Summary
Positive Train Control (PTC):
Overview and Policy Issues
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation Policy
April 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42637
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Summary
The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08) requires implementation of positive train
control (PTC) on railroads which carry passengers or have high-volume freight traffic with
toxicortoxic- or poisonous-by-inhalation hazardous materials. PTC is a communications and signaling system
that has been identified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a technology
capable of preventing incidents caused by train operator or dispatcher error. PTC is expected to
reduce the number of incidents due to excessive speed, conflicting train movements, and engineer
failure to obey wayside signals. It would not prevent incidents due to trespassing on railroads
’
' right-of-way or at highway-rail grade crossings, where the vast majority of rail-related fatalities
occur.
Under RSIA08, PTC is required on about 60,000 miles of railroad track by December 31, 2015.
Many railroad companies are uncertain of their ability to fully implement PTC by this deadline.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) estimates full PTC implementation will cost
approximately $14 billion. Although the larger freight railroads are well along in planning for
PTC, some smaller railroads and commuter lines have
not yet identified sources of funding for
implementation.
more difficulty funding implementation.
PTC uses signals and sensors along the track to communicate train location, speed restrictions,
and moving authority. If the locomotive is violating a speed restriction or moving authority,
onboardon-board equipment will automatically slow or stop the train. A more expansive version of PTC,
called communications-based train control (CBTC), would bring additional safety benefits plus
business benefits for railroad operators, such as increased capacity and reduced fuel consumption.
However, CBTC is not currently being installed by any U.S. railroad, due to the additional cost
and to uncertainty about implementation of PTC before the 2015 deadline.
PTC could be
PTC is an issue in the reauthorization of RSIA08, which
expiresexpired at the end of FY2013.
Two bills introduced in the
112th Congress, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century
Act (MAP-21; S. 1813),112th Congress, S. 1813 as approved by the Senate
, and the American Energy and Infrastructure
Jobs Act ( and H.R. 7
), as approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, would
have extended the deadline and made other policy changes. No language relating to PTC was
included in the final surface transportation bill (P.L. 112-141
) enacted on July 6, 2012. In the 113th Congress, bills were introduced to extend the deadline (S. 1462) and provide federal financial assistance for implementing PTC (H.R. 3634). Neither bill was enacted. ) enacted on July 6, 2012. If it wishes
to reexamine the PTC mandate, possible options for Congress include
•
postponing the implementation deadline;
•
considering whether to make dedicated radio spectrum available to the railroads
for PTC implementation and, if so, how to compensate current license holders of
that spectrum;
•
examining possible alternatives to PTC and their potential to create barriers to
competition in the rail freight market; and
•
providing federal financial support for PTC implementation by making PTC
projects eligible for funding under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Funding Program or by appropriating other funding to FRA, as authorized in
RSIA08.
Congressional Research Service
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Rail Safety and PTC ........................................................................................................................ 1
The Basics of PTC ........................................................................................................................... 4
Implementation ................................................................................................................................ 8
Cost and Benefits ............................................................................................................................. 9
Safety Benefits from PTC Preventable Incidents .................................................................... 10
Policy Issues .................................................................................................................................. 11
Interoperability ........................................................................................................................ 11
Communication Spectrum ....................................................................................................... 12
Avoiding Barriers to Market Entry .......................................................................................... 13
2015 Implementation Deadline ............................................................................................... 14
Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 15
Figures
Figure 1. National Network of Class I Railroads............................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Example PTC System Architecture .................................................................................. 5
Figure 3. Communication-based Train Control (CBTC) ................................................................. 7
Figure 4. Track Ownership and Rail Operations in the Northeast Corridor .................................. 12
Tables
Table 1. PTC Provisions in Unenacted Senate and House Bills in 112th Congress ....................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Research Service
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Introduction
RSIA08.
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Introduction
Following several high-profile train incidents, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act
of 2008 (RSIA08; P.L. 110-432), which mandated positive train control (PTC) on many passenger
and freight railroads by December 31, 2015. The law does not describe PTC in technical terms,
but defines it as a risk mitigation system that could prevent train incidents by automatically
stopping trains when a collision or derailment is imminent.
While PTC promises benefits in terms of safety, its implementation entails substantial costs and
presents a variety of other policy-related issues. These include the interoperability of individual
railroads’ systems, railroads' systems, access to sufficient radio spectrum to support PTC, and the possibility that PTC could
be a barrier to market entry.
Freight and commuter railroads have raised concerns about their ability to meet the deadline
imposed by Congress. In the
112th112th Congress, measures to relax the deadline were approved by the
Senate and by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, but were not included in
the Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), the surface
transportation bill signed by President Obama on July 6, 2012. The issue
could be revisited in the
reauthorization of RSIA08 during the 113th Congress.
Rail Safety and PTC
was reexamined in the 113th Congress in conjunction with the reauthorization of RSIA08. The December 1, 2013, derailment of a train operated by Metro-North Railroad in New York City, which resulted in four passenger fatalities, led to additional legislative proposals related to PTC.
Rail Safety and PTC
The United States railroad network comprises both freight and passenger operations. The seven
largest operators by revenue, known as the Class I freight railroads, own about two-thirds of the
nation’ nation's 140,810 miles of trackage (see Figure 1
).1).1 These companies include BNSF, Union
Pacific (UP), Norfolk Southern (NS), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Canadian Pacific (CP),
Canadian National (CN), and CSX Transportation (CSXT). The remaining trackage is controlled
by Class II or regional freight railroads; Class III or short-line railroads; state and local
government agencies; and Amtrak, the federally owned passenger operator.
In many situations, both passenger and freight railroad companies operate over track owned by
other railroads. This may occur under orders issued by the federal Surface Transportation Board
or under voluntary agreements between carriers. Amtrak also has the right to operate trains using
its own equipment over freight lines.
2
2
The majority of freight railroad lines have a single track with passing sidings at various locations
to allow trains to pass. Trains may operate in either direction along a track. High-volume
corridors may have multiple tracks that typically operate in a single direction to increase both
operating capacity and safety.3
1
U.S. Department of Transportation, “National Transportation Statistics,” http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_01.html.
2
See CRS Report R42512, Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli.
3
Cambridge Systematics, National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, Final Report,
September 2007, p. 25, http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Files/natl_freight_capacity_study.ashx.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
operating capacity and safety.3
Figure 1. National Network of Class I Railroads
Source: Cambridge Systematics, Inc., National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, September 2007.
Note: This map shows the Class I railroads in the United States. Not all lines shown are subject to the PTC implementation mandate.
|
For safety purposes, train dispatchers and signals along the track provide the engineer with the
authority to travel on a certain track segment to prevent collision with other trains. Some long
stretches of track in remote areas use only one main line without any signalization. This is called
“ "dark territory
.”," comprising about 40% of the North American rail network.4 In this case, railroads rely on communications with dispatchers to provide
authority. Dispatchers are also responsible for assigning priority when more than one train
requires use of a particular segment of track.
Figure 1. National Network of Class I Railroads
Source: Cambridge Systematics, Inc., National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study,
September 2007.
Note: This map shows the Class I railroads in the United States. Not all lines shown are subject to the PTC
implementation mandate.
According to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), an average of 2,000 derailments and
205 train collisions, resulting in 422 injuries and 12 fatalities, occurred annually from 1998 to
2009, excluding incidents at highway-rail crossings.4 The number of incidents may increase as
operations in both freight and passenger rail expand, despite a reduction in total track length.
However, the majority of train-related fatalities are due to interactions with vehicular traffic at
highway-grade crossings or trespassing on railroad property rather than train collisions or
derailments. In 2009, 4 fatalities occurred from train collisions or derailments, 247 fatalities
occurred at highway-rail grade crossings, and 417 fatalities resulted from trespassing on railroad
property or right-of-way.5
4
5
Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Railroad Safety Statistics, Annual Report, April 1, 2011, pp. 4-20.
