Multilateral Development Banks:
Overview and Issues for Congress
Rebecca M. Nelson
AnalystSpecialist in International Trade and Finance
November 8, 2013December 2, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41170
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Summary
The multilateralMultilateral development banks (MDBs) include the World Bank and four smaller regional
development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank
(AsDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). The United States is a member of, and major donor to, each
of the MDBs.
The MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic and
social development. Theyprovide financial assistance to developing countries in
order to promote economic and social development. The United States is a member, and donor, to
five major MDBs: the World Bank and four regional development banks, including the African
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
The MDBs primarily fund large infrastructure and other development projects and,
increasingly, provide loans
tied to policy reforms by the government. The MDBs provide nonconcessionalnon-concessional financial
assistance to middle-income countries and some creditworthy low-income
countries on market-basedmarketbased terms. They also provide concessional assistance, including grants and
loans at below-market rate interest rates, to low-income countries.
Critics argue that the MDBs focus on “getting money out the door” (rather than delivering
results), are not transparent, and lack a clear division of labor. They also argue that providing aid
multilaterally relinquishes U.S. control over where and how the money is spent. Proponents argue
that providing assistance to developing countries is the “right” thing to do and has been
successful in helping belowmarket rate interest rates, to low-income countries.
The Role of Congress in U.S. Policy at the MDBs
Congress plays a critical role in U.S. participation in the MDBs through funding and oversight.
Congressional legislation is required for the United States to make financial contributions to the
banks. Appropriations for the concessional windows occur regularly, but appropriations for the
non-concessional windows are less frequent. In FY2011 and FY2012, Congress authorized funds
for U.S. participation in major increases of the non-concessional lending facilities at the MDBs.
Appropriations for the capital increases have been spread out over a five- to eight-year period,
depending on the institution.
Congress exercises oversight over U.S. participation in the MDBs through hearings and
legislative mandates. For example, legislative mandates direct the U.S. Executive Directors to the
MDBs to advocate certain policies and how to vote on various issues at the MDBs. Congress also
issues reporting requirements for the Treasury Department on issues related to MDB activities.
Congress has also tied MDB funding to specific institutional reforms.
Issues for Congress
Effectiveness of MDBs: The impact of MDB financial assistance is debated.
Critics argue that the MDBs focus on “getting money out the door” (rather than
delivering results), are not transparent, and lack a clear division of labor. They
also argue that providing aid multilaterally relinquishes U.S. control over where
and how the money is spent. Proponents argue that providing assistance to
developing countries is the “right” thing to do and has been successful in helping
developing countries make strides in health and education over the past four
decades. They also argue that MDB assistance is important for leveraging funds
from bilateral
donors, promoting policy reforms, and enhancing U.S. leadership.
The Role of Congress in the MDBs
•
Funding: Congressional legislation is required for the United States to make
financial contributions to the MDBs. Appropriations for the concessional
windows occur regularly, but appropriations are far more infrequent for the nonconcessional windows. Unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing
the size of their non-concessional lending facilities. Congress authorized U.S.
contributions to the “general capital increases” of the non-concessional lending
windows in FY2011 for the AsDB and in FY2012 for the other MDBs. The
appropriations for these increases are expected to be spread out over a five- to
eight-year period, depending on the institution.
•
Oversight: In addition to congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress
exercises oversight over U.S. participation in the MDBs through legislative
mandates. These mandates direct the U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs to
advocate certain policies and how to vote on various issues at the MDBs.
Congress also issues reporting requirements for the Treasury Department on
issues related to MDB activities. Congress can also withhold funding for the
MDBs unless certain institutional reforms are met (“power of the purse”).
•
U.S. Commercial Interests: Billions of dollars in contracts are awarded each
year to complete projects financed by the MDBs. Some of these contracts are
awarded to U.S. companies. The World Bank has been discussing major changes
in how companies bid on World Bank projects, and this could be an area that
Congress may want to monitor.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction. donors, promoting policy reforms, and enhancing U.S. leadership.
Changing Landscape of the MDBs: In recent years, several countries have
taken steps to launch two new multilateral development banks: the Chinese-led
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank
(often called the “BRICS Bank,” since its members include Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa). The first major MDBs created in decades, questions
have been raised how they will fit in with existing MDBs. Proponents of the new
institutions argue that they will help address the financing needs of developing
countries and increase the representation of emerging markets in the global
economy. Others have expressed concerns about whether they will undermine
U.S.-led institutions and adopt internationally-recognized best practices on
governance, procurement, and environmental and social safeguards.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
U.S. Commercial Interests: Billions of dollars in contracts are awarded each
year to complete projects financed by the MDBs. The Foreign Commercial
Services (FCS) has representatives at the MDBs who are responsible for
protecting and promoting American commercial interests at the MDBs. Congress
has exercised oversight of MDB procurement policies and U.S. commercial
interests at the banks.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the Multilateral Development Banks .......................................................................... 1
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 2
World Bank ......................................................................................................................... 2
Regional Development Banks ............................................................................................. 32
Operations: Financial Assistance to Developing Countries. ...................................................... 5
Financial Assistance Overover Time .......................................................................................... 5
Recipients of MDB Financial Assistance ............................................................................ 76
Funding: Donor Commitments and Contributions .................................................................... 8
Non-Concessional Lending Windows ................................................................................. 8
Concessional Lending Windows ....................................................................................... 1110
Structure and Organization ....................................................................................................... 1311
Relation to Other International Institutions ....................................................................... 1311
Internal Organization and U.S. Representation ................................................................. 13
Debates about Effectiveness of the MDBs 12
The Role of Congress in U.S. Participation................................................................................. 14
Effectiveness of Foreign Aid.. 13
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs ........................................... 13
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs .................................................. 14
Bilateral vs. Multilateral AidIssues for Congress ............................................................................................. 16
Issues for Congress ............................................. 15
Effectiveness of MDB Financial Assistance ........................................................................... 17
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs15
Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid ........................................... 18
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs .................................................... 18
U.S. Commercial Interest in.... 16
The Changing Landscape the MDBs ................................................................................... 19
Figures
Figure 1. MDB Non-Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present ... 17
U.S. Commercial Interests ................................................... 6
Figure 2. MDB Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present ................................................... 618
Figures
Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000-Present ........... 171. Non-Concessional Financial Assistance: New Commitments, 2000-Present .................. 5
Figure 2. Concessional Financial Assistance: New Commitments, 2000-Present .......................... 6
Tables
Table 1. Overview of MDB Lending Windows ............................................................................... 4
Table 2. MDB Financial Assistance: Top 10 Recipients .................................................................. 7
Table 3. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: U.S. Financial Commitments ..................... 9 10
Table 4. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors ............................................... 10. 9
Table 5. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Cumulative U.S. Contributions ........................ 1210
Table 6. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors ........................................................ 1211
Table 7. U.S. Executive Directors. ................................................................................................. 1312
Table 8. U.S. Voting Power in the MDBs ...................................................................................... 14
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress13
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................... 20
19
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Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 2019
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions that provide financial
assistance, typically in the form of loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote
economic and social development. The term MDBs typically refers toUnited States is a member and significant donor to five
major MDBs. These include the World Bank and four
smaller regional development banks:
•
the the
African Development Bank (AfDB);
•
the Asian Development Bank (AsDB);
•
the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and
•
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).1
The United States is a member of each of these institutions.
(IDB).1 Congress plays an important role in
determining U.S. funding for the MDBs and engaging in oversight of the Administration’s
participation in the MDBsa critical role in shaping U.S. policy at the MDBs through funding and
oversight of U.S. participation in the institutions.
This report provides an overview of the MDBs and highlights major issues for Congress. The first
section discusses how the MDBs operate, including the history of the MDBs, their operations and
organizational structure, and the effectiveness of MDB financial assistance. The second section
discusses the role of Congress in the MDBs, including congressional legislation authorizing and
appropriating U.S. contributions to the MDBs; congressional oversight; and U.S. commercial
interests in the MDBs.
Overview of the Multilateral Development Banks
The MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries, typically in the form of loans and
grants, for investment projects and policy-based loans. Project loans include large infrastructure
projects, such as highways, power plants, port facilities, and dams, as well as social projects,
including health and education initiatives. Policy-based loans provide governments with
financing in exchange for agreement by the borrower country government that it will undertake
particular policy reforms, such as the privatization of state-owned industries or reform in
agriculture or electricity sector policies. Policy-based loans can also provide budgetary support to
developing country governments. In order for the disbursement of a policy-based loan to
continue, the borrower must implement the specified economic or financial policies. Some have
expressed concern over the increasing budgetary support provided to developing countries by the
MDBs. Traditionally, this type of support has been provided by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
Most of the MDBs have two major funds, often called lending windows or lending facilities. One
type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance on market-based terms, typically in
the form of loans, but also through equity investments and loan guarantees.2 Non-concessional
assistance is, depending on the MDB, extended to middle-income governments, some
creditworthy low-income governments, and private sector firms in developing countries.3 The
other type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance at below market-based terms
1
There are also several sub-regional development banks, such as the Caribbean Development Bank and the Andean
Development Corporation. However, the United States is not a member of these sub-regional development institutions,
and they are not discussed in this report. This report also does not discuss the North American Development Bank
(NADBank), a binational financial institution capitalized and governed by the United States and Mexico. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose mandate is to ensure international financial stability, is not an MDB. For
more on the IMF, see CRS Report R42019, International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Martin A. Weiss.
