Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary

Some progress in addressing recurrent conflict in eastern DRC was made in 2013. DRC and its neighbors agreed to a regional peace framework, and the Congolese military—backed by a new United Nations (U.N.) "Intervention Brigade"—defeated a relatively formidable rebel group known as the M23. Then-U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, former U.S. Senator Russell Feingold, helped facilitate a peace process with the M23 and pushed for full implementation of the regional accord. On the other hand, other armed groups remain active in the east, and the DRC government has made little progress on its commitments to demobilize and reintegrate former M23 combatants and to implement domestic security and governance reforms called for under the 2013 peace framework.

The United States provides development aid, security assistance, and emergency humanitarian assistance to DRC, and is the largest financial contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in DRC (MONUSCO). As a permanent, veto-capable member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States is positioned to influence the annual authorization of MONUSCO and a U.N. sanctions regime, which is implemented in the United States via executive order. The United States may also influence the actions of international financial institutions that have, at times, provided support to the DRC government. U.S. efforts to advance peace and stability in DRC may nonetheless be constrained by limited resources, a lack of DRC state capacity and commitment to shared policy goals, and the challenge of coordinating with and influencing other key players. U.S. policy may also be affected by a recent change in personnel: in July 2015, former U.S. Representative Tom Perriello was appointed to succeed Feingold as Special Envoy.

Congress has shaped U.S. policy toward DRC through legislation, regular hearings, and oversight activities. Congress authorizes and appropriates aid funding and U.S. contributions to MONUSCO's budget. Congress has also enacted restrictions on certain types of U.S. aid to countries that, like DRC, use child soldiers in their military (P.L. 110-457, as amended), fail to observe minimum standards in countering human trafficking (P.L. 110-457 and P.L. 106-386, as amended), or fail to uphold budget transparency (most recently, P.L. 113-235). The Obama Administration has waived most such restrictions for DRC, other than prohibiting certain military grants and sales. In addition, the Administration suspended some military aid to neighboring Rwanda in FY2012-FY2014 due to its support for the M23, citing provisions in foreign aid appropriations measures and child soldiers legislation. Members of Congress have also focused attention on wildlife trafficking issues and on the DRC government's decision to suspend the issuance of exit permits for internationally adopted children. See also CRS Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses, by [author name scrubbed].

Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, cyclical conflict in eastern DRC has caused regional instability and inhibited development, consuming substantial domestic and donor resources and thus becoming a key focus of international policy toward the country. The emergence of a new, formidable rebel movement known as the M23 in 2012 prompted international policymakers to increase their diplomatic engagement in the Great Lakes region of central Africa.¹ The defeat of the M23 in November 2013, which followed a regional "Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement," was hailed as a significant breakthrough for peace and stability.

However, multiple armed groups remain active in eastern DRC, the national military continues to be associated with abuses against civilians, and many elements of the 2013 Framework Accord are unimplemented—including commitments by the DRC government to improve governance and reform its security apparatus. State actors often appear more focused on controlling resources and augmenting their personal power than on establishing stability, creating effective state institutions, and fostering socioeconomic development for DRC's 77 million inhabitants. Donor efforts to ensure greater accountability for individuals implicated in serious human rights abuses have had limited impact. Tensions endure between DRC and its smaller but more capable neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, which both reportedly provided support to the M23. Donors, including the United States, are now focused on prospects for national elections, currently slated for 2016. DRC has never experienced an electoral transfer of power between administrations.

DRC is rich in minerals, water resources, and agricultural potential, and has experienced high annual economic growth in recent years. DRC also receives substantial international aid, with $2.57 billion in net official development assistance disbursed in 2013.² Yet the majority of Congolese live in poverty and many lack access to adequate food.³ Over 2.7 million Congolese are internally displaced—more than at the height of the M23 crisis—and nearly a half-million more are refugees in nearby countries.⁴ DRC was ranked second to last on the 2014 U.N. Human Development Index and has among the world's lowest per-capita gross domestic product (GDP).⁵ Despite abundant fertile land and water resources in DRC, the World Food Program found that 6.4 million residents—10% of the population—faced serious to severe food insecurity in late 2014.⁶ A lack of health care, water, and sanitation facilities, along with DRC's equatorial climate, have contributed to recurrent outbreaks of cholera, measles, Ebola, and yellow fever. DRC is the 11^th-largest country in the world, and some areas, such Katanga province, the heart of the industrial mining sector, have enjoyed comparative stability and prosperity. However, militia violence in parts of Katanga since 2012 suggests that even this relative security is tenuous.⁷

