The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
January 6March 11, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43240
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army’s proposed replacement for the
Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities
in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting
vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose
vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of
these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army.
The AMPV is intended to be a “vehicle integration” or non-developmental program (candidate
vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles—not vehicles that are
specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle
might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the
Army’s most recent developmental programs, such as the Future Combat System (FCS), the
Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter were cancelled before they
could be fully developed and fielded.
On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV.
This latest RFP stipulates that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014
worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between
FY2015-FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020.
The Army’s decision to provide BAE System’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle to other vendors to use
as they develop their own AMPV design proposals as a means of cutting program costs has
resulted in claims of unfairness from General Dynamics Land Systems, which is developing its
proposal based on the Stryker Combat Vehicle. General Dynamics has reportedly protested to the
Army Material Command as well as approached Congress to limit funding until the Army devises
what they believe is a more competitive program.
The Administration’s FY2014 AMPV Budget Request was $116.298 million in Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. The FY2014 National Defense
Authorization Act recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget Request. The House
Appropriations Committee recommended $86.298
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 recommended $28.3 million in RDT&E funding,
cutting $30
87.998 million from the FY2014 Budget AMPV Request due to schedule slip. This is due to the Army’s
decision to move the AMPV’s delay and an
Army requested program decrease, likely related to the Army’s decision to slip the AMPV’s
Request for Proposal from June 2013 to mid-September 2013. The
Senate Appropriations Committee has recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget
Request.
A potential issue for Congress is should the AMPV be the Army’s number one combat vehicle
acquisition priority? The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted in a report that it might be
advisable to make the replacement of M-113s with AMPVs the Army’s first acquisition priority as
opposed to developing the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Other defense officials and analysts
suggest, given current and anticipated future defense budgetary constraints, the Army’s emphasis
on the GCV might be unrealistic. They instead suggest a more appropriate course of action might
be for the Army to shift its emphasis to the non-developmental AMPV. This report will be
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract, as well as program management support.
Potential issues for Congress include: Did the Army’s decision to use the Bradley for design
proposals create an unfair advantage?, and What are the programmatic measures in the AMPV
program to ensure that the vehicle is deployable? This report will be updated.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) ................................................................................ 1
The Army’s AMPV Requirements ................................................................................................... 1
Program Overview ........................................................................................................................... 2
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV Program............................................................. 3
Army Issues AMPV Request for Proposal (RFP) ............................................................................ 3
Projected AMPV Production Quantities .......................................................................................... 3
Potential VendorsRecent Program Activities ............................................................................................................... 4
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date ...................................................... 4
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP ................................................................................... 4
General Dynamics Appeals to Congress ................................................................................... 5
4
Budgetary Issues .............................................................................................................................. 45
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request ............................................................................................... 45
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)..P.L. 113-66) ...................................................... 4
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2014 (H.R. 2397) 5
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) ..................................................... 5
FY2015 President’s Budget Request ....... 5
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2014 (S. 1429) ..................................................... 5
Potential Issue............................. 6
Potential Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................ 5
Should the AMPV Be the Army’s Number One Combat Vehicle Acquisition Priority? ........... 5 6
Has the Army’s Decision to Use Bradley Fighting Vehicles for AMPV’s Optional
Exchange Vehicle Created an Unfair Advantage? .................................................................. 6
The AMPV and the Army’s Emphasis on Deployability ........................................................... 6
Tables
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant ......................................................................... 2
Table 2. Projected AMPV Production, by Variant ........................................................................... 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 7
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
In early 1956, the Army began the development of an air-transportable, armored multi-purpose
vehicle family intended to provide a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier for armor
and mechanized infantry units.1 Known as the M-113, it entered production in 1960 and saw
extensive wartime service in Vietnam. Considered a reliable and versatile vehicle, a number of
different variations of the M-113 were produced to fulfill such roles as a command and control
vehicle, mortar carrier, and armored ambulance, to name but a few. The Army began replacing the
M-113 infantry carrier version in the early 1980s with the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
but many non-infantry carrier versions of the M-113 were retained in service. According to
reports, about 3,000 M-113 variants are currently still in use.2
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)3
According to the Army:
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the proposed United States Army program
for replacement of the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) to mitigate current and future
capability gaps in force protection, mobility, reliability, and interoperability by mission role
variant within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) [now known as the Armored
Brigade Combat Team – —ABCT]. The AMPV will have multiple variants tailored to specific
mission roles within HBCT. Mission roles are as follows: General Purpose, Medical
Evacuation, Medical Treatment, Mortar Carrier, and Mission Command. AMPV is a vehicle
integration program.
