The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
March 11May 6, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43240
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army’s proposed replacement for the
Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities
in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting
vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose
vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of
these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army.
The AMPV is intended to be a “vehicle integration” or non-developmental program (candidate
vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles—not vehicles that are
specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle
might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the
Army’s most recent developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the
Future Combat System (FCS), the
Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter
helicopter, were cancelled before they
could be fully developed and fielded.
On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV.
This latest RFP stipulates This RFP
stipulated that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014
worth $458
million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an
Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to
permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between
FY2015- FY2015 and
FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. The Army
currently plans to procure 2,907 AMPVs at an estimated program cost of $10.233 billion.
The Army’s decision to provide BAE System’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle to other vendors to use
as they develop their own AMPV design proposals as a means of cutting program costs has
resulted in claims of unfairness from General Dynamics Land Systems, which is developing its
proposal based on the Stryker Combat Vehicle. General Dynamics hashad reportedly protested to the
Army Material Command as well as approached Congress to limit funding until the Army devises
what they believe is a more competitive program.
The Administration’s FY2014 AMPV Budget Request was $116.298 million in Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. The FY2014 National Defense
Authorization Act recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget Request. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 recommended $28.3 million in RDT&E funding,
cutting $87.998 million from the FY2014 Budget AMPV Request due to schedule delay and an
Army requested program decrease, likely related to the Army’s decision to slip the AMPV’s
Request for Proposal from June 2013 to mid-September 2013 GDLS reportedly opted not to pursue a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) protest, and the Army decided to move the award date
of the AMPV System Development contract until the second quarter of FY2015 as well as
modifying the AMPV RFP to ensure wider availability of Bradley Fighting Vehicle technical data.
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract, as well as program management support.
Potential issues for Congress include: Did the Army’s decision to use the Bradley for design
proposals create an unfair advantage?, and What are the programmatic measures in the AMPV
program to ensure that the vehicle is deployable? Some Members have asked DOD to make AMPV a mixed fleet procurement, and the House
Armed Services Committee has called for a report on the AMPV program before all FY2015
funds can be expended.
A potential issue for Congress is the AMPV program and the Army’s emphasis on deployability.
This report will be updated.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) ................................................................................ 1
The Army’s AMPV Requirements ................................................................................................... 1
Program Overview ........................................................................................................................... 2
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV Program............................................................. 3
Army Issues AMPV Request for Proposal (RFP) ............................................................................ 3
2013 Projected AMPV Production Quantities .......................................................................................... 3 3
2014 Projected AMPV Production Quantities ................................................................................. 4
2014 Projected Total Program Costs................................................................................................ 4
Recent Program Activities ............................................................................................................... 45
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date ...................................................... 45
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP ................................................................................... 45
General Dynamics Appeals to Congress ................................................................................... 5
General Dynamics Decides Not to Pursue a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Protest......................................................................................................................... 6
Army Delays AMPV Schedule and Modifies Request for Proposals ........................................ 6
Budgetary Issues .............................................................................................................................. 56
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request ............................................................................................... 56
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) ...................................................... 56
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) ..................................................... 56
FY2015 President’s Budget Request ......................................................................................... 6
Potential Issues for Congress7
H.R. 4435, FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ................................................ 7
Congressional Interest in a Mixed AMPV Fleet ...................................................................... 6
Has the Army’s Decision to Use Bradley Fighting Vehicles for AMPV’s Optional
Exchange Vehicle Created an Unfair Advantage? ........ 9
Potential Issue for Congress ............................................................................................. 6............... 9
The AMPV and the Army’s Emphasis on Deployability ........................................................... 69
Tables
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant ......................................................................... 2
Table 2. 2013 Projected AMPV Production, by Variant ........................................................................... 3 4
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 7 10
Congressional Research Service
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
In early 1956, the Army began the development of an air-transportable, armored multi-purpose
vehicle family intended to provide a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier for armor
and mechanized infantry units.1 Known as the M-113, it entered production in 1960 and saw
extensive wartime service in Vietnam. Considered a reliable and versatile vehicle, a number of
different variations of the M-113 were produced to fulfill such roles as a command and control
vehicle, mortar carrier, and armored ambulance, to name but a few. The Army began replacing the
M-113 infantry carrier version in the early 1980s with the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
but many non-infantry carrier versions of the M-113 were retained in service. According to
reports, about 3,000 M-113 variants are currently still in use.2
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)3
According to the Army:
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the proposed United States Army program
for replacement of the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) to mitigate current and future
capability gaps in force protection, mobility, reliability, and interoperability by mission role
variant within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) [now known as the Armored
Brigade Combat Team— – ABCT]. The AMPV will have multiple variants tailored to specific
mission roles within HBCT. Mission roles are as follows: General Purpose, Medical
Evacuation, Medical Treatment, Mortar Carrier, and Mission Command. AMPV is a vehicle
integration program.