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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While most incidents are minor, several high-profile incidents led Congress to consider increased
rail safety. Most notably, the head-on collision of a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific
freight train in Chatsworth, CA, led to 25 fatalities and over 100 injuries in 2008. The cause of
the crash was determined to be negligence by the commuter train engineer. PTC was specifically
identified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a technology that could have
prevented Chatsworth and other similar incidents by providing a safeguard against human error.6
Interest in PTC dates to at least 1990, when the NTSB placed it on its initial “Most Wanted List
of Transportation Safety Improvements.”7 The High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994
directed FRA to issue a progress report on positive train control. In 2004, FRA submitted a costbenefit analysis of PTC at the request of Congress.8 That study showed that as of 2004, the costs
of PTC outweighed the direct safety benefits, but the agency’s letter to Congress stated, “we
believe PTC will be more affordable in the future.”9
The Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007, introduced in the 110th Congress,
mandated implementation of PTC in specific circumstances.10 The Chatsworth train incident on
September 12, 2008, expedited the legislative process, and the bill was signed into law October
16, 2008, as the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08). RSIA08 requires “each
Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail
passenger transportation” to implement PTC on all segments or routes of railroad tracks that (a)
carry frequent passenger or commuter service, or (b) carry more than 5 million gross tons of
freight per year and also are used for transporting poison-by-inhalation hazardous materials
(PIH).11 At the time the law was signed, this mandate covered approximately 70,000 miles of
railroad track.
During the FRA rulemaking process, it became apparent that rail companies could change the
routes of trains carrying PIH to avoid the PTC requirement on some track segments. A Senate bill
was introduced to forego mandatory PTC implementation on lines that will not be transporting
passengers or hazardous materials by the end of 2015.12 This was estimated to eliminate the PTC
mandate on 10,000 of the 70,000 track-miles initially covered. The bill was not enacted, but FRA
approved such a change in its amended final rule, effective July 13, 2012.13 The American Short
Line and Regional Railroad Association proposed several changes to the FRA final rule, including
eliminating the PTC requirement for trains traveling less than 20 miles on PTC-required track and
6
National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train LOF65-12
Chatsworth, California, RAR 10/01, September 12, 2008.
7
National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Public Affairs, “NTSB unveils new ‘Most Wanted List,’” press
release, June 23, 2011, p. 1, http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/110623.html.
8
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report on the Consolidate Appropriations
Resolution, To accompany H.J.Res. 2, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, H.Rept. 108-10 (Washington: GPO, 2003), pp.
1286-1287.
9
Letter from Betty Monro, Federal Railroad Administration Acting Administrator, to Senator Robert Byrd, ranking
Member, Committee on Appropriations, August 17, 2004, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/
ptc_ben_cost_report.pdf.
10
H.R. 2095, S. 1889.
11
P.L. 110-432, §104.
12
S. 301, 112th Congress.
13
Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR),” 76 Federal Register 52918,
August 24, 2011. See also 78 Federal Register 5767, January 28, 2013.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
extending the deadline for Class II and III railroads to employ PTC-equipped locomotives until
2020. FRA approved these changes in an amended final rule.14
In the 112th Congress, bills to delay the PTC implementation deadline were considered in both
houses of Congress. As approved by the Senate, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act (MAP-21; S. 1813) would have allowed DOT to extend the December 31, 2015,
deadline for any railroad in one-year increments until December 31, 2018, if it deemed full
implementation infeasible and if the railroad had made a good-faith effort to comply. The bill
would have allowed use of Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF)15 for PTC
requires use of a particular segment of track.
On signaled track, track is separated into blocks by trackside or overhead signals that indicate to an engineer whether the train can proceed (and at what speed) or must stop before it enters the next block. Given the long stopping distance required by trains, a prior signal actually informs the engineer about the indication on the next signal. This system is called automatic block signal (ABS), and is generally the most sophisticated signal system used by freight railroads. Since 1947, it has been required for freight trains traveling 50 or more miles per hour (mph) and passenger trains traveling 60 mph or more.5 Railroads have different operating rules regarding how and under what circumstances the conductor must call out signals to the engineer.
Intercity and commuter passenger trains often incorporate additional features in their signal systems. A "cab signal" system relays external signal information to control displays inside the engineer's cab via an electric current that travels along the rails and is picked up by a receiver on the locomotive. The cab signal is helpful when fog, sun, or track curvature hinders or delays visual sighting of wayside signals. It also increases track utilization, as the engineer can adjust train speed in between signals. An "automatic train stop" (ATS) or an "automatic train control" (ATC) system can override the engineer's control of a train if a wayside signal indication is not acknowledged by the engineer. These devices are installed along the tracks, and trip a train's brakes when an engineer fails to respond to a wayside signal. Cab signals, ATS, and ATC were developed beginning in the early 1900s, and have been required by federal regulations since 1947 for passenger trains traveling over 79 mph (see text box).
A Brief History of Major Legislative and Regulatory Developments
Congress has been interested in automatic train control for over a century. In 1906, Congress directed the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.)—the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA's) predecessor in federal regulation of rail safety—to investigate and report on the use of and necessity of devices for the automatic control of railway trains, and to recommend such legislation as the agency deemed advisable (H.J.R. 153, 34 Stat. 838). In the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 498), Congress authorized the I.C.C. to mandate the installation of ATS or ATC devices. In 1922, the I.C.C. ordered the installation of these devices on 49 railroads on segments of track totaling about 5,000 miles.6 In 1937, Congress enacted the Signal Inspection Act (50 Stat. 835), which required railroads to obtain I.C.C. permission for any modification to their signal systems. In 1947, the I.C.C. ordered any railroad operating at a speed of 80 or more mph (i.e., passenger trains) to install ATS, ATC, or cab signal systems on its lines.7 In its 1947 report, the I.C.C. noted that ATS or ATC was then in use on over 14,100 miles of track, while cab signals were in use on over 8,100 miles.8 The report estimated that its order would require such devices on an additional 27,156 miles of track.9
The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) first recommendation regarding automatic train control was issued to the FRA in 1970 after its investigation of a collision of a commuter train with a work crew train in Darien, CT, in 1969.10 It recommended that the FRA "study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic train control at points where passenger trains are required to meet other trains."11 In 1976, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment issued a report requested by Congress on the use of automatic train control devices in rail transit systems.12 In 1983, the FRA proposed a number of changes to signal and train control requirements, but in issuing its final rule, citing the 1947 I.C.C. threshold of 80 mph for installation of ATS, ATC, or cab signal devices, it determined that there was no compelling argument to either lower or raise the 80 mph speed threshold.13 In 1990, the NTSB placed automatic train control on its initial "Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements."14 Congress directed the FRA to issue a progress report on positive train control in The High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-440). In 1997, after investigation of an accident between a commuter train and an Amtrak train in Silver Spring, MD, that killed eight commuter passengers, the NTSB recommended that the FRA require the installation of a positive train separation control system for all tracks where commuter and intercity passenger railroads operate.15 The FRA responded in 1998 to the NTSB's recommendation by stating, in part,16
Current regulations create incentives for installation of these systems by authorizing higher train speeds. However, signal-based technology is expensive, and passenger operators cannot achieve significant increases in safety on the lines that they utilize absent parallel investments by freight operators (which are often the owners and/or dominant users of the line on which passenger trains operate). The answer to this problem is more affordable technology and commitments for joint action by freight and passenger service providers. It is important that we avoid any burden on passenger service providers that would result in service cutbacks and diversion of passengers to less safe forms of transportation.
