Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mark E. ManyinWilliam H. Cooper
Specialist in Asian Affairs
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and FinanceInternational Trade and Finance
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
August 2, 2013February 20, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33436
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
Japan is a significant partner for the United States in a number of foreign policy areas,
particularly in terms of security priorities, from hedging against Chinese military modernization
to countering threats from North Korea. The post-World War II alliance has long been an anchor
of the U.S. security role in Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 49,000
U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets based in Japan in the Asia-Pacific.
Until the recent parliamentary elections, Japan struggled to find political stability. Since 2007, six
men have been prime minister, including the current premier Shinzo Abe, who also held the post
in 2006-2007. His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in a landslide election in
December 2012, and cemented their power in parliamentary elections in July 2013. Japan’s
leaders face daunting tasks: After years of turmoil, Japanese politics appears to have entered a period of stability with the
December 2012 election victory of current premier Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP). New elections are not required to be held until 2016. Japan’s leaders face daunting tasks:
an increasingly assertive China, a weak economy, and rebuilding
from thea devastating March 2011
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster. In recent years,
opposition control of one chamber of parliament has
parliament paralyzed policymaking in Tokyo and made
U.S.-Japan relations difficult to manage
despite overall shared national interests. Abe is now more
free to pursue controversial However, the LDP’s recent election victories have given
it control over both chambers, thereby giving Abe more political room to pursue controversial
initiatives that the United States has encouraged such as joining the
Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade pact and increasing its military’s capabilities and flexibility.
Comments and actions on controversial historical issues by Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet
have raised concern that Tokyo could upset regional relations in ways that hurt U.S. interests. Abe
is known for his strong nationalist views. Abe’s approach to issues like the so-called “comfort
women” sex slaves from the World War II era, history textbooks, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
that honors Japan’s war dead, and statements on a territorial dispute with South Korea will be
closely monitored by Japan’s neighbors as well as the United States.
The massive and immediate humanitarian relief provided by the United States following the
March 2011 “triple disaster” bolstered the bilateral alliance, but difficult issues remain,
particularly those related to the stationing of marines on Okinawa. Washington and Tokyo have
agreed to relocate several U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has improved and evolved in recent decades as the allies adjust
to new security challenges, such as the ballistic missile threat from North Korea and the
confrontation between Japan and China over disputed islets. The alliance must cope with a new
strategic environment while managing more tangible issues like the realignment of several
thousand marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the
region, but the two governments have been unable to make tangible progress on implementing a
2006 agreement Asia-Pacific region. Despite
overcoming a major hurdle in late 2013 to relocate the controversial Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station to a less densely
populated location on Okinawa, many politicians and activists remain
opposed to the plan. In addition, the U.S. Congress has restricted some funding for the
realignment because of concerns and uncertainty about the cost of the realignment plans.
Japan is one of the United States’ most important economic partners. Outside of North America, it
is the United States’ second-largest export market and second-largest source of imports. Japanese
firms are the United States’ second-largest source of foreign direct investment, and Japanese
investors are the second-largest foreign holders of U.S. treasuries. In April 2013, the United
States and the Japan, the United States, and
10 other countries are participating in the TPP free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations
completed discussions with Japan and invited Tokyo to join the talks. Japan’s membership in the
TPP, if an agreement is reached, would constitute a de facto U.S.-Japan FTA. Congress must
. Congress
must approve implementing legislation if the TPP is to apply to the United States. Japan’s participation
participation in the talks could enhance the credibility and viability of the TPP, which is a core
component of
Administration efforts to “rebalance” U.S. foreign policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific
AsiaPacific region. If successful, the negotiations could reinvigorate a bilateral economic relationship
that has
remained steady but stagnant, by forcing the two countries to address long-standing, difficult
difficult issues. On the other hand, failure to do so could indicate that the underlying problems are too
too fundamental to overcome and could set back the relationship.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
July 2013 Elections—LDP Victory Gives Abe Control for Three More Years ......................... 1
Abe’s Foreign Policy and Regional Relations ...Shrine Visit Strains Northeast Asian Relations.......................................................................... 1
Okinawan Governor Approves Permit for U.S. Marine Base ................................................... 1
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) ........................................................................ 1 2
The TPP and Abe’s Economic Agenda ...................................................................................... 2
Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations ............................................................................ 45
Abe and History Issues .............................................................................................................. 46
Yasukuni Shrine .................................................................................................................. 56
Comfort Women Issue ......................................................................................................... 67
Sea of Japan/East Sea Naming Controversy ....................................................................... 8
Territorial Dispute with China ................................................................................................... 69
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) .................................................................... 10
China-Japan Trade ............................................................................................................... 7 11
Japan and the Korean Peninsula ................................................................................................ 8 11
Japan’s Ties with South Korea ............................................................................................ 8 11
North Korean Issues ............................................................................................................ 9
Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy 12
Renewed Relations with India, Russia, Australia, and ASEAN .............................................. 13
International Child Custody Disputes.................................................... 10
Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan.................................. 13
U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs) ................................................................... 11
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran 14
Energy and Environmental Issues ..................................................................................... 12
International Child Custody Disputes............. 15
Nuclear Energy Policy ....................................................................................................... 13
U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs) ...... 16
U.S. Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan ........................................................ 17
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran ...................... 14
Alliance Issues ................................................................. 17
Alliance Issues .......................................................................... 14
Futenma Base Relocation Controversy ..................................................... 18
Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa ........................................... 15.............. 19
Progress on Other Elements of Military Realignment and Alliance Transformation .............. 1721
Deployment of the MV-22 Osprey Aircraft to Japan............................................................... 17
March 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: U.S.-Japan Alliance Performance 22
Constitutional Constraints ................................ 17
Constitutional Constraints ....................................................................... 22
Burden-Sharing Issues ................................ 18
Burden-Sharing Issues ............................................................................. 23
Extended Deterrence ................................ 19
Extended Deterrence ............................................................................... 24
Maritime Defense Cooperation ................................ 19
Japan’s Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden ............................................................... 1925
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 2127
Overview of the Bilateral Economic Relationship .................................................................. 2127
Bilateral Trade Issues .............................................................................................................. 2329
Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef .................................................................................................. 2329
Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)............................................... 2430
Insurance ........................................................................................................................... 2632
Japanese Politics ............................................................................................................................ 2632
The Stabilization of Japanese Politics Around the LDP .......................................................... 2732
Abe’s Priorities ........................................................................................................................ 2732
The DPJ and Alternative Political Forces ................................................................................ 2934
Structural Rigidities in Japan’s Political System ..................................................................... 3035
Japan’s Demographic Challenge ............................................................................................. 3035
Selected Legislation ....................................................................................................................... 3036
113th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 30
36
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
112th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 3136
111th Congress.......................................................................................................................... 31
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress37
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Japan .................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. 4
Figure 2. Host Nation Support for USFJ ....................................................................................... 24
Figure 3. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan ........................................................................ 2026
Figure 34. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament ................................................ 2834
Figure 45. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament ................................................ 2934
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, Selected Years ....................................................... 2127
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 33
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
July 2013 Elections—LDP Victory Gives Abe Control for Three
More Years
Since 2007, Japan’s politics has been plagued by turmoil and short-term premiers, complicating
U.S.-Japan relations. This period of political instability may have come to an end in July 2013
with the landslide victory of Prime Minister Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in elections
for Japan’s Upper House of parliament, called the Diet. The LDP increased its seat total from 86
to 115 in the 242-seat chamber. The vote gives the LDP control of the Upper House, by virtue of a
coalition it holds with the smaller, New Komeito party. Abe and the LDP already controlled the
more powerful Lower House, which was won after a similarly dominant performance in
December 2012 elections, a victory that swept the party back into power after three years in
opposition. Elections for either chamber are not required to be held until 2016, which means that
Abe and the LDP are likely to hold the reins of power at least until then.
Since assuming the premiership in December 2012, Abe has governed and campaigned on a
platform of revitalizing Japan’s economy and strengthening its military. According to polls taken
before and after the election, large majorities of Japanese support Abe’s economic policy moves
to combat deflation and restore growth, a program he has dubbed “Abenomics” and consists of
three main pillars: monetary stimulus, fiscal stimulus, and economic reform. Abe’s arguments for
a more robust military posture have generated more controversy and debate within Japan. Abe has
said his government will proceed this fall with a study of how Japan can participate in collective
self-defense activities, combat cooperation in defense of another country that is prohibited under
the current official interpretation of Japan’s constitution. However, because the July 2013 Upper
House elections did not produce a two-thirds majority—a key legal threshold—Abe has said he
will not prioritize his more far-reaching proposals to amend Japan’s constitution.1 The LDP’s
reliance on the pacifist New Komeito party may give the latter increased influence in the debate
over whether and how Japan should revise its legal structure to allow its military forces greater
freedom of action.
Abe’s Foreign Policy and Regional Relations
Two of Abe’s major foreign policy goals are expanding Japan’s engagement in Asia and
increasing Japan’s military capabilities. In particular, he has emphasized deeper engagement with
Southeast Asia, as well as increasing security ties with India and Australia. At the Shangri-la
security conference in Singapore, defense ministers from South Korea, Japan, and the United
States met to discuss North Korean provocations. To attempt to pave the way for higher level
talks with Beijing, he dispatched a top diplomatic aide to China shortly after the July elections.
China and Japan continue to be locked in a struggle over ownership of a small group of islets
known as the Senkakus to Japan and the Diaoyu to China (see the “Territorial Dispute with
China” section below for more details), with near-daily encounters between Japanese and Chinese
1
“Japan: Prime Minister Abe Pledges to Further Implement Economic Policies in News Conference,” NHK General
Television in Japanese, as translated by the Open Source Center, JPO2013072212390999, 0500 GMT July 22, 2013.
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vessels in the East China Sea that could escalate into a more serious conflict. Although the U.S. is
officially neutral on the question of sovereignty, it otherwise has backed the position of Japan,
which administers the islets. China has refused to hold high-level meetings with Japan, including
a heretofore annual Japan-China-South Korea summit, unless Tokyo makes key concessions on
the Senkakus/Diaoyu issue.
China and South Korea remain wary of Abe’s goal of expanding Japan’s military capabilities
because of their lingering concern about how the Tokyo government treats Japan’s history of
aggression in Asia in the first half of the 20th century (see the “Abe and History Issues” section
below for background). Plans to adjust Japan’s constitution to loosen restrictions on the military
and to develop Japan’s defense activities with other countries draw complaints or statements of
concern from Beijing, and are unsettling to many in Seoul. Diplomatic meetings with both
countries are routinely canceled or postponed when a Japanese official makes a statement on
history that offends the other parties. U.S. officials, in general supportive of increasing Japan’s
defense posture in the region, quietly voice their concern about historical disagreements affecting
cooperative efforts, particularly in developing closer trilateral coordination with Japan and South
Korea. A visit by Abe or members of his cabinet to a controversial shrine that honors Japan’s
wartime dead (see the “Yasukuni Shrine” section below) on August 15, the sensitive anniversary
of Japan’s surrender in World War II, could again spike tension in the region.
The TPP and Abe’s Economic Agenda
On April 24, 2013, Acting USTR Demetrios Marantis, in a letter addressed to House Speaker
John Boehner, notified Congress of the Obama Administration’s intent to launch negotiations
with Japan as part of the TPP no earlier than 90 calendar days hence. The notification followed
the April 20, 2013, announcement by trade ministers from the United States and the other 10 TPP
partners that they have formally invited Japan to join the TPP negotiations. Japanese officials
would like Japan to be able to participate in an expected July round of TPP negotiations. On July
23, Japan formally joined the TPP negotiations and became the 12th participant.
Abe has made it a priority of his administration to grow the economy and to eliminate deflation,
which has plagued Japan for many years. After assuming power, Abe’s government announced a
three-pronged or “three arrow” program to boost economic growth and The first arrow consists of
a $122 billion fiscal stimulus package aimed at spending on infrastructure, particularly in areas
affected by the March 2011 disaster. While the package is expected to boost growth somewhat, it
will also add to Japan’s already large public debt. The second arrow consists of monetary
stimulus to arrest deflation. As a result, under pressure from Abe, the independent central Bank of
Japan announced that it would undertake quantitative easing measures and raise its inflation
target to 2% within two years. The Japanese yen then rapidly dropped in value against the U.S.
dollar and other major currencies. The third arrow is to consist of economic reforms that will be
aimed at restructuring the agricultural, medical services, and electricity sectors and to promote
new services and new industries, according to Prime Minister Abe. For Abe, Japan’s participation
in the TPP is a catalyst for those reforms.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Map of Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations2
The July 2013 election results mean that the LDP likely
will remain in power until the next Lower House
elections in 2016. To U.S. policymakers, continuity in
Tokyo’s leadership will be a welcome change from the
paralysis that has plagued Japan’s politics for the past
several years. The U.S.-Japan relationship is broad,
deep-seated, and stable but has been handicapped by the
annual replacement of prime ministers since 2006. The
Obama Administration’s rebalancing to Asia strategy,
also known as the “Pacific Pivot,” seeks a partner for
long-term planning. Tokyo and Washington share the
priorities of managing relations with a rising China, as
well as addressing the North Korean threat. Alliance
cooperation at the working level has been strong, driven
closer by assertive Chinese behavior and North Korean
provocations. Although major basing issues in Okinawa
remain stubbornly unresolved, other security matters
such as ballistic missile defense cooperation have
progressed under both the LDP government and its
immediate predecessors, which were led by the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ is now
Japan’s largest opposition party. The joint response to
the March 2011 disasters remains a vivid reminder to
both sides of the 38
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
Shrine Visit Strains Northeast Asian Relations
Tokyo’s relations with Beijing and Seoul continued to deteriorate in late 2013, particularly after
Prime Minister Abe’s highly publicized visit on December 26 to a controversial Shinto shrine that
honors those Japanese who died for their country during war. The Yasukuni Shrine houses the
spirits of several individuals convicted of Class A war crimes after Japan’s surrender in World
War II. Response to the visit, which had been discouraged in private by U.S. officials, was
uniformly negative outside of Japan. Unusually, the U.S. Embassy directly criticized the move,
saying in a statement, “The United States is disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an
action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors,” a statement repeated by the U.S.
State Department spokesperson in a subsequent press briefing.1
South Korean and Chinese reactions were harsh, and both countries explicitly stated that the visit
blocked the way for a leaders’ meeting; Abe has not held an official summit with either Chinese
President Xi Jinping or South Korean President Park Geun-hye since taking office in December
2012. A senior South Korean official labeled the visit as the “final blow to ongoing efforts to
improve relations between South Korea and Japan,” and Beijing blasted Abe for “hypocrisy in his
claims of prioritizing relations with China ... The Chinese people do not welcome him.”2 Chinese
and South Korean critics have long complained that official visits to the shrine glorify Japan’s
militarist past, including the often brutal colonization of China and Korea in the early 20th
century. Abe stated that he visited the shrine to honor those who died and pray for peace.
U.S. officials have become increasingly concerned about the poor relations between Seoul and
Tokyo in particular, pointing out that tension between two close U.S. allies hinders policy
coordination over both North Korea and the challenges of China’s rise. Washington, while
reluctant to referee the dispute, has both quietly discouraged Abe from taking actions that offend
South Koreans and urged leaders in Seoul to move beyond criticism of Japan’s past practices in
order to foster pragmatic relations.
Okinawan Governor Approves Permit for U.S. Marine Base
In the last days of 2013, the United States and Japan cleared an important political hurdle in their
long-delayed plan to relocate a major U.S. military base on the island of Okinawa. The governor
of Okinawa Prefecture, Hirokazu Nakaima, approved construction of an offshore landfill
necessary to build the replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Many
observers gave credit to the Abe Administration for convincing Nakaima to sign the highly
controversial document. Despite the bold decision by Governor Nakaima, most Okinawans
oppose the construction of a new U.S. base for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-oflife reasons. U.S. and Japanese officials on Okinawa asserted in 2013 that law enforcement
authorities are prepared to manage disruptive protests, but Okinawan anti-base civic groups may
take extreme measures to prevent construction of the facility at Henoko.3 The Abe
1
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131226-01.html.
“China Says Abe Not Welcome After War Shrine Visit,” Bloomberg, December 30, 2013.
3
Interviews with CRS analyst, July 2013.
2
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Administration, having invested significant time and money in meeting Nakaima’s conditions for
approval, will likely need to invest further political capital to ensure that the base construction
proceeds without significant delays and without further alienating the Okinawan public. There
remains a risk that heavy-handed actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to stridently antibase politicians making gains in Okinawa, particularly in the gubernatorial election later in 2014.
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
In November 2013, China abruptly announced that it would establish an air defense identification
zone in the East China Sea, covering the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets as well as airspace that
overlaps with the existing ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The move appears to fit
with an overall pattern of China asserting territorial claims more aggressively in the past few
years. To many security analysts, the announcement represented a new step to pressure—to
coerce, some experts argue—Japan’s conciliation in the territorial dispute over the islets. The
overlap of ADIZs could lead to accidents or unintended clashes, thus raising the risk of conflict in
the East China Sea. Some analysts argue that China’s ADIZ also represents a challenge to
Japanese administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, which is the basis of the U.S. treaty
commitment to defend that territory.
Japanese and U.S. officials reacted sharply to the move, calling the announcement destabilizing
and prompting Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to reiterate that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense
Treaty applies to the islets. Two days following the announcement, the U.S. Air Force flew B-52
bombers on a planned training flight through China’s new ADIZ without notifying China, and
Japanese military aircraft did the same soon after. However, the respective instructions of each
government to commercial airlines differed: whereas the State Department said that the United
States generally expects U.S. commercial air carriers to follow Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs),
including Chinese requests for identification in the controversial ADIZ, Tokyo instructed
Japanese commercial airlines to not respond to Chinese requests when traveling through the
ADIZ on routes that do not cross into Chinese airspace. The discrepancy contributed to latent
anxieties in Tokyo about U.S.-Japan unity and the relative prioritization of China and Japan in
U.S. policymaking.
The TPP and Abe’s Economic Agenda4
On July 23, 2013, Japan formally joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and
became the 12th participant of a group of countries that includes the United States. As expected,
both the multilateral and bilateral negotiations with Japan have encountered difficulties regarding
trade in automobiles and in agriculture. U.S. and Japanese negotiators reportedly are struggling
with the import restrictions that Japan wants to retain on five groups of agricultural products it
has said are “sacred”: rice, sugarcane/sugar products, wheat and barley, dairy products, and beef
and pork. The United States and other countries believe that a goal should be to include all
products in the TPP tariff reductions. Japan reportedly has been asking the United States for an
early phaseout of its 2.5% tariff on Japanese auto imports and 25% tariff on truck imports, which
could be important in selling the TPP agreement in Japan. The bilateral U.S.-Japan talks appear to
have contributed to the logjam in the multilateral TPP talks.
