Gangs in Central America
Changes from February 20, 2014 to August 29, 2016
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Gangs in Central America
Contents
- Introduction
- Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
- Defining Gangs
- Transnational Gangs in Central America
- Gang Activities in Central America
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America- Legacies of War and Authoritarian Rule: Arms and Violence
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities- Societal Stigmas
- Role of the Media
- Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts
- Prisons in Need of Reform
- U.S.
DeportationsRemovals (Deportations) to Central America and the Gang - Country Anti-
Ganggang Efforts - Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-
Gang Policiesgang Policies
- El Salvador's 2012 Gang Truce and Dissolution
- Military Involvement in Public Security and Human Rights
- Approaches in Other Central American Countries
- Gang Truce in El Salvador
- Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
- U.S. Policy
- Congressional Interest and Appropriations
for Anti-Gang and Related Security Efforts in Central America - Evolution of U.S. International Anti-
Ganggang Efforts - State Department
- U.S. Agency for International Development
Department of Justice- Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- U.S. Treasury Department
- Possible Questions for Oversight
Figures
Summary
Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America and begun to examine the role gang-related crime and violence has played in fueling a surge in unaccompanied alien children (UAC) emigrating to the United States. Congress has continued to monitor the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. This report focuses primarily on U.S.-funded international anti-gang efforts.
The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador having facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country's largest gangs in 2012. The truce contributed to a large reduction in homicides, before beginning to unravel in recent months. The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government that will take office on June 1, 2014, such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce stronger than before and/or if the truce were to end abruptly and prompt an escalation in intra-gang violence.
The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in parts of Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang-related crime and violence on governance, citizen security, and investment in Central America. Congress has examined the role that gang-related violence has played in fueling mixed migration flows, which have included asylum seekers, by families and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) to the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Central American governments have struggled to address the gang problem. From 2012 to 2014, the government of El Salvador facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country's largest gangs. The truce contributed to a temporary reduction in homicides but strengthened the gangs. Since taking office in June 2014, President Salvador Sanchez Cerén has adopted repression-oriented anti-gang policies similar those implemented in the mid-2000s, including relying on the military to support anti-gang efforts. El Salvador's attorney general is investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings committed by police engaged in anti-gang efforts. Successive Honduran governments have generally relied on suppression-oriented policies toward the gangs as well, with some funding provided in recent years to support community-level prevention programs. The Guatemalan government has generally relied on periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members. U.S. agencies have engaged with Central American governments on gang issues for more than a decade. In July 2007, an interagency committee announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which emphasized diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds through a special line item for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue those anti-gang initiatives. Significant additional support has been provided through CARSI for violence-prevention efforts in communities affected by gang violence, as well as for vetted police units working on transnational gang cases with U.S. law enforcement. Recently, U.S. and Salvadoran officials have also targeted the financing of MS-13, which the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Transnational Criminal Organization subject to U.S. sanctions in October 2012, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.U.S. agencies have engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. FY2013-FY2015
Summary
Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department's October 2012 designation of the MS-13 as a major Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.
In recent years, Congress has dedicated funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the potential impact of U.S. sanctions on law-impact of the Treasury Department's TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Also seeenforcement efforts. See also CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
Introduction
In recent years, analysts and U.S. officials haveCongress has expressed ongoing concernsconcern about the increasing rateshigh rate of violent crimes committed by drug traffickers, organized criminal groups, and gangs in Central America, particularly in the "northern triangle" countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (see Figure 1).1 Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed a significant proportion of violent crime in that region to youth gangs or marashomicides to maras (gangs), many of which have ties to the United States. U.S. concerns about gangs have accelerated as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a particularly violent group with ties to Central America, has increased its presence and illicit activities in the United States.2 Policy-makers in countries throughout the region, including in the United States, are struggling to find the right mix of suppressive and preventive policies to confront the gang problem. Most agree that a comprehensive, regional approach to gangs is necessary to prevent further escalation of the problem.
Congress is likely to maintain an interest in crime and gang violence in Central America, as well as the related activities of Central American gangs in the United States. are due in part to the role gangs have played in the violence, extortion, and forced recruitment that has fueled internal displacement, as well as the record-level emigration of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) and families to the United States.2 The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has asserted that gang violence is contributing to a "refugee-like" situation in the northern triangle.3 Governments maintain that recent migration has been due to a number of factors and that their efforts are reducing violence and illegal emigration.4
In recent years, Congress has considered what level of U.S. assistance is most appropriate to help Central American countries combat gang activity and what types of programs are most effective in that effort. Members of Congress have also taken an interest in the impact on the gang problem of U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records to Central America on the gang problem, as well as the evolving relationship between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and the gangs. More recently, there has been congressional interest in the gang truce in El Salvador and the potential implications that its success or failure might have for anti-crime efforts in other countries. Congress may also examine how anti-gang efforts have been affected by the Treasury Department's October 2012 decision to designate and sanction the MS-13 as a significant Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO).3
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. It concludes with possible questions for oversight that Congress may consider.
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
Defining Gangs
Academics and other experts on gangs continue to debate the formal definition of the term "gang" and the types of individuals that should be included in definitions of the term. There is general agreement that most gangs have a name and some sense of identity that can sometimes be indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti, and hand signs that are unique to the gang. Gangs are thought to be composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members are adults well over the age of 24. Typically, gangs have some degree of permanence and organization and are generally involved in delinquent or criminal activity. Gangs may be involved in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assaults to more serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, alien smuggling, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent felonies.
The lines between transnational gang activity and organized crime are increasingly blurry. Gangs generally feature horizontal power structures, with many small subgroups (semi-independent "franchises") and limited central leadership setting strategy and enforcing discipline. While many gangs lack the organizational structure, capital, and manpower required to run sophisticated criminal schemes or to penetrate state institutions at high levels, some (such as the MS-13 and the 18th Street) have become more highly organized.4 In Central America, gangs are often involved in the street-level distribution of drugs and in extortion rackets, but MS-13 may also be involved in higher-level criminal drug distribution.5
When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the term pandillas and maras interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two.6 Studies that make a distinction between the two types of Central America gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups that have long been present in the region, and maras as a more recent phenomenon that has some transnational roots. Some have more recently classified gangs into "first generation" (localized groups), "second generation" (national groups with some transnational links), and "third generation" gangs. Those analysts have augured that some gangs in the region may be evolving into "third generation" gangs that are "internationalized, networked, and complicated structures."7
Gangs in Central America
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. It concludes with possible questions for oversight that Congress may consider.
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Note: The "northern triangle" countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange. Experts have long debated the formal definition of the term gang and the types of individuals that should be considered gang members. Generally, experts agree that most gangs have a name and some sense of identity, which can sometimes be indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti, colors, and hand signs that are unique to the group. Gangs are thought to be composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members are older adults and others are younger, often forcibly recruited.6 These definitions are evolving. According to the U.S. National Gang Center, group criminality is the most important factor used to identify gang-related activity in the United States, followed by displaying gang symbols.7 Gangs may be involved in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, extortion, and assaults to more serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, rape, and murder. When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the terms pandillas and maras interchangeably, whereas others distinguish between the two.8 Studies that distinguish between the two types of Central American gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups that have long been present in the region and maras as a more recent phenomenon with transnational roots. For a variety of reasons discussed below, pandillas are more prevalent in Nicaragua, whereas maras are dominant in the northern triangle.9The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).8 The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs, as well as the evolving relationship between Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and the gangs. Congress is currently examining the degree to which governments in the region are taking steps to address gangs in a way that does not cause human rights abuses, as required by conditions included in the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113).5
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
Defining Gangs
. This process but remain active in the United States. According to U.S. estimates by the Department of Justice in 2015, the 18th Street gang is reportedly active in 20 states, whereas the MS-13 is present in 46 states and the District of Columbia.11
The expansion of MS-13 and 18th Street presence in Central America accelerated after the United States began deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the northern triangle region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208) of 1996.912 Many contend that gang- deportees "exported" a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and recruited new members from among the local populations.
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, with a top State Department official recently estimating that there may be 85,000 MS-13 and 18th Street gang members in the northern triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).10 In 2012(where local gangs were already present). Gangs have recruited new members from among vulnerable youth in poor neighborhoods and in prisons; forcible recruitment is common.13 Studies have shown that, as happened in the United States, gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to increase discipline and cohesion among their ranks.
Estimates of gang membership in Central America vary, with several widely cited estimates published in 2012. At that time, State Department officials estimated that there were roughly 85,000 MS-13 and 18th Street gang members in northern triangle countries.14 In contrast, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated total MS-13 and M-18 membership in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras at a more modestthe region at 54,000 (see Figure 12 below).1115 According to UNODC, in 2012 there arewere roughly 20,000 gang members in El Salvador, 12; 22,000 in Honduras, and 22,000 in GuatemalaGuatemala; and 12,000 in Honduras. El Salvador hashad the highest concentration of gang members, with some 323 mareros (gang members) for every 100,000 citizens, double the level of Guatemala and Honduras. In comparison, in 2007, UNODC cited total gang membership of some 64,500, with country membership totals of 10,500 in El Salvador, 36; 14,000 in Honduras, and 14,000 in Guatemala.12Guatemala; and 36,000 in Honduras.16
Nicaragua has a significant number of gang members, but does not have large numbers of MS-13 or M-18 members, perhaps due to the fact that Nicaragua has had a much lower deportation rate from the United States than the "northern triangle"presence of local gangs, but comparatively few MS-13 and M-18 members. Many attribute this in part to the strength of social networks and community policing programs established by the Sandinistas during the 1980s.17 Nicaragua also has received far fewer deportees from the United States than the northern triangle countries. countries.13 Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize also have local gangs. There are some MS-13 members present in the Costa Rican border regions, as well as increasing numbers of MS-13 members in Belize.14
In recent years, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama have reported some MS-13 and M-18 presence in their countries.18 The increased presence in these countries could be occurring because of deliberate expansion efforts made by the gangs or because of gang members fleeing from rival gangs, or it could be a result of tough gang policies in countries such as El Salvador driving gang members into neighboring countries. In April 2016, Panamanian police captured MS-13 members and deported them to El Salvador.19 While MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, there is some evidence that both gangs, but particularly the MS-13, have expanded geographically and become more organized and sophisticated. Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize also have gangs, although most of the gangs in those countries are more often described as pandillas than maras.
