IraqThe “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern AffairsMatthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
July 21September 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43612
Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Summary
The offensive in northern and central Iraq, led by the Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group
the Islamic State (IS) has raised significant concerns for the United States. These concerns
include a possible breakup of Iraq’s political and territorial order and the establishment of a
potential base for terrorist attacks in the region or even against the U.S. homeland. The crisis has
raised several questions for U.S. policy because it represents the apparent unraveling of a
seemingly stable and secure Iraq that was in place when U.S. combat troops departed Iraq at the
end of 2011. Some months after the U.S. departure, the uprising in Syria among some elements of
the Sunni Arab community there facilitated the reemergence of IS in areas of Syria and in its
original base in Iraq. After late 2011, the Sunni community grew increasingly restive as Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki marginalized senior Sunni leaders, and the skills and capabilities of the
Iraq Security Forces deteriorated. Many Sunnis in Iraq oppose IS’s tactics and attempts to impose
Islamic law, but support it as a vanguard against what they characterize as an oppressive Shiitedominated national government.
Although the apparent threat to Baghdad itself has eased since early July, U.S. officials assess that
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will not be able to recapture lost territory without outside help.
President Obama has announced several steps to help the Iraqi government reduce the threat to
U.S. interests posed by IS, but Administration officials say that additional options might not be
implemented—or be effective if implemented—unless Iraqi leaders can rebuild a political
consensus. The newly elected Iraqi parliament convened on July 2 but has, to date, not announced
agreement on the senior positions of President or Prime Minister. The parliament did select a
speaker and two deputy speakers on July 15. Maliki is seeking another term as Prime Minister but
several Iraqi factions say he is likely to be replaced.
An aspect of the U.S. response could potentially involve working with Iran to reform the Iraqi
political structure and to try to roll back the IS gains. Doing so would raise the potential of
linkage between possible U.S.-Iran cooperation on Iraq and the ongoing international diplomacy
on Iran’s nuclear program. Many Sunnis in Iraq and elsewhere in the region view any U.S.
engagement with Iran with suspicion and hostility, raising the stakes of such potential
coordination considerably. U.S. officials have generally dismissed prospects for direct military
cooperation with Iran.
The crisis has raised additional concerns about the safety of the more than 5,000 U.S. personnel
in Iraq and about the international response to the humanitarian effects of the fighting.
For detail on Iraq’s political and security situation and U.S. policy since the 2003 U.S. invasion of
Iraq, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth
Katzman. The report includes substantial information on Iraq’s Kurds, Sunni insurgent groups
other than IS, Shiite organizations and militias, Iraq’s human rights record, and a summary of
U.S. assistance to Iraq since 2003. For further information on the connections between the
situation in Iraq and that in Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview
and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview: The Situation in Iraq ...................................................................................................... 1
IS June 2014 Offensive and ISF Retreat.................................................................................... 1
Iraq’s Kurds Take Advantage of ISF Collapse .................................................................... 2
The Crisis’s Implications for Iraqi Government Formation ...................................................... 3
Other Possible Outcomes .......................................................................................................... 4
U.S. Response .................................................................................................................................. 4
Syria Dimension ............................................................................................................................ 10
Iran Dimension .............................................................................................................................. 11
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis ............................................................................ 12
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities and Citizens ............................................. 13
Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration .................................................................... 14
Figures
Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest ...................................................................................... 8
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 ...................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 16
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Overview: The Situation in Iraq
On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS) changed its formal name to
simply “the Islamic State” (IS) and declared the establishment of a caliphate in areas under its control in
Iraq and Syria. The IS advances within Iraq since June 2014 raise questions about the future of Iraq and
the region and pose U.S. policy challenges. The sections below analyze the IS-led offensive, its
implications, the U.S. response, and related issues. Previous events and developments, which provide
background information potentially relevant to understanding the causes of the offensive and the Iraq
Security Forces (ISF) collapse in northern Iraq, are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21968,
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33487, Armed
Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS
Report R43612, Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al.
IS June 2014 Offensive and ISF Retreat
Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government contained an earlier IS-led insurrection that began in
Anbar Province in January 2014, even though the government had been unable to regain control of the
city of Fallujah from IS-led forces. Such assessments were upended on June 10, 2014, when IS captured
the northern city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by ISF officers and personnel. According
to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be accounted for.1 In its
offensive, the IS reportedly has been either joined, supported, or enabled by Sunni tribal fighters, former
members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other Sunni residents.2 Their
enabling of the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the IS’s brutal tactics against
opponents and its intention to impose their version of Islamic law, appears to reflect broad Sunni
dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki.3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin Dempsey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 18, 2014,
that “ISIL [now IS] is almost undistinguishable from the other groups” currently fighting the Maliki
government.4
After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities, and
into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course of the
offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a substantial
amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and artillery equipped
with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.5 IS-led fighters captured the city of Tal Afar
west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles
northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. IS-led insurgents in Anbar, with the support of some tribal allies,
reportedly seized additional cities along the Euphrates River in that province, including Haditha. In mid-
1
Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014.
Tim Arango. “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq.” New York Times, June 19, 2014.
3
“Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
4
Testimony of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey, Senate Armed Services Committee, June 18, 2014.
5
Mitchell Prothero. “Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent of June Debacle Becomes Clearer.” McLatchey Wire Service,
July 14, 2014.
2
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July, IS members in Mosul reportedly ordered remaining Christians there to leave the city, and most
apparently complied.6
IS-led militant attacks on the country’s main oil refinery at Baiji have caused gasoline shortages in
northern Iraq, including in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)-controlled region.7 However, the
effect of the fighting on Iraq’s overall oil production and exports has been limited, in large part because
about 75% of Iraq’s oil is produced and exported from Iraq’s south, where Sunni insurgents are far fewer
in number.
Shiite militias have mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad.
The Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from elsewhere
volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government forces have regrouped to
some extent. U.S. officials express increasing confidence that the IS-led offensive will not be able to
capture the city outright, although the ISF might yet lose parts of the city.8 IS-led militants have been able
to approach Baghdad International Airport to the southwest of the city. ISF-led forces have conducted
some limited counterattacks on Tikrit and in Anbar Province, but Gen. Dempsey stated on July 3 that the
ISF would have difficulty recapturing any lost ground without external support.9
As a consequence of the reliance on the Shiite militias, sectarian violence in Baghdad is reportedly
escalating as Shiites retaliate against Sunnis for the IS-led offensive and Sunnis respond.10 The United
Nations reported that June 2014 was the deadliest month in Iraq since 2008 with about 2,400 Iraqis killed,
of which about two thirds were said to be civilians and the remainder ISF personnel.
As the crisis has unfolded, Prime Minister Maliki—who seeks a third term as Prime Minister in the
government formation process resulting from April 30, 2014 national elections – has worked with loyalist
Iraqi commanders to help the ISF regroup. Iraq’s small air force began conducting some air strikes on IS
positions in Mosul and elsewhere as early as June 12. Maliki’s emphasis on militarily countering the
offensive – rather than on reaching out to the disaffected Sunni Arab community – appears intended to
shore up his base in the Shiite community as Iraqi leaders try to determine the composition of the next
national government. Maliki has maintained this stance despite a public call by U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry for the Iraqi people “to find leadership... that is prepared to be inclusive and share power.”11
Iraq’s Kurds Take Advantage of ISF Collapse
The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) of the Kurds’ autonomous political
entity in northern Iraq, the KRG, to capture Kirkuk and large nearby oil fields. The Kurds have long
sought to control that oil-rich region, which they claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the
province with the KRG. Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of
Kirkuk to the central government.12 The capture has prompted renewed discussion among KRG leaders
6
Alissa Rubin. ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians From Mosul.” New York Times, July 19, 2014.
Steven Mufson. “Iraq’s Biggest Oil Refinery Is on Fire. How Important is That?” Washington Post, June 18, 2014
8
Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon. “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force.” New York Times, July 14, 2014.
9
Craig Whitlock. “Pentagon Leaders: Iraq Probably Needs Outside Help to Retake Seized Territory.” Washington Post, July 3,
2014.
10
Alissa Rubin and Rod Nordland. “As Sunnis Die in Iraq, a Cycle is Restarting.” New York Times, June 18, 2014.
11
“Kerry says U.S. wants Iraqis to find inclusive leadership,” Reuters, June 22, 2014.
12
Author conversation with expert on the Iraqi Kurds. June 14, 2014.
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about seeking outright independence from Iraq, and in early July KRG President Masoud Barzani asked
the KRG parliament to plan a referendum on independence.13 That step appeared to defy reported private
U.S. official urgings for the Iraqi Kurds not to seek independence, and aforementioned U.S. calls for
efforts within the Iraqi political process to form a new, inclusive central government in Baghdad.