4
For more information, please see CRS Report R42676, Japan Joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership: What Are the
Implications?, by William H. Cooper and Mark E. Manyin.
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Members of Congress have both a direct and an oversight role in U.S. participation in the TPP.
Ultimately, Congress must approve implementing legislation if a completed TPP agreement is to
apply to the United States. Additionally, during the TPP negotiating process, Congress has a
formal and informal role in influencing U.S. negotiating positions. The Obama Administration
has been negotiating the TPP as if trade promotion authority (TPA), which expired in 2007, were
in force. TPA is the authority that Congress gives to the President to negotiate trade agreements
that would receive expedited legislative consideration. The Administration has been adhering to
consultation requirements and notification deadlines that have been an integral part of previous
TPA or fast-track statutes. In January 2014, legislation to renew TPA was introduced in the House
(H.R. 3830) and in the Senate (S. 1900).5
Abe has made it a priority of his administration to grow the economy and to eliminate deflation,
which has plagued Japan for many years. After assuming power, Abe’s government announced a
three-pronged or “three arrow” program to boost economic growth and reform the Japanese
economy. The first arrow consists of a $122 billion fiscal stimulus package aimed at spending on
infrastructure, particularly in areas affected by a devastating earthquake and tsunami in March
2011. While the package is expected to boost growth somewhat, it will also add to Japan’s already
large public debt. The second arrow consists of monetary stimulus to arrest deflation. As a result,
under pressure from Abe, the independent central Bank of Japan announced that it would
undertake quantitative easing measures and raise its inflation target to 2% within two years. The
Japanese yen then rapidly dropped in value against the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.
The third arrow is to consist of economic reforms that will be aimed at restructuring the
agricultural, medical services, and electricity sectors and to promote new services and new
industries, according to Prime Minister Abe. For Abe, Japan’s participation in the TPP is a
catalyst for those reforms.
5
For more on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade
Policy, by William H. Cooper.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Map of Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations6
The return of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) to power in late 2012, led by Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, has stabilized Japanese politics and shored
up the foundation for long-term U.S.-Japan cooperation
and planning. The LDP coalition controls both chambers
of the Japanese parliament, known as the Diet, with no
elections required until summer 2016. This period of
expected stability follows a prolonged stretch of divided
government from 2007 until 2012, when six different
men served as Prime Minister, each for about one year.
The U.S.-Japan relationship is broad, deep-seated, and
stable but had been handicapped by the annual
replacement of prime ministers since 2006. Tokyo and
Washington share the priorities of managing relations
with a rising China, as well as addressing the North
Korean threat. The joint response to the March 2011
disasters remains a vivid reminder to both sides of the
underlying strength of the alliance.
Japan Country Data
Population: 127.4 million
% of Population over 64: 24% (U.S. =
12.4%)
Area: 377,835 sq km (slightly smaller than
California)
Life Expectancy: 84 years
Per Capita GDP: $36,200 (2012 est.)
purchasing power parity
Primary Export Partners: China 19.7%,
U.S. 15.5%, South Korea 8%, Hong Kong
5.2%, Thailand 4.6% (2011)
Primary Import Partners: China 21.5%,
US 8.9%, Australia 6.6%, Saudi Arabia 5.9%,
UAE 5%, South Korea 4.7% (2011)
Yen: Dollar Exchange Rate: 79.42 (2012
est.), 79.81 (2011 est.), 87.78 (2010 est.),
93.57 (2009), 103.58 (2008)
Foreign Exchange Reserves: $1.351
trillion (December 2012 est.)
Source: CIA World Factbook, February 2013.
It remains uncertain how Prime Minister Abe will fare as a steward of the relationship. On the one
hand, he is known as a strong supporter of the U.S. alliance and promotes a number of security
and economic positions that align with the United States. He is an advocate of building relations
with fellow democracies, particularly advancing security ties with Australia and India. On the
other hand, Abe faces questions about his ability to steer foreign policy away from divisive
regional issues that could hurt U.S. interests. (See section below for discussion.) Abe faces a
considerable challenge in convincing powerful sectoral constituencies to agree to some of the
likely provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (see “Economic Issues” section for more) and in
allaying regional and domestic skepticism of Japan engaging in more advanced defense
cooperation (see “Alliance Issues” section for more).
Foreign Exchange Reserves: $1.351
Abe has prioritized the alliance with the United States:
trillion (December 2012 est.)
he modestly increased Japan’s defense budget for the
first time in 10 years, supports defense reforms that
Source: CIA World Factbook, February 2013.
would enhance Japanese military capabilities, and
delivered on securing approval for the construction of a new U.S. Marine Corps base on
Okinawa. He has also entered Japan into the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade
agreement negotiations and has moved aggressively to restart Japan’s economy, including seeking
a number of economic reforms favored by many in the United States. Abe’s boldness in pursuing
such measures was welcomed by U.S. officials and aligns with the Obama Administration’s
strategy of “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in light of China’s increasingly
assertive territorial and maritime claims.
On the other hand, Abe’s December 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine despite quiet
discouragement from American officials demonstrates qualities of the leader that complicate
bilateral relations. China and South Korea, in particular, were offended by the visit because the
shrine houses the spirits of several Class A war criminals from World War II along with those of
Japanese who died in war. The Prime Minister’s visit further damaged already poor relations with
Seoul and Beijing. In addition to exacerbating regional tensions, the fact that Abe chose to ignore
U.S. advice with the surprise visit may have breached a degree of trust between the capitals.
There is also the danger that Abe’s views on history could clash with Americans’ conception of
the U.S. role in World War II and the subsequent occupation of Japan. To many U.S. observers,
Abe brings both positive and negative qualities to the alliance, at once bolstering it but also
renewing historical animosities that could disturb the regional security environment.
6
This section was written by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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Abe and History Issues
During his year-long stint as prime minister in 2006-2007, Abe was known for his nationalist
rhetoric and advocacy for more muscular positions on defense and security matters. Some of
Abe’s positions—such as changing the interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow for
Japanese participation in collective self-defense—were largely welcomed by U.S. officials eager
to advance military cooperation. Other statements, however, suggest that Abe embraces a
2
This section was written by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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revisionist view of Japanese history that rejects the narrative of imperial Japanese aggression and
victimization of other Asians. He has been involvedassociated with groups arguing that Japan has been
unjustly criticized for its behavior as a colonial and wartime power. Among the positions
advocated by these groups, such as Nippon Kaigi Kyokai, are that Japan should be applauded for
liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War
Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the
1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or fabricated.
Historical issues have long colored Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, particularly China
and South Korea, which argue that the Japanese government has neither sufficiently appreciatedatoned for
nor adequately compensated them for Japan’s occupation and belligerence in the early 20th
Century. Abe’s selections for his Cabinet include a number of politicians well-known for
advocating nationalist, and in some cases ultra-nationalist views that many argue appear to glorify
Imperial Japan’s actions. Many analysts say that Abe’s strengthened political position could lead
him and/or his Cabinet Members to take steps or make statements about history that inflame
regional relations, actions which could disrupt regional trade integration, threaten security cooperation
cooperation among U.S. allies, and further exacerbatedisturb already tense relations with China.
In his first term, Abe took a generally pragmatic approach to regional relations and had some
success in mending poor relations with Seoul and Beijing. During his second term, Abe made,
and then recanted,During his second term, Abe backtracked on controversial statements that upset China and South
Korea. In April 2013, he
made comments to the Diet that suggested that his government would
not re-affirm the apology
for Japan’s wartime actions issued by former Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama in 1995. The
“Murayama Statement” is regarded as Japan’s most significant official
apology for wartime acts.
Abe stated to the Diet that his government may not uphold the
statement “as is” and that the
definition of “aggression” has not yet been “firmly determined.”
Through his spokesperson, Abe
later said, “during the wars of the 20th century, Japan caused
tremendous damage and suffering to
the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian
nations ... this understanding is an
understanding that the Abe Cabinet shares with previous
cabinets.”37 From the earliest days of the
Abe administration, his chief spokesman has said that the Abe government will abide by the
Murayama statement.
Yasukuni Shrine
The controversial Yasukuni Shrine has been a flashpoint for regional friction over history. The
Tokyo shrine houses the spirits of Japanese soldiers who died during war, including severalbut also includes 14
individuals who were convicted as “Class A” war criminals after World War II. Visits to the
shrine by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi severely strained Tokyo’s relationships with Beijing
and Seoul in the early and mid-2000s. The DPJ government generally refrained from visiting the
shrine while in power. In April 2013, a large group of lawmakers, including three cabinet
ministers, visited Yasukuni, again drawing protests from China and South Korea, who said the
visits demonstrate Japan’s lack of remorse for Imperial-era aggression. The Japanese politicians
say that they went to Yasukuni to pay respects to the nation’s war dead, as any national leader
would do. Abe last visited the Yasukuni Shrine in October 2012, after he was elected president of
the LDP but before the parliamentary elections that made him prime minister.
3
Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 8, 2013. Accessed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
tyoukanpress/201305/08_a.html.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Comfort Women Issue4
Abe’s statements on the so-called “comfort women”—sex slaves used by the Japanese imperial
military during its conquest and colonization of several Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s—
have been criticized by other regional powers and the U.S. House of Representatives in a 2007
resolution. In the past, Abe has supported the claims made by many on the right in Japan that the
women were not directly coerced into service by the Japanese military. When he was prime
minister in 2006-2007, Abe voiced doubts about the validity of the 1993 “Kono Statement,” an
official statement issued by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that apologized to the
victims and admitted responsibility by the Japanese military. As the U.S. House of
Representatives considered H.Res. 121 (110th Congress), calling on the Japanese government to
“formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility” for forcing young women
into military prostitution, Abe appeared to soften his commentary and asserted that he would
stand by the statement. (The House later overwhelmingly endorsed the resolution.)
In recent years, Abe periodically has suggested that his government might consider revising the
so-called Kono Statement, a move that would be sure to degrade Tokyo’s relations with South
Korea and other countries. In May 2013, when questioned about the possibility of changing the
statement, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said, “With regard to the ‘comfort women’
issue, when we think of the women who experienced immeasurable pain and suffering we are
deeply pained. I have frequently stated the Government’s view that the Abe Cabinet shares the
same recognition as that of previous cabinets” but left open the possibility of amending the
statement by saying, “various scholars of history and experts in Japan and overseas are engaged
in research on various themes and ... it would be a good idea for further consideration to be given
from an academic perspective.”5The origins of the
shrine reveal its politically charged status. Created in 1879 as Japan’s leaders codified the state7
Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 8, 2013. Accessed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
tyoukanpress/201305/08_a.html.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
directed Shinto religion, Yasukuni was unique in its intimate relationship with the military and the
emperor.8 The Class A war criminals were enshrined in 1978; since then, the emperor has not
visited the shrine and scholars suggest that it is precisely because of the criminals’ inclusion.
Adjacent to the shrine is the Yushukan, a war history museum, which to many portrays a
revisionist account of Japanese history that at times glorifies Japan’s militarist past.
Abe’s visit in December 2013 (see “Recent Developments” section) was his first since becoming
Japan’s prime minister, although a large group of lawmakers, including three Cabinet ministers,
had visited earlier in the year. The Japanese politicians say that they went to Yasukuni to pay
respects to the nation’s war dead, as any national leader would do. Visits to the shrine by Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi severely strained Tokyo’s relationships with Beijing and Seoul in the
early and mid-2000s. Prime Ministers from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which held
power 2009-2012, refrained from visiting the shrine. Some politicians and observers have
suggested that the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, which houses the remains of unidentified
Japanese killed in World War II, could serve as an alternative place to honor Japan’s war dead. In
October 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel paid
their respects at Chidorigafuchi.
Comfort Women Issue9
Abe’s statements on the so-called “comfort women”—forced prostitutes used by the Japanese
imperial military during its conquest and colonization of several Asian countries in the 1930s and
1940s—have been criticized by other regional powers and the U.S. House of Representatives in a
2007 resolution. In the past, Abe has supported the claims made by many on the right in Japan
that the women were not directly coerced into service by the Japanese military. When he was
prime minister in 2006-2007, Abe voiced doubts about the validity of the 1993 “Kono
Statement,” an official statement issued by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that
apologized to the victims and admitted responsibility by the Japanese military. As the U.S. House
of Representatives considered H.Res. 121 (110th Congress), calling on the Japanese government
to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility” for forcing young
women into military prostitution, Abe appeared to soften his commentary and asserted that he
would stand by the statement. (The House later overwhelmingly endorsed the resolution10.)
In recent years, Abe periodically has suggested that his government might consider revising the
Kono Statement, a move that would be sure to degrade Tokyo’s relations with South Korea and
other countries. Since the days after Abe’s election in December 2012, Abe’s Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga has said that the Abe government would abide by the Kono statement.
In May 2013, for instance, when questioned about the possibility of changing the statement, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said, “With regard to the ‘comfort women’ issue, when we
think of the women who experienced immeasurable pain and suffering we are deeply pained. I
have frequently stated the Government’s view that the Abe Cabinet shares the same recognition as
8
John Breen, editor, Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past. Columbia University Press, 2008.
For a lengthier discussion of the comfort women issue, please request a copy of a 2007 CRS congressional
distribution memo on the topic authored by Larry Niksch.
10
In the 113th Congress, the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, H.R. 3547) indirectly referred to this
resolution. P.L. 113-76’s conference committee issued a Joint Explanatory Statement that called on Federal Agencies to
implement directives contained in the July 2013 H.Rept. 113-185, which in turn “urge[d] the Secretary of State to
encourage the Government of Japan to address the issues raised” in H.Res. 121.
9
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
that of previous cabinets.” Suga left open the possibility of amending the statement by saying,
“various scholars of history and experts in Japan and overseas are engaged in research on various
themes and ... it would be a good idea for further consideration to be given from an academic
perspective.”11
The issue of the so-called comfort women has gained visibility in the United States, due primarily
to Korean-American activist groups. These groups have pressed successfully for the erection of
monuments commemorating the victims, passage of a resolution on the issue by the New York
State Senate, and the naming of a city street in the New York City borough of Queens in honor of
the victims. In addition, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly instructed the State
Department to refer to the women as “sex slaves,” rather than the euphemistic term “comfort
women.”6
Territorial Dispute with China7
Japan and China have engaged in a struggle over islets in the East China Sea known as the
Senkakus in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan, which has grown increasingly
heated since summer 2012. The uninhabited territory, administered by Japan but also claimed by
China and Taiwan, has been a subject of contention for years, despite modest attempts by Tokyo
and Beijing to jointly develop the potentially rich energy deposits nearby, most recently in 20084
For a lengthier discussion of the comfort women issue, please request a copy of a 2007 CRS congressional
distribution memo on the topic authored by Larry Niksch.
5
Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 27, 2013. Accessed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
tyoukanpress/201305/27_p.html
6
“‘Comfort Women’ Were Sex Slaves,” Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 2012.
7
For more information, see CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty
Obligations, by Mark E. Manyin.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
2010. In August 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands from a private
landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro Ishihara.8
Although intended to tamp down the controversy, Japan’s “nationalization” of the territory upset
the status quo, leading to massive Chinese protests, sharp objections from Beijing, and a drop in
Sino-Japanese trade. In April 2013, the Chinese foreign ministry said for the first time that it
considered the islands a “core interest,” indicating to many analysts that Beijing was unlikely to
make concessions on this sensitive sovereignty issue.
Starting in the fall of 2012, China began regularly deploying China Maritime Surveillance (CMS)
and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships near the islands and stepped up what it
called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in “China’s territorial waters.” Chinese military
surveillance planes reportedly have entered airspace that Japan considers its own, in what Japan’s
Defense Ministry has called the first such incursion in 50 years. In early 2013, near-daily
encounters have escalated: both countries have scrambled fighter jets, Japan has threatened to fire
warning shots,
Sea of Japan/East Sea Naming Controversy
For centuries, South Korea and Japan have used different names to refer to the sea that lies
between the main islands of the Japanese archipelago and mainland Asia. Japan refers to these
waters as the “Sea of Japan,” while South Korea and North Korea refer to them as the “East
Sea.”12 “Sea of Japan” is the name used in a majority of atlases, by most international institutions,
and by most governments, including the United States government.13 The South Korean
government urges the concurrent use of both names, perhaps for an interim period, until only
“East Sea” is universally recognized.14 Japan opposes attempts to either replace the “Sea of
Japan” with “East Sea” or to use both names concurrently. For many Koreans, the predominant
use of “Sea of Japan” is a legacy of the period when Korea was under Japanese rule, because a
number of key decisions about the world’s geographic names were made during the first half of
the 20th century.
In recent years, the South Korean government, South Korean citizens, and some KoreanAmericans appear to have been broadening their appeal to atlas publishers, U.S. federal
government institutions, and the legislatures of some U.S. states such as Virginia and New York.
The South Korean government states that there is a “steady increase” in maps using both names.15
The Japanese government states that the name Sea of Japan is “overwhemingly” used.16
In the United States, geographic place name policies for federal government agencies are set forth
by the Board on Geographic Names (BGN), pursuant to P.L. 80-242. The BGN’s policy is that “a
single conventional name, if one exists, will be chosen as the standard name” for seas and oceans.
11
Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 27, 2013. Accessed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
tyoukanpress/201305/27_p.html.
12
Other countries also use the name “East Sea” to refer to different bodies of water. For instance, the body of water
commonly referred to as the “South China Sea” is referred to as the “East Sea” by Vietnam.
13
For instance, in 2012, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), an intergovernmental organization that
creates widely-used reference sources on the names and borders of waters around the world, decided not to change its
naming protocol of using only “Sea of Japan.”
14
The South Korean effort began in 1992, when shortly after they joined the United Nations, South Korea and North
Korea began urging that “East Sea” be included on world maps. JoongAng Ilbo, “Gov’t Goes Easy on East Sea
Renaming Demand,” May 2, 2011; International Hydrographic Organization, XVIIIth International Hydrographic
Conference, April 23-27, 2012, Report of Proceedings, Volume I.
15
“East Sea: The Name from the Past, of the Present and for the Future,” 2012 pamphlet published by the South
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Northeast Asian History Foundation.
