Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
November 8, 2013February 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requestsrequested funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the Navy’s goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 306
ships). The 8 ships includeincluded two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis
destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) ship. The Navy’s proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding
plan includesincluded a total of 41 ships—the same number as in the Navy’s FY213-FY2017 five-year
shipbuilding plan, and one less than the 42 ships that the Navy planned for FY2014-FY2018
under the FY2013 budget submission.
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years. The Navy’s FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043)
shipbuilding plan, like the Navy’s previous 30-year shipbuilding plans in recent years, does not
include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 306-ship goal over the long run.
The Navy projects that the fleet would remain below 306 ships during most of the 30-year period,
and experience shortfalls at various points in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships.
In its October 2013 report on the cost of the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the plan would cost an average of $19.3 billion per year in
constant FY2013 dollars to implement, or about 15% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s
estimate is about 6% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 14%
higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 26% higher than
the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. Some of the difference between CBO’s
estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference
between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding.
Proposed issues for Congress in reviewing the Navy’s proposed FY2014 shipbuilding budget, its
proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan, and its FY2014 30-year (FY2014FY2043) shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
the impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on
FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding;
•
the potential impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of a possible sequester later
this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year
funding;
•
the potential impact on the size of the Navy of reducing DOD spending (through
sequestration or regular appropriations activity) in FY2013-FY2021 to levels at
or near the lower caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011;
•
the appropriate future size and structure of the Navy in light of strategic and budgetary
budgetary changes;
•
the sufficiency of the 30-year shipbuilding plan for achieving the Navy’s goal for
a 306-ship fleet; and
•
the affordability of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs are tracked in
detail in other CRS reports.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal ............................................................................................. 1
January 2013 Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships ........................................................................... 1
306-Ship Goal Reflects 2012 Strategic Guidance and Projected DOD Spending
Shown in FY2013 and FY2014 Budget Submissions ...................................................... 1
Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals ..................................................... 1
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ................................................................... 3
Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................ 3
30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................... 4
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ............................................ 6
Comparison of First 10 Years of 30-Year Plans......................................................................... 9
Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014.................................................................................... 13
Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013 Funding ...................................................... 13
June 2013 DOD Report on March 1, 2013, Sequester ...................................................... 13
Executability of Third DDG-51 Funded in FY2013 ......................................................... 14
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony ................................................................................. 14
October 23, 2013, Navy Testimony................................................................................... 15
September 18, 2013, Navy Testimony .............................................................................. 16
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks ................................................................................... 17
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony ...................................................................................... 17
July 19, 2013, Navy Press Briefing ................................................................................... 18
May 8, 2013, Navy Testimony .......................................................................................... 19
Potential Impact of Possible Late 2013/Early 2014 Sequester on FY2014 Funding............... 21
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony .............on Size of Navy of Reducing DOD Spending to Lower BCA Caps
Through FY2021 .................................................................... 21
October 23, 2013, Navy Testimony................................................................................... 23
September 18 21
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony ................................................................................. 21 27
September 1418, 2013, Navy Blog Post..Testimony .............................................................................. 2924
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks ................................................................................... 3127
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony ...................................................................................... 3329
July 1931, 2013, NavyDOD Press Briefing ................................................................................... 34
May 829
April 16, 2013, Navy Testimony .......................................................................................... 38
Potential Impact on Size of Navy of Reducing DOD Spending to Lower BCA Caps
Through FY2021 ........... 30
February 12, 2013, Navy Testimony ....................................................................................................... 39
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony .......................... 30
Appropriate Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and Budgetary
Changes ....................................................... 39
September 18, 2013, Navy Testimony .............................................................................. 42
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks ................................................................................... 44
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony ....... 31
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan for Achieving Navy’s 306-Ship Goal ................... 35
Affordability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ............................................................................... 46
July 31, 2013, DOD Press Briefing 36
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs ................................................................................... 47
April 16, 2013, Navy Testimony36
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels ....................................................................................... 47
February 12, 2013, Navy Testimony 37
Legislative Activity for FY2014 ................................................................................. 48
Appropriate Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and Budgetary
Changes ........................................... 41
FY2014 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 48
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan for Achieving Navy’s 306-Ship Goal ................... 52
Affordability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan41
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66) .................................. 41
House.......................................... 53
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs ................................................................................... 53
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels ..................................... 41
Senate ................................................ 54
Legislative Activity for FY2014 ................................................................................. 47
Final Version ................... 58
FY2014 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 58
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960/S. 1197) ... 52
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76)..................................... 58 55
House................................................................................................................................. 58
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 64
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397/S. 1429) ......................................................... 69
House.55
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 69
Senate .........57
Final Version ....................................................................................................................... 70 60
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 7362
Tables
Table 1. Current 306 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals .................................. 2
Table 2. Navy FY2014 Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 3
Table 3. Navy FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 5
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043)
Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................................................................... 7
Table 5. Ship Procurement Quantities in First 10 Years of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ............... 10
Table 6. Projected Navy Force Sizes in First 10 years of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ................. 11
Table 7. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 5033
Table 8. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043)
Shipbuilding Plans ...................................................................................................................... 5437
Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 306-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel ........................................................................................... 8371
Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ..................................................... 8674
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2018 ..................................... 8775
Appendixes
Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests........... 7563
Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Current or Potential Future Ship Force
Levels.......................................................................................................................................... 7967
Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR .......................................................... 8169
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate ......................................................... 8573
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 8775
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress
concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the
Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the
past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
Background
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal
January 2013 Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships
On January 31, 2013, in response to Section 1015 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization
Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239 of January 2, 2013), the Navy submitted to Congress a report
presenting a goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 306 ships, consisting of certain types
and quantities of ships.1 The goal for a 306-ship fleet is the result of a force structure assessment
(FSA) that the Navy completed in 2012.
306-Ship Goal Reflects 2012 Strategic Guidance and Projected DOD Spending
Shown in FY2013 and FY2014 Budget Submissions
The 2012 FSA and the resulting 306-ship plan reflect the defense strategic guidance document
that the Administration presented in January 20122 and the associated projected levels of
Department of Defense (DOD) spending shown in the FY2013 and FY2014 budget submissions.
DOD officials have stated that if planned levels of DOD spending are reduced below what is
shown in these budget submissions, the defense strategy set forth in the January 2012 strategic
guidance document might need to be changed. Such a change, Navy officials have indicated,
could lead to the replacement of the 306-ship plan of January 2013 with a new plan.
Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals
Table 1 compares the 306-ship goal to earlier Navy ship force structure plans.
1
Department of the Navy, Report to Congress [on] Navy Combatant Vessel Force Structure Requirement, January
2013, 3 pp. The cover letters for the report were dated January 31, 2013.
2
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG), by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
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Table 1. Current 306 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals
Changes
to
February
2006 313ship plan
announced
through
mid-2011
February
2006
Navy
plan for
313-ship
fleet
260ships
325ships
20022004
Navy
plan
for
375ship
Navya
2001
QDR
plan
for
310ship
Navy
Early-2005
Navy plan
for fleet of
260-325
ships
306ship
plan of
January
2013
~310316 ship
plan of
March
2012
Revised
313-ship
plan of
September
2011
Ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs)
12b
12-14b
12b
12b
14
14
14
14
14
Cruise missile submarines
(SSGNs)
0c
0-4c
4c
0c
4
4
4
4
2 or
4d
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48
~48
48
48
48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11e
11e
11e
11e
11f
10
11
12
12
Cruisers and destroyers
88
~90
94
94g
88
67
92
104
116
Frigates
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
52
~55
55
55
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
33
~32
33
33h
31
17
24
37
36
MPF(F) shipsi
0j
0j
0j
0j
12i
14i
20i
0i
0i
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
29
~29
30
30
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine warfare ships
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
26k
16
10l
10l
10l
21l
3
0
0
0
0
17
10
11
25
25
313
260
325
375
310
or
312
Ship type
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
Otherm
Total battle force ships
23
~23
16
24n
306
~310316
313
328
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately and signals that the number
in question may be refined as a result of the Naval Force Structure Assessment currently in progress.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b.
The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
c.
Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire. This situation can be expressed in a
table like this one with either a 4 or a zero.
d.
The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into
SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a
plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
e.
With congressional approval, the goal has been temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers for the period
between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in December 2012 and entry into service of the
carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently scheduled for September 2015.
f.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
g.
The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
h.
The Navy acknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
i.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The planned MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for
example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron
were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. The planned MPF(F) squadron was subsequently
restructured into a different set of initiatives for enhancing the existing MPF squadrons; the Navy no longer
plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron.
j.
The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure some of the ships that were previously planned for the squadron—specifically, TAKE-1 class cargo
ships, and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships. These ships are
included in the total shown for “Other” ships.
k.
The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships included 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
l.
Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.
m.
This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
n.
The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal included the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2014 five-year (FY2013-FY2018) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy FY2014 Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 306-ship goal)
Ship type
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Total
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
0
0
0
0
1
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
1
2
2
2
2
9
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
4
4
2
2
2
14
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship
0
0
0
1
0
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
0
0
0
2
1
3
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB)
1
0
0
0
0
1
TAO(X) oiler
0
0
1
0
1
2
TOTAL
8
8
7
9
9
41
Source: FY2014 Navy budget submission.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Notes: The MLP/AFSB is a variant of the MLP with additional features permitting it to serve in the role of an
AFSB. The Navy proposes to fund the TATFs and TAO(X)s through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF)
and the other ships through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2014-FY2018)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
Total of 41 ships—about the same as last year. The Navy’s proposed FY2014FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 41 ships—the same
number as in the Navy’s FY213-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, and one
less than the 42 ships that the Navy planned for FY2014-FY2018 under the
FY2013 budget submission.
•
Average of 8.2 ships per year. The FY2013-FY2017 plan includes an average of
8.2 battle force ships per year. The steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of 306
ships with an average service life of 35 years is about 8.7 ships per year. In light
of how the average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.7 ships per year (see Appendix D), shipbuilding supporters for some time have
wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to a steady rate of 10 or more battle force
ships per year.
•
Second Virginia-class submarine added in FY2014. Compared to the FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, the FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding
plan adds a second Virginia-class attack submarine in FY2014. This follows
through on Congress’s action, in marking up the FY2013 budget, to provide
advance procurement funding in FY2013 for a second Virginia-class boat in
FY2014.
•
One DDG-51 destroyer in FY2014. The FY2014-FY2018 five-year
shipbuilding plan, like the FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, includes
one DDG-51 destroyer in FY2014. During Congress’s review of the Navy’s
FY2013 budget submission, there was interest in Congress in adding a second
DDG-51 destroyer to FY2014. In final action, Congress instead procured an
additional DDG-51 destroyer in FY2013 (increasing the number of DDG-51s
procured in FY2013 to three, compared to the two that were requested for
FY2013). The third DDG-51 procured in FY2013 might be viewed as the
equivalent of the second DDG-51 that supporters wanted to add to FY2014.
•
Start of LX(R) amphibious ship procurement deferred beyond FY2018. The
proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan defers the procurement of
the first LX(R) amphibious ship from FY2018 to a later fiscal year. The FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan had deferred the ship from FY2017 to
FY2018. LX(R)s (previously designated LSD[X]s) are to replace aging LSD41/49 class amphibious ships.
30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan, the tables for
which were submitted to Congress on April 22, 2012.
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Table 3. Navy FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
CVN
1
1
1
1
1
1
LSC
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
SSC
4
4
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
SSN
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
Total
8
8
7
9
9
10
10
10
11
14
11
11
6
8
10
8
9
9
11
9
7
5
4
8
10
8
11
8
9
8
Source: FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
In devising a 30-year shipbuilding plan to move the Navy toward its ship force-structure goal, key
assumptions and planning factors include but are not limited to the following:
•
ship service lives;
•
estimated ship procurement costs;
•
projected shipbuilding funding levels; and
•
industrial-base considerations.
The Navy states that
This [FY2014] 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on these key assumptions:
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
— [A] Battle Force inventory of the “2012 Navy FSA [Force Structure Assessment]” [i.e.,
of 306 ships] will remain the objective of this plan.
— In the near term [i.e., FY2014-FY2023], the Annual budget for Navy shipbuilding will
be sustained at the levels of the FY14 President’s Budget (PB14) [i.e., the Navy’s proposed
FY2014 budget] through the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) [i.e., during FY2014Fy2018]. In the med-term [i.e., FY2024-FY2033], [the] annual budget will remain at
appropriate (higher) levels; and in the far term [i.e., FY2034-FY2043], [it will] be sustained
at appropriate levels (slightly higher than [the] current historical average).
— All battle force ships serve to the end of the planned or extended lives.
— The DoN [Department of the Navy] will continue to acquire and build ships in the most
affordable manner.3
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2014-FY2043 that would result from
implementing the FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
3
Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014, May 2013, p. 4.
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Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043)
Shipbuilding Plan
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
11
88
52
48
0
12
33
29
33
306
FY14
10
85
26
55
4
14
31
31
26
282
FY15
10
78
23
55
4
14
28
29
29
270
FY16
11
82
27
53
4
14
29
29
31
280
FY17
11
83
29
50
4
14
30
29
33
283
FY18
11
84
33
52
4
14
31
29
33
291
FY19
11
86
38
52
4
14
31
29
35
300
FY20
11
87
37
49
4
14
31
29
33
295
FY21
11
88
37
49
4
14
31
29
33
296
FY22
12
87
39
48
4
14
31
29
33
297
FY23
12
87
38
48
4
14
31
29
34
297
FY24
12
89
40
48
4
14
32
29
34
302
FY25
11
88
42
47
4
14
34
29
34
303
FY26
11
89
45
46
2
14
33
29
33
302
FY27
11
91
48
45
1
13
33
29
33
304
FY28
11
90
51
43
0
12
33
29
33
302
306 ship plan
FY29
11
88
52
42
0
11
33
29
33
299
FY30
11
86
52
43
0
11
32
29
33
297
FY31
11
82
52
44
0
11
32
29
33
294
FY32
11
81
52
45
0
10
32
29
34
294
FY33
11
81
52
46
0
10
33
29
34
296
FY34
11
80
52
47
0
10
34
29
34
297
FY35
11
82
52
48
0
10
33
29
34
299
FY36
11
84
52
50
0
10
33
29
34
303
FY37
11
86
52
51
0
10
34
29
33
306
FY38
11
88
52
50
0
10
33
29
34
307
FY39
11
90
52
50
0
10
33
29
33
308
FY40
10
90
52
50
0
10
32
29
33
308
FY41
10
90
52
49
0
11
33
29
33
307
FY42
10
88
52
51
0
12
32
29
33
307
FY43
10
88
52
51
0
12
31
29
33
306
Source: FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan.
Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the
Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding
plan and resulting projected force levels included the following:
•
Total of 266 ships; average of about 8.9 per year. The plan includes a total of
266 ships to be procured, two less than the number in the FY2013 30-year
(FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan. The total of 266 ships equates to an
average of about 8.9 ships per year, which is slightly higher than the approximate
average procurement rate (sometimes called the steady-state replacement rate) of
about 8.7 ships per year that would be needed over the long run to achieve and
maintain a fleet of 306 ships, assuming an average life of 35 years for Navy
ships.
•
Projected fleet remains below 306 ships. Although the FY2014 30-year plan
includes an average of about 8.9 ships per year, the FY2014 30-year plan, like
previous 30-year plans, results in a fleet that does not fully support all elements
of the Navy’s ship force structure goal over the 30-year period. The distribution
of the 266 ships over the 30-year period, combined with the ages of the Navy’s
existing ships, results in a projected fleet that would remain below 306 ships
during most of the 30-year period and experience shortfalls at various points in
cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships.
•
Ballistic missile submarine force to be reduced temporarily to 10 boats. As a
result of a decision in the FY2013 budget to defer the scheduled procurement of
the first Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two years,
from FY2019 to FY2021, the ballistic missile submarine force is projected to
drop to a total of 10 or 11 boats—one or two boats below the 12-boat SSBN
force-level goal—during the period FY2029-FY2041. The Navy says this
reduction is acceptable for meeting current strategic nuclear deterrence mission
requirements, because none of the 10 or 11 boats during these years will be
encumbered by long-term maintenance.4
•
Seven CG-47 class cruisers and two LSD-41 class ships again proposed for
early retirement. The Navy’s FY2013 budget submission proposed the early
retirements in FY2013 and FY2014 of seven CG-47 class Aegis cruisers and two
LSD-41 class amphibious ships. Congress, in acting on the Navy’s proposed
FY2013 budget, did not accept this proposal, and instead instructed the Navy to
keep these nine ships in service. Section 8103 of the FY2013 DOD
appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6 of March 26, 2013, the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013) established a
Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund to fund the continued
operation and support of these nine ships in FY2013 and FY2014. The Navy’s
FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan again proposes the early retirements of seven
CG-47 class Aegis cruisers and two LSD-41 class amphibious ships, with the
retirement to occur in FY2015. The exact cruisers and amphibious ships to be
retired under the Navy’s FY2014 submission might differ from the exact cruisers
and amphibious ships to be retired under the Navy’s FY2013 budget submission,
but the general idea of having early retirements for seven CG-47 class cruisers
and two LSD-41 class amphibious appears to be the same, except that the early
4
For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
retirements would now occur in FY2015 (i.e., one year beyond the two-year
window funded by Section 8103).
Comparison of First 10 Years of 30-Year Plans
Table 5 and Table 6 below show the first 10 years of planned annual ship procurement quantities
and projected Navy force sizes in 30-year shipbuilding plans dating back to the first such plan,
which was submitted in 2000 in conjunction with the FY2001 budget. By reading vertically down
each column, one can see how the ship procurement quantity or Navy force size projected for a
given fiscal year changed as that year drew closer to becoming the current budget year.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 5. Ship Procurement Quantities in First 10 Years of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Years shown are fiscal years
FY of 30-year plan
(year submitted)
FY01 plan (2000)
FY02 plan (2001)
FY03 plan (2002)
FY04 plan (2003)
FY05 plan (2004)
FY06 plan (2005)
FY07 plan (2006)
FY08 plan (2007)
FY09 plan (2008)
FY10 plan (2009)
FY11 plan (2010)
FY12 plan (2011)
FY13 plan (2012)
FY14 plan (2013)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
8
8
8
8
7
5
6
6
6
7
6
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
5
5
7
7
11
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7
8
7
7
9
14
15
13
14
15
9
6
8
9
17
14
15
14
16
15
4
7
7
9
10
12
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7
7
11
12
14
13
12
11
11
10
7
11
12
13
12
12
10
12
11
6
7
8
8
12
12
13
13
12
12
13
8
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
9
8
12
9
12
9
12
9
13
9
10
13
11
12
9
12
10
12
8
9
10
7
8
9
7
11
8
12
9
12
8
8
7
9
9
10
10
10
11
23
14
Source: Navy 30-year shipbuilding plans supplemented by annual Navy budget submissions (including 5-year shipbuilding plans) for fiscal years shown. n/a means not
available—see notes below.
Notes: The FY2001 30-year plan submitted in 2000 was submitted under a one-time-only legislative provision, Section 1013 of the FY2000 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 1059/P.L. 106-65 of October 5, 1999). No provision required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan in 2001 or 2002, when Congress
considered DOD’s proposed FY2002 and FY2003 DOD budgets. (In addition, no FYDP was submitted in 2001, the first year of the George W. Bush Administration.)
Section 1022 of the FY2003 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546/P.L. 107-314 of December 2, 2002) created a requirement to submit a 30-year
shipbuilding plan each year, in conjunction with each year’s defense budget. This provision was codified at 10 U.S.C. 231. The first 30-year plan submitted under this
provision was the one submitted in 2003, in conjunction with the proposed FY2004 DOD budget. For the next several years, 30-year shipbuilding plans were submitted
each year, in conjunction with each year’s proposed DOD budget. An exception occurred in 2009, the first year of the Obama Administration, when DOD submitted a
proposed budget for FY2010 with no accompanying FYDP or 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan. Section 1023 of the FY2011 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011) amended 10 U.S.C. 231 to require DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that
CRS-10
DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Consistent with Section 1023, DOD did not submit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan at the time that it submitted
the proposed FY2012 DOD budget. At the request of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding
plan in late-May 2011. Section 1011 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) amended 10 U.S.C. 231 to
reinstate the requirement to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year, in conjunction with each year’s defense budget.
Table 6. Projected Navy Force Sizes in First 10 years of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Years shown are fiscal years
FY of 30-year plan
(year submitted)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
FY01 plan (2000)
316
315
313
313
313
311
311
304
305
305
316
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
314
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
292
292
291
296
301
305
308
313
317
321
290
290
298
303
308
307
314
320
328
326
289
293
297
301
301
306
n/a
n/a
305
n/a
285
294
299
301
306
315
317
315
314
317
286
289
293
302
310
311
307
311
314
322
286
287
289
290
293
287
288
291
301
309
287
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
284
287
287
285
285
292
298
305
311
315
290
287
286
286
297
301
311
316
322
324
285
279
276
284
285
292
300
295
296
298
282
270
280
283
291
300
295
296
297
FY02 plan (2001)
FY03 plan (2002)
FY04 plan (2003)
FY05 plan (2004)
FY06 plan (2005)
FY07 plan (2006)
FY08 plan (2007)
FY09 plan (2008)
FY10 plan (2009)
FY11 plan (2010)
FY12 plan (2011)
FY13 plan (2012)
FY14 plan (2013)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
297
Source: Navy 30-year shipbuilding plans supplemented by annual Navy budget submissions (including 5-year shipbuilding plans) for fiscal years shown. n/a means not
available—see notes below.
Notes: The FY2001 30-year plan submitted in 2000 was submitted under a one-time-only legislative provision, Section 1013 of the FY2000 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 1059/P.L. 106-65 of October 5, 1999). No provision required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan in 2001 or 2002, when Congress
considered DOD’s proposed FY2002 and FY2003 DOD budgets. Section 1022 of the FY2003 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546/P.L. 107-314 of
December 2, 2002) created a requirement to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year, in conjunction with each year’s defense budget. This provision was codified at
CRS-11
10 U.S.C. 231. The first 30-year plan submitted under this provision was the one submitted in 2003, in conjunction with the proposed FY2004 DOD budget. For the next
several years, 30-year shipbuilding plans were submitted each year, in conjunction with each year’s proposed DOD budget. An exception occurred in 2009, the first year
of the Obama Administration, when DOD submitted a proposed budget for FY2010 with no accompanying FYDP or 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The FY2006 plan
included data for only selected years beyond FY2011. Section 1023 of the FY2011 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7,
2011) amended 10 U.S.C. 231 to require DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Consistent with Section 1023, DOD did not submit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan at the time that it submitted the proposed FY2012 DOD budget. At
the request of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in late-May 2011. Section 1011 of the
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) amended 10 U.S.C. 231 to reinstate the requirement to submit a 30-year
shipbuilding plan each year, in conjunction with each year’s defense budget.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014
Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013 Funding
June 2013 DOD Report on March 1, 2013, Sequester
One issue for Congress concerns the impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of the March 1,
2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding. DOD’s June 2013 report
to Congress on the March 1, 2013, sequester states that the sequester reduced FY2013 and
unobligated prior-year funding in the Navy’s shipbuilding account (known formally as the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation account) by $1,752.7 million, or
about 7.6%, including
•
$541.2 million in the DDG-51 destroyer program;
•
$492.3 million in the Virginia class attack submarine program;
•
$184.2 million in the LCS program;
•
$176.3 in the program for performing mid-life nuclear refueling overhauls (called
refueling complex overhauls, or RCOHs) on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class
aircraft carriers;
•
$74.5 million in the program for building new CVN-78 class aircraft carriers;
•
$71.1 million for the LHA Replacement amphibious assault ship program;
•
$70.3 million for the DDG-1000 destroyer program;
•
$58.8 million in the LPD-17 amphibious ship program;
•
$25.7 million for the Moored Training Ship (MTS) program to convert an older
attack submarine into a moored training platform;
•
$24.7 million for ship outfitting costs;
•
$21.4 million for the JHSV program;
•
$10.0 million for the LCAC SLEP (air cushioned landing craft service life
extension program); and
•
amounts of less than $1 million each from a few other SCN-funded programs.5
The first two items listed above account for $1,033.5 million, or about 59.0%, of the total amount
sequestered from the SCN account. The first four items listed above account for $1,394.0 million,
or about 79.5%, of the total amount sequestered from the SCN account.
