Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 11September 8, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33142
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Summary
Libya’s post-conflictQadhafi transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by
the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress
(GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing
Since an armed uprising ousted the government
of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities have failed to form a stable government,
address pressing security issues, reshape the country’s public finances, or create a viable
framework for postconflictpost-conflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya
in the immediate wake of the
2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally
organized political leaders
remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival
groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed
decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the
provision of local and national security, the political future of Qadhafi-era officials, the proper
role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan
territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminals. The U.S. State Department now describes
Libya as a “terrorist safe haven,” and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about
threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony.
After removing interim Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in a no-confidence vote in March 2014, the
GNC endorsed a plan to replace itself with a new elected Council of Representatives (COR).
Meanwhile, selection of a replacement interim Prime Minister became challenging and
controversial. Since mid-May, armed forces led by former General Khalifa Haftar have attacked
some militias in Benghazi, attracting support from several military commanders, including air
force and special forces personnel. GNC leaders and the acting interim cabinet have denounced
the operations and called on the military to respond only to official orders. Amid calls from the
interim cabinet and Haftar for the GNC to adjourn, election officials have announced that voting
for the COR is to be held on June 25, 2014. U.S. officials have called for dialogue and have said
that “moving forward with new elections that establish a broadly representative government will
help lay the foundation for a more stable Libya.”
Before the May 2014 fighting, Libya’s transition had been proceeding according to an August
2011 interim constitutional declaration that was amended and is set to be replaced by the work of
a 60-member Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA). The nationwide election for the CDA was
delayed until February 2014 and marred by low turnout, boycotts, and threats of violence. After a
new constitution is drafted, considered, and approved, more elections are expected to be held to
select legislative and executive representatives. Viewed cumulatively, these recent developments,
conflicts, and remaining requirements suggest that Libya’s planned transition is at risk.
For the United States and other supporters of Libya’s transition, these conditions and
circumstances pose serious challenges and policy questions. Members of Congress continue to
conduct oversight of ongoing U.S. transition support and security assistance programs in Libya
and are considering FY2015 appropriations requests for Libya programs, amid continuing
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the September 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities and
personnel in Benghazi. The House of Representatives voted to establish a Select Committee on
the Benghazi attacks in May 2014 (H.Res. 567). For more information on select congressional
and executive branch responses to the 2012 attacks, contact the analysts and specialists listed in
CRS Report R43536, Select Committee on Benghazi: CRS Experts, by Alex Tiersky.
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Contents
Political Overview ........................................................................................................................... 1
May-June 2014 Clashes Raise Questions About Transition ...................................................... 4
Select Security Issues....................................................................................................................... 6
Ansar al Sharia and Other Libya-based Extremist Groups ........................................................ 7
Seizure of Oil Facilities Challenges Government Authority, Raises Budget Questions.......... 10
Political Developments and Challenges......................................................................................... 12
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 14
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Requests..................................................................................... 14
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Select Libyan and U.S. Figures ........................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. Libya: Map and Select Country Data ............................................................................... 3
Figure 3. Recent Ansar al Sharia Imagery from Libya and Syria .................................................... 8
Figure 4. Oil Production in Libya .................................................................................................. 11
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2015 ...................................................................... 16
Appendixes
Appendix. Libyan History, Civil War, and Political Change ......................................................... 18
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
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Political Overview
More than three years after the start of the 2011 anti-Qadhafi uprising in Libya and more than 18
months after the September 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel in Benghazi, Libya’s
security situation is dire and the direction of its political transition remains in question. The State
Department describes Libya as a “terrorist safe haven,”1 and Obama Administration officials have
recently stated in testimony before Congress that armed Islamist extremist groups are gaining
strength in areas of eastern and southwestern Libya and exploiting unsecured weapons flows and
weak border controls. These networks appear to be linked to terrorism in the region, and support
foreign fighter and weapons flows to Syria.2 U.S. efforts to empower Libyan security forces
remain challenged by the strength of armed non-state groups and discord among the country’s
interim leaders. These factors have delayed the completion of the post-Qadhafi transition.
Prior to the outbreak of conflict in mid-May 2014, on March 11, 2014, the elected General
National Congress (GNC) ousted interim Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in a vote of no confidence,
just days after Zeidan returned from a security-focused policy conference with U.S. and other
third-country officials in Rome. Zeidan, who was briefly abducted by militiamen in October
2013, had previously survived numerous attempted no confidence votes and had long faced
criticism at home and abroad for what some observers viewed as weak leadership. Zeidan has
rejected criticism of his tenure and denied corruption allegations, arguing instead that Libya lies
“between the hands of militia groups,” and warning that the “proliferation of weapons and
religious extremism are becoming mutually stronger.”3 Zeidan’s tenure was marked by a series of
crises stemming from armed groups’ demands for the political isolation of Qadhafi-era officials,
the seizure of oil infrastructure, and the strengthening of armed Islamist groups in eastern and
southern Libya.
After just weeks in his interim position, acting Prime Minister Abdullah al Thinni offered his
resignation and declined to appoint a new cabinet in the wake of Zeidan’s departure, citing threats
to his life and his family by armed groups; his doubts about the GNC’s ability to promptly
confirm new nominees; and what he reportedly sees as a lack of sufficient decision-making
authority granted by the GNC to executive offices. Al Thinni had served as Defense Minister
under Zeidan, and militiamen had previously kidnapped his son, releasing him in January 2014.
Gunmen attacked the GNC on April 29, 2014, and disrupted a vote on Al Thinni’s replacement.
The attack was one of a series of attacks on the GNC since early 2013 that have underscored the
increasing political pressure placed on the body and its members by disgruntled Libyan citizens,
competing militias, and rival political factions. A long-running debate over the GNC’s tenure
culminated on March 30, 2014, when GNC members voted to replace the body with a new 200member Council of Representatives (COR), set to be elected on June 25. Once elected, the COR
is to determine a process for identifying new interim executive leaders to manage the
government’s affairs. Meanwhile, leadership disputes continue, and the GNC, the interim
government, and its would-be replacements seek to distance themselves from ongoing violence.
1
State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 5, April 2014.
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 2: Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa, April 2014.
3
U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Report AFL2014041752530610, “Deposed Libyan Premier Says not
Afraid of Death, Intends To Return To Help Find Solution to Crisis,” Jeune Afrique (Paris) April 14–19, 2014.
2
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Figure 1. Select Libyan and U.S. Figures
Source: Prepared by CRS. Images derived from official Libyan and U.S. government sources.
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The revised transitional roadmap currently calls for an elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly
(CDA) to produce a draft constitution for consideration by elected legislators and the Libyan
public. Forty-eight out of 60 of the Assembly’s members were elected in February 2014 amid
very low voter turnout; the remaining 12 seats were not filled due to boycotts and security
disruptions, but are being filled as follow-on elections are held. As of May 14, Libya’s High
National Election Commission reported that 55 members had been elected. According to the 2011
interim constitutional declaration, the CDA is scheduled to have four months from its first session
to produce a draft constitution for consideration, a timeline which many outside observers viewed
as ambitious and potentially problematic even prior to recent events. The CDA held an initial
meeting on April 20, in Al Bayda, and is consulting with Libyans and international supporters.
Figure 2. Libya: Map and Select Country Data
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May-June 2014 Clashes Raise Questions About Transition
The onset of conflict in mid-May 2014 between forces led by General Khalifa Belqassem Haftar
and various militia groups amplified the political and security challenges Libya faces. Forces
loyal to the Qadhafi-era former military commander targeted militia forces in Benghazi on May
16, reportedly leaving dozens dead and injured on both sides. Interim authorities in Tripoli
acknowledged that military forces (including air force personnel) participated in the operation
without official orders, and commanders of important military forces in Tobruk, Benghazi, and
other areas have since pledged support for Haftar’s “Operation Dignity.” An armed attack on the
elected General National Congress (GNC) and the issuance of a statement by another military
officer dismissing the GNC on May 18 brought the new crisis to the capital.
On May 19, the interim cabinet and acting Prime Minister Al Thinni reiterated their demand that
military orders be coordinated with the cabinet and called on the GNC to take steps to clarify the
leadership of the government and adjourn until the new COR can be elected. The GNC has not
accepted the cabinet’s proposal, and the cabinet has issued subsequent statements criticizing the
GNC for ignoring its initiative and for inviting certain armed forces to Tripoli. Some GNC leaders
have rejected Haftar’s operations and his calls for an immediate replacement of the GNC.
In remarks on May 21, Haftar spoke on behalf of a “High Military Council of the Armed Forces”
and accused most of the GNC of having betrayed Libya. He called for the creation of a civilianled High Council for State Affairs to manage the business of government until the election of the
COR. In a disputed vote on May 27, 93 members of the GNC gathered to consider a cabinet lineup proposed by Ahmed Maiteeq—83 members supported the proposal. Interim Prime Minister Al
Thinni sought a judicial ruling regarding the validity of the vote and called for the GNC to halt
the transfer of executive powers. On June 9, Libya's Supreme Court ruled that the GNC's vote to
install Maiteeq as Prime Minister was unconstitutional. Interim Prime Minister Al Thinni,
Maiteeq, and GNC leaders accepted the court's ruling in public statements. In the midst of these
political disputes, Libyan election officials confirmed on May 29 that elections for the COR are to
be held on June 25, 2014.4
Haftar’s forces have continued their military campaign with sporadic but high-profile airstrikes
on areas of Benghazi’s suburbs believed to be under the control of Ansar al Sharia and other
opponents. On June 4, Haftar’s compound outside the city was targeted by a large vehicle-borne
bomb, but Haftar and his senior supporters reportedly were not seriously injured. In a series of
media interviews, Haftar has repeated that his goal is to combat what he describes as terrorists
and their political supporters, including Muslim Brotherhood members.5 Overall, Haftar has
emphasized a broadly held desire to establish security in the country and rebuild the national
army. He denies he is seeking power personally, while not ruling out a future elected leadership
role. In a radio address following the attempted attack on his base, Haftar reportedly said:
These killers, whom we call the terrorists, have not and will never reach any target they
desire. We are continuing in our endeavor. God willing, they will pay a heavy price and we
shall not stop until they either leave or being eliminated, because our citizens, whom they
4
High National Election Commission President Emad al Sayeh, Press Conference, May 29, 2014.
In an interview attributed to Haftar published in an Egyptian newspaper, he is quoted as having said, “We shall not
retreat until we destroy them and destroy Al Qaeda and the other militias which are nothing but tentacles of the Muslim
Brotherhood under different names.” OSC Report IML2014052229779287, “Libya’s Haftar Vows not to Leave Single
Brotherhood Member on Libyan Territory,” Al Watan (Cairo), May 22, 2014.
5
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have tortured for years, can absolutely never coexist with them again. We are ready and we
are continuing on the road and will absolutely never stop.6
Some Libyan observers continue to criticize Haftar’s actions as a coup attempt and warn that the
military units, local militias, and politicians who are embracing Haftar’s operations may be
seeking to take advantage of a broadly shared Libyan popular desire for the reestablishment of
national security in order to advance local or personal ambitions. In a visit to Benghazi on June 5,
acting Interim Prime Minister Al Thinni called on city residents to support the efforts of the local
Special Forces units in combatting armed extremist groups and asserting state security control.