16
“Sea of Japan: The One and Only Name Familiar to the International Community,” 2009 pamphlet published by the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
The BGN decides on what constitutes a “conventional name” by consulting various print and
online geographic references to determine which name is “under widespread and current usage.”17
Territorial Dispute with China18
Japan and China have engaged in a struggle over islets in the East China Sea known as the
Senkakus in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan, which has grown increasingly
heated since summer 2012. The uninhabited territory, administered by Japan but also claimed by
China and Taiwan, has been a subject of contention for years, despite modest attempts by Tokyo
and Beijing to jointly develop the potentially rich energy deposits nearby, most recently in 20082010. In August 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands from a private
landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro Ishihara.19
Claiming that this act amounted to “nationalization” and thus violated the tenuous status quo,
Beijing issued sharp objections. Chinese citizens held massive anti-Japan protests, and the
resulting tensions led to a drop in Sino-Japanese trade. In April 2013, the Chinese foreign
ministry said for the first time that it considered the islands a “core interest,” indicating to many
analysts that Beijing was unlikely to make concessions on this sensitive sovereignty issue.
Starting in the fall of 2012, China began regularly deploying maritime law enforcement ships
near the islands and stepped up what it called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in “China’s
territorial waters.” Chinese military surveillance planes reportedly have entered airspace that
Japan considers its own, in what Japan’s Defense Ministry has called the first such incursion in 50
years. Since early 2013, near-daily encounters have escalated: both countries have scrambled
fighter jets, and, according to the Japanese government, a Chinese navy ship locked its firecontrol radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two separate occasions.
U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United
States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since
1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article 5 of the treaty
stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of
Japan” and Japan administers the islets. China’s increase in patrols appears to be an attempt to
demonstrate that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islets, thereby casting
into doubt the U.S. treaty commitment. In its own attempt to address this perceived gap, Congress
inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239) a
resolution stating, among other items, that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the
United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.”
The Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict embodies Japan’s security challenges. The maritime confrontation
with Beijing is a concrete manifestation of the threat Japan has faced for years from China’s
rising regional power. It also brings into relief Japan’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee
and its anxiety that Washington will not defend Japanese territory if it risks going to war with
China. Operationally, Japan has an acute need for its military, known as the Japan Self Defense
Forces, to build up their capacity in the southwest part of the archipelago. Similarly, many
observers cite the lack of coordination and clear delineation of responsibilities between the
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and Coast Guard.
China-Japan Trade
One of the side-effects of the China-Japan islands dispute has been the adverse impact on their
bilateral trade, especially on Japanese exports to China. China is Japan’s most important trading
partner—its largest export market and its largest source of imports—having overtaken the United
States in that role long ago. The relationship developed as Japanese multinational companies
8
In April 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced in Washington, DC, that he intended to purchase three of
the five islets from their private Japanese owner. Ishihara, who is known for expressing nationalist views, called for
demonstrating Japan’s control over the islets by building installations on the island and raised nearly $20 million in
private donations for the purchase. In September, the central government purchased the three islets for ¥2.05 billion
(about $26 million at an exchange rate of ¥78:$1) to block Ishihara’s move and reduce tension with China.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
established production facilities in China that assemble finished goods that are exported
elsewhere, including to the United States. In addition, as Chinese citizens have become wealthier,
China has become a growing market for consumer goods such as cars. Japanese exports to China
declined 11% in 2012 with much of the decline occurring in the fourth quarter.9 These trends are
similar to those with other major partners: Japan’s exports to the United Kingdom declined 18.8%
and to Germany 14.6%, reflecting moderate economic growth or slowdown and the strong yen.
However,17
United States Board on Geographic Names Foreign Names Committee, “Statement Regarding the US Board on
Geographic Names’ Decision on the Name ‘Sea of Japan,’” approved by e-mail vote March 29, 2013.
18
For more information, see CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty
Obligations, by Mark E. Manyin, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for
Congress, by Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark E. Manyin.
19
In April 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced in Washington, DC, that he intended to purchase three
of the five islets from their private Japanese owner. Ishihara, who is known for expressing nationalist views, called for
demonstrating Japan’s control over the islets by building installations on the island and raised nearly $20 million in
private donations for the purchase. In September, the central government purchased the three islets for ¥2.05 billion
(about $26 million at an exchange rate of ¥78:$1) to block Ishihara’s move and reduce tension with China.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
rising regional power. It also brings into relief Japan’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee
and its anxiety that Washington will not defend Japanese territory if it risks going to war with
China. Operationally, Japan has an acute need for its military, known as the Japan Self Defense
Forces, to build up their capacity in the southwest part of the archipelago.
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
China’s November 2013 announcement that it would establish an air defense identification zone
in the East China Sea produced indignation and anxiety in the region and in Washington for
several reasons: the ADIZ represented a new step to pressure—to coerce, some experts argue—
Japan’s conciliation in the territorial dispute over the islets; China had not consulted with affected
countries and so they were unprepared; the announcement used vague and ominous language that
seemed to promise military enforcement within the zone; the requirements for flight notification
in the ADIZ go beyond international norms and impinge on the freedom of navigation; and the
overlap of ADIZs could lead to accidents or unintended clashes, thus raising the risk of conflict in
the East China Sea. Some analysts argue that China’s ADIZ also represents a challenge to
Japanese administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, which is the basis of the U.S. treaty
commitment to defend that territory. In November 2013, Japan submitted a proposal to the
International Civil Aviation Organization to examine whether China’s actions threatened the order
and safety of international aviation.
The United States and Japan have coordinated at a high level their individual and collective
responses to China’s ADIZ announcement and have reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Top officials from both capitals called on China to rescind the ADIZ, terming it
“dangerous” and “one-sided,” and they declared that it would not have any effect on Japan.20
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared that the ADIZ is a destabilizing attempt to alter the
status quo and will not change how the U.S. military conducts operations. At a press conference
during his previously scheduled visit to Tokyo in early December 2013, Vice President Joseph
Biden said, “We, the United States, are deeply concerned by the attempt to unilaterally change the
status quo in the East China Sea.... I told the Prime Minister that we will remain steadfast in our
alliance commitments.”21 American officials have expressed appreciation for Japan’s measured
response in what could have been a combustible situation. Reportedly, the United States and
Japan agreed to increase their reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the East China Sea,
presumably to monitor Chinese practices in the new ADIZ.
One aspect of the ADIZ issue that has strained U.S.-Japan relations is the respective instructions
of each government to commercial airlines. The State Department said on November 29, 2013,
that the United States generally expects U.S. commercial air carriers to follow Notices to Airmen
(NOTAMs), including Chinese requests for identification in the controversial ADIZ. This official
guidance appears to contradict the stated policy that the U.S. government does not accept China’s
requirements for operating in the ADIZ. On the instruction of the Japanese government, Japanese
commercial airlines do not respond to Chinese identification requests when traveling through the
newly declared ADIZ on routes that do not cross into Chinese airspace. The gravity of the
situation has magnified these seemingly minor discrepancies. Many Japanese strongly praised the
20
“Japan, China Trade Barbs over Controversial Air Defense Zone,” Kyodo News Agency, December 25, 2013.
Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, The Kantei, Tokyo,
Japan, December 3, 2013.
21
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training flight of U.S. B-52 bombers through the Chinese ADIZ and were deeply concerned when
the United States appeared to accede to China on commercial airline guidance. Several American
analysts argued that the United States lost credibility by not sufficiently supporting Japan.22 In a
more concrete sense, some Japanese analysts worry that certain U.S. actions abet China’s claim to
administer the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and thus weaken the U.S. treaty guarantee to defend the
disputed islands alongside Japan.
China-Japan Trade
One of the possible side-effects of the China-Japan islands dispute has been the impact on their
bilateral trade, especially on Japanese exports to China. China is Japan’s most important trading
partner. The relationship developed as Japanese multinational companies established production
facilities in China that assemble finished goods that are exported elsewhere, including to the
United States. In addition, as Chinese citizens have become wealthier, China has become a
growing market for consumer goods such as cars. However, Japanese exports to China declined
11% in 2012 and another 11% in 2013.23 Furthermore, China slipped from being Japan’s primary
export market to second most important market, while the United States reemerged in first place.
Some observers have noted that the political tensions caused by the confrontations over the
Senkaku/Daioyu islands may have spilled over in the commercial arena. During the height of the
fracas in September 2012, nationalists in China called for a boycott on Japanese goods and
defaced Japanese retail stores. Japanese auto manufacturers experienced sharp declines in sales in
China beginning in September 2012.10 To what degree these trends are a function of politics or
macroeconomic factors would require further analysis and more data.
Japan and the Korean Peninsula
Japan’s Ties with South Korea
After a period of relatively warm ties and the promise of more effective security cooperation,
Tokyo-Seoul ties appear to have cooled anew. Under the DPJ governments and the Lee Myungbak administration in Seoul, South Korea and Japan managed historical issues, cooperated in
responding to North Korean provocations, and exchanged observers at military exercises. The
two countries were on the verge of concluding two modest but significant bilateral security
agreements on information sharing and military acquisitions until an anti-Japanese outcry in
South Korea scuttled the signing. The new governments in both capitals appear less likely to
reach out to each other, dimming U.S. hopes for more sustained trilateral cooperation among the
three democracies. Policy toward North Korea has been the one issue where regular trilateral
consultation persists.
In addition to the comfort women issue discussed above, the perennial issues of a territorial
dispute between Japan and South Korea and Japanese history textbooks continue to periodically
ruffle relations. A group of small islands in the Sea of Japan11 known as Dokdo in Korean and
Takeshima in Japanese (referred to as the Liancourt Rocks by the United States) are administered
by South Korea but claimed by Japan. Mentions of the claims in Japanese defense documents or
by local prefectures routinely spark official criticism and public outcry in South Korea. Similarly,
Seoul expresses disapproval of some of the history textbooks approved by Japan’s Ministry of
Education that South Koreans claim diminish or whitewash Japan’s colonial-era atrocities.
Some of Abe’s cabinet appointments have raised concern among South Koreans. Minister of
Education Hakubun Shimomura has criticized history textbook companies for being insufficiently
patriotic by, among other items, giving undue deference to the concerns of China and South
Korea in their presentation of Japan’s colonial past. Abe’s appointment of Shimomura appears to
signal his intent to follow through on the LDP’s pre-election advocacy of reducing “self-torturing
views of history” in education and of giving the central government greater authority over the
content of history textbooks. Abe’s Cabinet also includes Internal Affairs Minister Yoshitaka
9
GTIS, Inc., Global Trade Atlas.
IHS Global Insight, October 12, 2012.
11
Koreans call the Sea of Japan the “East Sea.”
10
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Shindo and Minister for Administrative Reform Tomomi Inada, who have aggressively asserted
Japanese territorial claims, including a well-publicized attempt to visit South Korea in 2011 to
advocate for Japanese sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets 24 That being said, Japanese exports to other major trading
countries have also declined, indicating factors outside the Sino-Japanese relationship may have
played a role.
Japan and the Korean Peninsula
Japan’s Ties with South Korea
Japan’s relations with South Korea continued to worsen in late 2013 and early 2014, a
development that drew considerable attention from U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress
who met with officials from each country. A poor relationship between Seoul and Tokyo
jeopardizes U.S. interests by complicating trilateral cooperation on North Korea policy and other
regional challenges. In 2012, Seoul abruptly cancelled the signing of a military intelligencesharing agreement with Tokyo, a pact long encouraged by the United States, due to public outcry
in South Korea over the prospect of military cooperation with Japan. Tense relations also
complicate Japan’s desire to expand its military and diplomatic influence, goals the Obama
Administration generally supports, as well as the creation of an integrated U.S.-Japan-South
Korea ballistic missile defense system. Furthermore, South Korea-Japan frictions could damage
U.S. relations with South Korea or Japan if and when either country feels the United States is
taking the other country’s side in the ongoing bilateral disputes.
22
Charles Krauthammer, “Woe to U.S. Allies,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, December 6, 2013.
J. Randy Forbes and Michael Auslin, “U.S. Power Loses Altitude in Asia,” Wall Street Journal, Op-Ed, December 11,
2013.
23
GTIS, Inc., Global Trade Atlas.
24
IHS Global Insight, October 12, 2012.
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As of February 2014, Abe and his South Korean counterpart President Park Geun-hye had yet to
hold a summit, and the high-level interaction that has occurred between the two governments
frequently has been contentious. South Korean leaders have objected to a series of statements and
actions by Abe and his Cabinet officials that many have interpreted as denying or even glorifying
Imperial Japan’s aggression in the early 20th Century. For much of 2013, South Korean leaders
stated that they would have difficulty holding a summit, or improving relations, unless Japan
adopts a “correct understanding” of history. Many Japanese argue that for years South Korean
leaders have not recognized and in some cases rejected the efforts Japan has made to
acknowledge and apologize for Imperial Japan’s actions. As a result, South Korea has arguably
helped to undermine those Japanese who have made such overtures, including a proposal that the
previous Japanese government floated in 2012 to provide a new apology and humanitarian
payments to the surviving “comfort women.” During the fall of 2013, many U.S. policymakers
and Asia watchers grew concerned that the Park government, by appearing to allow history issues
to affect most aspects of Seoul-Tokyo relations, was being overly narrow and was damaging U.S.
interests in Asia. Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in December 2013, however, shifted the focus back to
Japan.
In addition to the comfort women issue, the perennial issues of Japanese history textbooks and the
territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea continue to periodically rile relations. A group
of small islands in the Sea of Japan, known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese (the
U.S. government calls them the Liancourt Rocks), are administered by South Korea but claimed
by Japan. Mentions of the claim in Japanese defense documents or by local prefectures routinely
spark official criticism and public outcry in South Korea. Similarly, Seoul expresses disapproval
of some of the history textbooks approved by Japan’s Ministry of Education that South Koreans
claim diminish or whitewash Japan’s colonial-era atrocities.
North Korean Issues
Since 2009, Washington and Tokyo have been strongly united in their approach to North Korea.
Although the U.S. and Japanese positions diverged in the later years of the Bush Administration
over prioritization of the abductee issue (see below), Pyongyang’s string of provocations in 20092010 forged a new consensus among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. North Korea’s
2012 missile launches and the February 2013 nuclear test have helped to drive enhanced trilateral
security cooperation between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. Japan also appeared to be at least
somewhat in sync with the United States in late 2011 and early 2012 when the Obama
Administration—with the blessing of the South Korean government—was negotiating
agreements with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs and food aid. Since those
agreements falteredAs of early 2014, multilateral
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear programs remain at a
standstill.
Tokyo has adopted a relatively hardline policy against North Korea and plays a leadership role at
the United Nations in pushing for stronger punishment for the Pyongyang regime for its military
provocations and human rights abuses. Japan has imposed a virtual embargo on all trade with
North Korea. North Korea’s missile tests have demonstrated that a strike on Japan is well within
range, spurring Japan to invest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and enhance BMD
cooperation with the United States. In addition to Japan’s concern about North Korean missile
and nuclear programs, the issue of several Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents in
the 1970s and 1980s remains a top priority for Tokyo. Japan has pledged that it will not provide
economic aid to North Korea without resolution of the abductee issue. The abductee issue
remains an emotional topic in Japan. In 2008, the Bush Administration’s decision to remove
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for North Korean
concessions on its nuclear program dismayed Japanese officials, who had maintained that North
Korea’s status on the list should be linked to the abduction issue. Although the abductions issue
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has lost potency in recent years, Abe came onto the political scene in the early 2000s as a fierce
advocate for the abductees and their families and could dedicate attention to the issue.
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9Renewed Relations with India, Russia, Australia, and ASEAN
The Abe Administration’s foreign policy has displayed elements of both power politics and an
emphasis on democratic values, international laws, and norms. Shortly after returning to office,
Abe released an article outlining his foreign and security policy strategy titled “Asia’s Democratic
Security Diamond,” which described how the democracies Japan, Australia, India, and the United
States could cooperate to deter Chinese aggression on its maritime periphery.25 In 2013, Japan
held numerous high-level meetings with Asian countries to bolster relations and, in many cases,
to enhance security ties. Abe had summit meetings in India, Russia, Great Britain, all 10 countries
in Southeast Asia, and several countries in the Middle East and Africa. This energetic diplomacy
indicates a desire to balance China’s growing influence with a loose coalition of Asia-Pacific
powers, but this strategy of realpolitik is couched in the rhetoric of international laws and
democratic values.
International Child Custody Disputes
Another prominent issue in bilateral relations is child custody cases involving overseas Japanese
women in failed marriages taking children to Japan without the consent of the foreign husband or
ex-husband. Sometimes, these women have acted in contravention of custody settlements and,
after arriving in Japan, have prevented the children from meeting their fathers. After several years
of persistent but low-decibel pressure from the United States (including from Members of
Congress), in April 2014 Japan is set to accede to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Hague Convention sets out rules for resolving
child custody in failed international marriages.
With cases involving approximately 100 American children, the United States reportedly has the
largest number of such custody disputes with Japan.26 In its domestic laws, Japan only recognizes
sole parental authority, under which only one parent has custodial rights, and there is a deeprooted notion in Japan that the mother should assume custody. Japanese officials say that, in many
cases, the issue is complicated by accusations of abuse or neglect on the part of the foreign
spouse, though a senior U.S. State Department official has said that there are “almost no cases” of
substantiated claims of violence.27 Some observers fear that, even after Japan accedes to the
Hague Convention, it is unlikely to enforce the treaty’s provisions, given the existing family law
system.28 Furthermore, the Hague Convention process will only apply to cases initiated after April
2014 and will not necessarily help to resolve pending custody disputes.
25
Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012.
“Child-Snatchers: Parental Abduction in Japan,” The Economist, U.S. edition, January 21, 2012.
27
U.S. State Department, “Press Availability on International Parental Child Abduction, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” February 2, 2010.
28
Leah Hyslop, “Hope for Parents Denied Access to Children in Japan,” The Telegraph, March 19, 2012.
26
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U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs)
For decades, U.S. soldiers who were held captive by Imperial Japan during World War II have
sought official apologies from the Japanese government for their treatment. A number of
Members of Congress have supported these campaigns. The brutal conditions of Japanese POW
camps have been widely documented.29 In May 2009, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
Ichiro Fujisaki attended the last convention of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor
to deliver a cabinet-approved apology for their suffering and abuse. In 2010, with the support and
encouragement of the Obama Administration, the Japanese government financed a
Japanese/American POW Friendship Program for former American POWs and their immediate
family members to visit Japan, receive an apology from the sitting Foreign Minister and other
Japanese Cabinet members, and travel to the sites of their POW camps. Annual trips were held in
2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.30
In the 112th Congress, three resolutions—S.Res. 333, H.Res. 324, and H.Res. 333—were
introduced thanking the government of Japan for its apology and for arranging the visitation
program.31 The resolutions also encouraged the Japanese to do more for the U.S. POWs,
including by continuing and expanding the visitation programs as well as its World War II
education efforts. They also called for Japanese companies to apologize for their or their
predecessor firms’ use of un- or inadequately-compensated forced laborers during the war.