The impact of the March 1, 2013, sequester on an individual Navy shipbuilding program will
depend on the particular circumstances of that program, including, among other things, the impact
5
Department of Defense Report on the Joint Committee Sequestration for Fiscal Year 2013, June 2013, pp. 36, 36A,
37, and 37A (pdf pages 85-88 of 438).
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
of the March 1, 2013, sequester on funding for research and development efforts supporting that
program. CRS reports on individual shipbuilding programs provide additional details about the
impact of the sequester on individual programs. (For a list of these reports, see “CRS Reports
Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs” at the end of the “Legislative
Activity for FY2014” section.)
Executability of Third DDG-51 Funded in FY2013
A key question regarding the impact of the sequester on FY2013 funding concerns the
executability (i.e., on the Navy’s ability to go ahead with the construction) of the third DDG-51
destroyer that was funded in FY2013. This ship is to be the 10th ship in a DDG-51 multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract for FY2013-FY2017 that was awarded in early June 2013.
At a May 8, 2013, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive), testified that as a
result of the March 1, 2013, sequester, there is an approximately $300 million funding shortfall in
the DDG-51 program that creates a problem for executing the third DDG-51 that was funded in
FY2013.6 Stackley stated that the Navy is ready to work with Congress to address this issue, and
that the ship is treated as an option in the DDG-51 MYP contract.7
The suggestion from the Navy’s testimony is that if Congress were to address the funding
shortfall for the DDG-51 program this year, either through its action on the Navy’s proposed
FY2014 budget or in some other way, the ship could be added to the MYP contract following the
award of the contract by exercising the contract’s option for the ship. If that were to happen this
year, it would not substantially affect the schedule for building this ship, because the Navy from
the start has anticipated building the ship on a schedule consistent with what would be expected
for a ship funded in FY2014. In other words, for construction scheduling purposes, the Navy from
the start has anticipated treating the ship like a “second FY2014 DDG-51” rather than a third
FY2013 DDG-51.
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a November, 7, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impact of
sequestration on the national defense, Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar
to the one he used at the September 18, 2013, hearing discussed below, that
Looking at the nearer term, the FY 2013 sequestration reductions compelled us to reduce our
afloat and ashore operations and created a significant shore maintenance backlog. However,
the effects were barely manageable because we received authorization to reprogram funds
into appropriate maintenance accounts, and we were able to use prior-year investment
balances to mitigate reductions to investment programs. Impact to Navy programs, caused by
the combination of a continuing resolution and sequestration, included:
6
Transcript of hearing. Stackley testified that the sequester created an approximately $560 million funding shortfall in
the DDG-51 program (as mentioned earlier DOD’s June 2013 report provided a final figure of $541.2 million), and that
the Navy was able to identify about $260 million in funding offsets to apply to the shortfall, leaving a shortfall of about
$300 million.
7
Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
• Cancelled five ship deployments.
• Delayed deployment of USS HARRY S TRUMAN strike group by six months.
• Planned inactivation, instead of repairing, USS MIAMI due to rising cost and inadequate
maintenance funds.
• Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by about 30%.
• Furloughed DON civilian employees for 6 days, which, combined with a hiring freeze,
reduced our maintenance and sustainment capacity by taking away logisticians, comptrollers,
engineers, contracting officers, and planners.
• Reduced base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 20%.
• Cancelled the Blue Angels’ season and most non-essential port visits for Fleet Weeks.8
October 23, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an October 23, 2013, hearing before the Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on the impacts of a continuing resolution (CR) and
sequestration on acquisition and modernization, Department of the Navy officials testified that
... FY 2013 sequestration reduced the DON top-line by approximately $11 billion and
impacted our readiness, operations and procurement. The effects were addressed by
curtailing operations, deferring maintenance, depleting unobligated prior-year balances in
our investment accounts, deferring costs to future year budgets, and employing the limited
transfer authority provided to the DON. These measures which mitigated the immediate
impacts were insufficient to bear the full weight of sequestration, resulting in delays to
development schedules and reductions to procurement quantities. The net effects of these
deferrals, delays, and program cuts are added bills and increased costs in FY 2014 and
beyond.
In support of our warfighters, the DON prioritized readiness for deployed and next to deploy
forces. By this action, the Navy and Marine Corps were able to preserve the capability and
capacity to meet the highest priority Combatant Commander demands, including crisis
response and theater security cooperation, although participation levels were reduced in
some cases. However, coupled with the continuing resolution for the first six months of FY
2013, sequestration compelled us to reduce our operations, including cancelling five ship
deployments, delaying deployment of the USS HARRY S TRUMAN strike group by six
months, and creating a significant maintenance backlog that has carried over into FY 2014.
The Navy was forced to defer required maintenance on 16 airframes and 55 engines/engine
modules and reduce non-deployed flying hours, thereby jeopardizing planned aircraft
modernization, mission system software capability improvements, fatigue-life management,
depot support, and the flight-hour program which maintains pilot proficiency and readiness.
While this preserved forward deployed activities and training for next-to-deploy forces, it
increased risk in the readiness of our non-deployed units which will take years to recover.
8
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense, November 7, 2013, pp. 11-12.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Sequestration also resulted in the furlough of DON civilian employees for six days, which
when combined with a hiring freeze, reduced our maintenance and sustainment capacity by
taking away logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers, and planners. Navy
facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization was reduced by approximately 30% and
base operations, including port and airfield operations, was reduced by approximately 20%.9
September 18, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a September 18, 2013, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on planning for
sequestration in FY2014 and perspectives of the military services on the Strategic Choices and
Management Review (SCMR), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
testified, in a statement similar to the one he used at the November 7, 2013, hearing discussed
above, that
the FY 2013 sequestration reductions compelled us to reduce our afloat and ashore
operations and created a significant afloat and ashore maintenance backlog. However, the
effects were barely manageable due to authorization to reprogram funds into appropriate
maintenance accounts, and we were able to use prior-year investment balances to mitigate
reductions to investment programs. Impact to Navy programs, caused by the combination of
a continuing resolution and sequestration, included:
• Cancelled five ship deployments.
• Delayed deployment of [the aircraft carrier] USS HARRY S TRUMAN strike group by six
months.
• Planned inactivation, instead of repairing, [the attack submarine] USS MIAMI due to rising
cost and inadequate maintenance funds.
• Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by about 30%.
• Furloughed DON [Department of the Navy] civilian employees for 6 days, which,
combined with a hiring freeze, reduced our maintenance and sustainment capacity by taking
away logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers, and planners.
• Reduced base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 20%.
• Cancelled the Blue Angels’ season and most non-essential port visits for Fleet Weeks.10
9
Statement of Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and
Lieutenant General Glenn M. Walters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Before the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Impacts of a Continuing Resolution
and Sequestration on Department of the Navy Acquisition, Programming & Industrial Base, October 23, 2013, pp. 2-3.
10
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp. 2-3
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks
At a September 5, 2013, event at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, stated that
...we have 285 ships today, about an average of 95 [of those ships] deployed. This is about a
90 day average. ... But we’re about 10 [ships] down in this deployment piece. I.e., we were
about 105 deployed [ships] about a year ago, and that is a factor of this last year of the
budget limitations that we’ve had....
This rebalance to the Asia Pacific, despite operations around the world, despite Mideast
operations, continues. It has slowed down. The continuing resolution of ’13 and
sequestration has slowed us down but it’s moving ahead....
The effect of sequestration, the continuing resolution in FY13 pretty much came about as we
predicted and as we testified to. The budget reduction was about $11 billion to us, to the
Navy. And we were fortunate enough to reach back to prior year money, which hadn’t been
fully obligated, and pull that forward into ’13 and it helped mitigate that. That’s a one-time
operation that we were able to do.
We in fact had to cancel five ship deployments in FY13. [And regarding] Our surge capacity,
the ability to respond here [indicating an overseas location on a briefing slide]. [using] Those
ships that are back here in the continental U.S. Usually we have three carrier strike groups
and three amphibious ready groups able to respond within a week. We have one [of each]
now. That’s going to be the story in FY14 as we look ahead. So it’s a reduction in surge
[capacity]. That’s where a lot of the, if you will, the reductions in the budget kind of
manifested themselves.
We’ve done very little shore maintenance upgrades. If there’s an area that I’m concerned
about and I have to watch closely, it is our shore readiness. This is where we’re taking a lot
of the reductions and we’ve got to be careful of that.11
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an August 1, 2013, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee and the
Readiness subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Navy surface ship
maintenance and readiness, the Navy testified:
Current readiness
The combination of the continuing resolution and sequestration put twenty three FY13
surface ship availabilities at risk, and represented the most immediate threat to surface ship
readiness. We were able to restore all but eight availabilities when the FY13 appropriations
bill was passed, and we appreciate the support of Congress on a reprogramming which will
fund the last eight availabilities.
The FY13 appropriations bill with sequestration left the Navy with a $4.1 billion shortfall in
our Operations and Maintenance (O&MN) accounts compared with the President’s 2013
11
Transcript of remarks by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, at the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), September 5, 2013, on American Military Strategy In A Time of Declining Budgets, provided to CRS by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs, September 6, 2013.
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budget submission. This has had an impact on Fleet operations and readiness in FY13, and
will carry over into FY14. Specifically, it has degraded our ability to provide the level of
global presence and surge capacity that we have executed over the last several years.
The decreased presence is apparent in our reduction of deployed carrier strike groups, as well
as a reduction in Southern Command and European Command deployments. For example, of
the ten vessels scheduled to conduct deployments to Southern Command this fiscal year,
only three will complete their deployments as planned. We will continue to provide ready
forces to execute the highest priority deployments, providing the Combatant Commanders
with the presence and capabilities they need most to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance.
However, reduction of presence or elimination of deployments to any region is noticed by
both our allies and potential adversaries, degrading not only our ability to build and foster
cooperative relationships with our maritime partners, but also reducing our capability to
ensure operational access and freedom of action. You cannot surge trust; rather you have to
be there, building it every day.
The decrease in our surge capacity is less apparent than reduced presence, but it still causes
great concern due to the impact on war plans and contingency operations. The net effect is
that surging our remaining surge capacity will likely lead to gaps in future regularly
scheduled presence operations. Due to fiscal constraints, the Navy has been forced to
prioritize maintenance and training for those forces deploying in FY14. Thus, those forces
deploying after FY14 will receive reduced maintenance and training, decreasing our ability
to surge these forces in case of emergency. This shortfall in surge capacity will be
problematic if our forces are required to respond to contingencies. Currently, our surge
forces are restricted to the forces trained and equipped for the next deployment, while the
rest of the Fleet is in a training and material readiness status below “ready to deploy in all
warfare areas.”12
July 19, 2013, Navy Press Briefing
At a July 19, 2013, press briefing, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations,
stated that
So could I get the Navy slide today up there, please? Thank you. I think you have this as part
of the handout, but this is where your Navy is today. Presence remains our mandate. This is
what we‘re mostly about. And it’s a central element of our defense strategic guidance.
As you can see, we have about 95 ships deployed, and about 3,700 operational aircraft are
also out there. I'll tell you, since sequestration sort of set in with the impact of a continuing
resolution, we're down about 10 ships from, say, about a year ago or actually several months
ago, forward deployed. So there is an impact....
In the Southern Command, sequestration has effectively caused us to reduce our combatant
ships to zero. You can see up there [on the slide]. I tell you, there are other naval forces in
the region, non-combatant ships and other forces, but we're zero [ships] today [in the
Southern Command area]. And that was a deliberate decision approved by the Secretary of
Defense as part of our global force management operation.
12
Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden, Director, Surface Warfare (N96) and Rear Admiral Timothy Matthews,
Director, Fleet Readiness (N43) on Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness With limited Maintenance Resources
before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on
Readiness, August 1, 2013, pp. 1-2.
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I would tell you, it'll undulate a little bit somewhere around zero, one or two as we go
through the process....
So a little bit on the—the budget and sequestration, it’s on my mind daily, and the fiscal year
‘13 appropriation bill helped us quite a bit. We're out there today with one carrier strike
group and one amphibious ready group deployed to each theater, so we've got one in the
Arabian Gulf region and one in the Western Pacific of each. But the issue is, the backup—
that would be the surge force—we're not where we need to be in that regard. We have today
one carrier strike group and one amphibious ready group ready to deploy with all the
capabilities that we have in our covenant to our combatant commanders. The rest of the fleet
is not ready to deploy with all the capabilities that are needed that we would normally have
in our fleet response plan, and that’s really the issue that we have there.
A year ago, I would tell you, we had three carrier strike groups and three amphibious ready
groups ready to surge. And if there were a contingency, we had to take on a large operation,
the surge force would be a concern, and the concern would be the capabilities that we would
bring and whether or not they were the right capabilities.
It may not be readily apparent to many, because as you look out there, you say, hey, it kind
of looks the same out there. But it's—it’s the surge issue, and it’s a real issue.
Now, for the remainder of the year, this year, this fiscal year, we'll be adjusting our
operations and maintenance spending to meet, really, the FY [fiscal year] ‘14 deployments.
The kids are training and doing maintenance this year for next year’s deployments. And we
have a plan in place, working with the Congress on a reprogramming, to restore the
maintenance availabilities that we had set aside due to our budgetary issues earlier in the
year. And we're trying to maintain as much of our training operations as feasible, for the
reasons I've said before.
My real concern tends to be the shore facilities and the shore readiness. They're taking the
brunt of this reduction here in ‘13, both in the case of the continuing resolution and
sequestration. And I'm looking very closely at this. We are effectively doing no projects, no
restoration or modernization projects, and we have taken our base operations and our
sustainment, the very basic things, down to really the minimum that we think is safe and
appropriate.13
May 8, 2013, Navy Testimony
The Navy’s prepared statement for the May 8, 2013, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs
before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee stated the following
regarding the impact of the March 1, 2013, sequester:
Sequestration ... reduced the Fiscal Year 2013 funding across all [Navy] accounts by roughly
8 percent, or about $10.7 billion total, thus directly impacting current and future readiness.
The Navy is still reconciling the impact of this reduction; however, due to the mechanics of
its implementation and the limits on Department-wide transfer authority authorized by the
Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Appropriations Act, it is likely that the Department [of the Navy]
will be compelled to reduce our near term forward presence, our planned depot maintenance
13
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Greenert in the Pentagon Briefing Room, July 19, 2013, accessed
August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5278. The term “fiscal year”
appears in brackets in the original.
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and training to support future operational rotations, our procurement of ships, aircraft and
weapons systems to meet our force structure and inventory requirements, and our investment
in future capabilities and readiness; thus impacting our future readiness. Every major weapon
system is impacted by sequestration in 2013 with impacts ranging from reducing quantities
procured, delaying schedules (delivery and initial operational capability), deferring costs to
future years (particularly in the case of executing programs, such as shipbuilding), and
absorbing cost growth due to all of these impacts.14
During the discussion portion of the hearing, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive), made
additional comments regarding the impact of the March 1, 2013, sequester in response to
questions. Early in the discussion portion of the hearing, he stated:
Let me start by just describing 2013 since we‘re dealing with sequestration in the current
budget year.
As I described at the outset, each of the program lines was impacted by sequestration. So in
2013, we are working line by line to mitigate the impact by either paying for the
sequestration impact to prior year assets, which we had accumulated through the last four to
five years of shipbuilding or trying to defer certain costs that we can defer to a later point in
the cycle in order to keep the plan procurement on track. And there are certain cases where
we're looking at do we need to de-scope certain items on the shipbuilding plan, but trying to
keep the overall force structure number healthy.
In that approach, in fact, the [third] DDG 51 that was added by Congress in 2013 is, in fact,
held up. Otherwise, the balance of the shipbuilding program is going forward admittedly at
some risk, so some increased risk in terms of called budget executability. So we're trying to
do this very mindfully if we allow sequestration to stop us in our tracks that will simply
cause or cause the disruption to go through the roof.
So we're going to continue to work that destroyer with Congress so that you all understand
its specific impact. We're going to continue to execute the balance of the shipbuilding
program in ‘13.
We have brought forward the budget request in ‘14, which as you're well aware does not
account for a sequestration in ‘14. And, in fact, in ‘14 and out in a more strategic review
that’s been accomplished under the direction and guidance of the secretary of Defense, we
are looking at shipbuilding amidst all of the capabilities that the department is pursuing in
terms of what are the impacts associated with reduction of the top line, and then what are the
priorities that we need to bring forward in terms of funding those capabilities.
And central to all of that is driving down the cost of what we're procuring and driving out the
cost of our doing business so that more of the dollars available can go towards capability.15
Later in the hearing, he stated that
14
Statement of The Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources and Vice Admiral Kevin M. McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Before the Subcommittee
on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Shipbuilding Programs, May 8,
2013, p. 5.
15
Transcript of hearing.
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across the board, sequestration affects everything that we do. So first, it has created a great
deal of uncertainty in terms of our planning and allowing us to prioritize within a top line
where our investments will go, so uncertainty creates an impact.
That uncertainty then trickles down into planning and procurement in the vendor base—first
year [sic: tier] shipyards and then down in the vendor base below that. So we're having to
keep an eye on ensuring that the vendor base that we're relying on in a longer term to support
our shipbuilding requirements doesn't break as a result of delays or uncertainty from
sequestration.
And then the most poignant impact is the dollar impact directly. Everything that we've been
doing to try to reduce the cost of our shipbuilding program whether it’s stabilizing
requirements, whether it’s trying to get stable production rates that allow investment by the
shipbuilders, trying to wrap in a multiyear where we harvest the significant savings, putting
that inside of a fixed price contract where we have confidence in the savings, sequestration
unravels that to an extent.
So now what we have to do when we look at—prospectively at sequestration on the outyear
budgets, we've got to fight for the priority that shipbuilding demands in order to hit the
CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operation’s] requirement within the budget so that our efforts to
reduce cost don't, in fact, go in a reverse direction as a result of sequestration and we end up
with potential disruption, taking low shipbuilding rates that we have today and driving them
lower and then ultimately driving those costs up. So we have to avoid that spiral that could
occur if we unravel what we've been attempting to do with regards to stabilizing the
shipbuilding plan over the last several years.16
Potential Impact of Possible Late 2013/Early 2014 Sequester on
FY2014 Funding
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on Navy shipbuilding
programs of a possible sequester on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding) that
might occur in late 2013 or early 2014 under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S.
365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011).
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a November, 7, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impact of
sequestration on the national defense, Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar
to the one he used at the September 18, 2013, hearing discussed below, that
Sequestration in FY 2014, particularly if combined with restrictions of a continuing
resolution (CR), will reduce our readiness in the near-term and in the long-term exacerbate
program impacts from budget reductions required under current law. The impacts below
assume an approximate 10% cut to the Navy’s budget; however, with military personnel
accounts exempted, the cut could increase to 14% in all other appropriations. In addition, the
restrictions imposed by a CR will reduce our ability to manage the impact of sequestration.
The impacts of this reduced funding will be realized in two main categories of budget
accounts: (1) operations and maintenance and (2) investments.
16
Transcript of hearing.
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(1) Operation and maintenance accounts will absorb a larger reduction than in FY 2013 from
a smaller overall amount of money; in addition we must begin to address deferred “carry
over” bills from FY 2013 that total approximately $2.3 billion over the next five years.
Because we will prioritize meeting current presence requirements, we will be able to
preserve 95% of the forward presence originally directed under the FY 2014 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). However, this is still only about half of the
Combatant Commander’s original request. To ensure adequate funding for the most
important deployments, we were compelled to adjust the plan in advance of FY 2014 to
remove the deployment of one CG to the Middle East, two salvage ships to Africa and South
America and five large surface combatants to the Western Pacific. Most concerning,
however, we will have two thirds less surge capacity in FY2014. Our planned presence to
meet the GFMAP in FY 2015 and beyond will also be at risk because maintenance cancelled
in FY2014 may result in ships being unable to deploy in future years. At a minimum this lost
maintenance will reduce the service life of these ships.
Because of the mechanics of sequestration, we cannot reprogram (move) funds from other
accounts into operations and maintenance to make up for the sequestered amount. As a
result, within operations and maintenance, we have to “go where the money is” and find
savings in training, maintenance, civilian personnel, and shore facilities. The reductions in
fleet training we are compelled to make will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one
ARG trained and ready for surge operations – notionally without these reductions there
would be three of each ready to deploy within about two weeks.
We will be compelled to cancel or defer planned FY 2014 fleet maintenance, including 34 of
55 surface ship maintenance periods totaling about $950 million – all in private shipyards –
and 191 of about 700 aircraft depot maintenance actions. This missed maintenance will
inevitably take time off the expected service life of our ships and aircraft, which in turn will
make it harder to sustain even the smaller fleet we will have if the BCA caps remain in place
for the long term. For example, a recent Center for Naval Analysis study estimated
cancelling and not making up one maintenance period at the ten-year point in a DDG’s life
will shorten its overall service life by about five years.
We will be compelled to keep in place our freeze on hiring for most civilian positions.
Ashore we will continue to conduct only safety-essential renovation and modernization of
facilities, further increasing the large backlog in that area.
(2) Investment accounts will be particularly impacted by sequestration in FY 2014, and we
will not be able to use prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls as we did in FY 2013. Without
Congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the reductions imposed by sequestration
and the limitations of a CR will compel us to:
• Cancel planned FY 2014 procurement of an SSN, an LCS and an AFSB; also, delay an
SSN planned for FY 2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the reduction in
fleet size, described earlier in this statement, that the BCA would compel us to make over the
long term.
• Delay the planned start of construction on the first SSBN(X) from FY 2021 to FY 2022.
This would cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence requirements
when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
• Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A Poseidon, 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons,
exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to project power despite
A2/AD threats.
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• Delay delivery of USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN-78) by two years, extending the period
of 10 CVN in service, and lowering surge capacity.
• Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) scheduled for
FY 2016, disrupting today’s “heel-to-toe” CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term
CVN capacity.
In order to avoid or remedy some of the FY 2014 impacts described above, we need
Congress to approve authorization and appropriations bills. This would enable the Navy to
transfer funds, pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase
production quantities, and complete ships. This would:
• Keep SSBN(X) on schedule to sustain required SSBN capacity after the Ohio class begins
to retire.
• Buy two Virginia class SSN in FY 2014 as planned and keep FY 2015 SSN procurement
on schedule. These actions will help maintain our undersea dominance and ability to project
power despite A2/AD threats.
• Protect CVN-73’s mid-life overhaul and complete CVN-78 on time to sustain CVN
capacity.
• Build the planned AFSB in FY 2014, which is needed to meet DSG and combatant
commander presence requirements for CT/IW capability.
• Restore half of the cancelled surface ship maintenance availabilities to protect FY 2015
presence.17
October 23, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an October 23, 2013, hearing before the Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on the impacts of a continuing resolution (CR) and
sequestration on acquisition and modernization, Department of the Navy officials testified that
the effect of another continuing resolution and sequestration-level reductions in FY 2014
would compound the impacts of the FY 2013 CR/sequestration. Operating under a CR in FY
2014, with corresponding restrictions on program funding and execution, significantly
impairs our ability to effectively allocate resources and meet mission requirements.
