U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
September 18, 2013May 8, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21048
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the
Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide
counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 6766,000
active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of
Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified
command.
In February 2013, based on a request from USSOCOM and the concurrence of Geographic and
Functional Combatant Commanders and Military Service Chiefs and Secretaries, the Secretary of
Defense reassignedassigned command of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to
USSOCOM. This
means that USSOCOM now has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip
TSOCs as it
previously had for all assigned SOF units. While USSOCOM is now responsible for the
the organizing, training, and equipping of TSOCs, the Geographic Combatant Commands will
continue to have operational control over the TSOCs.
The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) stipulates USSOCOM is responsible only for
synchronizing planning for global operations to combat terrorist networks. This limits its ability
to conduct activities designed to deter emerging threats, build relationships with foreign
militaries, and potentially develop greater access to foreign militaries. USSOCOM is proposing
changes that would, in addition to its current responsibilities, include the responsibility for
deploying and, when directed, employing SOF globally with the approval of the Geographic
Combatant Command.
In March 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a DOD-wide Strategic Choices
Management Review (SCMR). SCMR proposals include a possible reduction of USSOCOM and
Service Component Headquarters by as much as 20%, a reduction in headquarters intelligence
staff and capabilities, and possible reductions to SOF force structure.
USSOCOM’s FY2014 budget request was $7.483 billion for Operations and Maintenance;
$373.693 million for Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation; $1.614 billion for
Procurement; and $441.528 million for Military Construction funding. These totals reflect both
base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requests.
The House and Senate versions of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act recommended
selected cuts in Operations and Maintenance funding, including limitations on spending for
selected proposed family support programs, Regional SOF Coordination Centers, and the
USSOCOM National Capitol Region. The House and Senate Defense Appropriations bills also
recommended cuts to the Operations and Maintenance budget request and had similar limitations
on family support programs, Regional SOF Coordination Centers, USSOCOM National Capitol
Region as well as expressed concern “regarding the quality of the operation and maintenance
budget justification submitted by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).”
Potential issues for Congress include U.S. SOF, the SCMR, and the upcoming 2014 QDR and the
Global SOF Network and related concerns about its necessity and how certain aspects of this
network will be developed in a highly resource-constrained budgetary environment. This report
will be updated.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
current responsibilities, include the responsibility for
synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, and, when directed, the employment of
special operations forces globally and will do so with the approval of the Geographic Combatant
Commanders, the Services and, as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies. Further, the
proposed changes would give broader responsibility to USSOCOM beyond counterterrorism
activities, to include activities against other threat networks.
In February 2014, DOD issued the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2014 QDR
calls for 3,700 personnel to be added to USSOCOM’s current strength but falls short of the
72,000-person goal set by the 2010 QDR. The 2014 QDR also places heavy emphasis on
USSOCOM’s role in counterterrorism operations. Beyond this, the QDR offers little detail as to
how these additional personnel will be allocated and how the counterterror mandate will be
accomplished.
USSOCOM’s FY2015 budget request was $9.913 billion—a 4% reduction over the $10.409
billion FY2013 budget request. This includes both the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency
Operation (OCO) funding.
Potential issues for Congress include possible greater clarification of the 2014 QDR’s
implications for USSOCOM and U.S. SOF and recent events in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.
This report will be updated.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1
Command Structures and Components ..................................................................................... 1
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) ............................................................... 1
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities .................................................................................... 2
Proposed Changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) ......................................................... 3
USSOCOM Service Components .................................................................................................... 3
Army Special Operations Command ......................................................................................... 3
Air Force Special Operations Command ................................................................................... 4
Naval Special Warfare Command ............................................................................................. 5
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) .................................................................. 65
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) .................................................................................... 6
Organizational and Budgetary Issues............................................................................................... 7
20106
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related Directives ............................ 7
USSOCOM and the Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR) .................................... 8
Possible Cuts to USSOCOM Headquarters Staff ................................................................ 8
Proposed Strategic Approaches to Reducing Force Structure ............................................. 8
FY2014 USSOCOM Budget Request ....................................................................................... 9
FY20146
FY2015 USSOCOM Budget Request Breakdown .............................................................. 9
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)........................................................ 9
Selected FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960) USSOCOM
Legislative Provisions ............................................................................................................ 9
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197) .......................................................... 12
Selected FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197) USSOCOM
Legislative Provisions .......................................................................................................... 12
FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2397) .................................................................. 14
Selected FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill USSOCOM Legislative Provisions ............... 14
FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill (S. 1429) ...................................................................... 19
Selected FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill USSOCOM Legislative Provisions ............... 19......................... 7
Potential Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................... 8 20
U.S. Special Operations Forces, the Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR),
and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) ............................................................. 20
The Global SOF Network ........................................................................................................ 20
Global SOF Network-Related Concerns ........................................................................... 22
Tables
Table 1. FY2014 USSOCOM Budget Request, by Funding Category 8
U.S. SOF and Recent Events in Crimea and the Rest of Ukraine ............................................ 9. 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9 23
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
Overview
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite military units that are highly trained and specially
equipped and have the ability to infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct
a variety of operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and
lengthy specialized training. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the
training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.
Command Structures and Components
In 1986, Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning,
passed legislation (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen special operations’ position within the defense
community. These actions included the establishment of USSOCOM as a new unified command.
USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL, and currently consists of
approximately 2,500 military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (not including
government contractors).1 The commander of USSOCOM is a four-star officer who may be from
any military service. Navy Admiral William H. McRaven is the current USSOCOM Commander.
The USSOCOM Commander reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, although an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) provides
immediate civilian oversight over many USSOCOM activities.
USSOCOM currently has about 6766,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from
all four
services and DOD civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified
command.1subunified commands.2 USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM); the Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC); and the Marine Corps Special Operations Command
(MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified
command.
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)
Additional command and control responsibilities are vested in Theater Special Operations
Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs were originallyare sub-unified commands under their respective
Geographic Geographic
Combatant Commanders (GCCs). TSOCs are special operational headquarters
elements designed
to support a GCC’s special operations logistics, planning, and operational
control requirements,
and are normally commanded by a general officer.
In February 2013, based on a request from USSOCOM and with the concurrence of every Geographic
Geographic and Functional Combatant Commander and Military Service Chiefs and Secretaries,
the Secretary
of Defense reassigned the TSOCs from the GCCs to USSOCOM.23 This means that USSOCOM now has the
1
Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations
Command,” U.S. Special Operations Command Factbook 2014”
USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2013, p. 10 and CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff.
22014, p. 12.
2
Ibid.
3
Information in this section is taken from USSOCOM Information Paper, “Special Operations Forces: 2020: Theater
Special Operations Commands,” April 25, 2013.(continued...)
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
USSOCOM now has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip TSOCs as it previously had
for all assigned SOF units
as specified in U.S. Code Title 10, Section 167. This change is intended
to enable USSOCOM to standardize, to the extent possible, TSOC capabilities and manpower
requirements. While USSOCOM is now responsible for the
organizing, training, and equipping of
TSOCs, the GCCs will continue to have operational control
over the TSOCs.
Current TSOCs are3are4
•
Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), Homestead Air Force Base,
FL;
•
Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), Stuttgart, Germany;
•
Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), Stuttgart, Germany;
•
Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), MacDill Air Force Base, FL;
•
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), Camp Smith, HI;
•
Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), Yongsang, Korea; and
•
Special Operations DivisionCommand U.S. Northern Command (SODNORTH), Peterson
Air Force Base, CO. Note: While, at present, SODNORTH is not a TSOC, the
U.S NORTHCOM commander has announced that SOCNORTH is planned to be
established in early September 2015.4SOCNORTH), Peterson
Air Force Base, CO.