For the United States and other backers of the interim government, Libya’s deteriorating security
conditions, fragmented political scene, and shifting transition timelines have presented several
policy dilemmas. The State Department has said that the United States government does not
condone or support Haftar’s actions and has not assisted them. At the same time, U.S. officials
have not categorically rejected Haftar’s operations against armed extremist groups; the U.S.
response has been to call on all sides to deescalate the situation, to recommit to dialogue, and to
move forward with planned parliamentary elections. In a joint statement on May 23, the United
States, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom said:7
The European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States,
deeply concerned by the repeated acts of violence, call on all sides to refrain from the use of
force and to address differences by political means. We stand ready to support an inclusive
reconciliation process in order to gather all the Libyans in support of the political transition,
with the support of the United Nations.
We emphasize the importance of carrying on the transition in a peaceful and democratic way.
We insist, in this framework, on the opportunity of holding parliamentary elections as soon
as possible. The democratic constitutional process has begun its work to codify the principles
of democracy that will protect all citizens of Libya, irrespective of geographic or tribal
affiliation.
The process leading to a peaceful transition of power should be based upon broad consensus,
avoiding any acts which seek to undermine that process.
To date, U.S. officials and others working to support Libya’s transition and to combat Libyabased transnational threats have had to rely on interim leaders and institutions to make difficult
policy, budget, and personnel decisions to identify and support joint priorities. Meanwhile,
insecurity and violence have hampered progress in the transition. Infighting and inertia have
delayed improvements in the performance of government ministries, while the initiative and vigor
shown by various armed non-state actors has undermined the state’s limited investments in
reconstituting its security forces.
In a reinforcing cycle, indecision and insecurity have eroded the legitimacy of those leaders and
institutions tasked with reversing threats to Libya’s stability. Outsiders, including the United
States, have felt increasingly obliged to help break this negative cycle and to insist on an
expedited transition, while recognizing that, in the words of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
William Burns, “no one can make Libyans’ choices for them” and outside intervention may
6
OSC Report IML2014060469623835, “Retired Maj-Gen Haftar promises tougher response to assassination attempt,”
Libya International Channel, June 4, 2014.
7
State Department, Joint Statement on Libya, May 23, 2014.
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inflame problems further.8 On June 5, State Department spokesperson Marie Harf said, “we
believe Libyans need to address their challenges through constructive and democratic means. It’s
not for us to choose the future of Libya.”
The May 2014 clashes have revealed the weakness of the interim government’s control over even
the limited forces that were believed to be under its direct command. It is unclear what effect, if
any, this may have on U.S. and allied efforts to provide security assistance or training to Libyan
security forces in the immediate future. On May 21, U.S. Ambassador to Libya Deborah Jones
acknowledged that U.S. officials were reviewing and “rethinking” U.S. security assistance
programs and plans in light of the crisis.9 U.S. officials, including Ambassador Jones, continue to
emphasize the importance of building a credible, responsive, and responsible state security
apparatus in Libya, while recognizing that events and changing conditions in Libya may require
flexibility in planning and execution.
Until military chain-of-command issues are resolved, the new Council of Representatives is
elected, new executive leaders are identified, and a new constitution is developed, endorsed, and
implemented, the Libyan government may lack the political legitimacy, will, and capabilities
necessary to take assertive action on difficult security and economic issues.
Inaction may have considerable negative consequences, as unchecked threats could become more
costly and risky to address over time. If current conditions persist or deteriorate further, the
country may continue to fragment as locally organized groups and other non-state actors seek to
protect their interests and gain advantage over rivals. Under such circumstances, groups active in
Libya that are hostile to U.S. interests may grow stronger. On the other hand, direct efforts by the
Libyan government or other governments to confront armed non-state groups or fundamentally
recast transition plans risk igniting localized conflicts. Such conflicts could spread within or
beyond Libya’s borders and further disrupt Libya’s political transition or regional security.
In this context, Members of Congress are considering the Administration’s appropriations
requests for FY2015 foreign assistance programs in Libya (see “U.S. Foreign Assistance and
Requests” below) and conducting oversight of U.S. efforts to strengthen Libyan security forces
and support Libya’s troubled transition.
Select Security Issues
The U.S. intelligence community’s January 2014 unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment
described the terrorist threat to Western and Libyan government interests in Libya as “acute,
especially in the east of the country.” Administration officials repeated these views in subsequent
congressional testimony and statements. U.S. AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez10
8
OSC Report IML2014042533918510, “U.S. Supports Efforts to Enhance, Reform Security Institutions in Libya,”
Libya Herald (Tripoli), April 24, 2014.
9
Ambassador Deborah Jones, Remarks at Stimson Center, Washington, DC, May 21, 2014. Ambassador Jones said,
“At the time, of course, that the programs were set up and established, the situation was very different and being
presented in a very different way. So even as we speak, you know, we are certainly rethinking the program, but it
doesn’t negate the need for a national army.”
10
Testimony of General David Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM], before the House Armed
Services Committee, March 5, 2014.
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described Libyan institutions as “very, very weak”11 and warned that Al Qaeda adherents and
affiliates are gaining strength as “arms, ammunition, explosives from Libya ... continue to move
throughout the region in northwest Africa.”12 U.S. and French officials also have issued warnings
about the reported activities in southwestern Libya of Sahel-based terrorists and arms traffickers,
including members of Al Qaeda affiliates. When asked to compare threats to U.S. security from
Libya and Syria, Defense Department Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin recently said, “my
sense is that Libya isn't where Syria is today, but again—left unchecked, left without the proper
engagement in building the partnership capacity with the nascent Libyan forces—that we could
end up in a situation where it’s not too dissimilar if no attention is paid to it.”13
United Nations (U.N.) officials confirmed these trends, adding in a late February 2014 report that,
since September 2013,
The security environment continued to deteriorate, and there was no significant progress in
integrating members of brigades into an effective national army and police force or in the
disarming of other armed groups.... Security sector governance at the national level remains
hampered by lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities and an ill-defined security sector
architecture that has failed to undergo significant reform or manage the security crises
effectively. As a result, a well-defined government plan to rebuild and reform State security
institutions remains elusive.14
Ansar al Sharia and Other Libya-based Extremist Groups
On January 10, 2014, the U.S. State Department announced the designation of Ansar al Sharia in
Benghazi and Ansar al Sharia in Darnah as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities
under Executive Order 13224. According to the State Department, the groups:
have been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, frequent assassinations, and
attempted assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya, and the
September 11, 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya.
Members of both organizations continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests in Libya.
Ansar al Sharia has vigorously condemned the military operations against it by Haftar-aligned
forces as a “war against the religion and Islam backed by the West and their Arab allies.” In a
statement issued on May 19, the group called on pro-sharia tribal figures to support the group
against Haftar and said “the war declared is against the application of the sharia and the
establishment of the religion. This war is led by the infidels, the Jews and the Christians, as well
as the seculars and traitors who support them.”15 In a follow-on statement on May 27, an Ansar al
11
Press Briefing by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory and Gen. Rodriguez, Washington, DC, April
8, 2014.
12
Testimony of General David Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM], before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 6, 2014.
13
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict [SOLIC] Michael
Lumpkin before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 11, 2014.
14
Report of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
February 2014.
15
OSC Report TRN2014052021537855, “Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Vows To Defend Benghazi Against Attacks, Calls On
Tribes To Cooperate,” May 19, 2014.
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Sharia leader warned the United States against intervention in Libya and condemned Haftar,
saying: “They said that their war was against terrorism and extremism, as they claim, but the
reality is that their aim is to take over power.... We remind America that if it tries to intervene, we
remind it of its despicable defeats in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and that it will see worse
from Libya than what it has seen [so far].”16 Libya’s official religious authorities condemned
Ansar al Sharia’s statement, but the group has rejected their censure, citing a right to defend
themselves from Haftar’s offensive.
Libyan media and Ansar al Sharia social media accounts suggest that the organization’s current
operations extend to Benghazi, Sirte, and areas of eastern Libya and include military training,
security patrols, outreach and education efforts, and public works projects. The group also has
publicized its efforts to deliver relief supplies to civilians in northern Syria and other countries.
The U.S. government has not released a detailed unclassified assessment of the size and
capabilities of Ansar al Sharia in Libya. Publicly available information suggests the group’s
membership may be in the high hundreds or low thousands of individuals, some of whom possess
truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, military-style uniforms, and assault
rifles. Some images suggest the group possesses man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADs).
Figure 3. Recent Ansar al Sharia Imagery from Libya and Syria
Source: Ansar al Sharia on Twitter, collected and compiled by CRS in May 2014.
Notes: Clockwise from top left, images purport to show (1) children engaged with AAS-affiliated scholar, (2)
AAS security personnel conducting a drill, (3) the before-and-after result of an AAS public works program in
Benghazi; and (4) an AAS campaign delivering relief supplies in Syria. Center: Ansar al Sharia’s official logo.
16
OSC Report IML2014052831841695, “Libyan Ansar Al Shari'ah Praise Their ‘Victory’” Libya TV (Doha), May 27,
2014.
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Investigations into 2012 Attacks on U.S. Facilities and Personnel in Benghazi
U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were killed on September 11, 2012,
during an assault by armed terrorists on two U.S facilities in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) remains the lead U.S. agency tasked with pursuing the individuals responsible for the attacks.
Other government agencies, including the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD), and elements of the
intelligence community (IC), support the FBI’s efforts to bring the attackers to justice.
On September 28, 2012, the U.S. intelligence community concluded publicly that the incident was a “deliberate and
organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists,” and said that at the time it remained “unclear if any group or
person exercised overall command and control of the attack and if extremist group leaders directed their members
to participate. However, we do assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or
sympathetic to Al Qaeda.”17 As of May 2014, some progress reportedly has been made identifying suspects, but no
arrests have been made. In January 2014, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the attacks stated that,
“Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al Sharia, Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012,
attacks.”18 Also in January, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reported that, “The IC has
collected extensive information on many of the Benghazi attackers, but early coordination between IC and the DoD
was lacking, many intelligence gaps remain, and the Administration has yet to establish an effective plan to bring
known attackers to justice.”19 The U.S. government has offered up to $10 million through the Rewards for Justice
program for information that brings to justice those responsible for the attack.
U.S. military officials have referred to continuing intelligence gaps in Libya in recent unclassified testimony before
Congress, and U.S. AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez said on April 8 that continuing U.S. efforts
against the network responsible for the Benghazi attacks are “made more difficult, obviously, by the security
situation.”20 Rodriguez added that U.S. investigators “don't have everybody identified and located,” and said that the
feasibility of operations to apprehend or otherwise target suspects in Libya “depends ... on the situation and the risk
that people want to take.” In October 2013, U.S. military forces reportedly were involved in the capture of Nazih al
Ruqai’i (aka Abu Anas al Libi) in Tripoli. Ruqai’i is now in U.S. law enforcement custody and is on trial on charges
related to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa.
