Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
June 20July 3, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43612
Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Summary
The offensive in northern and central Iraq, led by the Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS), has raised significant concerns for the
United States. These concerns include a possible breakup of Iraq’s political and territorial order
and the establishment of a potential base for terrorist attacks in the region or even against the U.S.
homeland.
The crisis has raised several questions for U.S. policy because it represents the apparent
unraveling of a seemingly stable and secure Iraq that was in place when U.S. combat troops
departed Iraq at the end of 2011. Some months after the U.S. departure, the uprising in Syria
among some elements of the Sunni Arab community there facilitated the reemergence of ISIL in
areas of Syria and in its original base in Iraq. After late 2011, the Sunni community grew
increasingly restive as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki marginalized senior Sunni leaders, and the
skills and capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces deteriorated. Many Sunnis in Iraq oppose ISIL’s
tactics and attempts to impose Islamic law, but support it as a vanguard against what they
characterize as an oppressive Shiite-dominated national government.
Asserting that ISIL should not be allowed to prevail in Iraq, President Obama on June 19
announced several steps to help the Iraqi government protect Baghdad and reduce the threat to
U.S. interests posed by ISIL. The President says additional options are under consideration, but
might not be implemented—or be effective if implemented—unless Iraqi leaders can build a
political consensus among Iraq’s major communities. The newly elected Iraqi parliament
convened on July 2 but did not announce any agreement on the senior positions of parliament
speaker, President, or Prime Minister. Maliki is seeking another term as Prime Minister but a
growing number of Iraqi factions and figures say he is likely to be replaced.
An aspect of the U.S. response could potentially involve working with Iran to reform the Iraqi
political structure and to try to roll back the ISIL gains. Doing so would raise the potential of
linkage between possible U.S.-Iran cooperation on Iraq and the ongoing international diplomacy
on Iran’s nuclear program. Many Sunnis in Iraq and elsewhere in the region view any U.S.
engagement with Iran with suspicion and hostility, raising the stakes of such potential
coordination considerably. U.S. officials have generally dismissed prospects for direct military
cooperation with Iran.
The crisis has raised additional concerns about the safety of the more than 5,000 U.S. personnel
in Iraq and about the international response to the humanitarian effects of the fighting.
For detail on Iraq’s political and security situation and U.S. policy since the 2003 U.S. invasion of
Iraq, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth
Katzman. The report includes substantial information on Iraq’s Kurds, Sunni insurgent groups
other than ISIL, Shiite organizations and militias, Iraq’s human rights record, and a summary of
U.S. assistance to Iraq since 2003. For further information on the connections between the
situation in Iraq and that in Syria, see: CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview
and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
ISIL June 2014 Offensive and Iraq Security Force Collapse .................................................... 1
Possible Outcomes..................................................................................................................... 3
U.S. Response .................................................................................................................................. 4
Syria Dimension .............................................................................................................................. 9 10
Iran Dimension .............................................................................................................................. 1011
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis ............................................................................ 1112
Humanitarian Impact and Response ........................................................................................ 1112
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities and Citizens ............................................. 1213
Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration .................................................................... 1314
Figures
Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest ...................................................................................... 78
Figure 2. Evolution of ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 ........................... 89
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 1416
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Overview1Overview
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-led offensive in June 2014 has raised many
questions about the future of Iraq and the region, and has posed U.S. policy challenges. This
report analyzes the offensive, its implications, the U.S. response, and related issues. Previous
events and developments, which provide background information potentially relevant to
understanding the causes of the ISIL-led offensive and the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) collapse in
northern Iraq, are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance,
and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman.
ISIL June 2014 Offensive and Iraq Security Force Collapse
Iraq’s relatively peaceful April 30, 2014, election had led many observers to assess that the
government had contained an ISIL-led insurrection that began in Anbar Province in January 2014,
even though the government had been unable to regain control of the city of Fallujah from ISILled forces. However, such assessments were upended on June 10, 2014, when ISIL—apparently
assisted by large numbers of its fighters moving into Iraq from the Syria theater—launched a
major offensive against the northern city of Mosul. ISIL and allied fighters captured the city amid
mass surrenders and desertions by Iraq Security Forces (ISF) officers and personnel in and around
the city. According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions cannot be
accounted for, and all or most of their equipment (including U.S.-supplied vehicles and weapons)
should be considered lost.21 In its seizure of Mosul and subsequent advance, ISIL reportedly had
the support ofhas
been joined by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party
and military, and other Sunni residents.3 This support came 2 Their support for the offensive—despite reservations
among many
Sunnis about ISIL’s brutal tactics against opponents and intention to impose their
version of Islamic law, and reflected apparent broad
—appears to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the Maliki government’s perceived monopolization of power.4
government.3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey testified before the
Senate Armed
Services Committee on June 18, 2014 that “ISIL is almost undistinguishable from
the other
groups [fighting the Maliki government] ... ”4...”5
After taking Mosul, the ISIL-led fighters advanced southward toward Saddam’s hometown of
Tikrit and other cities, as well as eastward into Diyala Province. In the course of the offensive,
ISIL and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and captured a substantial amount of U.S.supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”), tanks, and armored personnel
carriers.65 ISIL leaders announced that the offensive would try to advance into Baghdad. They
, and the
group and its supporters continued to make gains, capturing the city of Tal Afar west of Mosul on
June 16 and moving to
the outskirts of Baqubah, a city about 38 miles northeast of Baghdad with
a mixed population, by
June 17. ISIL-led insurgents in Anbar, with the support of some tribal
allies, reportedly seized additional cities along the Euphrates
River in that province, including Haditha, Hit, and others.