The Army’s AMPV Requirements4
Regarding the decision to replace remaining M-113s, the Army notes:
•
The M-113 lacks the force protection and mobility needed to operate as part of
combined arms teams within complex operational environments. For example,
“commanders will not allow them to leave Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or
enter contested areas without extensive mission protection and route clearance.”5
•
The use of other vehicles for M-113 mission sets (casualty evacuations, for
example) reduces unit combat effectiveness.
1
Information in this section is taken from Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 2011-2012, 32nd Edition,
pp. 470-478.
2
Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for the AMPV Program, Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
3
From the Army’s AMPV Program website, https://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/ampv/ampv.htm, September
accessed
September 13, 2013.
4
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
5
Ibid., p. 13.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
M-113s are found in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), where they comprise 32% of the
tracked armored vehicles organic to that organization. The 114 M-113 variants in the ABCT are
distributed as follows:
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant
M-113 Variant Type
Number of M-113s
M-113A3 General Purpose (GP)
19
M-1068A3 Mission Command (MCmd)
41
M-1064 Mortar Carrier (MC)
15
M-113A3 Medical Evacuation (ME)
31
M-577 Medical Treatment (MT)
8
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 13.
Program Overview6
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in March 2012, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) approved a materiel
development decision for AMPV and authorized the Army’s entry into the materiel solution
analysis phase. The Army completed the AMPV analysis of alternatives (AoA) in July 2012 and
proposed a non-developmental vehicle (the candidate vehicle will be either an existing vehicle or
a modified existing vehicle—not a vehicle that is specially designed and not in current service).
Because the AMPV is to be a non-developmental vehicle, DOD has decided that the program will
start at Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and skip the
Milestone A, Technology Development Phase.
The Army plans for a full and open competition and will award one industry bidder a 42-month
EMD contract to develop all five AMPV variants. A draft Request for Proposal (RFP) released in
March 2013 stated that the EMD contract would be worth $1.46 billion, including $388 million
for 29 EMD prototypes for testing between 2014 and 2017 and $1.08 billion for 289 low-rate
initial production (LRIP) models between 2018 and 2020. The Army had planned on releasing the
formal RFP in June 2013 but instead slipped the date until mid-September 2013, citing a delayed
Defense Acquisition Board review attributed in part to Department of Defense civilian furloughs.7
Currently, theThe EMD contract award iswas planned for May 2014. The Army is also planning for an
average average
unit manufacturing cost (AUMC) of $1.8 million per vehicle. With projected production
quantities of 2,897 AMPVs, the overall AMPV program could exceed $5 billion, particularly if
requirements for additional force protection are added by the Army.
6
Information in this section is taken from the United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 133, and an Army briefing: “AMPV
Industry Day,” April 23, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work
Remains,” InsideDefense.com, August 16, 2013.
7
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,” InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves
AMPV AMPV
Program8
On November 26, 2013, DOD issued an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) officially
approving the Army’s entry into the Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase. The ADM directed the Army to impose an Average Procurement Unit Cost less
than or equal to $3.2 million at a production rate of not less than 180 vehicles per year. In
addition, operations and sustainment costs are to be less than or equal to $400,000 per vehicle per
year. The Army is also directed to down select to a single prime contractor at the completion of
Milestone B.