Compounding a CR with reductions to the FY 2014 budget in accordance with the
mechanics of sequestration would remove from the Department its ability to provide
warfighting capability and capacity with the measures of efficiency essential to balancing the
requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance with the fiscal constraints of the Budget
Control Act (BCA) of 2011.
In the near-term, the Navy and Marine Corps will prioritize preserving the global presence
requirements set forth in the FY 2014 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).
However, under sequestration-level funding, we will have less surge capability and our
planned presence for FY 2015 and beyond will be at risk. Sequestration will compel us to
forfeit long-term priorities to fund near-term readiness; resourcing training and maintenance
17
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense, November 7, 2013, pp. 12-14.
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of the next to deploy at the expense of those who will follow. Meanwhile, across the board
reductions to investment accounts will slow production on factory floors across the defense
industrial base adding cost and schedule to today’s weapon systems; and equally critical,
these reductions will drive delay into the development of those leading edge weapon systems
that provide our warfighters with the asymmetric advantage they hold over our adversaries....
The effects of an FY2014 CR and sequestration take away from the Department its ability to
provide warfighting capability and capacity with the measures of efficiency essential to
balancing the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance with the fiscal constraints
under current law. Without Congress acting to change the current path, our warfighters will
have less surge capability and our long-term priorities will be traded off to fund near-term
readiness. Further, weapon system development timelines will be extended and costs will be
higher, production unit costs will increase, and the risk to the long-term viability of the
defense industrial base will increase.
Our appeal is that Congress complete its work on the FY 2014 defense authorization and
appropriations bills and eliminate sequestration before we are driven to irreversible actions
which impair our collective responsibility to provide for the nation’s defense.
We understand the importance of resolving our fiscal challenges to ensure our nation’s
security and future prosperity and look forward to working with Congress to ensure our
Navy and Marine Corps remain the world’s preeminent maritime and expeditionary force.18
Regarding naval aviation programs in particular, the Department of the Navy officials testified at
the hearing that
Our FY 2014 Naval Aviation Budget request prioritizes several central themes: 5th
generation fighter/attack capability; persistent multi-role intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; supporting capabilities of electronic attack, maritime patrol, and vertical lift;
robust strike weapons programs; and targeted modernization of the force for relevance and
sustainability. It enables Naval Aviation to continue recapitalization of our aging fleets of
airborne early warning, maritime patrol, electronic attack, and vertical lift platforms.
FY 2014 sequestration is estimated to impose approximately a 10% cut to the DONs top-line
budget. With military personnel exempted by the President, the reduction increases
approximately to 14% in all other appropriations. With this loss of obligational authority, no
use of prior year investment funds to mitigate shortfalls, and a need to address deferred FY
2013 carry over bills, all aspects of Naval Aviation will be negatively impacted, including
both current readiness and development of future capabilities, eroding our margin of military
superiority.
A FY 2014 CR further creates several impacts, becoming more serious the longer the CR
continues into the fiscal year. Under a CR, we are unable to use funds for new procurements
or increase production rates above those sustained in FY 2013. Major programs that will be
affected include: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), MQ-8 FireScout, EA-18G Growler, Joint
Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS), and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System (APKWS II) integration with MH-60R Seahawk. The CR also prohibits new multi18
Statement of Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and
Lieutenant General Glenn M. Walters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Before the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Impacts of a Continuing Resolution
and Sequestration on Department of the Navy Acquisition, Programming & Industrial Base, October 23, 2013, pp. 1-2,
12.
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year procurement contracts planned for the C-130J and E-2D aircraft and associated mission
equipment, delaying awards to industry and impacting production lines, delivery schedules,
and most importantly, additional cost levied on pressurized budgets.
Operation & Support (O&S) Impacts:
Maintenance is critical to ensure our aircraft meet their expected service lives, keep strike
fighter inventories at required readiness, and to preclude a strike fighter inventory shortfall
above manageable levels. Our FY 2014 President’s Budget submission included the
resources necessary to continue Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) efforts and
modifications on legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets to extend their service lives from 6,000 flight
hours to 10,000 flight hours. Sequestration, however, will require us to cancel or defer
approximately 200 of 700 aircraft and 580 engine planned depot maintenance events;
eroding the service life of the aircraft and making it more difficult to sustain even the smaller
fleet we will have if the reduced discretionary funding caps remain in place. If the current
law levels remain long term, the maintenance backlog will continue to compound, eventually
leaving Navy with insufficient aircraft available in inventory to meet deployment and
training readiness objectives.
Marine Corps aviation readiness will degrade with reductions to the flying hour program and
depot maintenance in 2014. In 2013, approximately 70% of Marine squadrons met minimum
deployable combat readiness. By 2015, we project this number will be reduced to
approximately 60% as a result of sequestration.
Marine F/A-18A-D Hornet squadrons face the biggest challenge with regards to funding
reductions and depot maintenance backlogs. In September 2013, approximately half of the
available F/A-18 inventory was in an “out of reporting” status. This results in non-deployed
squadrons having only seven aircraft available for tasking when the squadron requirement is
12 aircraft. It is estimated that by January 2015 that number will be reduced to four aircraft
available per non-deployed F/A-18A-D squadron.
Personnel Impacts:
The DON relies on a ‘total force’ of military (active and reserve) and civilian personnel to
execute its mission. Even with the exemption of military personnel accounts from
sequestration in FY 2014, the DON will continue to drawdown military end strength as noted
in the FY 2014 President’s Budget Request. However, if the reduced discretionary caps
continue in force past 2014, we will not be able to afford our planned force structure, putting
the nation’s ability to respond to crisis around the globe at risk.
The impacts to our civilian workforce will affect every state and be detrimental to the
employees, their families, the DON mission, and local economies. While we will make every
effort to protect civilians from another furlough in FY 2014, sequestration-level funding
forces us to consider all civilian force shaping tools, to include Voluntary Separation
Incentive Pay, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, Reductions in Force (RIF), continued
hiring restrictions, and reductions or eliminations of bonuses. With the direct loss of laborhours, the workforce impacts also lead to inefficiencies caused by loss of learning,
productivity losses, cost increases driven by lengthening schedules, increased burdens on
military personnel, and lower morale – all of which translate to reduced readiness.
Investment Account Impacts:
Due to the mechanics of its implementation and the limits on Department-wide transfer
authority, sequestration will again impact every program and system, forcing reductions in
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procurement quantities, delays in schedules (delivery and initial operational capability),
deferral of costs to future years, and unnecessary cost growth.
The DON remains firmly committed to the JSF program as an essential platform in our
immediate and long-range Navy and Marine Corps aviation strategy and the nation’s
security. However, these funding constraints would compel us to reduce aircraft procurement
by one F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing variant and one F-35C Carrier Variant
and delay JSF Block IIIF development, test, and evaluation flights resulting in increased risk
of meeting planned initial operating capability dates. As we carefully monitor strike fighter
inventory requirements and projected availability, these reductions and delays also add
increased risk to our ability to meet operational demands for expeditionary strike and
maintain a complementary mix of strike fighter aircraft.
Sequestration will compel us to reduce E/A-18G Growler procurement by up to four aircraft
in FY 2014, relative to the budget request, which will decrease attrition reserve aircraft set
aside for the Navy’s expeditionary force. Although this reduction will not delay the transition
from EA-6B Prowlers to EA-18G Growlers, it will increase the risk associated with
inventory requirements to offset loss of aircraft over the life of the EA-18G. For more than
half a century, the DON has been the leader in Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) and this
asymmetric naval capability remains in high demand by the joint force. This reduction would
limit our only tactical AEA capability and reduce our ability to rapidly respond to emergent
operations on short notice. With FY 2014 as the last year of production, there will be no
opportunity to adjust in the future.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye procurement will be reduced by one aircraft relative to the request
in FY 2014. If the current law caps remain long-term, Navy would continue to field the Navy
Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) network with E-2D in 2015, but may have
to reduce the number of CVWs that have this capability in 2020 from six in our FY 2014
President’s Budget submission to four. The completion of transition to the E-2D would delay
by three years from 2023 to 2026.
P-8A Poseidon procurement may be reduced by up to two aircraft in FY 2014. If the current
law caps remain long-term, one potential scenario would not allow our development of
capabilities to project power to stay ahead of potential adversaries’ Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) capabilities, as our undersea capabilities will be slowed. For example, attainment of
the required P-8A inventory (117) will be delayed from 2019 to 2020, and the completion of
the transition from the P-3C to the P-8A will be delayed from 2019 to 2020. This would also
increase the sustainment cost of supporting legacy P-3C aircraft.
MV-22B Osprey procurement will be reduced by up to three aircraft if sequestered in FY
2014. This action would threaten the V-22 Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract and
require price renegotiation for all remaining aircraft. This significantly reduces the estimated
$1 billion in cost savings over the span of the current MYP contract. The increase in unit
costs will further reduce the quantity of aircraft that the Marine Corps can afford to purchase,
delaying full stand-up of future MV-22 squadrons, and Full Operational Capability.
Sequestration-level funding will also force reductions and delays in Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) programs. The Marine Corps will be required to reduce RQ-21 Small
Tactical Unmanned Air Systems (STUAS) procurement by one system, resulting in a
production rate below its minimum sustainment rate and increased system cost. This will put
the program at risk, eliminating a critical capability for persistent ship and land-based ISR
support for tactical-level maneuver decisions and unit level force defense and force
protection missions. The MQ-4C Triton UAS (formerly known as BAMS for Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance) initial operational test and evaluation will be delayed up to 12
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months, delaying the persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
coverage it will provide to increase our maritime domain awareness and presence.
Overall, relative to the Budget request, sequestration in FY 2014 would result in the loss of
an estimated 25 aircraft (2 F-35, 4 EA-18G, 3 MV-22, 4 H-1, 1 E-2D, 2 P-8A, 1 KC-130J, 3
MH-60, 1 UC-12, and 4 JPATS) across the Navy and Marine Corps and the loss of multiyear procurement contract savings. Critical development and delivery of capabilities will be
delayed, putting our warfighters in increased risk against technologically advanced
adversaries, especially over the long-term.
Sequestration delays fielding critical capabilities, breaks multi-year procurements, and
reduces the quantity of strike and ship self-defense weapons. A broad spectrum of key strike
weapons would be reduced, to include as many as seventy-three Joint Standoff Weapons;
forty-six Tomahawk cruise missiles; fifty-one Hellfire weapons; forty-two Advanced AntiRadiation Guided Missiles; and thirty-four AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles; thereby reducing
our overall strike capability and capacity. We would also be required to make cuts in
ammunition and training munitions that would be below minimum inventory requirements
thereby placing Fleet training and readiness at further risk. These cuts would affect General
Purpose Bombs, Practice Bombs, Air Expendable Countermeasures, Airborne Rockets, and
Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices.
If current law level caps continue, we would also see key components of the planned
improved air-to-air infrared kill (IR) chain that circumvents adversary radar jamming,
delayed by two years and the new, longer range AIM-9X/Block III missile delayed by up to
two years. Improvements to the air-to-air radio frequency (RF) kill chain also would be
slowed down as F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed
to 2020 and the equipping of all Pacific carrier air wings with the medium-range AIM-120D
missile delayed by two years to 2022.19
September 18, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a September 18, 2013, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on planning for
sequestration in FY2014 and perspectives of the military services on the Strategic Choices and
Management Review (SCMR), Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar to the
one he used at the November 7, 2013, hearing discussed above, that
Sequestration in FY 2014, particularly if combined with restrictions of a continuing
resolution (CR), will reduce our readiness in the near-term and exacerbate program impacts
from budget reductions required under current law in the long-term. The impacts below
assume an approximate 10% cut to the Navy’s budget; however, with military personnel
accounts exempted, the cut could increase to 14% in all other appropriations. In addition, the
restrictions imposed by a CR will reduce our ability to manage the impact of sequestration.
The impacts of this reduced funding will be realized in two main categories of budget
accounts: (1) operations and maintenance and (2) investments.
(1) Operation and maintenance accounts, if sequestered under a CR, will absorb a larger
reduction than in FY 2013 from a smaller amount; in addition we must begin to address
19
Statement of Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and
Lieutenant General Glenn M. Walters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Before the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Impacts of a Continuing Resolution
and Sequestration on Department of the Navy Acquisition, Programming & Industrial Base, October 23, 2013, pp. 3-8.
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deferred “carry over” bills from FY 2013 that total approximately $2.3 billion over the next
five years. Because we will prioritize meeting current presence requirements, we will be able
to preserve 95% of the forward presence originally directed under the FY 2014 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). However, this is only about half of the Combatant
Commander’s original request. To ensure adequate funding for the most important
deployments, we were compelled to adjust the plan in advance of FY2014 to remove the
deployment of one CG to the Middle East, two salvage ships to Africa and South America
and five large surface combatants to the Western Pacific. Most concerning, however, we will
have two thirds less surge capacity in FY2014. Our planned presence to meet the GFMAP in
FY 2015 and beyond will also be at risk because maintenance cancelled in FY2014 may
result in ships being unable to deploy in future years. At a minimum this lost maintenance
will reduce the service life of these ships.
Because of the mechanics of sequestration, we cannot reprogram (move) funds from other
accounts into operations and maintenance to make up for the sequestered amount. As a
result, within operations and maintenance, we have to “go where the money is” and find
savings in training, maintenance, civilian personnel, and shore facilities. The reductions in
fleet training we are compelled to make will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one
ARG trained and ready for surge operations – notionally without these reductions there
would be three of each ready to deploy within about two weeks.
We will be compelled to cancel or defer planned FY 2014 fleet maintenance, including 34 of
55 surface ship maintenance periods totaling about $950 million – all in private shipyards –
and 191 of about 700 aircraft depot maintenance actions. This missed maintenance will
inevitably take time off the expected service life of our ships and aircraft, which in turn will
make it harder to sustain even the smaller fleet we will have if the BCA caps remain in place
for the long term. For example, a recent Center for Naval Analysis study estimated
cancelling and not making up one maintenance period at the ten-year point in a DDG’s life
will shorten its overall service life by about five years.
We will be compelled to keep in place our freeze on hiring for most civilian positions.
Ashore we will continue to conduct only safety-essential renovation and modernization of
facilities, further increasing the large backlog in that area.
(2) Investment accounts will be particularly impacted by sequestration in FY 2014, and we
will not be able to use prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls as we did in FY 2013. Without
Congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the reductions imposed by sequestration
and the limitations of a CR will compel us to:
• Cancel planned FY 2014 procurement of an SSN, an LCS and an AFSB; also, delay an
SSN planned for FY 2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the reduction in
fleet size, described earlier in this statement, that the BCA would compel us to make over the
long term.
• Delay the planned start of construction on the first SSBN(X) from FY 2021 to FY 2022.
This would cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence requirements
when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
• Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A Poseidon, 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons,
exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to project power despite
A2/AD threats.
• Delay delivery of USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN-78) by two years, extending the period
of 10 CVN in service, and lowering surge capacity.
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• Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) scheduled for
FY 2016, disrupting today’s “heel-to-toe” CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term
CVN capacity.
In order to avoid or remedy some of the FY 2014 impacts described above, we need
Congress to approve authorization and appropriations bills. This would enable Navy to
transfer funds, pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase
production quantities, and complete ships. This would:
• Keep SSBN(X) on schedule to sustain required SSBN capacity after the Ohio class begins
to retire.
• Buy two Virginia class SSN in FY 2014 as planned and keep FY 2015 SSN procurement
on schedule. These actions will help maintain our undersea dominance and ability to project
power despite A2/AD threats.
• Protect CVN-73’s mid-life overhaul and complete CVN-78 on time to sustain CVN
capacity.
• Build the planned AFSB in FY 2014, which is needed to meet DSG and combatant
commander presence requirements for CT/IW capability.
• Restore half of the cancelled surface ship maintenance availabilities to protect FY 2015
presence.20
September 14, 2013, Navy Blog Post
In a September 14, 2013, blog post, Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Navy’s Chief of Information,
stated:
Lots of people are still talking about our ships in the eastern Mediterranean. And well they
should.
The President made it clear the other night that he still favors a strike, even as he pursues a
diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria.
So, those destroyers are still out there. And they are still ready. As Secretary Mabus said just
this week, “I guarantee you that if we are called upon to strike, we will strike hard and we
will strike fast. Presence is what we do. It is who we are.”
But for all the attention we’ve received, two things keep getting lost in the clutter. First,
those ships didn’t surge to the Med. They were already there. We’ve been rotating two or
three ballistic missile shooters through that region for several years now.
And second, the forward presence they represent is no given. Well, maybe in the immediate
future it is. But it’s sure not going to be a given if sequestration remains the law of the land.
20
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp. 11-13.
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Now, some folks might say we’re exaggerating about that—that we’re using the Syria
situation as a way to plug a better budget.
Well, consider this. If sequestration hits us square in the face again next year—and I see
nothing in the cards that says it won’t—we’ll be able to keep one carrier strike group and one
amphibious ready group deployed to both the Pacific and the Central Command regions. And
we’ll be able to keep another of each ready to go if needed. But not a whole heckuva lot
more than that.
And those destroyers? Yea, we’ll still keep them over there in the eastern Med. It’s an
important mission. But the only way we will maintain that presence is by basing destroyers
in Spain, which we will do starting next year.
In fact, if sequestration continues into the next fiscal year, a lot of things are going to get real
hard.
Another round of sequestration will cut the Navy’s budget by 10 percent below our FY14
budget submission. Worse, it will again apply the arbitrary, across-the-board cuts to our
accounts. And since the President exempted military manpower from the cuts, sequestration
essentially whacks a whopping 14 percent from every other account.
But this time, we won’t have prior-year funds to ease the sting. We won’t have that
flexibility because resources from previous years’ budgets have already been spent. There’s
no piggy bank to crack open.
Well, what about reprogramming authority? Wouldn’t that help? Sure it would. We’d love to
be able to move some money around. But even with reprogramming authority under an
FY14 Appropriations Bill—which, by the way, we don’t have yet—sequestration would cut
our operations and maintenance account by $4.6 billion instead of $5.6 billion. That’s the
account we use to keep those ships out there and those Sailors fully trained.
A cut of this size to that account—without reprogramming authority—will delay more than
half our ship maintenance availabilities next year and reduce our training to “just in time,”
meaning our Sailors won’t be ready until just before they leave.
In fact, we’ll have to shut down two airwings for three months each and limit four others to
only the minimum level of flying, the “tactical hard deck.”
Not only will we have fewer ships, subs and aircraft ready to go if needed, we’ll also lose
$4.5 billion next fiscal year from the accounts we use to buy new ones.
Sequestration could cost us a littoral combat ship, an afloat forward staging base/mobile
landing platform, and up to 25 aircraft (Prowler, JSF, Osprey and others) needed for our
future fleet. It will also delay a Virginia-class submarine.
And if we start the fiscal year with a continuing resolution, we will also delay the refueling
of USS George Washington and won’t be authorized to finish building the Gerald R. Ford.
We’ll be forced to award contracts later than planned. And we’ll no doubt miss out on multiyear procurement savings. That means the ships and planes we do buy are going to cost us
more and come off the production lines and shipyards a little slower. And that means a
smaller fleet.
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A few weeks ago, Defense Secretary Hagel explained the Strategic Choices Management
Review (SCMR), and the actions that could partially offset some of the damage sequestration
in FY14 promises.
“The bold management reforms, compensation changes, and force structure reductions
identified by the Strategic Choices and Management Review,” he said, “can help reduce the
damage that would be caused by the persistence of sequestration in fiscal year 2014. But they
won’t come close to avoiding it altogether. If these abrupt cuts remain, we risk fielding a
force that over the next few years is unprepared due to a lack of training, maintenance, and
the latest equipment.”
So, SCMR options—including an eight or nine carrier fleet—is not out of the realm of the
possible.
Of course, this isn’t just about the carriers. If the numbers of strike groups shrink, so would
the number of surface combatants, amphibious ships and air wings.
Indeed, if sequestration continues through this decade, the Navy will have something like 38
fewer ships to meet Combatant Commanders’ needs—needs which are unlikely to decrease.
And it won’t just be the Combatant Commanders who suffer. Just this month, we let
contracts in Grand Rapids, MI; Cedar Rapids, IA; Columbia City, IN; Rolling Meadows, IL,
and North Charleston, SC, and a host of other cities and small towns across America.
A smaller fleet means fewer jobs and lost revenue for small businesses and an unstable
industrial base.
Just look around. The Navy is in demand. Heavy demand. From the Asia-Pacific to the
eastern Mediterranean, we really are, as the CNO likes to say, “where it matters, when it
matters.”
But with the prospect of another sequestered year ahead, I wonder just how long we’ll be
able to keep that up.21
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks
At a September 5, 2013, event at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Admiral Jonathan
Greenert stated:
So as we look into [FY]14, we had about $11 billion reduction in [FY]’13. Well, it’s $14
billion in [FY]’14. It’s ten percent.
We again, as you probably have read, have exempted manpower [from the FY2014
sequester] and it’s the right thing to do. That means instead of [a] ten percent [reduction] for
[the remaining] appropriations, the [remaining] appropriations that receive a reduction, [the]
non-manpower [appropriation,] gets a 14 percent reduction.
What’s going to be the impact? Well, subject to any action and help from the Congress as we
move ahead, we’ll probably have to cancel about half of our surface ship [maintenance]
21
John Kirby, “U.S. Navy Presence At Risk Under Sequester,” Navy Live (http://navylive.dodlive.mil), September 14,
2013, accessed September 24, 2013, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/09/14/presence-at-risk-under-sequester/.
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availabilit[ies], so that’s 34 [canceled surface ship maintenance availabilities]. We’ll cancel a
lot of aircraft [maintenance] availabilities]. [That’s] About 190 [aircraft maintenance
availabilities]. Last year we canceled about 90. So we’re getting a backlog that is concerning
in that regard. It will take a long time.
If we restore the budget after [FY]’14 and say okay. I’ll tell you what. You’ve got full up
operations and maintenance budget, it will take about five years to get that backlog in aircraft
maintenance down.
Navy-wide, we’ll reduce training for those who are not going to deploy. That gets back to
that surge element that I mentioned before, reduction in that regard. So those that are not
deploying in FY14 will have less training.
We’ll have some air wings that will go to what we call tactical hard deck, which means
they’ll fly, the pilots will fly and the air crews will receive training at a level which is really
just above what we’re comfortable with for safety of flight, and it gets them at a point where
when they get ready to deploy they can ramp up relatively quickly.
There’s nothing magic about it. It’s a statistical point. Not where I want to be. I will be
pursuing to see if we can get more flying money to train our pilots above that level and get
our kids to sea more often in FY14 as we look for reprogramming opportunity, the ability to
move money.
So again [i.e., as in FY2013,] our surge capacity, I predict, will be about one-third of the
norm as we look into [FY]’14.
Remember, sequestration is, and we’re assuming it occurs in FY14, it takes reduction in
every single account. So our shipbuilding reductions, which we were able to attenuate with
prior money in [FY]’13, will take a hit in [FY]’14. I would see a loss of ta [sic: a] littoral
combat ship there, again without help; an afloat forward staging base [AFSB], which is an
important part of our future; and advance procurement for our Virginia Class submarine; and
for [aircraft] carrier [refueling complex] overhaul [RCOH].
We might lose two more [ships from the FY2014 shipbuilding account, namely], we might
lose a submarine procurement in [FY]’14, and a destroyer, again, if we are unable to
reprogram, to move money into those shipbuilding accounts from other accounts.
These will be challenges, these will be issues we’ll be working with the Congress as we
move ahead.
In aircraft [procurement] we’ll probably lose about 25 aircraft. If you say what kind? We’ll
say there isn’t any that won’t probably be lost. Some helos, the P-8s, to F-35s, they’ll all be
affected by this because it goes to every single account.