It should also be noted that in 2013, USSOCOM disestablished a TSOC assigned to U.S. Joint
Forces Command (USJFC) due to DOD’s decision to close USJFC.
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities
In addition to Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional
responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP), USSOCOM was given the
responsibility for synchronizing DOD plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed,
conducting global operations against those networks.5 In this regard, USSOCOM “receives
reviews, coordinates and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against
terror, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource
allocations to meet global requirements.”6 In October 2008, USSOCOM was designated the DOD
proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA).7 In this role, USSOCOM will performperforms a
synchronizing function in global training and assistance planning similar to the previously
described role of planning against terrorist networks.
3
(...continued)
Special Operations Commands,” April 25, 2013.
4
USSOCOM Pamphlet, “United States Special Operations Command, GlobalSOF Network2020,” 2013.
From USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
5
“Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2013, p. 10.
6
Ibid.
7
Information in this section is from testimony given by Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to the
House Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command, June 4, 2009. For a more in-depth treatment
of Security Force Assistance, see CRS Report R41817, Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force
Assistance, by Thomas K. Livingston.
4
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Proposed Changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP)8
The Unified Command Plan or UCP is:
A document approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified
combatant commanders; which establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force
structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic
combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant
commanders.9
Under the current UCP signed by the President in April 2011, USSOCOM is tasked in accordance
with Title 10 U.S.C. §167 to serve as a global SOF provider with the inherent responsibility to
coordinate global SOF operations with the Services, Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The current UCP stipulates that the USSOCOM
Commander is only responsibleresponsible only for synchronizing planning for global operations to combat
terrorist networks. This limits USSOCOM’s ability to conduct activities designed to deter
emerging threats, build relationships with foreign militaries, and potentially develop greater
access to foreign militaries. USSOCOM is proposing changes which would, in addition to its
current responsibilities, include the responsibility for deploying and, when directed, employing
SOF globally with the approval of the GCCs. USSOCOM noted that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approved USSOCOM’s proposed UCP changes and these changes will be
included in the next round of formal changes that will be submitted to the President for his
approval.10
USSOCOM Service Components
that include the responsibility for
synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, and, when directed, the employment of
special operations forces globally and will do so with the approval of the Geographic Combatant
Commanders, the Services and, as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies. Further, the
proposed changes would give broader responsibility to USSOCOM beyond counterterrorism
activities, to include activities against other threat networks.10
Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) includes approximately 2629,000 soldiers from the Active Army,
National Guard, and Army Reserve organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special operations
aviation units, along with civil affairs units, military information units, and special operations
support units.11 ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces (SF)
Groups (Airborne),1112 consisting of about 1,400 soldiers each, are stationed at Fort Bragg and at
Fort Lewis, WA; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Carson, CO; and Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Special
Forces soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in various skills, including foreign
languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout the world. In December 2005,
8
8
Information in this section is taken from USSOCOM Information Paper, “Special Operations Forces: 2020: Unified
Command Plan,” March 14, 2013.
9
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010 (as
amended through May 15, 2011), p. 385.
10
CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
11Information provided by USSOCOM to CRS, May 1, 2014.
11
Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from “U.S. Special Operations Command Factbook
2014” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2014, p. 18.
12
Airborne refers to “personnel, troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation,
either by parachuting or touchdown.” Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 31 July 2010).
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Airborne) was activated at Fort Bragg, NC, to provide combat
service support and medical support to Army special operations forces.12
In FY2008, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) began to increase the total
number of Army Special Forces battalions from 15 to 20, with one battalion being allocated to
each active Special Forces Group. Two Army National Guard Special Forces groups are
Two Army National Guard Special Forces groups are headquartered in Utah and Alabama. An
elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct
action operations,13 the 75th Ranger
Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists
of three battalions and a regimental
special troops battalion that provides support to the three
Ranger battalions. Army special
operations aviation units, including the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
(SOAR), headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY, feature pilots
trained to fly the most sophisticated
Army rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day
or night, and in adverse weather.
Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are Civil Affairs (CA) units, which provide
experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational
theaters. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit that exclusively
supportsupports USSOCOM. In September 2011 the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade was activated to support
U.S. Army General Purpose Forces (GPFs). All other CA units reside in the Reserves and are
affiliated with Army GPF units. Military Information Support Operations (formerly known as
psychological operations) units disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass
media. Two active duty Military Information Support Groups (MISG)—the 4th Military
Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne) and 8th Military Information Support Group
(MISG) (Airborne)—are stationed at Fort Bragg, and their subordinate units are aligned with
Geographic Combatant Commands.
Air Force Special Operations Command14Command
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is one of the Air Force’s 10 major
commands, with approximately 17,000 Active Duty18,000 active, Reserve, and civilian personnel. While
administrative control of AFSOC is overseen by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF),
operational control is managed by the USSOCOM commander. AFSOC units 14 AFSOC units
operate out of four
major continental United States (CONUS) locations and two overseas
locations. The headquarters
for AFSOC, the first Special Operations Wing (1st SOW), and the
720th Special Tactics Group are
located at Hurlburt Field, FL. The 27th SOW is at Cannon AFB,
NM. The 352nd and 353rd Special
Operations Groups provide forward presence in Europe (RAF
Mildenhall, England) and in the
Pacific (Kadena Air Base, Japan), respectively. The Air National Guard’s 193rd SOW at
Harrisburg, PA, and the Air Force Reserve Command’s 919th SOW at Duke Field, FL, complete
12
“United States Special Operations Command Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, p. 14.
Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments, as well as employing specialized military capabilities
to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional
offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
14
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2013, p. 18 and Lt. Gen. Wurster’s presentation to the Air Force Association, September 14 2010,
http://www.afa.org/events/conference/2010/scripts/Wurster_9-14.pdf, and “United States Special Operations Command
Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, p. 18 and CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff,
September 10, 2013.
13
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
AFSOC’s major units. A training center, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and
Training Center (AFSOTC), is located at Hurlburt Field. AFSOC conducts the majority of its
specialized flight training through an arrangement with Air Education and Training Command
(AETC) via the 550th SOW at Kirtland AFB, NM. AFSOC’s four active-duty flying units are
composed of more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
In March 2009, Headquarters AFSOC declared initial operational capability (IOC)15 for the CV22.16 USSOCOM plans for all 50 CV-22s to be delivered to AFSOC by 2015.17 Despite critical
reviews of the aircraft, AFSOC considers the CV-22 “central to our future.”18 AFSOC operates a
diverse fleet of modified aircraft. Of 12 major design series aircraft, 7 are variants of the C-130,
the average age of some of which is over 40 years old, dating from the Vietnam era. Because of
the age of the fleet, AFSOC considers recapitalization one of its top priorities.
AFSOC’s Special Tactics experts include Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Special
Operations Weather Teams, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs). As a collective group, they
are known as Special Tactics and have also been referred to as “Battlefield Airmen.” Their basic
role is to provide an interface between air and ground forces, and these airmen have highly
developed skill sets. Usually embedded with Army, Navy, or Marine SOF units, they provide
control of air fire support, medical and rescue expertise, or weather support, depending on the
mission requirements.