In 2004, the FRA submitted a cost-benefit analysis of PTC at the request of Congress.17 That study showed that as of 2004, the costs of PTC outweighed the direct safety benefits, but the agency's letter to Congress stated, "we believe PTC will be more affordable in the future."18
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According to the FRA, an average of 1,983 derailments and 203 train collisions, resulting in 420 injuries and 12 fatalities, occurred annually from 1999 to 2010, excluding incidents at highway-rail crossings.19 The number of incidents may increase as operations in both freight and passenger rail expand, despite a reduction in total track length. However, the majority of train-related fatalities are due to interactions with vehicular traffic at highway-grade crossings or trespassing on railroad property rather than train collisions or derailments. In 2010, 8 fatalities occurred from train collisions or derailments, 257 fatalities occurred at highway-rail grade crossings, and 434 fatalities resulted from trespassing on railroad property or right-of-way.20
While most incidents are minor, several high-profile incidents led Congress to mandate PTC. In 2005, a train carrying chlorine gas was improperly diverted onto a side track by a manual switch left in the wrong position. Another train was parked on the side track. As a result of the collision, chlorine gas was released from one derailed car, killing nine people and forcing the evacuation of 5,400 people within a mile radius of the incident for two weeks. This incident occurred in dark territory. The Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2095, S. 1889), introduced in the 110th Congress, mandated implementation of PTC in specific circumstances.
In 2008, the head-on collision of a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific freight train in Chatsworth, CA, led to 25 fatalities and over 100 injuries. That crash occurred on a section of track on which no cab signal, ATS, or ATC system was installed, leaving the commuter train engineer completely dependent on his sightings of the wayside signals. Reportedly, the cost of also equipping freight locomotives with automatic signaling technology was one reason a new system had not been installed.21 The cause of the accident was determined to be negligence by the commuter train engineer—it is believed he missed a red signal while texting. PTC was specifically identified by the NTSB as a technology that could have prevented Chatsworth and other similar incidents by providing a safeguard against human error.22
The Chatsworth accident on September 12, 2008, expedited the legislative process, and the bill mandating PTC was signed into law October 16, 2008, as the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08). RSIA08 requires "each Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation" to implement PTC on all segments or routes of railroad tracks that (a) carry frequent passenger or commuter service, or (b) carry more than 5 million gross tons of freight per year and also are used for transporting toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials (TIH).23 At the time the law was signed, this mandate covered approximately 70,000 miles of railroad track.
During the FRA rulemaking process, it became apparent that rail companies could change the routes of trains carrying TIH to avoid the PTC requirement on some track segments. A Senate bill was introduced to forgo mandatory PTC implementation on lines that will not be transporting passengers or hazardous materials by the end of 2015.24 This was estimated to eliminate the PTC mandate on 10,000 of the 70,000 track-miles initially covered. The bill was not enacted, but FRA approved such a change in its amended final rule, effective July 13, 2012.25 The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association proposed several changes to the FRA final rule, including eliminating the PTC requirement for trains traveling less than 20 miles on PTC-required track and extending the deadline for Class II and III railroads to employ PTC-equipped locomotives until 2020. FRA approved these changes in an amended final rule.26
In the 112th Congress, bills to delay the PTC implementation deadline were considered in both houses of Congress. As approved by the Senate, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; S. 1813) would have allowed the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to extend the December 31, 2015, deadline for any railroad in one-year increments until December 31, 2018, if it deemed full implementation infeasible and if the railroad had made a good-faith effort to comply. The bill would have allowed use of Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF)27 for PTC implementation. The American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 7), which was
adopted by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee but was not approved by the
House of Representatives, would have extended the deadline for PTC implementation to
December 31, 2020, and would have allowed railroads to adjust
PIHTIH routes until 2020 to reduce
the extent of track affected by the PTC mandate. The bill also would have allowed railroads to
implement alternative strategies on track that does not transport passengers where the
“alternative
"alternative risk reduction strategy that would reduce the risk of release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation
hazardous materials to the same extent the risk of a release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation
hazardous materials would be reduced if positive train control were installed on those tracks.
”16
"28 While the provision would have allowed flexibility on the part of the railroads, alternative safety
measures might interfere with the goal of interoperability and could raise costs for smaller
railroads that might need to conform to multiple safety systems.
The final version of the 2012 surface transportation bill, signed by President Obama on July 6,
2012, as P.L. 112-141, did not change existing law concerning PTC.
However, the issue remains
of interest to Congress as it considers reauthorization of federal rail safety programs.
The Basics of PTC
PTC is defined in federal law as a “system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train
through a switch left in the wrong position.”17 The federal government has imposed no specific
technical requirements, allowing railroads to adopt whatever PTC systems seem best suited to
their particular needs. However, all PTC systems share certain characteristics, including use of
radio communication to provide in-cab signals to the train engineer and the ability for the
dispatcher to stop a train in an emergency.18
Most U.S. railroads currently plan to implement what is referred to as an “overlay-type” system,
in which the sensors, signals, and transponders are installed over existing track.19 The network
14
Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems,” 75 Federal Register 2704, January 15, 2010.
Railroad Reinvestment and Improvement Funding (RRIF) provides direct loans and loan guarantees up to a total of
$35 billion to improve or develop new rail equipment and facilities, and refinance outstanding debt.
16
H.R. 7, §8401, p. 805.
17
49 C.F.R. §236.
18
Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research
Results, April 2009, p. 2.
19
Jeff D. Young, Lisa C. Wilson, and Denise E. Lyle, Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS)
Positive Train Control Development Plan (PTCDP), Union Pacific Railroad, Norfolk Southern Railway, and CSX
(continued...)
15
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
operating center sends one-way communication in the form of speed restrictions and moving
authorities to a train as it passes over a transponder embedded in the track. This information
requires integration with existing signals, switches, sensors, and other wayside infrastructure. The
network operating office does not track real-time train location, but rather receives notice
The derailment of a Metro-North commuter train in the Bronx, NY, on December 1, 2013, renewed calls for PTC implementation. Four passengers died and 60 to 70 passengers were injured in this derailment. The train traveled at 82 mph over a straight section of track with a 70-mph speed limit, but then derailed as it entered a curve with a 30-mph speed limit. According to one report, although this section of Metro-North's network was equipped with a cab signal/ATS/ATC system, Metro-North's version of this system was designed to prevent collisions with other trains, and did not restrict speeds when no other trains posed a danger (as was the case with the derailed train). In other words, the backup safety signal system was designed strictly to ensure train separation and did not include a speed control element. Other commuter railroads (New Jersey Transit and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, for example), as well as Amtrak on the Northeast Corridor, had a system that would have restricted train speed in this instance.29 FRA ordered Metro-North to add speed control to its signal system and to station a second crew member with train control duties at certain locations until it did so.30
The Basics of PTC
PTC is defined in federal law as a "system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position."31 The federal government has imposed no specific technical requirements, allowing railroads to adopt whatever PTC systems seem best suited to their particular needs. However, all PTC systems share certain characteristics, including use of radio communication to provide in-cab signals to the train engineer and the ability for the dispatcher to stop a train in an emergency.32
Most U.S. railroads currently plan to implement what is referred to as an "overlay-type" system, in which the sensors, signals, and transponders are installed over existing track.33 The network operating center sends one-way communication in the form of speed restrictions and moving authorities to a train as it passes over a transponder embedded in the track. This information requires integration with existing signals, switches, sensors, and other wayside infrastructure. The network operating office does not track real-time train location, but rather receives notice whenever a train passes the wayside infrastructure. Figure 2 illustrates PTC hardware and
communication pathways in an overlay-type system architecture.
Figure 2. Example PTC System Architecture
Source: Meteorcomm LLC, ETMS Wireless Network, 2011.
Note: Meteorcomm supplies communication equipment for the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS),
which several large freight companies are planning to implement. This diagram shows a two-way communications
-based PTC system, although most railroads are installing one-way systems that comply with the law.