Administration officials have repeatedly described Libya as a high risk operational environment, even with regard to
routine diplomatic operations in Tripoli. Operational risks presumably are higher in denied areas of Libya that are
controlled by anti-U.S. forces. On May 27, 2013, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Libya that
“warns U.S. citizens against all travel to Libya and recommends that U.S. citizens currently in Libya depart
immediately.” The warning further states that, “State security institutions lack basic capabilities to prevent conflict. As
a result, the potential for political violence continues, centered around specific events, including elections for a new
General National Congress and appointment of a new government, both anticipated for as early as June.”
Across Libya, attacks on foreign diplomatic facilities and personnel and on foreign nationals have continued in recent
months. Since April 2013, reported attacks have targeted the French and Russian embassies in Tripoli; the Turkish
Consul in Benghazi; the Finnish and Swedish consulates in Benghazi; a U.S. national teaching in Benghazi; a Turkish
national in Tripoli; oil workers from the United Kingdom and New Zealand; Egyptian Christians in Benghazi; Tunisian
Embassy employees and a Libyan employee of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli; and the Jordanian ambassador to Libya,
Fawaz al Etan, who was kidnapped on April 15, among others.
Two other Islamist militia forces and services organizations based in the eastern city of Darnah
also pose a challenge to Libyan authorities: the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and the Islamic Youth
Shura Council of Darnah. The latter group conducted a large display of military weaponry in a
convoy near the city in early April 2014, and the former group, named for the victims of a
Qadhafi-era prison massacre of predominantly Islamist detainees, has questioned the authority of
17
Statement, Director of Public Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence Shawn Turner, September 28, 2012.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya,
September 11-12, 2012, January 15, 2014.
19
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Benghazi Investigation Update, January 2014.
20
Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory and General David Rodriguez, Press Briefing, April 8, 2014.
18
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transitional officials. Constitutional assembly elections were disrupted in Darnah in February
2014. The Youth Shura Council has posted images of its checkpoints and seizures of alcohol and
contraband goods, and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade routinely posts images of its social
services activities. Ansar al Sharia members conducted and publicized similar operations when
that group was establishing itself in Benghazi in 2012.
In southwestern Libya, Islamist extremist operatives reportedly are active, and may be using
remote areas to serve as safe havens or transit areas for operations in neighboring Niger and
Algeria. Some press reports suggest that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of the group responsible
for the January 2013 attack on the natural gas facility at In Amenas, Algeria, that killed three
Americans, may be in southwestern Libya. U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed those
reports but describe Belmokhtar’s group—Al Murabitoun—as active in the area and as “the
greatest near-term threat to U.S. and international interests in the Sahel, because of its publicly
stated intent to attack Westerners and proven ability to organize complex attacks.”21
Seizure of Oil Facilities Challenges Government Authority, Raises
Budget Questions
In April 2014, government negotiators reached a partial agreement with armed groups who have
been occupying many of the key oil fields and export terminals in eastern Libya since mid-2013.
Led by a militia commander named Ibrahim Jadhran, the forces have demanded payment of
salaries to local guards and the implementation of oil revenue sharing arrangements on behalf of
the Cyrenaica Political Bureau, which seeks regional autonomy for eastern Libya.22 Tribal and
other local forces in other regions of Libya also seized oil infrastructure, driving production to
lows not seen since the 2011 anti-Qadhafi conflict.
Jadhran’s attempts to sell oil under his forces’ control have been thwarted to date, most notably in
March 2014, when U.S. Navy personnel seized and returned to Libya a North Korean-flagged
tanker ship carrying oil from the then-rebel-held port at Al Hariga (Tobruk). United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2146, adopted in March 2014, authorizes Member States to inspect
on the high seas vessels designated as carrying oil illegally exported from Libya and,
authorizes Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances, in
full compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as
may be applicable, to carry out such inspections and direct the vessel to take appropriate
actions to return the crude oil, with the consent of and in coordination with the Government
of Libya, to Libya.
The agreement reached in early April saw export terminals at Al Hariga and Zuwaytina returned
to government control. The terminal at Al Hariga is now operational, and exports have risen to
220,000 barrels per day (bpd) but remain well short of Libya’s 1.6 million bpd capacity. Major
export terminals at Al Sidra and Ras Lanouf remain under the control of Jadhran-aligned forces,
and Jadhran refuses to engage with Prime Minister-designee Maiteeq, citing the dispute over his
election.23 Important oil fields representing one-third of the country’s potential oil output also
21
State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 6, April 2014.
Margaret Coker, “Ex-Rebel, With Militia, Lays Claim to Libyan Oil Patch,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2013.
23
Maher Chmaytelli, Libya Rebels Keep Oil-Sharing Condition for Ports Opening, Bloomberg News, April 8, 2014;
and, OSC Report IML2014050778540693, “Head of Libyan Rebel Oil Blockade Group Condemns Appointment of
(continued...)
22
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were under the control of other non-state groups in western Libya, and as of mid-May, reports
suggested that the government had reached agreement with protestors to reopen some of them.
The inability of interim authorities to regain full control of vital national infrastructure facilities
has undermined public confidence in the government.
The immediate fiscal impact of the oil facilities crisis has been reflected in a severe drop in
national government oil export revenue receipts since mid-2013, which in turn has created some
challenges in making timely payments of some state salaries and subsidies. Nevertheless, the
country’s large foreign reserves and investment portfolios provide some limited flexibility for
covering recent budget shortfalls. In April 2014, the World Bank estimated that Libya’s reserves
had declined “to about $100 billion in 2014 and are expected to decline further to $82 billion in
2015 from $122 billion in 2013 when the government started running budget deficits.”24
Figure 4. Oil Production in Libya
Source: Created by CRS using U.S. Energy Information Administration data.
Even if oil exports and revenue flows are fully restored, the balance of priorities reflected in
Libya’s national budget may prove to be a politically divisive and controversial issue. Large
components of the annual budgets submitted for GNC approval by Libyan interim authorities to
date have been directed toward paying public sector salaries and subsidies, with far less directed
toward development, education, health, and infrastructure projects. The draft 2014 budget sets
(...continued)
New PM,” Libya TV (Doha) May 7, 2014.
24
“Fiscal and current account balances have deteriorated sharply due to the oil blockade that has reduced oil revenue
by 80 percent and also to continued expansionary fiscal policy.” World Bank, Office of the Chief Economist for the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Regional Economic Update, April 2014, p. 9-10.
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more than 37% aside for salaries and subsidies.25 Reforming subsidies for items such as fuel
could provoke protests or disrupt reported smuggling arrangements that shuttle subsidized fuel
out of the country. The interim government’s responsiveness to demands for the expansion of
public sector salaries since 2011 has demonstrated the potential volatility of reductions in the
scope or value of state payrolls.
Political Developments and Challenges
The July 2012 election of an interim 200-member General National Congress (GNC) to replace
the appointed TNC marked an important step on the planned transition timeline and was Libya’s
first national election in nearly 50 years. Many Libyans and outside observers expressed hope that
the elected interim Congress would appoint a cabinet that would have been able to leverage the
body’s election-derived democratic legitimacy to act decisively on key issues. However, like their
predecessors in the Transitional National Council, the GNC and its cabinet have proven unable to
successfully address a number of chronic challenges, some of which have been exacerbated by
the consequences of the violent revolution and complicated by the legacies of Qadhafi’s
patronage- and fear-based rule.
Many expert observers of Libya’s domestic politics have emphasized the general weakness and
fractured condition of Libya’s political landscape after 40 years of idiosyncratic abuse by Qadhafi
and his supporters. Qadhafi purposely undermined state institutions, including the military, and
manipulated tribal, regional, and political groups to maintain power. The 2011 conflict
empowered local groups and weakened the capacity of state security bodies. Transitional
authorities have inherited weak national government institutions and personnel that largely lack
the expertise and infrastructure to implement government decisions. Competition among some
groups has intensified during the transition, driven in part by the desire of anti-Qadhafi forces to
isolate not only former members of Qadhafi’s inner circle but a broader group of officials who
served under the former regime. Political support for interim leaders among some Libyans has
waned in light of the government’s failure to rapidly improve basic services, ensure security, or
deliver expected financial support via salaries, subsidies, and relief payments.
Key steps in the transition process, such as the selection of interim legislative and executive
leaders and the drafting and consideration of a new constitution, are complicated by the wide
range of security threats confronting Libyans in different parts of the country. Among the most
pressing and potentially divisive political issues still under debate are:
Islam and the State: Most Libyans support a prominent role for Sunni Islamic traditions in
public life, but differ in their personal preferences and interpretations of their faith. Libyan social
norms are relatively conservative and traditional, and Libyans remain engaged in a long-running
public debate about the proper role for Islam in public life. In the past, that debate led to violence
between the Qadhafi government and armed Islamist opponents. In the present, the debate has
taken on new urgency given the opportunity to define a new constitution. Calls for and against
strict interpretations and enforcement of sharia have featured regularly in public discourse since
the fall of the Qadhafi regime.
25
On May 7, GNC Finance and Budget Committee Chairman Mohammed Abdullah stated that the 85.9 billion dinar
budget for 2014 includes more than 18.7 billion dinars for salaries and 13.1 billion dinars for subsides.
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Libyans hold a wide array of views on these questions and are now freely sharing them. Armed
Salafist groups such as Ansar al Sharia demand that sharia be codified and enforced immediately.
In eastern Libya, these groups have become more organized and increasingly publicly active over
time. Other Libyan figures, including some Muslim Brotherhood leaders, have indicated they “are
calling for the establishment of a civilian state but with an Islamic reference.”26 In July 2012, the
TNC issued a declaration advising the newly elected government and the then-yet-to-be elected
constitutional committee to preserve sharia as the principal source of legislation under the new
constitution and to not submit the matter to a national referendum.27 In December 2013, the GNC
endorsed a statement that Libyan law must comply with sharia, sparking criticism from secular
groups and derision from religious conservatives demanding immediate implementation.28
Federalism and Regional Politics: Discussions about federalism in Libya combine general
debates about centralized administration versus decentralization and specific historical claims of
inequality among Libya’s regions. A widely espoused commitment to national unity and solidarity
has defined much of the political rhetoric of the post-Qadhafi transition period. Nevertheless,
some eastern Libyans fear that a consolidation of power at the national level will continue a
political pattern under Qadhafi that they believe marginalized the east and neglected its
development. As such, procedures for selecting a new constitutional drafting body have been
amended twice, each time in an effort to respond to calls from activists in eastern Libya
concerned that the constitution would be drafted on the basis of proportional differences in
population rather than equal regional representation.
Broader debate focuses on the relative merits of administrative decentralization or regional
autonomy in a federal system. Many Libyans have embraced calls for decentralization while
expressing concern that the political assertion of regional identity and calls by some easterners for
autonomy risk dividing the country and may spark renewed conflict. Similar debates, concerns,
and risks featured prominently during Libya’s founding as a unified state under United Nations
auspices in the early 1950s. Resentment of the centralization of state authority, first under the
easterner-dominated monarchy in the 1960s and then under Qadhafi from the 1970s onward,
divided Libyans on regional lines. Regional identities remain relatively weak compared with local
identities, but national identity and solidarity may prove weaker still.