1
Prepared by Kenneth Katzman.
Haditha and the large dam near that city.
1
Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014.
3
Tim Arango. “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq.” New York Times, June 19, 2014.
43
“Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
54
Testimony of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey, Senate Armed Services Committee. June 18, 2014.
65
Pictures of ISIL and other Sunni rebels with Iraqi armor have been posted on Twitter and other social media outlets.
2
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Sunni militants also surroundedISIL-led militants have been able to surround the country’s main oil refinery at Baiji, although government
forces were continuing to combat the attackers as of June 18. The refinery produces about one
third but
government forces have to date prevented the capture of the facility. It produces about one third
of Iraq’s domestic gasoline requirements. Iraq’s oil production and most of its export
infrastructure has been largely unaffected by the crisis to date, in large part because about 75% of
Iraq’s oil is produced and exported in Iraq’s south, where Sunni insurgents have little traction
among the overwhelmingly Shiite population. are few in number.
The northern Iraq oil export route (not including
Kurdish-controlled exports, which Baghdad
opposes) has been shut since March 2014 as a
consequence of earlier fighting.76
As ISIL-led forces have advanced, Shiite militias have mobilized to try to help the government
stabilize the
front and prevent ISIL from reaching Baghdad or the Shiite heartland to its south.
Many volunteers apparently answered calls Baghdad is
about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from elsewhere volunteered for militia
service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani, and other leading Shiite figures to counter the offensiveal-Sistani to
help the ISF. With support from these militias,
as well as from Iranian and U.S. advisers assisting
separately, the government forces regrouped and appeared to blunt an advancedeter any frontal assault on Baghdad itself. Because
Baghdad is about 80% Shiite-inhabited, many observers assessed that it was unlikely that the
ISIL-led offensive would
itself. As July began, U.S. officials expressed increasing confidence that the ISIL-led offensive
would not capture the city outright.8 However, journalists reported that sectarian
7 Still, ISIL-led militants have been able to approach Baghdad
International Airport to the southwest of the city and several Sunni cities south of Baghdad
(Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah) as part of an effort to encircle the capital. Journalists reported that
sectarian violence in Baghdad was escalating, as Shiites retaliated against Sunnis for the ISIL-led offensive
and Sunnis responded.9
offensive and Sunnis responded,8 and the United Nations reported that June had been the
deadliest month in Iraq since 2008. About 2,400 Iraqis were killed in the month, of which about
two thirds were civilians and the remainder ISF personnel.
As the crisis unfolded, Prime Minister Maliki asked the Council of Representatives (COR, Iraq’s
elected parliament) to grant him emergency powers and was attempting to work with
commanders to mount a counterattackworked with Iraqi commanders to
organize counterattacks. Iraq’s small air force began conducting some air strikes on
ISIL positions in Mosul and elsewhere as early as June 12. Maliki also reportedly was resisting
calls by the United States and other countries to conduct communications and political outreach
toward the Sunni community, preferring instead to focus on countering the offensive militarily.10
Some assessments indicated that Maliki is benefitting politically as Shiite rivals rally around him,
while others asserted that the collapse of the ISF would tarnish Maliki as a failed leader.
As the ISF collapsed in the north,
in Mosul and elsewhere as early as June 12. Maliki’s focus, as expressed in a national speech on
July 2, was on countering the offensive militarily, although he did announce an “amnesty” for
Sunni tribal figures who supported the offensive but return to the government side. Maliki’s
emphasis could represent an effort to shore up his base in the Shiite community as Iraqi leaders
try to determine the composition of the next national government (see further below).
The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) of the Kurds’ autonomous
political entity in northern Iraq, the (Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), advanced into
Kirkuk, in part to secure control of the city and in part to prevent ISIL from threatening the
territory the KRG administers. The , KRG) to capture Kirkuk. The
Kurds have long sought to control Kirkukthat oil-rich city, which they claim
is historic Kurdish territory,
and to affiliate the province with the KRG. The peshmerga reportedly
remain in control of Kirkuk city and most of the surrounding province, and someMany experts assert
that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of Kirkuk to the central government.11
Retaining control of Kirkuk, which contains vast oil reserves, could encourage the Kurdish
leadership to seek outright independence from Iraq. However, other considerations, such as the
potential for Kurdish secession to trigger political and military responses from Maliki, ISIL, and
neighboring countries; and possible KRG reluctance to lose its current legal claim to a percentage
of Iraq’s nationwide oil revenue; might lead the Kurds to continue to defer a decision on formal
independence, as they have since achieving autonomy a decade ago.
7
willingly return control of Kirkuk to the central government.9 The capture has prompted renewed
discussion among KRG leaders about seeking outright independence from Iraq, and KRG
President Masoud Barzani said on June 30 that a referendum on independence might be held in
coming months. Earlier, Secretary of State Kerry visited the KRG region on June 25 and urged
President Barzani and other Kurdish leaders not to seek independence but instead to work within
the Iraqi political process to form a new, inclusive central government in Baghdad. The potential
for Kurdish secession to trigger political and military responses from Baghdad or neighboring
countries, coupled with the likely loss of its receipts of a percentage of Iraq’s nationwide oil
6
Steven Mufson. “Iraq’s Biggest Oil Refinery Is on Fire. How Important is That?” Washington Post, June 18, 2014
Author conversations with experts on Iraq. June 10-17, 2014.
98
Alissa Rubin and Rod Nordland. “As Sunnis Die in Iraq, a Cycle is Restarting.” New York Times, June 18, 2014.