(...continued)
Transportation, Inc, FRA-2010-0060-0002, June 1, 2011.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Communication between wayside infrastructure, transponders, and trains is delivered through
analog radio signal. Wireless communication options that provide greater data transfer capability,
such as Wi-Fi, are not currently practical. Equipment on the train receives information from
transponders to alert the train operator to current and upcoming signals, movements, and work
zones. The train has equipment capable of superseding train engineer authority, so that the PTC
system can slow or stop the train to prevent incident in the event of human error.
A more expansive variant of an overlay-type system is communications-based train control
(CBTC). CBTC is a more sophisticated computer-aided dispatching framework which requires
train information to be sent to a central location, which then disseminates the information to all
entities in the network.
2034 In this architecture, Global Positioning System (GPS) is used to track
train location and speed, with other instrumentation providing location and speed coverage when
the GPS cannot locate a signal. These additional components provide greater precision as well as
system redundancy in the event of failure. Similarly, GPS and radio communication similar to cell
phone technology can be used to identify work zone locations along specific lengths of track.
CBTC is based on digital rather than analog technology, facilitating interoperability among
systems used by different railroads.
With CBTC, central control automatically tracks the movements of all the trains in the network,
sends speed restrictions and movement authorities to individual trains, and checks for potential
derailment and collisions (see Figure 3). The system uses location and speed information to
determine headway distance and the necessary braking distance required to prevent potential
incidents. Braking distance can be several miles for large freight trains and is dependent on
factors such as train speed, reaction time, wheel-rail friction, brakes wear, track conditions, track
grading, mass, and mass distribution of the train.
2135 All these variables are processed with a
complex braking algorithm to ensure an emergency stop prior to a collision without excessive
speed restriction leading to inefficient operation.
Figure 3. Communication-based Train Control (CBTC)
Source: Federal Railroad Administration, Research Results, North American Joint Train Control (NAJTC) Project, April 2009.
Note: Two-way data communication and computer-aided dispatch are the primary subsystems that distinguish full CBTC from PTC.
|
The greater capability of CBTC makes it suitable for very high speed passenger lines, and CBTC
is being instituted on some European rail lines for that reason. However, the system requires
seamless communication coverage along the entirety of PTC-equipped track, as temporary
communication loss can pose safety risks. The need for constant communication also requires
significant investment in either radio towers or fixed transponders. These requirements raise the
capital cost, making CBTC more expensive than an overlay-type system.
20
There are many ways of designing the system architecture to support PTC communication. In the context of railroad
operations with dispatchers, a system architecture with central control is the most plausible design.
21
David Barney, David Haley, and George Nikandros, “Calculating Train Braking Distance,” This paper appeared at
the 6th Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS ‘01), Brisbane, 2001, pp. 23-29,
http://129.96.12.107/confpapers/CRPITV3Barney.pdf.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Figure 3. Communication-based Train Control (CBTC)
Source: Federal Railroad Administration, Research Results, North American Joint Train Control (NAJTC)
Project, April 2009.
Note: Two-way data communication and computer-aided dispatch are the primary subsystems which distinguish
full CBTC from PTC.
capital cost, making CBTC more expensive than an overlay-type system.
The CBTC system potentially offers greater business benefits to railroad operators than an
overlay-type system. For example, the real-time, two-way communication of train locations
combined with speed restrictions and moving authorities can lead to more efficient scheduling,
increased capacity, and fuel savings. Nonetheless, U.S. railroads appear to have concluded that
the advantages of communication-based train control are not worth the additional cost of
installing it at the present time.
It is important to note that both overlay-type systems and CBTC systems are designed principally
to reduce collisions between trains. The systems do not address intrusion into railroad right-
ofwayof-way. Currently, there is no requirement that they be capable of detecting and notifying trains
about crossing-gate failures, vehicles blocking tracks, or trespassers. However, such capabilities
could be incorporated into PTC systems in the future.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Implementation
Implementation
Motivated by the December 31, 2015, deadline,
many of the large railroad companies are
currently testing and implementing PTC on selected track segments across the United States.
There are also several small-scale projects underway designed to meet specific local needs. Most
of the current PTC projects rely on fixed transponders in conjunction with GPS with one-way
information communication to the trains to fulfill the baseline PTC requirements. Only a few
systems involve two-way communication with real-time information and computer-aided
dispatch. The smaller railroad companies and commuter lines, in most cases, are relying on the
Class I railroads to implement PTC before investing in their own systems due to the high risk and
the cost of developing their own systems.
In the United States, precursors to full PTC capability were developed voluntarily prior to the
2008 mandate. Development of radio-based CBTC systems and coordinated wayside systems
used to locate and communicate with trains began in 1983. Although systems developed by the
Association of American Railroads and Burlington Northern Railroad achieved technical success,
both systems were functional only in fully signalized territory and were deemed not economically
viable to deploy on a nationwide scale.
In 1991, Amtrak adopted an automatic train control (ATC) system along the tracks it owns in the
Northeast Corridor. That system
, as discussed above, repeated signalization in the cab and required the train engineer
to acknowledge and enforce the speed limit given by the signals to reduce human error. That
system was later upgraded with the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, using
transponders to send signals to trains and to enforce speed restrictions and stop orders.
2236 Amtrak
began transitioning to radio-based communication in 2009 to incorporate work zone safety
measures required by RSIA08.
23
37
In 1999, CSX Transportation began development of a PTC system that uses GPS combined with
fixed infrastructure at switching points to provide exact track location information, specifically on
parallel lines. This method is particularly useful to improve safety on long stretches of
nonsignalizednon-signalized track. CSXT is now modifying this architecture to meet the full requirements of PTC.
BNSF, Union Pacific, Norfolk Southern, and Chicago
’'s Metra commuter line are planning
implementation of similar systems. Norfolk Southern
’'s system is expected to provide for
computer-aided dispatch over small segments of track.
24
38
Prior to certification and revenue service, each rail company is required to submit to FRA a PTC
Implementation Plan (PTCIP), Development Plan (PTCDP), and Safety Plan (PTCSP) and
receive approval for each plan in that order.
39 Companies can also receive
“type”"type" approvals when
using an identical PTC system that has already received approval. This process and
implementation of the plans must be completed prior to the deadline of December 31, 2015.
22
James Hoelscher and Larry Light, “Full PTC Today with Off the Shelf Technology: Amtrak’s ACSES Overlay on
Expanded ATC,” Proceedings of the 2001 AREMA Conference, Chicago, IL, 2001, http://www.arema.org/files/library/
2001_Conference_Proceedings/00022.pdf.
23
Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Overview,” press release, February 2, 2009, p. 1,
http://www.fra.dot.gov/rrs/pages/fp_1265.shtml.
24
William Vantuono, “Two new technologies ready to roll,” International Railway Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (April 2008),
pp. 26-28.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
At an NTSB forum on PTC held February 27, 2013, BNSF Railroad, Amtrak, the Alaska
Railroad, and Metrolink Commuter Railroad were identified by an FRA official as the only
railroads that were perhaps on schedule to meet the December 31, 2015, deadline.
2540 One topic of
discussion at the forum regarded the allowances FRA was making in implementing PTC because
of the deadline.
2641 The complexity of testing the numerous subsystems, spectrum availability in
urban areas, and
“"back office
”" software interoperability were some of the
current difficulties that
the railroads identified.
Cost and Benefits
FRA estimates
In 2009, the FRA estimated the total capital cost of wayside, on-board, radio, and office equipment necessary
for full PTC deployment on all affected railroads to be in excess of $10 billion. It projects annual
maintenance costs of $850 million.
27 In 201042 In 2011, fixed-capital investment by U.S. railroads was $11
.6 billion, of which $7.
89 billion went for structures and $3.
27 billion for equipment.