As directed in the 2010 QDR, AFSOC plans to increase aviation advisory manpower and
resources resident in the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). The 6th SOS’s mission is to
assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units with the intent to raise their capability and
capacity to interdict threats to their nation. The 6th SOS provides aviation expertise to U.S.
foreign internal defense (FID) missions.
Naval Special Warfare Command19
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is composed of approximately 7,0006th SOS’s
mission is to assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units with the intent to raise their
capability and capacity to interdict threats to their nation. The 6th SOS provides aviation expertise
to U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) missions. The Air National Guard’s 193rd SOW at
Harrisburg, PA, and the Air Force Reserve Command’s 919th SOW at Duke Field, FL, complete
AFSOC’s major units. A training center, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and
Training Center (AFSOTC), is located at Hurlburt Field. AFSOC’s four active-duty flying units
are composed of more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
AFSOC’s Special Tactics experts include Combat Controllers, Pararescuemen, Special Operations
Weather Teams, Combat Aviation Advisors, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs). As a
collective group, they are known as Special Tactics and have also been referred to as “Battlefield
Airmen.” Their basic role is to provide an interface between air and ground forces, and these
13
Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments, as well as employing specialized military capabilities
to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional
offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
14
Information in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from “U.S. Special Operations Command Factbook
2014” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2014, p. 26.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
airmen have highly developed skill sets. Usually embedded with Army, Navy, or Marine SOF
units, they provide control of air fire support, medical and rescue expertise, or weather support,
depending on the mission requirements.
Naval Special Warfare Command15
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is composed of approximately 8,800 personnel,
including active-duty Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat
Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel;
support personnel; and civilians. NSWC is organized around 10 SEAL Teams, 2 SEAL Delivery
Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and 3 Special Boat Teams. SEAL Teams consist of six SEAL platoons
each, consisting of 2 officers and 16 enlisted personnel. The major operational components of
NSWC include Naval Special Warfare Groups One, Three, and Eleven, stationed in Coronado,
CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups Two, Four, and Ten and the Naval Special Warfare
Development Group in Little Creek, VA. These components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery
Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contingency,
15
According to DOD, IOC is attained when some units and/or organizations in the force structure scheduled to receive
a system (1) have received it and (2) have the ability to employ and maintain it.
16
The CV-22 is the special operations version of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft used by the Marine Corps.
17
USSOCOM Acquisitions and Logistics office, http://www.socom.mil/soal/Pages/FixedWing.aspx.
18
For further detailed reporting on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
19
Information in this section is from Naval Special Warfare Command website, http://www.public.navy.mil/nsw/pages/
Mission.aspxe, accessed January 6, 2012, and “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM
Public Affairs, February 2013, p. 16 and CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
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and wartime requirements of theater commanders. Because SEALs are considered experts in
special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is
viewed as well postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can
operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and
aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units.
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC)2016
On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. MARSOC consists of three subordinate units: the
Marine Special Operations Regiment, which includes 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations
Battalions; the Marine Special Operations Support Group; the Marine Special Operations
Intelligence Battalion; and the Marine Special Operations School. MARSOC Headquarters, the
2nd and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special Operations School, and the
Marine Special Operations Support Group and the Marine Special Operations Intelligence
Battalion are stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion is
stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA. MARSOC forces have been deployed worldwide to conduct a
full range of special operations activities. MARSOC missions include direct action, special
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information operations, and
unconventional warfare. MARSOC currently has approximately 3,000 personnel assigned.
MARSOC reportedly at present consists of 625 critical skills operators, 32 teams, and 9
companies, but plans to expand to 844 critical skills operators, 48 teams, and 12 companies by
2016.21
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)2217
15
Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from “U.S. Special Operations Command Factbook
2014” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2014, p. 22.
16
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2013, p. 20; “U.S. Special Operations Command Factbook 2014” USSOCOM Public Affairs,
February 2014, p. 30; and CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
17
Amanda Wilcox, “MarSOC Continues Growing Despite Marine Corps Drawdown,” Jacksonville (NC) Daily News,
November 25, 2012.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)18
From JSOC’s official website:
The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a subunified command of the US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is charged to study special operations requirements
and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct
special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.
Despite its innocuous sounding charter, JSOC has made incredible strides in the special
operations field and is comprised of an impressive amalgamation of rigorously screened and
accessed Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians. These men and women possess
unique and specialized skills, and are routinely among the best in their field. Among them
are seasoned combat veterans who cut their teeth by participating in joint special operations
liked the Son Tay Prison Raid in Vietnam War which took place in 1970, long before JSOC
was activated. More recent members of the Command include active duty special operations
veterans of all services who have successfully completed the toughest training regiments and
demonstrated their mettle under the most challenging and difficult circumstances, including
20
Information in this section is from ““Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2013, p. 20 and CRS discussions with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
21
Amanda Wilcox, “MarSOC Continues Growing Despite Marine Corps Drawdown,” Jacksonville (NC) Daily News,
November 25, 2012.
22
Taken directly from JSOC Website, http://www.socom.mil/pages/jointspecialoperationscommand.aspx, August 8,
2013.
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combat. As a result, past and present members of JSOC have participated in all of our
Nation’s wars and contingency operations since it was activated in 1980. Included among the
places that military and civilian members of the Command have previously served our
Nation are Desert One in Iran (1980), Grenada (1983), the Mediterranean Sea during the
Achille Lauro hijacking (1985), Panama (1989), the Mideast during the Gulf War (1991),
Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), the Balkans (1996-2002), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq
(2003-present).
The Command is always decisively engaged in working to fulfill its charter and typically has
members located throughout the world at any given time. An incredibly busy Command,
JSOC accomplished its assigned missions successfully in the face of expanding
commitments largely due to the quality, dedication, and patriotism of its military and civilian
members and the family members who support them.
Organizational and Budgetary Issues
20102014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report
SOF-Related Directives23
USSOCOM is still operating under 2010 QDR guidance until the next QDR, which is planned to
be issued in early 2014. The 2010Directives19
The 2014 QDR contained a number of SOF-related directives pertaining
to personnel, organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
•
To increase key enabling assets24 for special operations forces.
•
To maintain approximately 660 special operations teams;25 3 Ranger battalions;
and 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft.
•
The Army and USSOCOM will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters
(MH-47G) to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
•
The Navy will dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval
special warfare units.
•
To increase civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM.
•
Starting in FY2012, purchase light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’s
6th Special Operations squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces
such aircraft might be appropriate, as well as acquiring two non-U.S. helicopters
to support these efforts.
The significance of these directives is that they serve as definitive goals for USSOCOM growth
and systems acquisition as well as directing how the services will support USSOCOM.
23
Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
Enabling assets are a variety of conventional military units that are assigned to support special operations forces.
25
These teams include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams; Navy Sea, Air, and Land
(SEAL) platoons; Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation
detachments.
24
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USSOCOM and the Strategic Choices Management Review
(SCMR)26
In March 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a DOD-wide Strategic Choices
Management Review (SCMR) with the stated objectives of (1) helping DOD to prepare for
sequestration if it continues into FY2014; (2) informing the fiscal guidance given to the military
services for their FY2015 through FY2016 budget plans; and (3) anchoring the upcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Possible Cuts to USSOCOM Headquarters Staff
On July 31, 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel held a news briefing to discuss the findings of the
SCMR.27 While this briefing did not discuss specific actions to be taken as a result of this review,
the Secretary of Defense stated that DOD would pursue a 20% reduction of U.S. military billets
and government civilian positions in major DOD headquarters, suggesting that USSOCOM
headquarters could lose up to 500 of its approximately 2,500 military and civilian personnel.