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by [author name scrubbed] using data from the Department of State (2011), Esri (2014), DeLorme (2014), ArcWorld (2014), and the DRC Référentiel Géographique Commun (2015). At-a-glance information from CIA World Factbook, June 2015; UNAIDS; World Bank; and the IMF (April 2015). Figures refer to 2014 estimates unless otherwise indicated.

The United Nations (U.N.) Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) is the world's largest U.N. peacekeeping operation, with nearly 21,000 uniformed personnel.⁸ Its mandate focuses on protecting civilians and supporting the DRC government's efforts to stabilize the east, tasks at which it has arguably had limited success. The U.N. Security Council has also tasked MONUSCO to support the disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, promote political rights and human rights, provide logistical support to DRC's upcoming elections, and support implementation of DRC domestic reforms under the 2013 framework accord—including through efforts to "encourage and accelerate national ownership of security sector reform by the government of the DRC."⁹ In March 2015, the Security Council voted to extend MONUSCO, including its Intervention Brigade (see "Conflict in the East"), for another year.

Tensions between MONUSCO and the DRC government have grown over the past year amid U.N. and other international criticism of DRC's democratic trajectory, human rights abuses, and lack of implementation of the framework accord. In the lead-up to MONUSCO's latest mandate renewal, the DRC government requested a significant drawdown of its forces, echoing a similar debate ahead of the 2011 elections. The Security Council resolution reauthorizing MONUSCO endorses a recommendation by the U.N. Secretary General to reduce its size by 2,000 troops—but maintains the same authorized troop ceiling and states that the latter should be reduced only "once significant progress has been achieved" in implementing its mandate.¹⁰

Whether greater stability can be brought to DRC is likely to depend on whether the Congolese military can or will successfully counter remaining armed groups in the east; whether neighboring countries seek new armed proxies for leverage and/or economic gain; and whether the DRC government implements promised reforms. While such reforms could potentially benefit the administration of President Joseph Kabila by enabling it to project state authority, structural changes to the security sector and economic governance could also threaten the interests of powerful individuals. Finally, events in the turbulent sub-region—with conflicts in neighboring Central African Republic and South Sudan, and new instability in Burundi—may negatively impact DRC's stability or divert international humanitarian and peacebuilding resources.

Recent maneuvers by Kabila and his supporters suggest he may intend to stay in power beyond his mandate. In 2014, some PPRD officials floated the idea of amending the constitution, which places a two-term limit on the presidency,²¹ but these proposals did not advance amid apparent disagreements within the party. In January 2015, Kabila's administration backed a draft law that would have required a country-wide census prior to elections, a process that most observers asserted would delay voting by several years. Following days of protests, which continued in spite of a violent crackdown by Congolese security forces, the Senate ultimately amended the bill to drop the census requirement. Shortly thereafter, Kabila promulgated a law mandating administrative découpage, a reform mandated in the 2006 constitution that would subdivide Congo's 11 provinces into 26.²² Critics have denounced the sudden push for decentralization as a delaying tactic, asserting that such large-scale territorial and administrative redistricting would likely require the postponement of elections.²³ The timeframe and precise mechanism are uncertain for implementing the process, which is vehemently opposed in parts of the country—notably the economically powerful Katanga province.

Source: National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) of DRC, calendar released on February 12, 2015; National Democratic Institute field staff, consulted June 2015.

While substantial power is concentrated in the presidency, some local and provincial officials—such as the former governor of Katanga, Moïse Katumbi Chapwe—appear to wield significant authority locally. Katumbi, who is reportedly popular among both Katanga residents and the international business community, belongs to the ruling party, but he has grown more openly critical of Kabila over the past year and is widely seen as an emerging rival. Katumbi claimed in early 2015 that he had been poisoned, and he later stepped down from his position as governor, citing the requirement under découpage to divide Katanga into four new provinces. In June, a Kabila advisor filed an anti-corruption suit against Katumbi and several other prominent figures.²⁵ Whether Katumbi might challenge Kabila's leadership within the PPRD, or form his own party, is a topic of intense speculation among DRC observers.