2843 The estimated
capital cost of meeting the PTC mandate is thus roughly
almost equal to the railroads
’' total capital
spending in a single year.
The four largest railroad companies account for almost all of the estimated 60,000 miles of Class
I track that fall under the PTC mandate. In August 2010, two railroads (CSXT and NS) estimated
costs of PTC alone to be over $1.2 billion each.
29
44
Smaller freight companies often share track with the Class I railroads. While this presents
interoperability challenges, there is opportunity to use the PTC type approvals from the larger
companies’ companies' development efforts to save cost. This is also the case with shared passenger rail in
the Northeast Corridor. Despite this advantage, the infrastructure cost alone for just two of the
five largest transit agencies operating on the corridor, Metro-North in the New York area and the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority in the Philadelphia area,
ishas been estimated at $350
million and $100 million, respectively.
30
Commuter railroads’45 As the FRA has stated (see text box), the expense of PTC could constrain commuter rail development, diverting commuters to less safe forms of transportation.
Commuter railroads' cost for installing PTC is likely to be borne primarily by state or local
governments. FRA established a railroad safety technology grant fund to support railroads
’
' development and implementation of PTC systems, with $50 million budgeted for each
FY2009FY2013.31 However, no funds have been appropriated for this program.
25
NTSB, Forum—Positive Train Control: Is It on Track?, February 27, 2013. Witness presentations and a webcast of
the forum are available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/ptc/presentations.html.
26
Described as “shortcuts” by a former FRA official, see testimony of Grady C. Cothen, Jr., NTSB, Forum—Positive
Train Control: Is It on Track?, February 27, 2013; available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/ptc/
presentations.html.
27
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-20060132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, p. 120.
28
U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Annual Capital Expenditures Survey, http://www.census.gov/econ/aces/xls/2010/
full_report.html, Table 4a.
29
CSX Transportation, CSX Corporation 2010 Annual Report, Jacksonville, FL, 2010, p. 6; Thompson Reuters, NSC Q1 2010 Norfolk Southern Corp Earnings, Conference Call Final Transcript, April 27, 2010, p. 19,
http://www.nscorp.com/nscorphtml/pdf/transcript042710.pdf.
30
Jeff Stagl, “PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate,”
Progressive Railroading, August 2010.
31
U.S. Department of Transportation, “FRA Announces $50 Million Safety Technology Grant Program,” press release,
(continued...)
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
FY2009-FY2013.46 However, no funds have been appropriated for this program.
Some shippers believe that since the majority of the investment in PTC will come directly from
the railroad companies, these costs will likely be passed to customers. They expect price increases
due to the cost of PTC implementation, especially if the rail companies are unable to realize
business benefits from the new systems. The Chlorine Institute, a trade organization representing
the chlorine industry, expects the railroad companies to raise costs disproportionately for
shipments of
poisonoustoxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials (
PIHTIH), as concern about the safety of
PIH TIH transport is perceived as a source of the PTC mandate.
32
47
Safety Benefits from PTC
-Preventable Incidents
Based on analysis of past PTC
-preventable incidents, FRA estimates $90 million in annual safety
benefits will be realized after full implementation of PTC.
3348 Safety benefits are calculated by
estimating the cost of incidents that are likely to be prevented by PTC, including fatalities and
injuries, equipment damage, track damage, off-track damage, hazardous material cleanup,
evacuations, wreck cleanup, loss of freight, and freight delay. According to a 1999 FRA estimate,
between 1987 and 1997 an annual average of 7 fatalities, 22 injuries, $20 million in property
damages, and evacuations of 150 people due to potential hazardous material release could have
been prevented by PTC.
34
49
Although many serious incidents due to error by train engineers or dispatchers could be prevented
by PTC, PTC is expected to prevent less than 2% of the approximately 2,000 railroad collisions
and derailments that occur annually. The majority of these 2,000 incidents occur in rail yards and
are generally less severe than PTC-preventable incidents.
While the costs and safety benefits are projected with some confidence, there is disagreement
regarding the potential business and social benefits of PTC. This makes a full cost-benefit
analysis of PTC-related issues difficult. Business and social benefits are expected to come from
increased railroad efficiency, reductions in logistical costs, and diversion of freight from truck to
rail. However, these benefits are predicated on the functionality of full computer-based train
control and not PTC alone. Computer-aided dispatch has the potential to increase capacity and
reduce fuel consumption. This can reduce railroad operating costs, lead to faster, less-expensive
delivery, and induce demand from truck freight. This then may lead to social benefits such as
reductions in fuel consumption and truck accidents.
FRA projects $4 billion in potential annual business benefits a decade after full PTC
implementation. However, the overlay system without CBTC capability currently planned by the
railroads is expected to offer little or no business benefit to the railroads. The social benefits of
the overlay system are likely to come largely from the anticipated reduction in incidents.35
(...continued)
April 7, 2010, http://www.fra.dot.gov/Pages/press-releases/201.shtml.
32
The Chlorine Institute, Inc, “Chlorine Institute Asks Federal Rail Administration to Reconsider Positive Train
Control Rule Due to Faulty Cost-Benefit Analysis,” press release, March 16, 2010, http://www.chlorineinstitute.org/
files/PDFs/2010-03-16%20-%20CI%20PTC%20petition.pdf.
33
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-20060132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 140-144.
34
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, Federal Railroad Administration, Implementation of Positive Train Control
Systems, Report, August 1999, https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/19990908.php.
35
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006(continued...)
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Policy Issues
Interoperability
the overlay system are likely to come largely from the anticipated reduction in incidents.50
Policy Issues
Interoperability
The freight rail transportation network has two primary components: the track and the freight
service. In some cases, the service is provided by the same company that owns the track.
However, since shippers
’' needs do not correspond to railroads
’' track ownership, freight operators
trade trackage or haulage rights and share revenue from the shipper. FRA regulations require that
railroads’ railroads' PTC systems be interoperable so that any train operating on PTC-equipped track can
communicate with the host railroad
’'s PTC system.
Prior to RSIA08, several railroad companies were developing communication-based train control
independently for their own business reasons, and were not concerned about interoperability. The
federal mandate has required changes in these plans in the interest of interoperability. UP, CSXT,
and NS have received FRA
“"type approvals
”" for Interoperable Electronic Train Management
Systems (I-ETMS) in which the PTC system itself is approved for development.
3651 This makes it
likely that the systems installed by these railroads will be highly compatible. BNSF, which has a
precursor ETMS system in place, has type approval for that system, which is to be updated to
IETMSI-ETMS when software becomes available.
Interoperability issues pertain to passenger service as well. In the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak
operates on Amtrak-owned track and track owned by regional transit authorities and vice versa.
Figure 4 illustrates the necessity for interoperable PTC systems to prevent disruption in service.
Amtrak began PTC development prior to RSIA08 and has provided the PTC standard and type
approval for transit authorities utilizing the corridor
. . The freight companies and Amtrak are now
working to ensure interoperability between their respective systems.
(...continued)
0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. A-1-A-16.
36
Letter from Jo Strang, FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, to Jeff D. Young et al.,
Union Pacific Railroad Assistant Vice President, Transportation System, August 26, 2011, FRA Type Approval (FRATA-2011-02) for the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS).
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Figure 4.Track Ownership and Rail Operations in the Northeast Corridor
Source: Government Accountability Office, GAO—06-470, Commuter Rail Issues Should Be Considered in Debate
Over Amtrak, April 2006.
Communication Spectrum
working to ensure interoperability between their respective systems.
Communication Spectrum
One aspect of interoperability involves the communications links between wayside equipment,
locomotive, and the network office. Various types of equipment owned by many different
railroads must be able to communicate on any track equipped with PTC. It would be most
efficient to utilize a single radio frequency band across the entire PTC system to minimize the
cost of radio receivers and network equipment, although a system with multiple frequencies is
possible.
