Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 1, 2013January 27, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33546
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian
relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its
cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and otherwith U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations, including the promotion of ArabIsraeli peace.
Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the
Administration on future aid
to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the
Jordanian regime (particularly
in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other
countries in the region), the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process
Jordan’s involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the civil war in
neighboring Syria, and
U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small
size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and
friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel,
Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful
neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries.
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2012FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.183 billion. Levels
of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during
periods offeaturing political differences or worldwide curbs on aid fundingreductions of aid worldwide. On September 22, 2008, the
the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to
provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. The
President’s FY2013 request includes $360 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $300
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $3.7 million in International Military
Education and Training (IMET).
During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama pledged to work with Congress to
deliver an additional $200 million in direct budget support to Jordan to help it cope with the
influx of Syrian refugees. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2013 included a provision authorizing U.S. loan guarantees for Jordan. Section 1706 (j) also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the cost of sovereign loan guarantees, which are
expected to enable Jordan to raise several hundred million dollars on the international bond
market. Recent U.S. humanitarian aid for Syria ($385 million total) includes funds to be spent
inside Jordan on Syrian refugees. To date, $57 million in Syrian humanitarian aid has been spent
in Jordan, including $25 million from a recent U.S. pledge of $155 million at a Kuwait Donors’
Conference. Funds spent in Jordan are for supplies and services for refugee camps there. In
addition, USAID funding is helping northern Jordanian communities address water shortages as a
result of the influx of Syrian refugees by upgrading and repairing water delivery networks and
encouraging conservation,
ending with FY2014. In the year ahead, both parties may try to reach a new five-year aid deal.
In recent months, Congress has taken additional steps to support Jordan. On August 2, 2013, the
House of Representatives passed H.Res. 222, which expressed lawmakers’ “firm commitment to
support the Government of Jordan as it faces regional challenges and works toward a more
peaceful and stable Middle East.” In order to bolster Jordan’s border security, Congress included
Section 1207 in H.R. 3304, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. This section
authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide up
to $150 million on a reimbursable basis to Jordan for security along its border with Syria.
On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2014 which Congress passed days earlier. The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic
aid and $300 million in military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under
title VIII designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not less than
$340 million above the levels included in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States and Jordan shall be made available for the extraordinary costs related to instability in the
region, including for security requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to
authorize foreign aid to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an
enterprise fund. Finally, Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee Assistance
funding (MRA) to help countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.
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Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Country BackgroundThe Syrian Civil War and its Effects on Jordan ............................................................................... 2
The Humanitarian Crisis ......................................... 2
Domestic Politics and the Economy .............................................................. 2
U.S.-Jordanian Military Cooperation Relating to the Syrian Civil War .............................. 3
The Hashemite Royal FamilyFY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) ............................................... 4
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process ............................................... 4
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary ....................................... 4
Overview ............ 4
Foreign Relations....................................................................................................................... 54
Jordan and the Syrian Civil WarStatus of Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations ........................................... 5
Recent Reports of Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation ............................................... 5
Jordan’s Relationship with Israel ....................... 6
Country Background ................................................................. 7
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation ....................................................... 8
Domestic Politics and the Economy ................................. 9
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ......................................................... 8
The Hashemite Royal Family ...................................... 9
The Five-Year Aid Deal........................................................ 9
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary ............................................... 9
Economic Assistance .. 10
The Economy.................................................................................................................... 10
Recent U.S. Assistance ....... 11
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ...................................................................................................... 10
Food Aid 13
The Five-Year Aid Deal..................................................................................................... 13
Economic Assistance ............................ 11
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) ............................................................................. 11
Military Assistance 13
Food Aid ................................................................................................................... 12
Trade ......... 14
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) ............................................................................ 14
Military Assistance ............................................................. 12
Free Trade Agreement ................................................. 14
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan ...................................................... 12
Qualifying Industrial Zones .................................. 15
U.S.-Jordanian Trade ............................................................ 13
Military Cooperation ......................................................... 16
Free Trade Agreement ...................................................... 13
Military Sales ................................................. 16
Qualifying Industrial Zones ................................................................... 13
Joint Exercises and Training ........................... 16
Military Cooperation .................................................................. 14
Other Activities ............................................. 17
Joint Exercises and Training ............................................................................. 14
Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan................................ 17
Figures
Figure 1. Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan .............................................................................. 15
Figures2
Figure 12. Jordan and Its Neighbors .................................................................................................. 3
Tables
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan8
Figure 3. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing .......................................................................... 14.... 12
Tables
Table 1. Possible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress ..................................... 17
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis .................................................... 1618
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 1719
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview
Despite the growing instability in neighboring states Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, Jordan has not
experienced mass unrest and its government remains arguably the mostconflict on its borders, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan appears to remain internally
stable and a reliable partner for the
United States in the Arab world. Though youth-led protests have become a constant in downtown
Amman and, more surprisingly, in tribal areas that have historically provided the kingdom’s base
of support, opposition to the monarchy has been restrained overall, perhaps owing to fear of the
type of instability on display in other Arab countries.
Though King Abdullah II has maintained his image in the international community as a
modernizer and tends to be more open to reform than most Jordanian politicians, his rhetoric is
often not matched by concrete actions. Very few substantive political reforms, serious anticorruption measures, or economic restructuring steps have taken place under his watch.
Overall, popular economic grievances have spurred the most vociferous protests in Jordan.