Observers regularly note that DRC's governance problems stretch far beyond the electoral process, citing endemic corruption and barely functional state institutions. The state's ability to manage and monitor extraction of its natural resources has been a perennial challenge (see "The Mining Sector"). Public service delivery is constrained by minimal central government control over large parts of the national territory, poor transportation and electricity infrastructure, challenging terrain, and protracted local conflicts. The State Department's annual human rights report on DRC highlights "widespread impunity and corruption throughout the government," state security force abuses, and a judiciary that is "corrupt and subject to influence."²⁶

Two decades of intermittent conflict in DRC's mineral rich, agriculturally fertile, and densely inhabited eastern provinces have rendered brutal violence against civilians common. Militia factions battling over territory and natural resources often prey on civilians. The national military (FARDC) and other state security forces are also implicated in atrocities, such as looting, killings, and sexual violence, including during operations against armed groups and as part of illicit involvement in mining.²⁷ Violence stems from deep-rooted tensions related to resources (including land) and citizenship, internal military disarray, and regional geopolitics. Security challenges also reflect a complex interplay of state negligence, incapacity, and coercion, including in the many regions of the country that are not directly affected by conflict.

Violence has been particularly acute in North and South Kivu and in the adjacent Ituri district of Orientale province, which together have been an epicenter of regional unrest since the 1990s. The spillover of conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990s aggravated long-standing tensions in the region between and among communities self-identified as "indigenous" and those that trace their ethnic origins (however distant) to Rwanda. These dynamics have been entrenched by localized disputes, organized criminal activity, and the interventions of neighboring states.

In 2012, a new rebel group known as the M23 emerged as a mutiny of soldiers who had been integrated into the FARDC as the result of a 2009 peace accord with a reportedly Rwandan-backed rebel group known as the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP).²⁸ According to a wide range of reports, including a 2014 assessment by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, the group received substantial support from Rwanda (see text-box below), with U.N. sanctions monitors referring to additional, more "subtle" support from Uganda.²⁹

The M23 conflict prompted increased international diplomatic attention, particularly after the group occupied the city of Goma in November 2012. This produced a U.N.-facilitated "Framework Agreement" that DRC and all of its neighbors signed in February 2013, which aimed to define the respective responsibilities of the DRC government, neighboring states, and donors in ending cyclical conflict in the east.³² Regional leaders committed to respect DRC's sovereignty and not to provide support to DRC-based armed groups, while DRC leaders committed to institutional reforms, the extension of state authority in the east, political decentralization, and national reconciliation. The signatories also agreed to pursue regional economic integration.

In the wake of the framework accord, the U.N. Security Council authorized an "Intervention Brigade" within MONUSCO tasked with "neutralizing" armed groups in the east.³⁴ While U.N. peacekeeping troops had previously provided support to DRC-led counterinsurgency operations, the Intervention Brigade is authorized to carry out "targeted offensive operations," including "unilaterally." The brigade is composed of about 3,000 troops from three African countries—South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi—that had expressed a commitment to confronting the M23. As noted above ("Introduction"), the Intervention Brigade has since been reauthorized through 2016. In the second half of 2013, the FARDC, backed by the Intervention Brigade, initiated a string of successful operations against the M23, reversing a pattern of military setbacks.³⁵ Ultimately, the M23 agreed to end its rebellion in exchange for various guarantees. However, few ex-combatants have been demobilized, and over 1,000 former M23 fighters remain in camps in Uganda and Rwanda. A notional government-run "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" (DDR) program has yet to be implemented.³⁶

After the defeat of the M23, the U.N. Security Council, MONUSCO commanders, and U.S. officials called for the FARDC and Intervention Brigade to initiate operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia founded by perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and which Rwanda views as a national security threat. However, DRC authorities have instead focused on other groups, and the main troop contributors to the Intervention Brigade, South Africa and Tanzania, backed a regional plan that instead granted the FDLR a six-month de facto reprieve to voluntarily disarm. After this deadline expired, in early 2015, the FARDC initiated operations against the group, but it appointed two commanders to whom MONUSCO cannot provide support because they do not pass U.N. human rights vetting.³⁷

Elements of a Burundian former rebel group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), are also present in the east, as is the LRA, along with another militia of Ugandan origin, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The Ugandan government and some analysts claim the ADF has ties to Islamist extremist groups.³⁸ The group's attacks on civilians have made it a growing target of DRC and U.N. military operations since 2014.