The Army’s AMPV Requirements4
Regarding the decision to replace remaining M-113s, the Army notes:
•
The M-113 lacks the force protection and mobility needed to operate as part of
combined arms teams within complex operational environments. For example,
“commanders will not allow them to leave Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or
enter contested areas without extensive mission protection and route clearance.”5
•
The use of other vehicles for M-113 mission sets (casualty evacuations, for
example) reduces unit combat effectiveness.
1
Information in this section is taken from Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 2011-2012, 32nd Edition,
pp. 470-478.
2
Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for the AMPV Program, Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
3
From the Army’s AMPV Program website, https://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/ampv/ampv.htm, accessed
September September
13, 2013.
4
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
5
Ibid., p. 13.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
M-113s are found in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), where they comprise 32% of the
tracked armored vehicles organic to that organization. The 114 M-113 variants in the ABCT are
distributed as follows:
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant
M-113 Variant Type
Number of M-113s
M-113A3 General Purpose (GP)
19
M-1068A3 Mission Command (MCmd)
41
M-1064 Mortar Carrier (MC)
15
M-113A3 Medical Evacuation (ME)
31
M-577 Medical Treatment (MT)
8
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 13.
Program Overview6
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in March 2012, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) approved a materiel
development decision for AMPV and authorized the Army’s entry into the materiel solution
analysis phase. The Army completed the AMPV analysis of alternatives (AoA) in July 2012 and
proposed a non-developmental vehicle (the candidate vehicle will be either an existing vehicle or
a modified existing vehicle—not a vehicle that is specially designed and not in current service).
Because the AMPV is to be a non-developmental vehicle, DOD has decided that the program will
start at Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and skip the
Milestone A, Technology Development Phase.
The Army plans for a full and open competition and will award one industry bidder a 42-month
EMD contract to develop all five AMPV variants. A draft Request for Proposal (RFP) released in
March 2013 stated that the EMD contract would be worth $1.46 billion, including $388 million
for 29 EMD prototypes for testing between 2014 and 2017 and $1.08 billion for 289 low-rate
initial production (LRIP) models between 2018 and 2020. The Army had planned on releasing the
formal RFP in June 2013 but instead slipped the date until mid-September 2013, citing a delayed
Defense Acquisition Board review attributed in part to Department of Defense civilian furloughs.7
Currently, the EMD contract award is planned for May 2014. The Army is also planning for an
average unit manufacturing cost (AUMC) of $1.8 million per vehicle. With projected production
quantities of 2,897 AMPVs, the overall AMPV program could exceed $5 billion, particularly if
requirements for additional force protection are added by the Army.
6
Information in this section is taken from the United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 133, and an Army briefing: “AMPV
Industry Day,” April 23, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work
Remains,” InsideDefense.com, August 16, 2013.
7
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,” InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV
AMPV Program8
On November 26, 2013, DOD issued an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) officially
approving the Army’s entry into the Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase. The ADM directed the Army to impose an Average Procurement Unit Cost less
than or equal to $3.2 million at a production rate of not less than 180 vehicles per year. In
addition, operations and sustainment costs are to be less than or equal to $400,000 per vehicle per
year. The Army is also directed to down select to a single prime contractor at the completion of
Milestone B.
Army Issues AMPV Request for Proposal (RFP)9
Also on November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
AMPV. This latest RFP stipulates that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May
2014 worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between
FY2015-FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020.