29
By various estimates, approximately 40% held in the Japanese camps died in captivity, compared to 1%-3% of the
U.S. prisoners in Nazi Germany’s POW camps. Thousands more died in transit to the camps, most notoriously in the
1942 “Bataan Death March,” in which the Imperial Japanese military force-marched almost 80,000 starving, sick, and
injured Filipino and U.S. troops over 60 miles to prison camps in the Philippines. For more, see CRS Report RL30606,
U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of
Compensation by Japan, by Gary Reynolds, currently out of print but available from the co-authors of this report.
30
For more on the program, see http://www.us-japandialogueonpows.org/. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has run similar
programs for the POWs of other Allied countries.
31
S.Res. 333 (Feinstein) was introduced and passed by unanimous consent on November 17, 2011. H.Res. 324 (Honda)
and H.Res. 333 (Honda) were introduced on June 22, 2011, and June 24, 2011, respectively, and referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
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March 2011 “Triple Disaster”
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake jolted a wide swath of Honshu, Japan’s largest island. The quake, with
an epicenter located about 230 miles northeast of Tokyo, generated a tsunami that pounded Honshu’s northeastern
coast, causing widespread destruction in Miyagi, Iwate, Ibaraki, and Fukushima prefectures. Some 20,000 lives were
lost and entire towns were washed away; over 500,000 homes and other buildings and around 3,600 roads were
damaged or destroyed. Up to half a million Japanese were displaced. Damage to several reactors at the Fukushima
Dai-ichi nuclear power plant complex led the government to declare a state of emergency and evacuate nearly 80,000
residents within a 20 kilometer radius due to dangerous radiation levels.
In many respects, Japan’s response to the multifaceted disaster was remarkable. Over 100,000 troops from the Self
Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s military, were deployed quickly to the region. After rescuing nearly 20,000 individuals
in the first week, the troops turned to a humanitarian relief mission in the displaced communities. Construction of
temporary housing began a week after the quake. Foreign commentators marveled at Japanese citizens’ calm
resilience, the lack of looting, and the orderly response to the strongest earthquake in the nation’s modern history.
Japan’s preparedness—strict building codes, a tsunami warning system that alerted many to seek higher ground, and
years of public drills—likely saved tens of thousands of lives.
Appreciation for the U.S.-Japan alliance surged after the two militaries worked effectively together to respond to the
2011 earthquake and tsunami. Years of joint training and many interoperable assets facilitated the integrated alliance
effort. “Operation Tomodachi,” using the Japanese word for “friend,” was the first time that SDF helicopters used
U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis. The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier provided a platform for air
operations as well as a refueling base for Japanese SDF and Coast Guard helicopters. Other U.S. vessels transported
SDF troops and equipment to the disaster-stricken areas. Communication between the allied forces functioned
effectively, according to military observers. For the first time, U.S. military units operated under Japanese command in
actual operations. Specifically dedicated liaison officers helped to smooth communication. Although the U.S. military
played a critical role, the Americans were careful to emphasize that the Japanese authorities were in the lead.
Despite this response to the initial event, the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear reactor meltdown and the failure
to .
Despite this response to the initial event, the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear reactor accident and the failure to
present longer-term reconstruction plans led many to question the government’s handling of the disasters. As reports
reports mounted about heightened levels of radiation in the air, tap water, and produce, criticism emerged regarding
the lack
of clear guidance from political leadership. Concerns about the government’s excessive dependence on information
information from Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the firm that owns and operates the power plant,
amplified public
skepticism and elevated criticism about conflicts of interest between regulators and utilities.
Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy
Japan is undergoing a national debate on the future of nuclear power, with major implications for
businesses operating in Japan, U.S.-Japan nuclear energy cooperation, and nuclear safety and
non-proliferation measures worldwide. Looking back to 2006, the “New National Energy
Strategy” had set out a goal of significantly increasing Japan’s nuclear power generating capacity,
partly as a way to decrease dependence on foreign energy supplies and partly to decrease
emissions of greenhouse gases. By 2011, nuclear power was providing roughly 30% of Japan’s
power generation capacity.
The policy of expanding nuclear power encountered an abrupt reversal in the aftermath of the
March 11, 2011, natural disasters and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Public trust in the safety of nuclear power collapsed, and a vocal anti-nuclear political movement
emerged. This movement tapped into an undercurrent of anti-nuclear sentiment in modern
Japanese society based on its legacy as the victim of atomic bombing in 1945. As the nation’s 54
nuclear reactors were shut down one by one for their annual safety inspections in the months after
March 2011, the Japanese government did not restart them—except for two reactors at one site in
central JapanEnergy and Environmental Issues
Japan and the United States cooperate on a wide range of environmental initiatives both
bilaterally and through multilateral organizations. In April 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry
and his counterpart launched a new bilateral dialogue to push for a post-2020 international
agreement to combat climate change and to cooperate in advancing low-emissions development
worldwide. The U.S. Department of Energy and Japan’s Ministry of Energy, Trade, and Industry
signed agreements in 2013 to step up civil nuclear cooperation on light-water nuclear reactor
R&D and nuclear nonproliferation. The U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear
Cooperation focuses on safety and regulatory matters, emergency management, decommissioning
and environmental management, civil nuclear energy R&D, and nuclear security. The U.S.-Japan
Clean Energy Policy Dialogue (EPD) focuses on clean energy technology and development.
Japan is considered to be closely aligned with the Obama Administration in international climate
negotiations in its position that any international climate agreement must be legally binding in a
symmetrical way, with all major economies agreeing to the same elements. Tokyo and
Washington also cooperate on climate issues in multilateral and regional frameworks such as the
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Clean
Energy Ministerial (CEM), the International Energy Forum (IEF), and the East Asian Summit
(EAS). However, because of the shutdown of Japan’s nuclear reactors (see below), international
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observers have raised concerns about losing Japan as a global partner in promoting nuclear safety
and non-proliferation measures, and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Nuclear Energy Policy
Japan is undergoing a national debate on the future of nuclear power, with major implications for
businesses operating in Japan, U.S.-Japan nuclear energy cooperation, and nuclear safety and
non-proliferation measures worldwide. Prior to 2011, nuclear power was providing roughly 30%
of Japan’s power generation capacity, and the 2006 “New National Energy Strategy” had set out a
goal of significantly increasing Japan’s nuclear power generating capacity. However, the policy of
expanding nuclear power encountered an abrupt reversal in the aftermath of the March 11, 2011,
natural disasters and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Public trust in the
safety of nuclear power collapsed, and a vocal anti-nuclear political movement emerged. This
movement tapped into an undercurrent of anti-nuclear sentiment in modern Japanese society
based on its legacy as the victim of atomic bombing in 1945. As the nation’s 54 nuclear reactors
were shut down one by one for their annual safety inspections in the months after March 2011,
the Japanese government did not restart them (except a temporary reactivation for two reactors at
one site in central Japan). Since September 2013, no reactors have been operating.
The drawdown of nuclear power generation resulted in many short- and long-term consequences
for Japan: rising electricity costs for residences and businesses; heightened risk of blackouts in
the summer, especially in the Kansai region; widespread energy conservation efforts by
businesses, government agencies, and ordinary citizens; the possible bankruptcy of major utility
companies; and increased fossil fuel imports (see next section). The Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan, calculated that the nuclear shutdowns led to the loss of 420,000 jobs and $25
billion in corporate revenue in 2012.12
12
Masakazu Toyoda. “Energy Policy in Japan: Challenges after Fukushima,” Institute of Energy Economics, Japan,
(continued...)
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With prominent intellectuals and politicians calling for the end of nuclear power in Japan, the
DPJ attempted to author a long-term energy policy. On September 14, 2012, the sub-Cabinetlevel Energy and Environment Council announced an ambitious plan to eliminate all nuclear
power generation in Japan by 2030. Leading voices in the Japanese business community harshly
criticized the plan and warned of the hollowing out of Japanese industry. One week later, the
Noda Cabinet announced a more flexible “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment,”
which pushed back the deadline for nuclear drawdown to 2040, continued the present nuclear fuel
cycle policy, and allowed the completion of under-construction plants and possible reactor lifespan extensions past 2040. American observers have raised concerns about losing Japan as a
global partner in promoting nuclear safety and non-proliferation measures.
The LDP has promoted a relatively pro-nuclear policy, despite persistent anti-nuclear sentiment
among the public. The LDP party platform for the December 2012 election called for the restart
of nuclear reactors as soon as new safety regulations are implemented and promised to study
Japan’s energy situation thoroughly before developing a national policy. In comments to the Diet
on January 30, 2013, Abe called the DPJ’s zero-nuclear energy policy “groundless.”13 Yet, 48% of
the population does not agree with the Abe Cabinet’s approach to reactor restarts, compared to
46% in favor. Temporary failures in the safety systems of the crippled Fukushima Daichi reactors
caused nuclear safety fears to resurface in spring 2013. The Abe Cabinet faces a complex
challenge: how can Japan balance concerns about energy security, promotion of renewable energy
sources, the viability of electric utility companies, the health of the overall economy, and public
concerns about safety?
Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan
Japan imports more LNG than any other country and would be a large market for potential LNG
exports from the United States. Due to the suspension of nuclear power at present, Japan has
become increasingly dependent on fossil fuels for electric power generation (see previous
section). Japan imported a record 87 million metric tons of LNG in 2012—an 11% increase on
the previous year.14 Japanese utility companies are attracted to the large difference between global
market prices for natural gas and the much lower price prevailing in North America. The lower
price is largely a result of the recent expansion of natural gas production from shale.
The U.S. government must satisfy legal requirements before additional LNG exports from the
continental United States to Japan are permitted (Japan currently imports less than 1% of its
natural gas supply from Alaska). The 2005 Energy Policy Act requires that the Department of
Energy (DOE) issue a permit to export natural gas to countries with which the United States does
not have a free trade agreement (FTA), including Japan. DOE must also determine that export to
non-FTA countries is in the public interest. A DOE-commissioned study concluded in December
2012 that LNG exports would produce net economic benefits for the United States, but the study
has been controversial. Critics of increased exports have raised concerns about the environment
and higher gas prices for domestic industries and consumers. The study completed a public
comment period in early March 2013, and now DOE must make a decision on 16 pending permits
(...continued)
presentation prepared for delivery on January 24, 2013.
13
“Abe Aims for Japan to Join Child Custody Pact Soon,” Kyodo News Agency, January 31, 2013.
14
“Japan to Join Pacific Region Free Trade Talks,” Platts Oilgram News, Vol. 91 No. 54, March 18, 2013.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
to export LNG to non-FTA countries. At present two permits have been approved, for the Sabine
Pass terminal in Louisiana and the Freeport LNG Quintana Island terminal in Texas32
The LDP has promoted a relatively pro-nuclear policy, despite persistent anti-nuclear sentiment
among the public. The LDP party platform for the December 2012 election called for the restart
of nuclear reactors as soon as new safety regulations are implemented and promised to study
Japan’s energy situation thoroughly before developing a national policy. In comments to the Diet
on January 30, 2013, Abe called the past administration’s zero-nuclear energy policy
“groundless.”33 Business Monitor International (BMI) predicts that the Japanese government will
approve 2-3 reactor restarts per year through 2022, by which time Japan would be operating at
almost half of its nuclear power generation capacity.34 The remaining reactors, roughly 30 of
them, would likely be decommissioned due to safety concerns or having reached the end of their
projected lifespan, BMI assesses.
Yet, approximately 60% of the Japanese public opposes the restart of nuclear reactors, compared
to approximately 30% in favor.35 Temporary failures in the safety systems of the crippled
Fukushima Daiichi reactors caused nuclear safety fears to resurface in spring 2013. The Abe
Cabinet faces a complex challenge: how can Japan balance concerns about energy security,
32
Masakazu Toyoda. “Energy Policy in Japan: Challenges after Fukushima,” Institute of Energy Economics, Japan,
presentation prepared for delivery on January 24, 2013.
33
“Abe Aims for Japan to Join Child Custody Pact Soon,” Kyodo News Agency, January 31, 2013.
34
“Rising Fuel Import Costs to Drive Nuclear Restarts,” Business Monitor Online, January 21, 2014.
35
“Over Half Oppose Japan Engaging in Collective Self-Defense: Survey,” Kyodo News Agency, January 26, 2014.
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promotion of renewable energy sources, the viability of electric utility companies, the health of
the overall economy, and public concerns about safety?
U.S. Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan
Japan imports more LNG than any other country and would be a large market for LNG exports
from the United States. Due to the suspension of nuclear power at present, Japan has become
increasingly dependent on fossil fuels for electric power generation (see previous section). Japan
imported a record 87.5 million metric tons of LNG in 2013, with Australia, Malaysia, and Qatar
the leading suppliers. Japanese utility companies are attracted to the large difference between
global market prices for natural gas and the much lower price prevailing in North America. The
lower price is largely a result of the recent expansion of natural gas production from shale.
As of February 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) has approved four terminals in the
continental United States to export LNG to countries with which the United States does not have
a free trade agreement (FTA).36 Although it will require several years for the terminals to
construct the infrastructure necessary to liquefy natural gas, experts say that LNG exports will
begin soon thereafter. Japanese energy companies have already signed contracts for delivery of
LNG in 2017. The 2005 Energy Policy Act requires that DOE issue a permit to export natural gas
to non-FTA countries, including Japan, if DOE determines that such export would be in the public
interest. A DOE-commissioned study concluded in December 2012 that LNG exports would
produce net economic benefits for the United States, but the study has been controversial. Critics
of increased exports have raised concerns about the environment and higher gas prices for
domestic industries and consumers. As of mid-February 2014, there are 22 terminals awaiting
DOE approval to export LNG.
Members of Congress have joined the debate on LNG exports to Japan. On January 31, 2013,
Senator John Barrasso introduced a bill (S. 192) “to enhance the energy security of U.S. allies” by
having DOE automatically approve natural gas exports to U.S. treaty allies, regardless of their
FTA status. Senator Lisa Murkowski reportedly wrote in a letter to the Secretary of Energy Steven
Chu, “Exporting LNG, particularly to allies that face emergency or chronic shortages, but with
whom we do not have free-trade agreements, is in the public interest.”1537 On the other side of the
debate, Senator Ron Wyden, chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee,
wrote in a letter to Secretary Chu, “The shortcomings of the [DOE] study are numerous and
render this study insufficient for the Department to use in any export determination.”16 In the
112th Congress, Representative Ed Markey introduced legislation (H.R. 4024) to suspend
approval of LNG export terminals until 2025.38
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran
Over the past decade, growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have led to increased
scrutiny of
Japan’s long-standing trade with and investments in Iran. Japan is the third-biggest
customer for Iranian oil, accounting for over 14% of the 2012 total.17 For most of the past decade
Iran has been Japan’s third-largest source of crude oil imports, although it fell to sixth in 2012,
accounting for 5% of Japan’s imports.18 As part of their efforts to enhance economic penalties on
Iran, the Bush and Obama Administrations have pushed Japan to curtail its economic ties with
Tehran. In general, although Japan has been a follower rather than a leader in the international
campaign to pressure Tehran, Japanese leaders have in recent years increased their cooperation
with the U.S.-led effort, reducing significantly what had been a source of tension between
Washington and Tokyo during the 1990s and early 2000s. Japanese firms have withdrawn from
energy sector investments in Iran, and some major companies such as Toyota Motors have ceased
doing business there, viewing it as a “controversial market.”
In September 2012, the Obama Administration granted Japan a second exemption under P.L. 11281, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which could have placed strict
limitations on the U.S. operations of Japanese banks that process transactions with Iran’s Central
Bank.19 Japan has reduced its imports of Iranian oil over the past several years, despite its
increased need for oil imports with the shutdown of virtually all of its nuclear power industry.
Japan’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by roughly 40% in 2012, and a further decline of 15% is
projected for 2013.20 Iran’s share of Japan’s oil market has fallen by several percentage points, to
15
Geof Koss, “With Eye on Japan, Murkowski Makes Case for Gas Exports,” CQ Roll Call, January 25, 2013.
Office of Senator Ron Wyden, “Wyden Highlights Flaws in DOE Export Study,” press release, January 10, 2013,
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-highlights-flaws-in-doe-export-study-.
17
International Trade Agencies via Global Trade Atlas.
18
Japan Customs via Global Trade Atlas.
19
State Department Press Release, “Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases,” March 20,
2012. For more on Iran sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
20
“Corrected: Japan Nov Crude Imports from Iran Fall 20.3 Pct yr/yr—METI,” Reuters News, January 7, 2013.
16
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less than 8%, a level not seen since 1988.21 Additionally, Japan has restricted the activities of 21
Iranian banks.22
New U.S. sanctions that went into effect on February 6, 2013, pressure banks that deal with the
Iranian Central Bank to either prevent repatriation of Iran’s foreign currency (non-rial) assets or
else be frozen out of the U.S. financial system. Iran can still use the funds to finance trading
activities not covered by sanctions, but, since it runs a large trade surplus with Japan (and other
Asian oil importers), a significant portion of its oil export earnings will likely be held in Japan
and other importing countries.23
International Child Custody Disputes
Another prominent issue in bilateral relations is child custody cases involving overseas Japanese
women in failed marriages taking children to Japan without the consent of the foreign husband or
ex-husband. Sometimes, these women have acted in contravention of custody settlements and,
after arriving in Japan, have prevented the children from meeting their fathers. In recent years,
both Congress and the executive branch have urged Japan to address the problem, provide access
to the children to the aggrieved parents, and join the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction. The Hague Convention sets out rules for resolving child
custody in failed international marriages.
The increased publicity has raised awareness of the issue in Japan, particularly among Diet
members. The Japanese government in March 2012 submitted a bill that would have adjusted
domestic law to allow Tokyo to accede to the Convention, but the Diet did not vote on the bill
during that session. A year later, the Abe government submitted a similar bill, and the Lower
House of the Diet passed it on April 23, 2013. On June 12, 2013, Japan formally ratified the treaty
and pledged to seek full implementation within a year.
With cases involving approximately 100 American children, the United States reportedly has the
largest number of such disputes with Japan.24 Legally, Japan only recognizes sole parental
authority, under which only one parent has custodial rights, and there is a deep-rooted notion in
Japan that the mother should assume custody. Japanese officials say that, in many cases, the issue
is complicated by accusations of abuse or neglect on the part of the foreign spouse, though a
senior U.S. State Department official has said that there are “almost no cases” of substantiated
claims of violence.25 Some observers fear that, even if Japan signs the Hague Convention, it is
unlikely to enforce the treaty’s provisions, given the existing family law system.26
21
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Historical Statistics of Japan, “Table 10-12 Imports of Crude Oil
by Region and Country (F.Y.1970-2003),” http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm; “Table 10-13,
“Imports of Crude Oil by Region and Country,” in Statistical Yearbook of Japan, 2008, 2010, and 2012. Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry, “Preliminary Report on Petroleum Statistics February 2012,” http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/statistics/tyo/sekiyuso/index.html.