Particular international attention has been paid to the issue of sexual and gender-based violence in DRC. Its scale and brutality are extreme in conflict-affected areas, with extensive reports of gang rape, mutilation, and other abuses by elements of the FARDC and armed groups. Such violence may be opportunistic or designed to systematically intimidate local populations. Its prevalence has been attributed to factors such as the eroded status of women, weak state authority, a deeply flawed justice system, and a breakdown in community protection mechanisms. As with other human rights problems, it has also been linked to structural problems within the security sector. While women and girls are the primary targets, men and boys have also been victims. Despite legal reforms, donor pressure, and foreign assistance efforts, researchers report that most cases are never investigated or prosecuted.³⁹ U.N. peacekeepers have been criticized for failing to protect civilians, and U.N. personnel in DRC have also periodically been accused of sexual abuse.

DRC has some of the largest endowments of natural resources in the world. Buoyed by high global commodity prices, the economy grew by 9.2% last year and is expected to grow by the same margin in 2015.⁴⁵ The vast majority of the population, however, remains dependent on subsistence agriculture for survival, and outside of major cities and industrial mining zones, economic activity is often carried out within a broad informal sector. The reestablishment of relations with international financial institutions after the 1998-2003 war helped stabilize DRC's macroeconomic situation, but in 2012, the IMF ended its concessional loan program due to concerns about a lack of transparency in mining contracts.

DRC was ranked 184 out of 189 countries in the World Bank's 2015 Doing Business Report, despite some steps by the government to improve the business climate. The State Department has reported on a number of obstacles to foreign investment and private sector development, including underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate contract enforcement, limited access to credit, continued insecurity in the east, inadequate property rights protection, high levels of bureaucratic red tape and corruption, a shortage of skilled labor, and a lack of reliable electricity.⁴⁶ In addition, current law requires that Congolese have a majority stake in all agriculture investments, which is seen as a significant impediment to foreign investment, despite government promises to revise the law.⁴⁷

DRC's sovereign debt declined from 136% of GDP in 2009 to around 21% by 2014, after the country qualified in 2010 for multilateral debt relief worth $12.3 billion under the World Bank- and IMF-led Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.⁴⁸ Conditions for the debt cancellation included "satisfactory implementation of the country's poverty reduction and growth strategy, maintenance of macroeconomic stability, improvements in public expenditure and debt management, and improved governance and service delivery in key social sectors, such as health, education and rural development." While macroeconomic improvements did occur, analysts have debated whether the World Bank and IMF moved ahead too quickly, thereby losing policy leverage in the absence of significant advances in governance and the business environment.⁴⁹

Exports of "conflict minerals"—ores that are alleged to fuel conflict when they are controlled or traded by armed groups—are associated with the informal, artisanal mining sector in eastern DRC. Countries in the region, multilateral institutions, some private-sector firms, and donors (including the United States) have advanced several methods and models for reducing the trade in conflict minerals, with varying results. For example, U.N. sanctions monitors reported in January 2014 that 98% of the gold produced in DRC "is smuggled out of the country" and that as a result, DRC and Uganda—the main transit country for Congolese gold—"are losing millions of dollars annually in tax revenue and tolerating a system that is financing armed groups."⁵⁰

The vast majority of state revenues from the mining sector, on the other hand, come from private sector industrial cobalt and copper mining operations located in relatively stable Katanga, in which the mining parastatal Gécamines is a partner. DRC accounts for 47% of the world's cobalt reserves and produced 55% of the world's supply of cobalt in 2012, along with 20% of industrial diamonds, and 12% of tantalum.⁵¹ China has a growing stake in DRC mining, and as part of its Sino-Congolese Cooperation Agreement, it has pledged over $6 billion in loans to DRC for infrastructure, which are expected to be repaid through joint-venture mining operations.⁵² In 2014, nearly 40% of DRC exports were destined for China, up from 10% in 2005.⁵³ The DRC government has for several years announced plans to revise its mining code, which could allow the state to derive a higher share of mining revenues from the private sector, but has also sparked concerns from foreign investors.