Projected AMPV Production Quantities10
Under current plans and projected force structure, the Army plans to start full rate production of
the AMPV in FY2020 at the rate of two to three ABCTs per year. Total vehicle production by
variant is depicted in the following table:
Table 2. Projected AMPV Production, by Variant
ABCT Total
Training and Doctrine
Command and Testing
(See Notes)
Total Vehicles by
Quantity
M-113A3 General Purpose
(GP)
462
58
520
M-1068A3 Mission
Command (MCmd)
899
92
991
Variant to Be
Replaced
8
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense, “Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Pre-Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposals Acquisition Decision Memorandum,” November 26, 2013 and
Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,”
InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
9
Information in this section is taken from Solicitation, Offer, and Award: Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Number:
W56HZV-13-R-0022, November 26, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,” InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
10
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
ABCT Total
Training and Doctrine
Command and Testing
(See Notes)
Total Vehicles by
Quantity
M-1064 Mortar Carrier
(MC)
348
36
384
M-113A3 Medical
Evacuation (ME)
736
52
788
M-577 Medical Treatment
(MT)
194
20
214
2,639
258
2,897
Variant to Be
Replaced
Totals
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 23.
Notes: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army command responsible for training the force,
would use AMPVs at its various schools and courses for training soldiers. Testing AMPV quantities would be
allocated to various Army and Department of Defense organizations responsible for testing vehicles.
Potential Vendors11
Reports suggest the two top potential competitors for the AMPV contract are BAE Systems and
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS). BAE is said to be offering a turretless Bradley
Fighting Vehicle design and GDLS, a tracked Stryker Fighting Vehicle or a wheeled Stryker
Double V-Hull Vehicle. It is not publically known if any other foreign or domestic vendors plan
to compete for the AMPV contract.
Budgetary Issues
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request12
The FY2014 AMPV Budget Request was $116.298 million in Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)13
Congress recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget Request.
11
Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
12
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget Request, Justification Book, RDT&E – Volume II,
Budget Activity 54, April 2013, p. 6.
13
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, http://armedservices.house.gov/
index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=8A5E9112-80EF-43E1-A4E9-9AB0C0C107D8, accessed January 2, 2014.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2014 (H.R. 2397)14
The House Appropriations Committee recommended $86.298 million in RDT&E funding, cutting
$30 million from the FY2014 Budget AMPV Request due to schedule slip. This is due to the
Army’s decision to slip the AMPV’s Request for Proposal from June 2013 to mid-September
2013.
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2014 (S. 1429)15
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget
Request.
Potential Issue for Congress
Should the AMPV Be the Army’s Number One Combat Vehicle
Acquisition Priority?
The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program16 is the Army’s proposed replacement combat
vehicle for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle in ABCTs and is the self-described centerpiece
of the Army’s overall combat vehicle modernization strategy. In terms of priority, the GCV is the
Army’s first combat vehicle acquisition priority, while the AMPV is the Army’s second priority.17
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates GCV’s total program cost at $37.923
billion.18
Some analysts suggest the Army’s emphasis on the GCV is misguided. In the Congressional
Budget Office’s (CBO’s) April 2013 report “The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and
Alternatives,” CBO notes:
As the GCV program is now constituted, the new vehicle would replace only a fraction of
the Army’s combat equipment. And some analysts assert that the vehicles slated for
replacement are not those that should be first in line. Specifically, according to the Army’s
current plan, the GCVs will replace the 61 Bradley vehicles that are configured as IFVs in
each of the Army’s armored combat brigades. Those vehicles represent only a small
portion—18 percent—of the 346 armored combat vehicles in each armored combat brigade.
Moreover, armored combat brigades made up only one-third of the Army’s total combat
brigades at the end of 2012.
14
H.Rept. 113-113, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 Report of the Committee on Appropriations,
June 17, 2013, p. 220.
15
S.Rept. 113-85, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014, August 1, 2013, p. 148.
16
For additional information on the GCV, see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
17
Army Equipment Modernization Plan 2013, June 20, 2012, pp. 10-11.
18
United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 141.