The radio frequency band to be used for communication must be known prior to equipment
purchases. PTC-220 LLC, a consortium of the Union Pacific, Norfolk Southern, CSX, and BNSF
railroads, has purchased licenses to some frequencies in the 220 MHz range,
3752 and is requesting
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to reassign additional spectrum in the 220 MHz
band to the railroads for the purpose of PTC. The FCC has designated spectrum in the 220 MHz
range mainly for commercial uses and has auctioned licenses to various parties.
37
Spectrum is segmented into bands of radio frequencies and typically measured in cycles per second, or hertz.
Standard abbreviations for measuring frequencies include kHz—kilohertz or thousands of hertz; MHz—megahertz, or
millions of hertz; and GHz—gigahertz, or billions of hertz.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Furthermore, along with Amtrak and other railroads, the consortium has requested additional
217222217-222 MHz spectrum and appropriate license and rule changes, claiming 220 MHz will be
insufficient in congested areas.
3853 Although frequencies may be available in various bands, the
railroads prefer the 217-222 MHz range due to compatibility with current infrastructure and the
radio communication technology they have chosen to employ (I-ETMS).
3954 Because of uncertainty
over spectrum needs, the FCC issued a public notice seeking comments from stakeholders on
May 5, 2011, but has not instituted a formal rulemaking process regarding PTC radio spectrum
issues.
40
55
The railroads
’' requests for dedicated spectrum for PTC raise a number of policy issues. Licenses
to much of the spectrum requested by the railroads have been purchased by other entities in FCC
auctions. While the FCC is empowered to reallocate spectrum if necessary for public safety,
reassignment for PTC would effectively represent a forced transfer of licenses from some private
parties to others. In comments submitted to the FCC, some current licensees of spectrum in the
218-219 MHz range asserted that it is unfair to reallocate spectrum to which they have purchased
rights in a competitive bidding process. They also believe the railroads have identified 220 MHz
as the core spectrum for PTC without sufficient investigation into their specific radio
communication needs or possible alternatives. They contend the railroads can lease spectrum
from primary license holders without FCC action.
41
56
The railroads counter that leasing spectrum for PTC from existing license holders could raise
their costs by creating captive demand for a limited amount of spectrum. A related problem stems
from the fact that some of the railroads required to install PTC are commuter lines owned by state
or local government agencies. These agencies may have difficulty raising the funds to obtain
desirable frequencies in competitive auctions; indeed, the FCC normally assigns frequencies to
government agencies at no cost.
Avoiding Barriers to Market Entry
An unexpected issue arose with the installation of PTC antennas on American Indian tribal lands. Tribal leaders are required to approve the installation under the Historic Preservation Act because digging is required for the antennas' foundations. Tens of thousands of antennas must be approved, more than the Indian tribes are capable of reviewing if PTC is to be installed as required by the end of 2015.57 The FCC established an expedited procedure for these reviews in May 2014.58
Avoiding Barriers to Market Entry
There are several ways the PTC mandate could be used as a barrier to market entry for the
railroads. First, installing track will now be more expensive due to the need to incorporate PTC
wayside equipment, which is expected to add approximately $50,000 per mile to the $1 million to
$3 million per mile cost of installing new rail lines. On-board PTC equipment is expected to cost
around $55,000 per locomotive, which represents only a minor increase in the cost of a new $2
million locomotive but is substantial compared to the $75,000 cost of used locomotives operated
38
Association of American Railroads, Comments of Association of American Railroads, Federal Communications
Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, June 20, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021688770.
39
It should be noted that the radio communication supplier for ETMS is MeteorComm, a wholly owned subsidiary of
BNSF, and BNSF is a member of PTC-220, LLC. MeteorComm, “MeteorComm™ Powers BNSF’s Electronic Train
Management Communications,” press release, January 19, 2007, http://meteorcomm.com/downloads/
MCC_PSPApproval.pdf.
40
Federal Communications Commission, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Spectrum Needs
for the Implementation of the Positive Train Control Provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, WT
Docket No. 11-79, Washington, DC, May 5, 2011, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-838A1.pdf.
41
The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Service Licensees, Reply Comments of The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Licensees,
Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, July 11, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs//document/
view.action?id=7021691731.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
by million locomotive but is substantial compared to the $75,000 cost of used locomotives operated by some short line railroads.
4259 In addition to capital costs, operating and maintenance costs will
increase as well.
4360 This could be a barrier to both railroad expansion and startup services.
Another barrier to market entry could arise
throughfrom the need for interoperability and spectrum
compatibility. Hypothetically, if two rail networks have different PTC systems because they do
not currently share track or services, it may be cost prohibitive to implement a new service over
these two lines. Similarly, one company could upgrade or modify its PTC system, forcing further
investment by other companies using its track. Also, if the radio spectrum licenses are owned by
certain railroads or a consortium of railroads, they could dictate leasing prices to operate
necessary PTC systems on that spectrum for a new railroad or service which is not part of the
consortium. Control of spectrum and interoperability issues with PTC could be used as tools to
prevent new services on existing lines or even using an interoperable spectrum on new lines.
The possibility that PTC could impede competition may be of particular concern for short line
and regional railroads which operate on Class I track. Class I railroads have a legal obligation to
accommodate short line railroads, but in some cases may be reluctant to allow short line trains on
their networks.
4461 The president of the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
issued the following testimony to the Surface Transportation Board:
Differential pricing of certain routes or products by class I carriers ... ha[s] eliminated
marginal customers who may be a small railroad
’'s only source of business on its line,
effectively putting the small railroad out of business. Some small railroads who want to
provide service to new customers meet resistance from connecting carriers whose marketing
plans are inconsistent with the small railroad
’'s proposed business.
45
62
At this point, concerns that PTC could create barriers to railroad competition are hypothetical, as
no specific complaints are known to have been presented to FRA or to the Surface Transportation
Board, which oversees certain rail competition issues.
2015 Implementation Deadline
It remains uncertain whether all affected railroads will be able to comply with the December 31,
2015, deadline for implementing PTC. Many railroads continue to argue that the large capital
expenditures required over a small period will divert funding from other uses, including
investment in improving the safety of highway-rail grade crossings, where most train-related
incidents and fatalities occur.46
42
Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR),” 77 Federal Register 28285,
May 14, 2012.
43
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-20060132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 115-116.
44
CRS Report RL34117, Railroad Access and Competition Issues, by John Frittelli.
45
Richard F. Timmons, STB Ex Parte No. 677: Common Carrier Obligation Hearing, American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association, Testimony of Richard F. Timmons, Washington, DC, April 25, 2008, p. 2.
46
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety - Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the
Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 25.
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
incidents and fatalities occur.63
The effect of the deadline on installation of more advanced systems is disputed. As discussed
earlier, PTC and CBTC have different capabilities, but they share similar infrastructure and
communication architectures. While CBTC would require additional cost, it might be
costeffectivecost-effective to develop both functionalities simultaneously. Railroads also argue the deadline for
PTC has caused railroads to focus on that system rather than on the potential business advantages
of a broader CBTC system.
4764 Also, some commuter lines have stated interest in extending PTC
capability through wireless technology capable of transmitting more data, but investment in these
more complex emerging technologies may be deferred due to the approaching deadline.
48
65
On the other hand, the PTC mandate institutes a common infrastructure and communication
architecture platform that could be used for future CBTC and additional safety feature integration
in a coordinated way across disparate stakeholders. Without the PTC mandate it is likely that
PTC/CBTC would not have been developed with such a coordinated effort, due to the multitude
of stakeholders. FRA has concluded that incremental steps are the preferred way to develop a
more complex train control system, such as CBTC.