Jordan’s lack of domestic energy and water resources places a constant strain on the government
budget, with fuel imports and subsidies driving deficit spending and borrowing in recent years.
When the government announced a reduction in fuel subsidies in November 2012 in line with
commitments made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), widespread street unrest ensued.
The Jordanian government is trying to balance the need to stave off unrest by keeping the cost of
living lower for many poorer Jordanians with financing the growing budget deficit that comes as
a result of social spending. Since it cannot do this alone, the government has turned to the IMF
($2.38 billion loan), the United States ($660 million a year in bilateral aid), Europe, and the Gulf
States ($5 billion multi-year aid package) to keep it afloat until the overall political and economic
situation improves. The IMF’s outlook for Jordan is somewhat positive, noting that “Looking into
2013, the outlook is good. Real GDP growth is expected to accelerate to above three percent
reflecting an increase in government capital spending, higher domestic consumption, and a
recovery in exports.”1
Despite the prospect of somewhat easier economic times ahead, many observers argue that the
kingdom clearly needs to take steps sooner rather than later to address the needs of its youth, who
seek more gainful employment, justice, and broader political participation. Providing better
economic opportunities for younger Jordanians is a major challenge outside of Amman. Largescale agriculture is not sustainable, so officials are left to provide young workers with low-wage,
unproductive civil service jobs. Attempts to boost the information technology sector have been
modestly successful in the capital, but commentators maintain that if Jordan is to address the
demands of tribal youth protestors, economic growth must be more widely distributed.
1
“IMF Mission Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Completion of the First Review Under the Stand-By
Arrangement with Jordan,” International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 13/70, March 11, 2013.
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Breaking Taboos: Public Criticism of the Royal Family
Since the so-called Arab Spring began over two years ago, emboldened protestors have more openly criticized the
Hashemite royal family directly. Though most protestors do not call for regime change, observers have chronicled a
certain loss of trust in the monarchy among some segments of the population. Public criticism of King Abdullah II,
Queen Rania, and even the institution of the monarchy has been persistent and has come from members of the
kingdom’s foundational support base—the tribal/military elite with roots around the East Bank of the Jordan River.
Some tribal elites have directly accused Queen Rania—who is of Palestinian origin—of enriching her family and
interfering in politics by promoting Palestinian allies. Tribal youth protestors have chanted denunciations of the royal
family, referring to the king and his coterie as “Ali Baba the Second and his 40 thieves.” Walid al Kurdi, the husband of
King Abdullah II’s aunt, Princess Basma, has fled Jordan to London after prosecutors launched a corruption case
against him, alleging that he illegally profited millions of dollars from the privatization of the Jordan Phosphate Mines
Company (JPMC), King Abdullah II acknowledged Jordanians’ frustration, probably at least partly in order to deflect
public antipathy. He remarked that “Members of my family don’t get it. They’re not involved day-to-day. The further
away you’re removed from this chair, the more of a prince or a princess you are. That happens in all royal families, I
think. The further you are from this chair, the more you believe in absolute monarchy. That’s the best way of
describing it. And that just doesn’t work.”2
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s
unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States
and the Persian Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played
an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein.
2
“The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013.
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Figure 1. Jordan and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS Graphics.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which
subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West
Bank.3 The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan,
remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of
support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55%
to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their
exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.4
3
Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
4
Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004 (the next
census may take place in 2014), and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time,
intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions
do persist.
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The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
King Abdullah II (age 51) has ruled the
country since 1999, when he succeeded to the
throne upon the death of his father, the late
King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated
largely in Britain and the United States, King
Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military
career, ultimately serving as commander of
Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the
rank of Major General. The king’s 18-year-old
son Prince Hussein is the designated crown
prince.5
Jordan in Brief
Population:
6,482,081 (July 2013 est.)
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
slightly smaller than Indiana)
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
Armenians 1%
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
small Muslim sects 2%
Literacy:
92.6% (male 95%, female 89.2%)
GDP:
Per Capita $6,000 (2012 est.),
country comparison to the
world: 144
Foreign
Exchange
Reserves:
Youth
Unemployment
(ages 15-24):
$10.7 billion (est. 2012)
27%, country comparison to the
world: 21
The king appoints a prime minister to head the
government and the Council of Ministers
External Debt:
$8.34 billion (December 2012
(cabinet).6 Typically, Jordanian governments
est.)
last no more than 15 months before they are
Sources: CIA World Factbook
dissolved by royal decree. This is done in
order to bolster the king’s reform credentials
and to dispense patronage to various elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander
of the armed forces.
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary
The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952 and last amended in 2011) empowers the king
with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and
may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or
accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution also
enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for
two years.7 The king also can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that
allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has
been dissolved.8 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary
5
In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his then 15-year-old son, Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah, as crown prince. The
position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
6
In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister.
Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to
reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election
leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime
minister would be chosen by the largest block in parliament.
7
The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
8
New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
(continued...)