Security and the Rule of Law: Qadhafi used the security bodies of the state to crush political
dissent and interfere in the daily lives of Libyans. As a result, debates among Libyans over the
relative powers of security authorities and the rule of law are very sensitive. The dispersion of
authority in the hands of armed groups and the existence of what one analyst has called “local
monopolies of violence” further complicates matters.29 In spite of these complications and
legacies, security conditions are the immediate and overarching concern for Libyan authorities.
Armed non-state groups continue to operate in many areas of the country, government authorities
rely on militias to provide security for key cities and facilities, and the country’s borders,
infrastructure, and military sites are unevenly secured. Threats to elected and appointed leaders
have grown, and coercive kidnappings and assassinations are rampant in some areas of the
26
OSC Report GMP20120305825005, “Libyan Brotherhood Leader Urges Creation of Civil State With Islamic
Reference,” March 5, 2012.
27
TNC Decree Number 7 of 2012, July 5, 2012.
28
OSC Report TRL2013120722786731, “Libya: Al-Rayah Releases Ansar al-Sharia Statement Condemning GNC
Statement on Islamic Sharia,” December 6, 2013.
29
Jacob Mundy, “Militia Politics in Libya’s National Elections,” Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, July 5, 2012.
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country. Militia forces based in and around Zintan, Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi remain the
most powerful security actors in the country.
Since late 2011, sporadic outbreaks of violence among rival militia groups, criminals, and armed
citizens have shaken Libyans’ confidence in transitional leaders and in each other. From one
perspective, the number of security disruptions is smaller than might otherwise be expected in a
post-conflict environment awash in weapons and dominated by dozens of armed groups with
varying relationships to state authority. From another perspective, the level of crime, the
continuing independence of local militia, the broad availability of weapons, and the relative
limitations of national security bodies suggest that Libya’s security remains a function of
Libyans’ self-restraint rather than the capability of national security authorities.
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
The September 2012 Benghazi attacks and ongoing clashes, assassinations, and abductions
involving militia groups have challenged U.S. plans to engage in a more comprehensive security
assistance and transition support relationship with Libya. Some Libyans have questioned the
interim government’s decision to seek foreign support for security reform and transition guidance,
while some U.S. observers have questioned Libya’s need for U.S. foreign assistance given its oil
resources and relative wealth. To date, the Obama Administration and some in Congress have
favored a partnership approach that seeks to build Libyan capacity, coordinate international
action, and leverage Libyan financial resources to meet shared objectives. Nevertheless, in some
cases where the United States government desires Libyan government action on priority issues,
especially in the security sector, U.S. officials weigh choices over whether U.S. assistance can
build sufficient Libyan capacity quickly and cheaply enough, whether interim leaders are
appropriate or reliable partners for the United States, and whether threats to U.S. interests may
require direct U.S. action. The conflict and political intrigue of May and June 2014 may
complicate U.S. partnership with Libyans further, as Libyans contest the legitimacy of institutions
and leaders.
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Requests
U.S. engagement in Libya since the anti-Qadhafi conflict ended has shifted from humanitarian
assistance to focus on transition assistance and security sector support. Over $25 million in
USAID-administered programs funded through the Office of Transition Initiatives, regional
accounts, and reprogrammed funds were identified to support the activities of Libyan civil society
groups and provide technical assistance to Libya’s nascent electoral administration bodies from
2011 to 2013. The security-related withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Libya in the wake of the
Benghazi attacks temporarily affected the implementation and oversight of U.S.-funded transition
assistance programs, and Congress has acted to condition the provision of future U.S. assistance
to the Libyan government on cooperation in the investigation. As noted above, Administration
officials are reviewing U.S. security assistance programs in light of recent events.30
The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, Sections 7015(f) and 7041(f))
conditions the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to the central government of Libya on a State
30
Ambassador Deborah Jones, Remarks at Stimson Center, Washington, DC, May 21, 2014.
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Department certification that the government is cooperating with U.S. government efforts to
investigate and bring to justice those responsible for the September 2012 Benghazi attacks. The
act and accompanying explanatory report further require detailed notification of the
appropriations committees of planned obligations of funds for Libya programs to include vetting
procedures for recipients. The act also prohibits the provision of U.S. assistance to Libya for
infrastructure projects “except on a loan basis with terms favorable to the United States.”
Administration officials have remained committed to providing transition support to Libyan
government entities and civil society groups and have requested new funding to continue current
programming in FY2015 (see Table 1). The FY2015 State Department foreign assistance budget
request identifies similar strategic goals as the FY2014 request: “1) supporting Libyan
government efforts to develop a basic security capability to reduce threats and sustain a
successful democratic transition, and 2) maintaining progress on Libya’s transition to a
permanent, inclusive democracy accountable to the Libyan people.” In FY2014, the State
Department’s budget justification also identified “enhancing the Libyan government’s capacity to
bring to justice those responsible for the Benghazi attacks” as a primary U.S. goal.
Of the funds requested for FY2015, $1.5 million would support International Military Education
and Training (IMET); $1 million would support International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) programs; and $3.5 million would support Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining and Related Programs (NADR) to expand engagement with Libyan security forces. In
addition, $9.5 million would support U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
programs “to help consolidate-democratic reforms” through technical assistance, training,
capacity building, and electoral process support, including $3 million requested in part to fund the
development of a “public financial management framework.” The Administration is also
requesting an additional $20 million in global FY2015 Transition Initiatives funding over
FY2014 levels and intends to use $10 million of its Complex Crises Fund request “to address
emerging needs and opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.” Some of
these funds could support activities in Libya.
To date, the centerpieces of U.S. security assistance efforts have been a $3.8 million Libyan
Security Reform Initiative to provide training to security sector leaders and an $18.4 million
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) initiative to improve border security. The latter
program includes the provision of some equipment and training for Libyan special operations
forces and support for border security forces in neighboring Algeria, Chad, and Niger.
On January 22, 2014, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to establish a Libyangovernment funded military training program in Bulgaria to create a General Purpose Force
(GPF) of 6,000-8,000 Libyan personnel. The U.S. contribution to the GPF training program
would complement parallel coordinated training efforts by Turkey, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Morocco, and France, which seek to train up to 20,000 personnel for such a force in the near
term. Congressional committees of jurisdiction reviewed the proposed $600 million Foreign
Military Sale for the training program, and, as of early April 2014, the U.S. government was
awaiting funds from the Libyan government to begin the training effort.31
31
Press Briefing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory and Gen. Rodriguez, April 8, 2014.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2015
(thousands of dollars, by account/program and fiscal year of appropriation unless noted)
Account/Program
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Complex Crises Fund (CCF-OCO)
FY2013
FY2014
Estimate
FY2015
Request
15,000
-
-
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
150
-
150
949
-
-
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
319
-
296
142
1,500
1,500
USAID Transition Initiatives (TI/TI-OCO)
-
4,000
1,500
4,825
-
-
Department of Defense Nonlethal Support
Drawdown Authority
25,000
-
-
-
-
-
Global Security Contingency Fund
-
-
18,400
-
-
-
International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement
-
-
-
-
1,500
1,000
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
3,530
3,145
NA
NA
TBD
TBD
Middle East Response Fund (MERF)
-
25,615
-
-
-
-
Democracy Fund
-
600
-
-
-
-
Development Assistance
-
470
-
-
-
-
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
-
-
-
-
-
ESF-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
-
-
3,000
5,000
-
-
ESF-USAID Middle East Regional Programs
-
175
-
2,850
TBD
9,500
2,100
1,437
2,940
3,500
-
-
-
-
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR)
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
-
-
-
-
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
(EXBS)
-
500
-
-
95
-
-
-
-
-
-
5,750
-
-
-
-
500
-
-
-
-
-
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund (NDF)
-
34,300a
-
-
-
-
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
-
9
-
-
-
-
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
-
25,000
-
-
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
-
13,300
-
-
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (FFP)
-
15,700
-
-
-
-
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
-
35,000
8,800
-
-
-
29,594
163,564
34,246
25,378
5,940
15,500
Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE)
Conventional Weapons Reduction (CWD)
Global Threat Reduction (CTR)
Humanitarian Funding
Estimated Total (subject to change)
Sources: U.S. Department of State communication to CRS, June 2012; State Department congressional budget
justification and notification documents. Amounts subject to change. Estimated totals may not reflect all funds.
Note: NA = Not Available, TBD = To Be Determined
a.
NDF funds reprogrammed from multiple fiscal years—FY2003, FY2004, FY2009 and FY2010.
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As noted above, Libyan leaders have yet to finalize plans to reform state security institutions and
Libyan citizens harbor disagreements over the legitimacy of seeking foreign support for security
sector reform. Interim leaders in the GNC and the cabinet endorsed plans for international
training of certain security forces prior to the May 2014 crisis, but competing political forces also
may have divergent views concerning who should be eligible for foreign training and which
missions ought to be assigned to foreign trained forces. The challenges illustrated by the May
2014 clashes and the continuing defiance of orders by military personnel also may raise questions
about the future content and oversight of U.S.-Libyan security cooperation efforts.
Outlook
The 2012 attacks in Benghazi, the deaths of U.S. personnel, and the emergence of terrorist threats
on Libyan soil have reshaped public and official debates in Washington about U.S. policy toward
Libya. Following intense congressional debate over the merits of U.S. and NATO military
intervention in Libya, many Members of Congress welcomed the announcement of Libya’s
liberation, the formation of the interim TNC government, and the July 2012 national GNC
election, while expressing concern about security in the country, the proliferation of weapons, and
the prospects for a smooth political transition.
To date, the Obama Administration and Congress have agreed to support a range of security and
transition support assistance programs in Libya, some of which respond to specific U.S. security
concerns about unsecured weapons and border security. Identifying and bringing those involved
in the Benghazi attack to justice has become a decisive issue in the bilateral relationship, as has
confronting any Al Qaeda affiliated groups present in Libya. Securing stockpiles of Libyan
weapons also remains an issue of broad congressional concern, as does ensuring that transitional
authorities act in accordance with international human rights standards in pursuing justice and
handling detainees.
U.S. officials must weigh demands for a response to immediate security threats emanating from
Libya with longer-term concerns for Libya’s stability, the success of its nascent democratic
institutions, and the future of U.S.-Libyan relations. Decisions about responding to threats to U.S.
security are complicated by the relative weakness of the Libyan state security apparatus and the
risk of inflaming public opinion or undermining the image of the elected Libyan government
through direct or overt U.S. security responses.
These risks may be heightened during the remainder of 2014, as the full course of the events
started in May 2014 is determined and as Libyans embark on initiatives to reconstitute their
elected interim legislative body and to draft and consider a new constitution. Responding to the
outbreak of conflict among Libyans also may remain fraught with difficulty for the United States
and other outsiders hoping to stand firm in their commitments to support Libya’s transition while
avoiding the appearance of intervention or the endorsement of individuals or groups. Libyans
may respond to domestic and international demands for dialogue, but also risk slipping backward
into conflict, with uncertain but likely negative security implications for the United States and the
region.
