10, 2016.

    5.

    Urias Gamarro, "Intervenciones de SAT Mejoraron Cobranza," Prensa Libre, May 2, 2017.

    6
  • President Otto Pérez Molina
  • The Perez Molina Administration
  • Landmark Trial of Former Dictator Rios Montt
  • Social Policies
  • Illicit Drug Policy
  • Land Use Conflicts
  • Security Conditions
  • Involvement of the Military in Internal Security
  • Guatemalan Cooperation with CICIG
  • Regional Security Efforts
  • Economic and Social Conditions
  • U.S. Relations With and Aid to Guatemala
  • Congressional Concerns
  • Protection of Human Rights and Conditions on U.S. Military Aid
  • Conditions on U.S. Military Aid to Guatemala
  • International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
  • Illicit Narcotics Trafficking and Other Organized Crime
  • President Proposes Revision of Drug Policies
  • Trade
  • Intercountry Adoption
  • Unaccompanied Children from Guatemala at the U.S. Border
  • Guatemalan Government Efforts to Address Root Causes of Migration

Summary

Since the 1980s, Guatemala, the most populous country in Central America with a population of 15.5 million, has continued its transition from centuries of mostly autocratic rule toward representative government. A democratic constitution was adopted in 1985, and a democratically elected government was inaugurated in 1986. A violent 36-year civil war ended in 1996.

This report provides an overview of Guatemala's current political and economic conditions, relations with the United States, and several issues likely to figure in future decisions by Congress and the Administration regarding Guatemala. With respect to continued cooperation and foreign assistance, these issues include security and governance; protection of human rights and human rights conditions on some U.S. military aid to Guatemala; support for the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala; combating narcotics trafficking and organized crime; trade relations; intercountry adoption; and unaccompanied children at the U.S. border.

President Otto Pérez Molina began his four-year term in January 2012. A former military commander who served during the civil war period, Pérez Molina faces concerns from some regarding his role in the human rights abuses committed during that period. In a landmark case, a Guatemalan court found former dictator Efrain Rios Montt guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity on May 10, 2013, but another court overturned his conviction days later. The trial is scheduled to resume in January 2015. Certain developments in 2014 have caused concern among some observers that there is a backlash against some of the judicial reforms that were achieved in recent years and that impunity for human rights violations and other crimes may rise again.

Guatemala continues to be plagued by security issues related to narcotics trafficking, the rise of organized crime, social inequality, and poverty. Upon taking office Pérez Molina announced a controversial position to decriminalize drugs as one policy initiative to address Guatemala's many problems. In his view, decriminalization has to be gradual, strongly regulated, and has to take place in the whole region, including producer and consumer countries. In the meantime, Pérez Molina vows to continue prosecuting and jailing drug-traffickers.

Economic growth was about 3.7% in 2013. Agriculture contributes about a fifth of Guatemala's GDP. According to the World Bank, Guatemala has one of the most unequal income distributions and highest levels of poverty in the hemisphere. Guatemala is part of the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).

Relations between Guatemala and the United States have traditionally been close, but they have been strained at times by human rights and civil-military issues, long of interest to the U.S. Congress. U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include strengthening democratic institutions; encouraging respect for human rights and the rule of law; supporting broad-based economic growth, sustainable development, and mutually beneficial trade relations; combating drug trafficking; supporting continued Central American integration, and addressing child migration.


Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations

Political Situation

Guatemala has suffered much violence for decades. Currently, it is considered one of the most insecure countries in the world, with a rate of 34 homicides per 100,000 people, and 76% of the population expressing little or no trust in the police.1 Guatemala endured a 36-year civil war, which ended in 1996 with the signing of peace accords. During most of that time the Guatemalan military was in power and engaged in violent repression against civil society organizations, and in gross violations of the human rights of its citizens, especially its majority indigenous population. Although Guatemala established a civilian democratic government in 1986, it took another 10 years to end the violence, during which time the military continued to engage in repression and violations of human rights. The United States maintained close relations with most Guatemalan governments before, during and after the civil war, including with the military governments.

Since the late 1980s, Guatemala has continued to consolidate its transition not only from decades of military rule, but also from a centuries-long tradition of mostly autocratic rule, toward representative government. Democratically elected civilian governments have governed Guatemala for 28 years now, making notable gains, such as carrying out significant military reforms and generally exerting effective control over the military. Nonetheless, democratic institutions remain fragile. In addition to military impunity for human rights violations and other crimes, drug trafficking, corruption, and grossly inequitable distribution of resources make political and social development difficult. Recent developments have caused concern among some observers that there is a backlash against some of the judicial reforms and that impunity for human rights violations and other crimes may rise again.

President Otto Pérez Molina

Former army general Otto Pérez Molina of the rightist Patriot Party (Partido Patriota, PP) was inaugurated as president of Guatemala in January 2012. He succeeded President Álvaro Colom of the center-left National Unity of Hope (Unidad Nacional de Esperanza, UNE) coalition. Pérez Molina is a controversial figure. He commanded army troops during the violent counterinsurgency campaign of the 1980s, was director of military intelligence during the 1990s, and has been linked by international human rights groups, the press, and others to human rights violations, including death squads and major political assassinations.2 Pérez Molina is also known as a military moderate who opposed then-President Jorge Serrano's autogolpe (self-coup) in 1993, and was the military's negotiator for the Peace Accords that ended Guatemala's 36-year civil war in 1996. As a member of the Guatemalan Congress, he has advocated for legal and security reform, but has also been accused by the banking regulatory commission of involvement in the siphoning of state funds.3 In 2011, U.S. citizen Jennifer Harbury filed the first step to trigger an investigation of Pérez Molina for his alleged role in the 1992disappearance and murder of her husband, guerrilla leader Efrain Bámaca. Pérez Molina responded at the time that the case had gone nowhere before, and that the new effort had to be politically motivated.4 During his campaign, Pérez Molina pledged to combat crime with a "mano dura," or iron fist, generally interpreted in Latin America to mean the use of repressive tactics. The party he created, the second-largest bloc in the previous legislature, generally opposed reforms proposed by the government under former President Colom, such as laws on rural development and the Law against the Illegal Accumulation of Wealth and Budget Expansion.5

The Perez Molina Administration

Since taking office in 2012, President Otto Pérez Molina has focused on reducing crime, increasing social spending, and enacting reforms to strengthen Guatemalan institutions. Early actions in support of judicial, social, and fiscal reform showed "surprisingly liberal inclinations," as one analyst put it.6 Limited political will and resources, weak capacity, and a divided legislature have slowed progress in all those areas, however. President Pérez Molina, of the rightist Partido Patriota, vowed to strengthen the judicial system, and during the first half of his four-year term, progress was made toward that end. Then-Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz, who had been appointed by his predecessor, pushed forward prominent human rights cases, reduced impunity for murder and other crimes, and improved the capacity of investigators and prosecutors. The U.N.-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) supported those efforts, and proposed legislative reforms as well. In 2014, however, several events have indicated that vested interests are working to slow or reverse the judicial reforms accomplished in recent years.

The intimidation of judicial officials, widespread corruption, and the involvement of organized crime in violence and extortion are all widely seen as contributing to high levels of impunity and public mistrust in institutions. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that these characteristics, plus "a persistent failure of the state to provide basic public services to large parts of the population, …will sustain the risk that public discontent results in widespread protest and social unrest in 2014-18."7 Opposition to mining activities in rural areas, and the limited advances made in reducing Guatemala's high levels of poverty and inequitable distribution of wealth may also contribute to instability.

One high profile example of judicial intimidation and impunity involved the case of former dictator Efrain Rios Montt. Rios Montt was found guilty in May 2013 of genocide and crimes against humanity committed during his rule (1982 to 1983). Just days later, however, Guatemala's Constitutional Court overturned those verdicts, following pressure from the executive branch and from a powerful business association known as CACIF (the Spanish acronym for the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations).8 (See "Landmark Trial of Former Dictator Rios Montt" below.)

In April 2014 Guatemala's national bar association suspended Judge Yassmin Barrios from practicing law for one year. Barrios had overseen the Rios Montt trial, and has received international praise for her integrity and judicial independence. CICIG, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and various local and international human rights organizations have condemned the suspension.9

In May 2014, Attorney General Paz y Paz, who had pushed forward the Rios Montt case, among others, was forced to step down early after a judicial decision reduced her term based on a technicality. Paz y Paz, who began to pursue aggressively cases against former military officials while she served the Colom Administration, had continued to do so under the Pérez Molina Administration. In March 2012, a former Kaibil special forces officer was sentenced to over 6,000 years in prison for participating in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre of 201 men, women, and children. The Kaibiles, an elite special forces unit of the army, allegedly committed extensive human rights violations during Guatemala's civil war. Also in 2012, the government opened the trial of four former members of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols and a military commissioner, on charges of involvement in another 1982 massacre that killed 256 Mayan Guatemalans.10

CICIG and other international and local organizations criticized the nominating process for Attorney General as being nontransparent, noting that Paz y Paz had received the second highest grade among the initial pool of candidates, and had garnered international praise for her prosecutorial independence, yet was not included on the final list of candidates.

The President appointed Thelma Aldana as the new Attorney General, citing her 20 years of experience in the judicial branch, including as a Supreme Court Magistrate, and that she received the highest grade from the nominating commission evaluating candidates for the position. Attorney Lorena Escobar, an expert in security and justice with the Guatemalan Association of Research and Social Studies, described Aldana as a capable woman who would strengthen the fight against femicide; she also said that in order for Aldana to overcome the charges that she is linked to the executive branch and to the ruling party, Aldana "should give continuity to the investigations of crimes that occurred during the armed conflict and against ruling party mayors accused of corruption."11 The President denied reports that Aldana had links to the ruling party, and said that international critics of the nominating process should not interfere in Guatemala's internal decisions.12

Human rights groups and other observers remain concerned that efforts to prosecute former military officials for human rights abuses face opposition from powerful elements in Guatemalan society. In May 2014, for example, the Guatemalan Congress passed a nonbinding resolution that essentially denied that genocide occurred during Guatemala's civil war. 13 Proposed by a legislator from the Partido Republicano Institucional party, which was founded by Rios Montt (and called the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco at the time), the resolution stated that "the trial of the century" has "reopened polarization" in the country and impedes national reconciliation.