Army Issues AMPV Request for Proposal (RFP)9
Also on November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
AMPV. This latest RFP stipulates that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May
2014 worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between
FY2015- and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in
2020.
2013 Projected AMPV Production Quantities10
Under current2013 plans and projected force structure, the Army plansplanned to start full rate production of
the AMPV in FY2020 at the rate of two to three ABCTs per year. Total vehicle production by
variant is depicted in the following table:
Table 2. Projected AMPV Production, by Variant
ABCT Total
Training and Doctrine
Command and Testing
(See Notes)
Total Vehicles by
Quantity
M-113A3 General Purpose
(GP)
462
58
520
M-1068A3 Mission
Command (MCmd)
899
92
991
Variant to Be
Replaced
8
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense, “Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Pre-Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposals Acquisition Decision Memorandum,” November 26, 2013 and
Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,”
InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
9
Information in this section is taken from Solicitation, Offer, and Award: Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Number:
W56HZV-13-R-0022, November 26, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,” InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
10
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. 2013 Projected AMPV Production, by Variant
ABCT Total
Training and Doctrine
Command and Testing
(See Notes)
Total Vehicles by
Quantity
M-113A3 General Purpose
(GP)
462
58
520
M-1068A3 Mission
Command (MCmd)
899
92
991
M-1064 Mortar Carrier
(MC)
348
36
384
M-113A3 Medical
Evacuation (ME)
736
52
788
M-577 Medical Treatment
(MT)
194
20
214
2,639
258
2,897
Variant to Be
Replaced
Totals
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 23.
Notes: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army command responsible for training the force,
would use AMPVs at its various schools and courses for training soldiers. Testing AMPV quantities would be
allocated to various Army and Department of Defense organizations responsible for testing vehicles.
2014 Projected AMPV Production Quantities11
GAO’s March 2014 Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs report notes the new production
quantity for the AMPV is 2,907 vehicles—a 10 vehicle increase over 2013 quantities. It is not
known whether these 10 additional vehicles will be allocated by variant or by gaining
organization.
2014 Projected Total Program Costs12
For a 2,907 vehicle procurement, GAO estimates total program costs as follows (FY2014
dollars):
•
Research and Development: $779.9 million.
•
Procurement: $ 9.443 billion.
•
Estimated Total Program Cost: $10.223 billion.
11
United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
GAO-14-340SP, March 2014, p. 129.
12
Ibid.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Recent Program Activities
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date13Recent Program Activities
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date11
Reports suggest the Army extended the deadline to industry to respond to the AMPV RFP from
February 24, 2014, until May 28, 2014, after General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—the
Stryker Combat Vehicle’s manufacturer—requested additional time. The reason why this
extension was granted was to permit GDLS to study the technical specifications of excess
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (designated Optional Exchange Vehicles [OEVs] by the Army), which
the Army has offered to vendors to use in their final AMPV production designs to “drive down”
total AMPV program costs. As the Bradley is manufactured by BAE Systems—the other
manufacturer vying for the AMPV contract—some Pentagon and Capitol Hill officials have
reportedly suggested because of the Army’s decision, BAE has an “edge” as its proposed design
is being built around a turretless Bradley, whereas GDLS has proposed both tracked and wheeled
designs based on its Stryker vehicle.
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP12RFP14
General Dynamics Land Systems reportedly filed a protest on February 14, 2014, with the Army
Material Command protesting the AMPV RFP. The basis of General Dynamic’s protest is the
program’s proposed timeline as well as the use of BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle as the optional
exchange vehicle for design development. This type of protest supposedly should be resolved
within 90 days or less.
11
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s RFP Response Date for AMPV Extended After GDLS Asks for Time,” InsideDefense.com,
January 31, 2014.