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Most of the MDBs have two funds, often called lending windows or lending facilities. One type
of lending window is used to provide financial assistance on market-based terms, typically in the
form of loans, but also through equity investments and loan guarantees.2 Non-concessional
assistance is, depending on the MDB, extended to middle-income governments, some
creditworthy low-income governments, and private sector firms in developing countries.3 The
other type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance at below market-based terms
2
These carry repayment terms that are lower than those normally required for commercial loans, but they are not
subsidized. See the discussion of financing below.
3
Countries that are eligible for concessional and non-concessional assistance are often referred to as “blend” countries.
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(concessional assistance), typically in the form of loans at below-market interest rates and grants,
to governments of low-income countries.
Historical Background
World Bank
The World Bank is the oldest and largest of the MDBs. The World Bank Group comprises three
sub-institutions that make loans and grants to developing countries: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and
the International Finance Corporation (IFC).4
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference led to the establishment of the World Bank, the IMF, and
the institution that would eventually become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The IBRD
was the first World Bank affiliate created, when its Articles of Agreement became effective in
1945 with the signatures of 28 member governments. Today, the IBRD has near universal
membership with 187 member nations. Only Cuba and North Korea, and a few micro-states such
as the Vatican, Monaco, and Andorra, are non-members. The IBRD lends mainly to the
governments of middle-income countries at market-based interest rates.
In 1960, at the suggestion of the United States, IDA was created to make concessional loans (with
low interest rates and long repayment periods) to the poorest countries. IDA also now provides
grants to these countries. The IFC was created in 1955 to extend loans and equity investments to
private firms in developing countries. The World Bank initially focused on providing financing
for large infrastructure projects. Over time, this has broadened to also include social projects and
policy-based loans.
2
These carry repayment terms that are lower than those normally required for commercial loans, but they are not
subsidized. See the discussion of financing below.
3
Countries that are eligible for concessional and non-concessional assistance are often referred to as “blend” countries.
4
Regional Development Banks
Inter-American Development Bank
The IDB was created in 1959 in response to a strong desire by Latin American countries for a
bank that would be attentive to their needs, as well as U.S. concerns about the spread of
communism in Latin America.5 Consequently, the IDB has tended to focus more on social
projects than large infrastructure projects, although the IDB began lending for infrastructure
projects as well in the 1970s. From its founding, the IDB has had both non-concessional and
concessional lending windows. The IDB’s concessional lending window is called the Fund for
Special Operations (FSO). The IDB Group also includes the Inter-American Investment
Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), which extend loans to private
sector firms in developing countries, much like the World Bank’s IFC.
4
In addition to the IBRD, IDA, and the IFC, the World Bank Group also includes the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The term
“World Bank” typically refers to IBRD and IDA specifically. MIGA and ICSID are not covered in this report, even
though they arguably play an important role in fostering economic development, because they do not make loans and
grants to developing countries. MIGA provides political risk insurance to foreign investors, in order to promote foreign
direct investment (FDI) into developing countries. ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of disputes
between governments and private foreign investors.
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Regional Development Banks
Inter-American Development Bank
The IDB was created in 1959 in response to a strong desire by Latin American countries for a
bank that would be attentive to their needs, as well as U.S. concerns about the spread of
communism in Latin America.5 Consequently, the IDB has tended to focus more on social
projects than large infrastructure projects, although the IDB began lending for infrastructure
projects as well in the 1970s. From its founding, the IDB has had both non-concessional and
concessional lending windows. The IDB’s concessional lending window is called the Fund for
Special Operations (FSO). The IDB Group also includes the Inter-American Investment
Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), which extend loans to private
sector firms in developing countries, much like the World Bank’s IFC.
5
Sarah Babb, Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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African Development Bank
The AfDB was created in 1964 and was for nearly two decades an African-only institution,
reflecting the desire of African governments to promote stronger unity and cooperation among the
countries of their region. In 1973, the AfDB created a concessional lending window, the African
Development Fund (AfDF), to which non-regional countries could become members and
contribute. The U.S.United States joined the AfDF in 1976. In 1982, membership in the AfDB nonconcessional lending window was officially opened to non-regional members. The AfDB makes
loans to private sector firms through its non-concessional window and does not have a separate
fund specifically for financing private sector projects with a development focus in the region.
Asian Development Bank
The AsDB was created in 1966 to promote regional cooperation. Similar to the World Bank, and
unlike the IDB, the AsDB’s original mandate focused on large infrastructure projects, rather than
social projects or direct poverty alleviation. The AsDB’s concessional lending facility, the Asian
Development Fund (AsDF), was created in 1973. Like the AfDF, the AsDB does not have a
separate fund specifically for financing private sector projects, and makes loans to private sector
firms in the region through its non-concessional window.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The EBRD is the youngest MDB, founded in 1991. The motivation for creating the EBRD was to
ease the transition of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and
the former Soviet Union from planned economies to free-market economies. The EBRD differs
from the other regional banks in two fundamental ways. First, the EBRD has an explicitly
political mandate: to support democracy-building activities. Second, the EBRD does not have a
concessional loan window. The EBRD’s financial assistance is heavily targeted on the private
sector, although the EBRD does also extend some loans to governments in CEE and the former
Soviet Union.
5
Sarah Babb, Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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Table 1 summarizes the different lending windows for the MDBs, noting what types of financial
assistance they provide, who they lend to, when they were founded, and how much financial
assistance they committed to developing countries in 2012 or FY20132014 or FY2015.6 The World Bank Group
accounted for more than half of total MDB financial assistance commitments to developing
countries in 2012 or FY20132014 or FY2015.7 Also, about three-quarters of the financial assistance provided by
the MDBs to developing countries was on non-concessional terms during those years.
6
The World Bank reports operations data for the fiscal year (July-June), while the regional MDBs report data on a
calendar year. Throughout this report, World Bank data is for fiscal years and regional MDB data is for calendar years.
7
Including IBRD, IFC, and IDA.
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Table 1. Overview of MDB Lending Windows
MDB
Type of Financing
Type of Borrower
Year
Founded
New
Commitments,
2012 or FY20132014 or FY2015
(Billion $)
World Bank Group
International Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)
Non-concessional
loans and loan
guarantees
Primarily middle-income
governments, also some
creditworthy low-income
countries
1944
15.2523.53
International
Development
Association (IDA)
Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments
1960
16.3019.00
International Finance
Corporation (IFC)
Non-concessional
loans, equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Private sector firms in
developing countries
(middle- and low-income
countries)
1956
18.310.54
African
Development Bank
(AfDB)
Non-concessional
loans, equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome governments, and
private sector firms in the
region
1964
3.24.64
African Development
Fund (AfDF)
Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments in
the region
1972
2.930
Asian
Development Bank
(AsDB)
Non-concessional
loans, equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome governments, and
private sector firms in the
region
1966
10.l23
Asian Development
Fund (AsDF)
Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments in
the region
1973
3.009
European Bank for
Reconstruction
and Development
(EBRD)
Non-concessional
loans equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Primarily private sector firms
in developing countries in
the region, also developingcountry governments in the
region
1991
11.8
6
The World Bank reports operations data for the fiscal year (July – June), while the regional MDBs report data on a
calendar year. Throughout this report, World Bank data is for fiscal years and regional MDB data is for calendar years.
7
Including IBRD, IFC, and IDA.
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MDB
Type of Financing
Type of Borrower
Year
Founded
New
Commitments,
2012 or FY2013
(Billion $)10.75
Inter-American
Development Bank
(IDB)
Non-concessional
loans and loan
guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome governments, and
private sector firms in the
region
1959
10.8012.65
Fund for Special
Operations (FSO)
Concessional loans
Low-income governments in
the region
1959
0.3230
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Note: Throughout the report, World Bank data is for FY2013 (July – June). RegionalFY2015 (July-June) and regional development bank data is
for 20122014 (calendar year), unless otherwise noted. Most of the MDBs also have additional funds that they
administer, typically funded by a
specific donor and/or targeted towards narrowly defined projects. These special funds tend to be small in value
and are not included in this table.Data on IFC
new commitments only includes long-term commitments.
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Operations: Financial Assistance to Developing Countries
Financial Assistance Overover Time
Figure 1 shows non-concessional MDB financial commitments to developing countries since
2000. As a whole, non-concessional MDB financial assistance was relatively stable in nominal
terms until the global financial crisis prompted major member countries to press for increased
financial assistance. In response to the financial crisis and at the urging of its major member
countries, the IBRD dramatically increased lending between FY2008 and FY2009. Regional development
development banks also had substantial upticks in lending between 2008 and 2009. MDB non-concessional
assistance, particularly by the IBRD, has started to fall to pre-crisis levels as the financial crisis
has stabilized.