Human rights advocates and others also are wary that efforts might founder further under President Pérez Molina, who has repeatedly denied that the army committed genocide, and has come under increased scrutiny as a result of the Rios Montt trial.

Guatemala's next general elections are due to be held in late 2015. The Guatemalan constitution prohibits presidential reelection in a type of article known as "artículos pétreo," or articles set in stone, that explicitly cannot be reformed. Pérez Molina has generated controversy by calling for a constitutional reform to extend the presidential term to six years, and by inference, his own term, allowing him to remain in office for an additional two years.14

Figure 1. Map of Guatemala

Source: CRS Graphics.

Landmark Trial of Former Dictator Rios Montt

On January 26, 2012—shortly after Pérez Molina took office—a Guatemalan judge ordered Efrain Rios Montt, dictator from the most violent civil war period from 1982 to 1983, to stand trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. Within 16 months, on May 10, 2013, a Guatemalan court found the former general guilty on both charges. Rios Montt, who is 86 years old, was sentenced to 80 years in prison: 50 years for genocide and 30 years for crimes against humanity. He was sent directly from the courtroom to prison. Tried alongside him was his former head of military intelligence, Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez. Rodriguez was acquitted of both charges; although he had written some of the military plans, the judges found that his command responsibility had not been proven.

Just 10 days later, however, Guatemala's Constitutional Court overturned those verdicts. The Guatemalan Public Ministry and civil parties challenged the ruling; the Center for Legal Action in Human Rights (CALDH) asked for the decision to be annulled. As discussed above, both the Attorney General who brought the case to trial and the judge who oversaw the case have been removed from their positions. Both had received international praise for their integrity and judicial independence. A new trial has been set for January 2015.

The charges against Rios Montt were based on the massacre of 1,771 Mayan Ixil people, massive displacement, and subjecting the Ixil to conditions meant to eliminate them as a group. Survivors filed the complaint with the Public Ministry 13 years ago. The three-judge tribunal found that, based on the evidence presented in court, Rios Montt had ordered the plans that led to genocide, had full knowledge of the massacres and other atrocities committed, and—although he had the power to do so—did nothing to stop them.

Not all Guatemalans were happy with the trial or its original verdict. President Pérez Molina, a former general and a commander under Rios Montt, continues to insist that genocide did not occur in Guatemala. The President repeated that assertion, which he said was based on his experience, after the verdict was announced. He also stated that he respected the independence of the judiciary and the trial's judgment, although he noted that the verdict was not final until all appeals were resolved. A powerful business association known as CACIF (the Spanish acronym for the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations) challenged the court's findings and denounced "grave errors" in the process. Both the president's spokesman and CACIF accused foreign organizations of interfering in the judicial process and contributing to polarization among various sectors of Guatemalan society.15 According to the New York Times and other reports, such pressure, based on the fear that the conviction would pave the way for further prosecutions for human rights violations, led the Constitutional Court to overturn the verdict.16

Others, usually anonymously, have threatened many people involved in the trial—Guatemalan judges and lawyers, human rights and rule of law advocates, researchers, and others—repeatedly throughout the process. The chief judge in the trial was reported to be wearing a bullet-proof vest as she left the courtroom after pronouncing the verdict.

Although diminished by the reversal of the conviction, the case is still historic both for Guatemala and globally. According to news reports, Guatemala was the first country to convict a former head of state of genocide in its own court system.17 Few thought Rios Montt would ever be brought to trial, much less convicted, and hundreds of procedural delays and motions from the defense threatened to derail the process before the conviction was handed down. That the Guatemalan judicial system, still fragile and subject to corruption, was able to try a senior political leader, hold him responsible for gross human rights violations and international crimes, and have him serve any time at all was widely seen as a landmark victory for the rule of law. Human rights advocates also lauded the trial as a watershed moment for the indigenous population that was targeted during the war, saying it was the first time they were able to present their case in Guatemalan courts and receive a measure of justice for the human rights violations their community suffered.

Nonetheless, many human rights advocates believe that the overturning of Rios Montt's conviction again raises serious questions about the rule of law and the independence of the legal system in Guatemala, and, if allowed to stand, will reinforce impunity for current and former military officials.18 A former Human Rights Ombudsman and president of the Constitutional Court concurred with the dissenting opinions of two sitting Constitutional Court judges, who said that the legal challenge was unfounded, and the majority's decision "improper," "disproportionate," and failed to take into account the rights of the victims.19

When meeting with President Pérez Molina in Guatemala on June 4, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry congratulated the President "on the enormous progress that you have made with respect to your justice system, the strengthening of your justice system, the independence of that system."20

President Pérez Molina, who was a major in the army and a field commander under Rios Montt in the Ixil region at the time the massacres occurred, emerged more vulnerable after this trial. One witness, a former army officer, stated that Pérez Molina had participated in executions during the time in question. According to the Wall Street Journal, witnesses in other investigations have accused Pérez Molina of torture and executions as well.21 Pérez Molina has denied the charges in the past. After delivering the verdict in the Rios Montt trial, chief judge Yassmin Barrios instructed prosecutors to continue investigations of others who may be responsible for those crimes. President Pérez Molina has immunity from prosecution through the end of his term in 2016. Some observers say that former U.S. officials who worked with the Rios Montt de facto government may also be vulnerable to charges emerging from investigations of those crimes.

Social Policies

Pérez Molina quickly created a Ministry of Social Development to implement social policy. By doing so, his Administration institutionalized social programs begun by earlier administrations and provided for greater coordination of the programs' operations. The ministry incorporated conditional cash transfer programs such as the "My Family Progresses" (Mi Familia Progresa) program created in 2008 as the cornerstone of former President Colom's antipoverty agenda. It included food pantries and cash payments of $40 per month for nearly 815,000 poor families to ensure children are in school and receive vaccines regularly.22 Although those programs were popular, they were criticized for not being transparent enough; the establishment of a ministry is meant to address that issue.

According to the government, the Ministry's poverty reduction programs aim to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty by enhancing human development both in rural areas where poverty is most severe and in urban areas.23 Programs include conditional cash transfer programs that ensure children and adolescents stay in school and receive vaccines and other healthcare regularly; provision of food to vulnerable populations; and extracurricular skills-building activities for youth.

In 2012, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton praised "the quick work that President Pérez Molina in Guatemala has shown in creating a tax system aimed at beginning to collect taxes from the elites in that country."24 Guatemala has one of the lowest tax collection rates in Latin America (11.2% of of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, according to the Department of State), and the private sector has fiercely resisted fiscal reform initiatives designed to provide the government with more resources to strengthen institutions and fight corruption. The two bills proposed by President Pérez Molina and passed by the legislature in 2012 are expected to provide 1.1% to 1.3% of GDP in additional revenue for social programs and improvements in security.25

The Guatemalan government announced a Pact for Security, Justice and Peace in late 2012, a strategy involving all state institutions to improve governability, security, and protection from crime, violence and impunity.26 While the government has made progress in strengthening some institutions, widespread corruption and impunity continue to limit the extent to which reforms can be carried out and maintained.

Illicit Drug Policy

Perhaps most surprisingly for a politician who promotes an "iron fist" policy toward crime, President Pérez Molina has said since taking office in 2012 that the region needs to consider legalizing the use and transport of illicit drugs. Arguing that the United States has failed to curb illegal drug consumption, Pérez Molina has stated that his country has no choice but to seek alternatives to the current "war on drugs," in order to stem violence related to drug trafficking in Guatemala and in neighboring countries. U.S. officials oppose the idea, stating that drug legalization would not stop organized criminal elements from trafficking weapons and people.27 The Guatemalan President has continued to push for legalization and regulation of drugs at international institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Land Use Conflicts

Land use continues to be a contentious issue during this administration. In March 2012 thousands of indigenous people marched over 120 miles to the capital to meet with President Pérez Molina and to demand the government settle land conflicts. The group that organized the march, the Committee for Peasant Unity, said its principal demands included "an end to the evictions and criminal prosecution of Indians, a pardon for farm debts of more than … ($38.96 million) affecting more than 100,000 families, access to land and the end of mining in the region."

Mining issues are especially contentious, and often violent, throughout the region. Governments often see mines as a potential source of revenue for poverty reduction and social programs. Yet indigenous populations, which might be the beneficiaries of such programs, often object to mining under current conditions because they see it as violating their ancestral land rights, removing them from and/or damaging their source of livelihood, and/or excluding them from the decision making process as to how profits from mines in their communities should be spent.

In May 2013, President Pérez Molina declared a state of emergency in four southeastern towns after protests against a silver mine turned deadly. The Canadian-owned Escobal silver mine was given a final permit in April. Those opposing the mine say it will contaminate local water supplies. A series of conflicts began when security guards at the mine shot and wounded six protesters. The following day protesters kidnapped 23 police officers; when police went to free them, one police officer and a demonstrator were killed. The government at first said the state of emergency was related to violence at the mine, but later said it was linked to organized crime and the Los Zetas drug cartel. The state of emergency was lifted after eight days, then a state of alert went into effect for a brief period, which also limited some constitutional guarantees, such as the right of protest, and covered the town in which the mine is located.28 According to the Guatemalan government, the mining company has signed an agreement with the former owners of the land on which it operates to give them 0.5% of the net earnings of commercial sales of the mine.29 The former owners established a foundation that will invest 10% of those earnings in development projects in the surrounding communities. Guatemala says it is one of the first such agreements in Latin America.

Former Guatemalan First Lady Sandra Torres called on President Pérez Molina to suspend mining until related legal reforms are approved. Mining reforms currently being considered include higher royalty payments and greater social and environmental protections.30 Torres, who was disqualified from running for President in the last elections (because of laws prohibiting relatives of sitting presidents from running), was reelected as general secretary of the UNE (National Unity of Hope) party in May 2013. Pérez Molina proposed a two-year stay on mining licenses; it is still pending in the Guatemalan Congress. Mining projects that have legally issued licenses have continued to operate.