It is unclear whether the potential for Kurdish secession to trigger political and military responses from
Baghdad or neighboring countries, coupled with the likely loss of its receipts of a percentage of Iraq’s
nationwide oil revenue, might lead the Kurds to defer a decision on formal independence, as they have
since achieving autonomy a decade ago. KRG leaders might be using the independence issue, along with
their newly-controlled territory, as leverage in their disputes with Baghdad. KRG leaders strongly oppose
a third term for Prime Minister Maliki, and suspended their participation in Iraq’s current government in
response to Maliki’s July 2014 accusations that Kurds were complicit in the June IS-led offensive. On
July 11, peshmerga reportedly seized control of two key oil fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled
company. That same day, Maliki replaced Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, with deputy prime
minister Hussein Shahristani, a Shiite from Maliki’s coalition.14
The Crisis’s Implications for Iraqi Government Formation
The crisis has the potential to produce major change in Iraq’s leadership—in part to address stated U.S.
concerns that Maliki is largely to blame for the crisis by alienating the Sunni community. Elections for the
Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) were held on April 30, 2014, which has yet to fully form a new
government. Several Iraqi factions – as well as some within Maliki’s core coalition – oppose a third term
for Maliki as Prime Minister in spite of the dominant performance of the Maliki-led “State of Law”
coalition in the election. The new COR convened July 2 and several times thereafter to begin the
government formation process, and succeeded on July 15 in selecting as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a
Sunni Arab), and two deputies. However, it is not clear whether the selection of a COR Speaker means
that the major factions have reached agreement on the other two most senior positions in Iraq’s
government. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely
ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the powerful executive post of Prime Minister is held by a
Shiite Arab. With the COR leadership team chosen, the constitution calls for a president to be selected
within two weeks, and for a Prime Minister to be selected by one month after that. In past government
formation processes, these constitutional deadlines were not met. As negotiations on the key positions
accelerated, President Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) faction of Iraqi
Kurds, returned to Iraq after almost two years of treatment in Germany for a 2012 stroke.
Maliki has argued that he should retain his post because his coalition won far more seats in the April 30
election than did any other bloc, and, running in Baghdad Province, he won by far the most votes of any
single candidate in the election. Maliki’s chances of securing a third term appeared to fade after June 20,
when Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement that the major factions should form “an effective government
that enjoys broad national support, avoids past mistakes, and opens new horizons toward a better future
for all Iraqis...”15 Potential candidates to replace Maliki include two other figures from his Da’wa Party
(the core of his State of Law coalition): Tariq Najm al Abdullah and acting Minister of National Security
(intelligence) Falah al-Fayyad. State of Law coalition member, foreign minister, and deputy prime
13
For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Report IN10105,
The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
14
Alissa Rubin. “Rift with Kurds Widens as Iraqi Leader Replaces the Foreign Minister.” New York Times, July 12, 2014.
15
“Top Shiite Cleric Deals Blow to Al Maliki Leadership.” USA Today, June 20, 2014.
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minister Hussein Shahristani also may be a candidate.16 Other possible replacements are Shiite figures
who are not in Maliki’s immediate State of Law bloc but are within the broader, pan-Shiite “National
Alliance” that encompasses all Shiite factions in the COR. They include secular Shiite politician Ahmad
Chalabi, who demonstrated some political strength in the July 15 vote for COR deputy speaker, even
though he ultimately lost that post to Haydar al Abbadi, a member of Maliki’s Da’wa Party. The other
deputy speaker selected was Aram Sheikh, of the Gorran (“Change”) Kurdish faction.
Other Possible Outcomes
Some of the longer-term possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive, include
•
An IS-led seizure or siege of Baghdad. Either of these developments could cause the
government to fall and IS to expand the Islamic state that it has declared. The outright
seizure of Baghdad is considered unlikely, as noted above, but a siege is possible because
of the significant Sunni population in towns just north and west of the city that IS and its
allies are attempting to capture. The fall or siege of Baghdad could prompt large-scale
Iranian ground intervention, and could raise the likelihood of U.S. ground intervention as
well.
•
De facto federalism or partition of Iraq. Another possible outcome could be that IS
fails to take Baghdad, but the Maliki government, the ISF, and Maliki’s Shiite allies are
unable to push the insurrection back. That could produce a new, accepted but informal,
political structure in which each of the major communities—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—
administer areas under their de facto political and military control.17
•
Long-standing civil war. Another potential outcome is that the situation in Iraq devolves
into a long-term outright civil war, in which forces loyal to the various parties—to the
Sunni insurrection, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the Maliki government and
its Shiite militia supporters—alternately gain and lose territory in a long struggle for
power.
•
A restoration of the pre-2013 situation. It is possible that the militias and outside
assistance could enable the government to recapture the territory gained by the IS-led
offensives. That could calm the current crisis but might not necessarily quiet Sunni unrest
over the longer term.
U.S. Response
President Obama and other U.S. officials attributed the ISF collapse largely to the failure of Iraqi leaders,
particularly Maliki, to build an inclusive government that could hold the allegiance of Sunni citizens or
Sunni ISF personnel. Citing the legacy of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the potential IS threat to U.S.
interests, President Obama stated on June 13, 2014, that the Iraqi government “needs additional support to
break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”18 He said
that he had requested that his national security team prepare a range of options. The actions announced by
16
Liz Sly. “Embattled Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ‘Will Not Go Quietly,’ Friends and Foes Say.” Washington Post, June
21, 2014; author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC. June-July 2014.
17
http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-fighting-nears-baghdad-un-warns-of-iraq-break-up/
18
White House. “Statement by the President on Iraq.” June 13, 2014.
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President Obama on June 19, 2014, and selected other options that have been considered, are discussed
below.19 President Obama’s statements on the crisis have implied U.S. support for the replacement of
Maliki, but it is not clear whether the Administration would discontinue the assistance it is providing—or
refuse any further assistance—if Maliki secures another term.
•
Advice, Training, and Intelligence Sharing. In his June 19 statement, President Obama
announced that he was sending up to 300 U.S. advisers to assess the ISF and gather
intelligence on the IS. Press reports indicate that these will be Special Operations
Forces.20 As of mid- July, about 200 of the advisors had arrived and had reportedly
submitted their assessment of the ISF to U.S. Defense Department officials. That
evaluation reportedly concludes that only about half of all ISF units are sufficiently
capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory, were the President to
decide on such an expanded mission.21 Such a mission, if successful, would presumably
reduce the geographic and political space available to the IS. On the other hand, a combat
advisory mission could potentially contradict President Obama’s statement on June 19,
2014, that the United States “will not pursue military actions that support one sect inside
of Iraq at the expense of another.”22 Some commentators further argue that sending forces
as advisers creates a potential for expanding U.S. involvement beyond what President
Obama announced.
•
U.S. combat troop deployment. President Obama has ruled out this option, saying, “We
will not be sending U.S. troops back into combat in Iraq.”23 There may be several reasons
for ruling out this option, including public opinion within the United States as well as the
apparent view within the Administration that U.S. troops would not be capable of fixing
the political problems that, in the Administration’s apparent view, have been primarily
responsible for the success of the IS-led insurrection. Were this an active option, one
potential complication is that there is no active “Status of Forces” Agreement (SOFA)
with Iraq that would U.S. military personnel legal immunity from Iraqi law. The advisers
discussed above are operating under a temporary SOFA specific for their mission.
•
Airstrikes. The U.S. advisers discussed above, as well as stepped-up manned and
unmanned surveillance flights, are gathering intelligence for potential U.S. airstrikes
against IS leaders and bases in Iraq.24 No decision on strikes has been announced. U.S.
officials have asserted that the IS has few clearly discernible targets that would not risk
causing Iraqi civilian casualties, and it is not clear that airstrikes alone could defeat the
IS-led insurrection. U.S. strikes also could conceivably further harden the Sunni-tribal-IS
alliance of convenience, contrary to apparent U.S. efforts to drive it apart. Former top
U.S. commander in Iraq General David Petraeus expressed an additional pitfall to
significant airstrikes, saying: “This cannot be the United States being the air force for
[Shiite] militias or a [Shiite] on Sunni Arab fight.”25
19
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq.” Federal News Service, June 19, 2014.
“Obama to Make Case for Sending Special Forces to Iraq. CBS News, June 17, 2014.
21
Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon. “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force.” op.cit.
22
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq.” op. cit.
23
White House, op. cit.
24
Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraq Is Said to Seek U.S. Strikes on Insurgents.” New York Times, June 12, 2014.
25
Nico Hines. “Petraeus: U.S. Must Not Become the Shia Militia’s Air Force.” The Daily Beast, June 18, 2014.
20
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•
26
Arms Deliveries. An option is to sell Iraq additional military equipment, such as tanks and
armored vehicles, to replace those lost in the IS-led offensive. Another option is to
accelerate deliveries of arms already purchased by Iraq, including F-16 aircraft and
Apache attack helicopters. The United States has been delivering additional HELLFIRE
missiles that Iraq’s small air force is using against IS targets. However, the capture of
U.S.-supplied weaponry by IS fighters in the June offensive raises the risk that new and
more sophisticated U.S. weapons could fall into IS hands. Moreover, U.S. officials and
Members of Congress have previously expressed concerns about the potential for the
Iraqi government to use sophisticated air assets against protesters and civilian opponents
rather than IS targets.26
Josh Rogin. “Congress to Iraq’s Maliki: No Ams for a Civil War.” Daily Beast, January 8, 2014.