[The] CIVPERS [civilian personnel] hiring freeze will probably continue through that
period. There’s a great potential we’ll have to do a RIF, a reduction in force, in our civilian
work force. So we’ll start a voluntary program probably immediately in [FY]’14, offering
programs for voluntary retirement to help attenuate the need to have to do a reduction in
force.
The key to all of this is this transfer, being able to transfer money to get reprogramming for
us, in order to have a balanced approach. If I were to estimate what I think we need, we need
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about a billion dollars to get into the operations and maintenance account, and about a billion
dollars to get into the procurement account so we can get that into shipbuilding which will be
our number one priority in the Navy.22
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an August 1, 2013, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee and the
Readiness subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Navy surface ship
maintenance and readiness, the Navy testified:
Future Readiness
The biggest challenge to future surface ship readiness during these fiscally constrained times
is finding the correct balance between funding the necessary maintenance, to provide ready
forces now, and executing life cycle maintenance that ensures the long term viability of our
ships. As the Navy learned in the report of the 2010 Fleet Review Panel, the impact of
delaying maintenance is significant, since the cost and duration of deferred repairs rise
exponentially. The end result will be ships being decommissioned before their expected
service life (ESL) due to degraded material condition.
Today, we are prioritizing current readiness over future readiness; however, this is not
sustainable over the long-term. If we choose to neglect life cycle maintenance, the material
condition of our ships will continue to degrade to the point that they may be unable to deploy
or conduct routine operations, culminating in decommissioning ships before their ESL. Even
when the trend is reversed and more funding is made available for future readiness
(operations, training, and maintenance); it will take a significant amount of time to restore
our readiness to levels that support both typical presence as well as surge requirements.
Future readiness will also be at risk if we fail to maintain the necessary capabilities and
capacity in our ship repair industrial base. Variations in workload can cause peaks and
valleys in the skilled labor demand of our industrial base. We cannot afford to lose the
skilled labor force we need to maintain our highly complex ships.
Today, our maintenance and modernization process, to include government oversight of the
private sector work, is extremely challenged by sequestration and furloughs. There have been
disruptions to basic waterfront services. Inspection of critical check points is stressed.
Testing is being delayed, as is the ability to place work on contract and modify it as
circumstances warrant. Under the furloughs, our Regional Maintenance Centers are
operating at approximately 64% manning for Contract Management and Oversight (CMO).
Similar shortages are occurring in first responder technical assistance positions. As a result,
it is estimated that availabilities will experience increases in duration of 20 or more days.
Delays and impacts have been observed onboard USS ROSS, USS MILIUS, USS
COMSTOCK, USS LABOON and USS MITSCHER.
We are concerned that the Navy’s budget challenges will be greatly exacerbated in FY14 and
beyond. FY14 sequestration will result in a $14B [billion] budget shortfall in the Navy,
which will have a significant impact on our operations and maintenance accounts and will
derail the efforts the Navy has made to restore the material condition of our surface fleet. Our
22
Transcript of remarks by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, at the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), September 5, 2013, on American Military Strategy In A Time of Declining Budgets, provided to CRS by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs, September 6, 2013.
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current estimate is that approximately 64% of the FY14 surface ship availabilities will be at
risk in the event of an FY14 sequester (absent reprogramming). These availabilities are
necessary to repair broken equipment and upgrade obsolete systems needed for deployment,
and to ensure each ship reaches its ESL of thirty-five to forty years.23
July 19, 2013, Navy Press Briefing
At a July 19, 2013, press briefing, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations,
stated that
Turning quickly to ‘14, we're still working to understand the fiscal situation, if sequestration
is the—really, the rule of the day, and looking at all of the programs and all of the
appropriations. The simple math is, it'll cause each account to go down 10 percent. That’s
what sequestration is. It’s an algorithm.
For the Navy—for the Department of Defense, it’s $52 billion. For the U.S. Navy, it’s about
$14 billion. Now, if manpower were excluded, as we did in ‘13, and we're still deliberating
on that, all the accounts would go down 14 percent, because when you exclude one, it all
goes to the other accounts.
The difference in ‘13 and ‘14 is, in ‘13, in our investments accounts, when sequestration set
in, where we had to do the reductions, we had what we call prior-year money. We had
money available from previous appropriations and laws coming in that we used to get us
through ‘13. That’s not available in ‘14. And so the impact on the investments accounts will
be deeper cuts and a concern.
My goal, the secretary’s goal would be to preserve shipbuilding and those ship contracts and
those aviation contracts as much as possible, meet our forward presence requirements, as I
mentioned before, and—because—and make sure we hold onto multiyear procurement. That
is the most efficient way to purchase equipment and platforms. But, again, as we do that, that
money—those reductions are real, and they'll take place in other accounts, as the case may
be.
In fiscal year ‘14, as we look at it now, I think there will be a significant reduction in our
surface ship [maintenance] availabilities,24 subject to a change. About half of the 60
availabilities that we have planned will have to be deferred. You can't buy those back right
away. [A] Ship is available for a maintenance period. If you don't do that maintenance period
and that ship is then called out to do other things, it’s a missed opportunity. So it takes time
to get back.
Reduced certification training in FY ‘14 would affect FY ‘15 deployers, so we've got to
reconcile that. We've got to watch our air wing readiness, folks coming back and shutting
down due to inability to have money because they're not deploying right away. You can't get
down far, deep into the readiness bathtub, as we would call it. It makes it that much harder to
get out, so we'll have to watch that very closely. And, again, a reduced ship procurement
23
Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden, Director, Surface Warfare (N96) and Rear Admiral Timothy Matthews,
Director, Fleet Readiness (N43) on Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness With limited Maintenance Resources
before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on
Readiness, August 1, 2013, pp. 2-3.
24
A maintenance availability is a Navy term for a maintenance action, such as an overhaul.
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would—and a break in a multiyear would cause each follow-on year’s procurement of those
ships that much more costly. So it’s a very inefficient way to approach it.
The results for presence and for both ‘14 and ‘15, to kind of summarize, one carrier strike
group, one amphibious ready group, each in each theater, Western Pacific and the Arabian
Gulf. Our surge will be limited, really, to those that are next to deploy. They'll be ready to
deploy with all the capabilities. But the rest of the fleet, regrettably, won't have the
capabilities that we would notionally have and that we like to have in our plans to support.
The bottom line for all of this, I would ask you to think about, is the importance of being
able to reprogram and being able to balance our accounts. Everything I kind of pass to you is
all about an algorithm, a reduction across each account, and we need the ability, if you will,
to be able to balance that.
Let me shift to people real quickly and then we'll go to questions and answers. As I
mentioned before, they're the foundation of what we're about and what makes your Navy the
finest Navy in the world. But we also have civilian shipmates, and regrettably, we're in the—
we're enduring furloughs, and it’s an impact. I felt it last week; I feel it this week. Just here at
the staff, we feel it all around the Navy here or there.
Civilians are an integral part of our team. And we're committed to finding offsets to limit
those effects whenever possible. We're looking at solutions, but it’s got to be a Department
of Defense-wide solution as we approach this.
We realize there’s a financial burden. And it’s regrettable. And it hurts our readiness, and it
hurts our productivity, as well. And if sequestration continues into ‘14, we're going to need
very closely—look very closely at that, at furloughs and, in my view, attempt to avoid it as
much as feasible.25
During the subsequent question-and-answer portion of the briefing, the following exchange
occurred:
Q: ... hello, sir. Two sequester-related questions, our favorite topic. One is, you were talking
about capabilities we are missing, if we need to, you know, surge ships. Capabilities is a little
vague. I presume it means more than, oh, gee, they're not sticker stocked in the onboard
vending machines. It’s probably a little bit more complicated and serious than that.
And, two, with this reprogramming you have pending, the Air Force got a bunch of grounded
squadrons back in the air. Are you guys hoping, planning to have any similar reversals of bad
fortune and get things back? You mentioned the ship’s maintenance availabilities. And what
capabilities have we lost? What can we get back?
ADM. GREENERT: When I speak to capabilities, Sydney, as an example, if you take an air
wing, they do air-to-air, they do air-to-ground, they do a whole series of missions that the
pilots are qualified to do, typically measured in how many cockpit hours you have in the air,
how much you fly.
And so what will happen is, when you are unable to fully fund it and you're called upon, you
have to reconcile, what missions will these pilots, in the case of an air wing, be qualified to
do and certified to, so that we can report to the theater, hey, you're going to get an all up
25
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Greenert in the Pentagon Briefing Room, July 19, 2013, accessed
August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5278.
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round in this particular mission in this regard. Similarly, with a destroyer or with a cruiser,
what are they certified to do?
So we would have to tailor more, something we don't like to do, because the world is
dynamic and they get a pretty big vote in what kind of operations we have, so we will
typically certify our people for a range of operations and missions and certifications.
Q: So it’s a matter of being trained to—to standard on the full range of things that you want
people to do?
ADM. GREENERT: That’s correct, because as you know—and in the past, we've had that—
a carrier strike group or any of our units can swing theater to theater. Very different—well,
somewhat different series of operations in, say, the Arabian Gulf, the North Arabian Sea
versus the Western Pacific versus the Eastern Mediterranean.
STAFF: Dan?
Q: If you could just kind of relate what you said about piracy to sequestration and resources
and so on, how—does that mean that you're not—the U.S. Navy will not be able to respond
to that piracy problem as it might have two years ago or a year ago because of sequestration?
And a related question. Could you go over again how U.S. naval capabilities are being
affected and will be affected in the gulf, given this—these budget cuts that are coming?
ADM. GREENERT: The—the piracy question, the mission of counter- piracy is—the skill
sets involved in that are more inherent in what we do as a Navy who is used to expeditionary
operations around the world. So I would tell you, that—excuse me—that is a skill set that we
can quickly revive and that doesn't concern me as much. In other words, those folks that are
in theater, even if called on short notice, I think—I'm pretty comfortable in their counterpiracy capability.
Now, there is a skill set that is called visit, board, search and seizure. And that’s basically
coming—pulling alongside, either through a small boat or dropping through a helicopter, and
that’s kind of getting high end in that regard. That’s a little different. That takes some
practice. But typical, counter-piracy reporting, maybe bringing in a law enforcement
detachment, we can do that relatively short order.
Your second question, capabilities affected in the Arabian Gulf as we move ahead. Again, it
would depend on the mission, and it would depend on the requirements of the Central
Command. The broad range of missions that we take there, ballistic missile defense,
maritime intercept, sea control, as you mentioned, counter-piracy, all the way up to surfaceto-surface missiles, you know, launching, counter- mining, that broad view we have to look
at and perhaps tailor by—by unit, because the units—because of the money that we receive
being so hard to predict out ahead. It would be a little different for each unit, so we have to
watch this very closely on who we would send, if called upon in a contingency.
But let me enforce that those that we send over now, those that we'll send over in ‘14, they
will be trained for the full range of missions. I'm right now talking about those that would
surge if called upon in a broader contingency. Did I answer your question yet?
Q: Yeah, and then just could you—again, how do you see the carrier group presence
evolving over the next year or two, given—with sequestration?
ADM. GREENERT: It will be one in the Western Pacific carrier strike group, one in the
Arabian Gulf for—you know, 1-0 [1.0], as we call, it one-one in each theater.
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Q: And that’s sustainable, even with sequestration?
ADM. GREENERT: For—through ‘14, as we currently are aligned in our budget. When I
get into the ‘14 budget and I get into the details, may have to alter that, but that's—that’s
what I see right now in my planning.
Q: Just a follow-up on that, does that mean that this on carrier strike group presence in the
gulf in FY ‘14 is—does that mean that the Navy relinquishes its goal of 1.7 ratio in the
region?
ADM. GREENERT: Well, the relinquishing would be, I guess, a good choice of words.
What that—what we have to do is we came forward and said, “Here is our fiscal situation.
Here is our forward presence situation aligned to that fiscal situation. We have to make a
choice.”
In a given year, we could send 1.7 over, but that money spent on operations this year would
be invested there, not in training. It just wouldn't be enough. And therefore, you're
mortgaging next year's—or you're foreclosing, I should say, next year’s deployment, because
those folks will not be trained, unless somehow you scramble and get money through the
year, and that would be high risk.
So these are the—these are the discussions we had. We had these discussions early this year
on the subject of the Truman deployment. And the simple choice was, we can continue the
1.7 and send the Harry Truman or—but that would be problematic for next year’s
deployment—or we could hold that, and it was determined overall that the right decision
was—and it’s a deliberate process, Matthew. It’s the global force management process,
approved by the secretary of defense.26
Later in the question-and-answer portion of the briefing, the following exchange occurred:
Q: Admiral. I wanted to ask on sequestration (inaudible) and you have no prior (inaudible)
you have lots of ships under contract. Are you considering canceling contracts? Or how will
you take (inaudible) cancel contracts?
ADM. GREENERT: It’s a good question. What we need to do and what we're doing is, you
sit down and you look at the contract, and what have you contracted—specifically have you
contracted to do? What’s in each line item? And how much does that cost? Is it feasible, for
example, to—when you build a ship, for example, you get the ship, you get documentation,
you get some ancillary gear, and you get some support, and you actually get some outfitting
spares to get you through the first number of years until industry, who you contract for can
procure the spares into the future.
So you say, all right, can we continue—can we keep this under contract at what might be 14
percent less than we had originally in the budget and then deal with as you're building the
ship, deal with it maybe later? Is that feasible? And we will do that with each of the builders.
That’s a notional example. It’s not precise, but it’s notional.
These are the things that we'll have to do. Some of the things we buy have that sort of flex
into them, and some of them don't. And if they don't, we'll lose the unit. And if you lose the
unit, all the other ones in the contract, that price will go up accordingly.
26
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Greenert in the Pentagon Briefing Room, July 19, 2013, accessed
August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5278.
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Q: Do you think, if you have sequestration in 2014, the goal of having 300 ships by the end
of the decade, is that pretty much the goal?
ADM. GREENERT: I would be hard-pressed to say it is out. If we can retain the ships under
contract in that multi-year that I mentioned before, where each one costs significantly less
because you're buying them in bulk, if you will, or in larger quantities, if we can't, then
those—those multi-years sort of unravel. The unit price goes up. You have less money, and
this just starts spiraling down. If sequestration continues beyond ‘14, I'm pretty confident
that it would be—we would not be able to meet those goals. That’s too much at $50 billion a
year.27
May 8, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a May 8, 2013, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive), stated the
following in response to a question about the potential impact of a sequester on FY2014 funding:
Let me first say that Secretary [of Defense Chuck] Hagel has, in fact, chartered a Strategic
Choices and Management Review to go directly at that question.
The Armed Services Committee has sent out a letter to the secretary asking for a more
discrete response to the potentially $52 billion [DOD-wide] impact [of sequestration] in
2014, and that response is being addressed in the real-time.
Now, let me just talk about shipbuilding and make some assumptions. If the $52 billion
impact [equates to] about 10 percent [of the DOD budget] and if that was prorated across all
her lines than in shipbuilding [sic: all the line items in shipbuilding?], we will be looking at
greater than $1 billion reduction to the 2014 [shipbuilding] request. That‘s assuming no
ability to prioritize our investments. That will be applying sequestration in ‘14 just like it was
in ‘13 line by line.
In 2013, shipbuilding took about a $1.7 billion reduction. We're able to manage that to a
great extent to the prior year [sic]. We had assets that we are building in the prior year, so we
were able to pay off about a third to 40 percent of sequestration by liquidating those assets.
Of the balance, $1 billion to $1.2 billion, some of that we are able to reduce our
requirements. Some of that we're going to have to work within ‘13 and some of it effectively
(inaudible) [sic: we have to shift?] into the outyears.
If you then do that again in 2014, effectively we have pulled all the margin out of the system
in shipbuilding. Where we had margin, we have pulled it out. So now if we double-down
sequestration in 2014, the margin is gone and now we're looking at direct impacts to the—
our ship procurement rates.28
27
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Greenert in the Pentagon Briefing Room, July 19, 2013, accessed
August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5278.
28
Transcript of hearing.
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Potential Impact on Size of Navy of Reducing DOD Spending to
Lower BCA Caps Through FY2021
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on the size of the Navy of
reducing DOD spending (through sequestration or regular appropriations activity) in FY2013FY2021 to levels at or near the lower caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA
(S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011). Navy officials state that a decision to reduce DOD’s
budget to such levels would eventually lead to a smaller Navy.
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a November, 7, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impact of
sequestration on the national defense, Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar
to the one he used at the September 18, 2013, hearing discussed below, that
Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of Defense told this committee in August, if
fiscally constrained to the revised discretionary caps, over the long term (2013-2023), the
Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. There are
numerous ways to adjust Navy’s portfolio of programs to meet the BCA revised
discretionary caps. These are currently under deliberation within the department. As
requested, the following provides perspective on the level and type of adjustments that will
need to be made.
on Size of Navy of Reducing DOD Spending to
Lower BCA Caps Through FY2021
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on the size of the Navy of
reducing DOD spending (through sequestration or regular appropriations activity) in FY2013FY2021 to levels at or near the lower caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA
(S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011). Navy officials state that a decision to reduce DOD’s
budget to such levels would eventually lead to a smaller Navy.
November 7, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a November, 7, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impact of
sequestration on the national defense, Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar
to the one he used at the September 18, 2013, hearing discussed below, that
Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of Defense told this committee in August, if
fiscally constrained to the revised discretionary caps, over the long term (2013-2023), the
Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. There are
numerous ways to adjust Navy’s portfolio of programs to meet the BCA revised
discretionary caps. These are currently under deliberation within the department. As
requested, the following provides perspective on the level and type of adjustments that will
need to be made.
16
Transcript of hearing.
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Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law must include sufficient
readiness, capability and manpower to complement the force structure capacity of ships and
aircraft. This balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be effective, even
if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG. There are, however, many ways to balance
between force structure, readiness, capability and manpower.
One potential fiscal and programmatic scenario would result in a “2020 Fleet” of about 255260 ships, about 30 less than today, and about 40 less than Navy’s PB-14 submission. It
would include 1-2 fewer CSG, and 1-2 fewer ARG than today. This 2020 fleet would not
meet the DSG requirements for the mission to Provide a Stabilizing Presence. As a result,
Navy would be less able to reinforce deterrence, build alliances and partnerships and
influence events abroad.
• Navy would not increase our global deployed presence, which would remain at about 95
ships in 2020. The lethality inherent in this presence, based on ship type deployed, would be
less than today’s 95-ship presence.
• Navy would not increase presence in the Asia-Pacific, which would stay at about 50 ships
in 2020. This would largely negate the ship force structure portion of our plan to rebalance to
the Asia Pacific region directed by the DSG.
• Navy would not “place a premium on U.S. military presence in—and in support of—
partner nations” in the Middle East, since presence would decrease and, assuming we use the
same ship deployment scheme in the future, there would be gaps in CSG presence totaling 23 months each year.
• Navy would still “evolve our posture” in Europe by meeting our ballistic missile defense
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable DDG
homeported in Rota, Spain and two land based sites in Romania and Poland. Additional
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presence would still be provided by forward operating JHSV, MLP, AFSB and some
rotationally deployed combatants.
• Navy would still provide “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to security
in Africa and South America by deploying, on average, one JHSV and one LCS continuously
to both regions and maintaining an AFSB in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility.
In order to sustain a balance of force structure (current and future), modernization and
personnel within our portfolio, continued compliance with the BCA revised discretionary
caps would compel us to reduce our investments in force structure and modernization, which
would result in a “2020 Fleet” that would not meet DSG direction in the following mission
areas:
Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW). We would not have the capacity to
conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions, as defined in the DSG. There would be
inadequate LCS available to allocate to this non-core Navy mission, in the amount defined
by the FSA and concurred upon by Special Operations Command.
Deter and Defeat Aggression. We would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation and
also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second theater. In this scenario,
the fleet would have 9-10 CVN/CSG and 9-10 LHA/D and ARG. We would be able to
sustain about one non-deployed CSG and one non-deployed ARG fully certified and able to
surge on required timelines. Together, our presence and surge forces would be sufficient to
conduct all missions associated with only one large scale operation, as defined today. This
overall force and associated readiness would, however, be sufficient to execute Navy
elements of the DSG mission to Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.
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Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Overall, in this
scenario, development of our capabilities to project power would not stay ahead of potential
adversaries’ A2/AD capabilities. We will not meet the projected capability requirements to
assure Joint access in a plausible operational scenario in 2020 due to shortfalls, in particular,
in air and missile defense:
• Some undersea capabilities will be slowed:
• Attainment of the required P-8A inventory (117) would be delayed from 2019 to 2020, and
transition from the P-3C to the P-8A would be delayed from 2019 to 2020.
• Anti-submarine warfare combat system upgrades for DDGs and MFTA installations would
not be affected.
• The LCS ASW Mission Package would be delayed from 2016 to 2017.
• Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedo procurement would still equip all of our
helicopters, SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018.
• Virginia Payload Module (VPM) would still be fielded in 2027 to enable Virginia-class
SSN to replace SSGN that begin retiring in 2026.
• The LCS mine warfare mission package would still field its first increment in 2015 and the
second in 2019.
• Air and missile defense improvements would be slowed:
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• SEWIP upgraded electromagnetic sensing and upgraded jamming and deception
capabilities would both be delayed one year (to 2015 and 2018, respectively). Both of these
upgrades are required to counter advances in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.
• The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) would be delivered on only four ships, as
compared to seven under our PB-14 submission, between 2021 and 2024.
• The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II would still be fielded in 2020, with 80
missiles being delivered to deployed ships.
• The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, would still
field in 2019 and join our CVW forward homeported in the Western Pacific in 2020. Overall,
the number of F-35 procured would decrease by about 30 aircraft in 2020.
• All components of the improved air-to-air IR “kill chain” that circumvents adversary radar
jamming would be delayed by two years. The Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor
system would field in 2018 and the improved longer-range IRST would not deliver until
2021. The new longer-range AIM-9X Block III missile would not be fielded until 2023.
• Improvements to the air-to-air RF “kill chain” would be slowed down as F/A-18E/F Block
II Super Hornet anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed to 2020. The longer-range AIM120D missile would still field in 2014 but equipping of all Pacific carrier air wings would be
delayed by two years to 2022.
• The Navy Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) network would still initially
field with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in 2015, but only four CVW (compared to six in our
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PB-14 submission) would have it by 2020. Transition to the E-2D would be delayed three
years to 2025.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space. Plans to recruit, hire and train 976 additional
cyber operators and form 40 computer operations teams by 2017 would not be impacted.
This is a priority in any fiscal scenario. However, the BCA’s reduced funding levels would
delay replacement of our cyber systems and decrease our ability to defend our networks.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. We would still be able to sustain
today’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The SSBN(X) would still deliver in 2030
to replace retiring Ohio class SSBN while meeting requirements for SSBN presence and
surge. This is the top priority program for the Navy.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. We would still meet the
capacity requirements for these missions.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. We would still meet the presence requirements for
this mission.
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. We would still meet the
presence requirements for this mission.
The extent of the fiscal changes in the BCA, when compared to current program and budget
levels, would compel Navy to request relief from several program mandates and force
structure capacity limits, in order to sustain and build a fleet with a balance of ship types. For
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example, mandated limits govern the size of the force, minimum funding for certain
activities and facilities, and changes to the number of personnel at a base.2917
September 18, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a September 18, 2013, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on planning for
sequestration in FY2014 and perspectives of the military services on the Strategic Choices and
Management Review (SCMR), Admiral Jonathan Greenert testified, in a statement similar to the
one he used at the November 7, 2013, hearing discussed above, that
Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of Defense told this committee last month, if
fiscally constrained to the revised discretionary caps, over the long term (2013-2023), the
Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. There are
numerous means and alternatives to adjust Navy’s portfolio of programs. These are currently
under deliberation within the department. As requested, the following provides perspective
on the level and type of adjustments that will need to be made.
Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law must include sufficient
readiness, capability and manpower to complement the force structure capacity of ships and
aircraft. This balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be effective, even
if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG. There are, however, many ways to balance
between force structure, readiness, capability and manpower. One potential fiscal and
programmatic scenario would result in a “2020 Fleet” of about 255-260 ships, about 30 less
than today, and about 40 less than Navy’s PB-14 submission. It would include 1-2 fewer
17
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense, November 7, 2013, pp. 7-11.
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CSG, and 1-2 fewer ARG than today. With regard to the DSG and presence, in this particular
scenario the “2020 Fleet”:
• Would not increase our global deployed presence, which would remain at about 95 ships in
2020. The lethality inherent in this presence, based on ship type deployed, would be less than
today’s 95-ship presence.
• Would not increase presence in the Asia-Pacific, which would stay at about 50 ships in
2020. This would largely negate the ship force structure portion of our plan to rebalance to
the Asia Pacific region directed by the DSG.
• Would not “place a premium on U.S. military presence in—and in support of—partner
nations” in the Middle East, since presence would decrease and, assuming we use the same
ship deployment scheme in the future, there would be gaps in CSG presence totaling 2-3
months each year.
• Would still “evolve our posture” in Europe by meeting our ballistic missile defense
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable DDG
homeported in Rota, Spain and two land based sites in Romania and Poland. Additional
presence would still be provided by forward operating JHSV, MLP, AFSB and some
rotationally deployed combatants.
• Would still provide “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to security in
Africa and South America by deploying, on average, one JHSV and one LCS continuously to
both regions and maintaining an AFSB in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility.
29
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense, November 7, 2013, pp. 7-11.
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In order to sustain a balance of force structure (current and future), modernization and
personnel within our portfolio, continued compliance with the current law discretionary caps
would compel us to reduce our investments (force structure and modernization), which
would result in a “2020 Fleet” that would not meet DSG direction in the following mission
areas:
Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW). We would not have the capacity to
conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions, as defined in the DSG. There would be
inadequate LCS available to allocate to this non-core Navy mission, in the amount defined
by the FSA and concurred to by Special Operations Command.
Deter and Defeat Aggression. We would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation and
also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second theater. In this scenario,
the fleet would have 9-10 CVN/CSG and 9-10 LHA/D and ARG. We would be able to
sustain about one non-deployed CSG and one non-deployed ARG ready and able to surge on
required timelines to meet all missions associated with one large scale operation, as defined
today.
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Overall, in this
scenario, development of our capabilities to project power would not stay ahead of potential
adversaries’ A2/AD capabilities:
• Some undersea capabilities will be slowed:
o Attainment of the required P-8A inventory (117) would be delayed from 2019 to 2020,
and transition from the P-3C to the P-8A would be delayed from 2019 to 2020.
o Anti-submarine warfare combat system upgrades for DDGs and MFTA installations
would not be affected.
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o The LCS ASW Mission Package would be delayed from 2016 to 2017.
o Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedo procurement would still equip all of our
helicopters, SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018.
o Virginia Payload Module (VPM) would still be fielded in 2027 to enable Virginiaclass SSN to replace SSGN that begin retiring in 2026.
o The LCS mine warfare mission package would still field its first increment in 2015
and the second in 2019.
• Air and missile defense improvements would be slowed:
o SEWIP upgraded electromagnetic sensing and upgraded jamming and deception
capabilities would both be delayed one year (to 2015 and 2018, respectively). Both of these
upgrades are required to counter advances in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.
o The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) would be delivered on only four
ships, as compared to seven under our PB-14 submission, between 2021 and 2024.
o The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II would still be fielded in 2020,
with 80 missiles being delivered to deployed ships.
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o The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, would
still field in 2019 and join our CVW forward homeported in the Western Pacific in 2020.
Overall, the number of F-35 procured would decrease by about 30 aircraft in 2020.
o All components of the improved air-to-air IR “kill chain” that circumvents adversary
radar jamming would be delayed by two years. The Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor
system would field in 2018 and the improved longer-range IRST would not deliver until
2021. The new longer-range AIM-9X Block III missile would not be fielded until 2023.
o Improvements to the air-to-air RF “kill chain” would be slowed down as F/A-18E/F
Block II Super Hornet anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed to 2020. The longer-range
AIM-120D missile would still field in 2014 but equipping of all Pacific carrier air wings
would be delayed by two years to 2022.
o The Navy Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) network would still
initially field with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in 2015, but only four CVW, compared to
six in our PB-14 submission, will have it by 2020. Transition to the E-2D would be delayed
three years to 2025.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space. Plans to recruit, hire and train 976 additional
cyber operators and form 40 computer operations teams by 2017 would not be impacted.
This is a priority in any fiscal scenario.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. We would still be able to sustain
today’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The SSBN(X) would still deliver in 2030
to replace retiring Ohio class SSBN while meeting requirements for SSBN presence and
surge. This is the top priority program for the Navy.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. We would still meet the
capacity requirements for these missions.
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Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. We would continue to be
able to support some missions with 2 ARG and 9 JHSV present overseas.
The extent of the fiscal changes in the BCA, when compared to current program and budget
levels, would compel Navy to request relief from several program mandates and force
structure capacity limits, in order to sustain and build a fleet with a balance of ship types. For
example, mandated limits govern the size of the force, minimum funding for certain
activities and facilities, and changes to the number of personnel at a base.3018
September 5, 2013, CNO Remarks
At a September 5, 2013, event at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Admiral Greenert
stated:
If you look out beyond [FY]’14, if you look at [FY]’15 through say the rest of that ten year
period that the Budget Control Act is expected, we’re looking right now in the building, in
the Pentagon, among the services, we’re building an alternative look from FY15-[FY]23 to
30
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp. 6-10.
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say okay, if this continues and we just, rather than doing this year by year we just look at,
what would this mean? And the Strategic Choices Management Review [SCMR] was a
snapshot of that. It took scenarios and said well, if we looked at it this way, this would be the
impact. It helped provide the Secretary of Defense that understanding of what kind of
scenarios might be out there.
So we don’t have “the” scenario now, but we have scenarios that we kind of lay in there.
My approach to this, it’s going to be to make sure we maintain a credible and modern seabased strategic [nuclear] deterrent. That’s my number one program, the SSBNX [Ohio
replacement ballistic missile submarine program] and the current Ohio [class SSBN]
program, along with the command and control features and along with the [service life]
extension of the [SSBNs’ D-5 submarine-launched ballistic] missile [SLBM].
Next, we need to maximize forward presence. Using the forward deployed naval force, that’s
the concept we have in Japan and the concept we’ve been offered in Rota[, Spain] to bring
ships, bring the Sailors and the families over there. We get great leverage from that. But also
to forward station ships [in other locations] also. So forward presence.
Three, we’ve got to have adequate readiness. The ships that are deployed have to be ready
because it’s all that much important with a smaller budget with a smaller Navy, that Navy
which is out and about is absolutely ready.
We’ve got to make sure that our asymmetric capabilities continue to be developed. The
undersea domain, electronic warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum, the electromagnetic
rail gun, our laser technology which is coming along. As you probably know, we are
deploying a laser gun this coming summer, if you will, in the summer of [FY]’14 I should
say, to the Arabian Gulf and we’re looking to bring along the electronic rail gun.
[Two other priorities are] Cyber and people. Remember, people are an asymmetric
advantage, so we’ve got to do that right.
18
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp. 6-10.
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We will reduce force structure in this plan, but we have to do it while preserving the right
capacity to at least do one MCO [Major Contingency Operation, i.e., a major regional
conflict] as we look out into the future, and we will have to reduce procurement. There’s no
doubt about it. I’ve got to look at the industrial base and make sure that as much as possible
we’re doing this in a deliberate and planned Navy.
That’s kind of the principles of this look ahead.
Let me give you a scenario. If you say okay, what might you look like? And a scenario could
be, in the future, if you take 2020 and you say what was your plan? Some of you may have
seen this and say well, the plan [without sequestration] was to get to 295 ships with 116
planned to be deployed. That’s in the red here [indicating on a briefing slide]. You say [in
the future] future, if we had to retire a number of ships [due to defense spending being
reduced to lower levels], [there] might [instead] be a 250 ship Navy in 2020, and able to get
about 96 ships deployed.
A couple of thoughts about this. This is really leveraging operating forward, as I like to—It’s
one of my tenets in there. It’s using the forward deployed naval force. Forward stationing
ships. It’s bringing along ships like the littoral combat ship [LCS] to join high speed vessel
[JHSV], the afloat forward staging base [AFSB], and putting them in key areas of the world
where we can leverage their usage. You get sort of a picture like that.
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There is not a lot of surge [capacity] here. This is a Navy which, you can do the math, 96
[deployed ships] divided by [a total fleet of] 257 [ships]. You see how much is forward and
out and about.
The reduction of our manpower associated with such a future where we reduce forces is
completely connected to our force structure. What I mean by that is, we man equipment.
That’s the principle in the Navy with regard to manpower where some of the other services,
they equip their manning. It’s all about where our people are. And we have it about right
now. We’re just about where I want to be on the number of people per unit. So it’s about
retiring units, if you will, if you want to get a lot of savings out there as opposed to reducing
people.
There’s also a compensation entitlement reform and an overhead reduction which is part and
parcel to a future look, and we are studying that closely.
I’ll close now and say look, preserving presence is the key. That’s our mandate, to be where
it matters and to be ready when it matters, and we’ll continue that rebalance to the Asia
Pacific. We’ll be moving ships forward. That’s kind of a key element as I look into the
future. And we’ve got to remain ready forward so we can do the things, like I showed you in
the little graphic today. [The goal is to] Be able to respond quickly to what the nation needs.
But throughout it all, Sailors and our civilian work force, our civilian sailors, are going to be
the asymmetric advantage, are going to assure that we keep a force which is whole and not
hollow.3119
19
Transcript of remarks by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, at the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), September 5, 2013, on American Military Strategy In A Time of Declining Budgets, provided to CRS by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs, September 6, 2013.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
August 1, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an August 1, 2013, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee and the
Readiness subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Navy surface ship
maintenance and readiness, Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden, the Director for Surface Warfare,
testified that
Keeping our equipment properly operating and training sailors takes money and time. When
required funding is limited through sequestration or for other reasons, we are forced to make
hard decisions about what gets fixed and what training is completed.
Make no mistake. We will deploy ready ships. But our ability to respond to contingencies
and surge additional ships to a crisis could be reduced.
In the long term, if we do not maintain our ships, the Navy will be forced to decommission
ships before their expected service life—or before they reach their expected service life. We
estimate that if sequestration continues over the long term, by 2020 we will be reduced from
295 ships down to 257 ships. Over the same period, we do not anticipate the combatant
commanders’ demand for ready forces will decrease.32
31
Transcript of remarks by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, at the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), September 5, 2013, on American Military Strategy In A Time of Declining Budgets, provided to CRS by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs, September 6, 2013.
32
Transcript of hearing.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress20
Later in the hearing, he stated: “There is no doubt, I think, that given where we are proposing to
go with sequestration that it will reduce the number of ships that we have in the Navy, and I think
probably by 2020, we're looking at about 257 ships.”3321 Still later in the hearing, he stated that
it goes back to the—the deferral of maintenance and the bow-waving of maintenance into
successive years. If we have to defer X number this year and that pushes into the following
fiscal year and we have to defer Y, eventually we get to the point where the cost to maintain
those ships goes to the point where it’s just not—it’s not cost-effective to maintain those
ships and therefore you start to remove them out of service early.
Based on what we've seen, there’s a potential that we could go down to as many as 257. I
haven't estimated it beyond that. I don't know whether Admiral Matthews34Matthews22 has anything
beyond the 2020 timeframe. But looking at where we think we may have to go in the next
seven years, we're looking at about—we think we're looking at about 257 ships by the time
we get to 2020.3523
July 31, 2013, DOD Press Briefing
At a July 31, 2013, press briefing on the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR)—a
DOD study of potential options for accommodating reductions in future defense funding levels—
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that “sequester-level cuts” to defense funding could,
among other things, “reduce the number of carrier strike groups from 11 to 8 or 9.... ”3624
20
Transcript of hearing.
Transcript of hearing.
22
The other Navy witness at the hearing was Rear Admiral Timothy Matthews, the Director for Fleet Readiness.
23
Transcript of hearing.
24
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and Adm. Winnefeld from the Pentagon, July 31, 2013,
accessed August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5280.
21
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April 16, 2013, Navy Testimony
At an April 16, 2013, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the Department of
the Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, Admiral Greenert, in answer to a question about the impact
of sequestration on the Navy, stated:
Mr. Chairman, as I—as I look at the numbers, and I think you're—you're talking, assuming a
sequestration, $500 billion. First thing I do is, and most important, we provide forward
presence. And it’s—I can't provide—I cannot meet the—the current Global Force
Management Allocation Plan with those numbers. So I don't know what number I would be
at. It would be on the order 30 ships [less than today], you know, as I look at a balanced
reduction in that regard, less than the number of ships that I have today.
So, let’s say 250 ships if I'm at 280 today.37
33
Transcript of hearing.
The other Navy witness at the hearing was Rear Admiral Timothy Matthews, the Director for Fleet Readiness.
35
Transcript of hearing.
36
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and Adm. Winnefeld from the Pentagon, July 31, 2013,
accessed August 7, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5280.
37
Transcript of hearing.
34
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress25
February 12, 2013, Navy Testimony
At a February 12, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impacts of
sequestration and/or a full-year continuing resolution on the Department of Defense, the Navy
testified that:
In addition to sequestration for FY13, the BCA also required the lowering of the
discretionary caps for FY14 through FY21. Beyond FY13, if the discretionary cap reductions
are sustained for the full nine years, we would fundamentally change the Navy as currently
organized, trained and equipped. As time allows, we will take a deliberate and
comprehensive approach to this reduction, based on a reevaluation of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. In doing so, I will endeavor to: (1) ensure our people are properly resourced; (2)
protect sufficient current readiness and warfighting capability; (3) sustain some ability to
operate forward by continuing to forward base forces in Japan, Spain, Singapore and
Bahrain, and by using rotational crews; and (4) maintain appropriate research and
development.
As I indicated last year to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under a set of
fiscal circumstances in sequestration, our Navy may be a fleet of around 230 ships. That
would be a loss of more than 50 ships, including the loss of at least two carrier strike groups.
We would be compelled to retire ships early and reduce procurement of new ships and
aircraft. This would result in a requisite reduction in our end strength. Every program will be
affected and as Secretary Panetta noted in his 2011 letter to Senators McCain and Graham,
programs such as the F-35 Lightning II, next generation ballistic missile submarine and
Littoral Combat Ship might be reduced or terminated.38
Appropriate Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic
and Budgetary Changes
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the appropriate future size and structure
of the Navy. Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over
the future size and structure of the military, including the Navy. Changes in strategic
circumstances include, among other things, the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the
winding down of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, and China’s military (including naval)
38
26
25
Transcript of hearing.
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on the Impact of Sequestration, February 12, 2013, pp. 8-9. Although the Navy’s written statement for the hearing is
from Admiral Greenert, the Navy’s testimony at the hearing was actually given by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Mark E. Ferguson III, who was substituting for Admiral Greenert at the hearing. The Navy presented similar
testimony at a similar hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2013.
Similarly, on October 22, 2012, Admiral Mark Ferguson, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated, “If you project
out 10 years—remember that the budget control act talks about 10 years of [funding] reductions—now you start talking
about a fleet reduced to about 230-235 ships.” (As quoted in David Smalley, “Leaner Navy Looking at Future
Technology, Fleet Size and Sequestration,” Navy News Service, October 23, 2012, accessed October 25, 2012 at
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=70311.) On January 8, 2013, Vice Admiral William Burke, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, stated, “As a result of sequestration, what I testified to last
year was we’ll have, if sequestration is fully implemented, we’ll have a force of about 230 ships.... I’m not talking
about what the aviation numbers are, but they’ll go down by a similar amount—a similar amount being 20 percent.”
(As quoted in Dan Taylor, “Adm. Burke: Navy Needs To Fill $2 Billion Hole When OCO Goes Away,” Inside the
Navy, January 14, 2013. See also Michael Fabey, “U.S. Navy Prioritizes Ship Total Ownership Costs, Maintenance,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 9, 2013: 3.)
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
modernization effort.39(continued...)
26
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appropriate Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic
and Budgetary Changes
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the appropriate future size and structure
of the Navy. Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over
the future size and structure of the military, including the Navy. Changes in strategic
circumstances include, among other things, the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the
winding down of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, and China’s military (including naval)
modernization effort.27 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on reductions in planned
levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA (S. 365/P.L.
112-25 of August 2, 2011).
On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the end of U.S. combat
operations in Iraq, the winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and developments in the
Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a stronger focus on the
Asia-Pacific region.4028 Since the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a maritime and aerospace theater
for the DOD, this shift in strategic focus is expected by many observers to result in a shift in the
allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air Force. DOD officials have indicated that
efforts to support a stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region will be protected if planned levels of
DOD spending in future years are reduced as a result of the BCA or other legislative action.
The Navy’s current goal for a fleet of 306 ships reflects a number of judgments and planning
factors (some of which the Navy receives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense), including
but not limited to the following:
•
U.S. interests and the U.S. role in the world, and the U.S. military strategy for
supporting those interests and that role;
•
current and projected Navy missions in support of U.S. military strategy,
including both wartime operations and day-to-day forward-deployed operations;
•
current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries, including their antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities;
•
regional combatant commander (COCOM) requests for forward-deployed Navy
forces;
•
the individual and networked capabilities of current and future Navy ships and
aircraft;
•
basing arrangements for Navy ships, including numbers and locations of ships
homeported in foreign countries;
•
maintenance and deployment cycles for Navy ships; and
•
fiscal constraints.
With regard to the fourth point above, Navy officials testified at least three times in 2012 that a
Navy of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet COCOM requests for forwarddeployed Navy forces (see Appendix A). The difference between a fleet of more than 500 ships
and the current goal for a fleet of 306 ships can be viewed as one measure of the operational risk
associated with the goal of a fleet of 306 ships. A goal for a fleet of more than 500 ships might be
viewed as a fiscally unconstrained goal.
39(...continued)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, stated, “As a result of sequestration, what I testified to last
year was we’ll have, if sequestration is fully implemented, we’ll have a force of about 230 ships.... I’m not talking
about what the aviation numbers are, but they’ll go down by a similar amount—a similar amount being 20 percent.”
(As quoted in Dan Taylor, “Adm. Burke: Navy Needs To Fill $2 Billion Hole When OCO Goes Away,” Inside the
Navy, January 14, 2013. See also Michael Fabey, “U.S. Navy Prioritizes Ship Total Ownership Costs, Maintenance,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 9, 2013: 3.)
27
For more on the modernization of China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for
required U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4028
Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG), by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell. See also CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
31
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
the individual and networked capabilities of current and future Navy ships and
aircraft;
•
basing arrangements for Navy ships, including numbers and locations of ships
homeported in foreign countries;
•
maintenance and deployment cycles for Navy ships; and
•
fiscal constraints.
With regard to the fourth point above, Navy officials testified at least three times in 2012 that a
Navy of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet COCOM requests for forwarddeployed Navy forces (see Appendix A). The difference between a fleet of more than 500 ships
and the current goal for a fleet of 306 ships can be viewed as one measure of the operational risk
associated with the goal of a fleet of 306 ships. A goal for a fleet of more than 500 ships might be
viewed as a fiscally unconstrained goal.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure that reflect their
own perspectives on the points listed above (particularly the first three and the final one) shows
some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, also shows the Navy’s 306-ship goal of
January 2013.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 7. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure
Sustainable
Defense
Task Force
(June 2010)
Center for
a New
American
Security
(CNAS)
(November
2008)
Center for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b
14
7
14
12
0
4
4
0
2
55
40
55
37
40
41
9
11
8
11
9
8
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
88
72-74
88
22
n/a
18
14
65
n/a
56
73
Frigate
0
2-7j
14
n/a
0
0
9e
LCS
52
12j
4
n/a
25
48
55
SSC
0
j
0
n/a
0
40
0f
Navy’s
306ship
goal of
January
2013
Project on
Defense
Alternatives
(PDA)
(November
2012)
Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a
Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)
Heritage
Foundation
(April
2011)
SSBN
12
7
14c
6
SSGN
0
6-7
4
SSN
48
42
CVN
11
CVE
Ship type
Submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Cruiser
Destroyer
28d
0
85
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious ships
33
>23
37
23
n/a
27
36
33
MPF(F) ships
0
n/a
0
0
n/a
n/a
0
3g
LSD station ships
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7h
0
0
0
36
40
230
300
Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW
0
14j
14
11
0
CLF ships
29
n/a
33
21
n/a
Support ships
33
n/a
25
27
n/a
306
230
309
241
346
TOTAL battle
force ships
31
31
326i
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National
Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 2526. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,
Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional
information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel
Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS:
Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington,
Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US
Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2008. p. 81 (Figure 5). For PDA: Carl Conetta, Reasonable Defense, Project on Defense Alternatives,
November 14, 2012, 31 pp.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a.
Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.
b.
Figures shown are for the year 2028.
c.
The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20
SLBM tubes.
d.
The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface
combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—as a way of collectively
referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS
report are separate from and smaller than the LCS.
e.
Maritime Security Frigates.
f.
Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.
g.
Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
h.
T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.
i.
The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 306-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.
j.
The report “prescribes ending procurement of the LCS with the 12 already purchased. The Reasonable
Defense model foresees a future cohort of 28 to 33 small surface combatants, including a mix of the 12 LCS
that have already been procured, 14 Mine Counter Measure (MCM) ships already in the fleet, and small
frigates or ocean-going corvettes. As the MCM ships age and leave the fleet, the LCS should assume their
role. The would leave a post-MCM requirement for 16 to 21 additional small surface combatants. For this,
the Navy needs a simpler, less expensive alternative to the LCS.”
A potential key question for Congress concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be
large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakerspolicy makers around the world. Some
observers are concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budgetdriven reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence
and demoralize U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby make it harder for the United
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States to defend its interests in the region.41 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
29 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
29
See, for example, Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com),
October 26, 2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean
Cheng, Sea Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576,
(continued...)
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Under the Administration’s plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the
policy makers around
the world?
•
What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?
•
If the Navy is reduced in size and priority is given to maintaining Navy forces in
the Pacific, what will be the impact on Navy force levels in other parts of the
world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea,
and consequently on the Navy’s ability to adequately perform its missions in
those parts of the world?
•
To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship
numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., “Sea Swap”)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?4230
•
Particularly in a situation of constrained DOD resources, if enough funding is
allocated to the Navy to permit the Navy in coming years to maintain a fleet of
306 ships including 11 aircraft carriers, how much would other DOD programs
need to be reduced, and what would be the operational implications of those
program reductions in terms of DOD’s overall ability to counter improved
Chinese military forces and perform other missions?4331
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan for Achieving Navy’s
306-Ship Goal
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan for achieving the Navy’s goal for a 306-ship fleet. The Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plans in recent years have generally not included enough ships to fully support all
elements of the Navy’s 306-ship goal over the long run. The Navy has projected that the fleet
would remain below 306 As shown in Table 4, the Navy has
projected that under the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan, the fleet would remain below 306
ships during most of the 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at
various points in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. In light of these
41
See, for example, Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com),
October 26, 2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean
Cheng, Sea Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576,
July 11, 2011, p. 10.
42cruisersdestroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. In light of these projected shortfalls, policy
makers may wish to consider various options, including but not limited to the following:
•
increasing planned procurement quantities of destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships;
(...continued)
July 11, 2011, p. 10.