10
Alissa Rubin and Rod Nordland. “Sunnis and Kurds on Sidelines of Iraq’s Leader’s Military Plans.” New York
Times, June 17, 2014.
119
Author conversations with expert on the Iraqi Kurds. June 14, 2014.
87
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revenue, might lead the Kurds to defer a decision on formal independence, as they have since
achieving autonomy a decade ago.
Possible Outcomes
The ISIL-led offensive may result in any of several possible outcomes, depending on internal
Iraqi decisions and processes, as well as outside involvement, if any occurs. In the short term, the
crisis could
produce a change in Iraq’s leadership—in part to address stated U.S. concerns that
Maliki is
largely to blame for the crisis. Elections for the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR)
were held
on April 30, 2014, and the COR could choose to replaceseveral Iraqi factions—as well as some within Maliki’s core coalition—
oppose a third term for Maliki as Prime Minister. The
new COR is mandated to meet within two weeks of new COR convened on July 2—within the
mandated time frame of two weeks from the certification of the vote, which occurred
on June 16. The COR selects (June 17). The COR is
mandated to first select a COR speaker, and then within two weeks select a President, who then
taps the leading elected bloc to nominate a
Prime Minister, the position that holds executive authority. Prime Minister. Iraqi leaders reportedly tried to reach
consensus on all three of these top positions before the July 2 COR session but failed, and the
next session is to be held on July 8.
Maliki’s coalition won far more seats
in the April 30 election than did any other bloc, but the crisis could cause the COR to turn tothere
appears to be a growing consensus among many Iraqi political leaders that the COR will select
another Shiite leader to be Prime Minister. Longtime anti-Saddam activist Ahmad Chalabi is
reportedly campaigning for the post,1210 but other candidates include one said to be favored by the
United States—Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Other potential
choices widely mentioned by Iraqi figures include former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari;
another ISCI stalwart Bayan Jabr; and deputy prime minister for energy issues and member of
Maliki’s faction Hussein Shahristani. Maliki’s chances of securing a third term appeared to fade
after June 20, when Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement. Maliki’s chances of
securing a third term were dealt a serious setback on June 20 with the statement by Ayatollah
Sistani that the major factions should form “an
effective government that enjoys broad national
support, avoids past mistakes, and opens new
horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis..”13
The statement was widely interpreted as Sistani’s withdrawing support for another Maliki term.”11
Some of the longer-term possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive, include:
•
An ISIL-led seizure or siege of Baghdad. Either of these developments could
cause the Maliki government to fall and more potently enable ISIL to attempt the
establishment ofISIL to expand the Islamic state that it has long said it seeks
declared. The outright
seizure of Baghdad is considered unlikely, as noted above,
but a siege is possible
because of the significant Sunni population in towns just north and west of the
city. This outcome could prompt large-scale Iranian intervention to reverse ISIL
gains, and would raise the likelihood of U.S. intervention toward that same
objective
north and west of the city that ISIL and its allies are attempting to capture. The
fall or siege of Baghdad could prompt large-scale Iranian ground intervention,
and could raise the likelihood of U.S. ground intervention as well.
•
De-facto federalism or partition of Iraq. Another possible outcome could be
that ISIL fails to take Baghdad, but the Maliki government, the ISF, and Maliki’s
Shiite allies are unable to push the insurrection back. That could produce a new,
accepted but informal, political structure in which each of the major communities
—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—administers areas under their de facto political
and military control.14
10
“As Iraq’s Troubles Mount, PM Nouri al-Maliki Shows Few Signs of Changing His Ways.” New York Times, June
17, 2014.
11
“Top Shiite Cleric Deals Blow to Al Maliki Leadership.” USA Today, June 20, 2014.
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communities—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—administer areas under their de facto
political and military control.12
•
Long-standing civil war. Another potential outcome is that the situation in Iraq
devolves into a long-term outright civil war, in which forces loyal to the various
parties— to the Sunni insurrection, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the
Maliki government and its Shiite militia supporters—alternately gain and lose
territory in a long struggle for power.
•
A restoration of the pre-2013 situation. It is possible that the government could
rally its forces and, with help from Shiite militias and possibly outside actors,
12
“As Iraq’s Troubles Mount, PM Nouri al-Maliki Shows Few Signs of Changing His Ways.” New York Times, June
17, 2014.
13
“Top Shiite Cleric Deals Blow to Al Maliki Leadership.” USA Today, June 20, 2014.
14
http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-fighting-nears-baghdad-un-warns-of-iraq-break-up/
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recapture the mostly Sunni-inhabited territory gained militias and
outside assistance could enable the government to recapture the territory gained
by the ISIL-led offensives.
That could calm the current crisis but might not
necessarily quiet Sunni unrest
over the longer term.
U.S. Response
The aspect of the crisis that reportedly has most surprised andmost concerned Administration and
international officials
has been the ISF’s collapse in the face of the ISIL offensive in the north and
central part of Iraq.
Some observers have suggested that the ISF’s collapse appeared to threaten
the legacy of the U.S.
military intervention in and withdrawal from Iraq. President Obama and
other U.S. officials attributed the collapse
largely to the failure of Iraqi leaders, particularly
Maliki, to build an inclusive government that
would hold the allegiance of ISF personnel and
Sunni citizens.
Citing the legacy of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the potential ISIL threat to U.S. interests,
President Obama stated on June 13, 2014, that the Iraqi government “needs additional support to
break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”1513
He said that he had requested that his national security team prepare a range of options, and
implementation of some of them were announced by the President on June 19, 2014.