Security Conditions

The focus of security issues in Guatemala has shifted from the violence of civil conflict to high levels of crime over the past quarter century. Weak institutions, remote areas with little effective state presence, and the country's geographic position between the drug producing nations of South America and consumers in the United States have made Guatemala a prime target for drug traffickers and other organized criminal groups. Crime and violence have been extremely high in recent years, and officials estimated that up to 60% of Guatemalan territory may be under the effective control of drug traffickers.31 The Guatemalan government has made some progress in addressing crime and impunity, with the help of the U.N.-supported Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The country's fragmented political system, inconsistent political will, and weak judicial and security institutions remain serious obstacles to addressing the problem adequately.

In addition, Guatemala's widespread poverty and high levels of inequality and unemployment make much of its population especially vulnerable to crime. Almost one in four (23.3%) Guatemalan respondents in a 2010 survey reported being the victim of a crime in the previous year, ranking Guatemala only behind El Salvador among the Central American nations. The rate of homicides in Guatemala in 2010 was about 41 per 100,000 inhabitants, placing Guatemala in the middle of the region, at fourth of seven. Though still relatively high, the 2010 homicide rate was the lowest it had been since 2005.32 In 2012 the national homicide rate dropped to 39.9 per 100,000. Preliminary figures for 2013, however, showed homicide rates rising again in 15 of Guatemala's 22 departments.33

Some crime is attributed to youth gangs, ranging from localized groups to national groups with international ties, including to gangs in the United States. The regions within Guatemala evidencing the highest murder rates, however, tend to be those where organized criminal groups and drug traffickers, not gangs, are most active.34

Involvement of the Military in Internal Security

In response to the high level of violence, a number of municipalities have asked for military troops to augment their ineffective police forces; the Guatemalan government, as under the previous four administrations, is using a constitutional clause to have the army "temporarily" support the police in combating rising crime. The day following his inauguration, President Pérez Molina stated, "Today, publicly, I want to lay out for the army an important goal of collaborating, coordinating and cooperating with other security institutions, and that is to put an end to the external threats and contribute to neutralizing illegal armed groups by means of military power."35

Despite efforts to develop a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to security, successive governments' actions have often been reactive and dependent on the military. Human rights groups and other analysts have warned against militarization of law enforcement, noting the peace accords' call for the army to focus solely on external threats, "the government's failure to investigate and punish unlawful killings committed by members of the security forces,"36 and now, Pérez Molina's high rank in the military during the civil war.

In 2012 Mayan citizens were protesting high electricity prices and demanding affordable education and the recognition of indigenous rights when Guatemalan soldiers shot at the crowd, killing six people and injuring another thirty. After initially denying military responsibility for the violence, President Pérez Molina then allowed for a thorough investigation, and soldiers were prosecuted for their role.

While in recent years observers said the executive branch appeared to exhibit effective control over the military, the State Department's 2013 human rights report noted that civilian authorities "on occasion" failed to exert such control.

Guatemalan Cooperation with CICIG

Beginning in 2008, Guatemalan judicial officials worked with CICIG (see section on "International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala" below) to investigate and prosecute illegal groups and clandestine structures, including some through which many former and current military officers allegedly engage in human rights violations, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

… [CICIG] has spurred a series of criminal investigations compromising some of the country's most powerful figures—despite occasional setbacks. A new head of the national prosecution service has managed to shape an extraordinary turnaround, ordering the arrest of several 'untouchable' druglords, as well as a former president and general accused of atrocities during the civil war. Drug interdictions have soared; the murder rate has fallen, albeit slightly; even impunity rates for serious crimes are down.

This progress cannot hide the dilapidation of the country's security and justice institutions, … nor the acute fear of crime that is felt by many Guatemalans. But in combination with the Central American region's determination to address its vulnerabilities to transnational crime, it does offer some reason to believe that the crisis may be contained.37

Others acknowledged the accomplishments, but expressed serious reservations. CICIG's former director, Francisco Dall'Anese, noted that CICIG can "build up the state, and create the legal conditions for the thing to function. Everything else depends on the willingness of the Guatemalans…. if you end up with the best system in Latin America and it is not used properly or is used for other purposes, there has been no progress."38

After the reversal of Rios Montt's conviction, the early termination of Paz y Paz's term, other apparent reactions against efforts to hold military and other officials accountable, and President Pérez Molina's decision not to renew CICIG's mandate, the Economist warned in May 2014 that "there are lingering risks that impunity levels will worsen again."

Regional Security Efforts

Guatemala is part of Central America's "Northern Triangle" region, along with El Salvador and Honduras. These countries have all felt the impact of the Mexican government's campaign against drug-trafficking organizations, as some of those organizations move their operations into their territory and operate across borders. In response, the Northern Triangle countries have generally adopted aggressive tactics, supplanting their weak police forces with military forces. Dall'Anese, a former attorney general of Costa Rica, also noted the limited resources of Guatemala and the other Central American nations: "Very often the budget of a country in Central America … is less than the petty cash fund of a criminal organization."39 One way to address the inequity of resources, he suggested, might be to create regional courts, to share resources and capacity. These and other ideas are being explored by Guatemala and its neighbors as they seek to improve regional efforts. They have various organizations through which they address security, such as the Central American Integration System (known by its Spanish acronym, SICA) and the Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC, to which only El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, plus the Dominican Republic, belong, but not Belize, Costa Rica, or Panama). Translating theoretical agreement on the need to cooperate on security matters into an operational institutional framework has proved difficult, however, in the face of differing priorities and approaches, and border and other types of disputes within the region.40

Economic and Social Conditions

Guatemala has the biggest economy in Central America, yet ranks lowest in that region, and 133rd out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index for 2013. With a 2013 gross domestic product (GDP) of $54 billion and a per capita income of $3,341, Guatemala is considered a lower middle income developing economy by the World Bank.41

The country has maintained generally sound macroeconomic policies, and enjoyed annual GDP growth rates of over 5% before the economy slowed as a result of the onset of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession. Significant declines in exports, remittances, and foreign direct investment slowed growth to 0.6% in 2009. The Guatemalan economy began to recover in 2010, with GDP growth of 2.9%, although a series of natural disasters in 2010 and 2011 caused losses and damages estimated at almost $2 billion. The recovery has continued, with economic growth estimated at 3.3% for 2013, and forecast to be 3.4% in 2014. 42 Guatemala's top exports are knit apparel, edible fruit and nuts, precious stones (gold), spices, coffee and tea, and woven apparel.43

Despite improvements in political and macroeconomic stability, Guatemala's levels of poverty and inequality remain among the highest in the region. According to the World Bank, although Guatemala reduced poverty by five points between 2000 and 2006, from 56% to 51%, the percent of the population living in poverty rose again to just under 54% by 2011.

Guatemala's income distribution is one of the most unequal in the world, and has gotten worse. In 2002 the wealthiest 10% of Guatemalans consumed over 42% of Guatemala's total income, while the poorest 10% accounted for just 1.4%. In the latest figures, the wealthiest 10% consume over 47% of Guatemala's total income, while the poorest 10% account for just 1% of the total national income.44

Guatemala's social development indicators often fall below those of countries with lower per capita incomes.45 The maternal mortality rate is 120 per 100,000; the infant mortality rate is 25 per 1,000, amongst the highest in Latin America.46 Chronic child malnutrition is at about 50%, the highest rate in Latin America, and fourth-highest rate in the world.47 The proportion of the population living with hunger has increased by 80% over the past 20 years, from about 17% in 1991, to 30.5% in 2012.48 This economic and social marginalization disproportionately affects Guatemala's indigenous population. Indigenous peoples comprise 24 different ethno-linguistic groups and account for roughly half of Guatemala's 15.5 million people. Over 42% of the rural population, which is mostly indigenous, lives in extreme poverty, compared to 29% nationally.49 Child malnutrition among the indigenous is almost 70%.50

U.S. Relations With and Aid to Guatemala

Relations between the United States and Guatemala traditionally have been close, but there has been friction at times over human rights and civil/military issues. According to the Department of State, U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include supporting the institutionalization of democracy and implementation of the peace accords; encouraging respect for human rights and rule of law, and the efficient functioning of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG); supporting broad-based economic growth and sustainable development and sustainable development; cooperating to fight money laundering, corruption, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and other transnational crimes; and supporting Central American integration through support for resolution of border and territorial disputes.51

Guatemala and the United States have significant trade relations. They are part of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which began to be implemented in 2006. Supporters of CAFTA-DR point to reforms it spurred in transparency, customs administration, intellectual property rights, and government regulation. Critics note that the commercial balance between the two countries previously favored Guatemala, and the balance has shifted in favor of the United States, with Guatemala registering its first trade deficit in a decade after CAFTA-DR was signed.

Top priorities for U.S. bilateral assistance to Guatemala are addressing security and justice for citizens; improving food security and reducing chronic malnutrition; providing access to health services, promoting better educational outcomes; and managing natural resources to mitigate the impact of global climate change.52 Various programs are integrated for a greater impact in the Western Highlands, which has the highest rates of poverty and chronic malnutrition in the country.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Guatemala by Account and Fiscal Year

($ in thousands)

Fiscal Year

Increase / Decrease

2013
Actual

2014 Estimate

2015 Request

TOTAL

80,779

65, 249

77,107

11,858

Development Assistance

45, 861

42, 789

57,387

14,598

Foreign Military Financing

712

1,740

1,000

-740

Global Health Programs- USAID

16, 796

15,000

13,000

-2000

International Military Education and Training

688

720

720

-

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

4,846

-

-

-

P.L. 480 Title II

11,876

5,000

5,000

-

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2013

The United States also provides assistance to Guatemala through two regional initiatives, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) -for combating narcotics trafficking and preventing transnational crime-and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). According to the State Department, "The goal of all U.S. assistance efforts is to create effective structures and organizations that can be sustained by the Government of Guatemala."

The Administration's FY2015 request for aid to Guatemala totals $77 million, an overall increase of almost $12 million from FY2014 funding (see Table 1). It includes approximately $57 million for Development Assistance; $1 million for Foreign Military Financing (FMF); $13 million for Global Health Programs (U.S. Agency for International Development); $720,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET); and $5 million for food aid (P.L. 480 Title II).