30
For further discussion of these options, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4331
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
projected shortfalls, policymakers may wish to consider various options, including but not limited
to the following:
•
increasing planned procurement quantities of destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships;
•
extending, if feasible, the service lives of older destroyers and amphibious ships,
and (if feasible) refueling and extending the service lives of a small number of
older attack submarines; and
•
reducing the Navy’s ship force structure goals for destroyers, attack submarines,
and/or amphibious ships.
The first two options would require increased funding for procurement and for operation and
support (O&S) costs, respectively, while the third option could reduce the Navy’s ability to
perform its missions.
Affordability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the
Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. In assessing the prospective affordability of the 30-year plan,
key factors that Congress may consider include estimated ship procurement costs and future
shipbuilding funding levels.
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship procurement costs. If one or more Navy ship designs turn out to
be more expensive to build than the Navy estimates, then the projected funding levels shown in
the 30-year shipbuilding plan will not be sufficient to procure all the ships shown in the plan.
Ship designs that can be viewed as posing a risk of being more expensive to build than the Navy
estimates include Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers (a program currently
experiencing cost growth), Ohio-replacement (SSBNX) class ballistic missile submarines, the
Flight III version of the DDG-51 destroyer, the TAO(X) oiler, and the LX(R) amphibious ship.
In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that certain Navy ships
would be more expensive to procure than the Navy estimates, and consequently that the Navy’s
30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated. In its
October 2013 report on the cost of the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan, the CBO estimates that
the plan would cost an average of $19.3 billion per year in constant FY2013 dollars to implement,
or about 15% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 6% higher than the Navy’s
estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 14% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the
second 10 years of the plan, and about 26% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years
of the plan.4432 Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate,
particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in
44
how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 8 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of
the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plans.
32
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2013, Table 3
(page 13).
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how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 8 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of
the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plans.
Table 8. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2014 30-Year (FY2014-FY2043)
Shipbuilding Plans
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2013 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2014-FY2023)
Next 10 years
(FY2024-FY2033)
Final 10 years
(FY2034-FY2043)
Entire 30 years
(FY2014-FY2043)
Navy estimate
15.4
19.8
15.2
16.8
CBO estimate
16.3
22.6
19.1
19.3
% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates
6%
14%
26%
15%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2013,
Table 3 (page 13).
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about future shipbuilding funding levels. It has been known for some time
that funding requirements for the Ohio-replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine
program will put considerable pressure on the shipbuilding budget during the middle years of the
30-year plan. Although the FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan reduces procurement of other types
of ships in the middle years of the plan to help accommodate the SSBN(X) program, the Navy
still projects that the shipbuilding budget would need to be substantially higher during the middle
years of the plan than during the earlier or later years of the plan.
If the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan is not achieved,
numerous ships shown for procurement during the middle years of the plan might not be
procured. A potential oversight question for Congress is whether the Navy has received a
commitment or assurance of some kind from DOD leaders that the Navy will be able to budget
for the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan without
reducing funding for other Navy program priorities. The Navy’s report on the FY2014 30-year
shipbuilding plan states:
The Department [of the Navy] will encounter several challenges in executing this
shipbuilding plan; perhaps the most important is funding and delivering the Ohioreplacement (OR) program SSBN. The OR SSBN is projected to cost about $6 billion each
[in constant FY2013 dollars]. Therefore, during the procurement and construction of OR
SSBN between FY2021 and FY2035 an average of $19.2 billion per year is projected to be
required for shipbuilding, which will be a key resourcing challenge for the Department.
In addition to the challenge of funding the OR SSBN, during several years in the early 20202
[the] Navy will also require approximately $2 billion [per year] in additional ship
construction funding to recapitalize the large number of ships decommissioning in those
years. Our current fleet has a large cohort of ships that are about the same age and will thus
retire as a group. These ships were built in the 1980s, some at a rate of three or four ships per
year per class. These retiring ships will need to be recapitalized to reach the FSA-required
battle force size and shape [i.e., the 306-ship goal]....
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DoN has historically been able to resource between $12B [billion] and $14B in annual newship procurement funding. During the FY2014-FY2018 FYDP, average annual new-ship
procurement funding is about $14B. This level of investment is based on the need to balance
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our resources between manning, maintenance, sustainment, modernization and
recapitalization of our ships, aircraft and weapons.
The cost of the OR SSBN is significant relative to the resources available to DoN in any
given year. At the same time, the Department will have to address the block retirement of
ships procured in large numbers during the 1980s which are reaching the end of their service
lives. The confluence of these events prevents DoN from being able to shift resources within
the shipbuilding account to accommodate the cost of the OR SSBN.
If DoN funds the OR SSBN from within its own resources, OR SSBN construction will take
away from construction of other ships in the battle force such as attack submarines,
destroyers, aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare shps. The resulting battle force will not
meet the requirements of the FSA and will therefore not be sufficient to implement the DSG
[Defense Strategic Guidance]. In addition there will be significant impact to the shipbuilding
industrial base.4533
A May 2, 2013, press report states:
[Vice Admiral William Burke, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems], who
is set to retire in the next few weeks,4634 spoke frankly about the undersea portion of the U.S.
strategic nuclear triad “and its intersection with our shipbuilding plan.”
His conclusion: “If we buy the [the 12 planned Ohio replacement (SSBNX) ballistic missile
submarines] within existing [Navy] funds, we will not reach 300 ships. In fact, we'll find
ourselves closer to 250. At these numbers, our global presence will be reduced such that
we'll only be able to visit some areas of the world episodically.”
Sequestration will only make the situation worse. Burke said it would cause the Navy “to
both reduce procurement as well as retire existing ships, leaving us with a Navy in the
vicinity of 200 ships, at which point we may not be considered a global navy.”4735
In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what would occur if defense
spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, the
affordability challenge posed by the 30-year shipbuilding plan would be intensified. Even then,
however, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would not necessarily become unaffordable.4836
The Navy estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year
shipbuilding plan would require an average of $16.8 billion in annual funding for newconstruction ships, compared to a historic average of $12 billion to $14 billion provided for this
purpose.4937 The required increase in average annual funding of $2.8 billion to $4.8 billion per year
45
equates to less than 1% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control
Act. CBO estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year
33
Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014, May 2013, pp.
11-12, 18-19.
4634
Vice Admiral Burke retired on May 20, 2013.
4735
Walter Pincus, “Budget Cuts Could Reshape Country’s Ship Supply,” Washington Post, May 2, 2013: 15.
4836
This paragraph and those that follow are adapted from Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs,
Congressional Research Service, Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, on the Navy’s FY2014 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, October 23, 2013, pp. 1-4.
4937
See Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014, May 2013, p.
(continued...)18.
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equates to less than 1% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control
Act. CBO estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year
shipbuilding plan would require an average of $19.3 billion in annual funding for newconstruction ships, or $2.5 billion per year more than the Navy estimates.5038 This would make the
required increase in average annual funding $5.3 billion to $7.3 billion per year, which equates to
roughly 1.1% to 1.5% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act.
Some observers, noting the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, have
advocated shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, on the grounds
that the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a maritime and aerospace theater for DOD. In discussing
the idea of shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, some of these
observers refer to breaking the so-called “one-third, one-third, one-third” division of resources
among the three military departments—a shorthand term sometimes used to refer to the more-orless stable division of resources between the three military departments that existed for the three
decades between the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in 1973 and the start of the Iraq
War in 2003.5139 In a context of breaking the “one-third, one-third, one-third” allocation with an
aim of better aligning defense spending with the strategic rebalancing, shifting 1.5% or less of
DOD’s budget into the Navy’s shipbuilding account would appear to be quite feasible.
More broadly, if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the
Budget Control Act, then fully funding the Department of the Navy’s total budget at the levels
shown in the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) would require increasing the Department
of the Navy’s share of the non-Defense-Wide part of the DOD budget to about 41%, compared to
about 36% in the FY2014 budget and an average of about 37% for the three-decade period
between the Vietnam and Iraq wars.5240 While shifting 4% or 5% of DOD’s budget to the
Department of the Navy would be a more ambitious reallocation than shifting 1.5% or less of the
DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account, similarly large reallocations have occurred in
the past:
•
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting a U.S. defense strategy at the
time that placed a strong reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, the
(...continued)
18.
50
Department of the Air Force’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget
increased by several percentage points. The Department of the Air Force’s share
averaged about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956-FY1965, and peaked at more
than 47% in FY1957-FY1959.
38
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2013, Table 3
(page 13).
5139
The “one-third, one-third, one-third” terminology, though convenient, is not entirely accurate—the military
departments’ shares of the DOD budget, while more or less stable during this period, were not exactly one-third each:
the average share for the Department of the Army was about 26%, the average share for the Department of the Navy
(which includes both the Navy and Marine Corps) was about 32%, the average share for the Department of the Air
Force was about 30%, and the average share for Defense-Wide (the fourth major category of DOD spending) was about
12%. Excluding the Defense-Wide category, which has grown over time, the shares for the three military departments
of the remainder of DOD’s budget during this period become about 29% for the Department of the Army, about 37%
for the Department of the Navy, and about 34% for the Department of the Air Force.
5240
Since the Defense-Wide portion of the budget has grown from just a few percent in the 1950s and 1960s to about
15% in more recent years, including the Defense-Wide category of spending in the calculation can lead to military
department shares of the budget in the 1950s and 1960s that are somewhat more elevated compared to those in more
recent years, making it more complex to compare the military departments’ shares across the entire period of time since
the end of the World War II. For this reason, military department shares of the DOD budget cited in this statement are
calculated after excluding the Defense-Wide category. The points made in this statement, however, can still made on
the basis of a calculation that includes the Defense-Wide category.
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Department of the Air Force’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget
increased by several percentage points. The Department of the Air Force’s share
averaged about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956-FY1965, and peaked at more
than 47% in FY1957-FY1959.
•
For the 11-year period FY2003-FY2013, as a consequence of combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army’s share of the non-DefenseWide DOD budget increased by roughly 10 percentage points. The Department
of the Army’s share during this period averaged about 39%, and peaked at more
than 43% in FY2008. U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during this
period reflected the implementation of U.S. national strategy as interpreted by
policymakerspolicy makers during those years.
The point of the foregoing is not to argue whether it would be right or wrong to shift more of the
DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account or to the Department of the Navy’s budget
generally. Doing that would require reducing funding for other DOD programs, and policymakers
policy
makers would need to weigh the resulting net impact on overall DOD capabilities. The point,
rather, is to
note that the allocation of DOD resources is not fixed, that aligning DOD spending
with U.S.
strategy in coming years could involve changing the allocation by more than a very marginal
marginal amount, and that such a changed allocation could provide the funding needed to
implement the
current 30-year shipbuilding plan. The alternative of assuming at the outset that
there is no
potential for making anything more than very marginal shifts in the allocation of DOD resources
resources could unnecessarily constrain options available to policymakerspolicy makers and prevent the
allocation of
DOD resources from being aligned optimally with U.S. strategy.
As an alternative or supplement to the option of altering the allocation of DOD resources among
the military departments, the 30-year shipbuilding plan could also become more affordable by
taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay
and benefits and reduce what some observers refer to as DOD’s overhead or back-office costs.
Multiple organizations have made recommendations for such actions in recent years. The Defense
Business Board, for example, estimated that at least $200 billion of DOD’s enacted budget for
FY2010 constituted overhead costs. The board stated, “There has been an explosion of overhead
work because the Department has failed to establish adequate controls to keep it in line relative to
the size of the warfight,” and that “in order to accomplish that work, the Department has applied
ever more personnel to those tasks which has added immensely to costs.” The board stated further
that “whether it’s improving the tooth-to-tail ratio; increasing the ‘bang for the buck’, or
converting overhead to combat, Congress and DoD must significantly change their approach,”
and that DOD “must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven business
operations that are applicable to DoD’s overhead.”5341
One potential way to interpret the affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan is to view it as an invitation by the Navy for policymakerspolicy makers to consider matters
such as the alignment between U.S. strategy and the division of DOD resources among the
53military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those now being implemented
by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and backoffice costs. The Navy’s prepared statement for a September 18, 2013, hearing before the House
Armed Services Committee on planning for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives of the
41
Defense Business Board briefing, “Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations, Initial Observations,”
July 22, 2010, slides 15, 5, and 6, posted online at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/072210rb1.pdf. See also Defense
Business Board, Modernizing the Military Retirement System, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11-05,
posted online at http://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY115_Modernizing_The_Military_Retirement_System_2011-7.pdf; and Defense Business Board, Corporate Downsizing
Applications for DoD, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11-08, posted online at http://dbb.defense.gov/
Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY11-8_Corporate_Downsizing_Applications_for_DoD_2011-7.pdf.
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military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those now being implemented
by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and backoffice costs. The Navy’s prepared statement for a September 18, 2013, hearing before the House
Armed Services Committee on planning for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives of the
military services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) provides a number
of details about reductions in Navy force structure and acquisition programs that could result
from constraining DOD’s budget to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act.5442 These
potential reductions do not appear to reflect any substantial shift in the allocation of DOD
resources among the military departments, or the taking of actions beyond those already being
implemented by DOD to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and
back-office costs. The fact that the Navy in its prepared statement did not choose to discuss the
possibility of a changed allocation of DOD resources among the military departments or
additional actions to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and
back-office costs does not prevent Congress from considering such possibilities.
Legislative Activity for FY2014
FY2014 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requestsrequested funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 306-ship goal)—two Virginia-class attack submarines, one
DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Mobile Landing
Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) ship. These ships are all funded through the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960/S. 11973304/P.L. 113-66)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-102 of June 7, 2013) on the
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)H.R.
1960, supported the Navy’s requests for
funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force ships,
approving, and in some cases
recommending increases above, the requested amounts. (Pages 387388387-388) The report
recommended:
•
an increase of $492 million for the Virginia-class attack submarine program,
which almost matches the $492.3 million sequestered from the program by the
March 1, 2013, sequester (see “Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013
Funding” in “Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014”);
•
an increase of $332 million for the DDG-51 program, which is similar to the
amount of additional funding that the Navy has testified would be needed to
execute the third DDG-51 procured in FY2013 (i.e., the tenth DDG-51 in the
FY2013-FY2017 DDG-51 multi-year procurement contract);
5442
Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp. 6-10.
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•
an increase of $79.3 million for the DDG-1000 destroyer program, which is $9
million more than the $70.3 million sequestered from the program by the March
1, 2013, sequester;
•
an increase of $23.4 million for the Moored Training Ship program, matching the
amount sequestered from the program by the March 1, 2013, sequester; and
•
an increase of $7.6 million for the JHSV program, which is about one-third as
much as the $21.4 million sequestered from the program by the March 1, 2013,
sequester.
Section 1022 of H.R. 1960 as reported states:
SEC. 1022. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT OR INACTIVATION OF
TICONDEROGA CLASS CRUISERS OR DOCK LANDING SHIPS.
(a) Limitation on Availability of Funds(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), none of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for the Department
of Defense may be obligated or expended to retire, prepare to retire, inactivate, or place in
storage a cruiser or dock landing ship.
(2) EXCEPTION- Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the funds referred to in such subsection
may be obligated or expended to retire the U.S.S. Denver, LPD9.
(b) Authority to Transfer Authorizations(1) AUTHORITY- Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, the
Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 2013 specifically for the modernization of vessels
referred to in subsection (a)(1). Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged
with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred.
(2) LIMITATION- The total amount of authorizations that the Secretary may transfer under
the authority of this subsection may not exceed $914,676,000.
(3) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY- The transfer authority provided by this subsection is in
addition to the transfer authority provided under section 1001 of this Act and under section
1001 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239; 126
Stat. 1902).
Regarding Section 1022, H.Rept. 113-102 states:
Section 1022—Availability of Funds for Retirement or Inactivation of Ticonderoga Class
Cruisers or Dock Landing Ships
This section would limit the obligation and expenditure of funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for the retirement, inactivation,
or storage of a cruiser or dock landing ship. This section would provide an exception for the
retirement of the U.S.S. Denver (LPD 9).
This section would further provide for transfer authority for the purpose of providing
sufficient appropriations to support the modernization of seven cruisers. If requested by the
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Secretary of Defense, the committee believes the following transfers should be included:
OPN Line 0960, $662.7 million; OPN Line 2312, $1.8 million; OPN Line 2360, $6.6
million; OPN Line 2915, $13.7 million; OPN Line 3050, $13.4 million; OPN Line 3216,
$20.8 million; OPN Line 5530, $4.6 million; WPN Line 4223, $91.1 million; and RDTE
Line 1447, $100.0 million. The total transfer authority is $914.7 million. (Pages 233-234)
Section 1024 states:
SEC. 1024. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING A BALANCED FUTURE NAVAL
FORCE.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The battle force of the Navy must be sufficiently sized and balanced in capability to meet
current and anticipated future national security objectives.
(2) A robust and balanced naval force is required for the Department of Defense to fully
execute the President’s National Security Strategy.
(3) To develop and sustain required capabilities the Navy must balance investment and
maintenance costs across various ship types, including—
(A) aircraft carriers;
(B) surface combatants;
(C) submarines;
(D) amphibious assault ships; and
(E) other auxiliary vessels, including support vessels operated by the Military Sealift
Command.
(4) Despite a Marine Corps requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships, the Navy possesses
only 30 amphibious assault ships with an average of 22 ships available for surge deployment.
(5) The inadequate level of investment in Navy shipbuilding over the last 20 years has
resulted in—
(A) a fragile shipbuilding industrial base, both in the construction yards and secondary
suppliers of materiel and equipment; and
(B) increased costs per vessel stemming from low production volume.
(6) The Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2013 provided $263,000,000 towards the
advance procurement of materiel and equipment required to continue the San Antonio LPD
17 amphibious transport dock class to a total of 12 ships, a key first step in rebalancing the
amphibious assault ship force structure.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the Sense of Congress that—
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(1) the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy must prioritize funding
towards increased shipbuilding rates to enable the Navy to meet the full-range of combatant
commander requests;
(2) the Department of the Navy’s future budget requests and the Long Range Plan for the
Construction of Naval Forces must realistically anticipate and reflect the true investment
necessary to meet stated force structure goals;
(3) without modification to Long Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Forces
shipbuilding plan, the future of the industrial base that enables construction of large, combatsurvivable amphibious assault ships is at significant risk; and
(4) the Department of Defense and Congress should act expeditiously to restore the force
structure and capability balance of the Navy fleet as quickly as possible.
Regarding Section 1024, H.Rept. 113-102 states:
Section 1024—Sense of Congress Regarding a Balanced Future Naval Force
This section would provide the Sense of Congress that additional funding should be
prioritized toward shipbuilding efforts and that Department of Navy budget projections
should realistically anticipate the true investment to meet force structure goals. (Page 234)
Section 1233 states:
SEC. 1233. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DEFENSE OF THE ARABIAN GULF.
(a) Findings- Congress finds the following:
(1) In response to U.S. Central Command requirements, the United States Navy has
maintained, on average, more than one aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf for more than five
years.
(2) In February 2013, the senior leadership of the Department of Defense elected to reduce
the number of aircraft carriers deployed to the Arabian Gulf in light of budget constraints and
limitation of the overall carrier force structure to support the two aircraft carrier requirement.
(3) In reference to the decision to indefinitely delay the deployment of the USS Harry
Truman, CVN 75, and the USS Gettysburg, its cruiser escort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Martin Dempsey stated, `We're trying to stretch our readiness out by keeping this
particular carrier in homeport in our global response force, so if something happens
elsewhere in the world, we can respond to it. Had we deployed it and `consumed’ that
readiness, we could have created a situation where downstream we wouldn't have a carrier
present in certain parts of the world at all.’.
(4) Highlighting the risks of having only one aircraft carrier in the region and relying on
land-based aircraft, General Dempsey stated, `When you have carrier-based aircraft, you
have complete autonomy and control over when you use them. When you use land-based
aircraft, you often have to have host-nation permission to use them.’.
(5) Addressing the perception of the United States commitment to the region, General James
Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, testified in March 2013, `Perhaps the
greatest risk to U.S. interests in the region is a perceived lack of an enduring U.S.
commitment to collective interests and the security of our regional partners.’. He went on to
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testify that, `The drawdown of our forces can be misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack
of commitment to the region.’.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) maintaining only one aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf constrains United
States’ options and could put at risk the ability to have diversified platforms from which to
defend the Arabian Gulf and, if necessary, to conduct military operations to prevent Iran
from threatening the United States, United States allies, or Iran’s neighbors with nuclear
weapons;
(2) it is in the interests of the United States to maintain both land-based and sea-based
capabilities in the region to project force;
(3) land-based locations in the region could restrict United States military options and
critically impact the operational capability if required to conduct a defense of the Arabian
Gulf because the United States has not finalized bilateral security agreements with key Gulf
Cooperation Council countries;
(4) as a result of these and other critical limitations associated with maintaining one aircraft
carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf, United States military commanders have expressed
concerns about the operational constraints, the increasing uncertainty among United States
allies, and the emboldening of potential adversaries such as Iran;
(5) regarding the ability of the United States Navy to maintain a two aircraft carrier presence
in the Arabian Gulf, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, stated, `We
need 11 carriers to do the job. That’s been pretty clearly written, and that’s underwritten in
our defense strategic guidance.’.
(6) the United States should construct and sufficiently sustain a fleet of at least eleven
aircraft carriers and associated battle force ships in order to meet current and future
requirements and to support at least a two aircraft carrier battle group presence in the
Arabian Gulf, in addition to meeting other operational requirements; and
(7) the United States should finalize bilateral agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council
countries that support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf requirements, at the earliest possible
date.
Regarding Section 1233, H.Rept. 113-102 states:
Section 1233—Sense of Congress on the Defense of the Arabian Gulf
This section would express the sense of Congress with respect to the United States’
operational posture and capacity to defend the Arabian Gulf, including the risk of
maintaining only 1 aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf to deter the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the limitations on maintaining a 2 aircraft carrier battle
group presence in the Arabian Gulf, stemming in part from not constructing and sustaining a
fleet of at least 11 aircraft carriers. Additionally, this section would express the sense of
Congress that the United States should finalize bilateral security agreements with key Gulf
Cooperation Council countries that support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf requirements at
the earliest possible date. (Page 273)
H.Rept. 113-102 also states:
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The committee is concerned about the Navy’s overall fleet size and the continuous sustained
demand for naval forces, especially in light of the Administration’s strategic shift to
operations in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the restriction precluding the Navy from retiring
seven Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious ships well before the
end of their expected service life continues for fiscal year 2014. The committee would
provide additional funds to the Navy to properly modernize and maintain these critical naval
assets. The committee notes that it is less costly to maintain existing assets than to procure
new ones and this funding ensures the correct naval capabilities and fleet mix for the length
of time originally authorized by Congress....
The committee also would fund needed ship construction to obviate the negative
consequences of sequestration on the various ship construction programs. The committee
would provide sufficient funds to support the acquisition of the 10th DDG–51 class destroyer
of a multiyear procurement; additional funds to support the continued acquisition of two
Virginia Class attack submarines; and additional funds associated with the completion of the
DDG–1000 class destroyer, the Moored Training Ship, and the Joint High Speed Vessel.
(Page 6)
H.Rept. 113-102 also states:
Long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels
Pursuant to section 231 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense provided the
annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels on May 10, 2013, as informed
by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for fiscal years 2014–18. The Secretary also
indicated that a force structure of “about 300 ships” would be necessary to support ongoing
naval operations. The Secretary further highlights the “resourcing challenges outside the
FYDP largely due to investment requirements associated with the SSBN(X) program”. The
Secretary acknowledges that these ship construction pressures will precipitate higher fiscal
requirements in the mid-term planning period (fiscal years 2024–33) requiring an annual
investment of $19.8 billion per year in fiscal year 2013 constant dollars.