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The Islamic State (IS)27
On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS) formally declared the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate extending from Aleppo province in Syria to Diyala province in Iraq. The declaration named ISIL’s leader Ibrahim Awad
Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),28 as imam and caliph and noted that the group would henceforth be
known as the Islamic State (IS).29
The IS is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern
Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013. The group’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late
Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of
the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I
leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI was weakened, but not eliminated, by the
time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Baghdadi, ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was
conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of the relationship between ISI/IS and Al Qaeda
leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent months, IS leaders have stated their view that their group “is not and has never
been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”30 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity, they have
given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than pledges of obedience.
ISIL was formed in April 2013, when Al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the
Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front). Nusra Front and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing
tensions among Sunni extremists in the region that have since erupted into conflict. In July 2013, ISIL attacked prisons at Abu
Ghraib and Taji in Iraq, reportedly freeing several hundred detained members. ISIL continued a fierce wave of attacks across
northern, western, and central Iraq, while in Syria the group consolidated control over the city and province of Raqqa and
expanded its presence in northwestern areas then controlled by other rebel forces. Late 2013 saw the Iraqi government
seeking expanded counterterrorism and military assistance from the United States, ostensibly to meet the growing ISIL threat.
Inside Syria, ISIL alienated its rebel counterparts further, and an anti-ISIL campaign erupted there in early 2014, expelling the
group from some areas it had controlled and unleashing a cycle of ongoing infighting. In Syria, ISIL remains strongest in Raqqa,
Dayr az Zawr, and Hasakah. ISIL’s attempts to assert control over the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq’s Anbar province and
its June 2014 offensive in northern Iraq underscored the group’s lethality and ability to conduct combat operations and manage
partnerships with local groups in multiple areas over large geographic distances. The durability of the IS’s partnerships are
questionable: it remains at violent odds with Islamist and secular armed groups in Syria, and tribal, Islamist, and Baathist armed
groups in Iraq have a history of opposing IS’s previous incarnations.
Statements and media materials released by IS figures reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview. Statements by Abu
Bakr al Baghdadi and IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, nonMuslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies.31 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and
“polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government of Nuri al Maliki as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the
government of Bashar al Asad, although some sources allege that ISIL operatives have benefitted from evolving financial and
security arrangements with Damascus dating back to the time of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Senior U.S. officials have stated that the IS poses a serious threat to the United States and maintains training camps in Iraq and
Syria, but presently lacks the capability to carry out operations on U.S. territory.32 In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders
that “the war with you has just begun.” In January 2014, he said, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not
help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict —God permitting—against your
will.”33
27
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
Al Baghdadi was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq at Camp Bucca, until his release in 2009.
29
U.S. Government Open Source Center Report TRR2014062966139093, June 29, 2014.
30
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, May 11-2, 2014.
31
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, April 9, 2013.
32
Statements by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, and
Secretary of State John Kerry, June 2014. See also Testimony of Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2014.
33
OSC Report GMP20120721586002, July 21, 2012; and OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, January 19, 2014.
28
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Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest
Notes: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not necessarily areas of current control.
CRS-8
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Syria Dimension34
Since 2013, IS fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a
parallel theater of operations.35 In early 2014, IS reestablished control in most areas of the
northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted itself to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province
rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the IS has
controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to
the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational
independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. The IS
derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a
percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its
control.36 The IS also has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a
connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual
advance towards Mosul.
IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the IS
and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the supply lines
they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces already has
appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. At the same time,
IS’s expanding theater of conflict could subject it to overextension.
IS gains may also motivate the Maliki and Asad governments to cooperate more closely in
seeking to counter the IS. IS advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to
hold ground in contested areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought
alongside Asad forces return home to combat the IS.37 In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted
air strikes against IS-held areas of Raqqah and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi
government, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.38 Syria later
struck IS targets near a border crossing between the two states. Maliki welcomed the strikes,
which he stated occurred on the Syrian side of the border. U.S. and Iraqi military sources stated,
however, that the Syrian strikes took place inside Iraq.39 Increased cooperation between
Damascus and Baghdad could alter the dynamics in both conflicts. It could also undermine
ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Iraqi leaders to support U.S. efforts to press Asad to step down
in favor of a transitional government. Increased Iraqi-Syrian cooperation could also decrease the
likelihood that Baghdad would comply with U.S. requests to crack down on Iranian overflights of
weapons and equipment to Damascus.
It is unclear what impact IS gains in Iraq would have outside of eastern Syria. At least half of
Syria-based IS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian IS defector.40 Like
34
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
35
“Syria war fueling attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, officials say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013.
36
“Sunni fighters gain as they battle 2 governments, and other rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
37
“Seeing their gains at risk, Shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
38
“Syria pounds ISIS bases in coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014.
39
“Iraqi PM welcomes Syria air strikes on border crossing,” BBC, June 26, 2014.
40
“Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
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other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand
hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas.41 The IS to date has
concentrated its forces in Syria's northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the
country's main urban areas in Syria’s western half.
Ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to consolidate its
supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. Press and social
media reports suggest that IS, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the provincial capital of
Dayr az-Zawr, although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime and other rebel
groups.42 Following the IS declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel forces
surrendered to the group and withdrew from their positions, further expanding the IS presence in
the Dayr az-Zawr countryside.43 Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts to disrupt or sever IS supply lines
through Abu Kamal or between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could benefit Syrian military and Nusra
Front forces also operating in the area.
Iran Dimension
The rapidity of the ISF collapse appeared to align the interests of Iran and the United States in
preventing an IS seizure of Baghdad. Secretary of State John Kerry said in an interview that the
United States was “open to discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s something constructive that
can be contributed by Iran.”44 U.S. diplomats reportedly discussed the situation in Iraq at the
margins of the June 16 talks on Iran’s nuclear program, reportedly seeking Iran’s cooperation to
compel Prime Minister Maliki to share power or be replaced outright.45 No decision on direct
cooperation on Iraq was announced after that meeting. A U.S. State Department spokeswoman
sought to refute criticism that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional
leverage in the nuclear talks, saying on June 18 that U.S. officials insisted on maintaining a
firewall between the ongoing nuclear negotiations and the crisis in Iraq.46
Many observers remain skeptical that that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran
on Iraq. Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Shiite-led government in Iraq and those in Iran
who control policy toward Iraq do not necessarily share the U.S. goal of creating a broad-based,
inclusive central government. Iran reportedly is open to supporting an alternative to Maliki as
Prime Minister but has not publicly insisted he be replaced.47
In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran has reportedly been delivering arms
and ammunition to Iraq since early in the crisis. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen
of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq
41
“The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation,
June 27, 2013.
42
“Syria’s Allies are Stretched by Widening War.” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS
Consolidates in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014.
43
“ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour.” Institute for the Study of War,” July 5, 2014.
44
Michael Gordon and David Sanger. “U.S. Is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” New York Times, June 17,
2014.
45
Ibid.
46
“U.S. is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” op. cit.
47
Author conversations with experts on Iran. Washington, DC. June-July 2014
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and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July
2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.48
Some experts assess, however, that Iran’s assistance to Iraq will be counterproductive to U.S.
aims. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 20032011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
personnel into Iraq to help re-organize these Shiite militias to assist in the fighting. As discussed
above, the revival of the militias is increasing tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who
still live in Baghdad and fear Shiite sectarian violence. Many Shiite militia forces had gone to
Syria to help President Asad but returned to Iraq after the fall of Mosul to help defend Baghdad.
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis
Humanitarian Impact and Response49
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 1.2 million
people have been displaced by fighting in and around Mosul and in areas reaching south towards
Baghdad. The actual displacement figures remain fluid and difficult to fully ascertain. More than
300,000 of those displaced have reportedly fled to the relatively secure KRG-controlled region of
Iraq (KRI) or have formed ad hoc camps along its border. Others have scattered elsewhere – with
the majority located in Western Anbar governorate as well as Dohuk, Nineveh, and Erbil
governorates. These figures include an estimated 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
who fled fighting in Anbar province earlier this year. In addition, there are more than 1.1 million
Iraqis who were displaced from the previous conflict in Iraq. Many had sought refuge in Syria
between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. With 2.3 million displaced Iraqis
inside the country, an urgent humanitarian crisis is emerging and humanitarian actors are
scrambling to meet the needs of IDPs and conflict victims. There are also over 400,000 Iraqi
refugees living in other countries.50
Priority needs include Core Relief Items (CRIs) such as shelter, food, clean water, and non-food
assistance. IDPs are residing with relatives and in host communities, mosques, tents, schools,
unfinished buildings, and other government facilities. Various reports indicate that access to
hospitals is limited, with some not functioning at all. Temporary transit facilities have been set up
close to KRG border areas to provide medical assistance and drinking water. Humanitarian
organizations are mobilizing teams to assess the situation further where possible and to
coordinate a response. Access in KRI is reportedly good and organizations are able to provide
assistance. Access in areas of conflict in the rest of the country is limited. There are concerns
about the impact of hostilities on minorities, particularly Christians. Freedom of movement –
where IDPs are able to move to areas of safety and between governorates – has been complicated
by conflict causing some, particularly in areas surrounding Baghdad, to be stranded.
48
“Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 5, 2014.
This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
50
Although this section is focused primarily on the situation in Iraq, the situations of displacement and movement of
populations are intertwined with the conflict in neighboring Syria.