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17 remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. Violence among
various forces in Tripoli and Benghazi has escalated since mid-2014, driven by overlapping
ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. The United Nations Support Mission
in Libya (UNSMIL) has documented indiscriminate use of military weaponry, abductions,
unlawful killings, and the internal displacement of more than 100,000 Libyans during the
fighting. The U.S. State Department describes Libya as a “terrorist safe haven,” and the U.S.
government suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and relocated U.S. personnel out
of the country in July 2014. On August 31, Libya’s interim government acknowledged that “the
majority of the ministries, institutions, and associations” in the capital were no longer under its
control and demanded that armed groups refrain from destroying state property.
Since 2011, security in Libya has largely been a function of self-restraint among citizens and
militias coexisting in an atmosphere of atomized power and contested political legitimacy,
amplified by the proliferation of military weaponry among citizens and non-state groups. Such
self-restraint has diminished as campaigns of political intimidation, patterns of criminality,
assassinations, and the consolidation of militia influence, at times with state support, have eroded
some Libyans’ trust in each other and in the political process. Criminals and violent Islamist
extremist organizations have exploited these conditions, and the latter have strengthened their
military capabilities and advanced their ideological agendas inside Libya and beyond its borders.
Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly have been held and
transparently administered, but have been marred by declining rates of participation, threats to
candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition.
Amid new reports of armed intervention and other apparent attempts by governments in the
region to influence events in Libya, U.S. officials and other international actors now seek to
convince Libyan factions and their regional supporters that inclusive, representative government
and negotiation are preferable to competing groups’ attempts to achieve dominance through force
of arms. On August 27, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2174,
authorizing the placement of financial and travel sanctions on individuals and entities in Libya
and internationally who are found to be “engaging in or providing support for other acts that
threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful
completion of its political transition.”
Congress has appropriated funding for U.S. transition assistance and security assistance
programs, and Members of Congress are considering FY2015 appropriations requests related to
Libya. Congressional consideration of the circumstances surrounding the September 2012 attacks
on U.S. facilities and personnel in Benghazi also is ongoing, notably under the auspices of a
House Select Committee on the Benghazi attacks established in May 2014 by H.Res. 567. For the
time being, conflict mitigation appears to be the Obama Administration’s top policy priority in
Libya, and political consensus among Libyans may remain elusive.
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Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 3
Operation Dignity and Fighting in Eastern Libya ..................................................................... 3
Operation Libya Dawn and Fighting in Western Libya ............................................................. 5
Disputed Legitimacy and International Responses.................................................................... 7
Challenges for International Actors ........................................................................................... 8
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................ 9
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Requests....................................................................................... 9
Select Security Issues..................................................................................................................... 13
Ansar al Sharia and Other Libya-based Extremist Groups ...................................................... 13
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 15
Figures
Figure 1. Map and Basic Country Data ........................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Select Libyan Figures ....................................................................................................... 6
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2015 ...................................................................... 11
Appendixes
Appendix. Libyan History, Civil War, and Political Change ......................................................... 16
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Overview
More than three years after the start of the 2011 anti-Qadhafi uprising in Libya and two years
after the September 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel in Benghazi, Libya’s security
situation is dire and the future of its political transition is in question. The State Department
describes Libya as a “terrorist safe haven,”1 and U.S. personnel were temporarily relocated from
the country under U.S. military protection in July 2014 amid escalating violence between militias.
Obama Administration officials have stated in testimony before Congress that armed Islamist
extremist groups are gaining strength in areas of eastern and southwestern Libya and are
exploiting unsecured weapons flows and weak border controls. These networks appear to be
linked to terrorism in the region, and support foreign fighter and weapons flows to Syria.2 Libya’s
interim government has acknowledged its loss of control over state ministries, as some armed
militias and some members of the country’s first post-Qadhafi elected legislature seek
independently to assert themselves as legitimate leaders relative to members of the recentlyelected Council of Representatives and the interim government.
The shared desire of the U.S. government and other international actors to empower Libyan state
security forces has been confounded by the strength of armed non-state groups and a fundamental
lack of political consensus among Libya’s interim leaders. Recent fighting and political
maneuvering among rival factions and armed groups reflect a number of unresolved debates over
Libya’s security relationships with foreign governments; the proper role for Islam in political and
social life; mechanisms for the provision of local and national security; the political future of
Qadhafi-era officials; the relative centralization or decentralization of national administrative
authority; competing fiscal priorities; and the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by
terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminals. Clashing personal ambitions and competition over illicit
financial proceeds also reportedly have contributed to unrest.
Public and intra-GNC tensions were driven in part by differences of opinion over the future roles
and responsibilities of armed militias, the relative influence of powerful local communities over
national affairs, and the terms governing the political exclusion of individuals who had formerly
served in official positions during the Qadhafi era. Disagreements between Islamist politicians
and relatively secular figures also contributed to the gradual collapse of consensus over the
transition’s direction. These groups differed over some domestic legal and social developments as
well as Libya’s security relationships with regional and international governments.
Gradually, an unspoken code under which Libyans sought to refrain from shedding other Libyans’
blood in the wake of Qadhafi’s ouster deteriorated under pressure from a series of violent
confrontations between civilians and militias, clashes between rival ethnic groups, and the blatant
targeting of security officers by an unidentified, but ruthless network in Benghazi. That code was
rooted in shared respect for the sacrifices of anti-Qadhafi revolutionaries and in shared fears that
the 2011 predictions of Muammar al Qadhafi and his supporters would come true: that Qadhafi’s
downfall would be followed by uncontainable civil strife and chaos.3
1
State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 5, April 2014.
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 2: Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa, April 2014.
3
For example, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, who remains in detention in Libya and is sought for arrest by the International
Criminal Court, said in a February 2014 television statement: “Libya, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, is about tribes, clans,
(continued...)
2
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Persistent discord over these issues has disrupted the post-Qadhafi transition and, as of September
2014, appears to be pushing the country toward a multifaceted civil war involving secular
partisans, moderate Islamists, local militias, tribal groups, Islamist extremists, and, reportedly,
foreign powers. The outgoing leader of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
Tarek Mitri, summarized the political challenges at the root of Libya’s conflicts in the following
way in an August 27 briefing to the U.N. Security Council:
The Libyan experience illustrates the fact that transition is fraught with great risks, some
being due to perceived conflicting interests and mutual fears, the legacy of more than four
decades of despotic rule, as well as reactivated enmities and reinvented hatred in the struggle
for power. These risks are also those of seeing Libya’s future impacted by regional
polarization and proxy rivalries. The threat of derailing the movement of change initiated by
the revolution is, in all probability, mounting. Reversing the descent into more instability and
uncertainty cannot happen unless various actors in Libya’s public life commit themselves, in
words and in deeds, to a democratic political process. The democratic process cannot be
reduced to the ballot box and to the emergence of numerical majorities and minorities. Its
progress is conditional on upholding principles of pluralism, inclusivity, separation of
powers, [and] adherence to agreed democratic values and norms.
The same day, the Security Council expanded the scope of the existing Libya sanctions regime
and tightened security assistance approval requirements under the existing arms embargo by
adopting Resolution 2174, which seeks to deter Libyans and outsiders from exacerbating the
situation or further undermining Libya’s fragile transitional institutions. Specifically, the
resolution extends travel and financial sanctions to all groups found to be “engaging in or
providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct
or undermine the successful completion of its political transition.” The Security Council and
influential Member States are now considering how best to apply balanced pressure using the new
resolution to convince or compel the range of actors vying for control in Libya “to engage in
peaceful and inclusive political dialogue and to respect the democratic process.”4
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2174 creates a mechanism through which individuals and
groups on all sides of the conflicts in Libya may be sanctioned for undermining security and
disrupting the transition. Applying such sanctions in a manner that does not subject the
international community to accusations of favoritism or partisanship may prove more difficult.
Opposing sides in Libya are apt to see actions targeting them as evidence of bias on the part of
interested third parties. Foreign governments who may be backing different sides in Libya also
may refuse to comply with restrictions on arms transfers, travel, and financial transactions with
potentially broader implications for regional and international security.
(...continued)
and alliances. Libya does not have a civil society or political parties. Libya is made up of tribes that know their areas,
allies, and people. …If secession or a civil war or a sedition occurs …do you think the Libyans will be able to reach an
agreement on how to share oil within a week, a month, or even two or three years? If your answer is yes, then you are
mistaken. … My brothers, we are tribes, and we will resort to arms to settle the matter since arms are available to
everyone now. Instead of mourning the death of 84 people, we will mourn the death of hundreds of thousands of
people. Rivers of blood will run through Libya and you will flee. There will be no oil supplies, the foreign companies,
foreigners, and oil companies will leave tomorrow, and the distribution of oil will come to an end…” U.S. Government
Open Source Center (OSC) Report FEA20110221014695, “Libya: Al-Qadhafi's Son Addresses Citizens; Warns of
Civil War, 'Colonization,'” Al Jamahiriya Television (Tripoli), February 20, 2011.
4
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2174, August 27, 2014.
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Indications of the potential challenges associated with U.N.-backed transition-support sanctions
can be seen in Yemen where, as of September 2014, a similar mechanism had yet to be tested by
the addition of a single name to its list of sanctioned individuals, months after the Security
Council acted to urgently prevent new violence. Using diplomacy and sanctions to dismantle the
alliances of convenience and restrain the opportunism that have pushed Libya into conflict may
require significant attention and will from members of the international community who are
otherwise concerned with a number of other serious security crises in the broader Middle East
and around the world.
Recent Developments
The unravelling of Libya’s post-Qadhafi transition intensified in late 2013, as a campaign of
unsolved assassinations targeting security officers swept Benghazi; a militia force briefly
kidnapped then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan; militias killed protesting civilians in Tripoli and
Benghazi; and rival coalitions within the General National Congress (GNC, elected July 2012)
clashed over the future of Zeidan’s government and the GNC’s mandate and term of office.
Zeidan survived numerous attempted no confidence votes during his tenure (November 2012 to
March 2014), which was marked by a series of crises stemming from armed groups’ demands for
the political isolation of Qadhafi-era officials, militias’ seizure of oil infrastructure, and the
strengthening of armed Islamists in the east and the south.
Long-expected elections for a Constitutional Drafting Assembly were delayed until February
2014, and were ultimately marred by low turnout and violence that prevented voters in some
areas from selecting delegates.5 In late March, a coalition of Islamist and independent forces in
the GNC garnered enough votes to oust Zeidan amid a growing boycott by other GNC members
that made it difficult for the body to operate with a politically viable quorum. Under increasing
political pressure to leave office, GNC members voted to replace the GNC with a new 200
member Council of Representatives (COR), to which legislative authority would be transferred.