12
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Protests RFP for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, February
20, 2014.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
General Dynamics Appeals to Congress13General Dynamics Appeals to Congress15
General Dynamics has reportedly been actively lobbying Congress to intervene in the AMPV
program, asking that program funding be denied until a more competitive plan is put forward by
the Army. GDLS contends the RFP is biased towards BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle and
Bradley technical data hashave not been provided to other potential vendors and the Army has not
provided sufficient data or time for others to compete. Supposedly, GDLS is considering asking
for up to a three-year program delay so they haveit has time to process the Bradley’s technical data and
then adjust its bid. A program delay would run counter to the Army’s efforts to accelerate the
AMPV program, an effort that has taken on increasing importance due to the recent termination
of the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program.14
Budgetary Issues
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request1516
13
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s RFP Response Date for AMPV Extended After GDLS Asks for Time,” InsideDefense.com,
January 31, 2014.
14
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Protests RFP for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, February
20, 2014.
15
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Lobbies Congress to Upend Army’s AMPV Program,” InsideDefense.com,
February 28, 2014.
16
For additional information on the GCV see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
General Dynamics Decides Not to Pursue a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Protest17
On April 14, 2014, GDLS reportedly announced it would not ask GAO to rule on the AMPV
program, noting that the company would instead continue to discuss the AMPV program with
DOD and Congress.
Army Delays AMPV Schedule and Modifies Request for
Proposals18
The Army has reportedly decided to move the award date for the AMPV System Development
contract until the second quarter of FY2015. The Army will also reportedly modify the AMPV
RFP to ensure the wider availability of Bradley Fighting Vehicle technical data.
Budgetary Issues
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request19
The FY2014 AMPV Budget Request was $116.298 million in Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)1620
Congress recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget Request.
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76)1721
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 recommended $28.3 million in RDT&E
funding, cutting $87.998 million from the FY2014 Budget AMPV Request due to schedule delay
and an Army requested program decrease, likely related to the Army’s decision to slip the
AMPV’s Request for Proposal from June 2013 to mid-September 2013.
13
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Lobbies Congress to Upend Army’s AMPV Program,” InsideDefense.com,
February 28, 2014.
14
For additional information on the GCV see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
1517
“General Dynamics Opts to Skip GAO Protest Over Army Vehicle Plan,” Reuters, April 15, 2014, and Tony
Bertuca, “Army Delays AMPV Schedule as GDLS Forgoes GAO Protest,” InsideDefense.com, April 15, 2014.
18
Tony Bertuca, “Army Delays AMPV Schedule as GDLS Forgoes GAO Protest,” InsideDefense.com, April 15, 2014,
and Ann Roosevelt, “General Dynamics Will Continue Talking AMPV With Army, No Further Protest,” Defense
Daily.
19
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget Request, Justification Book, RDT&E— – Volume II,
Budget Activity 54, April 2013, p. 6.
1620
P.L. 113-66, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014, December 26, 2013.
1721
H.R. 3547, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014, (P.L. 113-76), January 17, 2014, Division C— – Department
of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014.
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FY2015 President’s Budget Request18Request22
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract, as well as program management support.
Potential Issues for Congress
Has the Army’s Decision to Use Bradley Fighting Vehicles for
AMPV’s Optional Exchange Vehicle Created an Unfair Advantage?
The Army’s decision to use excess Bradley Fighting Vehicles as an “Optional Exchange Vehicle”
for use in vendor’s vehicle design efforts raises a number of potential questions that Congress
might chose to examine in greater detail. With both major vendors—GDLS and BAE—
developing designs based on previously developed and fielded systems (the Stryker and Bradley,
respectively), what program savings did the Army envision when it offered the Bradley to all
vendors? Does the provision of the Bradley as an optional exchange vehicle help to accelerate the
AMPV’s developmental timeline or did it instead interject another program requirement that
could extend the program and perhaps increase overall program costs? While the Army might
have viewed the provision of the Bradley as an optional exchange vehicle as a cost-savings
measure, did Army leadership consider that such a move could also give the appearance of
favoritism towards BAE’s Bradley design? If a potential vendor files a formal protest with the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) based on a perception of unfairness or favoritism,
what is the potential impact on the AMPV program should GAO rule in favor of the protestor(s)?
These and other possible questions could help Congress better understand if the Army’s actions
have created an unfair advantage and if the AMPV program, as currently envisioned by Army
leadership, is sustainable under these circumstances.