49
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According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the KRG policy on establishing IDP
camps has yet to be fully determined. Camps in Erbil and Dohuk already exist and the KRG
authorities are working to find a way to address the needs of the displaced, including identifying a
location for additional camps. However, there are reports that local authorities do not want to
allow large numbers of IDPs into their territory. The region is already housing more than 220,000
refugees from Syria. According to UNHCR, due to renewed conflict in Iraq, approximately 6,000
Syrians have returned to Syria since early June 2014.
UNAMI is coordinating the response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team and some partner
organizations. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA)
launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in March 2014 for $104 million to support the
Iraqi government in its efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the people affected by fighting
in Anbar Province. On June 24 UNOCHA launched a revised SRP, requesting $312.1 million in
funding to include support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider
geographical focus. Funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), a multilateral
funding mechanism administered through the United Nations, is also under consideration.
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities and Citizens51
On June 15, the Department of State announced that while the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would
remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily relocated” to Consulate Generals in
Basrah and Erbil as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan. The relocations
were reportedly being carried out by non-military means. The announcement stated that a
“substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would remain in place and that, with
an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be “fully equipped” to carry out
“its national security mission.”52
News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors were in place at
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy.53 Since the crisis began,
the White House has announced two deployments to reinforce that number. On June 16, the
White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military personnel were being
dispatched to Iraq to assist with the temporary relocation of diplomatic personnel, a deployment
undertaken with the consent of the Government of Iraq.54 On June 30, the White House
announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to provide
increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as to reinforce the
Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House notification to Congress, provided
“consistent with” the War Powers Act, the deployed forces would be accompanied by helicopters
and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and
property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,” according to the statement, and may/will
“remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such that it is no longer needed.”55 The
51
Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see: CRS Report IN10090,
Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities, by Alex Tiersky.
52
Department of State Spokesperson, “Press Statement: Iraq,” press release, June 15, 2014.
53
Dan Lamothe, “U.S. companies pulling contractors from Iraqi bases as security crumbles,” The Washington Post,
June 12, 2014.
54
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the War Powers Resolution
Report for Iraq,” press release, June 16, 2014.
55
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Letter regarding
(continued...)
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Department of Defense had also previously confirmed that it “has airlift assets at the ready should
State Department request them, as per normal interagency support arrangements.”56
The State Department posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens:
Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel
to Iraq because of current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their
safety to “make plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the
Embassy should not be contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that
the Embassy “does not offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the
Embassy remained open, the statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq
would be limited due to the security environment.57
On June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number of U.S. citizen contract employees
to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in connection with the U.S. Foreign
Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by their companies due to security
concerns.58
Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration59
What are the current threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Iraq? Can the U.S. government
mitigate those threats effectively by using available resources and authorities? Why or why not?
If not, what additional resources and/or authorities may be required?
What are overall U.S. priorities in this situation, and how should these priorities shape the U.S.
response? Is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that
Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional
differences? If the United States assists the Iraqi government and/or cooperates with other
countries to address this crisis, how might those actions affect regional balances and perceptions?
How, if at all, should recent developments in Iraq shape congressional consideration of pending
authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance? Should the United
States provide more assistance, and/or condition foreign or military assistance to Iraq on the
achievement of an inclusive national government?
What were the results of the U.S. military assessment of the ISF by the advisers sent in June?
What recommendations did the advisers make, if any? What actions is the Administration
(...continued)
Iraq,” June 30, 2014.
56
“DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014.
57
Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,”
press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html.
58
Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ.
59
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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prepared to take, based on the report of the advisers? Would additional authorities or approvals be
needed to augment or expand such support?
What are the humanitarian implications of the crisis, and what actions is the Administration
taking in support of international efforts to help refugees and internally displaced persons? How
have Iraqi forces used increased U.S. material support, advice, and/or any shared intelligence
over this period?
To what extent are the IS’s recent military advances a reflection of its organizational capabilities?
To what extent do recent developments stem from a lack of capability or organizational
shortcomings in Iraq’s security forces? Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the IS and
other armed anti-government groups. How likely is the IS to face resistance from Iraqi Sunnis in
areas it now controls? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the IS declaration of a
caliphate in areas under its control?
To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States in Iraq conflict or coincide? To what
extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support the Iraqi government, contradict or support those of
the United States?
What options are available for assisting locally organized forces in areas under IS control, or in
areas threatened by the IS, who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations? How
might such options affect the willingness of the Iraqi government to continue to cooperate with
the United States? Should the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey be encouraged to
support anti-IS entities in areas adjacent to their territory? Why or why not? If such third-party
government support is advisable, how might the United States encourage it, and are the
governments in question likely to be receptive to such encouragement?
What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the current Iraqi
government? Might the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states object to increased U.S. support
for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is closely aligned with Iran? How might
Iran respond? How might such support affect ongoing Iraqi consideration of post-election
government formation issues? How can the United States best pursue its immediate security
interests and its objectives of preventing (1) regional sectarian war and (2) foreclosure of the
possibility of a territorially integrated, democratically governed Iraq?
What kind of role might Iraq’s Kurds play in this crisis? Are they likely to be of help in actively
countering IS in areas outside of KRG control? Why or why not? Would such a role be desirable
from a U.S. policy perspective?
How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security
situation in that area and in Iraq generally? What actions are the IS and the Iraqi government
likely to take vis-à-vis Kurdish forces and authorities?
What is the likelihood that the Kurds will implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near
future? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?
Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of
developments related to the IS?
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as
international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program and the ongoing Syria conflict? Should the
United States seek or avoid an approach to the Iraq crisis that also involves these other issues?
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Congressional Research Service
16The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
Summary
The Islamic State is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded
its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the
security of both countries and drawing increased attention from the international community.
There is debate over the degree to which the Islamic State organization might represent a direct
terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland or to U.S. facilities and personnel in the region.
The Islamic State (IS) was initially part of the insurgency against coalition forces in Iraq and has
in the years since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq expanded its control over areas of
northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria. The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni
tribal areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war. In the summer of
2014, Islamic State-led forces, supported by Sunni Arab tribalists and groups linked to ousted
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, advanced along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, seizing multiple
population centers including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Since then, IS forces have
massacred Iraqi civilians, often from ethnic or religious minorities, and recently executed two
American journalists who had been held in captivity. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the
ire of the international community, increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political problems and on
the civil war in Syria.
At the NATO summit in Wales during September 4-5, 2014, the Administration began to unveil a
comprehensive strategy to defeat the Islamic State organization. As articulated by President
Obama and other senior U.S. officials, the strategy is to use a combination of military action,
support for partner forces in Iraq and Syria, diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and financial actions
to try to progressively shrink the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial
resources available to the Islamic State. The Administration and its allies all have ruled out
deploying combat forces to either Iraq or Syria.
Some assert that the U.S. strategy will attract the support of Sunnis in both Syria and Iraq in a
broad effort to defeat the Islamic State. Others assess that the strategy might have minimal effect
because local anti-IS forces will not have support from U.S. or other western combat troops.
For details on Islamic State operations in Iraq and U.S. policy toward Iraq since the 2003 U.S.
invasion, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth
Katzman. For further information on the Islamic State’s operations in Syria, see CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M.
Blanchard.
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The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
Contents
The Islamic State ............................................................................................................................. 1
Background ......................................................................................................................... 2
The Situation in Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 2
Islamic State Goes on Offensive In Kurdish-Controlled Territory ...................................... 4
Effect on Iraqi Government Formation ............................................................................... 4
Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis................................................................................. 5
Situation in Syria ............................................................................................................................. 6
U.S. Responses and Options ............................................................................................................ 7
Actions in Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 8
Options in Syria ......................................................................................................................... 9
Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State and the War Powers
Resolution ................................................................................................................................... 11
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis ............................................................................ 15
Humanitarian Impact and Response ........................................................................................ 15
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens ............................................ 16
Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration .................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest .................................................................................... 13
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 .................... 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
The Islamic State
The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS)is a transnational Sunni
Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and
northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the security of both countries and drawing increased attention
from the international community. The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni Musliminhabited areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war. The Islamic State’s
tactics have drawn the ire of the international community, increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political
problems and on the civil war in Syria.
Although the Islamic State is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is unclear if
it currently poses a significant direct threat to U.S. homeland security. In September 2014, National
Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen stated that the group poses “a direct and significant
threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region and potentially to us here at home.”1 Olsen
reported that the Islamic State “has more than 10,000 fighters …And its strategic goal is to establish an
Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with governments it considers apostate—including Iraq, Syria,
and the United States.” Olsen stated that “we have no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack
the U.S.,” and highlighted potential threats posed by foreign fighters with Western passports. According
to Olsen, as many as 12,000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria, including more than 1,000
Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens. Previous U.S. government assessments suggest that these
fighters hail from more than 50 countries and that among them are Al Qaeda-linked veterans of previous
conflicts. Olsen also stated that U.S. counterterrorism officials “remain mindful of the possibility that an
ISIL-sympathizer—perhaps motivated by online propaganda—could conduct a limited, self-directed
attack here at home with no warning.” However, Olsen noted that, “In our view, any threat to the U.S.
homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale.”