Among the options being implemented and still under consideration, potentially relevant factors
for Congress include:
•
Achieving a change of leadership in Iraq. President Obama’s June 13 statement,
and statements of other U.S. officials, implied support for the replacement of
Maliki by another leader who might seek to act in a more inclusive manner
across ethnic and sectarian lines. However, it is not clear whether Administration
officials are actively working to persuade Iraqi factions to rally around an
alternative choice for Prime Minister.16 It is uncertain whether the United States,
working with other regional actors possibly including Iran, could compel Iraqi
factions to replace Maliki, in light of the relative success of his supporters in the
April 30 election.
•
Achieving a change in Iraqi policy. An aspect of policy announced by President
Obama in a June 19, 2014 the following:
•
Advice, Training, and Intelligence Sharing. In his June 19 statement, President
Obama announced that he was sending up to 300 U.S. advisers to assess the ISF
and gather intelligence on ISIL for potential use in any future U.S. airstrikes.14
Press reports indicate that these will be Special Operations Forces.15 As of early
July, more than half of the 300 ceiling had arrived and begun work—some were
seconded from the existing Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. Defense
Department spokespersons say that the advisers will move beyond assessment
and into an advisory role at some point, but that the mission is of “limited
duration.”16 The option has, to some extent, aligned the United States with an
overwhelmingly Shiite Iraqi military but President Obama stated on June 19,
12
http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-fighting-nears-baghdad-un-warns-of-iraq-break-up/
White House. “Statement by the President on Iraq.” June 13, 2014.
14
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq.” Federal News Service, June 19, 2014.
15
“Obama to Make Case for Sending Special Forces to Iraq. CBS News, June 17, 2014.
16
Comments by Defense Department spokesman Rear Admiral William Kirby on several Cable News Network
interview programs. June 2014.
13
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2014, that the United States “will not pursue military actions that support one
sect inside of Iraq at the expense of another.” Still, some commentators argued
that sending forces as advisers creates a potential for expanding U.S.
involvement beyond what President Obama announced.17
•
Achieving a change of leadership in Iraq. President Obama’s statements on the
crisis implied—but did not directly state—U.S. support for the replacement of
Maliki by another leader who might seek to act in a more inclusive manner
across ethnic and sectarian lines. It is not clear whether Administration officials
are actively working to persuade Iraqi factions to rally around an alternative
choice for Prime Minister.18 And, it is uncertain whether the United States,
working with other regional actors such as Iran, could compel Iraqi factions to
replace Maliki, in light of the relative success of his supporters in the April 30
election.
•
Achieving a change in Iraqi policy. An aspect of policy announced by President
Obama in a June 19, 2014, statement on Iraq is to work with other regional actors
to compel the Maliki government to share power with Kurdish and Sunni leaders.
However, this component of policy is considered by many experts to be a longerterm strategy that would not necessarily produce results soon enough to reverse
the immediate threat posed byimmediately reverse the ISIL-led offensive.
•
U.S. combat troop deployment. President Obama has ruled out this option saying,
“We will not be sending U.S. troops back into combat in Iraq.”1719 There may be
several reasons for ruling out this option, including the apparent view within the
Administration that U.S. troops could not fix the political problems that in their
view have been primarily responsible for the success of the ISIL-led insurrection.
15
White House. “Statement by the President on Iraq.” June 13, 2014.
Author conversations with Iraq experts. June 10-16, 2014.
17
White House, op. cit.
16
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•
Airstrikes. The Administration says it is considering an Iraqi request to carry out
airstrikes against ISIL bases and other locations in Iraq.18 Such strikes could be
,20 and the U.S. advisers
discussed above are gathering intelligence for such potential action. Strikes could
be carried out by combat aircraft or by unmanned aerial vehicles. However, many
analysts have noted that ISIL has few clearly discernible targets that would not
risk causing Iraqi civilian casualties. It is also notNor is it clear that airstrikes alone could
defeat the ISIL-led insurrection. Former top U.S. commander in Iraq General
David Petraeus expressed an additional pitfall to significant airstrikes, saying:
“This cannot be the United States being the air force for [Shiite] militias or a
[Shiite] on Sunni Arab fight.”1921 Press reports as of June 18 indicatedindicate that the
Administration was
leaning against a broad package of intensive airstrikes, but is
still considering
undertaking targeted strikes against clearly discernible ISIL
targets using
unmanned aerial vehicles—a strategy similar to that employed
against high value targets in Yemen and Pakistan.20
•
Arms Deliveries. An option is to sell Iraq additional military equipment, such as
tanks and armored vehicles, to replace those lost in the ISIL-led offensive.
Another option is to accelerate deliveries of arms already purchased by Iraq,
including F-16 aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. However, the capture of
U.S.-supplied weaponry by ISIL in the June offensive raises the potential that
new and more sophisticated U.S. weapons could fall into the hands of ISIL.
Moreover, U.S. officials and Members of Congress have previously expressed
concerns about the potential for the Iraqi government to use sophisticated air
assets against protesters and civilian opponents rather than ISIL targets.21
•
Advice, Training, and Intelligence Sharing. In his June 19 statement, President
Obama announced that he was sending up to 300 U.S. advisers and trainers to
Iraq to help organize the ISF defenses and counter-offensives or to help in
targeting airstrikes. 22 Press reports indicate that these will be Special Operations
Forces.23 However, like the other stipulated options, a closer U.S. relationship
with the ISF on the ground risks portraying the United States as aligned with an
overwhelmingly Shiite Iraqi military against Iraqi Sunnis. Addressing that
potential drawback, President Obama stated on June 19, 2014 that the advisers
will not engage in combat and the United States “will not pursue military actions
that support one sect inside of Iraq at the expense of another.” Still, some
commentators argued that sending forces as advisers creates a potential for
expanding U.S. involvement beyond what President Obama announced.24
18
Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraq Is Said to Seek U.S. Strikes on Insurgents.” New York Times, June 12, 2014.