The AMPV and the Army’s Emphasis on Deployability
On February 24, 2014, during a news conference outlining his recommendations to the President
for DOD’s FY2015 budget, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated:
I have also accepted the Army’s recommendation to terminate the current Ground Combat
Vehicle [GCV] program and re-direct the funds toward developing a next-generation
platform. I have asked the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps to deliver new,
realistic visions for vehicle modernization by the end of this year.19
18
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense FY2015 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, March 2014, p. 3-3 and U.S. Army’s
FY2015 Budget Briefing, March 4, 2014, p. 13.
19
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday,
February 24, 2014.
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When asked to elaborate on Secretary Hagel’s comments, a DOD spokesman reportedly noted:
We found that the Ground Combat Vehicle isn't the best vehicle to replace the Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicle, both in terms of performance and cost. While it would have
protected troops inside it, it would have been too heavy and too expensive.20
It was also noted that industry proposed GCV variants ranging from 60 tons to 70 tons in order to
meet Army protection requirements as well as the capacity to transport a nine-soldier infantry
squad.21
The Army has reportedly stated “the service needs to become a lighter and more expeditionary
force in the coming decade if it is to remain relevant to America’s national security strategy” and
that “the increased weight of combat vehicles is one of the areas the Army needs to address if it is
to become more expeditionary.”22 While the AMPV is likely to be based on existing designs,
H.R. 4435, FY2015 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA)23
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
included the following provisions in its mark-up of FY2015 NDAA:
TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM
LIMITATIONS
TEST,
REQUIREMENTS,
AND
EVALUATION
RESTRICTIONS,
AND
Section 2XX—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
Program
This section would limit obligation or expenditure of funds to not more than 80 percent for
the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program until the Secretary of the Army
submits a report to the congressional defense committees on the Army’s plan to eventually
replace all M-113 Armored Personal Carriers (APC) within Echelons-Above-Brigade (EAB)
formations.
The committee notes that in 2007, the Army identified the M-113 APC for replacement due
to its inadequate survivability and force protection. The committee further notes that in the
committee report (H.Rept. 112-78) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012 and in the committee report (H.Rept. 112-479) accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the committee provided numerous
options for consideration by the Army to accelerate the AMPV program. The committee
understands that the Army has released a Request for Proposal for the Echelons-BelowBrigade (EBB) requirement which is focused on survivability shortfalls within the Armor
Brigade Combat Team. The committee continues to support the AMPV program and expects
the Army to conduct the competition in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations.
However, the committee is concerned that although the Army’s current plan addresses a
critical shortfall within EBB formations, there is currently no plan to address the
survivability shortfalls within Echelons-Above-Brigade formations. The committee
understands that there are approximately 2,000 M-113’s within existing EAB formations. In
addition, the committee notes that on at least one occasion, an Armor Brigade Combat Team
22
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, March 2014, p. 3-3 and U.S.
Army’s FY2015 Budget Briefing, March 4, 2014, p. 13.
23
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, H.R. 4435 – FY15 National Defense Authorization Bill, from House
Armed Services Committee website, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS25/20140501/102129/BILLS113HR4435ih.pdf, accessed May 2, 2014.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
(ABCT) deployed to the Republic of Iraq with Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicles.
Therefore, this section would also require the Secretary of the Army to include as part of the
report, an assessment for the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled variants within the
ABCT.24
SEC. 2 ___. [Log 53787] LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR
ARMORED MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLE PROGRAM.
(a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Army,
for the armored multi-purpose vehicle program, not more than 80 percent may be obligated
or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits to the congressional
defense committees the report under subsection (b)(1).
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to
the congressional defense committee a report on the armored multi-purpose vehicle program.
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of the existing capability gaps of the M–113 family of vehicles
assigned, as of the date of the report, to units outside of combat brigades.
(B) An identification of the mission roles that are in common between—
(i) such vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades; and
(ii) the vehicles examined in the armor brigade combat team during the armored multipurpose vehicle analysis of alternatives.