The committee supports a robust shipbuilding plan that invests in the near and long term
needs of our Navy, and considers the recapitalization of the SSBN fleet a challenging but
necessary strategic priority. However, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s ship
construction accounts will face significant pressure in supporting long term ship
requirements while also resourcing the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine
program. The committee also believes that a significant increase to the ship construction
accounts is unsustainable in times of budget challenges.
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the average ship construction
investment over the last 30 years, in current dollars, is $16.0 billion. Therefore, to better
understand the significance associated with even sustaining the current ship construction
investment throughout the long-range plan, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to provide a report to the congressional defense committee by March 1, 2014, that provides
an update to the long plan for the construction of naval vessels based on $16.0 billion across
the entirety of the long-range plan and to assess the corresponding reductions in the
shipbuilding plan. The Secretary of the Navy should also provide an assessment of this
investment in terms of the health associated with the industrial base, as well as a discussion
of alternative strategies for the Navy and Congress to consider in alleviating any shortfalls
between this assessment and the May 10 report. (Page 29)
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Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-44 of June 20, 2013) on S.
1197
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197), supported the Navy’s requests for funding
for the procurement of 8 new battle force ships,
approving, and in two cases recommending
increases above, the requested amounts. (Pages 295296295-296) The report recommended:
•
an increase of $100 million for the DDG-51 program, to “Help buy [a] 3rd DDG–
51 in FY[20]13;””; and
•
an increase of $55.3 million for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)
program, reflecting a “Navy requested adjustment.”
Section 1021 of S. 1197 as reported states:
SEC. 1021. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNUAL LONG-RANGE
PLAN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- Subsection (b) of section 231 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1)—
(A) by striking `should be designed’ both places it appears and inserting `shall be designed’;
and
(B) by striking `is capable of supporting’ both places it appears and inserting `supports’; and
(2) in paragraph (2)—
(A) in subparagraph (B), by inserting `and capabilities’ after `naval vessel force structure’;
and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
`(D) The estimated total cost of construction for each vessel used to determine estimated
levels of annual funding under subparagraph (C).’.
(b) Assessment When Construction Plan Does Not Meet Force Structure RequirementsSuch section is further amended—
(1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively;
and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):
`(d) Assessment When Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan Does Not Meet Force
Structure Requirements- If the annual naval vessel construction plan for a fiscal year under
subsection (b) does not result in a force structure or capabilities that meet the requirements
identified in subsection (b)(2)(B), the Secretary shall include with the defense budget
materials for that fiscal year an assessment of the extent of the strategic and operational risk
to national security associated with the reduced force structure of naval vessels over the
period of time that the required force structure or capabilities are not achieved. Such
assessment shall include an analysis whether the risks are acceptable, and plans to mitigate
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such risks. Such assessment shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the
combatant commands and the Nuclear Weapons Council under section 179 of this title.’.
Regarding Section 1021, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Modification of requirements for annual long-range plan for the construction of naval
vessels (sec. 1021)
The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 231 of title 10, Unites
Sates Code, to include a requirement to report on the total cost of construction for each
vessel used to determine estimated levels of annual funding in the report, and an assessment
of the extent of the strategic and operational risk to national security whenever the number or
capabilities of the naval vessels in the plan do not meet requirements. (Page 172)
Section 1022 states:
SEC. 1022. REPORT ON NAVAL VESSELS AND THE FORCE STRUCTURE
ASSESSMENT.
(a) Report Required- Not later than February 1, 2014, the Chief of Naval Operations shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on current and anticipated
requirements for combatant vessels of the Navy over the next 30 years.
(b) Elements- The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the naval capability requirements identified by the combatant commands
in developing the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) in 2005 and revalidating that
Assessment in 2010.
(2) The capabilities for each class of vessel that was assumed in the Force Structure
Assessment.
(3) An assessment of the capabilities of the current fleet of combatant vessels of the Navy to
meet current and anticipated requirements.
(4) An assessment the capabilities of the anticipated fleet of combatant vessels of the Navy to
meet emerging threats over the next 30 years.
(5) An assessment of how the Navy will meet combatant command requirements for
forward-deployed naval capabilities with a smaller number of ships and submarines.
(6) An assessment of how the Navy will manage the risk of massing a greater set of
capabilities on a smaller number of ships while facing an expanding range of asymmetrical
threats, such as—
(A) anti-access/area-denial capabilities;
(B) diesel-electric submarines;
(C) mines; and
(D) anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles.
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(c) Form- The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 1022, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Report on naval vessels and the Force Structure Assessment (sec. 1022)
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) to provide a report to the congressional defense committees no later than February 1,
2014, that would assess the current fleet capabilities compared to the threat and the likely
situation over the next 30 years. The CNO should produce an unclassified report, and a
classified annex to that report.
Section 1105 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law
112–239) required the Secretary of the Navy to provide a comprehensive description of the
current requirements for combatant vessels of the Navy, including submarines. The Navy
submitted that report which reflected that, while the previous requirement was for a fleet of
313 ships, originally identified in a 2005 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and revalidated
in 2010, the new requirements have declined to a total of 306 ships.
Within this seven-ship net decrease to 306 ships, actual combat power is reduced by six large
surface combatants, three small surface combatants, and four cruise missile submarines, for a
total reduction of 13 combatant ships, offset by an increase of six command and support
ships. The reduction in cruise missile submarines reflects a Navy plan not to replace these
ships when they retire in the late 2020s.
In congressional testimony this year about the 2012 FSA, representatives of the Department
of the Navy asserted that the revised fleet size goal considered various factors, including the
revised Defense Strategic Guidance in 2012, changed Navy mission requirements, different
individual ship capabilities, fleet networking capabilities, and ship basing arrangements and
operational cycles, as opposed to just platforms or numbers of ships.
The committee notes that the current fleet of 283 battle force ships provides combatant
commanders (COCOM) with a greater array of fire power than did the Navy fleets of 500 or
more ships of the Cold War era, with precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and the sophistication of command, control, communications, and
computer systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; and
networking capabilities that did not exist during the Cold War.
The President’s 2012 revised U.S. defense strategy calls for a rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific region, a predominantly maritime and aerospace domain. This will most likely
increase demands for Navy fleet resources and deployments in that region in competition
with global demand. Regarding global demands for naval forces, Navy officials testified last
year that fully satisfying COCOM requests for forward-deployed Navy forces in various
regions would require more than 500 ships.
The Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels
for FY 2014, dated May 10, 2013, proposes near-term retirements of cruisers and
amphibious ships, resulting in 270 ships, the smallest fleet since 1917. The committee is
concerned that the plan will not meet the goal of a 306-ship battle force inventory until 2037
and assumes risk over the 30-year period, with periodic shortages of aircraft carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The committee notes that the
Navy possesses only 28 amphibious ships, with an average of only 22 ships available for
surge deployment, despite a Marine Corps requirement for 38 amphibious ships. As such, the
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committee is also concerned that the Navy’s shortfall in amphibious ships adds risk to the
Marine Corps’ ability to meet current and future COCOM requests.
There are also risks with the Navy’s plan beyond mere numbers of ships:
(1) within the plan, the Navy intends that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will comprise over
one third of the Navy’s total surface combatant fleet by 2028. This fact compounds risk,
since the LCS to date has not completed operational testing or demonstrated adequate
performance of assigned missions in critical areas of mine countermeasures, anti-surface
warfare, or anti-submarine operations;
(2) with its decision in the fiscal year 2013 budget to delay the procurement of the first Ohioclass replacement ballistic missile submarine by 2 years, to fiscal year 2021, the Navy has
consumed all schedule margin for replacing the existing Ohio-class boats on a timely basis,
and increased the risk that an unforeseen event affecting a strategic missile submarine’s
operational availability would prevent the Navy from being able to fully satisfy U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) requirements; and
(3) the 2012 FSA and the shipbuilding plan do not account for the possible effects of further
budget cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011. Various representatives of the Navy have
testified that, if Department of Defense budgets are reduced below levels shown in the
President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014, the Navy will have to reduce the size and
capabilities of the fleet to reflect further changes in U.S. defense strategy and available Navy
resources.
Given the risks inherent in the planned size of the Navy, the capabilities of the ships planned,
the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the potential affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding
plans at a time of significant uncertainty in defense budgets, the committee agrees that in
order to adequately assess the ability of the fleet proposed by the 2012 FSA to meet national
security requirements, there needs to be an objective set of standards to assess the ability of
the Navy to meet national security objectives, as opposed to simply relying on numbers and
types of platforms.
The committee also believes that a failure to recapitalize our seabased strategic nuclear
deterrent on time would have devastating impacts on deterrence and strategic stability.
Accordingly, the committee directs the CNO to pay particular attention in producing the
report to the Navy’s ability to fully meet STRATCOM requirements. (Pages 172-174)
Section 1023 states:
SEC. 1023. REPEAL OF POLICY RELATING TO PROPULSION SYSTEMS OF ANY
NEW CLASS OF MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF THE STRIKE FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES NAVY.
Section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (10 U.S.C.
7291 note) is repealed.
Regarding Section 1023, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Repeal of policy relating to propulsion systems of any new class of major combatant
vessels of the strike forces of the United States Navy (sec. 1023)
The committee recommends a provision that would repeal section 1012 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181). That section
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requires that the Navy build any new class of major surface combatant and amphibious
assault ship with an integrated nuclear power system, unless the Secretary of the Navy
notifies the congressional defense committees that, as a result of a cost-benefit analysis, it
would not be practical for the Navy to design the class of ships with an integrated nuclear
power system.
As a matter of acquisition management laws and regulations, the Navy must conduct an
analysis of alternatives (AoA) for all such vessels to determine the ship characteristics,
including the required propulsion and power generation mechanism. The AoA outcome for
each surface combatant and amphibious assault ship should be based on an independent and
objective systems engineering and business case analysis. Within that analysis, the Navy can
evaluate the advisability of using an integrated nuclear propulsion system to determine the
best value for the Federal Government. (Pages 174-175)
S.Rept. 113-44 also states:
Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund
Section 8105 of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 113–6)
established the Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund, and appropriated
more than $2.4 billion to the Fund. The Fund was intended to prevent the premature
retirement of seven cruisers and two dock landing ships during fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
This reflected a concern with the proposed retirement plan that the plan: (1) was
disconnected from the defense strategy; (2) created future unaffordable shipbuilding
requirements; and (3) would exacerbate force structure shortfalls that negatively impact the
Department’s ability to meet combatant commander (COCOM) requirements.
The Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels
for fiscal year 2014, date May 10, 2013, proposes to retire these cruisers and amphibious
ships during fiscal year 2015, resulting in a fleet of 270 ships, the smallest fleet since 1917.
The Navy is taking this action despite the fact that keeping these vessels operating until the
end of 2014 will cost, according to the Navy, $931.1 million. The committee believes that
the Navy should use the remaining resources in the Fund to sustain all of these ships.
Available funds would permit the Navy to operate the ships during most of the period futureyears defense program and would permit the Navy and Congress to continue evaluating
options for modernizing and retaining these vessels until the end of their expected service
lives. (Pages 30-31)
S.Rept. 113-44 also states:
LHA–8 design effort
The budget request included $155.3 million in PE [Program Element] 64567N for various
ship design and research and development efforts, including $30.8 million for the next
amphibious assault ship, LHA–8. Within the $30.8 million, $14.5 million is for LHA–8 ship
design. Navy LHA–8 program development and design activities have involved two
shipyards, among other contractors. The Navy intends to begin procurement funding for
LHA–8 in fiscal year 2015.
Repeated Navy shipbuilding programs have shown that failing to complete a ship’s design
before starting construction inevitably leads to cost growth and schedule delays. The
committee believes that the Navy should invest more than it is currently planning to invest in
maturing the design of LHA–8 before starting construction activities.
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Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million in PE 64567N for
maturing the LHA–8 design. (Page 44-45)
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397/S. 1429)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-113 of June 17, 2013) on H.R.
2397, generally supported the Navy’s requests for funding for the procurement of 8 new battle
force ships while recommending increases and reductions to some of the requested amounts.
(Pages 163-164) The report recommended:
•
a $950 million increase to the Virginia class submarine program to “Fully fund
the Virginia class submarine program;”
•
a $96.1 million reduction to the program for performing mid-life nuclear
refueling overhauls on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers for an “Asset due
to prior year above threshold reprogramming;”
•
a $38 million increase for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) program for
“Program shortfall;”Final Version
The final version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of
December 26, 2013) generally supported the Navy’s requests for funding for the procurement of 8
new battle force ships while recommending some adjustments to the requested funding levels.
(See pdf page 402 of 532 of the explanatory statement for H.R. 3304.) The explanatory statement
recommended:
•
an increase of $492 million for the Virginia-class attack submarine program,
which almost matches the $492.3 million sequestered from the program by the
March 1, 2013, sequester (see “Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013
Funding” in “Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014”);
•
an increase of $100 million for the DDG-51 program, to “Help buy [a] 3rd DDG–
51 in FY[20]13”; and
•
an increase of $55.3 million for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)
program, reflecting a “Navy requested adjustment”;
•
an increase of $7.6 million for the JHSV program, which is about one-third as
much as the $21.4 million sequestered from the program by the March 1, 2013,
sequester; and
•
a reduction of $22.1 million in the line item for performing mid-life nuclear
refueling overhauls on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft carriers, reflecting
the funding of a requirement within that was done through a reprogramming of
FY2012 funding.
Section 1021 of the act states:
SEC. 1021. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNUAL LONG-RANGE
PLAN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- Subsection (b) of section 231 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended-(1) in paragraph (1)-(A) by striking `should be designed' both places it appears and inserting `shall be designed';
and
(B) by striking `is capable of supporting' both places it appears and inserting `supports'; and
(2) in paragraph (2)-(A) in subparagraph (B), by inserting `and capabilities' after `naval vessel force structure';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
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`(D) The estimated total cost of construction for each vessel used to determine estimated
levels of annual funding under subparagraph (C).'.
(b) Assessment When Construction Plan Does Not Meet Force Structure RequirementsSuch section is further amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new
subsection (c):
`(c) Assessment When Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan Does Not Meet Force
Structure Requirements- If the annual naval vessel construction plan for a fiscal year under
subsection (b) does not result in a force structure or capabilities that meet the requirements
identified in subsection (b)(2)(B), the Secretary shall include with the defense budget
materials for that fiscal year an assessment of the extent of the strategic and operational risk
to national security associated with the reduced force structure of naval vessels over the
period of time that the required force structure or capabilities are not achieved. Such
assessment shall include an analysis of whether the risks are acceptable, and plans to mitigate
such risks. Such assessment shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the
combatant commands and the Nuclear Weapons Council under section 179 of this title.'.
Regarding Section 1021, the explanatory statement for H.R. 3304 states:
Modification of requirements for annual long-range plan for the construction of naval
vessels (sec. 1021)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1026) that would modify
section 231 of title 10, United States Code, to include a requirement to report on the total
cost of construction for each vessel used to determine estimated levels of annual funding in
the report, and an assessment of the extent of the strategic and operational risk to national
security whenever the number or capabilities of the naval vessels in the plan do not meet
requirements.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with a technical/clarifying amendment. (pdf
pages 200-201 of 532)
Section 1023 of the act states:
SEC. 1023. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT OR INACTIVATION OF
TICONDEROGA CLASS CRUISERS OR DOCK LANDING SHIPS.
(a) Limitation on Availability of Funds- Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2014 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to retire, prepare to retire,
inactivate, or place in storage a cruiser or dock landing ship.
(b) Exception- Notwithstanding subsection (a), the funds referred to in such subsection may
be obligated or expended to retire the U.S.S. Denver, LPD9.
Section 1026 states:
SEC. 1026. REPORT ON NAVAL VESSELS AND THE FORCE STRUCTURE
ASSESSMENT.
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(a) Report Required- Not later than 30 days after the date of the submittal of the annual naval
vessel construction plan required under section 231 of title 10, United States Code, for fiscal
year 2015, the Chief of Naval Operations shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the current requirements for combatant vessels of the Navy and the
anticipated requirements for such vessels during the 30-year period following the submittal
of the report.
(b) Elements- The report required by subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) A description of the naval capability requirements identified by the combatant commands
in developing the Force Structure Assessment in 2005 and revalidating that Assessment in
2010.
(2) The capabilities for each class of vessel that was assumed in the Force Structure
Assessment.
(3) An assessment of the capabilities of the current fleet of combatant vessels of the Navy to
meet current and anticipated requirements.
(4) An assessment of how the Navy is currently managing deployment schedules to meet
combatant commander requirements with a smaller force than specified in the Force
Structure Assessment of 2005, including the impact on-(A) the material condition of the naval force due to longer deployment times; and
(B) long-term retention rates, especially in critical specialties.
(5) An assessment of the capabilities of the anticipated fleet of combatant vessels of the
Navy to meet emerging threats over the next 30 years.
(6) An assessment of how the Navy will meet combatant command requirements for
forward-deployed naval capabilities with a smaller number of ships and submarines.
(7) An assessment of how the Navy will manage the risk of massing a greater set of
capabilities on a smaller number of ships while facing an expanding range of asymmetrical
threats, including-(A) anti-access/area-denial capabilities;
(B) diesel-electric submarines;
(C) mines; and
(D) anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles.
(8) The assessment of the Commandant of the Marine Corps of-(A) the operational risk associated with the current and the planned number of ships of the
amphibious assault force, including vessels designated as LHA, LHD, LPD, or LSD; and
(B) the capabilities required to meet the needs of the Marine Corps for future ships of the
amphibious assault force.
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(c) Form- The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Section 1027 states:
SEC. 1027. MODIFICATION OF POLICY RELATING TO MAJOR COMBATANT
VESSELS OF THE STRIKE FORCES OF THE NAVY.
Section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (10 U.S.C.
7291 note) is amended-(1) by striking subsection (a) and redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and
(b), respectively; and
(2) in subsection (a), as so redesignated-(A) by striking `the request shall be for' and inserting `the request shall include a specific
assessment of'; and
(B) by inserting `in the analysis of alternatives' after `nuclear power system'.
Regarding Section 1027, the explanatory statement for H.R. 3304 states:
Modification of policy relating to major combatant vessels of the strike forces of the Navy
(sec. 1027)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1023) that would repeal
section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181).
That section requires that the Navy build any new class of major surface combatant and
amphibious assault ship with an integrated nuclear power system, unless the Secretary of the
Navy notifies the congressional defense committees that, as a result of a cost-benefit
analysis, it would not be practical for the Navy to design the class of ships with an integrated
nuclear power system.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment that would amend section
1021 to: (1) delete the requirement to include integrated nuclear power systems in any new
ship class, and (2) add the requirement that the Navy analyze integrated nuclear power
alternative in its analysis of alternatives for new ship classes, and report the results of that
analysis in the budget request. (pdf page 203 of 532)
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 11376)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-113 of June 17, 2013) on the
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397), generally supported the Navy’s requests for
funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force ships while recommending increases or
reductions to some of the requested amounts. (Pages 163-164) The report recommended:
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•
a $950 million increase to the Virginia class submarine program to “Fully fund
the Virginia class submarine program”;
•
a $96.1 million reduction to the program for performing mid-life nuclear
refueling overhauls on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers for an “Asset due
to prior year above threshold reprogramming”;
•
a $38 million increase for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) program for
“Program shortfall”;
•
a $23.4 million increase for the Moored Training Ship program for “Program
shortfall,” matching the amount sequestered from the program by the March 1,
2013, sequester; and
•
a $7.6 million increase for the JHSV program for “Program shortfall,” which is
about one-third as much as the $21.4 million sequestered from the program by
the March 1, 2013, sequester.
H.Rept. 113-113 states:
SHIPBUILDING
Despite assurances from the Navy that the shipbuilding account is as healthy as it has ever
been, the Committee remains skeptical. The Navy’s new stated required fleet size is 306
ships, down from the long stated but never achieved fleet size of 313 ships. The annual 30
year shipbuilding report provided by the Navy shows that the fleet will reach the required
fleet size of 306 ships in the year 2037, a full quarter century from now. The Secretary of the
Navy testified that the fleet size will reach the 300 ship mark by the end of the decade. While
this is encouraging, the Committee is concerned the fleet size remains at 300 ships for a
single year, then drops back under 300 until 2024. In fact, of the 30 years that comprise the
plan, the fleet size is under 300 ships for 16 of these years. The fleet size is at the required
306 ships or above for only the final seven years (2037 to 2043) that are displayed in the
report. The Committee believes a truly healthy shipbuilding program should reach and
sustain the required fleet size sooner than the Navy is projecting.
Additionally, the Navy requested authority to incrementally fund a Virginia Class Submarine
in fiscal year 2014. The Congress has authorized and appropriated funding for 18 fully
funded Virginia Class Submarines in the years prior to fiscal year 2014. The Committee does
not understand why funding requested for this particular submarine requires violating the
Department of Defense’s long standing full funding policy. The Committee is puzzled by
Navy claims of billions of dollars in savings for the taxpayers as it is the Committee’s
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understanding that these savings come from the fact that the program is conducting a multiyear procurement of ten submarines and not from the fact that one of the submarines is
incrementally funded. Quality budget discipline, not funding gimmicks, is called for more
than ever in these times of decreasing budgets and budget uncertainty.
Contributing to the poor health of the shipbuilding program is sequestration. As a direct
result of sequestration, a minimum of seven destroyers and submarines from fiscal year 2013
and prior years are no longer fully funded. The cost to make the funding for these ships
whole is just over $1,000,000,000. This funding will be required in the outyears to complete
the construction of these ships. When this funding is added to the funding required to
complete the incrementally funded submarine, the cost to complete these ships is in excess of
$2,000,000,000. This represents funding that will not be available to purchase new
equipment or increase readiness in future years, because it will have to pay the debt incurred
by the Navy in years past. While sequestration is in statute, the Committee is extremely
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concerned about the Navy willfully adding to its outyear liabilities by incrementally funding
a submarine. Therefore, the recommendation provides an additional $950,000,000 to the
Virginia Class Submarine program to fully fund the program. Additionally, the Secretary of
the Navy is directed to utilize the fiscal year 2015 funding currently reserved for the
completion of the submarine to fully fund the ships and programs that were impacted by the
sequestration reductions.
JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL
The Committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to continue to explore missions and
projects that leverage the flexibility of the Joint High Speed Vessel and explore the extension
of the current mission envelope beyond in-theater transport, to include such capabilities as
unmanned aerial systems and air surveillance.
SHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS
The Committee is extremely disappointed in the Navy’s inaction with respect to the seven
cruisers and two amphibious ships that were proposed for decommissioning in the fiscal year
2013 budget. Despite very clear direction from all four congressional defense committees to
keep these ships in the fleet, the Navy has taken no steps that would indicate it is moving
toward keeping the ships for the long term. The ships have significant life remaining and are
less expensive to keep when compared to procuring new ships with similar capabilities. Last
year the Congress provided sufficient funding for the operation and modernization of these
ships through the end of fiscal year 2014 and that funding has gone largely untouched,
indicating an unwillingness to commit to keep these ships in the fleet. The Committee fails to
understand why the Navy would choose to decommission these ships when it is having such
a difficult time maintaining the required fleet size through new procurements.
Therefore, the Committee recommendation rescinds all modernization funding from the
fiscal year 2013 Ship Modernization, Operations, and Sustainment Fund and re-appropriates
the funding in the Other Procurement, Navy, Weapons Procurement, Navy, and Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy accounts. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to
use this funding for the purpose of modernization of these seven cruisers and two
amphibious ships and to retain them in the fleet. (Pages 165-166)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-85 of August 1, 2013) on S.
1429the
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (S. 1429), generally supported the Navy’s requests for funding
for the procurement of eight new battle
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force ships while recommending increases andor reductions
to some of the requested amounts.