Furthermore, it is also possible that USSOCOM Service Component Headquarters, JSOC, and
perhaps even TSOCs might also lose up to 20% of their staffs depending on how DOD defines
“major DOD headquarters” in the context of the SCMR. The Secretary of Defense also
recommended reducing intelligence analysis and production at combatant command intelligence
and operations centers, which could also have a significant impact on USSOCOM headquarters,
particularly if currently assigned intelligence personnel are treated separately from USSOCOM
staff subject to the proposed 20% reduction; this may mean that more than 500 military and
government civilian personnel might be cut from USSOCOM headquarters staff.
Proposed Strategic Approaches to Reducing Force Structure
According to Secretary Hagel, the SCMR examined two possible strategic approaches to reducing
force structure: (1) maintain a larger force size or (2) place a premium on maintaining a
technological edge.
Under the larger force size construct, conventional forces would be reduced significantly while
“making cyber capabilities and special operations forces a high priority,”28 suggesting that
USSOCOM forces would not be appreciably cut and perhaps even modestly increased. The
technological edge construct proposes to have a significantly smaller force but one that would be
technologically dominant but less deployable and capable, which would also include reductions
in special operations forces.
While both constructs lack detail, they do, in a sense, set the “left and right limits” for
USSOCOM force levels under consideration by DOD leadership. Before the merits of either
26
Information in this section is taken from Karen Parrish, “Pentagon Review Reveals Best, Worst Case, Hagel Says,”
American Forces Press Service, July 31, 013 and DOD Transcripts, “Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Holds a
Defense Department News Briefing on the Recent Strategic Choices Management Review,” July 31, 2013.
27
Ibid.
28
Karen Parrish, “Pentagon Review Reveals Best, Worst Case, Hagel Says,” American Forces Press Review, July 31,
2013.
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approach can be evaluated from a policy perspective, DOD will need to provide additional details
about these proposed courses of action.
FY2014 USSOCOM Budget Request29
USSOCOM’s FY2014 budget request was $9.913 billion—a 4% reduction over the $10.409
billion FY2013 budget request. This includes both the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency
Operation (OCO) funding.
FY2014 USSOCOM Budget Request Breakdown
Table 1. FY2014 USSOCOM Budget Request, by Funding Category
Funding Category
Base Budget
OCO
Total
Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
$5.261 billion
$2.222 billion
$7.483 billion
Procurement
$1.586 billion
$27.529 million
$1.614 billion
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
$373.693 million
__
$373.693 million
Military Construction (MILCON)
$441.528 million
-—
$441.528 million
Totals
$7.663 billion
$2.250 billion
$9.913 billion
Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget Submission, United States Special
Operations Command, April 2013.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)30
The House version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) recommended
fully funding USSOCOM’s Procurement, RDT&E, and MILCON budget requests but
recommended a $30.752 million decrease to USSOCOM’s O&M Base Budget request. This
decrease included reductions in flying hours programs, the International SOF Information Sharing
System, the pilot program for SOF family members, preservation of the force human performance
and resiliency programs, Regional SOF Coordination Centers, and the USSOCOM National
Capitol Region program.31
Selected FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960)
USSOCOM Legislative Provisions
Selected major USSOCOM-specific provisions are highlighted in the following sections:
29
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget
Submission, United States Special Operations Command, April 2013.
30
H.R. 1960, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, July 8, 2013.
31
Ibid. p, 1017.
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SECTION 554. FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS FOR IMMEDIATE FAMILY
MEMBERS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES.
(a) PILOT PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED.—Consistent with such regulations as the Secretary of
Defense may prescribe to carry out this section, the Commander of the United States Special
Operations Command may conduct up to three pilot programs to assess the feasibility and
benefits of providing family support activities for the immediate family members of members of
the Armed Forces assigned to special operations forces.
(b) SELECTION OF PROGRAMS.—In selecting the pilot programs to be conducted under
subsection (a), the Commander shall—
(1) identify family support activities that have a direct and concrete impact on the readiness
of special operations forces, but that are not being provided to the immediate family members of
members of the Armed Forces assigned to special operations forces by the Secretary of a military
department; and
(2) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each family support activity proposed to be included in
a pilot program.
(c) EVALUATION.—The Commander shall develop outcome measurements to evaluate the
success of each family support activity included in a pilot program under subsection (a).
(d) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—The Commander may expend up to $5,000,000 during each
fiscal year specified in subsection (f) to carry out the pilot programs under subsection (a).
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term ‘‘Commander’’ means the Commander of the United States Special Operations
Command.
(2) The term ‘‘immediate family members’’ has the meaning given that term in section
1789(c) of Title 10, United States Code.
(3) The term ‘‘special operations forces’’ means those forces of the Armed Forces identified
as special operations forces under section 167(i) of such title.
(f) DURATION OF PILOT PROGRAM AUTHORITY
The authority provided by subsection (a) is available to the Commander during fiscal years 2014
through 2016.
(g) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after completing a pilot program under subsection (a), the
Commander shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing the results
of the pilot program.
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SECTION 1076. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES AND UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review of the United States
Special Operations Forces organization, capabilities, and structure.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than the date on which the budget of the President is submitted to
Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2015, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the review conducted
under subsection (a). Such report shall include an analysis of each of the following:
(1) The organizational structure of the United States Special Operations Command and each
subordinate component, as in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The policy and civilian oversight structures for Special Operations Forces within the
Department of Defense, as in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including the
statutory structures and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict within the Department.
(3) The roles and responsibilities of United States Special Operations Command and Special
Operations Forces under section 167 of Title 10, United States Code.
(4) Current and future special operations peculiar requirements of the commanders of the
geographic combatant commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, and command
relationships between United States Special Operations Command and the geographic combatant
commands.
(5) The funding authorities, uses, and oversight mechanisms of Major Force Program–11.
(6) Changes to structure, authorities, oversight mechanisms, Major Force Program–11
funding, roles, and responsibilities assumed in the 2014 2 Quadrennial Defense Review.
(7) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines are appropriate to ensure a
comprehensive review and assessment.
(c) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which the report required by
subsection (b) is submitted, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a review of the report. Such review shall include an assessment
of United States Special Operations Forces organization, capabilities, and force structure with
respect to conventional force structures and national military strategies.
SECTION 1245. LIMITATION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES COORDINATION CENTERS.
(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended
to plan, prepare, establish, or implement any ‘‘Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination
Center’’ (RSCC) or similar regional coordination entities.
(b) EXCLUSION.—The limitation contained in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any
RSCC or similar regional coordination entity authorized by statute, including the North Atlantic
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Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters authorized under section 1244 f the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional committees
specified in subsection (d) a report on the following:
(1) A detailed description of the intent and purpose of the RSCC concept.
(2) Defined and validated requirements justifying the establishment of RSCCs or similar
entities within each geographic combatant command, to include how such centers have been
coordinated and de-conflicted with existing regional and multilateral frameworks or approaches.
(3) An explanation of why existing regional centers and multilateral frameworks cannot
satisfy the requirements and needs of the Department of Defense and geographic combatant
commands.
(4) Cost estimates across the Future Years Defense Program for such centers, to include
estimates of contributions of nations participating in such centers.
(5) Any other matters that the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State determines
appropriate.
(d) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees referred
to in subsection (c) are—
(1) The congressional defense committees; and
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197)32
The Senate version of the FY2014 NDAA authorizes $7.64 billion for USSOCOM in base budget
and $2.5 billion for OCO.