(C) The estimated timeline and the rough order of magnitude of funding requirements
associated with complete M–113 family of vehicles divestiture within the units outside of
combat brigades and the risk associated with delaying the replacement of such vehicles.
(D) A description of the requirements for force protection, mobility, and size, weight, power,
and cooling capacity for the mission roles of M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units
outside of combat brigades.
(E) A discussion of the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units
outside of combat brigades that are comparable to the mission roles of the M–113 family of
vehicles assigned to armor brigade combat teams.
(F) A discussion of whether a one-for-one replacement of the M–113 family of vehicles as
signed to units outside of combat brigades is likely.
(G) With respect to mission roles, a discussion of any substantive distinctions that exist in
the capabilities of the M–113 family of vehicles that are needed based on the level of the unit
to which the vehicle is assigned (not including combat brigades).
(H) A discussion of the relative priority of fielding among the mission roles.
24
Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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(I) An assessment for the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled variants within the
armor brigade combat teams.25
Congressional Interest in a Mixed AMPV Fleet26
Some Members have expressed their concerns with the Army’s current AMPV RFP to DOD.
They propose the current RFP, which stipulates the selection of a single vendor, be modified so
that a mixed fleet (both tracked and wheeled) of AMPVs can be acquired. This would essentially
make the AMPV procurement a multi-vendor effort. The Members supporting this course of
action contend a mixed fleet is “sensible, sustainable, cost effective for the taxpayer, and most
importantly, best for the warfighter.”
Potential Issue for Congress
The AMPV and the Army’s Emphasis on Deployability
On February 24, 2014, during a news conference outlining his recommendations to the President
for DOD’s FY2015 budget, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated:
I have also accepted the Army’s recommendation to terminate the current Ground Combat
Vehicle [GCV] program and re-direct the funds toward developing a next-generation
platform. I have asked the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps to deliver new,
realistic visions for vehicle modernization by the end of this year.27
When asked to elaborate on Secretary Hagel’s comments, a DOD spokesman reportedly noted:
We found that the Ground Combat Vehicle isn't the best vehicle to replace the Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicle, both in terms of performance and cost. While it would have
protected troops inside it, it would have been too heavy and too expensive.28
It was also noted that industry proposed GCV variants ranging from 60 to 70 tons in order to meet
Army protection requirements as well as the capacity to transport a nine-soldier infantry squad.29
The Army has reportedly stated “the service needs to become a lighter and more expeditionary
force in the coming decade if it is to remain relevant to America’s national security strategy” and
that “the increased weight of combat vehicles is one of the areas the Army needs to address if it is
to become more expeditionary.”30 While the AMPV is likely to be based on existing designs,
25
Ibid., pp. 8-10.
Letter from Reps. Mike Rogers, Jim Jordan, Candice Miller, et al to the Honorable Frank Kendall, Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, April 3, 2014.
27
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday,
February 24, 2014.
28
Sebastian Sprenger and Tony Bertuca, “Combat Vehicle Axing Adds to Army’s List of Programs That Went
Nowhere,” InsideDefense.com, February 26, 2014.
29
Ibid.
30
Tony Bertuca, “Army Futurists Continue to Ponder a Lighter, More Expeditionary Force,” InsideDefense.com,
(continued...)
26
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
because there are five variants planned, there is potential for the vehicle to increase in both
weight and size as new features are added to the vehicles. Because the past two combat vehicles
proposed by the Army—the Future Combat System’s Manned Ground Combat Vehicle and the
Ground Combat Vehicle—were cancelled in large part due to what was deemed excessive weight
and size, Congress might decide to examine what programmatic measures are in place to ensure
that the AMPV does not fall victim to its weight and size—primary factors in the AMPV’s overall
deployability.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
20
Sebastian Sprenger and Tony Bertuca, “Combat Vehicle Axing Adds to Army’s List of Programs That Went
Nowhere,” InsideDefense.com, February 26, 2014.
21
Ibid.
22
Tony Bertuca, “Army Futurists Continue to Ponder a Lighter, More Expeditionary Force,” InsideDefense.com,(...continued)
January 24, 2014.
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