clicas (cliques)cliques with those in the United States.15 In 2008-2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) simultaneously arrested gang members in El Salvador and in Charlotte, NC, responsible for carrying out several murders in North Carolina.16 Ties between some Washington, DC-based cliques and groups in El Salvador are particularly well developed.17 Studies have shown that, as happened in the United States, gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to increase the discipline and cohesion among their ranks. Still, UNODC maintains that the term "transnational gangs" is misleading when used to describe the maras, as their21 More recent investigations have shown evidence of MS-13 leaders seeking to buy high-powered firearms in Mexico and Guatemala.22 Still, the term transnational criminal organization, or TCO, might be misleading when used to describe the maras across the region. Some researchers contend that the Central American gangs' primary focus continues to be on local issues, such as dominating a particular extortion racket or local drug distribution area.18
Gang experts have argued that, although gang members may be more visible than other criminals, violence perpetrated by gangs is part of a broader spectrum of violence in Central America. Child abuse and spousal rape are major problems in the three northern triangle countries. All three countries have among the highest rates of femicide (killing of women) in the world.25 El Salvador and Guatemala also have the highest proportion of homicide victims under the age of 20.26 Moreover, transnational criminal organizations, smugglers, and other violent groups are also prevalent.27 Press reports and some Central American officials have blamed MS-13 and other gangs for a large percentage of violent crimes committed in those countries, but some analysts assert that those claims may be exaggerated. UNODC found limited evidence to support that conclusion in 2007, and now maintains that disputes between crime groups over cocaine trafficking routes are the primary driver of violence in most of the region.19 Gang experts have argued that, although gangs may be more visible than other criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad spectrum of violence in Central America. Still, the decline in homicides that has occurred in El Salvador since the drug distribution area.23
The northern triangle countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world (see Figure 3). Some Central American officials have blamed gangs for most of the homicides committed in their countries. Gang-related murders occur when gangs discipline their members or punish those who attempt to leave, dispute territory, confront law enforcement and their families, and punish those who fail to comply with their orders. Gangs have also targeted witnesses to crimes.24
Although the actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central America remains controversial, the gangs have unquestionably been involved in a broad array of other criminal activities. Those activities include kidnapping; human trafficking; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling. Gangs have increasingly been involved in extortions of residents, bus drivers, and business owners in major cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence by gang members. In September 2010, to protest recently enacted anti-gang legislation, the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in El Salvador jointly issued a warning for public transportation operators to stay home for three days or face reprisals; the threats paralyzed the country's transport system.20 In recent years, gangs have reportedly killed more than 550 Guatemalan bus drivers.21
While some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal groups have increased, others have downplayed the connection. A March 2010 report from Mexico's Attorney General's Office reported the presence of MS-13 and 18th Street in 20 of Mexico's 32 states, with the gangs involved in extortion, drug distribution, and migrant smuggling.22 Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed increasing gang involvement in drug trafficking, although mostly on a local level, as U.S. officials maintain that the gangs "facilitate the logistics and transportation for the trafficking industry in Central America and Mexico."23 MS-13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico's warring DTOs to carry out revenge killings.24 Some analysts maintain that the relationship between DTOs and gangs appears to be most developed in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras, with few DTO-gang connections in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, or Panama.25
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities
Several organizations working directly with gang members have asserted that the combination of poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of educational and job opportunities for at-risk youth are perpetuating the gang problem. In Honduras, for example, close to 30% of the population is youth ages 15-24. Those youth have very limited educational or job opportunities. A 2007 World Bank risk assessment for Honduras stated that the country had large numbers of unemployed youth who were not in school. Unable to develop the skills required for attending a university or obtaining skilled employment, they provide a ready pool of gang recruits.26 In the absence of familial and community support, many marginalized youth have turned to gangs for social support, a source of livelihood, and protection.
Societal Stigmas
Societal stigmas against gangs and gang-deportees from the United States have made the process of leaving a gang extremely difficult. A 2007 State Department report on youth gangs in El Salvador identified religious conversion, marriage, enlistment in the military, or enrollment in a substance abuse rehabilitation program as the few options available for those who seek to leave a gang. Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those with criminal records, say that offender reentry is a major problem in many countries. Ex-gang members report that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members, especially returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have had the most difficulty finding gainful employment. Some gang members have gone through complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, which many feel is necessary to better blend into society.
Role of the Media
Many studies have observed that sensationalist media coverage of the gang phenomenon in Central America has contributed to a sense of insecurity in the region and may have inadvertently enhanced the reputation of the gangs portrayed. Exaggerated media reports may have also contributed to the popular perception, which has been backed by politicians, that youth gangs are responsible for the majority of violent crime in the northern triangle countries. This sentiment has led many Central American citizens to support tough law enforcement measures against gangs, hire private security firms, and, in isolated cases, take vigilante action against suspected youth gang members.27
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts
While tough law enforcement reforms (discussed below in the section "Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies") initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they were cracking down on gangs, studies have cast serious doubts on their effectiveness. In response to law enforcement roundups of any and all tattooed youth, gangs are now changing their behavior to avoid detection. Many gang members are hiding or removing their tattoos, changing their dress, and avoiding the use of hand signals, making them harder to identify and arrest. Studies have also shown that, largely in response to law enforcement tactics, gangs have developed into more sophisticated criminal entities, some of which are now running extortion rackets throughout the region.28
Prisons in Need of Reform
The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already teeming with inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of suspected gang members, many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, for example, as of December 2012, some 27,038 inmates, including 10,212 current or former gang members, were being held in prisons designed to hold a maximum of 8,328 people.29
(homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) Source: Washington Office on Latin America, Five Facts About Migration From Central America's Northern Triangle, January 15, 2016. Women and children are often targets of gang violence in Central America. Gang initiations for men and women differ. Whereas men are subject to a beating, women are often forced to have sex with various members of the gang.31 After joining a gang, women are expected to commit crimes (such as serving as drug mules or carrying contraband into prisons), sometimes dressed like men, but also to perform household duties, such as cooking and cleaning for the group. Female gang members are expected to tolerate infidelity from their partners, but women may be murdered if they are unfaithful.32 Non-gang affiliated women and girls have been murdered as a result of turf battles, jealousy, and revenge. Those who have refused to help a gang or reported a crime are particularly vulnerable, as are those who are related to or have collaborated with the police.33 Gangs also engage in sex trafficking involving women and children, particularly in Honduras and in Guatemala City.34 Threats and harassment by gangs have led thousands of youth to abandon school, including some 39,000 in El Salvador in 2015.35 Gangs have been involved in a broad array of other criminal activities, as well. Those activities include extortion; money laundering; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling. Gangs have increasingly been involved in extortions of residents, bus drivers, and business owners in major cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violent reprisals. In 2014, some 179 bus, minibus, and taxi drivers were assassinated in Guatemala.36 In July 2015, the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in El Salvador threatened public transportation operators to go on strike or face reprisals. The operators complied with the gangs' threats, and the country's transport system remained paralyzed for three days. The Honduran government cracked down on the MS-13 gang's finances in February 2016 in an operation that seized more than $1 million and several properties and businesses operated by the gang. In July 2016, the Salvadoran government arrested more than 70 people who had allegedly laundered the gang's money through motels, brothels, and other businesses.37 Although some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and other organized criminal groups have increased, other studies have downplayed the connections.38 Some gangs engage in local drug distribution, but gangs generally do not have a role in transnational drug trafficking.39 A gang's role in the drug trade depends on the country and area in which it operates. Some clicas act as facilitators by, for example, allowing a transnational criminal organization to land drug shipments on a clandestine airstrip in their territory in exchange for payment. MS-13 members reportedly have been contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico's warring criminal organizations to carry out revenge killings.40 The northern triangle countries have long histories of armed conflict and political repression. A legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has inhibited the development of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Protracted armed conflicts also contributed to widespread proliferation of illicit firearms, as well as a tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling disputes.41 Some 80% of homicides in Honduras between 2008 and 2015 involved the use of a firearm, the vast majority of which were unlicensed.42 Many current gang leaders grew up witnessing extreme violence in their homes and communities. Some were displaced to cities in the United States or neighboring countries (such as Costa Rica), whereas others were left behind by parents who died or fled during the conflict. In addition to war, authoritarian rule, and emigration, the social fabric in the northern triangle countries has been stressed by economic factors such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities for growing youth populations. According to the World Bank, poverty is acute in Honduras, where 63% of people live in poverty, and in Guatemala, where 59% of people live in poverty. All three northern triangle countries are also characterized by inequality, with income disparities exacerbating the social exclusion of ethnic minorities and gender discrimination. Poverty and inequality are reinforced by the lack of social mobility and persistent youth unemployment and underemployment.43 In 2010, more than 25% of youth aged 15-24 in El Salvador and Honduras neither worked nor studied.44 According to data from the Inter-American Development Bank, fewer than 45% of youth outside the highest income quintile graduate high school in those countries. High-school graduation rates are even lower in Guatemala, particularly among indigenous groups. Gangs target unemployed youth and, in the absence of family or community support, many of these youth have turned to gangs for social support, a source of livelihood, and protection.45 Societal stigmas against gangs and gang deportees from the United States have made the process of leaving a gang extremely difficult. Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those with criminal records, say that offender reentry is a major problem. Ex-gang members report that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members, especially returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have had the most difficulty finding gainful employment. Some gang members have gone through complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, to better integrate into society. The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already overpopulated have been filled with thousands of suspected gang members, many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, some 31,148 inmates (including 13,868 current or former gang members) were being held in prisons designed to hold a maximum of 10,035 people in late 2015. In Guatemala at about the same time, 19,972 people were being held in facilities with a capacity of 6,742.46Due to a lack of security within the prisons, gangs are often able to carry out criminal activities from behind bars, sometimes with assistance from corrupt prison officials. As previously mentioned, there is evidence that gangs have become larger, better organized, and more cohesive within the confines of many of the region's prisons28 Some also maintain that recent reductions in homicides in El Salvador may be due more to a nonaggression pact among the gangs than to the "extraordinary measures" adopted by the government in March 2016.29 Although gangs appear to be responsible for a significant percentage of murders in urban areas of Honduras and Guatemala, homicide rates also have been elevated in border regions and places where varying combinations of local groups transporting drugs, Mexican crime groups, and crime families are active.30
. Some observers have described prisons as "finishing schools"30 where, rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often deepen their involvement in illicit gang activities.