(Pages 100-101) The report recommended:
•
a $27.313 million reduction to the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program for
“Restoring acquisition accountability: Reduction in change orders” ($16.2
million) and “Maintaining program affordability: SEWIP [Surface Electronic
Warfare Improvement Program] Block 3 excessive cost growth” ($11.113
million);
•
a $22.1 million reduction to the program for performing mid-life nuclear
refueling overhauls on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers for an
“Improving funds management: CVN 72 requirement previously funded in Fiscal
Year 2012 reprogramming”;
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•
a $227 million increase to the Virginia class attack submarine program for
“Maintain critical industrial base: Virginia class submarine”;
•
a $91 million net increase to the DDG-51 destroyer program, consisting of a
$100 million increase for “Authorization adjustment: DDG–51” and a $9 million
reduction for “Restoring acquisition accountability: Flight III Advance Planning
early to need”;
•
a $55.3 million increase for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) program
for “Improving funds management: Transfer from NDSF [National Defense
Sealift Fund], line 020, for full funding of ASFB #2 only, per Navy request”;
•
a $23.4 million increase for the Moored Training Ship program for “Improving
funds management: Program shortfall, funds transferred per Navy request”; and
•
a $7.6 million increase to the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program for
“Improving funds management: JHSV program shortfall, funds transferred per
Navy request.”
S.Rept. 113-85 states:
Amphibious-class Warship Construction.—The Committee notes that the fiscal year 2014
budget request submitted by the Navy, once again, failed to present a plan to address the
amphibious lift shortfall that exists today. In January 2009, the Navy and Marine Corps
determined a minimum force of 33 ships is the limit of acceptable risk in meeting a 38-ship
amphibious warship force requirement. As of now, there are 28 ships in the Navy’s
amphibious fleet, with an average of only 22 ships operationally available at any given time
due to maintenance and overhaul schedules. This level of assumed risk with amphibious lift
capability by the Department of the Navy deeply concerns the Committee. Of particular
concern is the impact it has on the ability of Commanders to meet operations plans and crisis
response requirements, particularly as instability in the Middle East continues and as the
Department of Defense rebalances its global posture towards the Asia-Pacific region.
The ability to address the amphibious lift shortfall is exacerbated when the Navy funds only
one amphibious class warship in the current 5-year Future Years Defense Program. This lack
of commitment and funding by the Navy will not only have a negative impact on meeting
future operations plans and crisis response requirements, but it will also have a negative
industrial base impact and lead to additional cost growth in multiple shipbuilding programs.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a more responsible
amphibious warship acquisition plan to Congress with the fiscal year 2015 budget
submission.
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DDG–51 Destroyer.—The Committee understands that the DDG–51 program has a
$304,000,000 shortfall due to prior year sequestration reductions, and recommends an
additional $100,000,000 for the DDG–51 to allow the Navy to award the tenth DDG–51
under the current multi-year procurement contract, as previously authorized and
appropriated. The Committee understands that its fiscal year 2014 shipbuilding
recommendations create an outyear asset for the Navy to apply to shortfalls.
Joint High Speed Vessel.—The Committee recommends that the Navy continue to explore
missions and projects that leverage the flexibility of the Joint High Speed Vessel [JHSV] and
extend the mission envelope beyond in-theatre transport, including considering the addition
of an unmanned aerial system and air surveillance capability to the JHSV. (Pages 101-102)
S.Rept. 113-85 also states:
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SHIP MODERNIZATION, OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT FUND
With the fiscal year 2014 budget submission, the Navy again proposes to prematurely retire
seven Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious dock landing ships that
have a combined remaining service life of over 100 years. The Committee notes that this
proposal was rejected by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Appropriations Act; and
that Congress provided significant funds to man, operate, sustain and modernize these ships.
As previously expressed in Senate Report 112–196, the Committee is concerned with this
proposed elimination of force structure and believes it is disconnected from the strategic shift
to the Asia-Pacific, creates future unaffordable shipbuilding requirements, and exacerbates
force structure shortfalls that negatively impact the Department’s ability to meet Combatant
Command requirements.
The Committee notes that some key assumptions that led the Navy to propose prematurely
retiring these ships have changed. This includes the material condition of at least one ship
being superior to what the Navy assumed, as well as the scope and cost of modernization
efforts required for these platforms to maintain their operational relevance for the balance of
their service lives. The Committee believes that further adjustments to projected
modernization efforts could be made, resulting in cost savings while retaining valuable
operational capability in the near-term.
Therefore, the Committee again recommends denying these proposed premature retirements
and retaining this force structure in its entirety. The Committee recommends $2,422,400,000,
to man, operate, sustain, upgrade and modernize only CG–63, CG–64, CG–65, CG–66, CG–
68, CG–69, CG–73, LSD–41 and LSD–46 in the Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund, as specified elsewhere in this act. Recognizing the time required to plan
and execute shipyard availabilities and modernization periods, the Committee makes these
funds available until September 30, 2021. However, the Committee also believes that
upgrades to these ships have been delayed for too long, and therefore directs the Secretary of
the Navy to upgrade at least one of the above listed Ticonderoga-class cruisers starting in
fiscal year 2014. The Committee believes that this recommendation provides the fiscal relief
required by the Navy to maintain this critical force structure and allows the Navy sufficient
time to budget for this force structure in future budget submissions. (Page 10)
Funding for the Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund is provided by Section
8102 of S. 1429 as reported by the committee. The text of Section 8102 is as follows:
Sec. 8102. (a) Of the funds previously appropriated for the `Ship Modernization, Operations
and Sustainment Fund’, $2,098,000,000 is hereby rescinded;
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(b) There is appropriated $2,422,400,000 for the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund’, to remain available until September 30, 2021: Provided, That the
Secretary of the Navy shall transfer funds from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund’ to appropriations for military personnel; operation and maintenance;
research, development, test and evaluation; and procurement, only for the purposes of
manning, operating, sustaining, equipping and modernizing the Ticonderoga-class guided
missile cruisers CG-63, CG-64, CG-65, CG-66, CG-68, CG-69, CG-73, and the Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ships LSD-41 and LSD-46: Provided further, That funds
transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same
time period as the appropriation to which they are transferred: Provided further, That the
transfer authority provided herein shall be in addition to any other transfer authority available
to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall, not less
than 30 days prior to making any transfer from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund’, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of
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such transfer: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall transfer and obligate
funds from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund’ for modernization of
not less than one Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser as detailed above in fiscal year
2014.
Concerning the Navy’s research and development account, S.Rept. 113-85 states:
LHA 8 Amphibious Assault Ship.—The fiscal year 2014 budget request includes $19,967,000
[in research and development funding] for LHA 8 amphibious assault ship preliminary
design efforts. The Committee is aware that the Department of the Navy plans to reintroduce
a well deck and optimize the aviation capability of LHA 8, which is planned for initial
procurement funding in fiscal year 2015. As described in the Senate report accompanying S.
1197, the National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2014, as reported, previous Navy efforts to
start ship construction prior to completing a ship’s design inevitably led to cost growth and
schedule delays. Considering growing fiscal pressure on the national defense budget and
increasing amphibious assault ship demands from combatant commanders for contingency
operations, theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and conventional
deterrence missions, the Committee believes it is essential that LHA 8 be introduced in the
most cost-effective manner. Therefore, the Committee includes an additional $50,000,000
for LHA 8 advance planning and design and directs the Department of the Navy to work
with industry to identify affordability and producibility strategies that will lead to more
efficient construction of a large deck amphibious assault ship. (Pages 161-162)
Final Version
The final version of the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76
of January 17, 2014) generally supported the Navy’s requests for funding for the procurement of
8 new battle force ships while increasing or reducing some of the Navy’s requested amounts. As
detailed on pdf page 160 of 351 of the explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547,
changes to the Navy’s requested amounts include the following:
•
a $27.313 million reduction to the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program, with $16.2
million of the reduction being for “Reduction in change orders” and $11.113
million being for “SEWIP [Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program]
block 3 excess cost growth”;
•
a $950 million increase to the Virginia class submarine program to “Fully fund
the Virginia class submarine program”;
•
an additional $227 million increase to the Virginia class submarine program, with
this amount showing in the line item for completion of prior-year funded ships;
•
a $96.1 million reduction to the program for performing mid-life nuclear
refueling overhauls on existing Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers for an “Asset due
to prior year above threshold reprogramming”;
•
a $100 million increase to the DDG-51 destroyer program for “DDG-51
authorization adjustment,” with this amount showing in the line item for
completion of prior-year funded ships;
•
a $19 million reduction to the DDG-51 destroyer program for “Flight III advance
planning ahead of need”;
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•
a $55.3 million increase for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) program
for “Program shortfall”;
•
a $23.4 million increase for the Moored Training Ship program for “Program
shortfall,” matching the amount sequestered from the program by the March 1,
2013, sequester; and
•
a $7.6 million increase for the JHSV program for “Program shortfall,” which is
about one-third as much as the $21.4 million sequestered from the program by
the March 1, 2013, sequester, with this amount showing in the line item for
completion of prior-year funded ships.
The three altered amounts above that are shown in the line item for completion of prior-year
funded ships are also noted in Section 8072 of the act.
Section 8107 of the act states:
Sec. 8107. (a) Of the funds previously appropriated for the `Ship Modernization, Operations
and Sustainment Fund', $1,920,000,000 is hereby rescinded;
(b) There is appropriated $2,244,400,000 for the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund', to remain available until September 30, 2021: Provided, That the
Secretary of the Navy shall transfer funds from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund' to appropriations for military personnel; operation and maintenance;
research, development, test and evaluation; and procurement, only for the purposes of
manning, operating, sustaining, equipping and modernizing the Ticonderoga-class guided
missile cruisers CG-63, CG-64, CG-65, CG-66, CG-68, CG-69, CG-73, and the Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ships LSD-41 and LSD-46: Provided further, That funds
transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same
time period as the appropriation to which they are transferred: Provided further, That the
transfer authority provided herein shall be in addition to any other transfer authority available
to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall, not less
than 30 days prior to making any transfer from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund', notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of
such transfer: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall transfer and obligate
funds from the `Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund' for modernization of
not less than one Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser as detailed above in fiscal year
2014: Provided further, That the prohibition in section 2244a(a) of title 10, United States
Code, shall not apply to the use of any funds transferred pursuant to this subsection.
In connection with Section 8107, the explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547 states:
SHIP MODERNIZATION, OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT FUND
In the fiscal year 2014 budget submission, the Navy again proposes to prematurely retire
seven Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious dock landing ships that
have a combined remaining service life of over 100 years. It is noted that this proposal was
rejected by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014, as well
as in P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, and in
Division C of P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2013, and that Congress previously appropriated considerable funds to man, operate, sustain,
and modernize these ships. As previously expressed in Senate Reports 113-85 and 112-196,
and in House Reports 113-113 and 112-493, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees are concerned with this proposed elimination of force structure and believe this
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change is disconnected from the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, this
force structure change would likely create future unaffordable shipbuilding requirements and
exacerbate force structure shortfalls that negatively impact the Department's ability to meet
Combatant Command requirements.
It is noted that some key assumptions that led the Navy to propose prematurely retiring these
ships have changed. This includes the material condition of at least one ship being superior
to what the Navy had assumed, as well as the scope and cost of modernization efforts
required for these platforms to maintain their operational relevance for the balance of their
service lives. It is believed that further adjustments to projected modernization efforts could
be made, resulting in cost savings while retaining valuable operational capability in the nearterm. Therefore, these proposed premature retirements are again denied, and the agreement
directs the Secretary of the Navy to retain this force structure in its entirety. The agreement
provides $2,244,400,000 to man, operate, sustain, upgrade, and modernize only CG-63, CG64, CG-65, CG-66, CG-68, CG-69, CG-73, LSD-41 and LSD-46 in the Ship Modernization,
Operations and Sustainment Fund, as specified by Section 8107 of this Act. Recognizing the
time required to plan and execute shipyard availabilities and modernization periods, these
funds are made available until September 30, 2021.
However, upgrades to these ships have been delayed for too long, and therefore the Secretary
of the Navy is directed to upgrade at least one of the above listed Ticonderoga class cruisers
starting in fiscal year 2014. Further, the Secretary of the Navy is directed to provide to the
congressional defense committees, not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act, and
every 90 days thereafter, a written report, unclassified to the greatest extent possible and with
a classified annex if required, detailing for each of the nine ships listed above its readiness,
operational and manning status, planning efforts for modernization, deployment schedules,
as well as scheduled shipyard induction periods dating back to fiscal year 2012 and going
forward for each fiscal year until 2021. The agreement provides the fiscal relief required by
the Navy to maintain this critical force structure and allows the Navy sufficient time to
budget for this force structure in future budget submissions. Therefore, no funds provided in
this Act shall be used to prepare a budget submission to retire the above-listed ships. (pdf
pages 6-8)
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs, see the
following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy
Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests
This appendix presents three instances in 2012 when Navy officials testified that a Navy of more
than 500 ships would be required to fully meet combatant commander COCOM requests for
Navy forces.
March 22, 2012, Hearing
At a March 22, 2012, hearing on Navy readiness before the Readiness subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES:
We have a lot of requests for our combatant commanders—of the validated requests that
come from combatant commanders. How many ships would it take in our navy, based on
your estimation, to meet all of the validated requests from our commanders, combatant
commanders?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Let me—give me just a minute on that, sir.
FORBES:
Please. And if you’d like, on any of these questions, if you’d rather take them for the record
and get back I’m OK with that, too.
BURKE:
I’m—no, I'm happy to answer the question. I just want to make sure I elaborate a little to
make sure we get—get the point right.
FORBES:
Please.
BURKE:
The—the combatant commander requests come in to the—to the services, and then the—
there’s a—a very high number of requirements from the services, or from the—the
combatant commanders which are then prioritized and adjudicated by the joint staff.
Essentially, a way to adjudicate supply—a lesser supply and a greater demand. So—so
those—of those requests that come in, some are determined to be more valid than others, if
you will. But to get to your exact question, of those requests that come in from the combatant
commanders, if we ...
(CROSSTALK)
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FORBES:
Admiral, could—could I just—on the nomenclature, just make sure I’m right, too. As they
come in, one of the first weed-out processes is we determine whether they’re validated or
not. In other words, we go through and make sure they’re legal, they don't have the other
asset somewhere. And—and then we stamp them as validated.
And then like you said, they go through a process where we then look at the resources we
have and allocate what we can. And we adjudicate which ones we can give and which ones
we can’t. So I want the top number. The—the ones that we have validated and said, “Yes,
this is legal, it’s a proper request.”
Of those combatant commander requests, approximately how many ships would it take us to
be able to meet those if we had them?
BURKE:
It would take a navy of over 500 ships to meet the combatant commander requests. And, of
course, it would take a similar increase in the aircraft and—and other parts of the—of the
Navy, as well, to meet the combatant commander requests.5543
March 29, 2012, Hearing
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN D. HUNTER:
If you were to build the amphibs [i.e., amphibious ships] where would you prioritize? I
mean, where would you take money out of to be able to get the Marine Corps to where they
need to be?
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN TERENCE BLAKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES:
Here’s the issue we deal with: I don’t have the luxury of dealing with any single issue in
isolation; I have to deal with it across the entire...
HUNTER:
Well, we can. That’s why I'm asking.
BLAKE:
Well, we have to deal with it, though, across the entire portfolio.
HUNTER:
Sure.
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Source: Transcript of hearing.
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BLAKE:
And so what we have to do is we have to balance the requirement for amphibs, the
requirement for surface combatants, the requirement for the carriers, the submarines—every
category of ships that we have. And so when we do that we then have to say, all right, as we
balance across that where are we going to be able to assume more risk? And that’s how we—
that’s how we end up where we are.
HUNTER:
So you’re saying there is less risk but still risk in the Marine Corps being short on amphibs
than there are in the other—the rest of the picture?
BLAKE:
No. I’m saying that we have assumed risk in all areas. The best example I can give you: It
was only a short time ago, if we tried to fill all the COCOM needs we said the number was
around 400 ships we’d need in the fleet. Today—and we see no abatement in that
commitment or the...
HUNTER:
No (inaudible) signal.
BLAKE:
Today we look at it and we see that we would—if we wanted to hit 100 percent of all the
COCOM requirements we’d need in excess of 500 ships. So what we end up having to do is
we go through the—the global management process and we look at it and we say, here are
our highest priorities, these are how we are going to address them, and then we—we have
those units available and we push that...
HUNTER:
I understand.
I’m going to yield back in just one second.
So I would take from your statement, then, that you did go through a prioritization process
and the amphibs are not at the top of that list. And second, when you say that you assume
risk all the way around I would argue that when you do your risk assessment and you
prioritize your needs the fact that the COCOMs wanted more ships and needed more ships
due to the international environment and where we find ourselves with the world today,
going down is probably – it’s going the wrong way.
We all know that, but I—I would—I would argue that your prioritization—I would like to
see that, if you don’t mind, the—the way that you analyzed this and the—and the way that
you said, hey, we’re going to—we’re going to keep them there to make sure that we have
this over here. That’s all I'm asking for.
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BLAKE:
OK. When we put it together we do it across the entire spectrum; we don’t—and by that I
mean, as we look at the entire requirement we say, this is what we need to do in order to be
able to meet the COCOM demand signal.5644
April 19, 2012, Hearing
At an April 19, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR ROGER WICKER:
Admiral Burke and General Mills, from an operational perspective, the Navy budget cost for
decreases in large amphibious ships among other categories, in my opening statement, I
mentioned that the requests from combatant commanders for amphibious ships has increased
over 80 percent in the last five years—a very dramatic number. What is the reason for that
and what will be the impact if these requests are—are not met?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Senator, thanks for the question. You're right, the COCOM demand signal has gone up
significantly to the point where if we were to meet their—all their requirements, it would
take a Navy of greater than 500 ships.
So, I certainly am not here to begrudge the COCOM demand signal because they have
challenges that they’re trying to deal with. But—but we can’t meet—meet all their demands.
So there is a process in the—in the Pentagon run by the joint staff called the Global Force
Management process by which they take in the COCOM requirements and adjudicate that
along with the forces we have to come to a reasonable allocation of—of force. And so that’s
the—that’s a process we’re dealing with today. We’ve been using that process for a number
of years, and I would expect we will continue to use that process in the future to—to bridge
the gap between supply and demand.57
56
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Source: Transcript of hearing.
Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to
Current or Potential Future Ship Force Levels
In assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy,
observers sometimes compare that number to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, can be a problematic yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because
•
the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time; and
•
the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been
inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more than enough) for the meeting the Navy’s
mission requirements in that year.
Regarding the first bullet point above, the Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of
568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,5846 and as of November 8, 2013, included a total of
285 battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission
requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the November 2013 fleet is intended to meet a considerably
different set of mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both
land- and sea-based military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including
improved Chinese military forces and non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of
FY1987 differed substantially from the November 2013 fleet in areas such as profusion of
precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and the
sophistication of C4ISR systems and networking capabilities.5947
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology, increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles, and
the potential fielding of new types of weapons such as lasers or electromagnetic rail guns.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 285-ship fleet of November 2013 may or may not be capable of performing its
stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be
capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship
5846
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
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mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of
one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Regarding the second of the two bullet points above, it can be noted that comparisons of the size
of the fleet today with the size of the fleet in earlier years rarely appear to consider whether the
fleet was appropriately sized in those earlier years (and therefore potentially suitable as a
yardstick of comparison), even though it is quite possible that the fleet in those earlier years
might not have been appropriately sized, and even though there might have been differences of
opinion among observers at that time regarding that question. Just as it might not be prudent for
observers years from now to tacitly assume that the 285-ship of November 2013 was
appropriately sized for meeting the mission requirements of 2013, even though there currently are
differences of opinion among observers on that question (as reflected, for example, in Table 7)
simply because a figure of 285 ships appears in the historical records for 2013, so, too, might it
not be prudent for observers today to tacitly assume that the number of ships of the Navy in an
earlier year was appropriate for meeting the Navy’s mission requirements that year, even though
there might have been differences of opinion among observers at that time regarding that
question, simply because the size of the Navy in that year appears in a table like Table D-1.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors, as well as the possibility that earlier force-structure plans might not have been
appropriate for meeting the mission demands of their times, suggest that some caution should be
applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force
structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for
example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces
at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today, and there was considerable
debate during those years as to the appropriateness of the 600-ship goal.60
6048
48
Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
Total ships
Attack submarines
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
600-ship
~600
100
Base Force
1993 BUR
a
~450/416
80/~55c
346
45-55
1997 QDR
~305/310b
50/55d
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Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that
the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent
panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report
recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.6149 The
report stated the following, among other things:
•
“The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)
•
“In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)
•
“The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
(...continued)
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Amphibious ships
15e
242/228g
~75h
12
~150
51i
11+1f
~124
41i
11+1f
116
36i
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
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Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
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come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)
•
“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)
•
“Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The
United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
•
“To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)
In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table C-1 compares the Navy’s 306-ship goal
of March 2012 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in
subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.
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Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 306-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel
Ship Type
SSBNs
Navy’s 306-ship goal of
March 2012
Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) (1993)
2010 QDR
Independent
Review Panel
(July 2010)
12-14
18
14
(SSBN force was later
reduced to 14 as a result of
the 1994 Nuclear Posture
Review)
SSGNs
0-4
0
4
(SSGN program did not yet
exist)
SSNs
~48
45 to 55
55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term
goal of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
11 active
11 active + 1
operational/reserve
11 active
~145
124
n/a
(114 active + 10 frigates in
Naval Reserve Force; a total
of 110-116 active ships was
also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
Frigates
~90
n/a
n/a
0
n/a
n/a
0
n/a
(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs
~55
(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
~32
41
(30 operational ships
needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)
(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)
0
26
(to be replaced by LCSs)
(LCS program did not exist)
CLF ships
~29
43
n/a
Support ships
~33
22
n/a
~306
346
346
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
TOTAL ships
n/a
n/a
(numbers above add to
331-341)a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
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America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
a.
The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in
numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships.
In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the
Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s)
fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the thenplanned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.62
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50
Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.
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Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table D-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.6351 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of November 8, 2013.
As discussed in Appendix B, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of
ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more
than enough) for the meeting the Navy’s mission requirements in that year.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
6351
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
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Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1970
769
1992
466
1949
690
1971
702
1993
435
1950
634
1972
654
1994
391
1951
980
1973
584
1995
373
1952
1,097
1974
512
1996
356
1953
1,122
1975
496
1997
354
1954
1,113
1976
476
1998
333
1955
1,030
1977
464
1999
317
1956
973
1978
468
2000
318
1957
967
1979
471
2001
316
1958
890
1980
477
2002
313
1959
860
1981
490
2003
297
1960
812
1982
513
2004
291
1961
897
1983
514
2005
282
1962
959
1984
524
2006
281
1963
916
1985
541
2007
279
1964
917
1986
556
2008
282
1965
936
1987
568
2009
285
1966
947
1988
565
2010
288
1967
973
1989
566
2011
284
1968
976
1990
547
2012
287
1969
926
1991
526
2013
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.
Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table D-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2013) and requested (FY2014-FY2018) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
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Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2018
(Procured FY1982-FY2013; requested FY2014-FY2018)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
5
5
6
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
6
6
5
7
8
4a
5a
3a
8
7
10
11b
11c
8
8
7
9
9
Source: CRS compilation based on Navy budget data and examination of defense authorization and
appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships
that do not count toward the 306-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
a.
The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006,
another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.
b.
The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were
being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in
FY2012, and this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and
Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the JHSV
that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget
submission. The four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to FY2012, however, are
not included in the annual totals shown in this table.
c.
Figure shown does not reflect potential quantity reduction resulting from March 1, 2013, sequester on
FY2013 funding.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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