Selected FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197)
USSOCOM Legislative Provisions
Selected major USSOCOM-specific provisions are highlighted in the following sections:
SECTION 341. LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.
32
S. 1197, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, June 20, 2013 and Press Release, U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services, “Senate Committee on Armed Services Completes Markup of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,” June 14, 2013.
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(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended
for the United States Special Operations Command National Capital Region (USSOCOM– NCR)
until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a
report on the USSOCOM–NCR.
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following
elements:
(1) A description of the purpose of the USSOCOM-NCR.
(2) A description of the activities to be performed by the USSOCOM–NCR.
(3) An explanation of the impact of the USSOCOM-NCR on existing activities at United
States Special Operations Command headquarters.
(4) A detailed, by fiscal year, breakout of the staffing and other costs associated with the
USSOCOM-NCR over the future years defense program.
(5) A description of the relationship between the USSOCOM-NCR and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
(6) A description of the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict in providing oversight of USSOCOM-NCR activities.
(7) Any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate.
SECTION 342. LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR REGIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COORDINATION CENTERS.
(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2014 for
operation and maintenance, Defense-wide, may be obligated or expended for the establishment of
Regional Special Operations Coordination Centers (RSCCs).
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than September 30, 2013, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with the Commander of the
United States Special Operations Command, shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the establishment of RSCCs.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall outline, at a minimum—
(A) the requirement and justification for the establishment of RSCCs;
(B) the number and locations of planned RSCCs;
(C) the projected cost to establish and maintain the proposed RSCCs in future years;
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(D) the relevance to and coordination with other multilateral engagement activities and
academic institutes supported by the geographic combatant commanders and the Department
of State; and
(E) any legislative authorities that may be needed to establish RSCCs.
FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2397)33
The House Appropriations Committee recommended decreasing USSOCOM’s base budget O&M
request by $21.387 million and shifting it to the Defense Health Program and transferred
$196.641 million from USSOCOM’s OCO budget request to the base budget.
Selected FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill USSOCOM
Legislative Provisions34
Selected major USSOCOM-specific provisions are highlighted in the following sections:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND READINESS (p. 90)
The Committee recommendation provides an increase of $269,399,000 above the budget request
to restore readiness reductions to the Special Operations Command fiscal year 2014 operation and
maintenance base funding. The Committee recommendation restores funding for flying hours,
training, equipment replacement, depot maintenance, and enduring operational expenses. The
Consolidated and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 approved a shift of
$885,000,000 from overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding to base funding to begin to
transition these enduring readiness requirements into the base budget from the OCO accounts.
The Committee is disappointed that the fiscal year 2014 budget request proposes to shift
$194,641,000 back to the OCO accounts and proposes an additional $74,698,000 in reductions to
these readiness activities. Therefore, the Committee recommendation restores these reductions to
ensure Special Operations Forces are fully able to meet their long term readiness requirements.
USE OF MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM—11 FUNDS (pp. 90-91)
In an era of increasing fiscal constraint, the Committee believes it is incumbent on the
Department of Defense and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to ensure that Major
Force Program– 11 (MFP–11) funds be reserved for its original purpose, to provide the
incremental funding necessary for Special Operations Forces (SOF) unique capabilities and items,
rather than to supplement or supplant activities that are or should be provided by the military
Services. The Committee is concerned that several funding requests in the fiscal year 2014 budget
would establish new precedents for the use of MFP–11 funds. In some cases, funds were
requested to establish new programs and activities that duplicated Service-provided or
Department of Defense programs. In other cases, SOCOM’s request would assume responsibility
for activities that previously, and more appropriately, were funded by the Services.
33
Information in this section is taken from H.Rept. 113-113, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2104, June 17,
2013 .
34
Ibid.
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The Committee is concerned that MFP–11 funds are now perceived as a mechanism to insulate
SOCOM from Service budget reductions or to create separate SOF programs that are the
responsibility of the Services. It has come to the Committee’s attention that at least one waiver of
the use of MFP–11 operation and maintenance funds was granted in fiscal year 2013 in order to
establish a new SOF program, a process that the Committee was unaware of prior to this year.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), working with the
Comptroller, Special Operations for Financial Management (SOFM), to clearly identify and
justify in the fiscal year 2015 budget request all MFP–11 operation and maintenance funding for
programs and activities for which: (1) the military Services or other Department of Defense
elements previously had responsibility for funding, including those related to special operations;
or (2) funds would be transferred between the MFP–11 budget and other Major Force Program
budgets, and the justification for such transfers. Further, the Committee directs the
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), working with the Comptroller, SOFM, to submit a
report not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act to the congressional defense
committees outlining the guidelines for the use of MFP–11 operation and maintenance funds, a
description of the waiver process to use MFP–11 funds for non-MFP–11 activities, and a list of
all waivers granted in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and the justification for such waivers.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE
AND FAMILY PROGRAMS (pp. 91-92)
The Committee understands the tremendous toll exacted on all servicemembers and their
families, including those in the special operations community, after more than a decade of war.
The Committee has always made the care of servicemembers and their families its highest
priority, including special operators. The Committee appreciates the focus of the Commander,
Special Operations Command on the psychological health and well-being of special operations
forces and their families. The Committee also recognizes the success of the Services’ embedded
behavioral health programs and fully supports their expansion to the special operations
community. However, the Committee believes that the mental health needs of all
servicemembers, including special operations servicemembers, are most appropriately addressed
within the Defense Health Program to ensure the highest quality continuity of care for all
servicemembers. Therefore, the Committee recommendation transfers $21,300,000 requested
within the Special Operations Command operation and maintenance budget to the Defense Health
Program to address the needs of the special operations community consistent with Service
programs. The Committee directs the Service Surgeons General to work with the Commander,
Special Operations Command to implement an embedded behavioral health program for special
operations units during fiscal year 2014. The budget request also includes $8,786,000 to establish
special operations forces (SOF) unique family resiliency programs. The Committee does not
recommend funding for this unauthorized program. The Committee recognizes that the
deployment cycles of special operations forces may in some limited circumstances make it more
difficult for SOF families to fully participate in family support programs. However, the need for
the establishment of separate family support programs exclusively for SOF families has not been
demonstrated nor is it currently authorized. The Committee believes it is important for the morale
of all servicemembers that there not be inequities among families exclusively based on a
servicemember’s assignment. The Committee understands that the pending fiscal year 2014
National Defense Authorization Act authorizes a limited pilot program to assess the feasibility
and benefits of SOF family support activities. Therefore, the Committee recommends $5,000,000
for the pilot program.
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND HUMAN PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE
PROGRAM (pp. 92-93)
The Committee recommendation does not include an increase of $25,305,000 for the Human
Physical Performance Program. This request would fund 331 contractors to provide physical
training and sports conditioning, sports psychology, and sports nutrition services for special
operations forces (SOF), but would not cover the non-salary operational costs or anticipated new
facilities associated with this initiative. While military construction funding was requested for
new facilities associated with this initiative, the necessary authorization and funding was denied
in the pending fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, as well as in the pending
fiscal year 2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act.
The Committee has long supported physical training programs to ensure that special operators are
in top condition to achieve their mission and to prevent physical injuries. In the past, there has
often been a reliance on training programs designed for collegiate or professional athletes,
programs which may or may not meet the needs of the special operator. In addition, the physical
training requirements vary between special operators based on their mission set. In an attempt to
address this challenge, over the last several years at the request of the Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), the Committee has funded the Tactical Athlete Program within the
Department of Navy to provide the necessary baseline research for each individual type of SOF
operator in order to design appropriate physical training programs to meet those specialized
needs. This approach was previously used by the Department of the Army to successfully develop
a training program for the 101st Airborne Division.