Disputes between members of rival gangs, between gang and non-gang inmates, and between gangs and prison guards regularly occur. Prisoner abuse and torture is also not uncommon. Some argue that gangs have responded to "extralegal violence" employed by police and prison guards by waging war on governments and those suspected of collaborating with them.31
U.S. DeportationsRemovals (Deportations) to Central America and the Gang Problem
Policymakers in Central America have expressed ongoing concerns that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records are worseningexacerbating the gang and gang-related citizen security problems in the region. The Central American countries ofFor more than a decade, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after Mexico) for the last several fiscal years. Despite the large numbers of deportees repatriated to the region, the Central American countries have typically received a lower percentage of individuals deported from the United States on criminal grounds than other top receiving countries like Jamaica or the Dominican Republic (see Table 1).
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2010-FY2012
(Including Annual Percentage of Individuals Deported on Criminal Grounds)
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Country |
FY2010 |
% Crim. |
FY2011 |
% Crim. |
FY2012 |
% Crim. |
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Mexico |
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Honduras |
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Guatemala |
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El Salvador |
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Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Enforcement and Removal. Figures include "removals" (deportations) but not voluntary departures (returns). Since the mid-2000s, Central American officials had been asking the U.S. government to consider providing a complete criminal history for each individual who has been deported on criminal grounds, including whether or not he or she is a member of a gang. Although U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide a complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an individual's criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless gang affiliation is the primary reason why the individual is being deported. However, in January 2014, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) signed an agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program. Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador participate in CHIS. The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and Mexico to northern triangle countries vary but are generally limited in size and scope.48 Until recently, the few shelters and programs that existed to receive and reintegrate deportees in Central America tended to be funded and administered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Catholic Church, or the International Organization for Migration. Guatemala appears to provide the most deportee assistance upon arrival, but all three countries have limited resources for reintegration services and for tracking deportees once they return.49 Regional cooperation to address gang challenges is occurring among security and defense ministers, as well as attorney generals.50 Prosecutors from the three northern triangle countries have signed an agreement pledging to work together to prosecute gangs. The three presidents have signed an agreement to create a regional task force to address the gangs that will facilitate intelligence sharing and extraditions among the three countries, among other aims.51 Mano dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media pressure for these governments to "do something" about an escalation in gang-related crime. Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. A Mano dura law passed by El Salvador's Congress in 2003 was subsequently declared unconstitutional but was followed by a super mano dura package of anti-gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members. Similarly, in July 2003, Honduras enacted a penal code amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of up to 12 years in prison for gang membership. Changes in legislation were accompanied by the increasing use of joint military and police patrols to arrest gang suspects. Guatemala introduced similar legislation in 2003, but the legislation was not enacted.52 Mano dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about the leaders' infringements on civil liberties and human rights abuses (including cases of torture and extrajudicial killings of gang suspects). Early public reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms were positive, supported by media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members. Mano dura policies enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected gang members, including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid-2004 and late 2005. In addition, according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released, gang detainees provided law-enforcement officials with intelligence information.53 Upon taking office in 2009, then-Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes initially sought to move away from mano dura and toward a focus on crime prevention. Two years into his term, crime rates remained at elevated levels and people became frustrated. Funes moved his minister of defense, David Munguía Payés, a retired general, to head the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. With Munguía Payés's backing, a Catholic bishop and a former legislator (who was the minister's aid in the Defense Ministry) brokered a secret truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders serving time in maximum-security prison to less secure prisons to facilitate negotiations. Munguía Payés denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012.54 Between the time the prison transfers took place and May 2013 (when Munguía Payés was removed from his post for unrelated reasons), the Salvadoran government reported that homicide rates dramatically declined. Gang leaders pledged not to forcibly recruit children into their ranks or to perpetrate violence against women. Gang leaders also turned in small amounts of weapons and offered to engage in broader negotiations. The initial apparent success of the Salvadoran truce led the Honduran government to consider a similar initiative. Although some, including officials from the Organization of American States, praised the truce, many others expressed skepticism, maintaining that disappearances increased after the truce took effect and gangs garnered media attention and political power.55 Gangs continued to conduct illicit activities using cell phones in the prisons and refused to give up control over their territories or to stop extortion. El Salvador's attorney general is investigating several officials who were involved in facilitating the truce for allegedly providing as much as $25 million to gang leaders and their affiliates.56 The truce began to unravel after then-president Funes withdrew support for the truce mediators and reduced communication between imprisoned gang leaders and gang members in the streets in mid-2013. By April 2014, average murder rates had risen to some nine murders per day; gang attacks on police also occurred with increasing frequency. These trends worsened considerably in 2015, as El Salvador posted the world's highest homicide rate. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of military troops to help their often underpaid and poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when those deployments might end. Upon taking office in January 2014, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández ordered the military to conduct intensive patrols of high-crime neighborhoods in the capital with the police.59 Among the units involved in the ongoing operation are two hybrid forces that Hernández helped to establish while he was the head of the Honduran Congress: the military police force, or PMOP (Policía Militar de Orden Público), which is under the control of the Ministry of Defense, and a military-trained police unit under the control of the police, the TIGRES (Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad). In May 2015, the Salvadoran government created three battalions to help police in anti-gang efforts; at that time, some 7,000 soldiers were already involved in public security efforts.60 In March 2016, Salvadoran President Sánchez Cerén deployed hundreds of military reservists.61 Since taking office in January, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has extended the mandate of some 4,500 soldiers organized in nine groups that were involved in domestic security efforts during the previous government.62 The involvement of the military in domestic security has raised concerns regarding human rights in these countries. As in other parts of Latin America, deploying the military into the streets can be politically popular, but doing so usually fails to produce sustainable improvements in security conditions and often leads to human rights violations. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, there were credible reports of security forces' involvement in unlawful killings in all three countries in 2015. The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights in El Salvador reported that from June 2014 to May 2015 it received 2,202 complaints of human rights violations, 92% of which were allegedly committed by the police and/or the military. Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than those of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety of programs to deal with their gang problems. In Panama, President Juan Carlos Varela started an initiative in 2014 called Barrios Seguros (Safe Streets), where gang members willing to abandon criminality and be reintegrated into society are offered amnesty and job training to reduce gang violence.63 The initiative is currently active in seven provinces and has served more than 4,100 people.64 Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy that, at least on an official level, includes the active involvement of the police in preventive and rehabilitative efforts and focuses on family, school, and community interventions. With support from other countries and NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police's Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang activities a month. The Ministry of the Interior is administering a five-year program, which is supported by the Inter-American Development Bank, to target at-risk youth in 11 different municipalities. Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, toward more comprehensive anti-gang approaches than during the mano dura era of the mid-2000s. All of the Central American countries have created institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime-prevention strategies and have units within their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. Prevention is also a key component of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle plan launched in 2014 by all three countries for which the governments are seeking donor support to complement their budget outlays.65 Despite this rhetorical shift, government-sponsored gang prevention programs in the northern triangle have thus far tended to be relatively small scale, ad hoc, and underfunded. Of the $318.2 million collected through Honduras' security tax between 2012 and July 2016, just 6% was allocated to prevention programs. El Salvador's security plan, El Salvador Seguro (Secure El Salvador), prioritizes prevention, but the government lacks the funding to implement the programs the plan proposes and must obtain legislative approval for multilateral loans to support the plan. The Salvadoran Congress has been reluctant to approve additional debt unless the debt is primarily aimed at supporting the military and police. Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs. Resource constraints and a reluctance to work with gang members have thus far limited such anti-gang programs. Nevertheless, pilot projects based on experiences in cities in the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia have had some nascent success in Honduras.66 Those projects have involved individual and family therapy for youth deemed most at risk for joining gangs, intervention efforts to prevent retaliatory violence, and rehabilitation programs for those seeking to leave gangs and for nonviolent offenders in prisons. 67 In the mid-2000s, U.S. officials and Members of Congress expressed serious concerns about gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United States. For several years, however, concerns about gang-related violence were overshadowed by broader concerns about drug trafficking and organized crime in Central America, particularly after Mexico's aggressive anticrime efforts pushed Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) deeper into the sub-region. The failed truce in El Salvador and the escalating gang-related violence that has fueled illegal emigration from that country and parts of Honduras since 2014 has refocused attention on gangs in Central America. Congress has expressed concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest in the effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. Since the 110th Congress, interest in the topic of gangs and violence in Central America has included concerns about the domestic and international criminal activities of the gangs, as well as the relationship between gangs and Mexican TCOs. Members of Congress have also expressed interest in the effects of U.S. deportation policy and mano dura approaches in the region on Central American gangs. As Congress has appropriated significant funding for anti-gang efforts, it has also conducted oversight of the efficacy of U.S. programs that affect Central American gangs. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. A regional gang adviser based in El Salvador has coordinated Central American gang programs since that time. The INCLE line item for Central American gang programs ended in FY2013. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue specific anti-gang initiatives. Hundreds of millions more has supported broader law-enforcement and prevention efforts that have impacted the gang phenomenon. (in millions of U.S. dollars)
ESF INCLE NADR FMF Total FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
Total
FY2017 (req.)