22
Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade Press Release, “Addition of an Entity Subject to Accompanying Measures
Implemented Pursuant to the UN Resolution Against Iran,” March 13, 2012.
23
“Asian Buyers to Deepen Iranian Crude Import Cuts in 2013,” Metis Energy Insider, December 24, 2012.
24
“Child-snatchers: Parental Abduction in Japan,” The Economist, U.S. edition, January 21, 2012.
25
U.S. State Department, “Press Availability on International Parental Child Abduction, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” February 2, 2010.
26
Leah Hyslop, “Hope for Parents Denied Access to Children in Japan,” The Telegraph, March 19, 2012.
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U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs)
For decades, U.S. soldiers who were held captive by Imperial Japan during World War II have
sought official apologies from the Japanese government for their treatment. A number of
Members of Congress have supported these campaigns. The brutal conditions of Japanese POW
camps have been widely documented.27 In May 2009, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
Ichiro Fujisaki attended the last convention of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor
to deliver a cabinet-approved apology for their suffering and abuse. In 2010, with the support and
encouragement of the Obama Administration, the Japanese government financed a
Japanese/American POW Friendship Program for former American POWs and their immediate
family members to visit Japan, receive an apology from the sitting Foreign Minister and other
Japanese Cabinet members, and travel to the sites of their POW camps. Annual trips were held in
2010, 2011, and 2012.28 It is unclear whether the Abe government will continue the program. It is
also unclear if Abe and other LDP politicians’ suggestions that past Japanese apologies should be
reworded or retracted include the apologies to the U.S. POWs.
In the 112th Congress, three resolutions—S.Res. 333, H.Res. 324, and H.Res. 333—were
introduced thanking the government of Japan for its apology and for arranging the visitation
program.29 The resolutions also encouraged the Japanese to do more for the U.S. POWs,
including by continuing and expanding the visitation programs as well as its World War II
education efforts. They also called for Japanese companies to apologize for their or their
predecessor firms’ use of un- or inadequately compensated forced prison laborers during the war.
Alliance Issues30
Japan and the United States are military allies under a security treaty concluded in 1951 and
revised in 1960. Under the treaty, Japan grants the United States military base rights on its
territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s security. Although defense officials had
hoped that the 50th anniversary of the treaty would compel Tokyo and Washington to enhance
bilateral defense cooperation, a rocky start by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government
generated concern about the future of the alliance. The coordinated response to the March 2011
disaster by the U.S. and Japanese militaries made a strong statement about the strength and the
value of the bilateral alliance, and commitment from top U.S. leadership to assist the nation in its
27
By various estimates, approximately 40% held in the Japanese camps died in captivity, compared to 1%-3% of the
U.S. prisoners in Nazi Germany’s POW camps. Thousands more died in transit to the camps, most notoriously in the
1942 “Bataan Death March,” in which the Imperial Japanese military force-marched almost 80,000 starving, sick, and
injured Filipino and U.S. troops over 60 miles to prison camps in the Philippines. For more, see CRS Report RL30606,
U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of
Compensation by Japan, by Gary Reynolds, currently out of print but available from the co-authors of this
report. Estimates of the death rates in German prison camps for POWs are in the low single digits, compared to rates
near 40% for Imperial Japanese camps.
28
For more on the program, see http://www.us-japandialogueonpows.org/. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has run similar
programs for the POWs of other Allied countries.
29
S.Res. 333 (Feinstein) was introduced and passed by unanimous consent on November 17, 2011. H.Res. 324 (Honda)
and H.Res. 333 (Honda) were introduced on June 22, 2011, and June 24, 2011, respectively, and referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
30
For more information on the U.S.-Japan alliance, see CRS Report RL33740, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, by Emma
Chanlett-Avery.
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recovery may have assuaged fears that the alliance was adrift after a series of public
disagreements. On the other hand, the crisis response did little to change the fundamental
challenges of the thorny base relocation issue in Okinawa. Although the governments have now
amended the plan to allow several thousand marines to depart Okinawa in order to ease local
frustrations, fundamental questions about the existence of problematic military facilities and the
political sustainability of the Marine Corps presence on the island remain.
Under the Abe Administration, Japan has pressed ahead with alliance initiatives and raised the
defense budget modestly. A Defense Posture Review panel will complete a study to update
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines by the end of 2013: an interim report suggests that
the plan will call for developing additional capabilities in intelligence, maritime security, and
disaster preparedness, as well as responding to threats from ballistic missiles and attacks on
remote islands. In addition, Japan and the United States are considering revising the guidelines,
last updated in 1997, that govern alliance operations to reflect the changing security environment
in the Asia Pacific. Abe has advocated for changing the official interpretation of the Japanese
constitution to allow for collective self-defense, a change that many U.S. officials have
encouraged over the years. This change would allow Japanese forces to defend other countries
that are under attack, such as striking down a missile headed for U.S. military vessel. Adjusting
the interpretation will require changes to the National Security Basic Bill and is likely to generate
controversy both within Japan as well as among Japan’s neighbors.
Futenma Base Relocation Controversy31
A prominent controversy over the relocation of a Marine Corps base in Okinawa has vexed the
alliance for years. While a comprehensive resolution remains elusive, the two governments have
adjusted the plan in a way that removes the issue from the center of the security relationship. The
2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma Marine
Corps Air Station from its current location in crowded Ginowan City to Camp Schwab, in a less
congested part of the island, was envisioned as the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S.
forces in Japan.32 Under this agreement, the United States would redeploy 8,000 marines and their
dependents from Okinawa to Guam in exchange for permitting construction of a new Marine
Corps facility at Camp Schwab, located offshore of the Henoko area of Nago City. Problematic
from the start, the base relocation developed into a major point of contention between Tokyo and
Washington after Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister in 2009; Hatoyama had promised
Okinawans during his election campaign that he would oppose the relocation. Although
Hatoyama and his DPJ successors all eventually endorsed the plan, local opposition and
management missteps by Tokyo appeared to render the plan unworkable.
To remove impediments to the realignment of U.S. forces, the United States and Japan changed
their agreement in April 2012 by “de-linking” the transfer of marines off Okinawa with progress
on the new base in Henoko. In order to ease the burden on Okinawan residents, about 9,000
marines and their dependents would be transferred to locations outside of Japan: to Guam,
31
For more information, see CRS Report R42645, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base
Controversy, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart.
32
Per the agreement, the redeployment of roughly half of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) to new
facilities in Guam would lead to the return of thousands of acres of land to Japan. Japan agreed to pay around 60% of
the $10.3 billion estimated costs. After years of negotiations, U.S. and Japanese officials settled on Camp Schwab
because of its location in Henoko, a far less congested area of Okinawa.
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Hawaii, on a rotational basis to Australia, and perhaps elsewhere. Alliance officials described the
move as in line with their goal of making U.S. force posture in Asia “more geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.”33 The official timeline for the
reversion of U.S. base territory back to Japanese control indicates that substantial amounts of land
will not be turned over to local authorities until the mid-2020s.
After the announcement, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb, who had together
criticized the realignment plan as “unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable,”34 wrote in a letter
to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, “No new basing proposal can be considered final until it has
the support of Congress.”35 Concern about the ballooning costs of the Guam construction and
uncertainty about the future U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region drove Congress to zero
out the Administration’s request for related military construction funding in the FY2012 and
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Acts, P.L. 112-81 and P.L. 112-239. The acts prohibit
authorized funds, as well as funds provided by the Japanese government for military construction,
from being obligated to implement the planned realignment of Marine Corps forces from
Okinawa to Guam until certain justifications and assessments are provided. In April 2013, the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) issued a report that examined U.S. costs associated
with the American military presence overseas, including in Japan.36 The report found that
relocation of the Futenma base remained “unlikely” and that it would cost far more and take
longer than the Department of Defense currently projects.
Significant obstacles remain in Japan as well. Public opposition has hardened considerably in
Okinawa, with all the major political figures involved in the new base construction process
declaring opposition to the plan. The deployment of the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to the
Futenma base in summer 2012 heightened safety concerns of nearby residents, and a string of
crimes committed by U.S. servicemembers in late 2012 further inflamed local resentments. The
grievances that the Okinawans have harbored for decades seem unlikely to fade, driven by the
presence of foreign troops on a crowded urban landscape. The current controversy reflects a
fundamental tension in the relationship between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo:
while the entire country reaps the benefits of the U.S. security guarantee, Okinawans bear a
disproportionate burden. The April 2012 announcement that the U.S. and Japanese governments
will undertake long-deferred repairs on Futenma raised suspicions that the base will remain
indefinitely, and the 2013 SASC report expressed concerns that Japan’s contribution was in
question.37 The process is now on hold as Okinawan governor Hirokazu Nakaima decides
whether to sign a landfill permit allowing for construction of the base in Henoko.
33
“Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” State Department Media Note, April 26, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188586.htm.
34
“Senators Levin, McCain, Webb Call for Examination of Military Basing Plans in East Asia,” Press Release from
Senator McCain’s office, May 11, 2011, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=e00453cd-c883-65d2-f9c3-489463b38af1.
35
“Senators Levin, McCain and Webb Express Concern to Secretary Panetta Regarding Asia-Pacific Basing Tuesday,”
Press Release from Senator Levin’s office, April 24, 2012, http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
senators-levin-mccain-and-webb-express-concern-to-secretary-panetta-regarding-asia-pacific-basing/?section=alltypes.
36
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Inquiry Into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the
U.S. Military Presence Overseas, April 15, 2013. For full report, see http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press/
releases/upload/RELEASE_SASCBasingReport_041713.pdf.
37
Ibid.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congressone of the top consumers of
Iranian oil exports, albeit now at greatly reduced volumes. As part of their efforts to enhance
economic penalties on Iran, the Bush and Obama Administrations have pushed Japan to curtail its
36
The four terminals are Quintana Island in Texas, Cove Point in Maryland, and Sabine Pass and Cameron Parish in
Louisiana. Japan currently imports less than 1% of its natural gas supply from Alaska.
37
Geof Koss, “With Eye on Japan, Murkowski Makes Case for Gas Exports,” CQ Roll Call, January 25, 2013.
38
Office of Senator Ron Wyden, “Wyden Highlights Flaws in DOE Export Study,” press release, January 10, 2013,
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-highlights-flaws-in-doe-export-study-.
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economic ties with Tehran. In general, although Japan has been a follower rather than a leader in
the international campaign to pressure Tehran, Japanese leaders have in recent years increased
their cooperation with the U.S.-led effort, reducing significantly what had been a source of
tension between Washington and Tokyo during the 1990s and early 2000s. For most of the past
decade Iran was Japan’s third-largest source of crude oil imports, but it fell to sixth after sanctions
took effect in 2011 and Iran accounted for only 5% of Japan’s oil imports in 2012-2013.39
Japanese firms have withdrawn from energy sector investments in Iran, and some major
companies such as Toyota Motors have ceased doing business there, viewing it as a “controversial
market.”
In October 2013, the Obama Administration granted Japan another six-month exemption under
P.L. 112-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which could have
placed strict limitations on the U.S. operations of Japanese banks that process transactions with
Iran’s Central Bank.40 Japan has reduced its imports of Iranian oil over the past several years,
despite its increased need for oil imports with the shutdown of virtually all of its nuclear power
industry. Japan’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by roughly 40% in 2012, and declined a further
6% in 2013.41 Additionally, Japan has restricted the activities of 21 Iranian banks.42
U.S. sanctions that went into effect in February 2013 pressure banks that deal with the Iranian
Central Bank to either prevent repatriation of Iran’s foreign currency (non-rial) assets or else be
frozen out of the U.S. financial system. Iran can still use the funds to finance trading activities not
covered by sanctions, but, since it runs a large trade surplus with Japan (and other Asian oil
importers), a significant portion of its oil export earnings are held in Japan and other importing
countries.43 An interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in November 2013 allowed for the
repatriation of $4.2 billion of Iranian foreign currency assets held abroad. The Bank of Japan
transferred the first $550 million of this sum to Iran in February 2014.
Alliance Issues44
The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Forged in the
U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, the alliance provides a platform for U.S.
military readiness in the Pacific. About 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the
exclusive use of 89 facilities. In exchange, the United States guarantees Japan’s security,
including inclusion under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” The U.S.-Japan alliance, which many
believe has been missing a strategic rationale since the end of the Cold War, may have found a
new guiding rationale in shaping the environment for China’s rise. In addition to serving as a hub
for forward-deployed U.S. forces, Japan provides its own advanced military assets, many of
39
Takeo Kumagai, “Japan’s 2013 Crude Imports from Iran Drop 6% on Year to 177,414 b/d,” Platts Commodity News,
February 2, 2014.
40
State Department Press Release, “Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases,” March 20,
2012. For more on Iran sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
41
“Corrected: Japan Nov Crude Imports from Iran Fall 20.3 Pct yr/yr—METI,” Reuters News, January 7, 2013.
42
Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade Press Release, “Addition of an Entity Subject to Accompanying Measures
Implemented Pursuant to the UN Resolution Against Iran,” March 13, 2012.
43
“Asian Buyers to Deepen Iranian Crude Import Cuts in 2013,” Metis Energy Insider, December 24, 2012.
44
For more information on the U.S.-Japan alliance, see CRS Report RL33740, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, by Emma
Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart.
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which complement U.S. forces. The joint response to a 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan
demonstrated the interoperability of the two militaries.
Since the early 2000s, the United States and Japan have taken significant strides in improving the
operational capability of the alliance as a combined force, despite political and legal constraints.
Japan’s own defense policy has continued to evolve, and major strategic documents reflect a new
attention to operational readiness and flexibility. The originally asymmetric arrangement of the
alliance has moved toward a more balanced security partnership in the 21st century. Unlike 25
years ago, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now active in overseas missions, including
efforts in the 2000s to support U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and the reconstruction
of Iraq. Japanese military contributions to global operations like counter-piracy patrols relieve
some of the burden on the U.S. military to manage every security challenge. Due to the colocation of U.S. and Japanese command facilities in recent years, coordination and
communication have become more integrated. The United States and Japan have been steadily
enhancing bilateral cooperation in many other aspects of the alliance, such as ballistic missile
defense, cyber security, and military use of space. In 2013, the two allies agreed to revise the
Mutual Defense Guidelines, the main document defining the bilateral defense arrangement, by the
end of 2014. The document was last updated in 1997. Alongside these improvements, Japan
continues to pay nearly $2 billion per year to defray the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.
Prime Minister Abe is a strong supporter of the alliance and has an ambitious agenda to increase
the capability and flexibility of Japan’s military. However, constitutional, legal, fiscal, and
political barriers exist to significantly expanded defense cooperation. The most prominent debate
involves relaxing or removing the self-imposed ban on Japanese forces participating in collective
self-defense. Such measures face opposition from the public and from political parties. In
addition, leaders in China and South Korea distrust Abe because of his past statements on
Japanese actions in the World War II era. Suspicion from Beijing and Seoul also complicates
Japan’s efforts to expand its security role.
In late 2013, Japan released two new documents that reflect its concerns with security threats
from North Korea and the territorial dispute with China over a set of islets in the East China Sea.
The “National Defense Program Guidelines” (NDPG) emphasized Japan’s need to upgrade its
capabilities to respond to threats to its territory from ongoing Chinese incursions by purchasing a
variety of new military hardware and improving its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. The NDPG also called for a new defense approach termed “Proactive
Pacifism” that involves Japan taking a greater role in international operations in concert with
other countries. The NDPG was reinforced by the release of Japan’s first-ever “National Security
Strategy” that calls for Japan’s “proactive contribution to peace” and outlines a further increase in
defense spending to respond to “complex and grave national security challenges.”
Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa45
In the last days of 2013, the United States and Japan cleared an important political hurdle in their
long-delayed plan to relocate a major U.S. military base on the island of Okinawa. The governor
of Okinawa Prefecture, Hirokazu Nakaima, approved construction of an offshore landfill
necessary to build the replacement facility. This new base, located in the sparsely populated
45
For background information, see CRS Report R42645, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma
Base Controversy, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart.
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Henoko area of Nago City, would replace the functions of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
Futenma, located in the center of a crowded town in southern Okinawa. Although the recently reelected mayor of Nago City has displayed firm opposition to the new facility, most experts agree
that his powers to obstruct and delay its construction are limited. The governor’s approval of the
landfill permit in theory should allow Washington and Tokyo to consummate their agreement to
return the land occupied by MCAS Futenma to local authorities, while retaining a similar level of
military capability on Okinawa. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated
that the new base at Henoko would be completed no earlier than 2022.
Despite the decision by Governor Nakaima, most Okinawans oppose the construction of a new
U.S. base for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-of-life reasons. U.S. and Japanese
officials on Okinawa asserted in 2013 that law enforcement authorities are prepared to manage
disruptive protests, but Okinawan anti-base civic groups may take extreme measures to prevent
construction of the facility at Henoko. The Abe Administration, having invested significant time
and money in meeting Nakaima’s conditions for approval, will likely need to invest additional
political capital to ensure that the base construction proceeds without significant delays and
without further alienating the Okinawan public. Failure to implement the Futenma relocation
could solidify an impression among some American observers that the Japanese political system
struggles to follow through with difficult tasks. On the other hand, the risk remains that heavyhanded actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to stridently anti-base politicians making
gains in Okinawa, particularly in the gubernatorial election in late 2014.
Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island’s key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a
disproportionate share of the U.S. military presence in Japan. About 25% of all facilities used by
U.S. Forces Japan and over half of the U.S. military personnel are located in the prefecture, which
comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area. The attitudes of native Okinawans toward U.S.
military bases are generally characterized as negative, reflecting a tumultuous history and
complex relationships with “mainland” Japan and with the United States. The anti-base
movement remains strong and vocal in Okinawa. Opposition to U.S. military bases derives from
two main areas: one, quality-of-life issues such as personal safety, noise, crime, and
environmental degradation; and two, pacifism and anti-militarism. These two strands are often
interwoven in the rhetoric of the anti-base movement, but not all residents oppose the U.S.
military presence on principle. There are those who support the U.S.-Japan security alliance while
objecting to the significant and disproportionate “burden” imposed on Okinawa. Because of these
widespread concerns among Okinawans, the sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Japan
remains a critical challenge for the alliance.