Nico Hines. “Petraeus: U.S. Must Not Become the Shia Militia’s Air Force.” The Daily Beast, June 18, 2014.
20
Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt. “Obama Is Said to Consider Selective Airstrikes on Sunni Militants.” New York
Times, June 18, 2014.
21
Josh Rogin. “Congress to Iraq’s Maliki: No Arms for a Civil War.” Daily Beast, January 8, 2014.
22
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq.” Federal News Service, June 19, 2014.
23
“Obama to Make Case for Sending Special Forces to Iraq. CBS News, June 17, 2014.
24
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq. op. cit.
19
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The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)25
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also referred to as ISIS) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and
terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013,
threatening the security of both countries and drawing increased attention from the international community. The
group’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq
from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka
Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders
repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and
was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Awad
Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),26 ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was
conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders
from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent months, ISIL leaders have stated their view that “the ISIL is not and has never
been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”27 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity,
they have given leaders
targets in Yemen and Pakistan.22
17
“Text of Obama’s Remarks on Iraq, op. cit.
Author conversations with Iraq experts. June 10-16, 2014.
19
White House, op. cit.
20
Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraq Is Said to Seek U.S. Strikes on Insurgents.” New York Times, June 12, 2014.
21
Nico Hines. “Petraeus: U.S. Must Not Become the Shia Militia’s Air Force.” The Daily Beast, June 18, 2014.
22
Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt. “Obama Is Said to Consider Selective Airstrikes on Sunni Militants.” New York
Times, June 18, 2014.
18
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•
23
Arms Deliveries. An option is to sell Iraq additional military equipment, such as
tanks and armored vehicles, to replace those lost in the ISIL-led offensive.
Another option is to accelerate deliveries of arms already purchased by Iraq,
including F-16 aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. The United States has been
delivering additional HELLFIRE missiles that Iraq’s small air force is using
against ISIL targets. However, the capture of U.S.-supplied weaponry by ISIL in
the June offensive raises the potential that new and more sophisticated U.S.
weapons could fall into the hands of ISIL. Moreover, U.S. officials and Members
of Congress have previously expressed concerns about the potential for the Iraqi
government to use sophisticated air assets against protesters and civilian
opponents rather than ISIL targets.23
Josh Rogin. “Congress to Iraq’s Maliki: No Arms for a Civil War.” The Daily Beast, January 8, 2014.
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The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)24
ISIL on June 29 formally declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate extending from Aleppo province in Syria to
Diyala province in Iraq. The declaration named ISIL’s leader Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr
al Baghdadi),25 as imam and caliph and noted that the group would henceforth be known as the Islamic State.26
ISIL (also referred to as ISIS) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its
control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013. The group’s ideological and organizational
roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal
Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following
Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as
the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under
the leadership of Baghdadi, ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly
attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear.
In recent months, ISIL leaders have stated their view that “the ISIL is not and has never been an offshoot of Al
Qaeda,”27 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity, they have given leaders
of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than pledges of obedience.
In April 2013, Al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the Syria-based
Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front), under the name ISIL. Nusra Front and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger,
underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region. These tensions have played out in fighting
among Sunni extremist groups within Syria. In July that have since erupted into conflict. In July
2013, ISIL attacked prisons at Abu Ghraib and Taji in Iraq,
reportedly freeing several hundred detained members and shaking international confidence in Iraq’s security forces.
ISIL . ISIL
continued a fierce wave of attacks across northern, western, and central Iraq, while in Syria the group
consolidated consolidated
control over the city and province of Raqqa and expanded its presence in northwestern areas then
controlled by
other rebel forces. Late 2013 saw the Iraqi government seeking expanded counterterrorism and
military assistance
from the United States, ostensibly to meet the growing ISIL threat. Inside Syria, ISIL alienated its
rebel counterparts
further, and an anti-ISIL campaign erupted there in early 2014, expelling the group from some
areas it had controlled
and unleashing a cycle of ongoing infighting. In Syria, ISIL remains strongest in Raqqa, Dayr az
Zawr, and Hasakah.
ISIL’s attempts to assert control over the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq’s Al Anbar province
and its June 2014
offensive in northern Iraq underscored the group’s lethality and ability to conduct combat
operations and manage
partnerships with local groups in multiple areas over large geographic distances. The durability
of ISIL’s partnerships
are questionable: ISIL’s remains at violent odds with Islamist and secular armed groups in Syria,
and tribal, Islamist, and
Baathist armed groups in Iraq have a history of opposing ISIL’s previous incarnations.
Statements and media materials released by ISIL reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview and a relentless
ambition. Statements by
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and ISIL’s spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls
for violence and identify
Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to establish
“the Islamic State” and to revive their vision of “the caliphate.”.28 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as
“rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government of Nuri al Maliki as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is
aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some sources allege that ISIL operatives have benefitted
from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus dating back to the time of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq Brett McGurk told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February
2014 that ISIL’s objective is “to cause the collapse of the Iraqi state and carve out a zone of governing control in the
western regions of Iraq and eastern Syria.” ISIL has since built upon what McGurk described then as its
“unprecedented” resources in terms of funds, weapons and personnel. Several leading representatives of the U.S.
intelligence community have stated that ISIL maintains training camps in Iraq and Syria, has the intent to attack the
United States, and is reportedly recruiting and training individuals to do so. In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened
the United States directly, saying, “Know, O defender of the Senior U.S. officials have stated that ISIL poses a serious threat to the United States and maintains training camps in
Iraq and Syria, but presently lacks the capability to carry out operations on U.S. territory.29 In July 2012, Al Baghdadi
warned U.S. leaders that “the war with you has just begun.” In January 2014, he said, “Know, O defender of the
Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the Levant,
just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict
conflict—God permitting—against your will.”29
2530
24
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
Al Baghdadi was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq at Camp Bucca, until his release in 2009.