Congressional Concerns

Protection of Human Rights and Conditions on U.S. Military Aid

During most of Guatemala's 36-year civil war, the Guatemalan military was in power and engaged in violent repression against civil society organizations, and in gross violations of the human rights of its citizens, especially its majority indigenous population. Although Guatemala established a civilian democratic government in 1986, it took another 10 years to end the violence, during which time the military continued to engage in repression and violations of human rights. Civilians have governed Guatemala for about 28 years now, making notable gains, such as carrying out significant military and police reforms. Nonetheless, democratic institutions remain fragile, and security forces continue to enjoy widespread impunity for human rights and other crimes.

The U.S. State Department's most recent human rights report on Guatemala said that civilian authorities sometimes failed to maintain effective control over security forces, which commit human rights abuses. The report also said that:

Principal human rights abuses included widespread institutional corruption, particularly in the police and judicial sectors; police and military involvement in serious crimes such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extortion; and societal violence, including often lethal violence, against women.

Other human rights problems also included abuse and mistreatment by National Civil Police (PNC) members; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged pretrial detention; failure of the judicial system to ensure full and timely investigations and fair trials; and failure to protect judicial officials, witnesses, and civil society representatives from intimidation and threats. There were also killings of journalists and trade unionists; sexual harassment and discrimination against women; child abuse, including commercial sexual exploitation of children; discrimination and abuse of persons with disabilities; and trafficking in persons. Other problems included marginalization of indigenous communities and ineffective demarcation of their lands; discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; and ineffective enforcement of labor and child labor laws.53

The international community is continuing to combat military impunity for human rights violations and other crime through support of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), rule of law, judicial and police reform, and other types of democracy-strengthening programs. Under former Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz (2010- May 2014), the Public Ministry worked in conjunction with CICIG, and prosecuted officials who committed abuses and fraud. Paz y Paz, who had prosecuted extremely difficult cases such as the Rios Montt case, was forced to step down several months early on a technicality. Pérez Molina appointed a new Attorney General, Magistrate Thelma Aldana, in May 2014.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Guatemala in March 2012. Commissioner Navi Pillay commended Guatemala for the direction it was taking to address "staggering impunity," including, since 2010, the first successful prosecution of cases for past human rights violations, and the ratification of the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.54 She also stated that the government must operate within the framework of the Peace Accords, the rule of law, and respect for the human rights of all Guatemalans as it attacks the country's high levels of insecurity, crime, and violence. Although indigenous people constitute the majority of the population, she said, they continue to be subject to social and economic exclusion and denial of their human rights. The U.N. official expressed particular concern over the negative impact of economic investment projects on the rights of indigenous peoples.

In 2011, a Guatemalan court sentenced four former soldiers to over 6,000 years each in prison for a 1982 massacre of hundreds of civilians and crimes against humanity during the country's civil war.55 This was only the second time a trial was held in Guatemala relating to a civil war massacre. In 2012, Guatemala became the first country to find a former head of state guilty of genocide when it convicted Rios Montt for human rights crimes committed during the civil war. (See "Landmark Trial of Former Dictator Rios Montt" above.) His conviction was overturned 10 days later, which many observers saw as a major setback for the rule of law in Guatemala.

Guatemala had acquitted another former head of state, on embezzlement charges, in 2011. The United States filed separate charges against former President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) for conspiring to launder $70 million in state funds through U.S. banks. In May, 2013, Guatemala extradited Portillo to the United States to face corruption charges. Portillo pled guilty to conspiring to launder $2.5 million in March 2014.

Conditions on U.S. Military Aid to Guatemala

In 1990, President George H. W. Bush suspended overt military aid to Guatemala because of concerns over human rights abuses allegedly committed by Guatemalan security forces. In 2005, the United States began to allow Foreign Military Sales to Guatemala in recognition of progress the Guatemalan government had made in reforming the military.56 Since 2008, Congress has allowed Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Guatemala, but only to certain components of the armed forces, and with human rights conditions attached in the foreign assistance appropriations acts.

Congress placed conditions on aid to Guatemala in the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76), stating that assistance for the Guatemalan army may only be made available if the Secretary of State certifies that the Guatemalan government is taking credible steps to implement the 2010 Reparations Plan for Damages Suffered by the Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam. The law also stated that no IMET or FMF funds may be expended for assistance for the Guatemalan Armed Forces until the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the Guatemalan government has resolved all cases involving Guatemalan children and American adoptive parents pending since December 31, 2007, or that it is making significant progress toward meeting a specific time-table for resolving those cases. Those conditions apply to aid provided through the Foreign Operations appropriations act, but not to aid provided through the Department of Defense (DOD). Most DOD aid goes through regional programs, so it is always difficult to get precise amounts for aid to any one country.

The Pérez Molina Administration, like previous Guatemalan governments, has been pressing the United States to drop those conditions and provide increased military aid to the army. The Obama Administration's request for foreign aid for FY2015 includes proposed funding for the Guatemalan army (see Table 1). According to the Administration's budget request, the FMF would "enhance the capacity of the Guatemalan military to secure national territory", provide maritime security against transnational threats, and support humanitarian aid operations. IMET proposed for FY2015 would "support professionalization training for the Guatemalan military," and provide training in democratic values and respect for human rights and in technical areas such as aircraft maintenance.

According to the State Department's human rights report, civilian authorities sometimes failed to maintain effective control over the security forces. It also reported that members of both the military and the police committed human rights abuses, and that "the level of impunity for security forces accused of committing crimes was high." Human rights advocates and others say that the Constitutional Court's decision to overturn Rios Montt's conviction, if it stands, would show that the military still enjoys impunity for human rights and other crimes.

The Department of Defense provides military assistance, mostly for counternarcotics programs, some of which is not subject to the human rights conditions described above, as it is authorized through the defense appropriations, rather than through the foreign assistance appropriations acts. DOD military assistance to Guatemala is subject to requirements for vetting participants to exclude those with records of human rights violations. These are known as Leahy conditions, after the Senator who incorporated them into legislation. 57 In FY2009-FY2010, the Department of Defense spent $3.5 million on counternarcotics operations centers in Guatemala, including $754,000 for a base for the Guatemalan army's Kaibil special forces.58 As mentioned above, the Kaibiles are alleged to have committed extensive human rights violations during Guatemala's civil war. In addition, many ex-Kaibiles are reported to be members of the Mexican Los Zetas criminal organization. Four former Kaibiles were sentenced in 2011, another in March 2012, and another 12 remain fugitives from justice, for their roles in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre.

International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

The United States and other donors support the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which was created in 2007 under the auspices of the United Nations. The commission's mandate is to help Guatemala dismantle illegal groups and clandestine structures responsible for organized crime, human rights violations, and other crimes through investigations and prosecutions. After its first year of operation, CICIG noted that the Guatemalan government faced enormous challenges, but had begun to clean up the security forces and strengthen civil institutions.59 Since then, CICIG has helped Guatemala investigate and prosecute important cases; a number of former high-level officials have been charged with corruption, faced trials, and been convicted. In 2013, the CICIG-vetted prosecutors unit in the Guatemalan Public Ministry achieved convictions in the trials of a former chief of criminal investigations of the Guatemalan National Civil Police (PNC) and two former police investigators for the extrajudicial killing of ten inmates between 2005 and 2006; and of a former police chief, former PNC chief of antinarcotics, and former PNC officer for drug trafficking.60 All received sentences of significant time in prison.

CICIG has helped prevent a number of individuals with significant ties to corruption and/or organized crime from being appointed to senior positions in the Guatemalan state, and the Guatemalan government has approved CICIG-recommended legislative reforms.61

Nonetheless, CICIG and reform-minded elements of the government reportedly continue to be thwarted regularly by vested interests such as corrupt law enforcement and other public officials with alleged ties to criminal organizations. CICIG helped the Guatemalan judicial system to extradite, investigate, and prosecute former President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) for allegedly embezzling $15 million in government funds, only to have a panel of judges dismiss the charges this past May with reasoning that CICIG said was "neither valid nor logical."62 Cases such as this demonstrate both the progress that has been made with CICIG's assistance, and the obstacles to reform still remaining. (Guatemala did extradite Portillo to the United States in May 2013, however, where pled guilty in March 2014 to bribery.)

President Pérez Molina has said that he will not extend CICIG's term when it expires in 2015. In its Sixth Report, CICIG wrote, "In order for the [Guatemalan] State to be sufficiently coordinated to tackle criminal organizations without CICIG support, a steely commitment and political intent will be necessary on the part of the institutions so as to implement the recommendations made since August 2010…"

Illicit Narcotics Trafficking and Other Organized Crime63

In recent years Congress has become increasingly concerned over the increase in drug trafficking-related violence across Central America. It first appropriated higher levels of assistance for these countries to combat organized crime and drug trafficking through the Mérida Initiative, created mostly to help Mexico, then, beginning in FY2010, through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).

The end of Guatemala's civil war roughly coincided with the spread of drug trafficking rings throughout Central America. Many former combatants shifted into drug trafficking and other organized crime. A weak judicial system, with inadequate enforcement of laws and widespread impunity, has fostered the growth of widespread corruption and high levels of criminal activities in Guatemala. Partly as a consequence of having one of the lowest tax collection rates in Latin America, and a private sector that resists fiscal reform, the Guatemalan government has been unable to dedicate adequate resources to strengthening judicial institutions and fighting corruption. Furthermore, in part because of the human rights violations the armed forces committed during the civil war, the military was removed from remote areas such as Quiche and Izabal at the war's end. Since that time, drug traffickers have taken advantage of the lack of a law enforcement presence in those areas to conduct their operations. Additionally, as Mexico increases its counter-narcotics efforts against them, Mexican drug cartels have expanded into Guatemala.

Guatemala is a major transit country for cocaine and heroin trafficked from South America to the United States, an activity increasingly linked to arms trafficking, according to the Department of State's 2014 U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Money from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities are laundered in Guatemala. Guatemala is a minor producer of opium poppy, and of increasing amounts of marijuana produced for domestic consumption.

President Proposes Revision of Drug Policies

As mentioned above, President Pérez Molina said that in response to drug-trafficking related violence alternatives to the current "war on drugs" needed to be considered, including legalizing the use and transport of certain drugs. (See "Illicit Drug Policy" above.)