The Committee recommendation includes continued funding under the Department of the Navy
to complete these assessments. The Committee believes that the investment and corresponding
results from this research will enable SOCOM to design physical training programs uniquely
tailored to the needs of special operators in the most productive and cost effective manner
possible. The Committee is concerned that the new program proposed by SOCOM did not utilize
the research investment that has been made in order to develop a program that meets the unique
needs of special operators in the most cost effective manner possible. Therefore, the Committee
does not provide the requested increase to expand this new program.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ADVANCED EDUCATION PROGRAM (p. 93)
The fiscal year 2014 budget request includes $8,466,000 for a new Advanced Education Program
for the Special Operations Command. Of this amount, $3,603,000 was requested to fund a
National Defense University (NDU) satellite Masters Degree program at the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School established with funding from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict. The remaining $4,863,000 was requested
to establish new programs or expand existing programs.
The Committee supports professional military education opportunities for all servicemembers,
including those in the special operations forces (SOF) community. While the Committee
appreciates the Commander, Special Operations Command’s desire to augment the advanced
education opportunities for SOF students, it is unclear to the Committee that the proposed
programs represent truly SOF-unique requirements and instead may be duplicative of education
opportunities provided by the Services.
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The Committee understands that SOCOM is in the process of working with the Service
Secretaries to establish a process to formalize SOF-unique education requirements.
The Committee directs the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander,
Special Operations Command, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not
later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, which outlines all SOF-unique educational
requirements, includes recommendations to meet such requirements, and describes how the
proposed SOCOM educational initiatives compare to Service-offered educational opportunities.
Therefore, the Committee transfers $3,603,000 from SOCOM’s operation and maintenance
budget to NDU’s budget to maintain appropriate program and budget oversight of all NDU
programs. Additionally, the Committee recommendation includes a reduction of $3,863,000 for
new and expanded programs based on concerns regarding duplication and requirements. The
remaining $1,000,000 provided is for existing programs and SOCOM is directed to provide a
report to the congressional defense committees not later than 60 days after the enactment of this
Act on the use of these funds.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (p. 93-94)
The Committee recommendation does not include $10,000,000 to establish a Special Operations
Command National Capital Region (SOCOM–NCR) entity. This funding request was also denied
in the pending fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. The budget justification
materials indicate that SOCOM plans to implement this proposal in phases.
The Committee has requested, but has not received, a detailed plan which lays out the full
operating capability and end-state envisioned by this proposal and instead has only received
information on the phase-zero and phase-one plans. The Committee remains unclear about the
function, purpose, and costs associated with the operations, infrastructure, and facilities for this
entity both in the interim phase and the final end-state. Further, the Committee has received
conflicting information over the course of the last year as to the purpose of this entity. At times it
has been described as an efficiency mechanism to relocate over 300 SOCOM personnel to one
consolidated location within the NCR. The Committee is confused by this explanation given that
the vast majority of SOCOM personnel assigned to the NCR function as liaison officers and
Special Operations Support Teams to other federal agencies and as such should remain resident at
such agencies. At other times, some functions of the new SOCOM–NCR appear to duplicate
functions already resident at SOCOM headquarters. The Committee is concerned that in a time of
declining budget resources, it is incumbent upon SOCOM and the Department to fully delineate
the functions, responsibilities, facilities requirements, infrastructure, and operating costs
associated with this proposal before moving forward in order to carefully assess whether a
statutory waiver of the prohibition on relocations into and within the more expensive National
Capital Region area is warranted. Should the Secretary of Defense waive the prohibition in
Section 8018 of this Act, the Committee believes such a decision should be based on the full
operating capability and final end-state agreed to by the Department of Defense.
Therefore, the Commander, Special Operations Command is directed not to obligate or expend
funds for the proposed SOCOM–NCR until 30 days after the congressional defense committees
receive a copy of the Secretary of Defense’s waiver of Section 8018 of this Act and a report
which fully describes the anticipated full operating capability and end-state for this entity as
follows: (1) a description of the purpose and specific activities to be performed by the SOCOM–
NCR; (2) an explanation of the impact of this proposal on existing activities at SOCOM
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headquarters and components, including the cost differential associated with relocating these
functions from their existing locations to the NCR; and (3) a detailed, by fiscal year, breakout of
all staffing and costs, including a long term facilities plan, associated with its establishment over
the future years defense plan (fiscal years 2014–2018) and at the full operating capability and
planned final end-state.
The Committee will consider a prior approval reprogramming in fiscal year 2014 from within
available Special Operations Command operation and maintenance funds for the SOCOM–NCR
if the Secretary of Defense grants the waiver of Section 8018 and the congressional defense
committees have been provided the required comprehensive report.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (pp. 94-95)
The Committee is concerned regarding the quality of the operation and maintenance budget
justification submitted by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). As a result, the
Committee is unable to conduct meaningful oversight of SOCOM’s budget requirements as the
current justification does not include the necessary level of detail. Due to the failure of the budget
justification to provide such information, the Committee is unable to analyze changes and trends
over time in SOCOM’s budget requirements, conduct comparative analysis with similar
Department of Defense budget requirements, or have any understanding or visibility into
changing requirements in the year of execution. The budget structure required by Department of
Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR) would provide the information needed.
However, in fiscal year 2006, the Department of Defense took action to exempt SOCOM from
these requirements and thereby limited congressional visibility and oversight. Since that time, the
SOCOM base operation and maintenance budget has grown by 143 percent. Additionally, due to
this exemption, SOCOM does not provide meaningful information that details the changing
requirements among activities for overseas contingency operations requests.
In a time of declining budget resources, the Committee must have the same level of visibility into
SOCOM’s funding as is provided by the Services in order to facilitate appropriate oversight.
Therefore, the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Comptroller, Special Operations
for Financial Management (SOFM) are directed to submit the fiscal year 2015 SOCOM base and
OCO operation and maintenance budget justification in accordance with Volume 2A, Chapter 3 of
the FMR as such requirements apply to the Services. As required by the FMR, the budget
justification shall be delineated and detailed by budget activity group, activity group, and subactivity group with detailed changes within each sub-activity reflected on OP–5 and OP–32
exhibits. The Committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the
Comptroller, SOFM to consult with the Committee during development of the fiscal year 2015
budget on actions being taken to make the necessary changes not later than October 1, 2013.
EMBEDDED MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDERS (p. 276)
The Committee understands the tremendous toll exacted on all servicemembers and their
families, including those in the special operations and National Guard and reserve communities,
after more than a decade of war. The Committee has always made the care of forces and their
families its highest priority. The Committee appreciates the focus that the Commander, Special
Operations Command, has put on the psychological health and well-being of special operations
forces and their families and recognizes the importance of providing support to this vulnerable
population.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Further, the Committee recognizes the success of the embedded behavioral health program and
fully supports its expansion to the special operations community. However, the Committee
believes that the mental health needs of all servicemembers, including special operators, are most
appropriately addressed within the Defense Health Program by the Service Surgeons General to
ensure the highest quality continuity of care for the servicemember.
Therefore, the Committee recommendation transfers $21,300,000 requested within the Special
Operations Command operation and maintenance budget to the Defense Health Program to
address the needs of the special operations community. The Committee directs the Service
Surgeons General to work with the Commander, Special Operations Command to implement an
embedded behavioral health program for special operations units during fiscal year 2014.