49
66
Options for Congress
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st21st Century Act (MAP-21; S. 1813) and the American
Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act (H.R. 7) from the
112th112th Congress both included provisions
which amended RSIA08 with respect to PTC. The provisions in these bills were ultimately
excluded from the final version of the transportation bill (H.R. 4348), but both provide insight
into possible strategies to address some of the policy issues with PTC.
Table 1. PTC Provisions in Unenacted Senate and House Bills in
112th Congress
Bill
Deadline
Extension
Safety
Interoperability
Communication
Spectrum
Funding
Barrier to
Entry
HouseReported
H.R. 7
12/31/2020
Full PTC or
equivalent
alternative
No change
No change
No change
No change
SenatePassed
S. 1813
At FRA
discretion
for each
railroad in
one-year
increments,
not beyond
12/31/2018
Full PTC
No change
FCC/DOT joint
report on
spectrum needs
and availability for
PTC required
Eligible for
Railroad
Rehabilitation
and
Improvement
(RRIF)
financing
FCC/DOT
joint report on
spectrum
needs and
availability for
PTC required
Source: 112th Congress
Bill
|
Deadline Extension
|
Safety
|
Interoperability
|
Communication Spectrum
|
Funding
|
Barrier to Entry
|
House-Reported H.R. 7
12/31/2020
|
Full PTC or equivalent alternative
|
No change
|
No change
|
No change
|
No change
|
Senate-Passed S. 1813
At FRA discretion for each railroad in one-year increments, not beyond 12/31/2018
|
Full PTC
|
No change
|
FCC/DOT joint report on spectrum needs and availability for PTC required
|
Eligible for Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement (RRIF) financing
|
FCC/DOT joint report on spectrum needs and availability for PTC required
|
Source: CRS, based on texts of S. 1813 and
H.R. 7.
In the aftermath of the Metro-North derailment, Representative Sean Maloney introduced H.R. 3634, 113th Congress, which would have made PTC an eligible use of RRIF loans and extend and increase the authorization of federal grants for railroad safety technology. S. 1462, 113th Congress, introduced by Senator Thune in August 2013, would have extended the deadline for implementing PTC from December 31, 2015, to December 31, 2020, and authorized further extension of the deadline on a case-by-case basis for individual railroads under certain circumstances.
H.R. 7.
47
Ibid.
Jeff Stagl, “PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate,”
Progressive Railroading, August 2010.
49
Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research
Results, April 2009, p. 4.
48
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Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Congress has already shown its concern about implementation risk, and the enacted version of
MAP-21 required DOT to report on PTC implementation to Congress by December 31, 2012.
The Government Accountability Office recommended that this report include
“"an analysis of (1)
the likelihood that railroads will meet the PTC implementation deadline; (2) the risks to
successful implementation of PTC; and (3) actions Congress, railroads, or other stakeholders can
take to mitigate risks to successful PTC implementation.
”50"67 In August 2012, DOT reported that
railroads would likely miss the deadline and listed criteria for extending the deadline on a
casebycase-by-case basis, and suggested the possibility of granting provisional certification, and allowing for
alternative safety technology on line segments with lower safety risks.
51
68
The most obvious way to mitigate implementation risk would be to extend the 2015 deadline,
giving railroads and FRA additional time to make sure PTC will work as intended
. S. 1813 and
H.R. 7 both would have extended the deadline, albeit in different ways. However, extending the
deadline would create a different sort of risk by leaving railroads exposed to PTC-preventable
incidents for a longer period of time.
The NTSB's 2015 "Most Wanted List" specifies 2015 as a date certain for implementing PTC.69
One of the major concerns of railroad companies is the cost of PTC. This is especially true for
short line railroads and local commuter services reliant on local and state government funds.
RSIA08 authorizes federal grants to railroads to support PTC, but no funds have been
appropriated for this purpose. Congress could address this issue by specifically making PTC
projects eligible for funding under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Funding
Program, as provided in S. 1813, or by appropriating other funding to FRA.
Congress may wish to consider issues related to spectrum allocation for PTC. S. 1813 called for a
joint FCC/DOT investigation of spectrum issues, but no such directive has been enacted. While
Program or by appropriating other funding to the FRA.
Issues related to spectrum allocation for PTC remain unresolved. While the FCC has solicited comments about the use of spectrum for PTC, it has not instituted a formal
proceeding and is not required by law to do so. Congress could establish deadlines or direct FCC
actions on the subject. Alternatively, by not acting, Congress could choose to leave the matter
entirely to the FCC
’'s discretion.
Although many more rail-related fatalities occur at highway-rail crossings than from train
collisions, these are not specifically addressed in the PTC mandate of RSIA08. Congress could
address this by extending the definition of PTC to require coverage of highway-rail crossings.
This can be achieved technically within the PTC framework by installing sensors at crossings that
would engage the brakes of an oncoming train if a crossing gate
wereis not working properly or if a
vehicle is detected on the tracks.
5270 While this may require further investment on the part of the
railroads and may not be implementable by the current deadline, it may offer more significant
gains in terms of safety than train collision prevention alone.
50
In addition to routes serving passengers and moving TIH products, Congress authorized PTC installation on other tracks at FRA's discretion. In recent years, shipments of ethanol and crude oil have become a booming business for the railroads. These commodities are often hauled in unit trains of 70 to 120 tank cars, the first time hazardous materials have been hauled in unit trains. Several derailments of these trains have caused large fires, deaths (47 in one instance in Canada), injuries, and evacuation of nearby residents. While these derailments may not have been PTC-preventable, ethanol and crude oil represent a large and rapidly growing business of hazardous materials by rail.71
The commuter rail incidents at Chatsworth, CA, and the Bronx, NY, have revealed significant disparities among signal system capabilities deployed by commuter operators. These two incidents have intensified calls for PTC installation, even though neither railroad had fully deployed long-standing signal technology that could also reduce the risk of collisions and derailment. Congress may wish to gain a better understanding of the various available signal technologies and the obstacles to their use.
Acknowledgments
Former CRS Research Associate Jeffrey C. Peters made significant contributions to this report.
Footnotes
1.
|
U.S. Department of Transportation, "National Transportation Statistics," http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_01.html.
|
2.
|
See CRS Report R42512, Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by [author name scrubbed].
|
3.
|
Cambridge Systematics, National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, Final Report, September 2007, p. 25, http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Files/natl_freight_capacity_study.ashx.
|
4.
|
Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, Introduction to North American Railway Signaling (Omaha: Simmons-Boardman, 2008), p. vii.
|
5.
|
Codified today at 49 C.F.R. 236.
|
6.
|
69 I.C.C. 258 (Order No. 13413), "In the Matter of Automatic Train-Control Devices," decided June 13, 1922.
|
7.
|
268 I.C.C. 547 (Order No. 29543), "Appliances, Methods, and Systems Intended to Promote Safety of Railroad Operation," decided June 17, 1947; 12 Federal Register 4683, July 15, 1947.
|
8.
|
268 I.C.C. 552.
|
9.
|
268 I.C.C. 559.
|
10.
|
Railroad Accident Report, Head-on Collision between Penn Central Trains N-48 and N-49 at Darien, CT, August 20, 1969 (NTSB/RAR-70/03).
|
11.
|
NTSB Recommendation R-70-20.
|
12.
|
Office of Technology Assessment, Automatic Train Control in Rail Rapid Transit, May 1976.
|
13.
|
NPRM, 48 Federal Register 11882, March 21, 1983; Final rule, 49 Federal Register 3374, January 26, 1984.
|
14.
|
National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Public Affairs, "NTSB unveils new 'Most Wanted List,'" press release, June 23, 2011, p. 1, http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/110623.html.
|
15.
|
NTSB, Safety Recommendation R-97-9 through -21, August 28, 1997; see also Safety Recommendation R-97-013.
|
16.
|
Safety Recommendation History, NTSB Safety Recommendation R-97-013.
|
17.