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Furthermore, the GCVs are scheduled to replace vehicles that are far from the oldest armored
vehicles in the armored combat brigades. The more numerous M113- based vehicles—which
constitute more than 30 percent of the armored combat vehicles in an armored combat
brigade—are far older, both in terms of age of design and chronological age. The M113 was
designed in the wake of the Korean War as an armored personnel carrier intended to protect
soldiers from small-arms fire, artillery fragments, and the effects of nuclear weapons. Those
vehicles are not worth upgrading, in the Army’s estimation, and the service stopped doing so
in 2007. As a result, the Army’s M113-based vehicles were, on average, 13 years old at the
end of 2012.19
Others, noting anticipated future defense budget reductions, also question the Army’s combat
vehicles acquisition priorities. One article suggests:
With defense spending expected to decline, the AMPV, along with the Ground Combat
Vehicles, is seen as one of the last opportunities for the Army and industry to launch a major
vehicle acquisition program. The GCV, however, was dealt a setback recently when Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno suggested that the program might be significantly
delayed or even terminated due to sequestration-driven budget cuts.20
Some defense officials have reportedly suggested that:
... the AMPV seems to be ascending at a time when the Army’s top vehicle modernization
priority, the Ground Combat Vehicle, appears to be on shaky ground. “AMPV is looking like
it will move along; the program is simply less aggressive than GCV,” one official said.21
There appears to be a degree of concern among some defense analysts that, given current and
anticipated future defense budgetary constraints, the Army’s emphasis on the GCV might be
unrealistic. They instead suggest that a more appropriate course of action might be for the Army
to shift its emphasis to the non-developmental AMPV, which is intended to replace the five M113 variants that constitute 32% of ABCT’s tracked combat vehicles. Because of the level of
concern expressed by both government and non-government defense analysts about the priority
assigned the AMPV, Congress might choose to further examine this issue with the Army.
One potential discussion could focus on a decision by the Army to replace the GCV with the
AMPV as the Army’s number one ground combat vehicle acquisition priority. Would such a move
affect the pace of AMPV production, currently planned to reach full rate in FY2020? If
reprioritizing the AMPV speeds up its fielding to the force, how much would any increase in
AMPV production costs be offset by corresponding savings in M-113 Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) costs, as AMPVs would be able to replace M-113s sooner than currently
envisioned?
19
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives,” April 2013,
p. 15.
20
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,”InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
21
Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program, Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
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Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673Recent Program Activities
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date11
Reports suggest the Army extended the deadline to industry to respond to the AMPV RFP from
February 24, 2014, until May 28, 2014, after General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—the
Stryker Combat Vehicle’s manufacturer—requested additional time. The reason why this
extension was granted was to permit GDLS to study the technical specifications of excess
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (designated Optional Exchange Vehicles [OEVs] by the Army), which
the Army has offered to vendors to use in their final AMPV production designs to “drive down”
total AMPV program costs. As the Bradley is manufactured by BAE Systems—the other
manufacturer vying for the AMPV contract—some Pentagon and Capitol Hill officials have
reportedly suggested because of the Army’s decision, BAE has an “edge” as its proposed design
is being built around a turretless Bradley, whereas GDLS has proposed both tracked and wheeled
designs based on its Stryker vehicle.
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP12
General Dynamics Land Systems reportedly filed a protest on February 14, 2014, with the Army
Material Command protesting the AMPV RFP. The basis of General Dynamic’s protest is the
program’s proposed timeline as well as the use of BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle as the optional
exchange vehicle for design development. This type of protest supposedly should be resolved
within 90 days or less.
11
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s RFP Response Date for AMPV Extended After GDLS Asks for Time,” InsideDefense.com,
January 31, 2014.
12
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Protests RFP for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, February
20, 2014.
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General Dynamics Appeals to Congress13
General Dynamics has reportedly been actively lobbying Congress to intervene in the AMPV
program, asking that program funding be denied until a more competitive plan is put forward by
the Army. GDLS contends the RFP is biased towards BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle and
Bradley technical data has not been provided to other potential vendors and the Army has not
provided sufficient data or time for others to compete. Supposedly, GDLS is considering asking
for up to a three-year program delay so they have time to process the Bradley’s technical data and
then adjust its bid. A program delay would run counter to the Army’s efforts to accelerate the
AMPV program, an effort that has taken on increasing importance due to the recent termination
of the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program.14
Budgetary Issues
FY2014 AMPV Budget Request15
The FY2014 AMPV Budget Request was $116.298 million in Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)16
Congress recommended fully funding the FY2014 AMPV Budget Request.