Statements and media materials released by the Islamic State reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary
worldview and a relentless ambition. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Islamic State spokesman
Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and
unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to establish “the Islamic State” and to revive their
vision of “the caliphate.”2 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and
“polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites
and the Asad government, although some sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its
antecedents have benefitted from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus that started
during the 2003-2011 U.S. military presence in Iraq.
In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that “the mujahidin have set out to chase the affiliates of
your armies that have fled.... You will see them in your own country, God willing. The war with you has
just begun.”3 In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the United States directly, saying, “Know, O
defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq.
Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting—against your will.”4 English language propaganda
1
Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014.
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,’”
Translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
3
OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes To ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
4
OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir Condemning ‘War’
Against Group,” Translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014.
2
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and recruiting material released by the group in connection with its recent executions of U.S. citizens
James Foley and Stephen Sotloff suggest the group is attempting to portray itself as responding to U.S.
aggression, a posture adopted by its predecessors and now rivals in Al Qaeda.
Background
The Islamic State’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu
Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al
Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the
hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time
of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),5 ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of
deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006
onward is unclear. In recent months, Islamic State leaders have stated their view that their group “is not
and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”6 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a
sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than
pledges of obedience.
In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those
of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, under the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS).
Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni
extremists in the region.
Additional analysis can be found in: CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics,
Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman.
The Situation in Iraq
Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government contained an earlier IS-led insurrection that began in
Anbar Province in January 2014, even though the government had been unable to regain control of the
city of Fallujah from IS-led forces. Such assessments were upended on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic
State captured the northern city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by ISF officers and
personnel. According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be
accounted for.7 In its offensive, the Islamic State reportedly has been either joined, supported, or enabled
by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other
Sunni residents.8 Their enabling of the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the
Islamic State’s brutal tactics against opponents and its intention to impose its version of Islamic law,
5
Al Baghdadi reportedly was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq.
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri, Refusing To
Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-2, 2014.
7
Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014.
8
Tim Arango. “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq.” New York Times, June 19, 2014.
6
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appeared to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki,
who was replaced in September as discussed below.9
After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities, and
into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course of the
offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a substantial
amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and artillery equipped
with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.10 Islamic State-led fighters captured the city of
Tal Afar west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles
northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. Islamic State-led insurgents in Anbar, with the support of some tribal
allies, reportedly seized additional cities along the Euphrates River in that province. In mid-July, IS
members in Mosul reportedly ordered remaining Christians there to leave the city, and most apparently
complied.11 After initially establishing a relatively quiet front line with territory controlled by the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its peshmerga militia fighters, IS-led fighters went on the
offensive against Kurdish-controlled territory in early August, as discussed in a separate section below.
Islamic State-led militant attacks on the country’s main oil refinery at Baiji have caused gasoline
shortages in northern Iraq, including in the KRG.12 However, the effect of the fighting on Iraq’s overall oil
production and exports has been relatively limited, in large part because about 75% of Iraq’s oil is
produced and exported from Iraq’s south, where Sunni insurgents are far fewer in number.
Shiite militias mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad. The
Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from elsewhere
volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government forces regrouped to
some extent, and U.S. officials expressed confidence that the IS-led offensive would not capture the city
outright, although the ISF might yet lose parts of the city.13 Islamic State-led militants have been able to
approach Baghdad International Airport to the southwest of the city. ISF-led forces have conducted some
limited counterattacks on Tikrit and cities near Tikrit in Anbar Province, but General Dempsey stated on
July 3 that the ISF would have difficulty recapturing any lost ground without external support.14
The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) to capture Kirkuk and large nearby
oil fields abandoned by the ISF. The Kurds have long sought to control that oil-rich region, which they
claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the province with their autonomous region run by a
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On July 11, peshmerga reportedly seized control of two key oil
fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled company. Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to
willingly return control of Kirkuk and related areas to the central government.15
9
“Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
Mitchell Prothero. “Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent of June Debacle Becomes Clearer.” McLatchey Wire Service,
July 14, 2014.
11
Alissa Rubin. ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians From Mosul.” New York Times, July 19, 2014.
12
Steven Mufson. “Iraq’s Biggest Oil Refinery Is on Fire. How Important is That?” Washington Post, June 18, 2014
13
Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon. “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force.” New York Times, July 14, 2014.
14
Craig Whitlock. “Pentagon Leaders: Iraq Probably Needs Outside Help to Retake Seized Territory.” Washington Post, July 3,
2014.
15
Author conversation with expert on the Iraqi Kurds. June - August 2014.
10
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The peshmerga gains prompted renewed discussion among KRG leaders about seeking outright
independence from Iraq. In early July, KRG President Masoud Barzani asked the KRG parliament to plan
a referendum on independence.16 However, Kurdish leaders, including former Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari, said the crisis the KRG faced from the Islamic State offensive against KRG-controlled
territory in August has caused KRG leaders to largely shelve the independence effort, at least temporarily.
It remains unclear what practical gains would accrue from outright independence, because the Kurds in
Iraq already have a substantial degree of autonomy. KRG leaders might view the independence issue
primarily as leverage in disputes with Baghdad, such as those over KRG oil exports and revenue-sharing.
Islamic State Goes on Offensive In Kurdish-Controlled Territory
The Kurdish region was shaken—and further talk of pushing for independence apparently stalled
indefinitely—when Islamic State-led forces advanced into territory controlled by the peshmerga in early
August. In the face of superior Islamic State firepower, the relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces
retreated from several towns inhabited mostly by Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the
Yazidis. The Yazidis are mostly Kurdish speaking and practice a mix of ancient religions, including
Zoroastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the advent of Islam.17 Fearing Islamic State threats to
execute them if they did not convert to Islam, an estimated 35,000–50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar
Mountain. 18 By August 8, Islamic State-led fighters had advanced to within about 40 miles of the KRG
capital of Irbil, causing some flight from the city, and heightening U.S. concern about the security of U.S.
diplomatic and military personnel there. Reports of human rights violations by the Islamic State emerged,
including murder, kidnappings, forced conversions, and physical and sexual assault.19 Islamic State-led
forces captured Iraq’s largest dam, the Mosul Dam, as well, which Kurdish leaders assert could have been
damaged or used by the Islamic State to flood wide areas of northern and central Iraq.
Effect on Iraqi Government Formation
The crisis has contributed to major change in Iraq’s leadership, in part an Iraqi response to stated U.S.
concerns that Prime Minister Maliki’s policies had alienated the Sunni Arab community. Elections for the
Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) were held on April 30, 2014, beginning the process of forming a
new government. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely
ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the powerful executive post of Prime Minister is held by a
Shiite Arab. Several Iraqi factions – as well as some within Maliki’s core coalition – opposed a third term
for Maliki as Prime Minister in spite of the dominant performance of the Maliki-led “State of Law”
coalition in the election. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called for the Iraqi people “to find
leadership... that is prepared to be inclusive and share power.”20
In July, the COR selected as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a Sunni), and two deputies, and veteran
Kurdish figure Fouad Masoum as Iraq’s President. It is the constitutional responsibility of the President to
16
For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Report IN10105,
The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
17
Ishaan Tharoor. “Who Are the Yazidis.” Washington Post, August 7, 2014.
18
UNOCHA, “Iraq: OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis – Significant Displacement from Sinjar,” No. 2, August 4, 2014;
Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” August 7, 2014.
19
UNAMI, Public Information Office, “UN Gravely Concerned about Situation in Northern Iraq; Calls for Urgent Response,”
August 7, 2014.
20
“Kerry says U.S. wants Iraqis to find inclusive leadership,” Reuters, June 22, 2014.
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ask the candidate of the largest bloc in the COR to form a government. On August 11, President Masoum
formally asked Haydar al Abbadi, a 62-year old member of Maliki’s Da’wa Party, to become Prime
Minister-designate. Al Abbadi’s selection attracted public support from U.S. officials as well as from
senior figures in Iran, causing support for Maliki’s initial challenge of the al-Abbadi designation to
collapse. The designation gave him 30 days (until September 10) to form and achieve parliamentary
confirmation for a new cabinet. His work program and all but two of his ministerial nominations were
approved by the COR on September 8, enabling al-Abbadi to assume the prime ministership. The two
powerful security posts of Interior and Defense Minister were not filled with permanent selections; alAbbadi asserts he will nominate selections to those positions during the week of September 15. On
September 10, 2014, in conjunction with a visit by Secretary of State John Kerry, al-Abbadi proposed to
recruit Sunnis to a new “national guard” force that would protect Sunni-inhabited areas that might be
taken back from Islamic State control.
Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis
The Islamic State gains appeared to align the interests of Iran and the United States in Iraq. After the
Islamic State capture of Mosul, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the United States was “open to
discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s something constructive that can be contributed by Iran.”21 U.S.
diplomats reportedly discussed the situation in Iraq at the margins of June 16-20 talks on Iran’s nuclear
program, reportedly seeking Iran’s cooperation to compel Prime Minister Maliki to share power or be
replaced outright.22 The U.S. State Department sought to refute assertions that the bilateral discussion on
Iraq could provide Iran additional leverage in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States and its
partner countries. 23
In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran reportedly has been delivering arms and
ammunition to Iraq and the peshmerga. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen of the 100+ Iraqi
combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the United States-led
coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July 2014 Iran announced that one of its
pilots had died in operations in Iraq.24 As noted above, Iranian leaders backed the appointment of Abbadi
as Prime Minister-designate, abandoning their longtime ally Maliki.25
Many observers remain skeptical that that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran in Iraq.
Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and Iran
reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) personnel into Iraq to advise the
Shiite militias fighting alongside the ISF. The participation of the militias has increased tensions with
Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who live in mostly Shiite-inhabited Baghdad and in mixed provinces such
as Diyala. Anecdotal reports indicate that some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against
Sunnis who the militias accuse of supporting the Islamic State. Some of the Shiite militiamen who are
fighting in Iraq had returned from Syria, where they were helping President Asad against Sunni-led armed
rebels.
21
Michael Gordon and David Sanger. “U.S. Is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” New York Times, June 17, 2014.
Ibid.
23
“U.S. is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” op. cit.
24
“Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 5, 2014.
25
Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State.” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
22
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Situation in Syria26
Since 2013, Islamic State fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a
parallel theater of operations.27 In early 2014, IS fighters reestablished control in most areas of the
northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted itself to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province rich in oil
and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the Islamic State has controlled
several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to the Syrian
government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational independence from Al
Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. The Islamic State derived additional
revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a percentage of the funds
involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its control.28 The Islamic State also
has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a connection to Iraq’s Nineveh
province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual advance towards Mosul.
IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the Islamic
State and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the supply lines
they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces has appeared in
photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. Anecdotal reporting suggests that the
group relies on brutality and intimidation to manage communities under its control, and in some areas
partnerships with local armed groups appear to facilitate IS control.
At some point, the Islamic State’s expanding theater of conflict could subject it to overextension. IS gains
may also motivate the Iraqi and Syrian governments to cooperate more closely in seeking to counter the
group. Increased cooperation between Damascus and Baghdad could alter the dynamics in both conflicts.
It could also undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Iraqi leaders to support U.S. efforts to press
Asad to step down in favor of a transitional government. Increased Iraqi-Syrian cooperation could also
decrease the likelihood that Baghdad would comply with U.S. requests to crack down on Iranian
overflights of weapons and equipment to Damascus.
Further IS advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to hold ground in contested
areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces return home to
combat the IS.29 In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted air strikes against IS-held areas of Raqqah
and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi government, according to the London-based Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights.30 Syria later struck IS targets near a border crossing between the two
states and continues to conduct airstrikes on IS positions in Raqqah province. IS fighters in late July and
early August escalated attacks on government army and air force bases in northeastern Syria, capturing
several, seizing armaments, and executing captured Syrian military personnel.31
26
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report RL33487,
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
27
“Syria war fueling attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, officials say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013.
28
“Sunni fighters gain as they battle 2 governments, and other rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
29
“Seeing their gains at risk, Shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
30
“Syria pounds ISIS bases in coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014.
31
"Syria Update: July 26-August 7, 2014," Institute for the Study of War.
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It is unclear what impact IS gains in Iraq would have outside of northeastern Syria. At least half of Syriabased IS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian IS defector.32 Like other segments of
the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand hostilities against government
forces beyond their own local areas.33 The Islamic State to date has concentrated its forces in Syria's
northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the country's main urban areas in Syria’s
western half. In early August, Syrian rebels who recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State clashed
with Lebanese Armed Forces for control of the Lebanese town of Arsal, 13 km west of the Syrian border.
However, some observers note that there is no indication that the group coordinated its attack in advance
with IS leadership.34
Some ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to consolidate its
supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. Press and social media
reports suggest that IS, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the provincial capital of Dayr az-Zawr,
although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime and other rebel groups.35 Following the IS
declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel forces surrendered to the group and withdrew from
their positions, further expanding the IS presence in the Dayr az-Zawr countryside.36 Any Iraqi or U.S.
efforts to disrupt or sever IS supply lines through Abu Kamal or between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could
benefit Syrian military and Nusra Front forces also operating in the area. Islamic State fighters also
remain engaged in operations against Syrian armed forces southwest of Raqqah and against a range of
armed Syrian opposition groups to the northeast of Aleppo.
Syrian Kurdish fighters from the People's Protection Units (known as the YPG) continue to clash with IS
fighters along the border with Iraq and Turkey.37 YPG forces in early August established security
corridors along the Iraqi border, enabling some refugees fleeing IS violence in Iraq to cross into Kurdishheld areas of Syria, according to a Syrian Kurdish aid worker.38
U.S. Responses and Options
At the NATO summit in Wales during September 4-5, 2014, the Administration began to unveil a
comprehensive strategy to defeat the Islamic State organization. As articulated by President Obama and
other senior U.S. officials, the strategy is to use a combination of military action, support for partner
forces in Iraq and Syria, diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and financial actions to try to progressively
shrink the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to the Islamic
State.
The strategy depends on the participation of a broad coalition of countries, each providing its advantages
to the effort. A ten-country “core coalition” announced during the NATO summit consists of the United
States, Britain, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark. Senior U.S.
32
“Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
“The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation, June 27,
2013.
34
"The Battle for Arsal," Institute for the Study of War, August 7, 2013.
35
“Syria’s Allies are Stretched by Widening War.” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates
in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014.
36
“ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour.” Institute for the Study of War,” July 5, 2014.
37
OSC Report EUR2014090645329482, September 6, 2014.
38
OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014
33
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officials are also engaging with Middle Eastern leaders, such as those of Sunni-led states Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, to bring them into the coalition. The strategy depends heavily on
cooperation from these countries to delegitimize the Islamic State’s ideology, cut off its finances, and
provide intelligence on its recruitment patterns and leaders.
A major component of the announced strategy is for the “core group” to collectively strengthen the Iraq
Security Forces (ISF), the Kurdish peshmerga, and moderate Syrian rebel groups. The primary mission of
the United States, possibly assisted by forces from Britain and Australia, will be to strike Islamic State
positions and directly advise the ISF and peshmerga. The United States and other members of the core
group might provide military equipment and training to the ISF and peshmerga, and expand the training
and equipping of moderate Syrian rebels fighting not only against the Islamic State but also against the
Asad regime. The Obama Administration requested funds to begin an overt training and equipping
program for vetted members of the Syrian opposition in June 2014, and some congressional committees
have acted preliminarily to approve funding and authorization for such a mission. Some members of the
core coalition may provide indirect military support such as airlifts, as well as humanitarian aid to
vulnerable communities displaced by the Islamic State’s offensives. Pursuing its own interests, Iran has
been generally cooperating with U.S. policy in Iraq, although not in Syria, and the United States has ruled
out any formally bringing Iran into any U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. Managing U.S. policy
toward Syria, where the Administration has sought to pressure the Asad government into negotiating with
opposition groups and fulfilling its pledges with regard to chemical weapons, also may prove challenging.
Actions in Iraq
The U.S. strategy builds on existing action undertaken in Iraq. Citing the legacy of the U.S. intervention
in Iraq and the potential Islamic State threat to U.S. interests, President Obama stated on June 13, 2014,
that the Iraqi government “needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and
bolster the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”39 The following represent possible U.S. options to address
the ongoing situation in Iraq, and information on whether and to what extent they have been employed.
•
•
39
40
Advice, Training, and Intelligence Gathering. In a June 19 statement, President Obama
announced that he had authorized sending up to 300 U.S. military personnel to serve as
advisers and to assess the ISF and gather intelligence on the Islamic State. An additional
820 military personnel have been sent to help secure the U.S. Embassy and other U.S.
facilities in Baghdad and Irbil, to protect evacuation routes such as the international
airport in Baghdad, and to operate surveillance aircraft. This total includes 350 military
personnel authorized on September 2, 2014, to deploy for these purposes.The advisers
have formed “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.-ISF) and Irbil (U.S.peshmerga) and began assessing the ISF. Their first assessment reportedly concluded that
only about half of all ISF units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them
regain captured territory, were the President to decide on such an expanded mission.40
Airstrikes. Citing as an objective stopping the advance on Irbil and reducing the threat to
American diplomats and advisers there, on August 7, 2014, President Obama stated that
he had authorized targeted airstrikes against Islamic State positions. Virtually every day
since August 8, U.S. combat aircraft and armed unmanned aerial vehicles have struck
Islamic State heavy weaponry, checkpoints, and other positions. The strikes blunted the
White House. “Statement by the President on Iraq.” June 13, 2014.
Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon. “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force.” op.cit.
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•
•
•
Islamic State advance on Irbil and, on August 14, 2014, President Obama announced that
the strikes had succeeded in breaking the siege of Sinjar and in allowing the peshmerga
and ISF to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) there.41
Additional strikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic State fighters from
Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have used to flood large parts of
Iraq.