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Figure 1. MDB Non-Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: AsDB data is loans only (does not include other financial assistance such as equity investments or credit
guarantees funded out of ordinary capital resources).
However, IBRD commitments started rising again in FY2014 and FY2015.
Figure 2 shows concessional financial assistance provided by the MDBs to developing countries
since 2000. The World Bank’s concessional lending arm, IDA, has grown steadily over the
decade in nominal terms, while the regional development bank concessional lending facilities, by
contrast, have remained relatively stable in nominal terms.
Figure 2. MDB 1. Non-Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
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: New Commitments, 2000-Present
Billion US$
$50
IBRD
IFC
AfDB
AsDB
IDB
EBRD
$40
$30
$20
$10
$0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: AsDB data is loans only (does not include other financial assistance such as equity investments or credit
guarantees funded out of ordinary capital resources).
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Figure 2. Concessional Financial Assistance: New Commitments, 2000-Present
Billion US$
IDA
AfDf
AsDF
FSO
$25
$20
$15
$10
$5
$0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Recipients of MDB Financial Assistance
Table 2 lists the top recipients of MDB financial assistance in FY2013FY2015 (for the World Bank) and
20122014 (for the regional development banks). The table shows that several large, emerging
economies, including the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), receive a
steady flow of financial assistance from the non-concessional lending windows of the MDBs. For
example, at least one of the BRIC countries is among the top five recipients of financial
assistance from the IBRD, the IFC, the AfDB, the AsDB, the EBRD, and the IDB in 2012 or
FY2013.
Table 2. MDB Financial Assistance: Top 10 Recipients
(New commitments, Million US$)
World Bank, FY2013
IBRD
African
Development Bank,
2012
IDA
IFC
AfDB
Groupa
Brazil
3,076
Vietnam
1,982
Brazil
1,467
Multinational
1,248
Indonesia
1,721
Bangladesh
1,567
Mexico
1,328
Morocco
1,159
China
1,540
Africa
(regional)
1,470
World Region
1,276
Tunisia
545
Poland
1,308
Ethiopia
1,115
China
1,050
South Africa
420
Turkey
1,301
Nigeria
1,015
Turkey
985
Ghana
259
Colombia
600
India
948
Nigeria
974
Ethiopia
255
Morocco
593
Pakistan
744
India
943
Tanzania
237
Egypt
585
Kenya
615
Russia
819
Gabon
223
Tunisia
500
Tanzania
607
Vietnam
805
Ivory Coast
160
Ukraine
460
Dem. Rep.
of Congo
532
Bangladesh
573
Uganda
103
Asian Development Bank, 2012
European Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development, 2012
Inter-American
Development Bank,
2012
AsDB
EBRD
IDB Groupb
AsDF
India
2,418
Bangladesh
658
Russia
3,407
Brazil
2,009
China
1,809
Vietnam
463
Turkey
1,384
Mexico
1,519
Indonesia
1,233
1,232
Argentina
1,390
Afghanistan
376
Ukraine
Vietnam
822
Cambodia
275
Poland
Philippines
775
Uzbekistan
232
Romania
Uzbekistan
644
Sri Lanka
152
Mongolia
Kazakhstan
496
Laos
140
Kazakhstan
493
Bangladesh
435
Nepal
104
Serbia
355
Venezuela
400
Pakistan
343
Tajikistan
100
Bulgaria
325
Regional
400
Regional
340
Kyrgyz
Republic
95
Croatia
277
Ecuador
365
887
Costa Rica
700
807
Uruguay
629
553
Panama
528
Colombia
515
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
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Notes: Data is for commitments and approvals of new financial assistance project, not disbursements of financial
assistance.
a.
Table 2 also shows the shows the top recipients of concessional financial assistance. Ethiopia and
Bangladesh were top recipients of financial assistance from IDA, the World Bank’s concessional
lending window, in FY2015. For the AsDF, the top recipients of financial assistance in 2012 were
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam.
MDB Financial Assistance to Emerging Markets
Financial assistance from the MDBs to emerging economies is controversial. Some argue that, instead of using MDB
resources, these countries should rely on their own resources, particularly countries like China, which has substantial
foreign reserves holdings and can easily get loans from private capital markets to fund development projects. MDB
assistance, it is argued, would be better suited to focusing on the needs of the world's poorest countries, which do
not have the resources to fund development projects and cannot borrow these resources from international capital
markets.
Others argue that MDB financial assistance provided to large, emerging economies is important, because these
countries have substantial numbers of people living in poverty and MDBs provide financial assistance for projects for
which the government might be reluctant to borrow. Additionally, MDB assistance helps address environmental
issues, promotes better governance, and provides important technical assistance to which emerging economies might
not otherwise have access. Finally, supporters argue that because MDB assistance to emerging economies takes the
form of loans with market-based interest rates, rather than concessional loans or grants, this assistance is relatively
inexpensive to provide and generates income to cover the MDBs’ operating costs.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Table 2. MDB Financial Assistance: Top 10 Recipients
(New commitments, Million US$)
World Bank Group
African
Development
Bank, 2014
IBRD,
FY2015
IDA,
FY2015
IFC, FY2014
AfDB
Groupa
India
2,098
Ethiopia
600
Brazil
1,505
Nigeria
1,388
China
1,822
Bangladesh
375
Nigeria
1,319
Multinational
1,162
1,400
Congo,
Dem. Rep.
220
Colombia
Turkey
1,079
Angola
959
South Africa
341
Egypt
1,400
India
179
China
Ukraine
1,345
Uganda
150
India
943
Morocco
337
Argentina
1,337
Tanzania
122
World Region
830
Kenya
275
Bolivia
100
268
655
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
1,150
Turkey
1,008
Russia
Morocco
1,055
Myanmar
100
Lebanon
510
Cameroon
208
Indonesia
1,000
Rwanda
100
Pakistan
435
Uganda
185
Cameroon
100
Chile
389
Rwanda
144
Poland
966
Asian Development Bank, 2014
European Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development, 2014
Inter-American
Development
Bank, 2014
AsDB
EBRD
IDB Groupb
AsDF
India
2,835
Pakistan
563
Turkey
1,692
Brazil
2,241
China
1,820
Bangladesh
493
Ukraine
1,469
Mexico
2,054
Philippines
975
Vietnam
409
Russia
738
Colombia
932
Pakistan
820
Nepal
325
Poland
721
Ecuador
866
Vietnam
740
Cambodia
226
Egypt
720
Argentina
660
578
Indonesia
554
Sri Lanka
188
Romania
719
Dominican
Republic
Bangladesh
475
Kyrgyzstan
169
Kazakhstan
699
Peru
445
Sri Lanka
344
Afghanistan
149
Serbia
550
Uruguay
343
Azerbaijan
315
Bhutan
101
Croatia
362
Panama
306
Paraguay
Uzbekistan
300
Armenia
86
Macedonia
310
301
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: Data is for commitments and approvals of new financial assistance project, not disbursements of financial
assistance.
a. Approvals for the whole African Development Bank Group, which includes the African Development Bank
(non-concessional financial assistance), the African Development Fund (concessional financial assistance),
and the Nigeria Trust Fund.
b.
b. Approvals for financial assistance from ordinary capital resources (non-concessional financial assistance),
Funds for Special Operation (FSO, concessional financial assistance), and other funds in administration by
the IDB.
Financial assistance from the MDBs to emerging economies is controversial. Some argue that,
instead of using MDB resources, these countries should rely on their own resources, particularly
countries like China which has substantial foreign reserves holdings and can easily get loans from
private capital markets to fund development projects. MDB assistance, it is argued, would be
better suited to focusing on the needs of the world’s poorest countries, which do not have the
resources to fund development projects and cannot borrow these resources from international
capital markets.
Others argue that MDB financial assistance provided to large, emerging economies is important,
because these countries have substantial numbers of people living in poverty and MDBs provide
financial assistance for projects for which the government might be reluctant to borrow.
Additionally, MDB assistance helps address environmental issues, promotes better governance,
and provides important technical assistance to which emerging economies might not otherwise
have access. Finally, supporters argue that because MDB assistance to emerging economies takes
the form of loans with market-based interest rates, rather than concessional loans or grants, this
assistance is relatively inexpensive to provide.
Table 2 also shows the shows the top recipients of concessional financial assistance. Vietnam and
Balgladesh were top recipients of financial assistance from IDA, the World Bank’s concessional
lending window, in FY2013. For the AsDF, the top recipients of financial assistance in 2012 were
Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.Congressional Research Service
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Funding: Donor Commitments and Contributions
MDBs are able to extend financial assistance to developing countries due to the financial
commitments of their more prosperous member countries. This support takes several forms,
depending on the type of assistance provided. The MDBs use money contributed or “subscribed”
by their member countries to support their assistance programs. They fund their operating costs
from money earned on non-concessional loans to borrower countries. Some of the MDBs transfer
a portion of their surplus net income annually to help fund their concessional aid programs.