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scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article
195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lese-majeste) with
criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action
Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
January 2013 Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections on January 23 produced another overwhelmingly pro-palace parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front party (IAF) boycotted the vote in protest of the lack of seats allocated for the
party list vote system (27 out of 150 total seats). The IAF sought to delegitimize the election through its boycott
and tarnish the palace’s image in the eyes of Western governments. Turnout figures for the election are somewhat
disputed. The government claims that 56.6% of registered voters participated, while others assert that the turnout
calculation should be based on the total number of eligible voters (both registered and unregistered), which, if taken
into account, would have equated to an estimated 40% turnout. King Abdullah II has already called for parliament to
amend the election law, which is widely considered to favor rural, traditionally pro-monarchy Bedouin
constituencies. For example, Amman is allotted 25 seats for 2.4 million residents, while rural Tafileh has four seats
for 88,000 residents. In its preliminary assessment of the election, the National Democratic Institute concluded that
“systemic distortions remain. The unequal size of districts and an electoral system that amplifies family, tribal and
national cleavages limit the development of a truly national legislative body and challenge King Abdullah’s stated aim
of encouraging full parliamentary government.” Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry praised the electoral
process, saying that “The turnout is higher than any time previously, which shows a full and robust participation by
the Jordanian people in the election process.”
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are the military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketing, and “security offenses.”
Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palaceappointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.
Foreign Relations
Jordan and the Syrian Civil War
Although fighting in Syria has not yet posed an existential threat to the monarchy, Syrian
humanitarian suffering and concomitant refugee flows into Jordan are placing tremendous strains
on the government. As of late March 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimates that there are 366,212 registered (and waiting to be registered) Syrian refugees in
Jordan. The government of Jordan estimates that there are 420,000 Syrians in the country. An
(...continued)
temporary laws.
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estimated 2,500 to 4,000 refugees are being registered each day. The government of Jordan
estimates that another 500-700 Syrians cross the border illegally on a daily basis. In testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, said that “We should note that we are concerned by reports
that some Palestinian and Iraqi refugees have been turned around at the border and we have asked
the Government of Jordan to let them cross.”9
Za’atri refugee camp, which is in northern Jordan east of the town of Mafraq, opened in July
2012. By some estimates, the camp is now the fourth largest urban area in Jordan with a
population near 80,000.10 Some residents of the camp have demonstrated against poor living
conditions and occasionally have violently lashed out at aid workers stationed there. Jordanian
police have used tear gas in some cases to restore order, and lack of sufficient community
policing remains a concern inside Za’atri camp. Recently, the kingdom announced it would
deploy its desert patrol force to establish and seal a security cordon around the camp.
From a security standpoint, the fighting in Syria poses a number of risks for Jordan. Border
guards have exchanged fire with both Syrian government forces and radical groups. Numerous
reports indicate that Jordanians with Salafi-Jihadi beliefs are crossing into Syria to join extremist
rebel factions.11 In October 2012, Corporal Mohamad Abdulla Manaseer Abbadi became the first
recorded Jordanian casualty of the Syrian civil war when he was killed by militants trying to cross
into Syria. Fear of terrorist “blowback” into Jordan from Syria is a concern among security
authorities. Nearly a decade ago, Jordanian radicals who fought coalition forces in Iraq turned
their focus to conducting attacks inside Jordan, such as the November 9, 2005, hotel bombings in
Amman, which killed 60 people. In October 2012, the government arrested 11 Jordanians found
with explosives from Syria that they reportedly intended to use against various targets, including
the U.S. Embassy in Amman.
Just as the violence in Syria is affecting Jordan, the Jordanian government also may be indirectly
aiding certain parties to the conflict. Several European press reports allege that Jordan is serving
as a conduit for weapons purchased by the Gulf countries from Croatia to rebel factions that are
loosely associated with the Free Syrian Army/Supreme Military Council.12 The government of
Jordan denies any covert involvement either in the supplying of armaments or the training of
rebel forces. Some media reports suggest, however, that rebel fighters are receiving training
(possibly including for the potential securing of Syrian chemical weapons facilities) at Jordanian
military installations with supervision from American instructors.13 One article suggests that
Syrian rebels receiving training in Jordan hail from Sunnis and tribal Bedouins who formerly
served as members of the Syrian army and are not from the Free Syrian Army.14 In 2012, the New
York Times reported that the United States military sent a task force of “planners and other
9
Testimony, Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Committee on
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, United States Senate,
Washington, DC, March 19, 2013.
10
According to the New York Times, the number of tents has grown from 2,400 in September 2012 to 11,966 by
January 2013. See, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/01/27/world/middleeast/growth-of-the-zaatari-refugeecamp.html
11
Open Source Center, “Jordan: Salafi Jihadist Killed in Syria; Number of Killed Salafis Rises to 30,”
GMP20130307625002 Amman Net (in Arabic), March 7, 2013.
12
“New Route for Civil War Arms,” The Times (UK), February 27, 2013.
13
“US and Allies are Training Rebels in Fight against Assad,” The Times (UK), March 1, 2013.
14
“Officials: U.S. Training Syrian Forces in Jordan,” Associated Press, March 25, 2013.
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specialists” to Jordan.15 Israel may also be assisting Jordan in containing spillover from the Syria
conflict. One report suggests that Israeli drones are monitoring the Jordan-Syria border on
Jordan’s behalf.16
Jordan’s Relationship with Israel
Finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the utmost priority of the
Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of
military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999)
ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s
conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national
movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and Jordan’s support for Saddam
Hussein in the first Gulf War, which isolated it from the West.17 Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and
Israel signed a peace treaty,18 and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official
relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international
financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the continuation of conflict continues to be a major obstacle to Jordan’s
development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than
half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the
state of Israel. There are an estimated 1.9 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees
in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained
their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli
occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.19 Furthermore, for King
Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and rely politically
on the support of East Bank tribal families, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a
matter of political survival since the government cannot afford to ignore an issue of critical
importance to a majority of its citizens. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently
reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the
“Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the political status quo in Jordan.