International concerns related to the formal mining sector have focused on corruption, mismanagement, shortfalls in property rights, regulatory uncertainty, and poor labor conditions. A lack of transparency has been a perennial area of focus. For example, an independent investigation into five mining concessions sold between 2010 and 2012 reported that DRC lost at least $1.36 billion from underpricing those assets in complex deals featuring offshore companies and two multinational mining corporations, Glencore and the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC).⁵⁴ Intermediary companies involved in the deals have been linked to companies owned by Dan Gertler, an Israeli businessman with reportedly close ties to President Kabila. A 2013 investigation by the DRC public prosecutor's office reportedly accused mining companies of owing billions of dollars in unpaid taxes, duties, and fines.⁵⁵

In 2012, the IMF halted its concessional lending program in DRC because DRC had failed to publish mining contracts as required under the program. In 2013, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a U.S.-backed global effort to promote revenue transparency for extractive resources, suspended DRC, citing the unreliability of revenue figures disclosed from its extractive sectors.⁵⁶ Similar transparency concerns have been raised concerning DRC's oil sector, as exploration is increasing. Independent researchers accuse a British oil company, Soco, of bribing DRC military commanders to intimidate opponents of its efforts to explore in DRC's Virunga National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage site.⁵⁷ DRC subsequently made some progress in improving economic governance, achieving EITI compliant status in July 2014. However, it was accused by the IMF in June 2015 of again failing to disclose the sale of a mining concession partially owned by Gécamines, in violation of Congolese law and the terms of an agreement between DRC and the World Bank requiring the disclosure of all state mining deals.

The Obama Administration considers DRC "a strategic priority for the United States due to its size, location, and role in the Great Lakes region."⁵⁸ According to the U.S. State Department, "U.S. foreign policy in the D.R.C. is focused on helping the country become a nation that is stable and democratic, at peace with its neighbors, extends state authority across its territory, and provides for the basic needs of its citizens."⁵⁹ Since 2013, the Obama Administration has focused on encouraging the implementation of the regional peace Framework Agreement, including commitments by DRC's neighbors to respect the country's territorial integrity, and commitments by the DRC to make progress toward demobilizing ex-rebel combatants and instituting reforms. Then-U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Russell Feingold, a former U.S. Senator, helped facilitate a peace process with the M23 and pushed for full implementation of the 2013 accord, in coordination with U.N. and other special envoys.

Feingold left his position in February 2015 and was replaced by former U.S. Representative Tom Perriello in July 2015. In addition to pursuing regional diplomacy through the office of the Special Envoy, the Administration has imposed targeted sanctions under Executive Order 13413 (2006) on individuals and groups seen as fomenting conflict, impeding democracy, or committing gross human rights abuses, and supported actions in the U.N. Security Council that aim to advance the regional peace process and enhance MONUSCO's ability to protect civilians. The United States also provides logistical and advisory support for regional military operations against the Lord's Resistance Army, an insurgent group active in DRC and neighboring states.⁶⁰

In the wake of the M23 conflict, Feingold called for continued high-level political dialogue among countries in the region, new military operations against armed groups still active in eastern DRC, and accountability for human rights abusers. He also championed respect for presidential term limits in Central Africa—an issue at play in upcoming elections in DRC, and also in neighboring Burundi, Rwanda, and the Republic of Congo.⁶¹