Pérez Molina invited the other Central American presidents to discuss a major revision of counternarcotics policies and laws. Pérez Molina said he hoped to have a unified regional approach at the Summit of the Americas in April. But the presidents of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras apparently cancelled their attendance at the last minute without explanation, and then issued a statement on March 30 saying they oppose legalization of drugs and continue to support regional efforts to combat narcotics trafficking.64 The three leaders present at the March 25 meeting, Ricardo Martinelli of Panama and Laura Chincilla of Costa Rica, along with Pérez Molina, did not issue a policy declaration, but agreed to discuss several proposals further at a meeting of the Central American Integration System (SICA). The proposals include the decriminalization of drugs under certain conditions; creation of a regional penal court to handle drug trafficking cases; and compensation from drug-consuming nations—mainly the United States—for each shipment of drugs seized in Central America, and for the destruction of poppy and marijuana crops.

Pérez Molina has stated his government's position as fostering a global intergovernmental dialogue based on global regulations, "which means that consumption and production should be legalized but within certain limits and conditions." He also said that drug abuse, like alcoholism and tobacco use, "should be treated as public health problems, not criminal justice issues."65

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos had already put drug legalization and decriminalization on the agenda of the Summit of the Americas, which President Obama and a majority of other heads of state from the Americas attended in April 2012. Some of the other leaders criticized U.S. counternarcotics policy and urged a reconsideration of the so-called war on drugs. While President Obama listened to the arguments, he said he did not agree that decriminalization was a solution to the problem, and the summit ended without any joint declaration.66 Presidents Obama and Pérez Molina met briefly at the summit.

In April 2014 Pérez Molina said that a government commission is studying a proposal to legalize marijuana and opium poppies production in Guatemala.67 The commission is to release its recommendations in October. Guatemala will host an international conference on drug policy in September. Any proposal to unilaterally legalize marijuana and/or opium poppies is likely to meet strong opposition from the United States.

Pérez Molina continues to cooperate with the United States and other international partners on counter-narcotics efforts, and to pursue criminal cases against illicit drug trafficking. The Guatemalan government partners with the United States in security and counternarcotics programs through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) (see "U.S. Relations With and Aid to Guatemala" below). The government has achieved some success, such as increasing the volume of drug seizures. The United States transferred the title and operational control of six UH-1H II helicopters to Guatemala's Ministry of Government in September 2013 after the government showed that it had the structure to sustain maintenance of the equipment. This nationalized Guatemala's aviation interdiction program, according to the State Department's 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Guatemala also extradited a former President, Alfonso Portillo, to the United States in May 2013. Portillo had been indicted in 2009 in the United States on one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in the United States. He pled guilty in March 2014 to bribery.

Nonetheless, according to the State Department's 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,

While Guatemalan government agencies are maturing and gaining some momentum in the fight against drugs trafficking, they will not succeed in building durable and effective counter-narcotic enforcement organizations until the Guatemalan government fully implements its laws, provides adequate financial support, reforms its law enforcement culture, and professionalizes its judicial processes.68

Trade

Guatemala and the United States have significant trade relations. Since the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) began to be implemented in 2006, bilateral trade has expanded greatly—much more so on the U.S. side. Supporters of CAFTA-DR point to reforms it spurred in transparency, customs administration, intellectual property rights, and government regulation. Critics note that the commercial balance between the two countries previously favored Guatemala, and the balance has shifted in favor of the United States, with Guatemala registering its first trade deficit in a decade after CAFTA-DR was signed. According to U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) data, U.S. exports to Guatemala increased by 95% from 2005 (pre-CAFTA-DR) to 2013, while during the same period, Guatemalan exports to the United States increased by only 33%.69 This is largely because Guatemalan exports to the United States received unilateral trade preferences before CAFTA-DR was implemented.

Total U.S.-Guatemalan trade in 2013 was $9.7 billion. The U.S. goods trade surplus with Guatemala was $1.4 billion. U.S. exports to Guatemala amounted to $5.5 billion. Oil, machinery, articles donated for relief and low value shipments, electrical machinery, and plastics parts accounted for the majority of U.S. exports. U.S. imports from Guatemala amounted to about $4.2 billion, with knit apparel, edible fruit and nuts, precious stones (gold), spices, coffee and tea, and woven apparel accounting for the majority. The United States is Guatemala's top trading partner and Guatemala is the United States' 53rd -largest trading partner.

The United States filed a case against Guatemala under CAFTA-DR in 2010, "the first labor case the United States has ever brought against a trade agreement partner," according to the office of the USTR.70 In response to submissions filed by six Guatemalan unions and the AFL-CIO in 2008, the USTR conducted an investigation and found that "it appears that the Government of Guatemala is failing to meet its obligations under [CAFTA-DR] with respect to effective enforcement of Guatemalan labor laws related to the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and acceptable conditions of work." The USTR also expressed "grave" U.S. concerns regarding labor-related violence in Guatemala, "which is serious and apparently deteriorating." In April 2013 the two countries signed an 18-point Enforcement Plan outlining actions the country would take to strengthen enforcement of its labor laws.

In April 2014 U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman announced that the case would not be terminated and would remain suspended for an additional four months. The USTR said that while Guatemala had taken some steps under the plan, "progress is not sufficient to close the case."71 Among the steps Guatemala still needs to take are passage of legislation providing for an expedited process to sanction employers who violate labor laws, and implementation of a mechanism to ensure payment to workers when factories close suddenly.

Intercountry Adoption72

U.S. laws and policies concerning intercountry adoption are designed to ensure that all of the children put up for adoption are truly orphans, and have not been bought; kidnapped; or subjected to human trafficking, smuggling, or other illegal activities.

In FY2007, U.S. citizens adopted 4,726 children from Guatemala, more than from any other country except China (5,453). When the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (referred to hereafter as the Convention) went into effect in the United States that year, adoptions from Guatemala were suspended because Guatemala was not in compliance with the Convention's standards.

Since then, the only cases of adoptions by U.S. citizens of Guatemalan children that have been permitted are those that were already in-process in Guatemala on December 31, 2007.73 There were over 3,000 such adoption cases pending at the time. In FY2013, the most recent year for which data are available, U.S. citizens adopted 23 children from Guatemala. As of July 30, 2014, there were 31 cases still pending.74 The U.S. and Guatemalan governments have been working together to determine the status of these cases and to resolve the pending cases.75 Not all of these cases are still active. Some have been closed and some may be cases where the prospective parents have abandoned their applications.

The United States is a signatory of the Convention. The goal of the Convention is to eliminate confusion and delays caused by differences among the laws and practices of different countries, and to ensure transparency in adoptions to prevent human trafficking, child stealing, or child selling.76 As of June 1, 2014, the Convention had entered into force in 93 countries.77 Countries can sign and ratify the Convention, but until the country has the laws and procedures in place to implement the Convention, the Convention cannot enter into force in the country.

The Convention entered into force in the United States on April 1, 2008, and governs intercountry adoptions between the United States and other Convention countries. Guatemala is party to the Convention,78 but has not established regulations and procedures that meet Convention standards. As a result, the U.S. government is only processing petitions to allow an adopted child to immigrate to the United States for adoptions that were initiated in Guatemala prior to December 31, 2007,79 because such adoptions can be completed under the non-Convention system.

In September 2008, the Guatemalan National Adoption Council (CNA) announced it would not accept any new adoption cases to allow time to establish guidelines for accrediting adoption agencies and to focus on completing transition cases.80 In August 2011, the CNA announced a plan, referred to as the Acuerdo (agreement), which provides a general processing framework for limited numbers of pending adoption cases already under CNA processing authority. In December 2011, the CNA confirmed details of the processing plan for such cases which are referred to as acuerdo cases. According to the Department of State (DOS), the CNA had referred 28 cases to the U.S. Embassy for final adoption processing as acuerdo cases between January 2012 and March 2013, and had identified others that it considered eligible to move through the acuerdo process.81 The CNA does not charge fees for its adoption processing. This process does not apply to the earlier notario cases82 pending with the Procuraduría General de la Nación (PGN).83

The United States will not approve new adoptions from Guatemala until Guatemala's adoption process complies with Convention standards, and there is no estimate of when that will be.84

Unaccompanied Children from Guatemala at the U.S. Border

The recent surge in the number of unaccompanied children being apprehended at the U.S. border, most of whom are from Central America, has caused much concern among Congress and the executive branch. From FY2009 to the first eight months of FY2014, the number of unaccompanied children from Guatemala apprehended by U.S. officials rose by 930%, from 1,115 to 12,670.85

Guatemalan Government Efforts to Address Root Causes of Migration

High levels of poverty, violence, and impunity for crimes, and the government's inability to provide many basic services, including security, are seen as major factors contributing to the migration of Guatemalans to the United States.86 Despite social welfare programs implemented under the previous government of President Alvaro Colom, poverty increased between 2006 and 2011, from 51% to just under 54%.87 Upon taking office in January 2012, President Pérez Molina established a Ministry of Social Development to implement social policy. (See "Social Policies" above.) Nonetheless, poverty remains high, with Guatemala having some of the lowest social indicators in the region, and having one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. (See "Economic and Social Conditions" above.)

The Guatemalan government announced a Pact for Security, Justice and Peace in late 2012, a strategy involving all state institutions to improve governability, security, and protection from crime, violence and impunity.88 While the government has made progress in strengthening some institutions, widespread corruption and impunity continue to limit the extent to which reforms can be carried out and maintained, and public confidence in Guatemalan institutions remains low.

The Pérez Molina Administration has been working with the Mexican government on border security and migration issues, including through a joint high level security group. The two countries, which share a 595-mile border, are also collaborating on development programs along both sides of the border, developing "green" crops to improve the standard of living there. The two also have agreed to build a gas pipeline from southern Mexico into Guatemala to increase their industrial competiveness.