Weapons Sales. Since the Islamic State-led capture of Mosul in June, the United States
has announced sales of over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to
Baghdad. Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s and Apaches, purchased in 2011 and 2012, are
in the early stages of the delivery process. After the Islamic State move toward Irbil, the
Administration reportedly began supplying mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition
directly to the peshmerga, through the Central Intelligence Agency. 42 That channel is a
means of adapting to a general policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS,
run by the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government. U.S.
military officials have said that the peshmerga require heavy and long range weapons to
be able to counter the Islamic State’s use of captured U.S. weapons,43 but have not
specified which systems might be eventually provided to the Kurds. Other countries, such
as Britain, Germany, and France, have announced they would send weaponry to the
peshmerga.
Humanitarian Airdrops. During early August 2014, the U.S. military conducted airdrops
of food and water to those trapped on Sinjar Mountain. The Iraqi government requested
the assistance and also conducted some of its own airdrops and helicopter evacuations of
Yazidis from Sinjar.44 In late August, the U.S. military airdropped humanitarian aid to the
town of Amerli (in eastern Salahuddin Province), inhabited by ethnic Turkmen Shiite
Muslims, which was surrounded by ISIS fighters. With help from U.S. airstrikes, the ISF
and allied Shiite militiamen broke the siege of the town.
Direct U.S. combat deployment. President Obama has repeatedly ruled out this option. 45
He has stated that intervention by U.S. combat troops is not capable of fixing the
underlying political problems that caused the insurrection.
Options in Syria
Administration officials have acknowledged that countering the Islamic State will require dealing in some
way with the group’s branch in Syria. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey on 21
August noted that the group could not be defeated without accounting for its Syrian branch, stating that
the group “will have to be addressed on both sides of what is essentially at this point a nonexistent
border.”46 Administration officials appear to be considering options for targeting the Islamic State in Syria
without the introduction of U.S. ground forces. On September 5, President Obama stated,
…With respect to the situation on the ground in Syria, we will not be placing U.S. ground troops to try
to control the areas that are part of the conflict inside of Syria. I don’t think that’s necessary for us to
41
DoD News release. “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq.” August 14, 2014.
Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe. “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces.” Washington Post, August 12, 2014.
43
Press briefing by the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. William Mayville. August 11, 2014,
44
Brian Everstine, “U.S. Conducts Airdrops in Iraq,” Defense News, August 7, 2014.
45
White House, op. cit.
46
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, August 21, 2014.
42
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accomplish our goal. We are going to have to find effective partners on the ground to push back
against ISIL. And the moderate coalition there is one that we can work with. We have experience
working with many of them. They have been, to some degree, outgunned and outmanned, and that’s
why it’s important for us to work with our friends and allies to support them more effectively.47
Elements of the anti-Islamic State strategy build on initiatives proposed before public unveiling of the
strategy on September 10, 2014. On June 26, 2014, the Administration released its request for FY2015
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for the Department of Defense as well as additional
requested funds for State Department programs. Included in the request were requested funds that would
be designated for a proposed $1.5 billion Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative (RSI) as part of a broader
$5 billion Counterterrorism Partnership Fund.48 According to the RSI request, the Administration is
seeking funding and authorization from Congress to do the following:
Notwithstanding other provisions of law, through December 2018, to provide assistance, including the
provision of defense articles and defense services, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian
opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals for the following purposes:
(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of
essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;
(2) Defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by
terrorists in Syria; and
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.
If approved by Congress as requested, authority to train and equip Syrian opposition groups deemed
eligible for U.S. aid would be supported by $500 million in FY2015 funding, presumably with requests in
future years to follow. The requested authority would allow the U.S. government to accept foreign
contributions to authorized efforts to provide such assistance. The request also seeks funding and
authority for expanded efforts to “build the capacity of the Syrian opposition and of neighboring countries
including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to manage the growing spillover effects of the Syrian
conflict.” According to the request, the Administration intends to use any funds provided by Congress for
the RSI to “leverage existing security cooperation and assistance programs, expand training and related
infrastructure, and tailor support packages to meet identified regional needs for areas contending with
refugees and other destabilizing effects from the Syrian conflict.”
Section 9015 of the Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations
bill (H.R. 4870) would authorize assistance, including the provision of defense articles and defense
services, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition, for, among other purposes, “protecting
the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from threats posed by terrorists in Syria.”
Under this section, the committee specifies that up to $500 million from the Defense Department’s
Operation and Maintenance (O&M), a Defense-wide account, may be used for a support program. The
Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of H.R. 4870 also includes $1 billion in OCO funding for the
Department of State’s Complex Crises Fund (CCF) that may be made available for the purposes of
“undertaking counterterrorism partnership efforts, responding to crises, and addressing regional instability
47
Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, September 5, 2014.
Estimate #2—FY 2015 Budget Amendments: Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State and Other International
Programs (State/OIP) to update the FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations funding levels; for both DOD and State/OIP to
implement the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund and the European Reassurance Initiative; and for State/OIP peacekeeping
costs in the Central African Republic. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget_amendments.
48
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resulting from the conflict in Syria.” Some Senate Appropriations Committee members expressed some
criticism of the President’s broader Counterterrorism Partnership Fund proposal, as have some other
Members of the House and Senate.
Advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposition groups in Syria have argued that the
withdrawal or reduction of such assistance would bolster less cooperative or friendly groups. Advocates
have further argued that if the United States withdraws or reduces its support, then it may “force”
moderate groups to turn to extremist groups for funding and support—thereby increasing the influence of
extremists while reducing U.S. leverage. On the other hand, critics of continued or expanded U.S. support
have argued that such assistance risks exacerbating rivalry among opposition groups and reducing the
credibility of groups and individuals seen to be aligned with the United States. Critics of support
proposals also have pointed to problems in ensuring the identity of end users of provided support and the
uses of U.S.-provided materiel.
The purposes of any expanded U.S. or coalition assistance to armed opposition groups also may be
controversial among Syrians. President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will remain focused
“narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for
opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.49 Some Syrian political and military
opposition forces may resent such a narrow focus and insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals
as a condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State.
Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic
State and the War Powers Resolution50
Two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs) remain current law, but it is unclear
whether either could be seen to authorize ongoing and planned U.S. military strikes against the Islamic
State organization. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF; P.L. 107-40) targets those
who perpetrated and supported the 9/11 terror attacks, identified as Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but the
executive branch has interpreted the authorization to include targeting forces that are co-belligerent with
these two groups, so-called “associated forces.” The Islamic State organization, whose antecedents had
links to Al Qaeda, might fall within the definition of an associated force, but a public split between the
Islamic State and Al Qaeda in early 2014 calls this association into question. The 2002 Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq (AUMF-I; P.L. 107-243) authorizes force in part to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq....” The original
authorization focused on the Saddam Hussein regime (since toppled) and destruction of suspected
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, threats long extinguished. The recent successes of Islamic State-led
forces in Iraq, however, and its ties to former supporters of the Hussein regime, might be seen as falling
within the broad AUMF-I authority to counter the “threat posed by Iraq.” At the same time, AUMF-I
authority would not cover any military operations against Islamic State forces in Syria.
49
The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using chemical
weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he-- he has foregone legitimacy. But when it
comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on ISIL. It's narrowly on ISIL.”
President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
50
This section was prepared by Matthew Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation.
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Although these two authorizations are still current law, the President in his notifications to Congress of
deployments and airstrikes against the Islamic State, has relied upon his powers as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive under Article II of the Constitution. Article II of the Constitution makes the President
Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces, and gives the President certain foreign affairs powers. It is
debated to what extent Article II authorizes the President to unilaterally use military force, especially
given Congress’s Article I war powers, including the power to declare war. The President’s authority to
use force to defend the United States, its personnel, and citizens against ongoing or imminent attack has
been generally accepted, while employing such force simply to further foreign policy or general national
security goals is more controversial. In Iraq, the President would seem to have substantial authority to use
force to defend U.S. personnel, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and any other U.S. facilities and property.
His notifications of airstrikes, however, have cited as justification furthering U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests, and have described uses of force to provide humanitarian assistance, and to aid
Iraqi security forces in their fight against the Islamic State. Some, including Members of Congress, argue
that these actions fall outside the President’s Article II powers and require congressional authorization.
The President’s uses of military force are subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR;
P.L. 93-148). Since August, President Obama has reported to Congress on four uses of military force in
Iraq “consistent with” the WPR. In cases where the President has introduced armed forces into active or
imminent hostilities, the WPR requires termination of the use of U.S. armed forces and withdrawal of
those forces 60 days after a WPR report is required, unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized
the action; (2) has extended the period by law; or (3) cannot meet due to armed attack. The President can
extend the deadline for withdrawal for 30 days if he certifies it is needed to affect a safe withdrawal.
The airstrikes notifications seem likely to concern activities considered hostilities under the WPR, and
therefore could be considered to trigger the 60-day withdrawal period. There are questions, however,
about whether the 60-day period is currently running, on what date it began, or whether it has reset each
time one of the reported military operations has ceased. U.S. armed forces conducting airstrikes are likely
no longer over Iraqi territory, and the troops that are still in Iraq are not there to engage in hostilities. It is
unclear whether these frequent reports are intended simply to ensure that Congress is kept informed of
ongoing U.S. action in Iraq or, alternatively, whether it is intended to have some consequence for
assessing when and whether the WPR’s 60-day deadline for termination of hostilities begins and ends—
that is to say, that each of the particular actions reported constitutes a separate military action that is
subject to its own 60-day deadline for termination.51 Such an interpretation, however, would arguably
undercut the WPR’s goal of ensuring that U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities against an enemy
force for a sustained period of time without congressional authorization.