Source: U.S. Department of State. Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing. U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law-enforcement and the preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs for more than a decade. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information sharing and intelligence gathering among U.S. and Central American law-enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS created a national anti-gang initiative called "Operation Community Shield"; ICE also has a National Gang Unit. Also in 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) undertook a comprehensive assessment of the gang problem in Central America and Mexico. USAID found that although a few U.S. programs addressed some aspects of the gang phenomenon, several new initiatives would be needed in the areas of prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation and reintegration. |
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Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Enforcement and Removal. Figures include "removals" (deportations), but not voluntary departures (returns). FY2013 figures are not yet available.
Notes: Criminal deportees have been convicted of a crime in the United States that makes one removable (i.e., eligible for deportation) under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Not all individuals who have been deported on criminal grounds are gang members or violent criminals. Low level drug convictions and some non-violent offenses may result in a removal on criminal grounds. Non-criminal deportees have been removed because of a status violation (e.g., being in the country illegally or working without authorization).
a. Deportations to Haiti were halted for a time in the wake of the January 2010 earthquake in that country. For more information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by [author name scrubbed].
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider providing a complete criminal history for each individual who has been deported on criminal grounds, including whether or not he or she is a member of a gang. While U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide a complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an individual's criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless it is the primary reason why the individual is being deported. However, in January 2014, the State Department and DHS signed an agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program that has been used to share more information on certain criminal deportees with Mexican law enforcement officials to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and other countries vary widely across Latin America. While a few large and relatively wealthy countries (such as Colombia and Mexico) have established comprehensive deportee reintegration assistance programs, most countries provide few, if any, services to returning deportees. In Central America, for example, the few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered by either the Catholic Church, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Between 2010 and 2013, USAID provided support to IOM to administer a deportee reintegration project in Guatemala.
Country Anti-Gang Efforts
Country efforts to deal with gangs and gang-related violence have varied significantly. In general, governments in the "northern triangle" countries have adopted more aggressive law enforcement approaches than the other Central American countries. Tough anti-gang approaches carried out in the mid-2000s, which will subsequently be discussed, failed to stave off rising crime rates in the region and had several negative unintended consequences. As a result, recent studies maintain that governments appear to be moving away from enforcement-only policies towards "second-generation" anti-gang programs. Newer programs have emphasized, among other things, prevention programs for at-risk youth, interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against crime and violence.32 Even as governments have adopted some prevention and rehabilitation programs, they have continued to employ elite anti-gang units to carry out operations, begun to use wiretapping to further anti-gang investigations, and increasingly involved their military forces in law enforcement efforts. In 2012, the Salvadoran government has taken a new—and risky—approach to combating gang violence by facilitating a truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs.33
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies
Mano Dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media pressure for these governments to "do something" about an escalation in gang-related crime. Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. A Mano Dura law passed by El Salvador's Congress in 2003 was subsequently declared unconstitutional, but was followed by a Super Mano Dura package of anti-gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members, although they provided some protections for minors accused of gang-related crimes. Similarly, in July 2003, Honduras enacted a penal code amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of up to 12 years in prison for gang membership. Changes in legislation were accompanied by the increasing use of joint military and police patrols to arrest gang suspects. Guatemala introduced similar legislation in 2003, but the legislation never passed. Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched periodic law enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members.
Mano Dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about their potential infringements on civil liberties and human rights. Early public reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely positive, supported by media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members. Tony Saca was elected to the presidency of El Salvador in 2004 largely on the basis of his promises to further crack down on gangs and crime. Mano Dura enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected gang members, including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid-2004 and late 2005. In addition, according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released, gang detainees provided law enforcement officials with invaluable sources of intelligence information that those officials have since used to design better anti-gang strategies.34
Despite the early apparent benefits of Mano Dura policies, effects on gangs and crime proved to be largely disappointing. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime. Salvadoran police estimated that more than 10,000 of 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were later released.35 Some youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement joined the gang life while in prison. Gang roundups exacerbated prison overcrowding, and inter-gang violence within the prisons resulted in several inmate deaths. There have been credible reports that extrajudicial youth killings by vigilante groups have continued since mano dura was implemented, including alleged assassinations of gang suspects and gang deportees from the United States. Finally, in response to mano dura, gangs have changed their behavior to avoid detection.
Military Involvement in Public Security
Although mano dura policies have been largely phased out, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of military troops to help their often underpaid and poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when those deployments might end. In Guatemala, the government of retired general Perez Molina has developed protocols to coordinate the military's involvement in law enforcement operations.36 Since December 2011, the Honduran government has granted the military broad powers to carry out police functions.37 This trend has led many human rights groups to raise concerns about the "re-militarization" of some Central American countries and to predict an increase in human rights abuses committed by military personnel in the region who are ill-trained to perform police work (as has occurred in Mexico).38 Evidence also indicates that military involvement in public security functions has not reduced crime rates significantly.
Approaches in Other Central American Countries
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than those of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety of programs to deal with their gang problems. In Panama, the Ministry of Social Development, in coordination with other government entities and several NGOs, administers gang prevention programs, as well as a program to provide job training and rehabilitation services to former gang members. Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy that, at least on an official level, includes the active involvement of the police in preventive and rehabilitative efforts and focuses on family, school, and community interventions.39 With support from other countries and NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police's Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang activities a month. The Ministry of the Interior is administering a five-year program, which is supported by funding from the IDB, to target at-risk youth in 11 different municipalities. While less is known about Costa Rica's gang prevention efforts, the country has generally tended to favor a "preventive and rehabilitation-oriented approach."40
Belize brokered a truce among its local gangs in September 2011 in exchange for meeting gang members' demands for jobs. The truce helped murders decline through March 2012, but unraveled in April 2012 after a spate of reprisal killings. That month the country experienced its highest monthly murder rate in two years.41 The government removed its financial support for the truce in December 2012 as Belize recorded a record number of murders in 2012, up a reported 16% from 2011.42
Gang Truce in El Salvador
When Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes appointed his defense minister, retired general David Munguía Payés, as Minister of Justice and Public Security in November 2011, observers expected the minister to back a hardline approach to combating gangs. Munguía Payés did restructure the Salvadoran police and create a new elite anti-gang unit that has received U.S. training. However, he also surprised many analysts by lending government support to a former guerrilla fighter and congressman (who was his aid in the defense ministry) and a Catholic bishop who brokered a truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders currently serving time in prison to less secure prisons in order to facilitate negotiations for a truce between the gangs. Questions remain surrounding what exactly was negotiated with the gangs, when, and under what circumstances.43 Munguía Payés denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012.44
Between the time the prison transfers took place and May 2013 (when Munguía Payés was removed from his post),45 the Salvadoran government reported that homicide rates dramatically declined (from an average of roughly 14 per day to 5.5 per day). U.S. law enforcement could not verify those figures.46 Gang leaders pledged not to forcibly recruit children into their ranks or perpetrate violence against women, turned in small amounts of weapons, and offered to engage in broader negotiations that could potentially result in a permanent truce.47 They did not agree to give up control of over their territories. Gang negotiators said that improving prison conditions and providing more reintegration and job programs for gang members would be crucial to maintaining the truce. They hoped to obtain donor support for those efforts. The Organization of American States (OAS) monitored the implementation of the truce and tried to build support for the peace process from civil society, the private sector, and politicians.48
In November 2012, gang negotiators proposed the establishment of "peace zones" in municipalities across the country where gangs would stop all crimes in exchange for being able to participate in reinsertion programs. By January 2013, the first four municipalities participating in the "peace zone" plan had been announced, one governed by the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and three governed by the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party. A total of 11 municipalities are now participating, but have received little of the support they were promised from the Funes Administration.49 A charitable foundation has been established to coordinate international efforts to support the truce, including the "peace zone" plan. The European Commission is supporting development and conflict resolution programs in the "peace zone" communities. While some have praised the "peace zone" effort, others have expressed doubts about the gangs' commitment to ending all crimes (including extortion), and the government's ability to ensure that the "peace zones" do not become havens for lawlessness.
Some, including OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza, have praised the truce for reducing the homicide rate in El Salvador and effectively saving the lives of thousands of young people.50 The coordinator of U.N. programs in El Salvador has said that the truce presents a unique window of opportunity for the country to find a long-term, integral solution to violence and criminality.51 U.S.-based gang experts have formed a Transitional Advisory Group in Support of the Peace Process in El Salvador, while U.S. human rights groups have lent their support to the truce insofar as it provides an opportunity to increase focus and attention on the need for prevention and rehabilitation programs.52
The truce is not without its skeptics, including El Salvador's Minister of Justice and Public Security and Attorney General. Analysts have questioned the lack of transparency and changing narrative regarding the government's role in facilitating the truce. They have also pointed out that while gang-on-gang homicides have declined, the level of extortion and other violent crimes has remained high. Disappearances, for example, have reportedly doubled in the past year.53 Since the Funes government has withdrawn its support for the truce mediators and reduced communication between imprisoned gang leaders and gang members in the streets, there are signs that the truce has begun to unravel.54 Gang leaders have reportedly remained committed to the truce process despite the government's antagonism, but predicted that murder rates could increase to as high as 20 or 25 per day should the truce unravel.55
Partially in response to those assertions, some analysts maintain that the Salvadoran government has taken an enormous risk by recognizing the gangs as legitimate political actors and acceding to their demands. For example, should the truce collapse, the gangs could emerge even more powerful and organized after taking advantage of less restrictive prison conditions.56 While not all analysts concur with that assertion, most agree that whoever takes office as President of El Salvador on June 1, 2014, will have to handle the truce process extremely delicately.