27
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani's Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri,
Refusing To Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-2, 2014.
28
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,'”
Translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
29
OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir
Condemning ‘War’ Against Group,” Translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014.
26
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626
“Sunni rebels declare new ‘Islamic caliphate,’” Al Jazeera, June 30, 2014. Full text of ISIL declaration at
http://myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_53b039f00cb03.pdf.
27
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, May 11-2, 2014.
28
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, April 9, 2013.
29
Statements by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey,
and Secretary of State John Kerry, June 2014. See also Testimony of Central Intelligence Agency Director John
Brennan before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2014.
30
OSC Report GMP20120721586002, July 21, 2012; and OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, January 19, 2014.
25
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Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest
Note: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not areas of current control.
CRS-78
Figure 2. Evolution of ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014
CRS-89
Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Syria Dimension30Dimension31
Since 2013, ISIL fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a
parallel theater of operations.3132 In early 2014, ISIL reestablished control in most areas of the
northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted itself to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province
rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, ISIL has
controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to
the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational
independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. ISIL
derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a
percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its
control.3233 ISIL has also operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a
connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual
advance towards Mosul.
ISIL gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to
ISIL and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the supply
lines they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces already
has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. At the same
time, ISIL’s expanding theater of conflict could subject it to overextension.
ISIL gains may also motivate the Maliki and Asad governments to cooperate more closely in
seeking to counter ISIL. ISIL advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to
hold ground in contested areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought
alongside Asad forces return home to combat ISIL.3334 In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted
air strikes against ISIL-held areas of Raqqah and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi
government, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.34 Increased
cooperation between Damascus and 35 Syria later
struck ISIL targets near a border crossing between the two states. Maliki welcomed the strikes,
which he stated occurred on the Syrian side of the border. U.S. and Iraqi military sources stated
that the Syrian strikes took place inside Iraq.36 Increased cooperation between Damascus and
Baghdad could alter the dynamics in both conflicts. It could
undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to
encourage Iraqi leaders to press Asad to step down in favor of
a transitional government.
Increased Iraqi-Syrian cooperation could also decrease the likelihood
that Baghdad would comply
with U.S. requests to crack down on Iranian overflights of weapons
and equipment to Damascus.
It is unclear what impact ISIL gains in Iraq would have outside of eastern Syria. At least half of
Syria-based ISIL fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian ISIL defector.3537
Like other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand
hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas.36 ISIL to date has concentrated
30
31
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
3132
“Syria war fueling attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, officials say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013.
3233
“Sunni fighters gain as they battle 2 governments, and other rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
3334
“Seeing their gains at risk, Shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
3435
“Syria pounds ISIS bases in coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014.
35
“Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
36
“The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation,
June 27, 201336
“Iraqi PM welcomes Syria air strikes on border crossing,” BBC, June 26, 2014.
37
“Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
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hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas.38 ISIL to date has concentrated
its forces in Syria’its forces in Syria's northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the country's main
’s
main urban areas in Syria’s western half.
Ongoing ISIL operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to secure the
route to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. A recent press report
indicates that “moderate opposition” forces in Dayr az Zawr, aided by the Al Qaeda-affiliated
Nusra Front, are besieged on different sides of the city by the Syrian military and by ISIL.3739
Nusra and ISIL continue to clash inside Syria. Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts to disrupt or sever ISIL
supply lines through Abu Kamal or between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could benefit Syrian
military and Nusra Front forces also operating in the area.
Iran Dimension
The rapidity of the ISF collapse appeared to align the interests of Iran and the United States in
halting ISIL’s advance. Some senior officials of both governments stated that they would be open
to working together, at least diplomatically and politically, to reduce the threat posed by the ISILled offensive. Secretary of State John Kerry said in an interview that the United States was “open
to discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s something constructive that can be contributed by
Iran.”3840 U.S. diplomats reportedly discussed the situation in Iraq at the margins of the June 16
start of a previously-scheduled week of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, reportedly seeking Iran’s
cooperation to compel Prime Minister Maliki to share power, or possibly even be replaced
outright.3941 No decision on direct cooperation on Iraq was announced after that meeting.
Yet, many observers remain skeptical that that the United States could or should cooperate with
Iran on Iraq. Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Shiite-led government in Iraq and does not
necessarily share the U.S. goal of creating a broad-based, inclusive central government. Iran
reportedly helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 20032011 and which still contribute to sectarian conflict in Iraq. Apparently seeking first and foremost
to prevent the fall of Baghdad, Iran reportedly sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF) units into Iraq after the fall of Mosul to advise the ISF and help re-organize the Shiite
militias to assist in the fighting. The head of the IRGC-QF, Gen. Qasem Soleimani, reportedly
visited Baghdad as part of this effort.40 As ISIL-led fighters contested the city of Baqubah, which
is located in Diyala Province about 80 miles from the Iranian border, Iran threatened airstrikes
against any ISIL fighters who approached within 60 miles of Iranian territory.