Like his father before him, King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that “Jordan is Jordan and
Palestine is Palestine.”
15
“U.S. Military Sent to Jordan on Syria Crisis,” New York Times, October 10, 2012.
“Israel Asked Jordan for Approval to Bomb Syrian WMD Sites,” The Atlantic, December 3, 2012.
17
In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan. See Section 502 of P.L. 10227, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and Pensions, and Urgent Needs
for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
18
Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors;
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
19
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan. UNRWA has 7,000 staff in Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates
172 schools in Jordan (providing education through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government).
According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees
live outside of UNRWA camps.
16
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The King’s Statements on Israel and Peace Process
For over a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and Congress
to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. For the past
two years, amid a stalled peace process and now regional political upheaval, King Abdullah II has
reiterated his support for his country’s peaceful relationship with Israel while chiding the Israeli
government for not only failing to restart negotiations but also for obstructing the peace process
by continuing to build settlements. He has called both publicly and privately for the United States
to pressure Israel into returning to the negotiating table. The king has used the Western and U.S.
media as a platform not only to advocate for peace but to warn of the dire regional consequences
if war breaks out. He also has repeatedly cautioned that the lack of a resolution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict undermines U.S. credibility in the Arab world and only increases Israel’s
isolation. Recent statements include
•
During President Obama’s visit to Jordan in March 2013, King Abdullah II stated
at a joint press conference that “Obviously, I reiterate Jordan’s commitment to
the peace process and the crucial importance of U.S. leadership in resuming the
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations based on the two-state solution. There is simply
no other formula, no other alternative. The two-state solution is the only way to
go. And if you compare that also with the radicalization of Syria, together with
the impasse in the peace process, this is going to be a serious threat to an already
volatile region. I believe there is a window of opportunity to make a serious push
for resuming negotiations on the final status issues. But the window, I believe, is
fast closing—primarily due to increasing settlement activities. So there is no time
to wait.”
•
In an April 2012 speech before the European Parliament, the king remarked that
“We cannot afford one more generation in waiting for a Palestinian state.... The
Arab Spring is rooted in a profound call for human respect. No affront is felt
more deeply than the Israeli occupation.... The longer Palestinian suffering
endures, the longer settlement-building continues, the greater the frustrations,
dangers and unknowns.”20
•
In September 2011, the king remarked that “Everything we've seen on the ground
has been completely the opposite.... [There’s] increasing frustration, because
they're [Israeli officials] sticking their heads in the sand and pretending there isn't
a problem.”21
•
In May 2011, the king stated that “It’s always easy to find an excuse why not to
do the right thing.... And if we continue along those lines, then we will never
solve this problem. So we need leaders with courage to take the tough decisions
and solve this once and for all.”22
•
In April 2010, the king said that “I met Benjamin Netanyahu ... this time last
year. I was extremely optimistic by the vision he had for peace between the
Israelis and the Palestinians and the Israelis and the Arabs.... However, I have to
say, that over the past 12 months, everything I've seen on the ground has made
20
“'No time to wait’ for peace deal, says Jordan’s king,” Agence France Presse, April 18, 2012.
“Jordan’s King Says Israel Blocks Peace,” Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2011.
22
“King Abdullah II warns of fresh Mideast conflict,” Agence France Presse, May 22, 2011.
21
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me extremely skeptical.... And, I believe I'm one of the more optimistic people
you'll find in this part of the world.”23
•
In May 2009, the king said that “If we delay our peace negotiations, then there is
going to be another conflict between Arabs or Muslims and Israel in the next 1218 months.... Just because there is a right-wing [Israeli] government in Israel
does not mean that we should chuck in the towel.”24
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
With instability spreading throughout the Arab world, the Kingdom of Jordan may be the most
dependable Arab partner for pursuing U.S. interests in the region. During President Obama’s
recent trip to Jordan in March 2013, he remarked:
The reason I'm here is simple. Jordan is an invaluable ally. It is a great friend. We've been
working together since the early years of the Kingdom under His Majesty’s greatgrandfather, King Adbullah I, who gave his life in the name of peace. Today, our partnership
in development, education, health, science, technology, improve the lives of our peoples. Our
close security cooperation helps keep your citizens and ours safe from terrorism. Your
military and police help train other security forces from the Palestinian Authority to
Yemen.25
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2012 amounted to approximately $13.10 billion.
The Five-Year Aid Deal
On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the
United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a
five-year period (FY2010-FY2014). Under the terms of their non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future
congressional appropriation and availability of funds, to providing $360 million per year in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).26 According to the Jordanian government, the agreement “reaffirms the strategic
partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Coming at a time when the overall
budget for foreign aid was constrained by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deal was a
testament to strong U.S.-Jordanian relations.
23
“Jordan’s king issues rebuke to Israel,” Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2010.
“King Abdullah warns of Mideast war if no deal,” Agence France Presse, May 11, 2009.
25
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and His Majesty King Abdullah II of
Jordan in Joint Press Conference,” Al Hummar Offices, Amman, Jordan, March 22, 2013.
26
Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
24
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Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers27 to service its foreign debt.28
Approximately 53% of Jordan’s ESF allotment goes toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in
Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and
education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S.
assistance supports capacity building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian
Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican
Institute and the National Democratic Institute also receive U.S. grants to train, among other
groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk
of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources,
as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently
subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of
Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.