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76)17
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 recommended $28.3 million in RDT&E
funding, cutting $87.998 million from the FY2014 Budget AMPV Request due to schedule delay
and an Army requested program decrease, likely related to the Army’s decision to slip the
AMPV’s Request for Proposal from June 2013 to mid-September 2013.
13
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Lobbies Congress to Upend Army’s AMPV Program,” InsideDefense.com,
February 28, 2014.
14
For additional information on the GCV see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
15
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget Request, Justification Book, RDT&E—Volume II,
Budget Activity 54, April 2013, p. 6.
16
P.L. 113-66, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014, December 26, 2013.
17
H.R. 3547, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014, (P.L. 113-76), January 17, 2014, Division C—Department
of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014.
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FY2015 President’s Budget Request18
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract, as well as program management support.
Potential Issues for Congress
Has the Army’s Decision to Use Bradley Fighting Vehicles for
AMPV’s Optional Exchange Vehicle Created an Unfair Advantage?
The Army’s decision to use excess Bradley Fighting Vehicles as an “Optional Exchange Vehicle”
for use in vendor’s vehicle design efforts raises a number of potential questions that Congress
might chose to examine in greater detail. With both major vendors—GDLS and BAE—
developing designs based on previously developed and fielded systems (the Stryker and Bradley,
respectively), what program savings did the Army envision when it offered the Bradley to all
vendors? Does the provision of the Bradley as an optional exchange vehicle help to accelerate the
AMPV’s developmental timeline or did it instead interject another program requirement that
could extend the program and perhaps increase overall program costs? While the Army might
have viewed the provision of the Bradley as an optional exchange vehicle as a cost-savings
measure, did Army leadership consider that such a move could also give the appearance of
favoritism towards BAE’s Bradley design? If a potential vendor files a formal protest with the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) based on a perception of unfairness or favoritism,
what is the potential impact on the AMPV program should GAO rule in favor of the protestor(s)?
These and other possible questions could help Congress better understand if the Army’s actions
have created an unfair advantage and if the AMPV program, as currently envisioned by Army
leadership, is sustainable under these circumstances.
The AMPV and the Army’s Emphasis on Deployability
On February 24, 2014, during a news conference outlining his recommendations to the President
for DOD’s FY2015 budget, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated:
I have also accepted the Army’s recommendation to terminate the current Ground Combat
Vehicle [GCV] program and re-direct the funds toward developing a next-generation
platform. I have asked the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps to deliver new,
realistic visions for vehicle modernization by the end of this year.19
18
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense FY2015 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, March 2014, p. 3-3 and U.S. Army’s
FY2015 Budget Briefing, March 4, 2014, p. 13.
19
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday,
February 24, 2014.
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When asked to elaborate on Secretary Hagel’s comments, a DOD spokesman reportedly noted:
We found that the Ground Combat Vehicle isn't the best vehicle to replace the Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicle, both in terms of performance and cost. While it would have
protected troops inside it, it would have been too heavy and too expensive.20
It was also noted that industry proposed GCV variants ranging from 60 tons to 70 tons in order to
meet Army protection requirements as well as the capacity to transport a nine-soldier infantry
squad.21
The Army has reportedly stated “the service needs to become a lighter and more expeditionary
force in the coming decade if it is to remain relevant to America’s national security strategy” and
that “the increased weight of combat vehicles is one of the areas the Army needs to address if it is
to become more expeditionary.”22 While the AMPV is likely to be based on existing designs,
because there are five variants planned, there is potential for the vehicle to increase in both
weight and size as new features are added to the vehicles. Because the past two combat vehicles
proposed by the Army—the Future Combat System’s Manned Ground Combat Vehicle and the
Ground Combat Vehicle—were cancelled in large part due to what was deemed excessive weight
and size, Congress might decide to examine what programmatic measures are in place to ensure
that the AMPV does not fall victim to its weight and size—primary factors in the AMPV’s overall
deployability.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
20
Sebastian Sprenger and Tony Bertuca, “Combat Vehicle Axing Adds to Army’s List of Programs That Went
Nowhere,” InsideDefense.com, February 26, 2014.
21
Ibid.
22
Tony Bertuca, “Army Futurists Continue to Ponder a Lighter, More Expeditionary Force,” InsideDefense.com,
January 24, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
7