It is unclear how the Iraq crisis might affect the balance of leverage between Iran and the United
States in international diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program. Each country could arguably stand
to protect its interests by obtaining help from the other. Some assess that Iran might offer
cooperation in Iraq—for example in compelling Maliki to share power—in exchange for U.S. and
37
is open to supporting an alternative to Maliki as Prime Minister but is not necessarily
insisting he be replaced. Some press reports indicate that Iraqi factions are taking Iran’s views
into account in the deliberations on the prime minister and other positions.
In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran has reportedly been delivering arms
and ammunition to Iraq since early in the crisis. In early July, Iran began returning to Iraq some of
the 100+ combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the
United States-led coalition. Iran had integrated the aircraft into its air force as “reparations” for
Iraq’s invasion of Iraq in 1980, but decided to return at least some of the jets to help the small
Iraqi air force that has not yet received the F-16s it bought from the United States. Iran delivered
as many as 12 Su-25s to Iraq in early July as part of this return process.
38
“The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation,
June 27, 2013.
39
OSC Report LIN2014061734348841, “Report says Syrian regime forces, Da’ish tighten siege on Dayr az Zawr,
food, fuel to run out,” Translation from Al Sharq al Awsat Online, June 17, 2014.
3840
Michael Gordon and David Sanger. “U.S. Is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” New York Times, June 17,
2014.
39
Ibid.
40
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2014/06/17/iranian-general-in-iraq-to-counterinsurgents.html41
Ibid.
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partner concessions on the final disposition of Iran’s program to enrich uranium.4111
Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Some experts assess that Iran’s assistance could, in the long run, be counterproductive. Iran
helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011.
Apparently seeking first and foremost to prevent the fall of Baghdad, Iran reportedly sent Islamic
Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) units into Iraq after the fall of Mosul to advise the
ISF and help re-organize the Shiite militias to assist in the fighting. The head of the IRGC-QF,
Gen. Qasem Soleimani, reportedly visited Baghdad as part of this effort.42 There are widespread
concerns that the revival of the militias is increasing tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those
who still live in Baghdad and fear arbitrary Shiite sectarian violence.
It is unclear how the Iraq crisis might affect the balance of leverage between Iran and the United
States in international diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program. Each country could arguably stand
to protect its interests by obtaining help from the other. Some assess that Iran might offer
cooperation in Iraq—for example in compelling Maliki to share power—in exchange for U.S. and
partner concessions on the final disposition of Iran’s program to enrich uranium.43 A U.S. State
Department spokeswoman said on June 18 that U.S. officials insist on maintaining a firewall
between the ongoing nuclear negotiations and the crisis in Iraq.
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis
The crisis in Iraq has raised a number of additional issues for U.S. and international policy.
Humanitarian Impact and Response42Response44
Approximately 500,000 people have been displaced by fighting in and around Mosul and in areas
reaching south towards Baghdad. The actual displacement figures remain fluid and difficult to
fully ascertain. Many of those displaced are reportedly fleeing to the relatively secure KRGcontrolled region or forming ad hoc camps along its border. Others have scattered elsewhere. This
is in addition to the estimated 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who fled fighting in
Anbar province earlier this year and the nearly 1 million people who sought refuge in Syria
between 2003 and 2011, many of whom are thought to remain displaced. An urgent humanitarian
crisis is emerging and humanitarian actors are scrambling to meet the needs of IDPs and conflict
victims.
Priority needs include shelter, food, clean water, and non-food items. IDPs are residing with
relatives and in host communities, mosques, tents, schools, unfinished buildings, and other
government facilities. Various reports indicate that access to hospitals is limited, with some not
functioning at all. Temporary transit facilities have been set up close to KRG border areas to
provide medical assistance and drinking water. Humanitarian organizations are mobilizing teams
to assess the situation further where possible and to coordinate a response.
According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the KRG policy on establishing IDP
camps has yet to be fully determined. Camps in Erbil and Dohuk already exist and the KRG
42
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2014/06/17/iranian-general-in-iraq-to-counterinsurgents.html.
43
“U.S. is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq,” op. cit.
44
This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
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authorities are working to find a way to address the needs of the displaced, including identifying a
location for additional camps. However, there are reports that local authorities do not want to
allow large numbers of IDPs into their territory. The region is already housing more than 200,000
refugees from Syria.
UNAMI is coordinating the response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team and some partner
organizations. In addition, the United Nations launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq
in March 2014 for $104 million to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to meet the
humanitarian needs of the people affected by fighting in Anbar Province. The SRP is being
revised to include support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider
geographical focus. Funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), a multilateral
funding mechanism administered through the United Nations, is also under consideration.
41
42
“U.S. is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” op. cit.