In order to address many of the economic grievances expressed by Arab protestors throughout the
so-called Arab Spring of 2011, USAID has reprogrammed $45 million in previously-appropriated
ESF to the establishment of a small-to-medium enterprise (SME) loan guarantee financing
facility. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) plans to provide $250 million in
loan guarantees for new and expanding SMEs, and USAID funding will support administration of
the fund.
Recent U.S. Assistance
•
During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama pledged to work with
Congress to deliver an additional $200 million in direct budget support to Jordan
to help it cope with the influx of Syrian refugees.
•
P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
included a provision authorizing U.S. loan guarantees for Jordan. Section 1706
(j) also appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the cost of sovereign loan
guarantees, which are expected to enable Jordan to raise several hundred million
dollars on the international bond market.
•
Recent U.S. humanitarian aid for Syria ($385 million total) includes funds to be
spent inside Jordan on Syrian refugees. To date, $57 million in Syrian
humanitarian aid has been spent in Jordan, including $25 million from a recent
U.S. pledge of $155 million at a Kuwait Donors’ Conference. Funds spent in
27
In 2012, USAID issued a Congressional Notification permitting U.S. cash transfer to Jordan to be used or “sector
related budget support,” as there was not enough eligible, non-military debt coming due within an acceptable timeframe
for repayment. See, CN#10, November 7, 2012.
28
When providing cash transfer assistance, the United States, though USAID, requires the Jordanian government to
meet certain mutually-agreed upon benchmarks. According to USAID, these benchmarks include, among others, the
Government of Jordan approving an Insolvency and Bankruptcy draft law, streamlining the consultation process
required for registering property, approving a Medical Liability draft law, approving the Anti-Money Laundering Unit
(AMLU) By-Laws, amending the Judicial Independence Law to allow for the formation of a Judges Association, and
allowing Iraqis returning home to exit the Kingdom without paying overstay fees or incurring a bar to reentry. CRS
Correspondence with USAID, March 3, 2011.
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Jordan are for supplies and services for refugee camps there. In addition, USAID
funding is helping northern Jordanian communities address water shortages as a
result of the influx of Syrian refugees by upgrading and repairing water delivery
networks and encouraging conservation.
•
In FY2012, in order to further support Jordanian macroeconomic stability, the
Administration provided $184 million in cash transfer aid (notified to Congress
on September 13), part of its annual allotment of $360 million in ESF that is
divided between USAID programming in Jordan and direct budget support. In
addition, Jordan received a one-time $100 million allotment of budget aid
(notified to Congress on July 6) from ESF designated as Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) United States in the Arab world. Nevertheless, Jordan is an
arid, resource-poor country that has been inundated with more than 500,000 Syrian refugees over
the past two years. As Syria’s civil war continues, how Jordan can cope with the humanitarian
fallout is an open question. Supporting the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan and elsewhere has
been a major priority for U.S. and international aid agencies, and Members’ support for or
opposition to additional funding to the Jordanian government for humanitarian purposes may
depend on a variety of factors.
Promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a major priority for Jordan, which signed a
peace treaty with Israel in 1994 (the second Arab country to do so—Egypt was the first). The
kingdom supports U.S. efforts to mediate a final settlement, which it believes should be based on
the 2002 Saudi Arabian-proposed Arab Peace Initiative—an independent Palestinian state with
East Jerusalem as its capital. Although Jordan unilaterally annexed the West Bank from 1950 to
1988, and maintains responsibilities in administering various holy sites in Jerusalem, it rejects
those who claim that “Jordan is Palestine,” and Jordanian officials routinely claim that Israeli
construction of settlements is illegitimate.
Domestically, Jordan’s lack of domestic energy and water resources places a constant strain on
the government budget, with fuel imports and subsidies driving deficit spending and borrowing in
recent years. When the government announced a reduction in fuel subsidies in November 2012 in
line with commitments made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), widespread street unrest
ensued. The Jordanian government is trying to balance the need it apparently perceives to stave
off unrest through social spending with the need to finance the growing budget deficit that results
from such spending. Since it cannot do this alone, the government has turned to the IMF (a threeyear, $2.38 billion loan approved in August 2012), the United States ($660 million a year in
bilateral aid), Europe, and the Gulf States ($5 billion multi-year aid package pledged in December
2011) to keep it afloat until the overall political and economic situation improves.
Jordan’s domestic political system has endured, as King Abdullah II, now in his 14th year of rule,
attempts to appease domestic constituencies that serve as the foundation for his family’s rule,
while maintaining external ties to Jordan’s financial benefactors in the Arab Gulf and the West.
During the so-called Arab spring between 2011 and 2013, Jordan experienced periodic social
unrest, but not nearly at the same level as some of its neighbors. Overall, while many Jordanians
are struggling economically, popular movements for democratic reform have failed to galvanize
decisive support. Instead, the King himself has often tried to appear as the most fervent advocate
of a top-down reform process that many observers believe may be more politically expedient than
substantively effective.
Overall, popular economic grievances have spurred the most vociferous protests in Jordan. Like
elsewhere in the Middle East, youth unemployment is high, and providing better economic
opportunities for younger Jordanians is a major challenge outside of Amman. Large-scale
agriculture is not sustainable, so officials are left with the option of providing young workers with
low-wage, relatively unproductive civil service jobs. How the Jordanian education system and
economy can respond to the needs of its youth has been and will continue to be one of the
defining domestic challenges for the kingdom in the years ahead.