The relocation of the Futenma base is part of a larger bilateral agreement developed by the U.S.Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1996. In the SACO Final Report, the
United States agreed to return approximately 20% of land used for U.S. facilities on Okinawa,
including all or parts of a dozen sites. Handover of MCAS Futenma was contingent on
“maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities.”46 The plan for
implementing the SACO agreement evolved over the late 1990s and early 2000s until Washington
and Tokyo settled on a “roadmap” in 2006: once Japan constructed the Futenma replacement
facility at the Henoko site, the United States would relocate roughly 8,000 marines from Okinawa
to Guam, about half of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) presence then on Okinawa. In 2012, the
46
“The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station,” Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.
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allies revised the implementation plan to “de-link” the Futenma relocation and the realignment of
marines to Guam; in other words, the construction of a replacement facility was no longer a
precondition for deploying marines off Okinawa. The 2012 agreement also revised the USMC
realignment into a plan called the “distributed laydown”: 9,000 marines would be relocated from
Okinawa; 4,700 to Guam; 2,500 to Australia (on a rotational basis); and the remainder to Hawaii
and the continental United States.
The realignment of marines to Guam and elsewhere is now proceeding on its own timeline,
separate from the issue of the Futenma replacement facility, but that process has its own
challenges. The 2012 “distributed laydown” cut the projected USMC presence on Guam in half,
requiring a new set of infrastructure plans and a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.
Following this two-year environmental study, the U.S. Navy expects to announce a Record of
Decision (a key planning milestone) for the Guam realignment no sooner than 2015. Observers
report that Department of Defense (DOD) planning for the increased USMC presence on Hawaii
is still in its early stages.
The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-66) continues the freeze on
funding to implement the Okinawa/Guam realignment from the past two NDAAs, with key
exceptions, until DOD can meet certain requirements. The FY2014 NDAA repeats the unfulfilled
FY2013 requirement (P.L. 112-239, Sec. 1068) for DOD to submit to Congress a comprehensive
report on military resources necessary to execute U.S. force posture strategy in the Asia-Pacific
region. Section 2822 of the FY2014 NDAA also requests master plans for new facilities and
infrastructure on Guam and Hawaii, including civilian infrastructure. Although the start of
construction on the Futenma replacement facility is not an explicit requirement stated in the
NDAA, signs of tangible progress there may give renewed urgency to other parts of the
realignment.47 The exceptions to the funding freeze in the FY2014 NDAA—exceptions that may
allow the realignment to proceed more expeditiously—are that DOD may expend funds to initiate
planning and design of construction projects on Guam, to undertake additional environmental
studies, and to begin military construction authorized elsewhere in the bill.
Progress on Other Elements of Military Realignment and Alliance
Transformation
The relocation of Futenma air station is the largest and most controversial part of a broad
overhaul of U.S. force posture in Japan and bilateral military activities, but it is not the only
element. In 2002, the U.S. and Japanese governments launched the Defense Policy Review
Initiative (DPRI) to review force posture and develop a common security view between the two
sides. With the exception of the Henoko relocation, the plan has been largely successful. A
training relocation program allows U.S. aircraft to conduct training away from crowded base
areas to reduce noise pollution for local residents. U.S. Carrier Air Wing Five is being relocated
from Atsugi Naval Air base to the Iwakuni base, where a new dual-use airfield is operational. In
2010, U.S. Army Japan established at Camp Zama (about 25 miles southwest of Tokyo) a forward
operational headquarters, which can act as a bilateral joint headquarters to take command of
47
Senator John McCain, who in the past had criticized various aspects of the realignment plan, released a statement on
December 27, 2013, praising Governor Nakaima’s approval of the landfill permit as a “major achievement” for the
U.S.-Japan alliance. The statement said, “After 17 years of hard work and setbacks, today’s action paves the way for
the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, the redeployment of U.S. Marines from Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma, and the broader realignment of U.S. forces on Okinawa and in the Asia-Pacific region.”
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theater operations in the event of a contingency. The SDF Air Defense Command facility at
Yokota U.S. Air Base was recently completed. Since 2006, a bilateral joint operations center at
Yokota allows for data-sharing and coordination between the Japanese and U.S. air and missile
defense command elements. In June 2011, Japan announced a long-sought agreement to allow the
transfer of jointly developed missile components to third parties, representing an exception to
Japan’s ban on arms exports2011 (and again in 2013), the Japanese government relaxed its
self-imposed restrictions on arms exports, which date back to the 1960s, paving the way for coproduction arrangements with American defense firms.
Deployment of the MV-22 Osprey Aircraft to Japan
The U.S. Marine Corps is replacingreplaced the 24 CH-46E “Sea Knight” helicopters stationed at the
Futenma base with 24 MV-22 “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft in 2012 and 2013. The deployment of
the first 12 Osprey
aircraft to Japan in mid-2012 created a public outcry in Okinawa and mainland
base-hosting
communities. Japanese politicians and civil society groups strongly opposed
introduction of MV22MV-22 to Japan due to the aircraft’s safety record.3848 The crashes of V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft in training
exercises in Morocco and Florida in early 2012 reminded Okinawans of the
U.S. military
helicopter crash on the grounds of a school near Futenma Air Station in August
2004. In response
to these concerns, the Japanese Ministry of Defense conducted its own
investigation of the
aircraft’s safety. The investigation cleared the MV-22 for deployment, but
Japan requested that
Osprey pilots adhere to a set of operational guidelines to reduce the risk of
accidents in populated
areas. The introduction of these advanced aircraft to Okinawa reportedly
will enhance the
operational capability of the Marines based there, particularly in a rapid response scenario.
March 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: U.S.-Japan Alliance
Performance
Appreciation for the alliance surged after the two militaries worked effectively together to
respond to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Years of joint training and many interoperable assets
facilitated the integrated alliance effort. “Operation Tomodachi,” using the Japanese word for
“friend,” was the first time that SDF helicopters used U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis.
The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier provided a platform for air operations as well as a
38
During its development phase, the Osprey suffered several highly publicized crashes. Since the aircraft achieved
initial operational capability in 2007, the Class-A mishap rate is slightly better than the Marine Corps average. See the
CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Program, by Jeremiah Gertler, for more information.
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refueling base for Japanese SDF and Coast Guard helicopters. Other U.S. vessels transported SDF
troops and equipment to the disaster-stricken areas. Communication between the allied forces
functioned effectively, according to military observers. For the first time, U.S. military units
operated under Japanese command in actual operations. Specifically dedicated liaison officers
helped to smooth communication. Although the U.S. military played a critical role, the Americans
were careful to emphasize that the Japanese authorities were in the lead.
The successful bilateral effort held several important consequences. First, it reinforced alliance
solidarity after a somewhat difficult period of public disagreement over the Futenma base issue. It
was also very well-received by the Japanese public, leading to exceptionally high approval ratings
of both the SDF performance and the U.S. relief efforts. The operation demonstrated to others the
capability of the alliance. It also illuminated challenges that the two militaries might face if
responding to a contingency in the defense of Japan in which an adversary were involved,
including having more secure means of communication as multiple agencies and services
mobilized resources.39
scenario.
Constitutional Constraints
Several legal factors restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States.
The most prominent and fundamental restriction is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted
by American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of
Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well
as other war potential will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted this clause to
mean that it can maintain a military for national defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed
the SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions
and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense
cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that
member nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in
collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the
constitution to forbid collective actions because they would exceed the minimum necessary use of
force to defend Japan itself. Participation in non-combat logistical operations and rear area
support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm of collective selfdefense. Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly proposed that this restriction be reconsidered, a move
that has been welcomed by U.S. officials in the past.
48
During its development phase, the Osprey suffered several highly publicized crashes. Since the aircraft achieved
initial operational capability in 2007, the Class-A mishap rate is slightly better than the Marine Corps average. See the
CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Program, by Jeremiah Gertler, for more information.
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During the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq, the interpretation prevented the SDF from
defending other nations’ troops. Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis
destroyers should not use their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be
allowed to respond to an incoming attack on those vessels. As the United States and Japan
increasingly integrate missile defense operation, the ban on collective self-defense also raises
questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is
being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could not respond if the United
States were attacked.
39
See “Partnership for Recovery and a Stronger Future; Standing with Japan after 3-11,” http://csis.org/files/
publication/111026_Green_PartnershipforRecovery_Web.pdf.
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Burden-Sharing Issues
According to the Department of Defense, costs to maintain U.S. forces in Japan in FY2012 was
expected to total over $4.8 billion, in addition to the roughly $2 billion contributed by the
government of Japan annually.40 This total includes approximately $2.75 billion in personnel
costs and over $2 billion in non-personnel costs. In December 2010, Japan agreed to continue
Host Nation Support (HNS), the funds provided to contribute to the cost of stationing U.S. troops
in Japan, at current levels for the next five years, starting in FY2011. The agreement came as a
compromise, as the government of then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan had been pressured to cut
Japan’s contribution due to Japan’s ailing fiscal health. Japan pays for most of the salaries of
about 25,000 Japanese employees at U.S. military installations. The current agreement calls for
Japan to pay about 188 billion yen annually (about $2.2 billion at 82 yen to one USD) through
FY2016 to defray the costs of stationing troops in Japan. The agreement also commits to reducing
the number of Japanese nationals working for the U.S. military and affirms that the proportion of
utility costs paid by the Japanese government will fall from 76% to 72% over a five-year period.
The 2013 SASC report expressed concerns about a downward trend in Japan’ s contributions to
Host Nation Support, compared to higher amounts contributed in the 1990s.41
Extended Deterrence
Another source of strategic anxiety in Tokyo concerns the U.S. extended deterrence, or “nuclear
umbrella,” for Japan. The Bush Administration’s shift in negotiations with Pyongyang triggered
fears in Tokyo that Washington might eventually accept a nuclear armed North Korea and thus
somehow diminish the U.S. security guarantee for Japan. These anxieties have persisted despite
repeated statements by both the Bush and Obama Administrations to reassure Tokyo of the
continued U.S. commitment to defend Japan. However, Japan’s sense of vulnerability is
augmented by the fact that its own ability to deter threats is limited by its largely defensiveoriented military posture. Given Japan’s reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, Tokyo is wary of
any change in U.S. policy—however subtle—that might alter the nuclear status quo in East Asia.
Japan’s Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden
Japan’s military, known as the Self-Defense Force (SDF), has been engaged in counter-piracy
activities in the Gulf of Aden since March 2009. Approximately 400 personnel are stationed in
Djibouti and currently housed in Camp Lemonier, the large U.S. military base located close to
Djibouti’s airport. In April 2010, the Japanese government announced plans to build its own $40
million facility in Djibouti, effectively establishing an overseas base for its military. Although this
would be Japan’s first foreign base since World War II, the move has sparked little controversy
among the generally pacifist Japanese public.
40
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Operation and Maintenance
Overview: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates (February 2012) at 201.
41
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Inquiry Into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the
U.S. Military Presence Overseas, April 15, 2013.
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Figure 2. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Economic Issues42
Trade and other economic ties with Japan remain highly important to U.S. national interests and,
therefore, to the U.S. Congress.43
Burden-Sharing Issues
The Japanese government provides nearly $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing U.S.
forces in Japan. The United States spends an additional $2 billion per year (on top of the Japanese
contribution) on non-personnel costs for troops stationed in Japan.49 Japanese host nation support
is comprised of two funding sources: Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) and the Facilities
Improvement Program (FIP). Each SMA is a bilateral agreement, generally covering five years,
that obligates Japan to pay a certain amount for utility and labor costs of U.S. bases and for
relocating training exercises away from populated areas. The current SMA, which runs from
2011-2015, allows a gradual decline in Japan’s contributions to labor and utility costs, although
U.S. costs are slowly rising, according to a April 2013 report issued by the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC).50 The amount of FIP funding is not strictly defined, other than an
agreed minimum of $200 million per year, and thus the Japanese government adjusts the total at
its discretion. Tokyo also decides which projects receive FIP funding, taking into account, but not
necessarily deferring to, U.S. priorities.
49
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support
the U.S. Military Presence Overseas, 113th Cong., April 15, 2013, S.Rept. 113-12 (Washington: GPO, 2013).
50
Ibid.
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Figure 2. Host Nation Support for USFJ
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions
to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas, 113th Congress, April 15, 2013, S.Rept. 113-12 (Washington:
GPO, 2013).
Notes: Chart from U.S. Forces Japan, Presentation: Special Measures Agreement Overview (June 27, 2012). Tng
Reloc = Training Relocation.
Extended Deterrence
The growing concerns in Tokyo about North Korean nuclear weapons development and China’s
modernization of its nuclear arsenal in the 2000s provoked renewed attention to the U.S. policy of
extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella.” The United States and Japan
initiated the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue in 2010, recognizing that Japanese
perceptions of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence were critical to its effectiveness. The
dialogue is a forum for the United States to assure its ally and for both sides to exchange
assessments of the strategic environment. The views of Japanese policymakers (among others)
influenced the development of the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.51 Reportedly, Tokyo
discouraged a proposal to declare that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter
nuclear attack.
Japan also plays an active role in extended deterrence through its BMD capabilities. The number
of U.S. and Japanese BMD interceptors are judged to be sufficient for deterring North Korea
51
Brad Roberts, “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” National Institute of Defense Studies
(Japan), Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No. 1, August 9, 2013, p. 24.
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without affecting strategic stability with China. In the future, Japan may develop a conventional
strike capability with the intent to augment extended deterrence.52 Japanese diplomatic support
for nuclear non-proliferation is another element of cooperation to reduce nuclear threats over the
long-term.
Maritime Defense Cooperation
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MDSF) is one of the most capable navies in the
world and cooperates closely with its U.S. counterparts. U.S. Navy officials have claimed that
they have a closer daily relationship with the MSDF than with any other navy, conducting over
100 joint exercises annually. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy and MSDF developed strong
combined anti-submarine warfare cooperation that played a key role in countering the Soviet
threat in the Pacific. The navies also protect key sea lines of communication (SLOCs), although
Japan’s constitution prohibits the MSDF from defending allied vessels in international waters.
The most significant help extended by Japan in support of U.S. operations has come from the
MSDF: refueling coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean active in Operation Enduring Freedom
and, at times, an Aegis destroyer escort; the dispatch of several ships, helicopters, and transport
aircraft to assist in disaster relief after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami; participation in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises; and the deployment of MSDF
vessels for anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia.
The MSDF has been engaged in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden since March 2009.
Japanese vessels and P-3C patrol aircraft have escorted over 3,000 commercial ships and
conducted over 1,000 surveillance flights.53 MSDF and ASDF personnel are stationed at a base
constructed in 2011 in Djibouti, where Japan has deployed a total of roughly 600 SDF personnel
since 2009.54 Although the Djibouti facility is Japan’s first overseas base since World War II, the
move has sparked little controversy among the Japanese public.
52
Ibid, p. 20.
“Djibouti to Be Provided Patrol Ships for Security,” Kyodo News Agency, August 28, 2013.
54
“Japanese PM on Official Visit to Djibouti,” Xinhua News Agency, African News, August 28, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-08/28/c_132670904.htm.
53
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Figure 3. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Notes: MCAS is the abbreviation for Marine Corps Air Station. NAF is Naval Air Facility.
* This map reflects geographic place name policies set forth by the United States Board on Geographic Names
pursuant to P.L. 80-242. In applying these policies to the case of the sea separating the Korean Peninsula and the
Japanese Archipelago, the Board has determined that the “Sea of Japan” is the appropriate standard name for use
in U.S. Government publications. The Republic of Korea refers to this body of water as the “East Sea.” It refers
to the “Yellow Sea” as the “West Sea.”
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Economic Issues55
Trade and other economic ties with Japan remain highly important to U.S. national interests and,
therefore, to the U.S. Congress.56 By the most conventional method of measurement, the United
States and Japan are the world’s largest and third-largest economies (China is number two),
accounting for around 30% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012. Furthermore,
their economies are intertwined by trade in goods and services and by foreign investments.
Overview of the Bilateral Economic Relationship
Japan is an important economic partner of the United States, but its importance has slid as it has
been edged out by other partners. Japan was the United States’ fourth-largest merchandise export
market (behind Canada, Mexico, and China) and the fourth-largest source for U.S. merchandise
imports (behind China, Canada, and Mexico) at the end of 20122013. These numbers probably
underestimate the importance of Japan in U.S. trade since Japan exports intermediate goods to
China that are then used to manufacture finished goods that China exports to the United States.
The United States was Japan’s second-largest export market and second-largest source of imports
as of
the end of 20122013. The global economic downturn had a significant impact on U.S.-Japan
trade:
both exports and imports declined in 2009 from 2008. U.S.-Japan bilateral trade has
increased since 2009 reflecting the recovery, albeit weak, from the economic downturn. (See
2009 and until 2012, but declined in 2013. (See Table 1.)
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, Selected Years
($ billions)
Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
1995
64.3
123.5
-59.1
2000
65.3
146.6
-81.3
2003
52.1
118.0
-66.0
2004
54.4
129.6
-75.2
2005
55.4
138.1
-82.7
2006
59.6
148.1
-88.4
2007
62.7
145.5
-82.8
2008
66.6
139.2
-72.3
2009
51.2
95.9
-44.8
4255
This section was written by William Cooper.
For a more complete treatment of U.S.-Japan economic ties, see CRS Report RL32649, U.S.-Japan Economic
Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options, by William H. Cooper.
4356
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Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
2010
60.5
120.3
-59.8
2011
66.2
128.8
-62.2
2012
70.0
146.4
-76.3
2013
65.1
138.5
-73.4
Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Census Bureau. FT900. Exports are total exports valued on a free
alongside ship (f.a.s.) basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.
Despite some outstanding issues, tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship have
been much lower than was the case in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. A number of factors
may have contributed to this trend:
•
Japan’s slow, if not stagnant, economic growth, which began with the burst of the
asset bubble in the latter half of the 1990s and continued as a result of the 20082009 economic downturn and the 2011 disasters, has changed the general U.S.
perception of Japan from one as an economic competitor to one as a “humbled”
economic power;
•
the rise of China as an economic power and trade partner has caused U.S.
policymakers to shift attention from Japan to China as a source of concern;
•
the increased use by both Japan and the United States of the WTO as a forum for
resolving trade disputes has de-politicized disputes and helped to reduce friction;
•
shifts in U.S. and Japanese trade strategies that have expanded the formation of
bilateral and regional trade areas with other countries have lessened the focus on
their bilateral ties; and
•
the rise of China as a military power and the continued threat of North Korea
have forced U.S. and Japanese leaders to give more weight to security issues
within the bilateral alliance.