U.S. officials have made few public comments about the truce; in August 2012, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Mari Carmen Aponte reportedly said that the truce had reduced crime, but that policies must "address the root causes [of crime] in order to be effective and for any reduction [in crime] to be sustainable."57 While some believe the Treasury Department's decision to sanction the financial activities of the MS-13 may signify U.S. skepticism of the truce, Ambassador Aponte has said that the decision responded to the activities of the gang in the United States and was made totally independent of the truce.58 (See "U.S. Treasury Department" section below.) A State Department Travel Warning for El Salvador issued on January 23, 2012, stated that the truce "contributed to a decline in the homicide rate … [but] the sustainability of the decline is unclear, and the truce [has] had little impact on robbery, assaults, and other violent crimes."59 An August 9, 2013, updated Travel Warning makes no mention of a decline in homicides while saying that El Salvador "has one of the highest per capita murder rates in the world."60
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
In the last few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, towards more comprehensive anti-gang approaches. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President Tony Saca opened a summit of the Central America Integration System by stating that the gang problem had shown the importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most important element of those efforts being prevention.61 All of the Central American countries have created institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units within their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. In general, however, government-sponsored gang prevention programs have tended, with some exceptions, to be small-scale, ad-hoc, and underfunded. Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs.
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing concerns, such as drug trafficking, as major factors limiting their ability to implement more extensive prevention and rehabilitation programs. Experts have asserted, however, that it is important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.62
Research has shown that successful anti-gang efforts involve governments working in close collaboration with civil society, the private sector, churches, mayors, and international donors in order to leverage limited public resources.63 In fact, many successful anti-gang programs have developed as a result of community-driven efforts to respond to particular problems which are then supported by capacity-building programs for leaders from those communities. Although these types of programs may benefit from financial contributions from local and/or national governments, they may also need non-financial support, including "training, information sharing, leadership, or simply the provision of a dedicated space for programming or meetings."64
Country and regional youth violence prevention programs have received significant support from a variety of international donors, but Central American governments have tended not to take an active role in ensuring that donor funds are well-coordinated and strategically invested. European donors, particularly the European Commission, Spain, and Germany, have been the largest supporters of prevention programs in Central America. U.S. support for prevention programs has also increased in recent years, beginning with the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America as part of the Mérida Initiative. However, many of these traditional donors now have fewer funds to dedicate to overseas prevention projects. As a result, Central American governments may have to enact tax reforms to increase the revenues they have available for these and other programs. They may also seek new support for these types of projects from other countries or private entities interested in forming public-private partnerships.
U.S. Policy
In the mid-2000s, Administration officials and Members of Congress expressed serious concerns about gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United States. More recently, concerns about gang-related violence have become subsumed by broader concerns about drug trafficking and organized crime in Central America, particularly since Mexico's aggressive anticrime efforts have pushed Mexican DTOs deeper into the sub-region. Nevertheless, in September 2009 congressional testimony, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that "criminal gangs ... are of increasing concern for domestic and international law enforcement ... [and that] the MS-13 [in particular] continues to expand its influence in the United States."65 On October 11, 2012, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen said that "MS-13 is an extremely violent and dangerous gang responsible for a multitude of crimes that directly threaten ... U.S. citizens, as well as countries throughout Central America."66 U.S. officials are striving to coordinate anti-gang initiatives on both the domestic and international fronts, taking into account their likely impact on domestic security, on the one hand, and on foreign relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico, on the other.
Congressional Interest and Appropriations for Anti-Gang and Related Security Efforts in Central America
Congress has expressed concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest in the effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. Since the 110th Congress, interest in the topic of gangs and violence in Central America has included concerns about the domestic and international criminal activities of the gangs, as well as the relationship between gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Members of Congress have also expressed interest in the effects of U.S. deportation policy and mano dura approaches in the region on Central American gangs. As Congress has appropriated significant funding for anti-gang efforts, there has also been oversight of the efficacy of U.S. programs that affect Central American gangs.
Since the enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161, Congress has appropriated global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for anti-gang programs in Central America that are led by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).67 Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress provided some $30 million through that mechanism.68 As subsequently discussed, a Regional Gang Advisor based in El Salvador coordinates the anti-gang funds in support of the 2007 U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico.
In order to address broader security concerns in Central America, Congress has appropriated roughly $803.6 million for the countries of Central America since FY2008 under what was formerly known as the Mérida Initiative-Central America and is now known as the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).69 Of that total, Congress has provided $196.8 million to the USAID for rule of law efforts and crime and violence prevention programs and to the State Department for cultural programs and small grants.70
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts
For at least the past decade, U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. In 2004, the FBI created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information-sharing and intelligence-gathering among U.S. and Central American law enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created a national anti-gang initiative called "Operation Community Shield"; it now also has a National Gang Unit. Also in 2005, USAID undertook a comprehensive assessment of the gang problem in Central America and Mexico. In that assessment, USAID found that while a few U.S. programs addressed some aspects of the gang phenomenon, several new initiatives would be needed in the areas of prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation/reintegration.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, an inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central America Integration System (SICA)71 summit on security issues.7268 The strategy acknowledged that, based on previous U.S. and regional experiences, future anti-gang efforts should be holistic, comprehensive, and regional in scope. It called for active engagement with governments and institutions in the region, the OAS, and the SICA. The strategy stated that the U.S. government willwould pursue coordinated anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Selected current initiatives by U.S. agencies to implement the international components of that strategy are discussed below.
In April 2010, the GAO published a report examining (1) the extent to which the federal government had developed an adequate strategy to combat Central American gangs, and (2) how well federal agencies had implemented the strategy, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results.73 According to that report, the U.S. government hasIn January 2008, the State Department sent a regional gang adviser to El Salvador to coordinate the State Department's Central American gang programs. Those programs have included training and technical assistance to law-enforcement and corrections officials, anti-gang workshops and training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, and regional coordination efforts.69
In April 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report concluding that the U.S. government had developed and implemented an interagency anti-gang strategy that outlines the threats posed by Central American gangs and the activities that each federal each agency is doing to respond to those threats. However, the GAO recommended that the strategy be revised to include better coordination mechanisms between the various implementing agencies and performance measures to evaluate its progress.
In recent years, the.
The U.S. government has expanded its citizen -security and law -enforcement programs in Central America through the Mérida Initiative/CARSI. CARSI builds upon existing programs, both on a bilateral and regional basis. Its five primary goals are tobeyond anti-gang efforts and antidrug programs through CARSI, a regional security initiative for which Congress appropriated roughly $1.5 billion from FY2008 to FY2016. CARSI has five primary goals: (1) create safe streets for the citizens in the region; (2) disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between the nations of Central America; (3) support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments; (4) re-establishreestablish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and (5) foster enhanced levels of security and rule of -of-law coordination and cooperation between the nations of the region.74
El Salvador's selection as one of four countries in the world to participate in the Obama Administration's Partnership for Growth (PFG)75 initiative has further heightened the attention on security issues—including anti-gang efforts—in that country in particular. As a first step of implementing the PFG in El Salvador, a binational team conducted a diagnostic study published in July 2011 that identified crime and insecurity as one of the two major barriers to growth in the country.76 The countries then signed a 2011-2015 Joint Country Action Plan that includes detailed pledges by the U.S. and Salvadoran governments on how they intend to address 20 shared goals, 14 of which focus on security. Since the two countries have promised to provide public reports every six months on progress made in reaching those goals, there has been pressure on both governments to expand community policing programs, U.S. training of the police's anti-gang unit, and crime prevention programs. As a result of the PFG, entities within the Department of Justice (DOJ) have helped police and judicial officials there stand up Business and Transit Crimes task forces to investigate and prosecute gang extortions and violence.
State Department
Over the past several years, the State Department has provided training and technical assistance to law enforcement and corrections officials throughout Central America, sponsored anti-gang workshops at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)77 in San Salvador, and promoted regional coordination through SICA. In January 2008, INL sent a Regional Gang Advisor to El Salvador to coordinate its Central American gang programs. In July 2008, that advisor produced a detailed assessment of the gang problem in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala and a work plan focusing on six key areas: investigative capacity, legal capacity, intelligence capacity, community policing, prevention, and prisons.
Since that time, INL has sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for police, prison officers, and justice sector operators from across the region; provided training and equipment to vetted police units and intelligence analysts; and established 10 community policing/model police precinct programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and, most recently, Honduras.78 INL funding is also supporting a Regional Corrections Advisor who is assisting with prison reform programs in the region, including the development of intelligence units within the prisons. In the area of prevention, INL has trained more than 300 police officers throughout Central America who have provided training to more than 50,000 youth through the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program.79
Additionally, the State Department, which coordinates Mérida Initiative/CARSI programs in Central America, has allocated resources to the Department of Justice; the Department of Homeland Security, particularly ICE; and the U.S. Agency for International Development to enable those agencies to counter the impact of gangs in the region.
Department of Justice
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share intelligence on gang suspects. It also focuses on developing and protecting witnesses who will testify in gang cases. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) has also provided training on prosecuting gang-related cases to judicial officials in the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosive (ATF) Regional Advisor to San Salvador is enabling ATF to support transnational gang investigations involving U.S. origin firearms. FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are supported by the Mérida Initiative/CARSI or other State Department funding and are carried out in collaboration with INL. Recent programs include:
- Central American Fingerprinting Exploitation (CAFÉ): a criminal file/fingerprint retrieval initiative that has incorporated thousands of finger prints from gang members from Mexico, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and Guatemala into the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System since 2006. The data are accessible to Central American police officials.
- Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Units: a program that began in El Salvador in October 2007 involving the creation of vetted police units that work with FBI agents stationed in San Salvador on investigating gang-related cases that have a nexus with the United States. TAG activities have been expanded into Guatemala and Honduras and have contributed to successful indictments of MS-13 members in major cities across the United States.
- Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE): a joint FBI/INL program that brings law enforcement officials from Central America together with their counterparts from several large U.S. cities to share information and intelligence.