Non-Concessional Lending Windows
To offer non-concessional loans, the MDBs borrow money from international capital markets and
then re-lend the money to developing countries. MDBs are able to borrow from international
capital markets because they are backed by the guarantees of their member governments. This
backing is provided through the ownership shares that countries subscribe as a consequence of
their membership in each bank.8 Only a small portion (typically less than 5%-10%) of the value
of -10%) of the value of
8
In most cases, the banks do not use the capital subscribed by their developing country members as backing for the
(continued...)
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
these capital shares is actually paid to the MDB (“paid-in capital”). The bulk of these shares
are a
guarantee that the donor stands ready to provide to the bank if needed. This is called
“callable
capital,” because the money is not actually transferred from the donor to the MDB
unless the
bank needs to call on its members’ callable subscriptions. Banks may call upon their
members’
callable subscriptions only if their resources are exhausted and they still need funds to repay
repay bondholders. To date, no MDB has ever had to draw on its callable capital. In recent
decades, the
MDBs have not used their paid-in capital to fund loans. Rather it has been put in financial
financial reserves to strengthen the institutions’ financial base.
Due to the financial backing of their member country governments, the MDBs are able to borrow
money in world capital markets at the lowest available market rates, generally the same rates at
which developed country governments borrow funds inside their own borders. The banks are able
to relend this money to their borrowers at much lower interest rates than the borrowers would
generally have to pay for commercial loans, if, indeed, such loans were available to them. As
such, the MDBs’ non-concessional lending windows are self-financing and even generate net
income.
Periodically, when donors agree that future demand for loans from an MDB is likely to expand,
they increase their capital subscriptions to an MDB’s non-concessional lending window in order
to allow the MDB to increase its level of lending. This usually occurs because the economy of the
world or the region has grown in size and the needs of their borrowing countries have grown
accordingly, or to respond to a financial crisis. An across the board increase in all members’
shares is called a “general capital increase” (GCI). This is in contrast to a “selective capital
increase” (SCI), which is typically small and used to alter the voting shares of member countries.
The voting power of member countries in the MDB is determined largely by the amount of
capital contributed and through selective capital increases; some countries subscribe a larger
share of the new capital stock than others to increase their voting power in the institutions. GCIs
happen infrequently. Quite unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing the size of
their non-concessional windows. Simultaneous forhad GCIs following the global financial crisis
of 2008-2009; simultaneous capital increases for all the MDBs has not
occurred since the mid-1970s.
Table 3 summarizes current U.S. capital subscriptions to the MDB non-concessional lending
windows. Currently, the largest U.S. share of subscribed MDB capital is with the IDB at nearly
30% while its smallest share among the MDBs is with the AsDB at just above 6%.
(...continued) occurred since the mid1970s. U.S. participation in the GCIs is discussed in greater detail in
8
In most cases, the banks do not use the capital subscribed by their developing country members as backing for the
bonds and notes they sell to fund their market-rate loans to developing countries, but instead just use the capital
subscribed by their developed country members.
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Table 3 summarizes current U.S. capital subscriptions to the MDB non-concessional lending
windows. Currently, the largest U.S. share of subscribed MDB capital is with the IDB at over
30%, while its smallest share among the MDBs is with the AfDB at just above 6%.
Table 3. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: U.S. Financial Commitments
MDB
U.S. Paid-in
Capital
U.S. Callable
Capital
Total U.S.
Commitment
U.S.
Share
Billion $
Billion $
Billion $
%
World Bank. FY2013
IBRD
2.23
33.58
35.81
16.05FY2015
IBRD
2.67
40.50
43.17
17.07
IFC
0.57
—
0.57
23.6922.19
Regional Development Banks, 20122014
AfDB
0.26
6.17
6.43
6.63
AsDB
1.27
24.17
25.45
15.60
EBRD
0.83
3.13
3.96
10.14
IDB
1.39
32.66
34.05
29.1330
5.79
6.10
6.60
AsDB
1.19
22.63
23.83
15.57
EBRD
0.76
2.88
3.64
10.11
IDB
1.61
42.91
44.52
32.05
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: Values may not add due to rounding.
Table 4 lists the top donors to the MDBs’s non-concessional facilities. The United States has the
largest financial commitments to the non-concessional lending windows to the IBRD, the IFC,
the EBRD, and the IDB. The United States is also essentially tied with Japan for the largest financial
financial commitment to the AsDB. The United States is also a substantialthe second largest donor to the
AfDB.
Other top donor states include Western European countries, Japan, and Canada. Additionally,
several regional members have large financial stakes in the regional banks. For example, among
the regional members, China and India are large contributors to the AsDB; Nigeria, Egypt,
Algeria, and and
South Africa are large contributors to the AfDB; Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela
are large
contributors to the IDB; and Russia is a large contributor to the EBRD.
Table 4. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows:Top Donors
(Financial commitment, including callable and paid-in capital, as a % of total financial commitments)
World Bank, FY2013FY2015
IBRD
%
IFC
%
United States
16.0517.07
United States
23.69
Japan
8.94
Japan
5.87
China
5.76
Germany
5.36
Germany
4.73
France
5.04
France
4.22
UK
5.04
United
Kingdom
4.22
Canada
3.38
Canada
3.15
India
3.38
India
3.07
Italy
3.38
Italy
2.54
Russia
3.00
Russia
2.48
Netherlands
2.34
Saudi Arabia
2.48
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Japan
7.89
Japan
6.33
China
5.09
Germany
5.02
Germany
4.61
UK
4.72
UK
4.13
France
4.72
France
4.13
Russia
4.01
India
3.20
India
4.01
Saudi Arabia
3.17
Italy
3.17
Russia
2.97
Canada
3.17
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Canada
2.78
China
2.41
Regional Development Banks, 20122014
AfDB
%
AsDB
%
EBRD
%
IDB
%
Nigeria
9.3420
Japan
15.6168
United States
10.1411
United States
29.1375
United States
6.6307
United States
15.60
France
8.6457
UK
8.62
Argentina
10.5811.09
Japan
5.5257
China
6.44
Germany
8.6447
Japan
8.62
Brazil
10.5811.09
Egypt
5.4028
India
6.33
Italy
8.64
Canada
6.92
South Africa
4.84
Australia
5.79
Japan
8.64
Mexico
6.80
Algeria
4.23
Indonesia
5.44
United
Kingdom
8.64
Venezuela
4.98
Germany
4.13
Canada
5.23
Russia
4.06
Japan
4.85
Libya
4.06
Korea
5.04
Canada
3.45
Chile
2.90
Canada
3.83
Germany
4.33
Spain
3.45
Colombia
2.90
France
3.78
Malaysia
2.72
European
Investment
Bank
3.04
France
1.84
European
Union
3.04
Germany
1.84
Italy
1.84
Spain
1.8436
Italy
8.62
Mexico
7.13
Canada
4.59
Australia
5.81
Germany
8.62
Japan
4.96
Germany
4.18
Canada
5.25
France
8.62
Canada
4.93
Algeria
4.05
Indonesia
5.13
Russia
4.05
Venezuela
4.03
South Africa
4.02
Korea
5.06
Spain
3.44
Colombia
3.04
France
3.81
Germany
4.35
3.44
Chile
3.04
Morocco
3.75
Malaysia
2.74
Canada
European
Union
European
Investment
Bank
3.03
Spain
1.93
3.03
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Concessional Lending Windows
Concessional lending windows do not issue bonds; their funds are contributed directly from the
financial contributions of their member countries. Most of the money comes from the more
prosperous countries, while the contributions from borrowing countries are generally more
symbolic than substantive. The MDBs have also transferred some of the net income from their
non-concessional windows to their concessional lending window in order to help fund
concessional loans and grants.
As the MDB extends concessional loans and grants to low-income countries, the window’s
resources become depleted. The donor countries meet together periodically to replenish those
resources. Thus, these increases in resources are called replenishments, and most occur on a
planned schedule ranging from three to five years. If these facilities are not replenished on time,
they will run out of lendable resources and have to substantially reduce their levels of aid to poor
countries.
Table 5 summarizes cumulative U.S. contributions to the MDB concessional lending windows.
The U.S. share of total contributions is highest to the IDB’s concessional lending window and
lowest to the AsDB’s concessional lending window.
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Table 5. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Cumulative U.S. Contributions
MDB
U.S. Contribution
U.S. Share
Billion $
%
46.54
20.75
AfDF
3.53
10.91
AsDF
3.78
10.25
EBRD
—50.42
20.63
3.80
10.03
World Bank, FY2013FY2015
IDA
Regional Development Banks, 2012
IDB: FSO
—
5.07
49.582014
AfDF
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
AsDF
3.97
11.92
EBRD
—
—
5.08
49.58
IDB: FSO
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: EBRD does not have a concessional lending window. Data may be pledged or actual paid-in
commitments, depending on the institution.