This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
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Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities and Citizens43Citizens45
On June 15, the Department of State announced that while the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would
remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily relocated” to Consulate Generals in
Basrah and Erbil as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan. The relocations
were reportedly being carried out by non-military means. The announcement stated that a
“substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would remain in place and that, with
an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be “fully equipped” to carry out
“its national security mission.”44
Military assets have been deployed to assist with the relocations of Embassy staff and to bolster
security at the U.S. diplomatic sites. On June 15, reports suggested 50 U.S. Marines had arrived at
the Embassy in response to a Department of State request, in order to bolster security.45 The
Marines were in addition to the reported 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors already in
place to protect the Embassy.46 On June 16 the White House informed Congress that up to
46
News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors were in place at
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy.47 Since the crisis began,
the White House has announced two deployments to reinforce that number. On June 16, the
White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military personnel were being
dispatched to Iraq to assist with the
temporary relocation of diplomatic personnel, a deployment
undertaken with the consent of the Government
of Iraq.47 The Department of Defense also confirmed that it “has airlift assets at the ready should
State Department request them, as per normal interagency support arrangements.”48
The State Department posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens:
Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel
to Iraq because of current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their
safety to “make plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the
Embassy should not be contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that
the Embassy “does not offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the
Embassy remained open, the statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq
would be limited due to the security environment.49
On June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number of U.S. citizen contract employees
to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in connection to the U.S. Foreign
Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by their companies due to security
concerns.50
43 of Iraq.48 On June 30, the White House
announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to provide
increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as to reinforce the
Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House statement, the deployed forces
would be accompanied by helicopters and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the
purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,”
according to the statement, and would “remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such
that it is no longer needed.”49 The Department of Defense had also previously confirmed that it
45
Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see: CRS Report IN10090,
Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities , by Alex Tiersky.
4446
Department of State Spokesperson, “Press Statement: Iraq,” press release, June 15, 2014.
45
Karen DeYoung, “Security boosted at U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, some personnel are relocated,” The Washington
Post, June 15, 2014.
4647
Dan Lamothe, “U.S. companies pulling contractors from Iraqi bases as security crumbles,” The Washington Post,
June 12, 2014.
4748
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the War Powers Resolution
Report for Iraq,” press release, June 16, 2014.
48
“DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014.
49
Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,”
press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html.
50
Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ.
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Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration5149
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Letter regarding
Iraq,” June 30, 2014.
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“has airlift assets at the ready should State Department request them, as per normal interagency
support arrangements.”50
The State Department posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens:
Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel
to Iraq because of current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their
safety to “make plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the
Embassy should not be contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that
the Embassy “does not offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the
Embassy remained open, the statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq
would be limited due to the security environment.51
On June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number of U.S. citizen contract employees
to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in connection to the U.S. Foreign
Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by their companies due to security
concerns.52
Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration53
The following represent possible questions that Members of Congress and staff might ask
Administration officials or outside experts regarding the situation in Iraq:.
What are the current operational and tactical threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Iraq? Does
the Administration believe those threats are imminent, and, if so, what does “imminent” mean in
this context? How reliant is the United States on the cooperation of the Iraqi government and its
security forces to mitigate those threats? Can the U.S. government mitigate those threats
effectively using available resources and authorities? Why or why not? If not, what additional
resources or authorities may be required?
How, if at all, should recent developments in Iraq shape congressional consideration of pending
authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance? Should the United
States legislatively condition the provision of future foreign or military assistance to Iraq on the
achievement of the conditions identified by President Obama in his June 13 remarks at the White
House or considered in strategic planning since thenan inclusive national government?
What are the humanitarian implications of the crisis, and what actions is the Administration
taking in support of international efforts to help refugees and internally displaced persons? How
might the crisis affect Administration requests to Congress for authorization and appropriations
legislation for FY2015?
50
“DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014.
Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,”
press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html.
52
Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ.
53
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
51
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What is the operational status of the increased security support approved by Congress for Iraq
since late 2013? How have Iraqi forces used increased U.S. material support, advice, and/or any
shared intelligence over this period? Would additional authorities or approvals be needed to
augment or expand such support? Please describe the nature of current military advisory efforts in
Iraq. How might those efforts be adapted to address the current crisis? Would expanded advisory
efforts require the introduction of combat-equipped U.S. military personnel?
To what extent are ISIL’s recent military advances a reflection of its organizational capabilities?
To what extent do recent developments stem from a lack of capability or organizational
shortcomings in Iraq’s security forces? To what extent have other armed groups facilitated or
taken advantage of ISIL’s advance? Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of ISIL and other
armed anti-government groups. How likely is ISIL to face resistance from Iraqi Sunnis in areas it
now controls?
What options are available for assisting locally organized forces in areas under ISIL control or
areas threatened by ISIL who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations? How might
such options affect the willingness of the Iraqi government to continue to cooperate with the
United States? Should the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey be encouraged to
support anti-ISIL entities in areas adjacent to their territory or support individuals and groups
over whom these governments have influence? Why or why not? If such third-party government
support is advisable, how might the United States encourage it?
51
Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the current Iraqi
government? How might the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states respond to increased U.S.
support for the Maliki government? How might Iran respond? How might such support affect
ongoing Iraqi consideration of post-election government formation issues? How can the United
States best pursue its immediate security interests and its objectives of preventing regional
sectarian war and foreclosing the possibility of a territorially integrated, democratically governed
Iraq?
What kind of role might Iraq’s Kurds play in this crisis? Are they likely to be of help in actively
countering ISIL in areas outside of Kurdistan Regional Government administrative control? Why
or why not? Are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources more likely to
strengthen or to weaken the security situation in that area and in Iraq generally? What actions are
ISIL and the Iraqi government likely to take vis-à-vis Kurdish forces and authorities? Are the
Kurds likely to attempt formal secession from Iraq in the near future as a result of the current
crisis? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?
What are overall U.S. priorities in this situation, and how should these priorities shape the U.S.
response? Is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that
Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional
differences? If the United States assists the Iraqi government and/or cooperates with other
countries to address this crisis, how might those actions affect regional balances and perceptions?
What are the connections between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as international
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program and the ongoing Syria conflict? Should the United States
seek or avoid an approach to the Iraq crisis that also involves these other issues?
Congressional Research Service
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Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Congressional Research Service
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