Japan was hit by two economic crises in the last few years that affected U.S.-Japan economic
relations. The first was the global financial crisis which began to hit in 2008 and intensified in
2009. Japan was hit hard by the decline in global demand for its exports, particularly in the
United States and Europe. Japan had become dependent on net export growth as the engine for
overall GDP growth, as domestic consumer demand and investment lagged.
The second crisis was the March 11, 2011, earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accidentsreactor meltdowns in
northeast Japan. (See section on the March 2011 “Triple Disaster.”) The Japanese government has
responded with a series of four supplemental fiscal packages to finance reconstruction. The
implementation of the reconstruction efforts has been slower than expected, dampening the
stimulus effect on economic growth. In addition the country has had to cope with electricity
shortages and search for alternative sources of power, including increased fossil fuel imports.
The two crises and the economic problems in Europe, among other factors, have adversely
affected Japan’s economic growth. Japan incurred growth rates of -1.1% in 2008 and -5.5% in
2009 but recovered in 2010 to expand by 4.7%. ThatThe recovery proved short-lived as Japan
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experienced -0.54% growth in 2011 and 1.9% in 2012. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts
weak economic growth in Japan for the next few years.44
, only 1.4% in 2012, and 1.6% in 2013.
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Prime Minister Abe has made it a priority of his administration to grow the economyboost economic growth and to
eliminate deflation, which has plagued Japan for many years. On assuming power, Abe’s
government announced a $122 billion stimulus Abe is promoting a three-pronged,
or “three arrow,” economic program. The first arrow consisted of a $122 billion fiscal stimulus
package aimed at spending on infrastructure,
particularly in areas affected by the March 2011 disasters. While the package is expected to boost
growth somewhat, it will also add to Japan’s already large public debt.45 In addition, the
ostensibly independent Bank of Japan (Japan’s central bank) announced a continued loose
disaster. While the package appears to have boosted growth somewhat, its effects appear to have
largely run their course and it has added to Japan’s already large public debt, which at over 200%
of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is the highest of any advanced economy.
The second arrow consists of monetary stimulus to arrest deflation. As a result, under pressure
from Abe, the independent central bank (Bank of Japan, or BOJ) announced in the spring of 2013
a continued loose monetary policy with interest rates of 0%, quantitative easing measures, and a
target inflation rate
of 2%.46 The Japanese yen rapidly dropped in value against the U.S. dollar and
other major currencies after that announcement. Although few observers think that the BOJ will
reach its target in the short term, according to a number of measures it appears that inflationary
pressures have re-emerged in the economy, at least in part due to the rise in import prices
resulting from the yen’s depreciation.
The third arrow consists of economic reforms that are and will be aimed at restructuring the
agricultural, medical services, and electricity sectors (among others) and the promotion of new
services and industries. For Abe, Japan’s participation in the TPP is a catalyst for those growthpromoting reforms, but many of the established economic interests are deeply entrenched,
particularly within his own party, the LDP. Critics argue that Abe has pursued structural reforms
cautiously, and has backtracked on many of them, such as liberalizing the sale of
pharmaceuticals. Abe’s government has said that in the spring of 2014 it will create a number of
special economic zones (SEZs), areas that have lower taxes and fewer regulations, in order to
stimulate private-sector investment.
A likely by-product of these measures will be weakening of the yen. For the past five years, the
yen had exhibited unprecedented strength in terms of the dollar. In January 2007 the yen’s
average value was ¥120.46=$1 during the month, but after rapid appreciation, it reached as high
as ¥76.65=$1 in October 2011. Since that time, it has depreciated to ¥97.8=$1 on July 29, 2013.
Some governments have already charged that Japan’s monetary actions will spark a currency war
because other countries will try to counter the trade effects of a weaker yen.47102.3=$1 on February 7,
2014.
Bilateral Trade Issues
Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef48Beef57
On February 1, 2013, the Japanese government loosened its restrictions on beef imports from the
United States to allow beef from cattle 30 months or younger for the first time since December
2003. According to a joint press release from the Office of the United States Trade Representative
and the Department of Agriculture, the Japanese government’s Food Safety Commission would
continue to monitor shipments of U.S. beef and would consider the possibility of allowing U.S.
beef from cattle of any age to be imported into Japan. These steps would appear to provide the
opportunity for growth in U.S. beef imports to Japan and to resolve an issue that had been a major
irritant in the bilateral trade relationship.
57
For more information, see CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by Charles E. Hanrahan
and Geoffrey S. Becker.
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The issue arose in December 2003 when Japan imposed a ban on imported U.S. beef in response
to the discovery of the first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow
disease”) in Washington State. In the months before the diagnosis in the United States, nearly a
dozen Japanese cows infected with BSE had been discovered, creating a scandal over the
Agricultural Ministry’s handling of the issue (several more Japanese BSE cases have since
emerged). Japan had retained the ban despite ongoing negotiations and public pressure from Bush
Administration officials, a reported framework agreement (issued jointly by both governments) in
October 2004 to end it, and periodic assurances afterward by Japanese officials to their U.S.
counterparts that it would be lifted soon.
44
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Japan, February 2013, p. 34.
Ibid., p.25.
46
Ibid., p.27.
47
Ferguson, Niall, “Global Currency Wars Are Best Fought on the Quiet,” Financial Times, January 26-27, 2013, p.7.
48
For more information, see CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by Charles E. Hanrahan
and Geoffrey S. Becker.
45
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In December 2005 Japan lifted the ban after many months of bilateral negotiations but re-imposed
it in January 2006 after Japanese government inspectors found bone material among the first beef
shipments. The presence of the bone material violated the procedures U.S. and Japanese officials
had agreed upon that allowed the resumption of the U.S. beef shipments in the first place.
Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
The TPP is an evolving regional free trade agreement (FTA). Originally formed as an FTA among
Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei (the P-4), the TPP is now an agreement under
negotiation negotiation
among the original four countries plus the United States, Australia, Canada, Mexico,
Peru, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The current 11 TPP partners have conducted a number of rounds of
negotiations
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Japan. The negotiators envision a comprehensive arrangement to
liberalize trade and to
cover broad range of trade and trade-related activities. But they also
envision the TPP to be a “21st
century” framework for conducting trade within the Asia-Pacific
region and, therefore, addressing
cross-cutting issues that are relevant now and will be in the
future. These issues include
regulatory coherence; competitiveness and business facilitation, also
known as transnational
supply and production chains; issues pertaining to small and medium-sizedmediumsized companies; economic
development; and the operations of state-owned enterprises.
Therefore, while the 1112 TPP
countries negotiate the agreement, they expect other economies in
the region will seek to join in
those negotiations or will accede to the agreement after it has been
concluded.
As the second-largest East Asian economy and a crucial link in the Asian production networks,
Japan would seem to be a logical candidate for the TPP. Japan’s participation in the TPP is the
was and
continues to be the subject of debate within the Japanese political leadership and among other Japanese stakeholders.
On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan would formally seek to participate
in the negotiations to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Japanese stakeholders. In making the decision to
seek participation in the TPP, Prime Minister
Abe had to confront influential domestic interests
that argued against the move. Among the most
vocal have been Japanese farmers, especially rice
farmers, and their representatives. They have
argued that Japanese agriculture would be severely
harmed by foreign competition as Japan
would have to negotiate away high tariffs and other
protective measures on imports of
agricultural products. Some Japanese health providers have
argued that Japan’s national health
insurance system would be adversely affected because, they
claim, the TPP would force Japanese
citizens to buy foreign-produced pharmaceuticals and
medical devices. In his March 15 statement, Prime Minister Abe
acknowledged those domestic
sensitivities, but also insisted that Japan needed to take advantage
of “this last window of
opportunity” to enter the negotiations, if it is to grow economically. Other
Japanese business
interests, including manufacturers, strongly support the TPP.
The United States and Japan have been engaged in informal discussions since November 2011
when the government of then-Prime Minister Noda first expressed interest in the possibility of
seeking to join the TPP negotiations. At that timePrior to Japan’s joining the TPP negotiations, the Obama Administration identified three
issues issues
that Japan needed to address as “confidence building measures” if the United States were
to to
support Japan’s entry into the TPP: Japanese restrictions on imports of U.S. beef; market
access for U.S.-made cars; and insurance and express delivery issues. After further consultations
with Japan following Prime Minister Abe’s announcement, acting USTR Demetrios Marantis
announced that the United States would support Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations on
April 12, 2013. On April 20, 2013, on the sidelines of a APEC trade ministers’ meeting, the 11
current TPP partners announced that they have invited Japan to join the TPP negotiations, after
the members have completed their respective domestic notification procedures, including U.S.
presidential notification to Congress. On April 24, in a letter to Speaker John Boehner, Acting
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USTR Marantis notified Congress of the Administration’s intent to begin negotiations with Japan
no earlier than 90 calendar days hence. On July 26, 2013, Japan officially joined the TPP
negotiations.
The beef issue appears to have been addressed with the February 1, 2013, Japanese action to
allow imports of U.S. beef from cattle younger than 30 months. Regarding the auto issue, Japan
agreed to increase the number of U.S.-made vehicles that can be imported under its Preferential
Handling Procedure (PHP) from 2,000 per vehicle “type” to 5,000 per vehicle “type.” In addition,
the two countries agreed to address in parallel negotiations issues regarding non-tariff measures
(NTMs) pertaining to auto trade, including transparency in regulations, standards, certification,
“green” and other new technology vehicles, and distribution. The parallel auto negotiations are
also to address the establishment of a special “safeguard” provision to deal with injurious surges
in auto imports and of a special tariff “snap-back” mechanism to deal with a partner’s failure to
fulfill the commitments on auto trade. Japan agreed that under the proposed TPP, U.S. tariffs on
imports of Japanese motor vehicles will be phased out over a period equal to the longest phaseout period in the agreement.
The activities of the government-run Japan Post, subsidiaries of which sell insurance and express
delivery services, were the main focus of USTR’s agreement with Japan on insurance. Japan
announced that the government would not approve new or modified cancer insurance products or
stand-alone medical insurance products for sale by Japan Post until it has been determined that a
“level-playing field” has been established in competition between private insurers and Japan Post.
The countries agreed to address additional “level-playing field” issues regarding insurance in the
actual TPP negotiations.
Furthermore, the two sides agreed to hold negotiations parallel to the TPP negotiations to address
issues regarding non-tariff measures (NTMs) in insurance, government procurement, competition
policy, express delivery, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. The parallel negotiations
are to achieve “tangible and meaningful” results by the completion of the main TPP negotiations
and will be legally binding at the time a TPP agreement would enter into force.
Japan brings its own issues to the TPP negotiating table. Its negotiators are expected to seek
consideration of sensitive products of its agricultural sector, especially sugar, beef and pork, dairy,
rice, and wheat and barley and to address U.S. methods in determining antidumping duties and
the use of Buy American laws.49
Japan’s membership in the TPP with the United States would constitute a de facto U.S.-Japan
FTA. A large segment of the U.S. business community has expressed support for Japanese
participation in the TPP, if Japan can resolve long-standing issues on access to its markets for
U.S. goods, services, and agriculture. However, the Detroit-based U.S. auto industry, the United
Autoworkers union, and Members of Congress with a large auto-industry presence in their
districts have expressed strong opposition. Other segments of the U.S. business community have
expressed support for Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, although some have conditioned
their support on Japan’s willingness to address long-standing issues.
Japan is also pursuing or considering other regional trade arrangements. On November 20, 2012,
Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean trade ministers announced the launching of negotiations on
49
Bloomberg BNA, July 25, 2013, and Washington Trade Online, July 26, 2013.
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a trilateral FTA. The negotiations are to begin in early 2013. The scope of the possible agreement
remains undefined but would likely not match the ambition of the TPP. Market access for
agricultural products will likely be a point of contention as the small but vocal agriculture
interests in South Korea and Japan confront the possibility of increased rice imports from China
under an FTA arrangement.50
access
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for U.S.-made cars; and insurance and express delivery issues. The beef issues appeared to be
addressed when Japan loosened restrictions in 2013.
In July 2013, Japan joined the United States and the 10 other members of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. If an agreement is reached, Japan’s
membership in the TPP would constitute a de facto U.S.-Japan FTA. Japan’s participation
enhances the clout and viability of the TPP, which is a core component of Obama Administration
efforts to rebalance U.S. foreign policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region. When Japan
entered the talks, the share of the world economy accounted for by TPP countries rose from
around about 30% to about 38%. If successful, the negotiations could reinvigorate a bilateral
economic relationship that has remained steady but stagnant by forcing the two countries to
address longstanding, difficult trade issues. On the other hand, failure to resolve these bilateral
issues could indicate that the underlying problems are too fundamental to overcome, which could
set back the relationship.
Underlying Abe’s decision to enter the TPP talks is a growing feeling among many Japanese that,
after two decades of relatively sluggish growth, Japan’s economic and political influence is
waning in comparison with China and with middle powers such as South Korea. The rapid aging
and gradual shrinking of Japan’s population have added to a sense among many in Japan that the
country needs to develop new sources of growth to maintain, if not increase, the country’s living
standards.
Parallel U.S.-Japan Negotiations
Because Japan joined the TPP talks after they had begun, it was required to reach agreements with the 11 other
members over the terms of its entry. As a result of its discussions with the United States, Japan in April 2013 made a
number of concessions and agreed to address a number of other outstanding issues in separate talks with the United
States that would occur in parallel with the main TPP negotiations. Among other steps, Japan agreed that under the
proposed TPP, U.S. tariffs on imports of Japanese motor vehicles will be phased out over a period equal to the
longest phase-out period in the agreement. Japan also agreed to increase the number of U.S.-made vehicles that can
be imported into Japan under its Preferential Handling Procedure (PHP), from 2,000 per vehicle type to 5,000 per
vehicle type. In addition, the two countries agreed to convene separate negotiations that will address issues regarding
non-tariff measures (NTMs) pertaining to auto trade. Furthermore, the two sides agreed to hold another separate set
of bilateral negotiations, parallel to the TPP talks, to address issues regarding NTMs in insurance, government
procurement, competition policy, express delivery, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The parallel negotiations
are to achieve “tangible and meaningful” results by the completion of the main TPP negotiations and will be legally
binding at the time a TPP agreement would enter into force.
In addition, Japan, along with the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India, announced on November 20,
2012, their intention to begin negotiations to form a trade arrangement—the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). While not ostensibly in conflict with the TPP,
some have suggested the RCEP could be a less ambitious alternative to the more comprehensive
TPP. While RCEP would include some TPP partners, it is noteworthy for the absence of the
United States and the inclusion of China.5158
58
See, for example, Pakpahan, Beginda, “Will RCEP Compete with the TPP?” EastAsiaForum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org.
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Insurance
Japan is the world’s second-largest insurance market, next to the United States. U.S.-based
insurance providers have found it difficult to access the Japanese market especially in life and
annuity insurance. They have been concerned about favorable regulatory treatment that the
government gives to the insurance subsidiary of Japan Post, the national postal system that holds
a large share of this market. For example, they cite subsidies to the insurance operations from
revenues from other Japan Post operations. Also, Japan Post-owned insurance companies are not
subject to the same regulations as other, privately-owned insurance providers, both domestic and
foreign-owned. On October 1, 2007, the government of then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
introduced reforms as part of a privatization process. However, the successor government, led by
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), took steps to roll back the reforms. On April 27, 2012, the
Diet passed legislation that appears to loosen regulatory requirements, according to U.S. industry
sources.5259 The bill is reportedly a compromise package by the lawmakers from the DPJ, the LDP,
and the Komeito Party.53New Komeito party.60 The United States is also concerned about insurance sold by
cooperatives that, they claim, are regulated more leniently than private firms. The United States
considers Japan’s treatment of insurance to be a confidence-building measure that must be addressed
if Japan is to be considered for participation in the TPP.
Japanese Politics54
In elections for the Lower House of the Japanese parliament (called the Diet) on December 19,
2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) scored a commanding victory that swept the party and
its leader, Shinzo Abe, back into power. The LDP and its coalition partner won 324 of the
chamber’s 480 seats, up from 141. The LDP has now ruled Japan for all but about four years
50
International Trade Reporter, May 31, 2012.
See, for example, Pakpahan, Beginda, “Will RCEP Compete with the TPP?” EastAsiaForum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org.
52
Inside U.S. Trade, April 27, 2012.
53
World Trade Online, April 5, 2012.
54
This section was written by Mark Manyin and Emma Chanlett-Avery. For more, see CRS Report R40758, Japan’s
Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Weston S. Konishi.
51
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since the end of World War II. Abe (pronounced “ah-bay”) was also prime minister for about a
12-month period in 2006 and 2007. The December elections toppled the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ), which had been Japan’s ruling party since the previous Lower House vote in 2009.
The DPJ’s seat total tumbled from 230 seats to 57. A new group, the Japan Restoration Party, led
by two controversial figures known for their iconoclastic and generally hawkish views, won 54
seats to become Japan’s third-largest party. As discussed in the “Japanese Politics” section below,
most observers interpreted the election more as a rejection of the DPJ than an endorsement of the
LDP.
The Stabilization of Japanese Politics Around the LDP
Since 2007, Japanese politics has been plagued by instability. Six men have been prime minister,
including the current occupant of the post, Shinzo Abe (born in 1954), who was also prime
minister for a 12-month period from 2006-2007. The LDP’s dominant victory in December 2012
Lower House elections swept the party back into power. The LDP and its coalition partner, the
New Komeito party, won 324 of the chamber’s 480 seats, up from 141 before the election. (See
Figure 3.) The victory gave the premiership to the LDP and Abe (the Lower House selects
Japan’s prime minister), and meant that the LDP has ruled Japan for all but about four years since
the end of World War II.
In July 2013, Abe consolidated his political hold by leading the LDP-New Komeito coalition to a
landslide victory in elections for half of Japan’s Upper House. The results appear to have brought
an end to the divided Diet period that structurally paralyzed Japanese policymaking in recent
years; since 2007, no party has controlled both the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet for more
than a few months. At the time of the election, Abe’s public approval ratings were generally in the
60%-70% range, which polls attributed to voters’ support for his economic policies. As
mentioned earlier, the fact that parliamentary elections do not have to be held until the summer of
2016 presumably gives Abe and the LDP a relatively prolonged period in which to promote their
agenda.
Abe’s Priorities
In statements after his Upper House victory, Abe said the results gave the LDP a “mandate” to
push forward with its policies.55 For the remainder of 2013, Abe said that “implementing
[economic] reforms” will be the “first and foremost political issue” the LDP will tackle in the fall
of 2013. Abe has presented participating in the TPP negotiations as part of his structural reform
efforts, and has said that the 2012 and 2013 elections have given the LDP now the “robust
political power” to take on vested interests that are expected to oppose reforms, such as those
likely to be required by the TPP negotiations.