51
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/a-new-tactic-to-avoid-war-powers-resolution-time-limits/.The term “hostilities” has been
a subject of debate in recent years as well. The Obama Administration stated that its airstrikes in Libya in 2011 that occurred
after the passing of the WPR’s 60-day deadline did not amount to “hostilities” under the WPR because they did not involve
sustained fighting or exchanges of fighting with enemy forces, and because no ground troops were involved.
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Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest
Notes: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not necessarily areas of current control.
CRS-13
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014
CRS-14
The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
.
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis
Humanitarian Impact and Response52
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 1.2 million
people have been displaced by fighting in and around Mosul and in areas reaching south towards
Baghdad. The actual displacement figures remain fluid and difficult to fully ascertain. More than
300,000 of those displaced have reportedly fled to the relatively secure KRG-controlled region or
have formed ad hoc camps along its border. Others have scattered elsewhere—with the majority
located in Western Anbar governorate as well as Dohuk, Nineveh, and Irbil governorates. This
figure includes an estimated 500,000 IDPs who fled fighting in Anbar province earlier this year.
In addition, there are more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought
refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. With 2.3 million
displaced Iraqis inside the country, an urgent humanitarian crisis is emerging and humanitarian
actors are scrambling to meet the needs of IDPs and conflict victims. There are also over 400,000
Iraqi refugees living in other countries.53 The humanitarian situation remains fluid and urgent in
many parts of the country.
Priority needs include Core Relief Items (CRIs) such as shelter, food, clean water, and non-food
assistance. IDPs are residing with relatives and in host communities, mosques, tents, schools,
unfinished buildings, and in other government facilities. Various reports indicate that access to
hospitals is limited, with some not functioning at all. Temporary transit facilities have been set up
close to KRG border areas to provide medical assistance and drinking water. Humanitarian
organizations are mobilizing teams to assess the situation further where possible and to
coordinate a response. Access in the KRG reportedly remains stable and organizations are able to
provide assistance. Access in areas of conflict in the rest of the country is limited. There are
concerns about the impact of hostilities on minorities, particularly Christians. Freedom of
movement—where IDPs are able to move to areas of safety and between governorates—has been
complicated by conflict, causing some persons, particularly near Baghdad, to be stranded.
According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the KRG policy on establishing IDP
camps has yet to be fully determined. Camps in Irbil and Dohuk already exist and the KRG
authorities are working to find a way to address the needs of the displaced, including identifying a
location for additional camps. However, there are reports that local authorities do not want to
allow large numbers of IDPs into their territory. The region is already housing more than 220,000
refugees from Syria. According to UNHCR, due to renewed conflict in Iraq, approximately 6,000
Syrians have returned to Syria since early June 2014.
UNAMI is coordinating the response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some
partner organizations. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(UNOCHA) launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in March 2014 for $104 million
52
This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
Although this section is focused primarily on the situation in Iraq, the situations of displacement and movement of
populations are intertwined with the conflict in neighboring Syria.
53
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to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the people
affected by fighting in Anbar Province. On June 24, UNOCHA launched a revised SRP,
requesting $312.1 million in funding to include support for the significantly increased caseload of
IDPs and a wider geographical focus. Funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF), a multilateral funding mechanism administered through the United Nations, is also under
consideration. As of early August, the HCT expects to revise the SRP again in mid-September
based on information from additional needs assessments and analyses of situations in hard-toreach or limited access areas.54
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens55
The crisis has prompted the Administration to undertake a number of measures to ensure the
safety of its personnel in Iraq, including direct military action, relocation of personnel, and
deployment of additional protective assets. The Department of State has also repeatedly warned
U.S. citizens unaffiliated with the U.S. government of the threats to their security.
President Obama affirmed on August 9 that the protection of American diplomats and military
personnel in the city of Irbil was among the principal justifications for conducting targeted
airstrikes against ISIL in the area. He also asserted that the United States would “take action” in
response to any further threat to U.S. facilities or personnel.56
A number of diplomatic personnel had previously been moved to the Consulate General in Irbil
from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. On June 15, the Department of State announced that while
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily
relocated” to Consulate Generals in Basrah and Irbil as well as to Department of State facilities in
Amman, Jordan. The relocations were reportedly carried out by non-military means. The
announcement stated that a “substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would
remain in place and that, with an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be
“fully equipped” to carry out “its national security mission.”57 On August 10, the Iraq Travel
Warning was updated to announce that “a limited number” of additional staff had been relocated
from the Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate General in Erbil to the Consulate General in
Basrah as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan.58 Despite these measures,
President Obama on August 9 affirmed that “we’re not moving our embassy anytime soon. We’re
not moving our consulate anytime soon.”59
Military assets and personnel have played a key role in securing U.S. diplomatic facilities and
personnel in Iraq. News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors
54
UNOCHA, “Iraq IDP Crisis: Situation Report No. 5, July 27 – August 1, 2014.
Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see: CRS Report IN10090,
Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities, by Alex Tiersky. This section was last updated on
August 15, 2014.
56
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq.
57
Department of State Spokesperson, “Press Statement: Iraq,” press release, June 15, 2014.
58
Department of State, “Iraq Travel Warning,” updated August 10, 2014,
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/iraq-travel-warning.html.
59
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq.
55
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were in place at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy.60 Since
the crisis began, the White House has announced three deployments to reinforce that number. On
June 16, the White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military
personnel were being dispatched to Iraq to assist with the temporary relocation of diplomatic
personnel, a deployment undertaken with the consent of the Government of Iraq.61 On June 30,
the White House announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces
personnel to provide increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as
to reinforce the Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House notification to
Congress, provided “consistent with” the War Powers Act, the deployed forces would be
accompanied by helicopters and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the purpose of
protecting U.S. citizens and property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,” according to the
statement, and may/will “remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such that it is no
longer needed.”62 The Department of Defense had also previously confirmed that it “has airlift
assets at the ready should State Department request them, as per normal interagency support
arrangements.”63 On September 2, 2014, the Administration announced that an additional 350
U.S. military personnel would deploy to Iraq for similar purposes.
The State Department has also communicated with U.S. citizens in Iraq about threats to their
safety. It posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of
Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Iraq because of
current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their safety to “make
plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the Embassy should not be
contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that the Embassy “does not
offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the Embassy remained open, the
statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq would be limited due to the
security environment.64
A number of U.S. citizens working in various other capacities in Iraq have also been evacuated in
response to the crisis. For example, on June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number
of U.S. citizen contract employees to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in
connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by
their companies due to security concerns.65
60
Dan Lamothe, “U.S. companies pulling contractors from Iraqi bases as security crumbles,” The Washington Post,
June 12, 2014.
61
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the War Powers Resolution
Report for Iraq,” press release, June 16, 2014.
62
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Letter regarding
Iraq,” June 30, 2014.
63
“DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014.
64
Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,”
press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html.
65
Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ.
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Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration66
What are overall U.S. priorities in the strategy against the Islamic State organization, and how are
these priorities shaping the U.S. response?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy against the Islamic State that have been
articulated by President Obama? What factors could hinder the implementation or effectiveness
of the strategy?
With respect to Iraq, is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in
expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and
regional differences?
What are the key considerations for the Administration in any decision to expand anti-Islamic
State operations into Syria?
Press reports indicate that the United States has spent over $500 million on military operations in
Iraq from June until the beginning of September. How, if at all, should recent developments in
Iraq shape congressional consideration of pending authorization and appropriations legislation for
defense and foreign assistance? Should the United States provide more assistance, and/or
condition foreign or military assistance to Iraq on reforms or other actions by the national
government?
What have been the results of the U.S. military assessment of the ISF by the advisers? What
recommendations have the advisers made, if any? What additional actions is the Administration
prepared to take, based on their recommendations or reports? Would additional authorities or
approvals be needed to augment or expand such support?
To what extent do the Islamic State’s gains reflect its organizational capabilities?
Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State? With respect to Iraq, what
effect, if any, has the replacement of Maliki by Haydar al-Abbadi had on Sunni Arab support for
the Islamic State? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the Islamic State’s
declaration of a caliphate in areas under its control?
What options are available for assisting locally organized forces in areas under Islamic State
control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the
group’s operations? How might such options affect the willingness of the regional governments to
continue to cooperate with the United States?
To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States conflict or coincide, with respect to
the Islamic State issue? To what extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support Iraq’s government and
Shiite militia forces contradict or support those of the United States? Please answer with respect
to Iran’s policy of supporting the Asad regime in Syria?
66
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as
international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program and the ongoing Syria conflict? Should the
United States seek or avoid an approach to the Iraq crisis that also involves these other issues?
To what extent will the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey support anti-Islamic
State entities in areas adjacent to their territory?
What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the current Iraqi
government? What has been the reaction of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to
increased U.S. support for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is closely aligned
with Iran? How might Iran respond?
How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security
situation in that area generally and in Iraq specifically?
What is the likelihood that the Kurds will implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near
future? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?
Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of
developments related to the Islamic State?
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
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