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The Syrian Civil War and its Effects on Jordan
The Humanitarian Crisis
Although fighting in Syria has not spilled over into Jordan, the continued inflow of Syrian
refugees is placing tremendous strains on the government. As of January 2014, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 568,501 registered (or waiting to
be registered) Syrian refugees in Jordan. There may be tens of thousands more unregistered
Syrian refugees inside the country. Overall, the influx of Syrians into Jordan has increased the
country’s population by 10%. Some estimates suggest that if the war continues, the total Syrian
refugee population in Jordan will surge to over 800,000 by the end of 2014.1
Most Syrian refugees in Jordan have taken
refuge in urban areas, especially in the
northern part of the country. Nearly 20% of
all Syrian refugees live in refugee camps,
specifically in the 80,000-tent “city” of Al
Zaatari refugee camp in northern Jordan east
of the town of Mafraq. This camp opened in
July 2012 and, by some estimates, it is now
the fourth largest urban area in Jordan. The
United Arab Emirates has constructed a
smaller refugee camp in Jordan and a third
camp, the Azraq refugee camp 60 miles east
of Amman, is set to open soon.
Figure 1. Registered Syrian Refugees in
Jordan
Jordan has been widely praised
internationally for its “open door” policy,
though at times border authorities have
Source: UNHCR.
blocked some refugees’ entry into the
kingdom for days or even weeks either due to security concerns or the strains of the refugee
population on the government.2 In October 2013, Amnesty International published a report
charging that the Jordanian government had contravened international law by forcibly deporting
“scores of people” back to Syria.3 The Jordanian government claims that it has been welcoming
of all Syrians who have fled to the kingdom at great expense to the government, asserting that
over $2 billion in government funding has been allocated to support refugee needs for public
health, education, energy, and basic services. Government officials also note that Syrian refugees
residing in the north have strained water resources, which has led to shortages. According to
Jordanian Ambassador to the United States Dr. Alia Hatoug Bouran, “Jordan stands firm in its
commitment to keep its borders open. We see this as a humanitarian duty and we have no plans to
1
Statement of Andrew Harper, Representative, Jordan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Hearing
Before Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,
December 10, 2013.
2
“Displaced Syrians Stranded along Jordanian Border; Humanitarian Crisis Feared,” Washington Post, July 23, 2013.
Additionally, reports indicate that Jordan has sought to prevent Palestinian refugees in Syria from entering Jordan.
3
“Jordan’s Restrictions on Refugees from Syria Reveal Strain on host Countries,” Amnesty International, October 30,
2013.
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shy away from this commitment.”4 According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has
allocated more than $61 million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to help Jordan cope with
the Syrian refugee crisis.5
U.S.-Jordanian Military Cooperation
Relating to the Syrian Civil War
Overall, Jordan and the United States support
a political solution to the Syrian civil war, and
in its absence, both countries seek to cooperate
in ensuring that the fighting there does not
adversely affect Jordan. In order to achieve
what could be considered a containment
strategy, the United States has made several
public deployments of personnel and
equipment to the kingdom in 2012 and 2013.
According to Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of
Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, the goal of
U.S. forces in Jordan is to demonstrate that “in
a very volatile region and at a very critical
time in their history, that they can count on us
to continue to be their partner.”6
Jordanian Concern over Cross-Border
Terrorism
From a security standpoint, the fighting in Syria poses a
number of risks for Jordan. Border guards have
exchanged fire with both Syrian government forces and
opposition groups. Numerous reports indicate that
Jordanians with Salafi-Jihadi beliefs are crossing into Syria
to join extremist rebel factions. Jordan also is concerned
that the southern Syrian province of Dera’a, where the
rebellion against the Asad regime originally started, could
be gradually taken over by Al Qaeda-linked terrorist
groups like the Nusra Front. Fear of terrorist
“blowback” into Jordan from Syria is also a concern
among security authorities. Nearly a decade ago,
Jordanian radicals who fought U.S.-led coalition forces in
Iraq turned their focus to conducting attacks inside
Jordan, such as the November 9, 2005, hotel bombings in
Amman, which killed 60 people. In October 2012, the
government arrested 11 Jordanians found with explosives
from Syria that they reportedly intended to use against
various targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Amman.
In October 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the United States
military had sent a task force of “planners and other specialists” to Jordan. In April 2013, the
Defense Department announced that it would deploy an Army headquarters element (est. 200
personnel) to Jordan to help local forces defend their border with Syria. The Defense Department
noted that U.S. troops dispatched to Jordan would provide training and equipment to Jordanian
forces to “detect and stop chemical weapons transfers along Jordan's border with Syria, and
develop Jordan's capacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets.” U.S. forces also have
been tasked with assisting border authorities with coordinating assistance to refugees.
In June 2013, after a two-week multilateral military training exercise in Jordan in which U.S.
forces participated, the President notified Congress that he was leaving some of the forces that
had participated in the exercise in Jordan indefinitely. The U.S. contingent includes a Patriot
missile battery and its associated support systems, F-16 fighter aircraft, and various command and
control personnel. President Obama noted that “The detachment will remain in Jordan, in full
coordination with the government of Jordan, until the security situation becomes such that it is no
longer needed.”7
4
Statement of Alia Bouran U.S. Assistance Jordan and Lebanon, Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, December 10, 2013.
5
U.S. Department of State, “The Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,” Fact Sheet, Office of
the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, January 17, 2014.