The Committee also recognizes that National Guard and reserve personnel in states at high risk
for suicide and dangerous behavioral health conditions need convenient access to mental health
professionals for proper screening and care. Onsite access to embedded mental health specialists
during training assemblies has proven successful in overcoming geographical, stigma, and time
barriers that might otherwise bar a member from similar services in an underserved community.
The Committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to work with the Chief, National Guard
Bureau and Service Surgeons General to implement an embedded behavioral health program for
National Guard and reserve component servicemembers in order to provide reserve component
personnel with ready access to screening and treatment during unit training assemblies and urges
the Secretary of Defense to robustly fund these programs.
FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill (S. 1429)35
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a $130.230 million decrease to
USSOCOM’s FY2014 O&M base budget request.
Selected FY2014 Defense Appropriations Bill USSOCOM
Legislative Provisions36
Selected major USSOCOM-specific provisions are highlighted below:
Special Operations Command Budget Justification Materials (pp. 51-52)
The level of detail provided in budget justification documents is not sufficient for Special
Operations Command’s [SOCOM] operation and maintenance [O&M] resources. With increased
requirements driving larger budget requests, the Committee needs more itemized information in
order to conduct proper oversight. Therefore, the Committee directs that budget activities be
established for SOCOM’s O&M budget. Additionally, SOCOM is directed to submit an OP–5
Operation and Maintenance Detail exhibit and OP–32 52 Summary of Price and Program
Changes exhibit for each budget subactivity.
35
Information in this section is taken from S.Rept. 113-85, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 (S. 1429),
August 1, 2013.
36
Ibid.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Finally, the Committee directs that normal prior approval reprogramming procedures be used to
transfer funds between budget activities in excess of $15 million. The following table assigns the
budget activity and budget subactivity structure:
Budget Activity 1 includes Subactivities:
Combat Development Activities; Flight Operations; Other Operations; Ship/Boat Operations;
Base Support; Communications; Force Related Training; Intelligence; Maintenance;
Management/Operational Headquarters; Operational Support
Budget Activity 3 includes Subactivities:
Professional Development; Specialized Skill Training;
Budget Activity 4 includes Subactivity:
Acquisition/Program Management
Potential Issues for Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces, the Strategic Choices Management
Review (SCMR), and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
As previously noted, DOD’s ongoing SCMR will be used to “anchor the upcoming QDR,” which
is due to Congress in early 2014. Reports suggest the formal internal DOD QDR process will
begin in the early fall of 2013.37 The proposed 20% reduction in major headquarters staff and
reduction of combatant command intelligence analysis and operations centers, as well as the two
proposed strategic approaches for reducing force structure, will likely form the basis of QDR
analysis. Because of USSOCOM’s unique and demanding global missions and relatively small
size and budgetary resources, these proposals could have a far greater impact on USSOCOM as a
combatant command as well as U.S. SOF in general. Before QDR analysis gets “too far down the
road,” Congress might decide to review with DOD and USSOCOM the specifics of the SCMR’s
headquarters and force structure proposals as they relate to USSOCOM to insure they take into
account USSOCOM’s uniqueness and its expected role in the future national security
environment. One potential issue for both DOD and Congress is, given the myriad of irregular
threats facing the United States and USSOCOM’s central role in addressing many of these
threats, does it make sense to apply the same type of force sizing construct to USSOCOM that is
applied to conventional forces?
The Global SOF Network
In testimony before Congress earlier this year, Admiral McRaven described the threat facing the
United States:
37
Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations Command
Before the 113th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2013.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly networked and pose
complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around the world. These networks are
diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once linear. In
today’s environment, this convergence can have explosive and destabilizing effects—there is
no such thing as a local problem.
In the words of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Extremist networks squeezed in
one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks
as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami.
Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent
and interconnected. And today’s threats have become so complex, fast-moving, and crosscutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.
In response to this threat, Admiral McRaven proposed the following strategy:
Accordingly, with the support of the Global Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Chiefs of
Mission (COM), USSOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our
interagency and international partners in order to gain expanded situational awareness of
emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in critical
locations, and facilitates engagement where necessary or appropriate—all under the authority
of the GCC and COM.
Through civil-military support elements and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly
supports interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of
violence that al-Qa’ida and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist
radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology
in the future; neither we nor our partners can kill our way to victory in this fight. These
efforts require continuity and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the
potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations
we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk,
protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks.
To this end, using already programmed force structure, USSOCOM is methodically
enhancing the capabilities of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a
multi-year deliberate process supported by detailed analysis and war gaming. The goal is to
increase the capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to the GCCs to
conduct full spectrum special operations—ranging from building partner capacity
(particularly in austere, high-risk or sensitive environments) to irregular warfare and
counterterrorism.
In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U.S. Government agencies and partner
nations, USSOCOM is working to develop opportunities to improve our partnership with
regional Special Operations Forces. This approach was very successful in NATO, with the
establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters which allowed U.S. and partner nations to
share information, improve interoperability and, when necessary, work together abroad.
While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we believe there are other low-key
opportunities that may present themselves in other regions of the world.
In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through the TSOCs, USSOCOM also
employs Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) in key U.S. embassies around the
world. SOLOs are in-country SOF advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They advise and
assist partner nation SOF and help to synchronize activities with the host nation. Currently,
there are SOLOs in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France,
Turkey, Kenya, and Italy.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, one-to-three person Special
Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) work with our interagency partners in the National
Capital Region (NCR). They comprise the SOF liaison network that assists in synchronizing
DOD planning for training, exercises and operations. Currently, we have SOSTs working
within 19 U.S. Government departments and agencies.
Given the importance of interagency collaboration, USSOCOM is placing greater emphasis
on its presence in the National Capital Region (NCR) to better support coordination and
decision making with interagency partners. Thus, USSOCOM began to consolidate its
presence in the NCR in early 2012. This is not a duplication of effort. We are focused instead
on consolidating USSOCOM elements in the Washington D.C. region under the leadership
of the USSOCOM Vice-Commander—who resides in Washington.38
USSOCOM describes this strategic approach as the Global SOF Network that envisions
•
a robust and flexible global network of SOF, U.S. government partners, and
partner nations;
•
Geographic Combatant Commands and Chiefs of Mission with improved special
operations capacity; and
•
structures, processes, and authorities that enable the network.39
In terms of authorities, aside from the previously described proposed changes to the UCP,
USSOCOM is seeking legislative authorities primarily directed at Security Force Assistance
(SFA), Regional SOF Coordination Centers, and USSOCOM-developed initiatives for the
Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF).
Global SOF Network-Related Concerns
An examination of the proposed Global SOF Network suggests that it would be an ambitious
undertaking even under “normal” budgetary conditions. In light of the initial findings and
recommendations from DOD’s SCMR, it appears that DOD anticipates budgetary “uncertainty”
for the foreseeable future and, with it, highly constrained resources. Given DOD’s announcement
of a “20 percent reduction of U.S. military billets and government civilian positions in major
DOD headquarters”40 and a more recent announcement by the Army of a 25% reduction in Army
headquarters at the two-star and above levels,41 there is concern that USSOCOM’s plans for
TSOCs, Regional SOF Coordination Centers, and USSOCOM National Capitol Region, for
starters, might not be achievable under these recently announced manning and reduced resources
constraints. As in the Army’s case, the remaining services might also opt to impose commensurate
or greater cuts to their headquarters, which might further complicate USSOCOM’s plans to
establish the Global SOF Network.