Operation Dignity and Fighting in Eastern Libya
In May 2014, forces loyal to Qadhafi-era retired general Khalifah Haftar launched an armed
campaign unauthorized by interim authorities dubbed Operation Dignity to evict Islamist militia
groups from eastern Libya. Haftar capitalized on widely shared presumptions that certain armed
Islamist groups were responsible for the assassination of security officers and were cooperating
with foreign jihadists, including Al Qaeda, its regional affiliates, and Syria-based armed groups.
More controversially, Haftar broadened his rhetoric and objectives to include pledges to cleanse
Libya of Islamists, including supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
5
The revised transitional roadmap calls for an elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) to produce a draft
constitution for consideration by elected legislators and the Libyan public. Forty-eight out of 60 of the Assembly’s
members were elected in February 2014 amid very low voter turnout; elections to fill the remaining 12 seats have been
delayed due to boycotts and security disruptions. As of May 14, Libya’s High National Election Commission reported
that 55 members had been elected. According to the 2011 interim constitutional declaration, the CDA is scheduled to
have four months from its first session to produce a draft constitution for consideration, a timeline which many outside
observers viewed as ambitious and potentially problematic even prior to recent events. The CDA held its first meeting
on April 20, in Al Bayda.
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Figure 1. Map and Basic Country Data
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
In the months since, Libya appears to have been drawn deeper into a region-wide struggle
between pro- and anti-Islamist forces. Haftar’s actions and those of his opponents have helped to
push many of the country’s latent tensions to the surface and contributed to Libya’s polarization
on ideological and community lines. This polarization was visible during a summer 2014 political
struggle between supporters of Prime Minister Abdullah Al Thinni and the leading coalition of
Islamists and independents within the GNC, which sought to replace Al Thinni prior to the June
25 elections for the new COR.
Haftar’s armed extremist military opponents and his relatively more moderate political
adversaries have responded vigorously to his challenges. By late August, the Operation Dignity
military campaign had suffered several setbacks on the battlefield at the hands of the U.S.
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Ansar al Sharia (AAS) and that group’s allies in an
emergent coalition known as the Benghazi Revolutionaries’ Shura Council. Haftar’s forces
remain strongest outside of Benghazi and have bases of operation near Marj and Tobruk, where
the COR is meeting. In fierce fighting in and around Benghazi, AAS and its partners seized
control of military bases belonging to Haftar-aligned forces, including the Benghazi-based Saiqah
(Lightning) Special Forces unit, which had been a primary target of the campaign of
assassinations and attacks attributed by some observers to AAS and other armed Islamists. AAS
and other Islamist forces also acted to strengthen defenses near Darnah—their eastern
stronghold—and paraded with weaponry in the central town of Sirte.
Operation Libya Dawn and Fighting in Western Libya
Meanwhile, in western Libya, fighting erupted along political, ideological, and community lines
with two coalitions of forces battling for control of Tripoli’s international airport, government
facilities, other strategic infrastructure, and areas around the capital. Tensions between locallyorganized militia groups in the west predated the launch of Haftar’s operations in the east. Over
time, however, fighting and rhetoric in the two theaters has become more interrelated, with some
western-based forces endorsing and offering material support to Haftar’s campaign and the COR
and others mobilizing to isolate Haftar’s erstwhile allies and/or the COR before their own
interests can be threatened.
Specifically, some armed groups from the city of Misrata and smaller Islamist militias formed a
coalition known as Operation Libya Dawn and launched a multi-pronged offensive in July 2014
to take control of main Tripoli’s international airport. Participants have included Libya’s Central
Shield Force, members of the Tripoli-based Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR), the
Knights of Janzour Brigade, militias from Zawiya, and several Misrata-based militias, including
the Marsa and Hatin Brigades. The airport had long been held by a rival coalition of militias
largely from Zintan—the Sawa’iq and Qaaqaa Brigades, and the Martyr Mohammed Madani
Brigade—who opposed the GNC-leading Islamist-independent coalition during its final months
in office. Libya Dawn operations since the fall of the airport have included clashes with militias
in Tripoli’s Suq al Jumah neighborhood and militias affiliated with the Warshafanah tribe south
and west of the city.
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Figure 2. Select Libyan Figures
Source: Prepared by CRS. Images derived from official Libyan and U.S. government sources and social media sources.
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Disputed Legitimacy and International Responses
Militias on both sides of the fighting in the west had previously aligned themselves with Libya’s
Ministry of Defense and continue to claim political legitimacy for their operations. This dynamic
mirrors the broader political contest between the ex-leaders and principal beneficiaries of the
GNC and those marginalized by the GNC and/or supportive of Haftar’s anti-Islamist goals.
Former GNC President Nouri Abou Sahmain claims he and the GNC remain the legitimate
legislative authorities in Libya, based nominally on a dispute over terms for the formal handover
of legislative authority to the COR and rejection of the COR’s calls for international assistance.
Some elected COR members continue to boycott its sessions and may support continuing
government leadership roles for anti-COR members of the GNC. In August 2014, former GNC
president Abou Sahmain and some other former GNC members announced the appointment of a
“salvation government” to be led by Omar al Hassi, rejecting the leadership of Interim Prime
Minister Abdullah al Thinni, who was reappointed by the COR in late August. The United States
government, the European Union, and several Middle Eastern governments6 have stated their
view that the COR and the interim government led by Al Thinni are the legitimate governing
bodies in the country.
Resolution 2174 refers to inclusivity and respect for elected institutions as important elements of
a potential solution, which suggests that all parties demanding the exclusion of their
adversaries—be they former regime supporters, secular nationalists, or Islamists—may be under
increasing international scrutiny in the weeks and months ahead. The COR and Al Thinni
conceivably could offer inclusive leadership positions to figures now contesting their legitimacy,
in spite of recent vows to pursue legal recourse against Operation Libya Dawn participants and
supporters. It remains to be seen how Libya Dawn leaders, former members of the GNC who
oppose the COR’s authority and Al Thinni’s leadership, or others opposed to Haftar and/or the
COR would respond to an offer to form a unity government.
The vehement and violent opposition to democratic governance voiced by Ansar al Sharia and
some other Islamist groups suggest that these groups may be more durably at odds with the
majority of Libyans’ preferred outcome for the transition and for the country’s long-term security.
In late August, Ansar al Sharia leaders appealed to supporters of Operation Libya Dawn to “Unite
with the mujahideen in Benghazi and have their same aims, objectives, and goals,” and to,
“Declare that your fight is for the sake of the Islamic sharia rather than for democratic
legitimacy.”7 The advent of such an alliance would further complicate the security situation in the
country, but would likely divide Libya Dawn’s supporters, given the range of motives and goals
that exists among them. On August 31, Ansar al Sharia rejected an agenda proposed by the newly
formed Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Shura Council (an alliance of Islamist militias supportive of
Operation Libya Dawn) based on the Council’s statements of support for a democratic system.8
6
An Egypt-backed regional initiative launched in August 2014 recognizes the COR as Libya’s legitimate governing
body and offers political and security support.
7
U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Report TRN2014082318896718, “Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Calls On
'Dawn of Libya' Leaders to Join Mujahideen against Haftar's Forces,” Twitter, August 22, 2014.
8
OSC Report IMN2014090143268632,” Libya: Tripoli Revolutionaries Announce Formation of Group's Shura
Council, Issue Statement,” Twitter, September 1, 2014; and, OSC Report TRR2014090103849470, “Libya: Ansar alSharia Comments on Founding Statement by Tripoli's Revolutionaries Shura Council,” Twitter, August 31, 2014.
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Challenges for International Actors
For the United States and other backers of the interim government, Libya’s deteriorating security
conditions, fragmented political scene, and shifting transition timelines present several policy
dilemmas. The State Department has said that the United States government does not condone or
support Haftar’s actions and has not assisted them. At the same time, U.S. officials have not
specifically rejected Haftar’s operations against armed extremist groups or the actions of specific
armed groups in western Libya other than to warn of consequences for groups found to have
destroyed or damaged civilian aircraft and infrastructure at the Tripoli International Airport. The
core of the U.S. message to date has been to call on “all parties to renounce violence and resolve
differences through political dialogue and participation in the democratic process.”9 Convincing
or compelling parties to do so has proven more difficult.
The timeline for Libya’s anticipated transition to a more durable political system has been
repeatedly extended and challenged. Since 2011, U.S. officials and others working to support
Libya’s transition and to combat Libya-based transnational threats have relied on interim leaders
and institutions to make difficult policy, budget, and personnel decisions and to identify and
support joint priorities. Those leaders are now engaged in bitter political struggles and
questioning each other’s patriotism and legitimacy. Internationally-recognized interim
government officials are not in control of key state bureaucracies or security forces. In a
reinforcing cycle, indecision and insecurity have eroded the legitimacy of leaders on all sides and
eroded citizens’ trust in institutions tasked with reversing threats to Libya’s stability.
Outsiders, including the United States, have felt increasingly obliged to help break this negative
cycle and to insist on an expedited transition, while recognizing that, in the words of U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State William Burns, “no one can make Libyans’ choices for them” and that outside
intervention may inflame problems further.10 Some news reports allege that some Middle Eastern
governments, including those of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Qatar, have offered
financial and/or military support to their preferred interlocutors in Libya in the hope of
influencing the outcome of ongoing struggles for power. U.S. engagement with these
governments may be further complicated by international efforts to impose costs on individuals
and groups on all sides of Libya’s various divides who are threatening the security and stability of
the country.
Furthering the difficulties facing international actors, security conditions—including a rash of
kidnappings targeting foreign diplomats—have led many countries to withdraw their personnel
and suspend or terminate assistance programs, including those aimed at strengthening central
government and security forces. UNSMIL has evacuated its personnel from Libya, but its new
leader, Bernadino León, remains actively engaged conflict resolution efforts and UNSMIL
officials have stated their intention to return staff to Libya as soon as the security situation allows.
9
The White House, Statement by the President on the Elections in Libya, June 26, 2014.
OSC Report IML2014042533918510, “U.S. Supports Efforts to Enhance, Reform Security Institutions in Libya,”
Libya Herald (Tripoli), April 24, 2014.
10
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
The September 2012 Benghazi attacks, political infighting, and ongoing violence have challenged
U.S. plans to engage in a more comprehensive security assistance and transition support
relationship with Libya. Prior to the escalation of conflict in May 2014, some Libyans had
questioned the interim government’s decision to seek foreign support for security reform and
transition guidance, while some U.S. observers had questioned Libya’s need for U.S. foreign
assistance given its oil resources and relative wealth. During recent fighting, some Libyans have
vigorously rejected others’ calls for international support and assistance and traded accusations of
disloyalty and treason in response to reports of partnership with foreign forces. These dynamics
raise questions about the potential viability of the partnership approach favored by the Obama
Administration and some in Congress, which seeks to build Libyan capacity, coordinate
international action, and leverage Libyan financial resources to meet shared objectives.
In some cases where the United States government has desired Libyan government action on
priority issues, especially in the counterterrorism sector, U.S. officials have weighed choices over
whether U.S. assistance can build sufficient Libyan capacity quickly and cheaply enough,
whether interim leaders are appropriate or reliable partners for the United States, and whether
threats to U.S. interests require direct U.S. action. Ongoing conflict and political intrigue may
amplify these questions and complicate U.S. partnership with Libyans further, as some Libyans
contest the legitimacy of institutions and leaders with whom the U.S. government has sought to
cooperate.