6
“With Eyes on Syria, U.S. Turns Warehouse Into Support Hub for Jordan,” New York Times, August 16, 2013.
7
“Letter from the President -- Regarding the War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
June 21, 2013.
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Moreover, several public statements by U.S. officials and numerous open source reports suggest
that the United States may be, under covert authorities, running a training program for armed
elements of the Syrian opposition generally perceived to be moderate (referred to as the Supreme
Military Council or SMC), possibly inside Jordan,8 in order to bolster non-al Qaeda-affiliated
opposition forces operating along Jordan’s northern borders. According to one report, Western
and Arab intelligence officials operating out of a command center in Amman channel sniper
rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns, and vehicles to SMC-affiliated fighters in Syria.9 The
government of Jordan denies any involvement either in the supplying of armaments or the
training of rebel forces. In response to alleged reports of Jordanian assistance to armed elements
of the Syrian opposition, Syrian state television and radio have broadcast warnings to the
Jordanian government, accusing Jordan of having “a hand in training terrorists and then
facilitating their entry into Syria.”
Overall, should the Jordanian government take a more direct role in supporting so-called
moderate Syrian opposition forces, such action would most likely reflect a shared U.S.-Jordanian
interest in boosting non-radical forces inside Syria amidst reports of continued gains from
possible al Qaeda-affiliated militias. According to one unnamed Western official, “It’s a race
between them [al Qaeda] and the regular rebels to Damascus.... And it’s in no one’s interests if Al
Qaeda wins.”10
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)
In order to bolster Jordan’s border security, Congress included Section 1207 in H.R. 3304, the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. This section authorizes the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, on a reimbursement basis to
the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces
of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and
Syria. The funds are to be drawn from the Coalition Support Fund account. According to the Act,
the total amount of assistance provided under this authority may not exceed $150 million and
may be provided in quarterly installments through December 31, 2015.
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process
Overview
Helping secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the highest priorities of
the Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of
military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999)
8
According to one recent report, “Neighboring Jordan has quietly played a key role in helping coordinate divided FSA
[Free Syrian Army] forces in the south of Syria, channeling Western aid, guns and ammunition. Wounded fighters are
treated in Jordanian medical facilities. FSA commanders travel here to meet with US, European, and Arab military and
intelligence officials. As part of its covert aid to the Syrian opposition, the CIA is leading the training of Syrian fighters
in the south of the kingdom, US officials say privately.” See, “As Foreign Funds run Dry, Syrian fighters Defect to
Anti-Western Militias,” Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2013.
9
“Secret HQ in Amman helps and directs Syrian Rebels in South, The National (UAE), December 28, 2013.
10
“Syria: Jordan to Spearhead Saudi Arabian Arms Drive,” The Guardian (UK), April 14, 2013.
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ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s
conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national
movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and the need for Jordan to regain
Western support after it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq politically in the first Gulf War.11
Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,12 and King Abdullah II has used
his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with
Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for
external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major obstacle to
Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as
more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now
comprising the state of Israel. There are an estimated 2 million United Nations-registered
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as
temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future
settlement.13
Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin
descent and whose legitimacy historically derives from the support of tribal families from the east
bank of the Jordan River, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political
survival. Although the Palestinians may be less rooted in Jordan than its East Bank citizens,
because they constitute a majority and express some grievances about their status within Jordan
relative to East Bankers, addressing their grievances regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of
critical importance to the monarchy. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently
reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the
“Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the demographic and political status
quo in Jordan. King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that his father introduced after
relinquishing Jordan’s claims to the West Bank: “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”
Jordan and the Status of Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
For over a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and Congress
to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. He has praised
11
In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan as a result of its support for
Iraq. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and
Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
12
Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors;
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
13
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan, including part of its headquarters (the other part is in Gaza City). UNRWA has 7,000 staff in
Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 172 schools in Jordan (providing education
through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government). According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104
million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees live outside of UNRWA camps.
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U.S. efforts to mediate the latest final status negotiations, which began in July 2013 with a goal
for the parties to reach resolution within nine months. According to King Abdullah II, who
addressed the issue of Middle East peace during a speech at the United Nations in September
2013:
The talks that began in July show that progress can be made, with willing parties, determined
US leadership, and strong regional and international backing. We commend the President of
Palestine and the Prime Minister of Israel for the bold decision to resume final status
negotiations. We urge them to stay committed to reaching an agreement within the set time
frame. Let there be no actions that can derail what is still a fragile process. This means no
continued settlement construction, and no unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in
East Jerusalem and its Muslim and Christian holy sites. Such threats would be a flashpoint
for global concern. We know the right way forward. And the goal can be reached: a just and
final two-state settlement, based on international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative.
For Israel: real security and normal relations with 57 Arab and Muslim countries. For the
Palestinian people, at long last, the rights they deserve, in a viable and independent
Palestinian State, on Palestinian national soil, based on the 1967 lines, and with East
Jerusalem as its capital.14
One unresolved issue in the negotiations, among many, concerns potential security arrangements
along Jordan’s border with a potential future Palestinian state. According to numerous public
reports, the United States government, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, has been working to
reassure Israel that any final peace deal would contain arrangements for either an Israeli or
international security presence in the Jordan Valley. Israel’s position is that it retains an army
presence along the border with Jordan in order to deter terrorist activity and counter smuggling.