Table 6 shows the top donor countries to the MDB concessional facilities. The United States has
made the highest cumulative contributions to IDA and the IDB’s FSO, and the second -highest
cumulative contributions to the AfDF and the AsDF, after Japan. Other top donor states include
the more prosperous member countries:, including Japan, Canada, and those in Western Europe.
Within the
FSO, regional members including Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela have also made
made substantial contributions.
Table 6. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors
(Cumulative contributions)
World Bank, FY2013
IDA
%FY2015
IDA
Regional Development Banks, 2012
2014
%
AfDF
%
AsDF
%
IDB: FSO
%
United States
20.75
Japan
11.31
Japan
50.07
United States
49.58
Japan
18.23
United States
10.91
United States
10.25
Japan
6.09
United Kingdom
11.14
Germany
10.26
Germany
5.31
Brazil
5.60
Germany
10.73
France
10.22
Canada
4.91
Argentina
5.20
France
7.09
United Kingdom
8.60
Australia
4.53
Mexico
3.38
Canada
4.56
Canada
7.18
France
3.73
Canada
3.20
Italy
4.26
Italy
5.72
United Kingdom
3.11
Venezuela
3.08
Netherlands
3.66
Sweden
5.30
Italy
2.52
Germany
2.36
Sweden
3.33
Norway
4.38
Netherlands
2.28
France
2.27
Belgium
1.81
Netherlands
4.16
Switzerland
1.35
Italy
2.22
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Note: EBRD does not have a concessional lending window. Data may be pledged or actual paid-in commitments,
depending on the institution.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Structure and Organization
Relation to Other International Institutions
The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United Nations. However, it is autonomous in its
decision-making procedures and its sources of funds. It also has autonomous control over its
administration and budget. The regional development banks are independent international
agencies and are not affiliated with the United Nations system. All the MDBs must comply with
directives (for example, economic sanctions) agreed to (by vote) by the U.N. Security Council.
However, they are not subject to decisions by the U.N. General Assembly or other U.N. agencies.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Internal Organization and U.S. Representation
The MDBs have similar internal organizational structures. Run by their own management and
staffed by international civil servants, each MDB is supervised by a Board of Governors and a
Board of Executive Directors. The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making authority,
and each member country has its own governor. Countries are usually represented by their
Secretary of the Treasury, Minister of Finance, or Central Bank Governor. The United States is
currently represented by the Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew. The Board of Governors meets annually,
though may act
more frequently through mail-in votes on key decisions.
While the Boards of Governors in each of the Banks retain power over major policy decisions,
such as amending the founding documents of the organization, they have delegated day-to-day
authority over operational policy, lending, and other matters to their institutions’ Board of
Executive Directors. The Board of Executive Directors in each institution is smaller than the
Board of Governors. There are 24 members on the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors,
and fewer for some of the regional development banks. Each MDB Executive Board has its own
schedule, but they generally meet at least weekly to consider MDB loan and policy proposals and
oversee bank activities.
The current U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs are listed in Table 7. TwoOne U.S. Executive
Director positions at the MDBs areposition is currently vacant. When an Executive Director position is
vacant, the rules
governing the MDBs generally permit Alternate Executive Directors, if
appointed, to fulfill the
same roles and functions as an Executive Director would. When both the
Executive Director and
Alternate Director positions are vacant at a MDB, Treasury considers
what interim steps are
needed to ensure effective U.S. participation, taking into account personnel
and legal constraints,
as well as the bylaws of the particular institution.
Table 7. U.S. Executive Directors
MDB
U.S. Executive Director
World Bank
Vacant
AfDB
Jones Walter Crawford
AsDB
Robert Orr
EBRD
Vacant
IDB
Gustavo Arnavata
Source: MDB websites.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
a.
In September 2013, the Obama Administration announced it was nominating Mark Lopes to be the U.S.
Executive Director at the IDB, pending Senate confirmationMatthew T. McGuire
AfDB
(Vacant)a
AsDB
Robert Orr
EBRD
Marisa Lago
IDB
Mark Lopes
Source: MDB websites.
a. Marcia Occomy was nominated in February 2015 for this position.
Decisions are reached in the MDBs through voting. Each member country’s voting share is
weighted on the basis of its cumulative financial contributions and commitments to the
organization.9 Table 8 shows the current U.S. voting power in each institution. The voting power
of the United States is large enough to veto major policy decisions at the World Bank and the
IDB. However, the United States cannot unilaterally veto more day-to-day decisions, such as
individual loans.
9
This is not necessarily the case with the MDBs’ concessional windows, though. In order to insure that borrower
countries have at least some say in these organizations, the contributions of donor countries in some recent
replenishments have not given the donor countries additional votes. In all cases, though, the donor countries together
have a comfortable majority of the total vote.
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Table 8. U.S.Voting Power in the MDBs
MDB
U.S. Voting
Share (%)
World Bank Group, FY2013FY2015
IBRD
15.1916.16
IDA
10.7147
IFC
22.4120.99
Regional Banks, 20122014
AfDB
6.5956
AfDF
5.4932
AsDB
12.7875
IDB
30.0302
EBRD
10.16
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Debates about Effectiveness of the MDBs
Effectiveness of Foreign Aid
The effectiveness of foreign aid, including the aid provided by MDBs, in spurring economic
development and reform in developing countries, is contested. Many academic studies of foreign
aid effectiveness typically examine the effects of total foreign aid provided to developing
countries, including both bilateral aid and multilateral aid. With bilateral aid, most U.S. resources
go directly to programs and projects in developing countries. With multilateral aid, multilateral
organizations, like the MDBs, pool money from different donors and then provide money to fund
programs and projects in developing countries. The results of these studies that examine the
effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid are mixed, with conclusions ranging from (a) aid is
ineffective at promoting economic growth10 to (b) aid is effective at promoting economic
9
This is not necessarily the case with the MDBs’ concessional windows, though. In order to insure that borrower
countries have at least some say in these organizations, the contributions of donor countries in some recent
replenishments have not given the donor countries additional votes. In all cases, though, the donor countries together
have a comfortable majority of the total vote.
10
E.g., see William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 3
(Summer 2003), pp. 23-48.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
growth11 to (c) aid is effective at promoting growth in some countries under specific
circumstances (such as when developing-country policies are strong).12 The divergent results of
these academic studies make it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the overall effectiveness
of aid.
Beyond the debates about the overall effectiveness of foreign aid, there are also criticisms of the
providers of foreign aid. Many of these criticisms are made broadly about multilateral aid
organizations and government aid agencies, and are not targeted at the MDBs specifically. For
example, it is argued that the national and international bureaucracies that dispense foreign aid
focus on “getting money out the door” to developing countries, rather than on delivering services
to developing countries; emphasize short-term outputs like reports and frameworks but do not
engage in long-term activities like the evaluation of projects after they are completed; and put
enormous administrative demands on developing-country governments.13 Bilateral and
multilateral foreign aid agencies have also been criticized for their lack of transparency about
their operating costs and how they spend their aid money; the fragmentation of foreign aid across
many small aid bureaucracies that are not well coordinated; and the proportion of foreign aid that
goes to corrupt leaders or is spent ineffectively.14 However, some analysts contend that among
government and international foreign agencies, MDBs ranked among the best for adhering to
foreign aid “best practices.”15 Many of these criticisms and proposals for change are discussed in
a March 2010 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the international financial
institutions (IFIs).16
Proponents of foreign aid argue that, despite some flaws, such aid at its core serves vital
economic and political functions. With 1.4 billion people in the developing world (one in four
people in the developing world) living on less than $1.25 a day in 2005,17 some argue that not
providing assistance is simply not an option; they argue it is the “right” thing to do and part of
“the world’s shared commitments to human dignity and survival.”18 These proponents typically
point to the use of foreign aid to provide basic necessities, such as food supplements, vaccines,
nurses, and access to education, to the world’s poorest countries. Additionally, proponents of
foreign aid argue that, even if foreign aid has not been effective at raising overall levels of
economic growth, foreign aid has been successful in dramatically improving health and education
in developing countries over the past four decades. For example, it is argued that foreign aid
contributed to rising life expectancy in developing countries from 48 years to 68 years over the
past four decades, and lowering infant mortality from 131 out of every 1,000 babies born in
11
E.g., see Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik Hansen, “On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies,” Journal of Development
Studies, vol. 37, no. 6 (August 2001), pp. 17-41.
12
E.g., see Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4
(September 2000), pp. 847-868.
13
William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” Foreign Policy, vol. 131 (July-August 2002), pp. 40-49.
14
William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze, “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2008). For more on foreign aid reform, also see CRS Report
R40102, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed and CRS
Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein.
15
Ibid.
16
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The International Financial Institutions: A Call for Change,
111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2010, http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/55285.pdf.
17
World Bank, New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live On Less Than US$1.25 A Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains
Strong, August 26, 2008, http://go.worldbank.org/F9ZJUH97T0.