|
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report on the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, to accompany H.J.Res. 2, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, H.Rept. 108-10 (Washington: GPO, 2003), pp. 1286-1287.
|
18.
|
Letter from Betty Monro, Federal Railroad Administration Acting Administrator, to Senator Robert Byrd, August 17, 2004, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/ptc_ben_cost_report.pdf.
|
19.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Railroad Safety Statistics, 2010 Annual Report (latest available), April 4, 2012, pp. 4-20.
|
20.
|
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
|
21.
|
"Train Crash's Roots Run Deep; Decades-old Decisions by Metrolink Gambled on Passenger Safety, According to Experts and Documents," Los Angeles Times, December 12, 2008.
|
22.
|
National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California, RAR 10/01, September 12, 2008.
|
23.
|
P.L. 110-432, §104.
|
24.
|
S. 301, 112th Congress.
|
25.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, "Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR)," 76 Federal Register 52918, August 24, 2011. See also 78 Federal Register 5767, January 28, 2013, and 79 Federal Register 49693, August 22, 2014.
|
26.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, "Positive Train Control Systems," 75 Federal Register 2704, January 15, 2010.
|
27.
|
Railroad Reinvestment and Improvement Funding (RRIF) provides direct loans and loan guarantees up to a total of $35 billion to improve or develop new rail equipment and facilities, and refinance outstanding debt.
|
28.
|
H.R. 7, §8401, p. 805.
|
29.
|
"Spuyten Duyvil: Why? A Safety Expert Weighs In," Railway Age, December 5, 2013.
|
30.
|
FRA, Emergency Order 29, Notice No. 1, December 6, 2013.
|
31.
|
49 C.F.R. §236.
|
32.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research Results, April 2009, p. 2.
|
33.
|
Jeff D. Young, Lisa C. Wilson, and Denise E. Lyle, Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) Positive Train Control Development Plan (PTCDP), Union Pacific Railroad, Norfolk Southern Railway, and CSX Transportation, Inc., FRA-2010-0060-0002, June 1, 2011.
|
34.
|
There are many ways of designing the system architecture to support PTC communication. In the context of railroad operations with dispatchers, a system architecture with central control is the most plausible design.
|
35.
|
David Barney, David Haley, and George Nikandros, "Calculating Train Braking Distance," This paper appeared at the 6th Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS '01), Brisbane, 2001, pp. 23-29, http://129.96.12.107/confpapers/CRPITV3Barney.pdf.
|
36.
|
James Hoelscher and Larry Light, "Full PTC Today with Off the Shelf Technology: Amtrak's ACSES Overlay on Expanded ATC," Proceedings of the 2001 AREMA Conference, Chicago, IL, 2001, http://www.arema.org/files/library/2001_Conference_Proceedings/00022.pdf.
|
37.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, "Positive Train Control Overview," press release, February 2, 2009, p. 1, http://www.fra.dot.gov/rrs/pages/fp_1265.shtml.
|
38.
|
William Vantuono, "Two new technologies ready to roll," International Railway Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (April 2008), pp. 26-28.
|
39.
|
For an example, see 79 Federal Register 62705, October 20, 2014.
|
40.
|
NTSB, Forum—Positive Train Control: Is It on Track?, February 27, 2013. Witness presentations and a webcast of the forum are available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/ptc/presentations.html.
|
41.
|
Described as "shortcuts" by a former FRA official, see testimony of Grady C. Cothen, Jr., NTSB, Forum—Positive Train Control: Is It on Track?, February 27, 2013; available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/ptc/presentations.html.
|
42.
|
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, p. 120.
|
43.
|
Association of American Railroads, Railroad Facts, 2012 edition (latest available), p. 44.
|
44.
|
CSX Transportation, CSX Corporation 2010 Annual Report, Jacksonville, FL, 2010, p. 6; Thompson Reuters, NSC - Q1 2010 Norfolk Southern Corp Earnings, Conference Call Final Transcript, April 27, 2010, p. 19, http://www.nscorp.com/nscorphtml/pdf/transcript042710.pdf.
|
45.
|
Jeff Stagl, "PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate," Progressive Railroading, August 2010.
|
46.
|
U.S. Department of Transportation, "FRA Announces $50 Million Safety Technology Grant Program," press release, April 7, 2010, http://www.fra.dot.gov/Pages/press-releases/201.shtml.
|
47.
|
The Chlorine Institute, Inc., "Chlorine Institute Asks Federal Rail Administration to Reconsider Positive Train Control Rule Due to Faulty Cost-Benefit Analysis," press release, March 16, 2010, http://www.chlorineinstitute.org/files/PDFs/2010-03-16%20-%20CI%20PTC%20petition.pdf.
|
48.
|
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 140-144.
|
49.
|
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, Federal Railroad Administration, Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems, Report, August 1999, https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/19990908.php.
|
50.
|
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. A-1-A-16.
|
51.
|
Letter from Jo Strang, FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, to Jeff D. Young et al., Union Pacific Railroad Assistant Vice President, Transportation System, August 26, 2011, FRA Type Approval (FRA-TA-2011-02) for the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS).
|
52.
|
Spectrum is segmented into bands of radio frequencies and typically measured in cycles per second, or hertz. Standard abbreviations for measuring frequencies include kHz—kilohertz or thousands of hertz; MHz—megahertz, or millions of hertz; and GHz—gigahertz, or billions of hertz.
|
53.
|
Association of American Railroads, Comments of Association of American Railroads, Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, June 20, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021688770.
|
54.
|
It should be noted that the radio communication supplier for ETMS is MeteorComm, a wholly owned subsidiary of BNSF, and BNSF is a member of PTC-220, LLC. MeteorComm, "MeteorComm™ Powers BNSF's Electronic Train Management Communications," press release, January 19, 2007, http://meteorcomm.com/downloads/MCC_PSPApproval.pdf.
|
55.
|
Federal Communications Commission, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Spectrum Needs for the Implementation of the Positive Train Control Provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, WT Docket No. 11-79, Washington, DC, May 5, 2011, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-838A1.pdf.
|
56.
|
The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Service Licensees, Reply Comments of The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Licensees, Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, July 11, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs//document/view.action?id=7021691731.
|
57.
|
See 78 Federal Register 65308, October 31, 2013.
|
58.
|
FCC, WT Docket No. 13-240, May 19, 2014.
|
59.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, "Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR)," 77 Federal Register 28285, May 14, 2012.
|
60.
|
Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 115-116.
|
61.
|
CRS Report RL34117, Railroad Access and Competition Issues, by [author name scrubbed].
|
62.
|
Richard F. Timmons, STB Ex Parte No. 677: Common Carrier Obligation Hearing, American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Testimony of Richard F. Timmons, Washington, DC, April 25, 2008, p. 2.
|
63.
|
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety - Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the
Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology
, GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 47.
51
FRA, , GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 25.
64.
|
Ibid.
|
65.
|
Jeff Stagl, "PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate," Progressive Railroading, August 2010.
|
66.
|
Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research Results, April 2009, p. 4.
|
67.
|
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety - Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 47.
|
68.
|
FRA, Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts, August 2012, http://www.fra.dot.gov/
downloads/08.2012_FRA_Report_to%20Congress_on_Positive_Train_Control.pdf
.
52
.
69.
|
http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Documents/MWL_2015_Factsheet_04.pdf.
|
70.
|
Fred Coleman III, Ronald W. Eck, and Eugene R. Russell,
“"Railroad-Highway Grade Crossings,
”" TRB Conference
Publication, Washington, DC, January 2000.
Congressional Research Service
16
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues
Author Contact Information
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation Policy
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033
Acknowledgments
This report was originally authored by Jeffrey C. Peters, Research Associate, in the summer of 2012.
Congressional Research Service
17
Publication, Washington, DC, January 2000.
71.
|
CRS Report R43390, U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
|