On security issues, Abe has said he will proceed this fall with a study of how Japan can
participate in collective self-defense activities, combat cooperation in defense of another country
that is prohibited under the current official interpretation of Japan’s constitution. Abe has said he
55
Japanese Prime Minister’s Office, “Japan and ASEAN, Always in Tandem,” Speech Given by Shinzo Abe in
Singapore, Friday, July 26, 2013; “Japan: Prime Minister Abe Pledges To Further Implement Economic Policies in
News Conference,” NHK General Television in Japanese, as translated by the Open Source Center,
JPO2013072212390999, 0500 GMT July 22, 2013.
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will not prioritize his more far-reaching proposals to amend the constitution’s security-related
clauses such as Article 9. This decision is likely based upon a number of political calculations.
For one, the July 2013 elections did not give the LDP the two-thirds majority that Abe would
need to amend Japan’s constitution. Second, the LDP’s coalition partner, New Komeito, opposes
efforts to weaken or do away with Japan’s collective self-defense ban, though New Komeito
leaders often have placed a greater priority on maintaining their coalition with the LDP than
upholding the party’s principles in matters of national security. Thus, the LDP’s ruling coalition is
unlikely to be in jeopardy if Abe pushed forward with his agenda of loosening or abandoning the
legal and political restrictions on the operations of Japanese military forces. However, New
Komeito’s stance means that Abe will have to rely upon votes from conservatives in other parties
to make progress on his security agenda. Months before the July Upper House elections one such
grouping, the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) was expected to be a partner with the LDP on
security issues. But its political fortunes sank after its co-leader, Osaka mayor Toru Hashimoto,
made statements in early May that many interpreted as condoning Imperial Japan’s “comfort
women” system of sex workers. Finally, while public support for amending the constitution’s
security provisions has increased in recent years, it remains a highly controversial topic that
divides the Japanese electorate.
In 2007, Abe cited his poor health as one reason for his abrupt resignation. Days after he stepped
down he was hospitalized for what was later revealed to be ulcerative colitis, a chronic and
episodic form of inflammatory bowel disease in which ulcers and sores in the colon can cause
pain and other symptoms. Stress can trigger flareups, and Abe’s symptoms reportedly became
nearly unbearable in the weeks after he led the LDP to its 2007 Upper House defeat. Abe
reportedly says that the disease is now under control thanks to medication that was not available
in Japan until 2009.56
Figure 3. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament
The LDP and its partner, New Komeito, control the Lower House, which elects the prime minister
Source: Kyodo News, December 26, 2012.
56
Alexander Martin, “Japan’s New Leader Says Recovered From Illness,” The Wall Street Journal Online, December
16, 2012.
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Figure 4
addressed if Japan is to be considered for participation in the TPP.
Japanese Politics61
The Stabilization of Japanese Politics Around the LDP
From 2007 to 2012, Japanese politics was plagued by instability. The premiership changed hands
six times in those six years, and no party has controlled both the Lower and Upper Houses of the
parliament for more than a few months. This period of turmoil appears to have been brought to an
end with the LDP coalition’s dominant election victories in December 2012 and July 2013. The
former event, elections for Japan’s Lower House, returned the LDP and its coalition partner, the
New Komeito party, into power after three years in the minority. The latter consolidated the LDP
coalition’s hold by giving it a majority in the Upper House. (See Figure 4 and Figure 5 for a
display of major parties’ strength in Japan’s parliament, which is called the Diet.) At the time of
the election, Abe’s public approval ratings were generally in the 60%-70% range, which polls
attributed to voters’ support for his economic policies. The fact that parliamentary elections do
not have to be held until the summer of 2016 presumably gives Abe and the LDP a relatively
prolonged period in which to promote their agenda. The LDP has ruled Japan for all but about
four years since 1955.
Abe’s Priorities
Abe has made improving Japan’s economy his top priority. In a previous stint as prime minister,
from 2006-2007, widespread feelings that his government was paying insufficient attention to
59
Inside U.S. Trade, April 27, 2012.
World Trade Online, April 5, 2012.
61
This section was written by Mark Manyin and Emma Chanlett-Avery. For more, see CRS Report R40758, Japan’s
Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Weston S. Konishi.
60
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economic and social welfare issues contributed to low public approval ratings and his LDP’s
defeat in 2007 Upper House elections. For much of 2013, Abe’s cabinet enjoyed poll numbers
above 60%. They declined slightly in the fall, in part due to unease among many Japanese about
the LDP’s passage of a new state secrets law and the manner in which the party pushed it through
the Diet. By early 2014, the government’s approval ratings appeared to have stabilized at the
50%-60% level, buoyed in part by continued support for his economic stewardship.
Abe’s popularity may be challenged in 2014 due to some economic issues. In April, Japan’s
consumption tax will rise from 5% to 8%, potentially curtailing economic growth at a time when
many of the benefits of “Abenomics” have run their course. Also, many analysts—and Abe
himself—argue that longer term economic growth will require structural reforms, which critics
argue that Abe has pursued tentatively, in part due to opposition from entrenched interests,
including elements within the LDP.
On security issues, as discussed earlier, Abe has been acting on his pledges to boost Japan’s
security capabilities, such as through the creation of a national security council in the prime
minister’s office. These moves are generally popular in the LDP, which has steadily become more
hawkish on national security matters, as well as more revisionist on historical matters over the
past twenty years.
Despite these trends within the LDP, Abe has said he will not prioritize his far-reaching proposals
to amend the constitution’s security-related clauses such as Article 9. This decision is likely based
upon a number of political calculations. For one, the July 2013 elections did not give the LDP the
two-thirds majority that Abe would need to amend Japan’s constitution. Second, the LDP’s
coalition partner, New Komeito, opposes efforts to weaken or do away with Japan’s collective
self-defense ban, though New Komeito leaders often have placed a greater priority on
maintaining their coalition with the LDP than upholding the party’s pacifist principles in matters
of national security. Thus, the LDP’s ruling coalition is unlikely to be in jeopardy if Abe pushed
forward with his agenda of loosening or abandoning some legal and political restrictions on the
operations of Japanese military forces. However, New Komeito’s stance means that Abe would
have to rely upon votes from conservatives in other parties to make progress on his security
agenda. Finally, while public support for amending the constitution’s security provisions has
increased in recent years, it remains a highly controversial topic that divides the Japanese
electorate.
The LDP’s fortunes appear to have been boosted in February when the candidate it supported,
Yoichi Masuzoe, easily won an election to be governor of Tokyo. The victory was notable in part
because it featured an attempt by former prime minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) to reemerge as a political force. Koizumi, who left office as one of the most popular prime ministers in
Japan’s post-war history, backed the candidacy of former prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro
(1993-1994) to be governor. The two campaigned on a platform of opposing the restart of Japan’s
nuclear reactors, a position supported by a majority of Japanese, according to public opinion
polls.
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Figure 4. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament
The LDP and its partner, New Komeito, control the Lower House, which elects the prime minister
Source: Kyodo News, December 26, 2012.
Figure 5. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament
The LDP-New Komeito coalition controls the Upper House
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, July 22, 2013.
The DPJ and Alternative Political Forces
The December 2012 and July 2013 parliamentary elections drastically reduced the size of Japan’s
largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was the ruling party from
2009-2012. In the Lower House election, the DPJ’s seat total tumbled from 230 seats to 57, and a
number of prominent DPJ leaders lost their seats. In the July Upper House election, the DPJ seat
total fell by nearly half, from 106 to 59 seats.
Moreover, the prevailing narrative is such that the party’s actual power appears less than its
numerical strength. Formed in the late 1990s by an amalgamation of former conservative and
progressive politicians, the party continues to be riven by divisions among its more hawkish and
dovish factions. It remains to be seen whether some of the DPJ’s advocates for a tougher security
stance will break with the other members of their party and support some of Prime Minister Abe’s
security initiatives.
Over the past 20 years, growing frustration with Japan’s political status quo has periodically
given rise to small-to-moderate protest movements. One such wave resulted in the defeat of the
LDP in the 2009 Lower House elections, ushering in the DPJ’s three-year reign. Until the spring
of 2013, many Japanese The DPJ’s public approval numbers have remained
in the single digits since it lost its hold on power.
Over the past 20 years, growing frustration with Japan’s political status quo has periodically
given rise to small-to-moderate protest movements. Until the spring of 2013, many Japanese
seemed to embrace alternative leaders such as Osaka mayor Toru
Hashimoto, who since mid-2011mid2011 has captured national attention as the de facto leader of a
populist deregulatory and
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decentralization movement. Together with former Tokyo mayor
Shintaro Ishihara, Toru
Hashimoto formed the Japan Restoration Party (JRP, also known as Ishin No
Kai) in the fall of
2012 and captured enough seats to almost overtake the DPJ as the leading
opposition party in the
Lower House. Both Hashimoto and Ishihara are known to support
nationalist positions on matters
of security and history, and thus couldwere thought to perhaps be natural ad hoc
allies for Abe on these
issues. However, as mentioned above, the JRP’s poll numbers fell
dramatically after Hashimoto’s May 2013 comfort women statement. Although the party gained
made statements in
early May 2013 that many interpreted as condoning Imperial Japan’s “comfort women” system of
forced prostitution. Although the party gained seats in the July Upper House elections, its
performance was weaker than many had expected
before the mayor’s remarks, and it has polled at
or below the DPJ’s levels ever since.
In a seemingly contradictory trend, Tokyo’s gubernatorial election also saw a surprisingly strong
result for Toshio Tamogami, who many consider to be an extreme nationalist. A former chief of
Japan’s air force, Tamogami won more than 10% of the vote, including nearly a quarter of those
in their 20s, according to one exit poll. Tamogami was dismissed from the military in 2008 after
he wrote an essay playing down Imperial Japan’s military conduct during World War II and
arguing that the United States and China drew Japan into the war.mayor’s remarks.
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Structural Rigidities in Japan’s Political System
Compared to most industrialized democracies, the Japanese parliament is structurally weak, as is
the office of the prime minister and his cabinet. Though former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
(who served from 2001 to 2006)Koizumi and his
immediate predecessors increased politicians’ influence
relative to bureaucrats’, with important
exceptions Japan’s policymaking process tends to be
compartmentalized and bureaucratized,
making it difficult to make trade-offs among competing
constituencies on divisive issues. The
result is often paralysis or incremental changes at the
margins of policy, particularly during
periods of weak premierships such as the one Japan
experienced from 2006-2013. These
difficulties were a major reason Abe took the unprecedented
decision in early 2013 to house
Japan’s TPP negotiating team in the Prime Minister’s office, in the hopes that
this would help
overcome the bureaucratic obstacles to making the trade-offs that are likely to be
necessary to
enable Japan’s joining a final agreement, if one is reached.
Japan’s Demographic Challenge
Japan’s combination of a low birth rate, strict immigration practices, and a shrinking and rapidly
aging population presents policymakers with a significant challenge. Polls suggest that Japanese
women are avoiding marriage and child-bearing because of the difficulty of combining career and
family in Japan; the fertility rate has fallen to 1.25, far below the 2.1 rate necessary to sustain
population size. Japan’s population growth rate is -0.1%, and its current population of 127 million
is projected to fall to about 95 million by mid-century. Concerns about a huge shortfall in the
labor force have grown, particularly as the elderly demand more care. The ratio of working age
persons to retirees is projected to fall from 5:2 around 2010 to 3:2 in 2040, reducing the resources
available to pay for the government social safety net.5762 Japan’s immigration policies have
traditionally been strictly limited, closing one potential source of new workers. Prime Minister
62
Lynann Butkiewicz, “Implications of Japan’s Changing Demographics,” National Bureau of Asian Research,
Washington, DC, October 2012.
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Abe has discussed ways to mobilize greater women’s participation in the workforce through such
means as improving the availability of child care.
Selected Legislation
113th Congress
H.R. 44 (Bordallo). Recognizes the suffering and the loyalty of the residents of Guam during the
Japanese occupation of Guam in World War II. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a
fund for the payment of claims submitted by compensable Guam victims and survivors of
compensable Guam decedents. Directs the secretary to make specified payments to (1) living
Guam residents who were raped, injured, interned, or subjected to forced labor or marches, or
internment resulting from, or incident to, such occupation and subsequent liberation; and (2)
57
Lynann Butkiewicz, “Implications of Japan’s Changing Demographics,” National Bureau of Asian Research,
Washington, DC, October 2012.
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survivors of compensable residents who died in the war (such payments to be made after
payments have been made to surviving Guam residents). Referred to House subcommittee on
January 31, 2013. Status: Referred to the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and
Insular Affairs.
H.Res. 65 (Royce). Condemning the Government of North Korea for its flagrant and repeated
violations of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, for its repeated provocations
that threaten international peace and stability, and for its February 12, 2013, test of a nuclear
device. Passed/agreed to in the House on February 15, 2013. Status: On motion to suspend the
rules and agree to the resolution, as amended Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required):
412-2 (Roll no. 45). Latest Action: 2/15/2013 Motion to reconsider laid on the table agreed to
without objection.
S. 192 (Barrasso). Expedited LNG for American Allies Act of 2013; the exportation of natural
gas to Japan shall be deemed to be consistent with the public ... during only such period as the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed at Washington January 19, 1960, and entered
into force June 23, 1960 between the United States and Japan, remains in effect. Referred to
Senate committee on January 31, 2013.
112th Congress
H.Res. 172 (Honda). Expressing heartfelt condolences and support for assistance to the people of
Japan and all those affected in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake and tsunamis of March 11,
2011. Subcommittee hearings held.
S.Res. 101 (Reid). A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate relating to the March 11, 2011,
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Passed/agreed to in Senate on March 14, 2011.
S.Res. 333 (Feinstein). A resolution welcoming and commending the Government of Japan for
extending an official apology to all United States former prisoners of war from the Pacific War
and establishing in 2010 a visitation program to Japan for surviving veterans, family members,
and descendants. Submitted in the Senate, considered, and agreed to without amendment and with
a preamble by Unanimous Consent on November 17, 2011.
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S.Res. 543 (Boxer). A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate condemning the international
parental abduction of all children. Passed/agreed to with an amendment and an amended
preamble in Senate on December 4, 2012.
111th Congress
H.R. 44 (Bordallo). Sought recognition of the loyalty and suffering of the residents of Guam who
suffered unspeakable harm as a result of the occupation of Guam by Imperial Japanese military
forces during World War II, by being subjected to death, rape, severe personal injury, personal
injury, forced labor, forced march, or internment, as well as payments for death, personal injury,
forced labor, forced march, and internment. Referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
March 5, 2009.
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H.R. 423 (Mica). Sought to provide compensation for certain World War II veterans who
survived the Bataan Death March and were held as prisoners of war by the Japanese. Referred to
House Subcommittee on Military Personnel on February 6, 2009.
H.R. 2055 (Thompson) and S. 817 (Cantwell). The Pacific Salmon Stronghold Conservation
Act of 2009. Among other items, authorized the sharing of status and trends data, innovative
conservation strategies, conservation planning methodologies, and other information with North
Pacific countries, including Japan, to promote salmon conservation and habitat. In April 2009, the
House bill was referred to House Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Insular
Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife, which held a hearing on the bill on June 16, 2009. The Senate bill
was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in April 2009.
H.R. 2647 (Skelton) and S. 1390 (Levin); P.L. 111-84. The National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2010. Signed into law October 28, 2009. On July 21, 2009, the Senate passed (58-40,
Record Vote Number: 235) an amendment (S.Amdt. 1469) to S. 1390, the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act, that eliminated funding for additional F-22 aircraft production. In
conference, this provision was deleted, but both chambers agreed not to authorize funding for
additional procurement of the F-22 in FY2010. Section 1250 requires the Secretary of Defense to
report to Congress on the potential for foreign military sales of the F-22A fighter aircraft. Section
2835 establishes an Interagency Coordination Group of Inspectors General for Guam
Realignment, which among other items, is required to submit by February 1 an annual report on
Japan’s budgetary contribution to the relocation of military personnel on Guam. The conference
committee deleted the portion (in Section 2833) of the House version of H.R. 2647 that would
have required construction firms that get contracts for projects associated with the expansion of
U.S. military facilities on Guam to pay their workers wages consistent with the labor rates in
Hawaii.
H.Res. 933 (Dingell). Commended the Government of Japan for its current policy against
currency manipulation and encouraged the Government of Japan to continue in this policy.
Introduced November 19, 2009; referred to House Ways and Means Committee.
H.Res. 125 (C. Smith). Called on Brazil in accordance with its obligations under the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to obtain, as a matter of
extreme urgency, the return of Sean Goldman to his father David Goldman in the United States;
urging the governments of all countries that are partners with the United States to the Hague
Convention to fulfill their obligations to return abducted children to the United States; and
recommended that all other nations, including Japan, that have unresolved international child
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abduction cases join the Hague Convention and establish procedures to promptly and equitably
address the tragedy of international child abductions. Passed/agreed to in House on March 11,
2009.
H.Res. 997 (Sutton). Expressed the sense of the House of Representatives regarding unfair and
discriminatory practices of the government of Japan in its failure to apply its current and planned
extension of the Government’s Eco-friendly Vehicle Purchase and scrappage program to imported
vehicles made by U.S. automakers. Introduced January 5, 2010; referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
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S.Res. 388 (Stabenow). Expressed the sense of the Senate regarding unfair and discriminatory
measures of the Government of Japan in failing to apply the Eco-Friendly Vehicle Purchase
Program to vehicles made by United States automakers. Introduced January 20, 2010; referred to
the Committee on Finance.
H.Res. 1464 (Ros-Lehtinen). Recognized the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the United
States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and expressing appreciation to the
Government of Japan and the Japanese people for enhancing peace, prosperity, and security in the
Asia-Pacific region. Passed/agreed to in House on June 24, 2010.
S.Res. 564 (Webb). Recognized the 50th anniversary of the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual
Security and Cooperation with Japan, and affirmed support for the United States-Japan security
alliance and relationship. Resolution agreed to in Senate without amendment and with a preamble
by Unanimous Consent on June 29, 2010.
H.Res. 1326 (Moran). Called on the Government of Japan to immediately address the growing
problem of abduction to and retention of United States citizen minor children in Japan, to work
closely with the Government of the United States to return these children to their custodial parent
or to the original jurisdiction for a custody determination in the United States, to provide leftbehind parents immediate access to their children, and to adopt without delay the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Passed in the House on
September 29, 2010.
Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
irinehart@crs.loc.gov, 7-0345
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