- Repatriation-Criminal History Information Program (CHIP): an FBI program to provide more complete criminal history information on U.S. deportees to vetted Central American law enforcement officials in receiving countries. CHIP began in El Salvador in 2012.80
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Through December 2013, ICE's Operation Community Shield had led to the arrest of some 4,506 MS-13 gang members in the United States, an increasing percentage of those arrests made on criminal grounds, including under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions.81 In addition to Operation Community Shield, ICE formed an anti-gang task force in Honduras to gather intelligence to support gang investigations in Honduras and in the United States. ICE special agents are also based at other U.S. embassies in the region, including in Guatemala and El Salvador. ICE supports Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama. The TCIUs focus on transnational investigations and border crimes, some of which have a nexus with gangs. ICE has also developed an internet-based system to facilitate the transmission of travel documents for individuals, including gang members, who are deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
The State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) manages CARSI funding, with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) implementing most State Department programs. INL has sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for police, prison officers, and justice-sector operators from across the region. INL has also provided training and equipment to vetted police units and intelligence analysts and established more than 50 community policing/model police precinct locations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.72 INL has trained hundreds of police officers, who have provided training to more than 200,000 youth through the Gang Resistance Education and Training program.73 INL has embedded U.S. law-enforcement advisers and prosecutors with investigative units that are conducting money-laundering investigations targeting the leadership of MS-13 in El Salvador. INL is supporting gang-related research as well, including a study under way by Florida International University to examine whether and how gang members in El Salvador can leave a gang without putting their lives at risk. Additionally, WHA has transferred resources to the Department of Justice; the Department of Homeland Security, particularly ICE; and USAID to enable those agencies to counter the impact of gangs in the region. State Department funding is also supporting a regional corrections adviser, who is assisting with prison-reform programs in the region. USAID has implemented a variety of country and regional gang-prevention programs. Under CARSI, USAID supports an approach to crime and violence prevention that directly targets at-risk individuals and communities while simultaneously helping municipalities to develop and implement crime-prevention plans. In Honduras, municipalities have received support in rehabilitating public spaces, installing street lighting, and procuring materials for schools and recreational facilities. National-level security and justice-sector reform efforts are designed to strengthen the institutions charged with enforcing and administering justice, including programs aimed at improving victims assistance, juvenile justice, and respect for human rights. USAID also produces and disseminates research on what works in crime and violence prevention. USAID uses geographic and demographic risk factors to provide population-based interventions to individuals and communities at high risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of crime and violence. The creation of more than 200 youth outreach centers in high-violence communities has provided youth with safe places where they can study, participate in recreational activities, and receive job training and job placement assistance. USAID has built prominent public-private partnerships with local and multinational companies. For example, mobile phone providers Claro and Tigo deliver free Internet access to outreach centers in El Salvador and Honduras, and in El Salvador, Microsoft trains thousands of youth on software and information technology. Governments also support some programs. The Honduran government has provided $3 million from its security tax to support USAID's violence-prevention programming. Through Vanderbilt University, USAID concluded a rigorous three-year impact evaluation of its CARSI-funded community-based crime and violence-prevention programs in 120 high-crime urban treatment and control communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Final results demonstrated that crime victimization is lower and public perception of security is higher in USAID's CARSI treatment communities. Until recently, however, USAID and INL were working in separate municipalities and were not closely coordinating their efforts. USAID and INL are now working to implement a "place-based" model in which prevention and policing programs are co-located and closely coordinated. USAID is providing community-resiliency programs in communities where INL is training law enforcement in community-based policing. The model is active in selected sites in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador and is based on evidence from Los Angeles, Ciudad Juárez, and Medellin that integrated prevention and law-enforcement efforts can have significant impacts in even the most violent communities. USAID and the State Department are in the process of obtaining a waiver from the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) to ensure that programming they have planned to support the rehabilitation of former gang members does not violate sanctions on MS-13 members. USAID and INL aim to expand the place-based model to more locations in the coming year. Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share intelligence on gang suspects. The FBI also focuses on developing and protecting witnesses who will testify in gang cases. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) has provided training on prosecuting gang-related cases to judicial officials in the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) regional adviser to San Salvador is enabling ATF to support transnational gang investigations involving U.S.-origin firearms. FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are supported by CARSI or other State Department funding and are carried out in collaboration with INL. The programs include the following: Since 2005, ICE's Operation Community Shield has led to the arrest of more than 32,200 gang members in the United States, including thousands of MS-13 and 18th Street gang members. In addition to Operation Community Shield, ICE formed an anti-gang task force in Honduras to gather intelligence to support gang investigations in Honduras and the United States. ICE special agents are also based at other U.S. embassies in the region, including in Guatemala and El Salvador. ICE supports Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama. The TCIUs focus on transnational investigations and border crimes, some of which have a nexus with gangs. As previously mentioned, the State Department and DHS signed an agreement in 2014 to expand the Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program, which has been used to share information on criminal deportees with Mexican law-enforcement officials, to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.In January 2014, the State Department and DHS signed an agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program that has been used to share information on criminal deportees with Mexican law enforcement officials.70
In 2015, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars published a comprehensive assessment of CARSI that raised concerns about the organization's lack of a comprehensive strategy to improve citizen security in the region, tendency to focus on combating drug trafficking with vetted units rather than on broader law-enforcement reform and professionalization, and weak program evaluation (aside from USAID's community-based prevention programs).71
State Department
Department of Homeland Security
to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID has implemented a variety of country and regional gang prevention programs, some of which have been co-managed by SICA. Initial support for these programs came from what was known as the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) for Central America that was created by P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act. Congress has maintained support for these efforts by providing a percentage of CARSI funds through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, which is implemented by USAID.
As of early 2014, USAID had projects under implementation in 63 municipalities and 215 communities. Those projects include support for municipal committees to develop crime prevention plans; funding to implement the initiatives identified as priorities by those municipalities, including community policing programs, crime observatories, and at-risk youth programs; and the establishment of 120 outreach centers to provide recreational and educational opportunities for youth in high-crime areas, with 50 more planned over the next few years. USAID has also worked with SICA on regional policy initiatives, such as reforming juvenile justice systems throughout the region to move towards an emphasis on restorative justice. Finally, USAID has formed partnerships with other donors, private foundations/companies, and, most recently, the city of Los Angeles, to develop innovative prevention and rehabilitation/reinsertion programs. The city of Los Angeles will share best practices in preventing gang violence and promoting youth development with cities in Central America and advise USAID and its implementers on citizen security programming.
In mid-2013, USAID suspended funding that was intended to reimburse the Salvadoran government for costs of a small grants program to assist individuals affected by the global financial crisis. Following media allegations that the benefits of the program were being directed to gang members, USAID investigated and found that the government's implementing agency had failed to follow correct program procedures, including how participating communities had been selected. For that reason, USAID ended its funding for that particular component, intended to benefit six of the "violence free" municipalities, before any funding had been reimbursed to the government for program costs. The Salvadoran government continued the program using non-U.S. government funding.82
U.S. Treasury Department
On October 11, 2012, the Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a significant transnational criminal organization whose assets will be targeted for economic sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.83 Issued in July 2011 as part of the Obama Administration's National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, E.O. 13581 enables the Treasury Department to block the assets of members and associates of designated criminal organizations and prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with them.84these individuals.75 The Treasury Department worked with ICE to build evidence to support the designation of the MS-13 based on the gangs'gang's involvement in "drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder," and other serious criminal offenses that threaten U.S. and Central American citizens. As of February 2014, sixJuly 2016, eight individuals in El Salvadorappear to have been designated as subject to U.S. sanctions.85
While there is evidence that some MS-13 cliques in the Washington, DC, area
Although evidence suggests that some MS-13 cliques collaborate with groups based in El Salvador, some analysts maintain that transnational collaboration is not the norm for the MS-13.8676 Salvadoran officials seemed surprised by the designation, with Presidentthen-president Funes asserting that U.S. officials may be "overestimating the economic risk or financial risk resulting from the criminal actions of the MS."87 In response, U.S. officials have stood by the TCO designation, asserting that it will provide law enforcement with additional tools to advance domestic and international anti-gang efforts.88
Possible Questions for Oversight
- Evolving Gang Threat. To what degree are the gangs in Central America becoming more organized and sophisticated? Are their concerns primarily local
,or transnational? What types of ties dotheythese gangs have with other criminal organizations based in Central America and with MexicanDTOsTCOs? To what extent are cliques in the region communicating with groups in the United States? - U.S. Strategy.
SevenNine years after the adoption of an interagency strategy to combat the gangs, what have been the results of U.S. efforts? How is the success or failure of the strategy being measured? How are domestic and international efforts in support of the strategy being coordinated? - CARSI.
To what extent is CARSI addressing the gang problem in Central America? How have INL's centrally managed gang programs been folded into CARSI initiatives? Leveraging U.S. assistanceAnalysts have criticized CARSI for lacking a comprehensive strategy and rigorous monitoring and evaluation. To what extent, if at all, does CARSI have a guiding strategy behind its programs? How has that strategy evolved over time? How are the successes or gaps in the implementation of that strategy being measured and adjusted? Leveraging U.S. Assistance. To what extent are U.S. anti-gang efforts being coordinated with those of other donors? Has the private sector stepped forward to complement any donor-led initiatives? Have any recipient countries been able to take over responsibility for programs that began with U.S. funding? Howwell is SICA coordinatingeffective are regional anti-gang efforts?- New Tools. To what extent are countries in the region using new tools—such as asset forfeiture and wiretapping—to go after the gangs? How has the Treasury
Department's decision to sanction the MS-13 bolstered efforts to combat the gangs, both in the United States and in Central America? - U.S. Efforts and the Gang Truce in El Salvador. Have any U.S. programs been revamped or scaled up in order to support the truce? How was USAID's decision to stop funding grant programs in several "violence-free" municipalities due to avoid potential violations of E.O. 15381 been received in El Salvador? Should the truce fail, what might be the impact on security in that country and across the region?
Author Contact Information
Acknowledgments
Thais A. Ramo, a former CRS research associate, provided background research and updated sections of this product.