While Pérez Molina has met with U.S. officials and other regional leaders to discuss strategies to address the current crisis, he has emphasized that efforts to create "a prosperous, modern, safe border with orderly migratory flows..." has to include the United States, and that "instead of putting up walls, obstacles and difficulties," there should be unity. 89 He has also asked that Guatemalan migrants be granted Temporary Protected Status until the United States passes comprehensive immigration reform.90 Pérez Molina stood with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto on July 7, 2014, when the latter announced a Southern Border Security Campaign to protect the human rights of migrants passing from Guatemala and Belize through Mexico to the United States, and to strengthen border security. When Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson met with President Pérez Molina in Guatemala on July 8, the two said they were seeking further ways to cooperate in combatting transnational crime and terrorism and strengthening borders.91 First Lady Rosa Leal de Pérez launched a campaign called "Quedate," or "Stay Here," fully funded with Guatemalan resources, to encourage youth to stay in Guatemala rather than illegally emigrate to the United States.

Pérez Molina, along with the Presidents of El Salvador and Honduras, met with Members of Congress and President Obama and Vice President Joe Biden in Washington on July 24 and 25. President Pérez Molina suggested the need for a comprehensive regional program to promote security and economic and social development. He also reiterated his request for TPS for Guatemalans until U.S. migration reform is enacted, to which the United States has not responded. President Obama said the United States has compassion for the children, but reiterated that those who do not have proper claims to remain here will be returned to their country of origin.92 He also mentioned a pilot program the Administration is considering for Honduras which would screen youths while still in their country to determine whether they qualify for refugee status. Although the program could possibly be extended to include Guatemala and El Salvador, the President said only a small number of people would qualify. President Obama also said the United States was committed to working in partnership with the three countries "to find ways in which we can come up with more aggressive action plans to improve security and development and governance in these countries."93

On July 8, President Obama submitted to Congress a $3.7 billion supplemental request to address increased migration from Central America. The majority of funding would go toward border security and enforcement efforts. Just under 8% of the funding would be allotted for "the repatriation and reintegration of migrants to countries in Central America and to address the root causes of migration from these countries."

Support Programs in Guatemala for Returned Migrants. In response to the dramatic increase in the number of Guatemalans removed from the United States, and related problems or consequences, the Guatemalan and U.S. governments have initiated programs to support returning migrants during the past few years. In 2004, the Guatemalan government estimated that 7,029 Guatemalans, including 200 children, were deported from the United States. By 2012, that number had increased by almost 600% to 40,647, including 586 children.94 In FY2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) removed 47,215 Guatemalans from the United States. About 33% of those had criminal records.95 The data did not indicate how many of those removed in 2013 were minors. In FY2011, the most recent year for which U.S. data for removal of unaccompanied minors is available, DHS removed 458 unaccompanied children originally from Guatemala.96 Recognizing the obstacles faced by repatriated people, and their possible contribution to social instability if left unsupported, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the now ended two-year Guatemalan Repatriates Project with IOM in 2011.97

Guatemalan Repatriates Project

Overview

The Guatemalan Repatriates Project expanded the services provided to deportees arriving both by air from the United States at the Guatemalan Air Force Base in Guatemala City and by land from Mexico through San Marcos. Shelters are at both locations. Immediate assistance included an initial needs assessment, the provision of hygiene kits, psychosocial support, legal advice, and transportation to communities of origin. Reintegration services included vocational training and job placement programs in the capital.

The Guatemalan Repatriates Project proved less effective at providing longer-term support for the reintegration of repatriated Guatemalans than at providing short-term aid. Of the 88,153 Guatemalans assisted by the Guatemalan Repatriates Project from June 2011 to July 2013, only 4,457 were housed at the two shelters. Only about 3,000 of those Guatemalans received comprehensive social and/or economic reintegration assistance in Guatemala City. Although most were from poor rural areas, 184 Guatemalans received such services elsewhere in Guatemala. The Repatriates Project worked with companies willing to hire returnees; 397 Guatemalans were referred to that network, and just 55 were hired during that two-year period.

Outcomes and Government Action

Now that the USAID- funded pilot project has ended, the Guatemalan government is providing much of the same immediate assistance, but the project's reintegration services are no longer being provided. The Guatemalan government has greatly expanded its presence at the reception center at the Guatemalan Air Force Base. Numerous ministries and agencies are present to help the 90 to 135 repatriates arriving on two to three flights daily. Reception services now provided or facilitated by the government include motivational welcome talks, refreshments, free phone calls, on-site banking for changing money, and psychological care. Immigration officials help process returnees; National Registry officials begin the process of getting returnees a national identification card; the Foreign Affairs Ministry explains available services and offers help such as buying transportation tickets to remote areas; and the Health Ministry has a clinical office on the premises. The U.S. and Guatemalan governments see the reception center as a model for the region in providing services upon reentry.

Since 2012, unaccompanied minors being repatriated have been processed in an area separate from adults. The Guatemalan government and several NGOs offer support to unaccompanied minors deported to Guatemala. For example, the Attorney General's office takes custody of children until family or other guardians can be found. The Ministry for Social Well-Being coordinates a shelter for children in Guatemala City which provides psychosocial, legal, education and health assistance to human trafficking victims. From June 2011 to July 2013, 124 minors were assisted at the shelter.98 The NGOs Global Fund for Children (GFC) and Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) work with four Guatemalan nonprofit community-based organizations to provide services through the Guatemalan Child Return and Reintegration Project. Services include pro bono legal help during the removal process in the United States, and upon return to Guatemala, temporary shelter, family reunification assistance, psychological services, education, job training, employment assistance, and workshops to support social reintegration. GFC and KIND say they will take the best practices learned from the pilot project and promote similar projects elsewhere in the region.99

Guatemala established the National Council for Attention to Migrants (Consejo Nacional de Atencion al Migrante, CONAMIGUA) several years ago, which initially provided services to Guatemalan migrants in the United States, and kept records on immigrants in Guatemala and repatriates to Guatemala. In 2013, about 20% of its budget was dedicated to new reintegration services for repatriates.100 IOM has also provided capacity-building for government officials, focusing on the prevention of human trafficking, the protection of victims, and the prosecution of perpetrators.

When Vice President Biden visited Guatemala in June 2014 to speak with President Pérez Molina and leaders from El Salvador and Honduras, he promised an additional $9.6 million to help those countries receive and reintegrate their repatriated citizens. In Guatemala, USAID will use some of those funds to work with IOM to provide services and goods such as those given earlier through the Guatemalan Repatriates Project—food, water, temporary housing, transportation to home communities, medical and psychosocial support. They will also give support to Guatemalan officials for processing returned citizens, and train officials on working with returned children and their families. Vice President also announced $40 million for a new five-year USAID program in Guatemala to improve citizen security, including reducing risk factors for youth involvement in gangs; and $161.5 million for CARSI programs to address some of the root causes of migration, such as prevention activities for at-risk youth, and programs to strengthen the rule of law.

On July 8, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress a $3.7 billion supplemental request to address increased migration from Central America. The majority of funding would go toward border security and enforcement efforts. Just under 8% of the funding, or $295 million, would be allotted for "the repatriation and reintegration of migrants to countries in Central America and to address the root causes of migration from these countries." Of that amount, USAID would be allotted $25 million to expand community-based programs to reduce youth crime and violence.

Footnotes

12. U.S. bilateral assistance in 2017 included $5 million in food aid (as seen in Table 1), but this is not included in the Strategy total because food aid is considered outside of the Strategy. This and the following information is from the U.S. Department of State, Intercountry Adoption, "Guatemala, Notice: Update on Status of Intercountry Adoptions from Guatemala," updated November 8, 2016, accessed by CRS on October 3, 2017, https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/guatemala.html.
1.

Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), Public Security Index: Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, Buenos Aires, October 2013, p. 66.

2.

See for example, Manuel Roig-Franzia, "Choosing a Future From Tainted Pasts: Both Presidential Candidates in Today's Vote in Guatemala Have Links to Some of the Nation's Most Painful Wounds," Washington Post, November 4, 2007, p. A18; Susan C. Peacock, Adriana Beltrán, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala: Illegal Armed Groups and the Forces Behind Them, Washington Office on Latin America, 2003, pp.19-20; Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop?, Grove Press, 2007, p. 385; and Tim Weiner, "Guatemalans Covered up Killing of an American, U.S. Aides Say," New York Times, March 24, 1996, p.1.

3.

Kate Joynes, "Accused Guatemalan Congress Chief Sidelined; Fiscal Reform Delayed," Global Insight Daily Analysis, June 18, 2008.

4.

"Jennifer Harbury Acciona Contra Pérez Molina," Prensa Libre.com, March 23, 2011, translation by author.

5.

International Crisis Group, Guatemala's Elections: Clean Polls, Dirty Politics, Policy Briefing, Latin America Briefing No. 24, Bogota/Brussels, June 16, 2011, p. 4.

6.

Robert Munks, "Further Civil War Abuse Trial Opens in Guatemala," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, March 14, 2012.

7.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Guatemala, May 2014, p. 3.

," generated June 7, 2017, p. 2.
87.

Carlos Hernández, "Monitoreo Final de PNC Reportó 258 Homicidios Menos en el País," Ministerio de Gobernacion, January 1, 2017.

8.

Lorena Baires, "Guatemala Reforzará Sus Fronteras para Cortar Rutas de Narcotráfico," Diálogo, April 4, 2017.

9.

"Lack of Reforms Will Undermine Corruption Crackdown," Business Monitor Online, March 1, 2016.

10.

As of June 12, 2017, the TSE had yet to make a decision on penalizing these parties.

11.

Nina Lakhani, "Guatemala President Under Pressure over Lobbying Firm Linked to Mike Pence," The Guardian, June 23, 2017.

El Periódico, "Gobierno señala injerencia internacional en sentencia por genocidio," May 15, 2013; and CACIF, "CACIF llama a Corte de Constitucionalidad a preservar gobernabilidad y futuro del país," press release, at http://www.cacif.org.gt, author's translations.

9.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Guatemala, May 2014, pp. 27-28.

10.

Robert Munks, op. cit.

11.

Sergio Morales, Claudia Palma, "Thelma Aldana es la nueva Fiscal General," Prensa Libre.com, May 9, 2014.

12.

Sergio Morales, "Thelma Aldana es la nueva Fiscal General," video report at http://www.prensalibre.com/postuladora_fiscal_general/Preisente-nombrara-nuevo-fiscal-general_0_1135086685.html, May 9, 2014.