38
Ibid.
Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network, March 1, 2013 and CRS discussions with USSOCOM
Staff, July 24, 2013.
40
Information in this section is taken from Karen Parrish, “Pentagon Review Reveals Best, Worst Case, Hagel Says,”
American Forces Press Service, July 31, 013 and DOD Transcripts, “Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Holds a
Defense Department News Briefing on the Recent Strategic Choices Management Review,” July 31, 2013.
41
Department of the Army Memorandum, “2013 Focus Areas,” August 14, 2013 from InsideDefense.com.
39
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
According to USSOCOM, an April 2013 JCS Planning Order directed USSOCOM to develop a
detailed campaign plan for the Global SOF Network, further directing that the Global SOF
Network be “resource neutral,”42 suggesting that if Global SOF Network is established,
USSOCOM must find funds elsewhere, perhaps by “cutting” other programs or operations. If this
is indeed the case, Congress might wish to explore the following two issues with USSOCOM:
1. What new capabilities will USSOCOM require to create, operate, and sustain the
Global SOF Network?
2. What must USSOCOM cut or divest in order to create, operate, and sustain the
Global SOF Network?
In the context of “structures, processes, and authorities,” congressional defense committees have
imposed spending restraints on selected proposed family support programs, Regional SOF
Coordination Centers, USSOCOM National Capitol Region, with one committee expressing
concern “regarding the quality of the operation and maintenance budget justification submitted by
the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).”43 In aggregate, this suggests that Congress has
ongoing concerns primarily with the “structures” aspect of the Global SOF Network and also the
necessity of such entities as the Regional SOF Coordination Centers and USSOCOM National
Capitol Region. Because of the emphasis USSOCOM leadership is placing on the role that the
Global SOF Network is expected to play in defeating networked threats to U.S. interests around
the world, it can be assumed that USSOCOM would likely undertake additional dialogue with the
congressional defense committees to address concerns reflected in the previously cited defense
authorizations and appropriations bills reports. USSOCOM notes that enhanced dialogue will
help them develop the resource space and trade-offs needed to form and size the Global SOF
Network.44
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
42
CRS discussion with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
H.Rept. 113-113, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill 2014, June 17, 2013, pp. 94-95.
44
CRS discussion with USSOCOM staff, September 10, 2013.
43
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organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
•
“Counter Terror and Special Operations. We will grow overall Special
Operations Forces end strength to 69,700 personnel, protecting our ability to
sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat al Qa’ida, counter
18
Taken directly from JSOC Website, http://www.socom.mil/pages/jointspecialoperationscommand.aspx, accessed
April 21, 2014.
19
Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2014.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build the capacity of our
partners, and support conventional operations.” (Page 17)
•
“Counterterrorism and Special Operations. The Department of Defense will
continue to protect its capacity and capability to counter terrorist threats around
the world. U.S. Special Operations Forces play a central role in these efforts,
increasingly maintaining persistent forward presence to prevent crises in addition
to serving as a crisis response and contingency force. The Department will grow
overall SOF end strength to 69,700. We will protect the ability of SOF to sustain
persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat al Qa’ida and counter other
emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build partnership capacity for
counterterrorism, deny enemy sanctuary, and conduct or support direct action, as
appropriate. As forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, more SOF will be
available to support Combatant Commanders’ efforts to counter a range of
challenges across the globe. The demand for U.S. forces to expand the
counterterrorism capabilities of allied or partner forces will likely increase in the
coming years. The United States will continue to advise, train, and equip partner
forces to perform essential tasks against terrorist networks, complementing U.S.
activities in the field. Operations and activities in the Maghreb, Sahel, and Horn
of Africa, for example, further our national security interests without a large
commitment of U.S. forces.” (Page 37)
•
“Special Operations Forces
•
Approximately 660 special operations teams (Includes Army Special Forces
Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy
Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) platoons.
•
Marine special operations teams; Air Force special tactics teams; and
operational aviation detachments (OADs). Does not include civil affairs (CA)
teams or military information support operations (MISO) detachments.
•
3 Ranger battalions.
•
259 mobility and fire support aircraft.
•
Approximately 83 ISR aircraft (40 remotely-piloted and 43 manned).
•
Personnel end strength: 69,700.” (Page 41)
FY2015 USSOCOM Budget Request20
USSOCOM’s FY2015 budget request was $9.913 billion—a 4% reduction over the $10.409
billion FY2013 budget request. This includes both the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency
Operation (OCO) funding.
20
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 President’s Budget
Submission, United States Special Operations Command, March 2014.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Potential Issues for Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR)
The 2014 QDR calls for approximately 3,700 additional personnel to be added to the command
and places a heavy emphasis on the conduct of counterterrorism operations, but it provides little
detail or discussion on how these mandates will be accomplished. In terms of the 3,700 additional
personnel, are they “operators,” headquarters, or support personnel or a combination of all three?
Are these increases spread across USSOCOM components or, instead, service componentspecific personnel increases? Over how many years will this growth occur? Regarding the
emphasis on counterterrorism, if USSOCOM is required to focus the majority of its resources and
efforts to address counterterrorism threats, are other USSOCOM mission areas that are not
terrorism-related adequately addressed? If gaps in mission coverage do occur as a result of
USSOCOM’s counterterror focus, how will these gaps be addressed? Will U.S. conventional
forces be asked to fill these gaps? Could one solution be asking allied SOF forces to take on noncounterterror SOF missions that are mutually beneficial? From an intellectual perspective, if
USSOCOM’s focus is to be counterterrorism-related for the foreseeable future, does the U.S.
special operations community run the risk of losing the knowledge, experience, and skills needed
if it is employed in a more traditional war fighting role?
U.S. SOF and Recent Events in Crimea and the Rest of Ukraine
It can be argued recent events in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine illustrate there are threats to U.S.
national security that are not terror-related and can present themselves with little to no notice.
Over the past decade, U.S. SOF efforts have been focused in the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) area of operations and, during the latter half of the decade, the United States has
increased U.S. SOF involvement in Africa in response to a growing terrorist threat in the region.
The Administration’s 2012 strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region has also likely resulted in
increased U.S. SOF involvement in that region as well. Given the heavy emphasis on these
regions, it is possible that European-focused U.S. SOF activities have been scaled back over the
recent past to compensate for increased SOF employment in other regions.
Congress might choose to examine how U.S. SOF are currently postured in the U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM) region. Potential questions for examination could include the following:
•
Have European-based or aligned U.S. SOF units been allocated to other regions?
•
If so, what U.S. SOF activities in Europe were either assigned to non-SOF units
or not accomplished due to a lack of forces?
•
Are there U.S. SOF Title 10 activities, such as Foreign Internal Defense, Security
Force Assistance, or other authorized activities, that might be included as part of
a U.S./NATO response to events in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine?
•
At present, are there adequate U.S. SOF assets in or dedicated to Europe that
could participate in U.S. or NATO activities in response to events in Crimea and
the rest of Ukraine? For example, about 600 U.S. paratroopers from the Italybased 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) were recently deployed to
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to “reassure” U.S. Eastern European
allies.21
•
In light of events in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine and the possibility that unrest
in Eastern Europe could become a wider, long-term issue, are there plans to
relook at the role of U.S. SOF in the USEUCOM region and perhaps reallocate
U.S. SOF units to the region?
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
21
Philip Ewing, “U.S. Dispatches Troops to Reassure Eastern Europe,” Politico, April 23, 2014.
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