Footnotes
| 1. |
The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. This report focuses on the "northern triangle" countries of Central America, where the gang problem has been most acute |
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U. |
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Ibid; "Capturan a Salvadoreño en Costa Rica por Secuestro," La Prensa Gráfica, August 11, 2009. |
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| 5.
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CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Background and FY2017 Budget Request, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 6.
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Frank de Waegh, Unwilling Participants: The Coercion of Youth into Violent Criminal Groups in Central America's Northern Triangle, Jesuit Conference of Canada and the United States, 2015. Hereinafter de Waegh, 2015. 7.
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See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Gang Center, National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, at https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Defining-Gangs. |
See, for example, Demoscopia S.A., Maras y Pandillas: Comunidad y Policía en Centroamérica, October 2007, as opposed to Dennis Rodgers et al., "Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions," Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 23, May 2009. |
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James C. Howell, The History of Street Gangs in the United States: Their Origins and Transformations, (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2015); Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011). 11.
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DOJ, Organized Crime and Gang Section, About Violent Gangs, Criminal Street Gangs, May 12, 2015; DOJ, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, "Fifty-Six MS-13 Members Indicted," press release, January 29, 2016. 12.
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The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA; P.L. 104-208) |
For the history and evolution of these gangs in the United States, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and American Law Enforcement, (Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009). For a cross-national comparison of gang development, see Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011). Hereinafter: Bruneau, 2011. |
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14.
de Waegh, 2015. |
U.S. Department of State, "Gangs, Youth, and Drugs |
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U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: a Threat Assessment, September 2012 |
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UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007 |
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Rodgers et al., 2009, op. cit; Valencia, op. cit. |
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Mike LaSusa, "Are Mara Salvatrucha Gangs Expanding in Costa Rica?," Insight Crime, April 8, 2016; Martha Celia Hernandez, "How MS13 and Barrio 18 are Extending Their Reach to Nicaragua," Insight Crime, August 28, 2014. 19.
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Antonio Pérez, "Director de la Policía Confirma Presencia de Maras en Panamá," Panamá América, April 4, 2016. 20.
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Douglas Farah and Pamela Phillips Lum, Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: the Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil, International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. Hereinafter Farah and Lum, 2013. 21.
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U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative: Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008. 22.
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Mike LaSusa, "El Salvador's MS13 Gang Sought Big Guns in Mexico, Guatemala," Insight Crime, August 12, 2016. 23.
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Insight Crime and Associación para una Sociedad Más Justa, Gangs in Honduras, November 20, 2015. 24.
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See, for example, Sarah Kinosian, Angelika Albaladejo, and Lisa Haugaard, El Salvador's Violence: No Easy Way Out, Center for International Policy and Latin America Working Group, August 2016. 25.
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Small Arms Survey, Femicide: A Global Problem, Research Note 14, February 2012. 26.
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U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), Hidden in Plain Sight: a Statistical Analysis of Violence Against Children, September 2014. 27.
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Steve Dudley, Briefing on Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle, Washington DC, July 6, 2016; International Crisis Group (ICG), Easy Prey: Criminal Violence and Central American Migration, Latin America Report No. 57, July 28, 2016. Hereinafter ICG, July 2016. 28.
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José Miguel Cruz, The Political Workings of the Funes Administration's Gang Truce in El Salvador, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013. 29.
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Since March 2016, the Salvadoran government has sent mid-level gang leaders to more secure facilities, blocked phone signals near jails, deployed military reservists, and secured legislative approval of loans for public security. Carlos Martinez, "Pandillas Caminan Hacia una Frente Común Ante Medidas Extraordinarias," El Faro, July 5, 2016. 30.
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Dudley, op cit. International Crisis Group, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, June 4, 2014. 31.
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Interpeace Regional Office for Latin America, Violentas y Violentadas Relaciones de Género en las Maras Salvatrucha y Barrio 18 del Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica, Guatemala, May 15, 2013. 32.
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Ibid. 33.
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Kelly McEvers and Jasmine Garsd, "The Surreal Reasons Girls Are Disappearing In El Salvador: #15Girls," NPR, October 5, 2015; Óscar Martinez, "El Salvador es un buen lugar para matar," El Faro, May 9, 2016; Christopher Sherman, "Gangs Declare War on Police as El Salvador Violence Rages," AP, April 13, 2016. 34.
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"Niñas y Niños en Honduras son Sometidos a una Esclavitud Moderna," El Heraldo, October 11, 2015; UNICEF and the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation Purposes in Guatemala, 2016. 35.
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Jaimi López, "Deserción Escolar por Violencia se ha Triplicado en Últimos Dos Años," ElSalvador.com, July 19, 2016. 36.
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Fred Rivera, "Persisten Acosos Contra Transportistas," El Quetzalteco, February 17, 2015. 37.
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Sarah Esther Maslin, "El Salvador says a Brutal Gang Laundered Money Through Motels, Brothels, and Taxis," Washington Post, July 29, 2016. 38.
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Farah and Lum, 2013, asserts that linkages are increasing. For a contrasting view, see Juan Carlos Garzon, "Rethinking the El Salvador Mara- Drug Trafficking Relationship," Insight Crime, April 3, 2014. 39.
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Efren Lemus, "From Extortion to Investment: The Making of Barrio 18, Inc.," Insight Crime, October 2, 2015; Carlos Garcia, "6 Common Misconceptions About the MS13 Street Gang," Insight Crime, February 25, 2016. 40.
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"MS-13," Insight Crime, November 21, 2013. 41.
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UNODC, Firearms Within Central America, 2012; Tani Marilena Adams, Chronic Violence and its Reproduction: Perverse Trends in Social Relations, Citizenship, and Democracy in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2012. 42.
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David Gagne, "80% of Homicides in Honduras Result of Gun Violence: Report," Insight Crime, July 7, 2016. 43.
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Marc Hanson, Migration, U.S. Assistance, and Youth Opportunities in Central America, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), February 2016. 44.
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Rafael de Hoyos, Halsey Rogers, and Miguel Székely, Out of School and Out of Work Risk and Opportunities for Latin America's Ninis, World Bank, Washington DC, 2016. 45.
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Douglas Farah, "Central America's Gangs Are All Grown Up," Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016. 46.
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U.S. Department of State, 2015 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, April 2016. 47.
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T. W. Ward, Gangsters Without Borders: An Ethnography of A Salvadoran Street Gang (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 48.
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Victoria Rietig and Rodrigo Dominguez Villegas, Stopping the Revolving Door: Reception and Reintegration Services for Central American Deportees, MPI, December 2015. 49.
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ICG, July 2016. 50.
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"'Northern Triangle' Countries Boost Security Cooperation," Latin News Daily, August 15, 2016. 51.
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"Central America Leaders Agree on Joint Force to Fight Gangs," AP, August 23, 2016. 52.
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Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members. 53.
|
|
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Regional Gang Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008. 54.
|
|
Carlos Martínez and Jose Luis Sanz, "The New Truth About the Gang Truce," Insight Crime, September 14, 2012. 55.
|
|
Organization of American States (OAS), "OAS Secretary General Highlights Results from the First Year of Gang Truce in El Salvador," press release, March 11, 2013; Douglas Farah, "Central America's Gangs Are All Grown Up," Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016. 56.
|
|
Munguía Payés has denied any involvement in illicit payments to the gangs and remains in his post as El Salvador's minister of defense even though he has been interrogated by the attorney general's office. Héctor Silva Ávalos and Bryan Avelar, "Case Against El Salvador's MS13 Reveals State Role in Gang's Growth," Insight Crime, August 3, 2016. 57.
|
|
Other recent cases of extrajudicial killings allegedly committed by police have been documented but not yet investigated. Adriana Beltrán and Carolyn Scorpio, "Turning a Blind Eye to Police Abuse and Extrajudicial Executions?" WOLA, August 16, 2016. 58.
|
|
"El Salvador, Deadliest Nation in 2015, Sees Lull in Violence," AP, July 3, 2016. 59.
|
|
CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. 60.
|
|
Loren Riesenfeld, "El Salvador to Deploy Special Forces to Combat Gangs," Insight Crime, May 8, 2015. 61.
|
|
Evan Ellis, "The New Offensive Against Gangs in El Salvador," Latin America Goes Global, May 2, 2016. 62.
|
|
"Guatemala: Military to Continue Civilian Security Tasks," Latin News Security & Strategy Review, July 2016. 63.
|
|
David Gagne, "Panamá Ofrece Capacitación Laboral y Amnistía a Pandilleros," InSight Crime, November 29, at http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/panama-ofrece-capacitacion-laboral-amnistia-pandilleros. 64.
|
|
Erika Edith Quiñones, "Someterán a Revisión el Programa Barrios Seguros," Panamá América, January 24, 2016. 65.
|
|
For more information on the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, see the text of the plan at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=39224238. 66.
|
|
Sonia Nazario, "How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth got a Little bit Safer," New York Times, August 11, 2016. 67.
|
|
Thomas Abt, Christopher Winship, and Democracy International, Inc., What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle, United States Agency for International Development, February 2016. 68.
|
|
The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico," July 18, 2007. 69.
|
|
The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) is based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional law-enforcement training academies funded by the State Department's INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers training and technical assistance to law-enforcement officials from throughout Latin America, including courses in how to address gang-related crimes and prosecutions. 70.
|
|
For background, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 71.
|
|
Eric Olson et.al. Crime and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policies are Helping, Hurting, and Can be Improved, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Latin American Program, 2015. 72.
|
|
U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Efforts to Advance Civilian Security in Central America's Northern Triangle," press release, June 2016, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258635.htm. 73.
|
|
Ibid. 74.
|
|
The criteria established for declaring a transnational criminal organization (TCO) pursuant to Executive Order 13581 are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-transnational-criminal-organizations. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization," press release, October 11, 2012. 75.
|
|
The first four criminal organizations that received TCO designations were the Brother's Circle, the Camorra, Los Zetas, and the Yakuza. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Executive Order 13581—Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," July 25, 2011. 76.