13.

A truth commission supported by the United Nations determined that state security forces were responsible for most of the 200,000 deaths during the civil war, and that violence targeted at the indigenous Mayan population amounted to genocide because the entire population was targeted. Text of the May 2014 resolution in Spanish provided by the Guatemalan Embassy.

14.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Calls for Constitutional Reform Spark Controversy," June 6, 2014.

15.

ElPeriódico, "Gobierno señala injerencia internacional en sentencia por genocidio," May 15, 2013; and CACIF, "CACIF llama a Corte de Constitucionalidad a preservar gobernabilidad y futuro del país," press release, at http://www.cacif.org.gt, author's translations.

.

Nina Lakhani, "Guatemala President Under Pressure over Lobbying Firm Linked to Mike Pence," The Guardian, June 23, 2017.

1613.

Elisabeth Malkin, "Guatemalan Court Overturns Genocide Conviction of Ex-Dictator," New York Times, May 20, 2013; Sonia Perez Diaz, "In Guatemala, Ex-Dictator Wins Genocide Decision," Pittsburgh Post- Gazette, May 22, 2013"Guatemala: Officials and Police Charged over Girls Shelter Blaze," BBC, June 25, 2017.

1714.

Peru's judicial system convicted former President Alberto Fujimori of crimes against humanity in 2009Communication between U.S. State Department officials and CRS Specialist.

18.

See for example, Jo-Marie Burt, Geoff Thale, "The Guatemala Genocide Case: Using the Legal System to Defeat Justice," Washington Office on Latin America, June 5, 2013; and Emi MacLean, "Uncertainty Hovers over next Stages in Historic Guatemala Genocide Case after Constitutional Court Overturns Conviction," The Trial of Efrain Rios Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez, Open Society Justice Initiative, May 28, 201315. Henry Estuardo Pocasangre and Jerson Ramos, "Ríos Montt Enfrentará Juicio Especial por Masacre de Dos Erres," Prensa Libre, March 31, 2017.

1916.

Ibid.

20.

U.S. Department of State, "Secretary's Remarks: Remarks With Guatemalan President Otto Fernando Pérez Molina, June 4, 2013.

Sarah Blaskey, Jeff Abbott, "The Military Powers Behind Guatemala's Comedian Presidential Front-Runner," Tico Times, October 9, 2015.
2117.

Elisabeth Malkin, Nic Wirtz, "Byron Lima Oliva, Bishop's Killer, Dies in Attack at Guatemala Prison," New York Times, July 18, 2016.

18.

"Guatemala Corruption Report," GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, August 2016, p.5, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/guatemala

19.

Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, Javier Estrada Tobar, "Aislado y en pie de guerra, asi afrontan Jimmy y FCN el Paro Nacional," Nomada, September 20, 2017.

20.

The Editorial Board, "A Corruption Crusade in Guatemala," New York Times, June 11, 2016.

21.

Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, Javier Estrada Tobar, "Aislado y en Pie de Guerra, Asi Afrontan Jimmy y FCN el Paro Nacional," Nomada, September 20, 2017.

22.

"Guatemala: 3 Ministers Resign, Citing 'Political Crisis,'" BBC Monitoring Americas, September 20, 2017.

23.

Sofia Menchu, "Guatemala Federal Auditor to Probe President's Pay Bonus," Reuters, September 12, 2017. Also see http://www.paywizard.org/main/salary/vip-check/world-leaders-salaries for salary comparisons.

24.

Attorney General Thelma Aldana left the country for a month due to death threats. She, as well as judges presiding over prominent cases, continue to face death threats and intimidation. Intimidation has included public and anonymous attempts to discredit the head of CICIG, as well as other officials, activists, and their organizations.

25.

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of His Office in Guatemala, U.N. General Assembly, A/HRC/34/3/Add.1, March 22, 2017, p.4.

26.

"Latin American Weekly Report," LatinNews, May 4, 2017.

27.

"Guatemala's Morales Reiterates Support for Cicig," LatinNews, October 29, 2015.

28.

"Chairman Royce Statement on Guatemala," House Foreign Affairs Committee News Release, U.S. Government Publishing Office, August 28, 2017.

29.

Dudley Althaus, "U.S. Urges Guatemala's President to Allow Corruption Probe; Comments from Officials Come a Day After Jimmy Morales Moved to Expel Special Prosecutor," Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2017.

30.

"At UN, Guatemalan President Pledges Government's Full Commitment to Fight Corruption," U.N. News Centre, September 19, 2017.

31.

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Cerna Rosada, La Independencia Judicial en Guatemala, International Commission of Jurists, November 2016.

32.

"Se Plantean 60 Enmiendas a Reformas," Prensa Libre, February 13, 2017.

33.

Adriana Beltrán, "Guatemala at a Crossroads: Reinforce the Fight Against Corruption or Reinstate the Hidden Powers?," Washington Office on Latin America, December 12, 2016.

34.

World Bank data online, at http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala, accessed May 25, 2017.

35.

World Bank, Guatemala: Overview, accessed March 29, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview.

36.

Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Guatemala, República de Guatemala: Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 2014, December 2015, https://www.ine.gob.gt.

37.

International Monetary Fund Western Hemisphere Department, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with Guatemala, International Monetary Fund, September 2016, http://www.elibrary.imf.org.

38.

UNDP, Human Development Report 2016, March 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.

39.

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Guatemala, generated May 25, 2017, p. 7.

40.

UNESCO, "Education Transforms Lives," 2013, p. 7.

41.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017, March 23, 2017.

42.

Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Guatemala, República de Guatemala: Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 2014, December 2015, https://www.ine.gob.gt.

43.

IMF, op. cit.

44.

For example, seven Guatemalan protesters recently won the right to sue a Canadian mining company in Canadian courts for injuries sustained when Tahoe Resources security guards sprayed protesters with rubber bullets outside the Guatemalan Escobal mine with rubber bullets in 2013. "Supreme Court Clears Way for Lawsuit by Mine Protesters in Guatemala," Vancouver Sun, June 8, 2017.

45.

Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Convenio núm. 169 de la OIT Sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes y la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas en Proyectos de Inversión. Reporte Regional: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Chile, Lima, OIT, Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe, 2016. Findings cited here are on pp. 46, 34, and 15, respectively.

46.

EIU, op. cit, p. 22.

47.

U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Guatemala," Fact Sheet, December 8, 2016, accessed October 2, 2017.

48.

U.S. Embassy, Guatemala, tweet, @usembassyguate, February 22, 2017, http://pic.twitter.com/xkY8mg66rs.

49.

U.S. Embassy, Guatemala, tweet, @usembassyguate, "Roxana Baldetti and Mauricio Lopez Bonilla indicted in US Court," press release, February 24, 2017, http://pic.twitter.com/W2NQo5AMMg.

50.

Associated Press, "Guatemala Court, ex-VP Baldetti Accept Her Extradition to US," June 15, 2017.

51.

Ben Fox, Gisela Salomon, "US, Central America Work Toward Common Ground at Security Conference," Associated Press, June 16, 2017.

52.

U.S. Department of State, 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2017.

53.

See CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

54.
55.

Inter-American Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Organization for Migration, Organization of American States, and the World Food Programme, Food Security and Emigration: Why People Flee and the Impact on Family Members Left Behind in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, August 2017.

56.

See El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle: A Road Map, September 2014, http://iadbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=39224238. See CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

57.

"Presidente Hernández Asegura que 'Fuerza Trinacional' con El Salvador y Guatemala Va Por Buen Camino," La Tribuna, January 5, 2017.

58.

Information in this section is from Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR," https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr, accessed June 27, 2017; Kevin Banks, et al., "Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty: In the Matter of Guatemala—Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of the Panel," June 14, 2017; and Isabelle Hoagland and Jenny Leonard, "Sources: U.S. Loses to Guatemala in FTA Labor Dispute Settlement Case," World Trade Online, June 22, 2017. Trade data in this section are from Global Trade Atlas.

59.

This and the data that follow are from Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Guatemala: U.S.-Guatemala Trade Facts, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/guatemala, accessed June 5, 2017.

60.

Gregory Korte, "On His 100th Day in Office, Trump Orders Review of Free Trade Agreements," USA Today, May 1, 2017.

61.

U.S. Department of State, 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2017.

62.

Louisa Reynolds, "Former Guatemala Interior Minister Accused of Receiving Money from Los Zetas," Noticen, August 17, 2017.

63.

Anna Brown and Renee Stepler, Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2014, Pew Research Center, April 2016; Unauthorized Immigrant Population Trends for States, Birth Countries and Regions, Pew Research Center, November 2016.

64.

See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

65.

See CRS Report R44764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed].

66.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on DACA," Washington, DC, September 5, 2017.

67.

Sophie Tatum, "Trump: I'll 'revisit' DACA If Congress Can't Fix in 6 Months," CNN, September 6, 2017.

68.

U.S. Border Patrol, "Unaccompanied Children (Age 0-17) Apprehensions, Fiscal Year 2008 Through Fiscal Year 2012," February 4, 2013; and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children," accessed July 2014.

69.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection, May 2014.

70.

Nicholas Casey, "World News: Guatemala Genocide Case Pressures Leader," The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2013.

22.

Ezra Fieser, "Guatemala's Presidential Divorce of Convenience," Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2011.

23.

Gobierno de Guatemala, Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, http://www.mides.gob.gt/, accessed July 9, 2014.

24.

Federal Information & News Dispatach, Inc., Remarks at the Transparency International-USA's Annual Integrity Award, State Dept. Press Releases and Documents, Remarks, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, March 23, 2012.

25.

"Country Report: Guatemala," Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2012, pp. 3-5.

26.

Gobierno de Guatemala, Ministerio de Gobernación, http://www.mingob.gob.gt/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=381&Itemid=563, accessed July 9, 2014.

27.

Romina Ruiz-Goiriena, "Guatemala President Weighs Drug Legalization, Blames US For Not Reducing Consumption," Associated Press, February 14, 2012.

28.

Sources for this paragraph include Business News Americas: "State of emegency not linked to anti-mining activity, Guatemala govt says," May 2, 2013, and "Guatemala govt lifts state of emergency in zone hit by anti-mining violence," May 10, 2013; and Reuters, "Guatemala declares emergency in 4 towns to quell mining protests," May 2, 2013.