U.S. officials have repeatedly urged DRC to improve governance and compliance with the rule of law, and to cooperate with MONUSCO to stabilize the east. Secretary of State John Kerry stated during a visit to DRC in 2014 that "military force alone will not deliver stability to the DRC." He also emphasized support for the 2013 framework accord and called for DRC to hold "free, fair, timely, and transparent elections."⁶² In April 2015, the State Department criticized the Kabila administration's detention of youth activists at a pro-democracy event sponsored, in part, by the U.S. government (a USAID official was also detained, but was soon released).⁶³ During a visit to Kinshasa in June 2015, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor Tom Malinowski praised the government's commitment to holding national elections in 2016 but warned against any "pretext for delay" as well as any effort to amend constitutional term limits.⁶⁴ He also urged the government to restart full military cooperation with MONUSCO, and indicated that MONUSCO's troop levels should not decrease while armed groups remained active in the east. The DRC government spokesman condemned Malinowski's comments as "unacceptable" and "intolerable" interference in the country's internal affairs.⁶⁵

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015 (req.)

FY2016 (req.)

DA

GHP (State + USAID)

ESF

INCLE

NADR

IMET

PKO

FFP

Subtotal

TOTAL

Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2012-FY2016; USAID fact-sheets on humanitarian aid to DRC.

Notes: DA-Development Assistance; GHP-Global Health Programs; ESF-Economic Support Fund; INCLE-International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement; NADR-Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs; IMET-International Military Education & Training; FMF-Foreign Military Financing; FFP-Food For Peace; PKO-Peacekeeping Operations; OCO-Overseas Contingency Operations; TBD-to be determined. Totals may not add up due to rounding. Table does not include regionally or centrally budgeted program funding.

Appropriations, $ Millions

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015 (est.)

FY2016 (req.)

CIPA

Many Members of Congress have expressed an interest, through legislation and oversight activities, in advancing peace and stability, improving governance and natural resource management, and addressing health and humanitarian needs in DRC. However, Congolese political actors have, at times, displayed limited ability and will to pursue such ends. U.S. influence may be further constrained by limited available U.S. fiscal and personnel resources, and by the challenges of coordinating with and influencing other key players, including other donors, China, and regional actors such as Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Tanzania, and South Africa. U.S. bilateral aid does not easily present opportunities for leverage, as most programs are aimed at addressing humanitarian, development, and/or human rights problems. Citing this emphasis, President Obama has waived most legal restrictions on aid stemming from human rights and budget transparency concerns, using waiver authorities provided by Congress.

U.S. officials publicly criticized the 2011 electoral process, but in the end, the Obama Administration tacitly accepted Kabila's victory. Prospects for future steps toward greater democracy and accountable governance are uncertain. National elections scheduled for 2016 will be another test of DRC's political trajectory, but many analysts are skeptical that they will occur on time and be conducted freely and fairly. Tensions with the U.N. peacekeeping operation appear to reflect an effort by DRC leaders to assert greater sovereignty ahead of the coming elections.

U.S. policymakers, including in Congress, face a particularly thorny set of challenges with regard to the situation in the east. The 2013 U.N.-backed Framework Agreement between DRC and its neighbors represents a potential foundation for more functional regional relationships and greater internal stability. However, the DRC government's commitments to demobilize and reintegrate ex-rebel combatants and institute domestic reforms have not been fulfilled. Security sector reform has also stalled, in part due to seemingly low DRC government interest in restructuring a security apparatus whose dysfunction may benefit powerful actors. The M23's defeat was a significant accomplishment and may point to the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic criticism of Rwanda—but it did not, by itself, address the root causes of conflict in the region.

A key issue for Congress is whether a long-running focus on specific issues such as sexual violence in conflict zones and the trade in conflict minerals has distracted from systemic governance problems—or has resulted in a policy and aid profile that overwhelmingly concentrates on the east at the possible expense of the rest of the country. Debate continues among policymakers in Congress and the executive branch over issues such as

• the impact and strategic design of U.S. aid to DRC, such as whether aid flows to the areas of greatest need and/or highest U.S. national interests;
• the degree to which U.S. aid to DRC and neighboring states can or should be conditioned or restricted as a tool of policy leverage;
• the relative effectiveness of various tools for exerting U.S. influence, such as diplomacy, foreign assistance, and U.S. actions in multilateral forums; and
• the degree to which the Kabila government has shown progress in confronting deeply ingrained problems related to the security sector, economic governance, accountability for human rights abuses, and state capacity.

Author Contact Information

Acknowledgments

Tomas Husted, CRS Research Associate, contributed to this report.