|
|
Geoffrey Ramsey, "Tracking El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC," Insight Crime, October 12, 2012. 77.
|
|
Geoffrey Ramsey, "El Salvador President: US 'Overestimating' MS-13," Insight Crime, October 11, 2012. 78.
|
Phone interview with officials from the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control, July 5, 2016 |
CRS interview with official from the National Gang Unit of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), January 2, 2013. |
| 15. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative: Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008. |
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| 16. |
Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) official, December 10, 2012. |
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| 17. |
Geoffrey Ramsey, "Tracking El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC," Insight Crime, October 12, 2012. |
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| 18. |
UNODC, 2012, p. 28. |
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| 19. |
UNODC, 2012. |
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| 20. |
"Governments Unite Against Maras; Maras Against Governments," Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America, October 2010. |
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| 21. |
Saul Elbein, "The Most Dangerous Job in the World," New Republic, June 4, 2013. |
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| 22. |
Gobierno Federal de México, Procuraduría General de la República, Medidas de Acción y Prevención contra el Fenómeno de las Pandillas en México, March 2010. |
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| 23. |
Brownfield, 2012. |
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| 24. |
"MS-13," InSight Crime, November 21, 2013. |
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| 25. |
Stephen S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010. |
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| 26. |
Sara Michel, Elizabeth Utting, and Bob Moquin, Honduras: a Risk Assessment, World Bank, February 2007. |
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| 27. |
The State Department 2011 Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering Honduras included references to NGO reports that vigilante torture and even killings of youths had occurred. NGOs asserted that these abuses may have been perpetrated by groups that included members of the security forces. The Guatemala section of that report also included allegations that unnecessary force had often been used by police against suspected gang members. |
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| 28. |
Demoscopia, S.A., 2007; José Miguel Cruz, "Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets," Global Crime, November 2010. |
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| 29. |
U.S. Department of State, 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, May 2013. |
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| 30. |
T.W. Ward, Gangsters Without Borders: An Ethnography of A Salvadoran Street Gang (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). |
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| 31. |
José Miguel Cruz, "Responses and the Dark Side of Suppression of Gangs in Central America," in Bruneau, et al., 2011. |
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| 32. |
Rodgers et al., May 2009. |
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| 33. |
Lauren Villagran, "Can a Gang Truce in El Salvador Open the Door to Lasting Peace?" Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2012. |
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| 34. |
U.S. Department of State, INL, Regional Gang Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008. |
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| 35. |
"Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released," EFE News Service, December 27, 2005. |
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| 36. |
CRS interview with Guatemalan military official, January 20, 2011. |
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| 37. |
"Gobierno de Honduras Extiende Facultades Policiales a Militares por 90 Días Más," El Heraldo (Honduras), June 26, 2012. |
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| 38. |
See, for example, relevant sections of George Withers, Lucila Santos, and Adam Isaacson, Preach What you Practice: the Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas, WOLA, November 2010. |
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| 39. |
Some studies have described a disconnect between the Nicaraguan government's official rhetoric in support of non-repressive approaches to youth violence and the excessive use of force that some low-ranking police officials have used against youth in Nicaragua. Those studies are summarized in: Peter Peetz, "Youth Violence in Central America: Discourses and Policies," Youth Society, October 11, 2010. |
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| 40. |
Ibid. |
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| 41. |
"A Meeting of the Maras; Central America's Gangs," The Economist, May 12, 2012. |
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| 42. |
Grant Hurst, "Belize Registers Record Murders in 2012," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, January 4, 2013. |
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| 43. |
"MS Tenía una Computadora Oculta en el Penal de Gotera," El Salvador.com, February 18, 2014; Carlos Martínez, "Los dos Versiones de Nelson Rauda Sobre la Tregua," El Faro, February 17, 2014. |
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| 44. |
Carlos Martínez and Jose Luis Sanz, "The New Truth About the Gang Truce," Insight Crime, September 14, 2012. |
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| 45. |
In May 2013, El Salvador's Supreme Court nullified President Funes' appointment of retired general David Munguía Payés as Minister of Justice and Public Security because it contravened the Peace Accords and a constitutional provision stipulating that public security must be led by an individual independent of the military. Munguía Payés' replacement, Ricardo Perdomo, has proven to be a critic of the truce. Benjamin Witte-Lebhar, "Court Ruling, Political Potshots Challenge El Salvador's 15-month-old Gang Truce," Noticen: Central American and Caribbean Affairs, June 27, 2013. |
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| 46. |
CRS interview with State Department official in El Salvador, May 24, 2013. |
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| 47. |
WOLA, El Salvador's Gang Truce: In Spite of Uncertainty, an Opportunity to Strengthen Prevention Efforts, July 17, 2012; Randal C. Archibold, "Gangs' Truce Buys El Salvador a Tenuous Peace," New York Times, August 27, 2012. |
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| 48. |
Lauren Villagran, "Can a Gang Truce in El Salvador Open the Door to Lasting Peace?" Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2012. |
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| 49. |
Miriam Wells, "El Salvador Peace Zone Mayors Say Truce Is Failing," Insight Crime, November 1, 2013. |
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| 50. |
Organization of American States (OAS), "Secretary General Insulza: 'The Three Challenges to Democracy in the Region are Inequality, Organized Crime and the Lack of Political Dialogue,'" press release, October 10, 2012.; Carmen Rodríguez, "OEA Reitera Apoyo a Tregua entre Pandillas," La Página, July 26, 2013. |
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| 51. |
"ONU: Tregua entre Pandillas es Oportunidad contra la Violencia en El Salvador," La Prensa Gráfica, September 13, 2012. |
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| 52. |
WOLA, op. cit. |
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| 53. |
"Se Duplica Cifra de Personas Desaparecidas en 2013," La Prensa Gráfica, December 19, 2013 |
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| 54. |
"Gang Violence Peaks Again in El Salvador," Latin News Daily, December 18, 2013. |
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| 55. |
Carlos Martinez and José Luis Sanz, "Para que la Gente nos Crea Estamos Dispuestos a Dejar de Meter Jóvenes a la Pandilla," El Faro, January 27, 2014. |
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| 56. |
Douglas Farah, The Transformation of El Salvador's Gangs into Political Actors, Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 2012. |
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| 57. |
Archibold, op. cit. |
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| 58. |
Enrique García, "Aponte Reitera que la "MS" es Organización Criminal Transnacional," El Mundo, October 16, 2012. |
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| 59. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: El Salvador, January 23, 2013. |
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| 60. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: El Salvador, August 9, 2013, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/el-salvador-travel-warning.html. |
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| 61. |
"Centroamérica Revisa Estrategias Para Luchar Contra Pandillas," Agence France Presse, December 13, 2007. |
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| 62. |
Kliksberg, 2007. |
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| 63. |
USAID Gang Assessment, 2006; José Miguel Cruz, Street Gangs in Central America, San Salvador: UCA Editors, 2007. |
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| 64. |
See the section by Caterina Gowis Roman in Daring to Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang Violence in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States, WOLA, October 2008. |
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| 65. |
Testimony by Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 16, 2009. |
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| 66. |
U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization," press release, October 11, 2012. |
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| 67. |
Initial funds for the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' (INL) programs in the region came from $16 million in unspent Andean Counterdrug Program funds that were reprogrammed in September 2007 to support drug interdiction operations, anti-gang efforts, and demand reduction initiatives in Central America. |
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| 68. |
The FY2010 funds for INL's regional anti-gang efforts – roughly $8 million – were included as part of CARSI because of legislative language that placed a cap on security aid to the region. |
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| 69. |
For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress. |
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| 70. |
That total does not include final figures for those categories that will be allotted from the FY2014 appropriations provided in P.L. 113-76. |
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| 71. |
The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts. |
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| 72. |
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico," July 18, 2007. |
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| 73. |
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts, 10-395, April 23, 2010. |
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| 74. |
For background, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
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| 75. |
The principles behind the PFG Initiative are to (1) focus on broad-based economic growth; (2) select countries with demonstrated performance and political will; (3) use joint decision-making and prioritization of activities; (4) support catalytic policy change and institutional reform; (5) leverage U.S. government engagement for maximum impact; and (6) emphasize partnership and country ownership. |
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| 76. |
U.S. Department of State, Partnership for Growth: El Salvador Constraints Analysis, July 19, 2011. |
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| 77. |
The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional law enforcement training academies funded by the State Department's INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers training and technical assistance to law enforcement officials from throughout Latin America. In 2009, the ILEA conducted five anti-gang courses. |
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| 78. |
Three model police precincts currently exist in Guatemala, six in El Salvador, and one in Honduras. The model precincts emphasize crime prevention and targeted, intelligence-driven enforcement. CRS electronic correspondence with INL's Regional Gang Advisor, February 14, 2014. |
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| 79. |
Ibid. |
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| 80. |
FBI Press Release, "United Against MS-13; Our Central American Partnerships," November 10, 2009; Embassy of the United States in San Salvador, El Salvador, "El Salvador Signs Chip," press release, May 9, 2012. |
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| 81. |
For background on RICO, see CRS Report 96-950, RICO: A Brief Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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| 82. |
Teresa Alvarado, "FISLD Continuará Financiando Programa PATI en Municipios Excluidos por USAID," Transparencia Activa, September 13, 2013. |
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| 83. |
The criteria established for declaring a transnational criminal organization pursuant to Executive Order 13581 are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-transnational-criminal-organizations. U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization," press release, October 11, 2012. |
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| 84. |
The first four criminal organizations that received Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) designations were: the Brother's Circle, the Camorra, Los Zetas, and the Yakuza. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order 13581—Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," July 25, 2011. |
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| 85. |
CRS interview with Treasury Department official, February 20, 2014. |
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| 86. |
Geoffrey Ramsey, "Tracking El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC," Insight Crime, October 12, 2012. |
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| 87. |
Geoffrey Ramsey, "El Salvador President: US 'Overestimating' MS-13," Insight Crime, October 11, 2012. |
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| 88. |
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