29.

Email communication with Embassy of Guatemala official, Washington, DC.

30.

Business News Americas, "Guatemala: Politican [sic] demands mining moratorium pending reforms, press report," May 13, 2013.

31.

"Drug Traffickers Have Stranglehold on Guatemala Says Top Prosecutor," El País, February 23, 2011.

32.

Crime victimization rates from Americas Barometer survey data from 2010 by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University; homicide rates from U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime; for tables and further information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (data on pp. 4-5).

33.

RESDAL, Public Security Index, Central America: Costa Rica/El Salvador/Guatemala,/ Honduras/Nicaragua/

Panama, 2013, p. 67.

34.

Reports by Washington Office on Latin America and Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, and UNODC, as cited in CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by [author name scrubbed], p. 5.

35.

CNN Wire Staff, "Guatemala's President Calls on Troops to 'Neutralize' Organized Crime," CNN.com, January 16, 2012.

36.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Human Rights Reports: Guatemala, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011, p. 1, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154507.htm.

37.

Ivan Briscoe and Marlies Stappers, Breaking the Wave: Critical Steps in the Fight against Crime in Guatemala, Clingendael Institute, Impunity Watch, January 2012, p. 3.

38.

Daniel Pacheco, Guatemala Must Fight Impunity from Within: CICIG Director, In Sight: Organized Crime in the Americas, June 1, 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2711-guatemala-must-fight-impunity-from-within-cicig-director.

39.

Ibid.

40.

Latin American Newsletters, "Central America: Prospects for a New US-backed Regional Scheme," Latin American Security & Strategic Review, no. SSR-11-02 (February 2011).

41.

World Bank data online, at http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala, accessed July 29, 2014.

42.

Data in this paragraph and the next from: World Bank, "Guatemala Overview," April 9, 2014.

43.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Guatemala: U.S.-Guatemala Trade Facts, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/guatemala, April 29, 2014, accessed July 25, 2014.

44.

U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013, December 2013, p. 78.

45.

U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Guatemala," March 22, 2010.

46.

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2013, 2013, pp. 158,168.

47.

World Food Programme, Guatemala, at http://www.wfp.org/countries/Guatemala/Overview, accessed July 29, 2014.

48.

United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators, "MDG Country Progress Snapshot: Guatemala," http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2013/Snapshots/GTM.pdf.

49.

ECLAC, op. cit., p. 75.

50.

World Food Programme, op. cit.

51.

U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Guatemala," Fact Sheet, August 23, 2013.

52.

U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2015, Appendix 3: Regional Perspectives. The section on aid to Guatemala is on pp. 658-663, and is drawn on for this section.

53.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, "Guatemala," 2014, p. 1.

54.

"Guatemala Must Address Rule Of Law Challenges: UN," India Blooms News Service, March 17, 2012.

55.

Ken Ellingwood, "Rights Groups Praise Troops' Trials; Guatemala Convicts Four Ex-Soldiers in a 1982 Massacre during the Brutal Civil War," Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2011.

56.

Ibid; John Hendren, "Guatemala Gets U.S. Military Aid; A 15-Year Freeze on the Funds because of Human Rights Abuses is Lifted in Recognition of Reforms," Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2005.

57.

For more on the Leahy laws, please see CRS Report R43361, "Leahy Law" Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

58.

Michael Vickers, Asst. Sec. of Defense, FY2009 Section 1022(a) Report, Department of Defense, Letter to Hon. Ike Skelton, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, February 17, 2010, p. 25, and Michele Flournoy, Under Sec. of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 DoD Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, Department of Defense, Letter to Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, April 4, 2011, p. 7.

59.

International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, One Year Later, September 2008, Guatemala, available at

http://www.cicig.org/Publications.html.

60.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 "Guatemala," 2014, p. 3.

61.

Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), Tercer Año de Labores, September 2010.

62.

CICIG, "Apela Sentencia Absolutoria del ex Presidente Portillo y Dos ex Ministros," press release no. 041, May 30, 2011, translation by author; and "Impunity in Guatemala: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," Economist, June 8, 2011.

63.

Information in this section drawn from U.S. Department of State: 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Guatemala, volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, and volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, March 5, 2013, and Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database: Guatemala, May 2011.

64.

"Update:APNewsNow," AP, March 31, 2012.

65.

Otto Pérez Molina, "We Have to Find New Solutions to Latin America's Drugs Nightmare; Narcotics Should be Legally Available - in a Highly Regulated Market, Argues the President of Guatemala," The Guardian, April 7, 2012.

66.

Frank Bajak and Vivian Sequera, "Cuba Split Leaves Summit Without Declaration," The Miami Herald, April 14, 2012.

67.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Guatemala, May 2014, p. 22.

68.

U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/

69.

This and the data that follows is from: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Guatemala: U.S.-Guatemala Trade Facts, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/guatemala, April 29, 2014, accessed July 25, 2014.

70.

Quotes in this paragraph from: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Announces Labor Rights Trade Enforcement Case Against Guatemala, Press release, Washington, PA, July 2010.

71.

USTR, "United States Keeps in Place Labor Case against Guatemala," press release, April 2014.

72.

This section prepared by William Kandel, Analyst in Immigration Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.

73.

Department of State, Intercountry Adoption, Guatemala, updated March 2013, accessed by CRS on August 1, 2014, http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=guatemala.

74.

Email correspondence from U.S. Department of State, Office of Children's Issues, Adoptions Division, July 30, 2014.

75.

Telephone conversation with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Office of Congressional Affairs, April 7, 2014.

76.

The Convention requires that: certain determinations, such as adoptability of the child, eligibility to immigrate, parent suitability and counseling be made before the adoption can proceed; every country establish a national government-level central authority to carry out certain functions that include cooperating with other central authorities, overseeing local implementation of the Convention, and providing access to information on adoption laws; a child's welfare be protected throughout the adoption process; certified adoptions be recognized in all other countries that are party to the Convention; and every country party to the Convention establish a national government-level process for uniform screening and authorization of adoption service providers.

77.

Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, 33: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Updated June 1, 2014, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69, accessed by CRS on August 1, 2014.

78.

Although the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ruled in 2004 that the country's signing of the Convention was unconstitutional, under international law, Guatemala is still party to the Convention and has been since March 1, 2003. Department of State, "Frequently Asked Questions: Intercountry Adoptions and the Hague Convention: Guatemala," Oct. 12, 2008.

79.

Adoptions initiated in Guatemala prior to Dec. 31, 2007 are processed by the United States under non-Convention procedures. Since Guatemala refused to allow adoption from U.S. citizens between Dec. 31, 2007 and Apr. 1, 2008, all cases being processed were initiated in Guatemala prior to Dec. 31, 2007. Department of State, Warning: Adoptions Initiated In Guatemala on or after April 1, 2008, Apr. 1, 2008.

80.

More information about the CNA's September 2008 decision may be found on its website, http://www.cna.gob.gt.

81.

Department of State, Intercountry Adoption, Guatemala, updated March 2013, accessed by CRS on August 1, 2014, http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=guatemala.

82.

Prior to the Acuerdo, all cases were processed by local lawyers and law professionals, or notarios and registered with the CNA. If such cases were registered with the CNA prior to the enactment of the Acuerdo, they could be processed under the prior notarial system. This process has been repeatedly criticized. See CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Current State of Intercountry Adoptions from Guatemala, October 22, 2008, by [author name scrubbed] (available upon request).

83.

The PGN or Office of the Solicitor General of the Nation oversees the legality of notarial (notario) adoption cases. It conducts investigations of the orphan status for all children considered for adoption.

84.

Department of State, Intercountry Adoption, Guatemala, updated March 2013, accessed by CRS on August 1, 2014, http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=guatemala.

85.

U.S. Border Patrol, "Unaccompanied Children (Age 0-17) Apprehensions, Fiscal Year 2008 through Fiscal Year 2012," February 4, 2013; and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children," accessed July 2014.

86.

For more information, see CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

87.

World Bank, "Guatemala Overview," April 9, 2014.

88.

Gobierno de Guatemala, Ministerio de Gobernación, http://www.mingob.gob.gt/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=381&Itemid=563, accessed July 9, 2014.

89.

Francisco Reséndiz Enviado, "Va Plan de ayuda a ninos migrantes," El Universal, July 8, 2014.

90.

"Mexican and Guatemalan Leaders Tackle Child Migrant Crisis," Latin News Daily Report, July 8, 2014.

91.

Gobierno de Guatemala, Ministerio de Gobernación, "Afirman Lucha contra el Crimen Transnacional y Terrorismo," July 8, 2014.

92.

Jim Kuhnenn and Erica Werner, "Obama Prods GOP on Border Issue, Cites Progress," AP, July 26, 2014.

93.

The White House, "Remarks by President Obama After Meeting with Central American Presidents," July 25, 2014.

94.

These migration figures are from the Guatemalan government as cited in: International Organization for Migration (IOM): Migration initiatives Appeal 2010, 2010, p 72 (2004 data); "Migracion en Guatemala (Cifras)," August 31, 2013, pp.1-2.They may not correspond exactly with figures from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Immigration Statistics, 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. DHS calculates removals by fiscal year. In FY2004, DHS removed 8,235 Guatemalans. In FY2012, DHS removed 38,677 Guatemalans. DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

95.

DHS, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2013 Removals by Departed to Country.

96.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Report to Congress on the Provision of P.L. 110-457 Regarding Repatriation of Unaccompanied Alien Children and U.S. Government Efforts to Protect Them from Human Trafficking, January 16, 2013, p. 2.

97.

IOM, "Press Conference on the Guatemalan Repatriates Project," June 3, 2011.

98.

Ibid.

99.

Kids in Need of Defense, http://www.supportkind.org/en/kind-in-action/guatemala-return-and-reintegration-project, accessed May 12, 2014.

100.

Lee Hopkins, "Making Guatemala 'Home' Again: Service Approaches for Sustainable Reintegration of Repatriates in Guatemala," Columbia University Partnership for International Development Online Journal, February 9, 2014, p. 2.