Administration officials have referred to the withdrawal of U.S. Embassy personnel from Libya
as temporary. The implications of armed groups’ reported infiltration of an evacuated U.S. facility
in Tripoli for any future return of diplomatic personnel remain to be seen.
Congress may choose to conduct oversight of ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts or set terms for the
potential resumption of U.S. diplomatic operations in Libya. U.S. security and transition
assistance programming also may merit reevaluation in light of recent developments.
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Requests
U.S. engagement in Libya since the anti-Qadhafi conflict ended has shifted from humanitarian
assistance to focus on transition assistance and security sector support. Over $25 million in
USAID-administered programs funded through the Office of Transition Initiatives, regional
accounts, and reprogrammed funds were identified between 2011 and 2013 to support the
activities of Libyan civil society groups and provide technical assistance to Libya’s nascent
electoral administration bodies. The security-related withdrawal of some U.S. personnel from
Libya in the wake of the Benghazi attacks temporarily affected the implementation and oversight
of U.S.-funded transition assistance programs. As noted above, Administration officials are
reviewing U.S. security assistance programs in light of recent events, and it remains to be seen
what impact the withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Libya may have on the implementation of
specific U.S .assistance programs going forward.11
11
Ambassador Deborah Jones, Remarks at Stimson Center, Washington, DC, May 21, 2014.
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The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, Division K, Sections 7015(f) and
7041(f)) conditions the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to the central government of Libya on
a State Department certification that the government is cooperating with U.S. government efforts
to investigate and bring to justice those responsible for the September 2012 Benghazi attacks. The
Act and accompanying explanatory report further require detailed notification to the
appropriations committees of planned obligations of funds for Libya programs, to include vetting
procedures for recipients. The Act also prohibits the provision of U.S. assistance to Libya for
infrastructure projects “except on a loan basis with terms favorable to the United States.”
Administration officials have remained committed to providing transition support to Libyan
government entities and civil society groups and requested new funding earlier this year to
continue programming in FY2015 (see
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Table 1). The FY2015 State Department foreign assistance budget request identifies similar
strategic goals as the FY2014 request: “1) supporting Libyan government efforts to develop a
basic security capability to reduce threats and sustain a successful democratic transition, and 2)
maintaining progress on Libya’s transition to a permanent, inclusive democracy accountable to
the Libyan people.”12
Of the funds requested for FY2015, $9.5 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) monies would
support U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs “to help consolidatedemocratic reforms” through technical assistance, training, capacity building, and electoral
process support, including $3 million requested in part to fund the development of a “public
financial management framework.” The Administration also requested an additional $20 million
in global FY2015 Transition Initiatives funding over FY2014 levels and hopes to use $10 million
of its Complex Crises Fund request “to address emerging needs and opportunities in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region.” Funds appropriated in these accounts may be
programmed for operations in Libya.
The FY2015 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill under consideration in the House (Section
7041(f) of H.R. 5013) would extend the existing “Benghazi cooperation” certification
requirement and existing spending and vetting plan requirements. The Senate version of the bill
(Section 7041(f) of S. 2499) would similarly extend these requirements and authorize the use of
an unspecified amount of FY2015 and prior year funds from the Complex Crises Fund, Economic
Support Fund, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), and International Military Education
and Training (IMET) accounts for purposes including security sector reform efforts. The Senate
bill would require cost-matching by Libya “to the maximum extent practicable.”
To date, the United States has initiated security assistance efforts to provide training to security
sector leaders and to improve Special Forces units and border security, although the
implementation of related programs has been delayed by developments in Libya. On January 22,
2014, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to establish a Libyan-government funded
military training program in Bulgaria to create a General Purpose Force (GPF) of 6,000-8,000
Libyan personnel. Congressional committees of jurisdiction reviewed and approved the proposed
$600 million Foreign Military Sale for the training program.
12
In FY2014, the State Department’s budget justification also identified “enhancing the Libyan government’s capacity
to bring to justice those responsible for the Benghazi attacks” as a primary U.S. goal.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2015
(thousands of dollars, by account/program and fiscal year of appropriation unless noted)
Account/Program
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Complex Crises Fund (CCF-OCO)
FY2013
FY2014
Estimate
FY2015
Request
15,000
-
-
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
150
-
150
949
-
-
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
319
-
296
142
1,500
1,500
-
4,000
1,500
4,825
-
-
25,000
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
USAID Transition Initiatives (TI/TI-OCO)
Department of Defense (DoD) Nonlethal Support
DoD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
Section 1206 Train and Equip
8,420
Global Security Contingency Fund
-
-
22,650
-
-
-
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
-
-
-
-
1,500
1,000
3,530
3,145
NA
NA
TBD
TBD
Middle East Response Fund (MERF)
-
25,615
-
-
-
-
Democracy Fund
-
600
-
-
-
-
Development Assistance
-
470
-
-
-
-
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
-
-
-
-
-
ESF-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
-
-
3,000
5,000
-
-
ESF-USAID Middle East Regional Programs
-
175
-
2,850
TBD
9,500
2,100
1,437
2,940
3,500
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR)
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
-
-
-
-
-
-
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
-
500
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
-
-
-
-
5,750
-
-
-
-
500
-
-
-
-
-
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund (NDF)
-
34,300a
-
-
-
-
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
-
9
-
-
-
-
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
-
25,000
-
-
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
-
13,300
-
-
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (FFP)
-
15,700
-
-
-
-
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
-
35,000
8,800
-
-
-
29,594
163,564
38,496
38,653
5,940
15,500
Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE)
Conventional Weapons Reduction (CWD)
Global Threat Reduction (CTR)
Humanitarian Funding
Estimated Total (subject to change)
Sources: U.S. Department of State communication to CRS, June 2012; State Department congressional budget
justification and notification documents. Amounts subject to change. Estimated totals may not reflect all funds.
Note: NA = Not Available, TBD = To Be Determined
a.
NDF funds reprogrammed from multiple fiscal years—FY2003, FY2004, FY2009 and FY2010.
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In June 2014, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Derek Chollet
testified before Congress that “Libya’s political turmoil and a deteriorating security situation”
prevent the U.S. government from being able “to have the necessary U.S. personnel on the
ground in Tripoli” to execute the GPF program. According to Chollet, “Other factors include a
lack of vetted training candidates, a lack of pledged Libyan funding, and weak security
institutions.”13
Investigations into 2012 Attacks on U.S. Facilities and Personnel in Benghazi
U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were killed on September 11, 2012,
during an assault by armed terrorists on two U.S facilities in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) remains the lead U.S. agency tasked with pursuing the individuals responsible for the attacks.
Other government agencies, including the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD), and elements of the
intelligence community (IC), support the FBI’s efforts to bring the attackers to justice.
On September 28, 2012, the U.S. intelligence community concluded publicly that the incident was a “deliberate and
organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists,” and said that at the time it remained “unclear if any group or
person exercised overall command and control of the attack and if extremist group leaders directed their members
to participate. However, we do assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or
sympathetic to Al Qaeda.”14 In January 2014, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the attacks stated
that, “Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al Sharia, Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012,
attacks.”15 In June 2014, U.S. forces apprehended Ahmed Abu Khattala, a Libyan suspect in the attack, in a military
operation in Libya. Abu Khattala has been transferred to the United States and is awaiting trial. The U.S. government
has offered up to $10 million through the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program for information that help
to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for the attack.
Prior to Abu Khattala’s capture, U.S. military officials referred to continuing intelligence gaps in Libya in unclassified
testimony before Congress, with U.S. AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez saying on April 8, 2014, that
continuing U.S. efforts against the network responsible for the Benghazi attacks are “made more difficult, obviously,
by the security situation.”16 Rodriguez added that U.S. investigators “don't have everybody identified and located,” and
said that the feasibility of operations to apprehend or otherwise target suspects in Libya “depends ... on the situation
and the risk that people want to take.” Security conditions in the country have deteriorated further since that time,
and U.S. Embassy personnel have departed, with unknown implications for support of similar operations.
Administration officials have repeatedly described Libya as a high risk operational environment, even with regard to
routine diplomatic operations in Tripoli, which were suspended in July 2014. Operational risks presumably are higher
in areas of Libya that are controlled by anti-U.S. forces. In conjunction with the relocation of U.S. diplomatic
personnel from Libya on July 26, 2014, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Libya that “warns U.S.
citizens against all travel to Libya and recommends that U.S. citizens currently in Libya depart immediately.”
Across Libya, attacks on foreign diplomatic facilities and personnel and on foreign nationals have continued, and
reports suggest the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and related facilities have been damaged by recent fighting. Since April
2013, other reported attacks have targeted the French and Russian embassies in Tripoli; the Turkish Consul in
Benghazi; the Finnish and Swedish consulates in Benghazi; a U.S. national teaching in Benghazi; a Turkish national in
Tripoli; oil workers from the United Kingdom and New Zealand; Egyptian Christians in Benghazi; Tunisian Embassy
employees and a Libyan employee of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli; and the Jordanian ambassador to Libya, Fawaz al
Etan, who was kidnapped and subsequently released, among others.
13
Assistant Secretary Chollet, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and
North Africa, June 25, 204.
14
Statement, Director of Public Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence Shawn Turner, September 28, 2012.
15
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya,
September 11-12, 2012, January 15, 2014.
16
Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory and General David Rodriguez, Press Briefing, April 8, 2014.
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Select Security Issues
The U.S. intelligence community’s January 2014 unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment
described the terrorist threat to Western and Libyan government interests in Libya as “acute,
especially in the east of the country.” Administration officials repeated these views in subsequent
congressional testimony and statements. U.S. AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez
has described Libyan institutions as “very, very weak”17 and warned that Al Qaeda adherents and
affiliates are gaining strength as “arms, ammunition, explosives from Libya ... continue to move
throughout the region in northwest Africa.”18 U.S. and French officials also have issued public
warnings about the reported presence and activities in southwestern Libya of terrorists and arms
traffickers, including members of Al Qaeda affiliates. When asked in March 2014 to compare
threats to U.S. security from Libya and Syria, Defense Department Assistant Secretary Michael
Lumpkin said, “my sense is that Libya isn't where Syria is today, but again—left unchecked, left
without the proper engagement in building the partnership capacity with the nascent Libyan
forces—that we could end up in a situation where it’s not too dissimilar if no attention is paid to
it.”19 U.N. officials and reports confirm these trends, and UNSMIL reported on August 27 that,
The threat from the spread of terrorist groups has become real. Their presence and activities
in a number of Libyan cities are known to all. At present, the chaotic security situation and
the very limited capacity of the government to counter this threat may well have created a
fertile ground for a mounting danger in Libya and beyond.20
Ansar al Sharia and Other Libya-based Extremist Groups
On January 10, 2014, the U.S. State Department announced the designation of Ansar al Sharia in
Benghazi and Ansar al Sharia in Darnah as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities
under Executive Order 13224. According to the State Department, the groups:
have been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, frequent assassinations, and
attempted assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya, and the
September 11, 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya.