18
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (Penguin Books, 2006), p. xvi.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
developing countries to 36 out of every 1,000 babies.19 It is also argued that providing foreign aid
is an important component of U.S. national security policy and U.S. leadership in the world.
Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid
There are also policy debates about the merits of giving aid bilaterally or multilaterally.20 Bilateral
aid gives donors more control over where the money goes and how the money is spent. For
example, donor countries may have more flexibility to allocate funds to countries that are of
geopolitical strategic importance, but not facing the greatest development needs, than might be
possible by providing aid through a multilateral organization. By building a clear link between
the donor country and the recipient country, bilateral aid may also garner more goodwill from the
recipient country towards the donor than if the funds had been provided through a multilateral
organization.
Providing aid through multilateral organizations offers different benefits for donor countries.
Multilateral organizations pool the resources of several donors, allowing donors to share the cost
of development projects (often called burden-sharing). Additionally, donor countries may find it
politically sensitive to attach policy reforms to loans or to enforce these policy reforms.
Multilateral organizations can usefully serve as a scapegoat for imposing and enforcing
conditionality that may be politically sensitive to attach to bilateral loans. Finally, many believe
that providing funds to multilateral organizations is important for enhancing and symbolizing
U.S. leadership in the world economy.
The United States provides most of its foreign aid for promoting economic and social
development bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Data from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reports that
in 2011, 12% of U.S. foreign aid disbursed to developing countries with the purpose of promoting
economic and social development was provided through multilateral institutions, while 88% was
provided bilaterally.21 Figure 3 shows that the level of multilateral aid disbursed by the United
States has remained fairly constant since 2000, although U.S. bilateral aid for development has
increased.
OECD-DAC data allows comparison of the United States with other developed countries.
Generally, other developed countries typically disburse a higher proportion of their development
assistance through multilateral institutions than the United States does. For example, 34% of
Germany’s, 20% of Japan’s, and 38% of the United Kingdom’s foreign aid for economic and
social development in 2011 was disbursed to multilateral organizations.22
19
William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 176-177.
For more on the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid, see, for example: Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley,
“The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy,” Working Paper, February 10, 2010 and
Helen Milner, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems,” in Delegation and
Agency in International Organizations, eds. Darren Hawkins et al. (New York City: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 107-139.
21
See the note in Figure 3 for explanation of OECD aid data. It does not, for example, include military assistance
provided by the United States or the callable capital committed by the United States to the MDBs.
22
Gross disbursements at current prices.
20
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000Present
(Billion $)
Source: OECD.
Notes: DAC reports data on gross disbursements at current prices of official development assistance (ODA).
ODA is defined as flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions which are administered with the
promotion of economic development and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least
25%. DAC data does not include, for instance, other official flows including military assistance. DAC data also
focuses on the disbursements of ODA, and would not include, for example, the callable capital committed by the
United States to the MDBs, because this money has never actually been disbursed from the United States to the
MDBs. Also, multilateral organizations not only include the MDBs but also U.N. agencies.
An alternative data source for U.S. multilateral and bilateral economic assistance to developing
countries is U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorization, published by
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).23 According to this publication, commonly
referred to as the “Greenbook,” 8.4% of U.S. economic assistance in 2011 was provided to
multilateral organizations. The data is drawn from the same source as the data provided by the
United States to the OECD-DAC, but the totals are different due to differences between the
definitions of economic assistance used by OECD-DAC and the Greenbook.
Issues for Congress
Congress plays an important role in authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the
MDBs and exercising oversight of U.S. participation in these institutions. The MDBs provide
commercial opportunities for U.S. firms, and one area of potential oversight is potential changes
to the procurement policies at the MDBs. For more details on U.S. policy-making at the MDBs,
see CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and
Implements Policy, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
23
Available at http://catalog.data.gov/dataset/us-overseas-loans-and-grants-greenbook.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs
Authorizing and appropriations legislation is required for U.S. contributions to the MDBs. The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Financial Services are
responsible for managing MDB authorization legislation. During the past several decades,
authorization legislation for the MDBs has not passed as freestanding legislation. Instead, it has
been included through other legislative vehicles, such as the annual foreign operations
appropriations act, a larger omnibus appropriations act, or a budget reconciliation bill. The
Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
manage the relevant appropriations legislation. MDB appropriations are included in the annual
foreign operations appropriations act or a larger omnibus appropriations act.
In recent years, the Administration’s budget request for the MDBs has included three major
components: funds to replenish the concessional lending windows, funds to increase the size of
the non-concessional lending windows (the “general capital increases”), and funds for more
targeted funds administered by the MDBs, particularly those focused on climate change and food
security.24 Replenishments of the MDB concessional windows happen regularly, while capital
increases for the MDB non-concessional windows occur much more infrequently. Quite
unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing their non-concessional windows,
primarily to address the increase in demand for loans that resulted from the financial crisis,
prepare for future crises, and, in the case of the IDB, recover from financial losses resulting from
the financial crisis. Simultaneous capital increases for all the MDBs has not happened since the
1970s. For more information on the general capital increases, see CRS Report R41672,
Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases, by Martin A. Weiss. Data on U.S.
contributions (including requests and appropriated funds) to the MDBs can be found in CRS
Report RS20792, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2014, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs
As international organizations, the MDBs are generally exempt from U.S. law. The President has
delegated the authority to manage and instruct U.S. participation in the MDBs to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Within the Treasury Department, the Office of International Affairs has the lead role
in managing day-to-day U.S. participation in the MDBs. The President appoints the U.S.
Executive Directors, and their alternates, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, the
Senate can exercise oversight through the confirmation process.
Over the years, Congress has played a major role in U.S. policy towards the MDBs. In addition to
congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress has enacted a substantial number of legislative
mandates that oversee and regulate U.S. participation in the MDBs. These mandates generally fall
into one of four major types. More than one type of mandate may be used on a given issue area.
24
For information about the FY2013 budget request, see U.S. Department of Treasury, International Programs:
Justification for Appropriations, FY2013 Budget Request, http://www.treasury.gov/about/budgetperformance/Documents/FY2013_CPD_FINAL_508.pdf.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
First, some legislative mandates direct how the U.S. representatives at the MDBs can vote on
various policies. Examples include mandates that require the U.S. Executive Directors to oppose:
(a) financial assistance to specific countries, such as Burma, until sufficient progress is made on
human rights and implementing a democratic government;25 (b) financial assistance to broad
categories of countries, such as major producers of illicit drugs;26 and (c) financial assistance for
specific projects, such as the production of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops for export if the
financial assistance would cause injury to United States producers.27 Some legislative mandates
require the U.S. Executive Directors to support, rather than oppose, financial assistance. For
example, a current mandate allows the Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors
to vote in favor of financial assistance to countries that have contributed to U.S. efforts to deter
and prevent international terrorism.28
Second, legislative mandates direct the U.S. representatives at the MDBs to advocate for policies
within the MDBs. One example is a mandate that instructs the U.S. Executive Director to urge the
IBRD to support an increase in loans that support population, health, and nutrition programs.29
Another example is a mandate that requires the U.S. Executive Directors to take all possible steps
to communicate potential procurement opportunities for U.S. firms to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the business community.30
Mandates that call for the U.S. Executive Director to both vote and advocate for a particular
policy are often called “voice and vote” mandates.
Third, Congress has also passed legislation requiring the Treasury Secretary to submit reports on
various MDB issues (reporting requirements). Some legislative mandates call for one-off reports;
other mandates call for reports on a regular basis, typically annually. For example, current
legislation requires the Treasury Secretary to submit an annual report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the actions taken by countries that have borrowed from the MDBs
to strengthen governance and reduce the opportunity for bribery and corruption.31
Fourth, Congress has also attempted to influence policies at the MDBs through “power of the
purse,” that is, withholding funding from the MDBs or attaching stipulations on the MDBs’s use
of funds. For example, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act stipulates that 10% of the
funds appropriated to the AsDF will be withheld until the Treasury Secretary can verify that the
AsDB has taken steps to implement specific reforms aimed at combating corruption.32
U.S. Commercial Interest in the MDBs
Billions of dollars of contracts are awarded to private firms each year in order to acquire the
goods and services necessary to implement projects financed by the MDBs. MDB contracts are
25
Section 570(a)(2) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208). Also on human rights
more broadly, see 22 USCS §262d.
26
22 USC §2291j(a)(2).
27
22 USC §262g.
28
22 USC §262p-4r(a).
29
22 USC §262p-4m.
30
22 USC §262s-1.
31
22 USC §262r-6(b)(2).
32
Section 7086 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117).
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
awarded through international competitive bidding processes, although most MDBs allow the
borrowing country to give some preference to domestic firms in awarding contracts for MDBfinanced projects in order to help spur development.