Members of both organizations continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests in Libya.21
Ansar al Sharia has vigorously condemned the military operations against it by Haftar-aligned
forces as a “war against the religion and Islam backed by the West and their Arab allies.” In a
statement issued on May 19, the group called on pro-sharia tribal figures to support the group
against Haftar and said “the war declared is against the application of the sharia and the
establishment of the religion. This war is led by the infidels, the Jews and the Christians, as well
17
Press Briefing by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory and Gen. Rodriguez, Washington, DC, April
8, 2014.
18
Testimony of General David Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM], before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 6, 2014.
19
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict [SOLIC] Michael
Lumpkin before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 11, 2014.
20
Report of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
February 2014.
21
State Department, Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders, January 10, 2014.
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as the seculars and traitors who support them.”22 In a follow-on statement on May 27, an Ansar al
Sharia leader warned the United States against intervention in Libya and condemned Haftar,
saying: “They said that their war was against terrorism and extremism, as they claim, but the
reality is that their aim is to take over power.... We remind America that if it tries to intervene, we
remind it of its despicable defeats in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and that it will see worse
from Libya than what it has seen [so far].”23
Libyan media and Ansar al Sharia social media accounts suggest that the organization’s current
operations extend to Benghazi, Sirte, and areas of eastern Libya and include military training,
security patrols, outreach and education efforts, and public works projects. The group also has
publicized its efforts to deliver relief supplies to civilians in northern Syria and other countries.
The U.S. government has not released a detailed unclassified assessment of the size and
capabilities of Ansar al Sharia in Libya. Publicly available information suggests the group’s
membership may be in the high hundreds or low thousands of individuals, some of whom possess
truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, military-style uniforms, and assault
rifles. Some images suggest the group possesses man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADs).
In its recent counterattacks on pro-Operation Dignity forces, Ansar al Sharia has displayed
improved military capabilities, and reports suggest it has succeeded in capturing new military
equipment. In allying itself with and fighting alongside members of other Islamist and anti-Haftar
militias in eastern Libya, the group may be expanding its potential base of political support.
Members of Libya’s Shield Forces, a militia formerly affiliated with the Ministry of Defense,
reportedly are fighting alongside Ansar al Sharia under the rubric of the Benghazi
Revolutionaries’ Shura Council. Nevertheless, Ansar al Sharia’s hard-line rhetoric and rejection
of alternatives to Islamic law also may create new enemies for the group.
Other Islamist militia forces and services organizations based in the eastern city of Darnah also
pose a challenge to Libyan authorities, including the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and the Islamic
Youth Shura Council of Darnah. The latter group conducted a large display of military weaponry
in a convoy near the city in early April 2014, and the former group, named for the victims of a
Qadhafi-era prison massacre of predominantly Islamist detainees, has questioned the authority of
transitional officials. Constitutional Assembly and Council of Representatives elections were
disrupted in Darnah in February and June 2014, respectively, in light of Islamist militia threats.
The Youth Shura Council has posted images of its checkpoints and seizures of alcohol and
contraband goods, and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade routinely posts images of its social
services activities. Ansar al Sharia members conducted and publicized similar operations when
that group was establishing itself in Benghazi in 2012.
In southwestern Libya, Islamist extremist operatives reportedly are active, and may be using
remote areas to serve as safe havens or transit areas for operations in neighboring Niger and
Algeria. Some press reports suggest that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of the group responsible
for the January 2013 attack on the natural gas facility at In Amenas, Algeria, in which three
Americans were killed, may be in southwestern Libya. U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed
those reports but describe Belmokhtar’s group—Al Murabitoun—as active in the area and as “the
22
OSC Report TRN2014052021537855, “Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Vows To Defend Benghazi Against Attacks, Calls On
Tribes To Cooperate,” May 19, 2014.
23
OSC Report IML2014052831841695, “Libyan Ansar Al Shari'ah Praise Their ‘Victory’” Libya TV (Doha), May 27,
2014.
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greatest near-term threat to U.S. and international interests in the Sahel, because of its publicly
stated intent to attack Westerners and proven ability to organize complex attacks.”24
Outlook
The 2012 attacks in Benghazi, the deaths of U.S. personnel, the emergence of terrorist threats on
Libyan soil, and the internecine conflict between Libyan militias have reshaped debates in
Washington about U.S. policy toward Libya. Following intense congressional debate over the
merits of U.S. and NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011, many Members of Congress
welcomed the announcement of Libya’s liberation, the formation of the interim Transitional
National Council government, and the July 2012 national General National Congress election,
while expressing concern about security in the country, the proliferation of weapons, and the
prospects for a smooth political transition.
To date, the Obama Administration and Congress have agreed to support a range of security and
transition support assistance programs in Libya, some of which respond to specific U.S. security
concerns about unsecured weapons, terrorist safe-havens, and border security. Identifying and
bringing those involved in the September 2012 Benghazi attacks to justice has become a priority
issue in the bilateral relationship, as has confronting any Al Qaeda affiliated groups present in
Libya. Securing stockpiles of Libyan weapons also remains an issue of broad congressional
concern, as does ensuring that transitional authorities act in accordance with international human
rights standards in pursuing justice and handling detainees.
U.S. officials must weigh demands for a response to immediate security threats emanating from
Libya with longer-term concerns for Libya’s stability, the survival of its nascent democratic
institutions, and the future of U.S.-Libyan relations. Decisions about responding to threats to U.S.
security are complicated by the relative weakness of the Libyan state security apparatus and the
risk of inflaming public opinion or undermining the image of elected Libyan leaders through
direct or overt U.S. security responses. If conflict persists, congressional debate over transition
and security assistance programs in Libya may intensify, with advocates possibly arguing for
further investment to prevent a broader collapse and critics possibly arguing that a lack of
political consensus among Libyans makes U.S. assistance unlikely to achieve intended objectives.
24
State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 6, April 2014.
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Appendix. Libyan History, Civil War, and
Political Change
The North African territory that now composes Libya has a long history as a center of Phoenician,
Carthaginian, Greek, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya is a union of three
historically distinct regions—northwestern Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica or Barqa, and the
more remote southwestern desert region of Fezzan. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire
struggled to assert control over Libya’s coastal cities and interior. Italy invaded Libya in 1911 on
the pretext of liberating the region from Ottoman control. The Italians subsequently became
mired in decades of colonial abuses against the Libyan people and faced a persistent anti-colonial
insurgency. Libya was an important battleground in the North Africa campaign of the Second
World War and emerged from the fighting as a ward of the Allied powers and the United Nations.
On December 24, 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became one of Africa’s first independent
states. With U.N. supervision and assistance, a Libyan National Constituent Assembly drafted and
agreed to a constitution establishing a federal system of government with central authority vested
in King Idris Al Sanussi. Legislative authority was vested in a Prime Minister, a Council of
Ministers, and a bicameral legislature. The first parliamentary election was held in February
1952, one month after independence. The king banned political parties shortly after
independence, and Libya’s first decade was characterized by continuous infighting over taxation,
development, and constitutional powers.
In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a unitary monarchy that
further centralized royal authority, in part to streamline the development of the country’s newly
discovered oil resources. Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government
was largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance it received from international
institutions and through military basing agreements with the United States and United Kingdom.
The U.S.-operated air base at Wheelus field outside of Tripoli served as an important Strategic
Air Command base and center for military intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Oil wealth brought rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in
the 1960s, but the weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites’ growing identification with
the pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the
gradual marginalization of the monarchy. Popular criticism of U.S. and British basing agreements
grew, becoming amplified in the wake of Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War.
King Idris left the country in mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup
in September, led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qadhafi.
The United States did not actively oppose the coup, as Qadhafi and his co-conspirators initially
presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform. Qadhafi focused intensely on securing the
immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which was
complete by mid-1970. The new government also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies
to renegotiate oil production contracts, and some British and U.S. oil operations eventually were
nationalized. In the early 1970s, Qadhafi and his allies gradually reversed their stance on their
initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary,
anti-Western, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These
policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations that persisted for decades
and was marked by multiple military confrontations, state-sponsored acts of Libyan terrorism
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against U.S. nationals, covert U.S. support for Libyan opposition groups, Qadhafi’s pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and international sanctions.
Qadhafi’s policy reversals on WMD and terrorism led to the lifting of international sanctions in
2003 and 2004, followed by economic liberalization, oil sales, and foreign investment that
brought new wealth to some Libyans. After U.S. sanctions were lifted, the U.S. business
community gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns
that were finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political
change in Libya remained elusive. Government reconciliation with imprisoned Islamist militants
and the return of some exiled opposition figures were welcomed by some observers as signs that
suppression of political opposition had softened. The Qadhafi government released dozens of
former members of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG) and the
Muslim Brotherhood from prison in the years prior to the revolution as part of its political
reconciliation program. The Bush Administration praised Qadhafi’s cooperation with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and the LIFG.
Qadhafi’s international rehabilitation coincided with new steps by some pragmatic government
officials to maneuver within so-called “red lines” and propose minor reforms. However, the
shifting course of those red lines increasingly entangled would-be reformers in the run-up to the
outbreak of unrest in February 2011. Ultimately, inaction on the part of the government in
response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of a constitution
suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful change among hardliners.
This inaction set the political stage for the revolution that overturned Qadhafi’s four decades of
rule and led to his grisly demise in October 2011.
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. The 2011 revolution was
triggered in mid-February by a chain of events in Benghazi and other eastern cities that quickly
spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. The government’s loss of control in these cities became
apparent, and broader unrest emerged in other regions. A number of military officers, their units,
and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi. Qadhafi and his supporters denounced their opponents
as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until August 2011, Qadhafi and
his forces maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other western cities. The cumulative
effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military targets and a coordinated offensive by
rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya then turned the tide, sending Qadhafi and his
supporters into retreat and exile. September and early October 2011 were marked by sporadic and
often intense fighting in and around Qadhafi’s birthplace, Sirte, and the town of Bani Walid and
neighboring military districts. NATO air operations continued as rebel fighters engaged in battles
of attrition with Qadhafi supporters.
Qadhafi’s death at the hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20, 2011, brought the revolt to
an abrupt close, with some observers expressing concern that a dark chapter in Libyan history
ended violently, leaving an uncertain path ahead. The self-appointed interim Transitional National
Council (TNC) and its cabinet took initial steps toward improving security and reforming national
institutions. Voters elected an interim General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012. The GNC
assumed power on August 8, 2012, and voted to replace itself with a 200-member Council of
Representatives (COR). As of late May, the COR election is scheduled to be held in June 2014. A
The GNC’s tenure grew increasingly controversial, and more than half of
its membership had resigned or was no longer active by mid-2014. The COR election was held in
June 2014 and the COR convened in August. A Constitutional Drafting Assembly was partially
elected in February 2014 and is tasked with
in April began developing a permanentdraft constitution for popular consideration.
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Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Congressional Research Service
2019