U.S. commercial interest in the MDBs has been and may continue to be a subject of
Congressional attention, particularly if the banks expand their lending capacity for infrastructure
projects through the GCIs. One area of focus may be the Foreign Commercial Services (FCS)
representatives to the MDBs, who are responsible for protecting and promoting American
commercial interests at the MDBs.33 Some in the business community are concerned about the
impacts of possible budget cuts to the U.S. FCS, particularly if other countries are taking a
stronger role in helping their businesses bid on projects financed by the MDBs.
There may also be interest in discussions about policy changes for procurement standards at the
World Bank, who awards the largest number and highest volume of contracts each year. In
January 2011, the World Bank Executive Board approved a pilot program for a new lending
instrument, “Program for Results,” or P4R.34 This new lending instrument links the disbursement
of funds directly to the delivery of defined results. Proponents argue that P4R will help
developing countries improve the design and implementation of their development programs, and
help strengthen their institutions and build capacity. Opponents argue that relying on country’s
own systems could undermine adequate social and environmental safeguards, while also
undermining transparency objectives and accountability commitments.35
Author Contact Information
Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Acknowledgments
Amber Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist, prepared the graphs.
33
For more information, see http://www.export.gov/advocacy/eg_main_022753.asp.
World Bank, “Program-for-Results Financing (PforR),” Accessed April 16, 2012, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTRESLENDING/
0,,contentMDK:22748955~pagePK:7321740~piPK:7514729~theSitePK:7514726,00.html.
35
Bank Information Center, “P4R Update: World Bank Approves Program for Results Policy,” February 29, 2012,
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.12602.aspx.
34
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2013
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
The Role of Congress in U.S. Participation
Congress plays an important role in authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the
MDBs and exercising oversight of U.S. participation in these institutions. For more details on
U.S. policy-making at the MDBs, see CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks:
How the United States Makes and Implements Policy, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A.
Weiss.
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs
Authorizing and appropriations legislation is required for U.S. contributions to the MDBs. The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Financial Services are
responsible for managing MDB authorization legislation. During the past several decades,
authorization legislation for the MDBs has not passed as freestanding legislation. Instead, it has
been included through other legislative vehicles, such as the annual foreign operations
appropriations act, a larger omnibus appropriations act, or a budget reconciliation bill. The
Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
manage the relevant appropriations legislation. MDB appropriations are included in the annual
foreign operations appropriations act or a larger omnibus appropriations act.
In recent years, the Administration’s budget request for the MDBs has included three major
components: funds to replenish the concessional lending windows, funds to increase the size of
the non-concessional lending windows (the “general capital increases”), and funds for more
targeted funds administered by the MDBs, particularly those focused on climate change and food
security.10 Replenishments of the MDB concessional windows happen regularly, while capital
10
For information about the FY2013 budget request, see U.S. Department of Treasury, International Programs:
Justification for Appropriations, FY2013 Budget Request, http://www.treasury.gov/about/budgetperformance/Documents/FY2013_CPD_FINAL_508.pdf.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
increases for the MDB non-concessional windows occur much more infrequently. Quite
unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing their non-concessional windows,
primarily to address the increase in demand for loans that resulted from the financial crisis,
prepare for future crises, and, in the case of the IDB, recover from financial losses resulting from
the financial crisis. Simultaneous capital increases for all the MDBs has not happened since the
1970s. For more information on the general capital increases, see CRS Report R41672,
Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases, by Martin A. Weiss. Data on U.S.
contributions (including requests and appropriated funds) to the MDBs can be found in CRS
Report RS20792, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2015, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs
As international organizations, the MDBs are generally exempt from U.S. law. The President has
delegated the authority to manage and instruct U.S. participation in the MDBs to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Within the Treasury Department, the Office of International Affairs has the lead role
in managing day-to-day U.S. participation in the MDBs. The President appoints the U.S.
Governors and Executive Directors, and their alternates, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Thus, the Senate can exercise oversight through the confirmation process.
Over the years, Congress has played a major role in U.S. policy towards the MDBs. In addition to
congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress has enacted a substantial number of legislative
mandates that oversee and regulate U.S. participation in the MDBs. These mandates generally fall
into one of four major types. More than one type of mandate may be used on a given issue area.
First, some legislative mandates direct how the U.S. representatives at the MDBs can vote on
various policies. Examples include mandates that require the U.S. Executive Directors to oppose
(a) financial assistance to specific countries, such as Burma, until sufficient progress is made on
human rights and implementing a democratic government;11 (b) financial assistance to broad
categories of countries, such as major producers of illicit drugs;12 and (c) financial assistance for
specific projects, such as the production of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops for export if the
financial assistance would cause injury to United States producers.13 Some legislative mandates
require the U.S. Executive Directors to support, rather than oppose, financial assistance. For
example, a current mandate allows the Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors
to vote in favor of financial assistance to countries that have contributed to U.S. efforts to deter
and prevent international terrorism.14
Second, legislative mandates direct the U.S. representatives at the MDBs to advocate for policies
within the MDBs. One example is a mandate that instructs the U.S. Executive Director to urge the
IBRD to support an increase in loans that support population, health, and nutrition programs.15
Another example is a mandate that requires the U.S. Executive Directors to take all possible steps
to communicate potential procurement opportunities for U.S. firms to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the business community. 16
11
Section 570(a)(2) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208). Also on human rights
more broadly, see 22 USCS §262d.
12
22 USC §2291j(a)(2).
13
22 USC §262g.
14
22 USC §262p-4r(a).
15
22 USC §262p-4m.
16
22 USC §262s-1.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Mandates that call for the U.S. Executive Director to both vote and advocate for a particular
policy are often called “voice and vote” mandates.
Third, Congress has also passed legislation requiring the Treasury Secretary to submit reports on
various MDB issues (reporting requirements). Some legislative mandates call for one-off reports;
other mandates call for reports on a regular basis, typically annually. For example, current
legislation requires the Treasury Secretary to submit an annual report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the actions taken by countries that have borrowed from the MDBs
to strengthen governance and reduce the opportunity for bribery and corruption.17
Fourth, Congress has also attempted to influence policies at the MDBs through “power of the
purse,” that is, withholding funding from the MDBs or attaching stipulations on the MDBs’s use
of funds. For example, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act stipulates that 10% of the
funds appropriated to the AsDF will be withheld until the Treasury Secretary can verify that the
AsDB has taken steps to implement specific reforms aimed at combating corruption.18
Issues for Congress
There are a number of policy issues that Congress has or may be interested in. Some of these
issues are discussed below.
Effectiveness of MDB Financial Assistance
There is a broad debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid, including the aid provided by the
MDBs. Many studies of foreign aid effectiveness examine the effects of total foreign aid provided
to developing countries, including both aid given directly by governments to developing countries
(bilateral aid) and aid pooled by a multilateral institution from multiple donor countries and
provided to developing countries (multilateral aid). The results of these studies are mixed, with
conclusions ranging from (a) aid is ineffective at promoting economic growth;19 (b) aid is
effective at promoting economic growth;20 and (c) aid is effective at promoting growth in some
countries under specific circumstances (such as when developing-country policies are strong).21
The divergent results of these academic studies make it difficult to reach firm conclusions about
the overall effectiveness of aid.
Critics of the MDBs argue that they are international bureaucracies focused on getting money
“out the door” to developing countries, rather than on delivering results in developing countries;
that the MDBs emphasize short-term outputs like reports and frameworks but do not engage in
long-term activities like the evaluation of projects after they are completed; and that they put
enormous administrative demands on developing-country governments.22 Many of the MDBs
were also created when developing countries had little access to private capital markets. With the
17
22 USC §262r-6(b)(2).
Section 7086 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117).
19
E.g., see William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 3
(Summer 2003), pp. 23-48.
20
E.g., see Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik Hansen, “On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies,” Journal of Development
Studies, vol. 37, no. 6 (August 2001), pp. 17-41.
21
E.g., see Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4
(September 2000), pp. 847-868.
22
William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” Foreign Policy, vol. 131 (July-August 2002), pp. 40-49.
18
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globalization and the integration of capital markets across countries, some analysts have
expressed concerns that MDB financing might “crowd out” private sector financing, which
developing countries now generally have readily accessible. Some analysts have also raised
questions about whether there is a clear division of labor among the MDBs.
Proponents of the MDBs argue that, despite some flaws, such aid at its core serves vital economic
and political functions. With about 896 million people living on less than $1.90 a day in 2012,23
they argue that not providing assistance is simply not an option; they argue it is the “right” thing
to do and part of “the world’s shared commitments to human dignity and survival.”24 These
proponents typically point to the use of foreign aid to provide basic necessities, such as food
supplements, vaccines, nurses, and access to education, to the world’s poorest countries, which
may not otherwise be financed by private investors. Additionally, proponents of foreign aid argue
that, even if foreign aid has not been effective at raising overall levels of economic growth,
foreign aid has been successful in dramatically improving health and education in developing
countries over the past four decades.25
Some analysts have also highlighted a number of reforms that they believe could increase the
effectiveness of the MDBs.26 For example, it has been proposed that the MDBs adopt more
flexible financing arrangements, for example to allow crisis lending or lending at the sub-national
level, and more flexibility in providing concessional assistance to address poverty in middleincome countries. There are also arguments that, as countries continue to develop, there need to
be clearer guidelines on when countries should “graduate” from receiving concessional and/or
non-concessional financial assistance from the MDBs.
Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid
In a tight budget environment, there may be debate about whether Congress should prioritize
bilateral or multilateral aid.27 Bilateral aid gives donors more control over where the money goes
and how the money is spent. For example, donor countries may have more flexibility to allocate
funds to countries that are of geopolitical strategic importance, but not facing the greatest
development needs, than might be possible by providing aid through a multilateral organization.
By building a clear link between the donor country and the recipient country, bilateral aid may
also garner more goodwill from the recipient country towards the donor than if the funds had
been provided through a multilateral organization.
Providing aid through multilateral organizations offers different benefits for donor countries. By
pooling the resources of several donors, multilateral organizations pool the resources of several
donors, allowing donors to share the cost of development projects (often called burden-sharing).
23
World Bank, Poverty Overview, October 7, 2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overviewhttp://go.worldbank.org/F9ZJUH97T0.
24
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (Penguin Books, 2006), p. xvi.
William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 176-177.
26
For example, see Scott Morris and Madeline Gleave, “The World Bank at 75,” Center for Global Development
Policy Paper 058, March 2015; Martin Ravallion, “The World Bank: Why It Is Still Needed and Why It Still
Disappoints,” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 400, April 2015.
27
For more on the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid, see, for example: Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley,
“The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy,” Working Paper, February 10, 2010 and
Helen Milner, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems,” in Delegation and
Agency in International Organizations, eds. Darren Hawkins et al. (New York City: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 107-139.
25
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Additionally, donor countries may find it politically sensitive to attach policy reforms to loans or
to enforce these policy reforms. Multilateral organizations can usefully serve as a scapegoat for
imposing and enforcing conditionality that may be politically sensitive to attach to bilateral loans.
Additionally, because MDBs can provide aid on a larger scale than many bilateral agencies, they
can generate economies of scale in knowledge and lending.28
Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) reports that in 2014, about 17% of U.S. foreign aid disbursed to
developing countries with the purpose of promoting economic and social development was
provided through multilateral institutions, while about 83% was provided bilaterally.29
The Changing Landscape the MDBs
In recent years, several countries have taken steps to launch two new multilateral development
banks. First, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries) signed an
agreement in July 2014 to establish the New Development Bank (NDB), often referred to as the
“BRICS Bank.”30 The agreement outlines the bylaws of the bank and a commitment to a capital
base of $100 billion. Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB was formally launched in July 2015.
The BRICS leaders have emphasized that the bank’s mission is to mobilize resources for
infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing
economies.31 The NDB’s website also states that it is “an alternative to the existing US-dominated
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.”32
Second, China has led the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 33
Launched in October 2014, the AIIB will focus on the development of infrastructure and other
sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural
infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental
protection, urban development and logistics. The AIIB currently has 57 members, including
several advanced European and Asian advanced economies, such as France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. The United States, Japan, and
Canada are not members. The AIIB's initial total capital reportedly is expected to be $100 billion.
These two institutions are the first major MDBs to be created in decades, and there is debate
about how they will fit in with existing international financial institutions. Proponents of the new
MDBs argue that the infrastructure and financing needs of developing countries are beyond what
can be met by existing MDBs and private capital markets, and that new institutions to meet the
28
Martin Ravallion, “The World Bank: Why It Is Still Needed and Why It Still Disappoints,” Center for Global
Development, Working Paper 400, April 2015.
29
DAC reports data on gross disbursements at current prices of official development assistance (ODA). ODA is
defined as flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions which are administered with the promotion of
economic development and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25%. DAC data does
not include, for instance, other official flows including military assistance. DAC data also focuses on the disbursements
of ODA, and would not include, for example, the callable capital committed by the United States to the MDBs, because
this money has never actually been disbursed from the United States to the MDBs. Also, multilateral organizations not
only include the MDBs but also U.N. agencies.
30
“Agreement on the New Development bank,” Fortaleza, July 15, 2014, http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/pressreleases/219-agreement-on-the-new-development-bank-fortaleza-july-15.
31
“Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan,” BRICS Summit, July 2014, http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/categoryenglish/21-documents/223-sixth-summit-declaration-and-action-plan.
32
The NDB website is at http://ndbbrics.org/.
33
For more on the AIIB, see CRS In Focus IF10154, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, by Martin A. Weiss.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
financing needs of developing institutions should be welcomed. Proponents also argue that the
new MDBs address the long-held frustrations of many emerging markets and developing
countries that the governance of existing institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, have
not been reformed to reflect their growing importance in the global economy.34 For example, the
NDB stresses that, unlike the World Bank and the IMF, each participant country will be have
equivalent voting rates and none of the countries will have veto power.
Other analysts and policymakers have been more concerned about what the new MDBs could
mean for the existing institutions and whether they will diminish the influence of existing
institutions, where the United States for decades has held a powerful leadership. They point to an
already crowded landscape of MDBs, and express concerns that new MDBs could exacerbate
existing concerns about mission creep and lack of clear division of labor among the MDBs. Some
analysts have also raised questions about whether the new institutions will adopt the bestpractices on transparency, procurement, and environmental and social safeguards of the existing
MDBs that have been developed over the past several decades. Some analysts have also raised
questions about why many emerging markets are top recipients of non-concessional financial
assistance from the World Bank and regional development banks, if they have the resources to
capitalize new MDBs.
The response of the Obama Administration to the new MDBs has evolved over time. The
Administration initially lobbied several key allies to refrain from joining the bank. Ultimately,
these lobbying efforts were largely unsuccessful, as several key allies in Europe and Asia,
including the United Kingdom and South Korea, joined.35 Recent comments from the
Administration have been more positive. Specifically during Chinese President Xi’s visit to
Washington in September 2015, the White House emphasized that “the United States welcomes
China’s growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond.”36
During the visit, Xi also reportedly committed that the AIIB would abide by the highest
international environmental and governance standards.37 Xi also pledged to increase China’s
financial contributions to the World Bank and regional development banks, signaling its
continuing commitment to existing institutions. Congress may want to exercise oversight of the
Administration’s policy on and engagement with these new MDBs.
U.S. Commercial Interests
Billions of dollars of contracts are awarded to private firms each year in order to acquire the
goods and services necessary to implement projects financed by the MDBs. MDB contracts are
awarded through international competitive bidding processes, although most MDBs allow the
borrowing country to give some preference to domestic firms in awarding contracts for MDBfinanced projects in order to help spur development.
U.S. commercial interest in the MDBs has been and may continue to be a subject of congressional
attention, particularly if the banks expand their lending capacity for infrastructure projects
through the GCIs. One area of focus may be the Foreign Commercial Services (FCS)
34
For more on IMF reforms, see CRS Report R42844, IMF Reforms: Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson and
Martin A. Weiss.
35
For example, see, Jamil Anderlini, “UK Move to Join China-led Bank a Surprise to Even Beijing,” Financial Times,
March 26, 2015 and “Washington’s Lobby Efforts Against China’s ‘World Bank’ Fail as Italy, France Welcomed
Abroad,” Forbes, April 3, 2015.
36
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Economic Relations,” September 25, 2015.
37
Shawn Donnan, “White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB,” Financial Times, September 27, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
representatives to the MDBs, who are responsible for protecting and promoting American
commercial interests at the MDBs.38 Some in the business community are concerned about the
impacts of possible budget cuts to the U.S. FCS, particularly if other countries are taking a
stronger role in helping their businesses bid on projects financed by the MDBs.
There may also be interest in discussions about policy changes for procurement standards at the
World Bank, who awards the largest number and highest volume of contracts each year. In
January 2011, the World Bank Executive Board approved a pilot program for a new lending
instrument, “Program for Results,” or P4R.39 It was subsequently launched as a financing
instrument in 2012. This new lending instrument links the disbursement of funds directly to the
delivery of defined results. Proponents argue that P4R helps developing countries improve the
design and implementation of their development programs, and helps strengthen their institutions
and build capacity. Opponents argue that relying on country’s own systems could undermine
adequate social and environmental safeguards, while also undermining transparency objectives
and accountability commitments.40
Author Contact Information
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Acknowledgments
Gabriel Nelson, Research Assistant, provided research assistance. Amber Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist,
prepared the graphics.
38
For more information, see http://www.export.gov/advocacy/eg_main_022753.asp.
World Bank, “Program-for-Results Financing (PforR),” Accessed April 16, 2012, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTRESLENDING/
0,,contentMDK:22748955~pagePK:7321740~piPK:7514729~theSitePK:7514726,00.html.
40
Bank Information Center, “P4R Update: World Bank Approves Program for Results Policy,” February 29, 2012,
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.12602.aspx.
39
Congressional Research Service
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