According to Gadi Shamni, a former Israeli army general, “In the past, the issue of the eastern
front was worrisome. The scenario in which convoys of tanks and armored personnel carriers and
commandos head toward the border seems further off....Now, it's mainly [the] threat of terror.”15
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders speak frequently about the possibility
of rockets coming into the West Bank in the event of an Israeli military withdrawal, as they came
into Gaza and southern Lebanon after Israeli military withdrawals in both those places.
Recent Reports of Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation
The Dead Sea16: Recently, Jordan and Israel have pursued several potential resource and energy
cooperative agreements. On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority
signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, which is a
multi-billion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The Red-Dead
Canal is a decades-old plan to provide freshwater to water-scarce countries in the surrounding
area while simultaneously restoring the Dead Sea. The “Red-Dead” concept is to pump water
from the Red Sea, desalinate some of it, and then transfer remaining saltwater north and below
sea level to the Dead Sea. The proposal has been extensively studied; however, its estimated high
cost ($10 billion to $12 billion) has hindered implementation. Moreover, since Israel, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority all govern territory or have claims to territory adjacent to the Dead Sea,
14
“Jordanian Paper Publishes Reports on King's Speech at UN General Assembly,” BBC Monitoring Middle East,
September 25, 2013.
15
“Altered Landscape Marks Mideast Talks,” Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2013.
16
See, Testimony of Jeremy M. Sharp, Hearing on Water as a Geopolitical Threat, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats, January 16, 2014.
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continued political uncertainty caused by the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement
also has hindered construction. Palestinians reject moving the canal project forward without a
conflict-ending agreement with Israel in place delineating their territorial and riparian rights
regarding the Dead Sea and its shore. Nevertheless, Jordan has pursued the Red-Dead Canal
concept. Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world and is constantly
searching for new water resources. In August 2013, the Jordanian government announced its
intent to construct a scaled-down version of the canal entirely on Jordanian territory. Jordan
would then send desalinated water to its southern city of Aqaba and possibly sell excess water to
Israel, while sending remaining seawater to the Dead Sea to replenish it. Environmentalists, who
have long criticized plans to restore the Dead Sea using Red Sea water, assert that rather than risk
damaging the Dead Sea’s ecosystem, countries should stop diverting water from the Jordan River,
which feeds the Dead Sea.
Under a December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have agreed to a
water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea will be desalinated in a plant to be
constructed in Aqaba, Jordan, over the next three years. Some of this water will then be used in
southern Jordan. The rest will be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel will
sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority
discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The
other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from
desalination) will be channeled to the Dead Sea.
Natural Gas: In December 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel and Jordan were
negotiating the terms of the sale of Israeli natural gas to Jordan.17 The kingdom depends on oil
and gas imports and, since 2011, cut-offs in the supply of Egyptian natural gas due to unrest in the
Sinai have cost the Jordanian government several billion dollars by compelling it to import more
expensive alternatives. In Egypt under Mubarak, energy cooperation with Israel had been a source
of controversy and a symbol of corruption, and the government of Jordan could face domestic
criticism if the deal moves forward.
17
“Energy Firms Near Deal to Sell Israeli Gas into Jordan Deal Would Move Israel Closer To Becoming an Energy
Exporter,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2013.
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Figure 2. Jordan and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS Graphics.
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s
unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States
and the Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an
increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which
subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as
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the West Bank.18 The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in
Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the
bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an
estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector
due to their exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.19
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
King Abdullah II (age 51) has ruled the
country since 1999, when he succeeded to the
throne upon the death of his father, the late
King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated
largely in Britain and the United States, King
Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military
career, ultimately serving as commander of
Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the
rank of Major General. The king’s son Prince
Hussein (b. 1994) is the designated crown
prince.20
Jordan in Brief
Population:
6,482,081 (July 2013 est.)
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
slightly smaller than Indiana)
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
Armenians 1%
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
small Muslim sects 2%
Literacy:
92.6% (male 95%, female 89.2%)
GDP:
Per Capita $6,000 (2012 est.),
country comparison to the
world: 144
Foreign
Exchange
Reserves:
Youth
Unemployment
(ages 15-24):
$10.7 billion (est. 2012)
27%, country comparison to the
world: 21
The king appoints a prime minister to head the
government and the Council of Ministers
External Debt:
$8.34 billion (December 2012
(cabinet).21 On average, Jordanian
est.)
governments last no more than 15 months
Sources: CIA World Factbook
before they are dissolved by royal decree. This
seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s
reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also
appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.
18
Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
19
Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004 (the next
census may take place in 2014), and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time,
intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions
do persist.
20
In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his then 15-year-old son, Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah, as crown prince. The
position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
21
In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister.
Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to
reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election
leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime
minister would be chosen by the largest block in parliament.
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Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary
The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952 and last amended in 2011) empowers the king
with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and
may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or
accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution also
enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for
two years.22 The king also can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that
allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has
January 2013 Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections on January 23, 2013, produced another overwhelmingly pro-palace parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front party (IAF) boycotted the vote in protest of the lack of seats allocated for the
party list vote system (27 out of 150 total seats). The IAF sought to delegitimize the election through its boycott
and tarnish the palace’s image in the eyes of Western governments. Turnout figures for the election are somewhat
disputed. The government claims that 56.6% of registered voters participated, while others assert that the turnout
calculation should be based on the total number of eligible voters (both registered and unregistered), which, if taken
into account, would have equated to an estimated 40% turnout. King Abdullah II has already called for parliament to
amend the election law, which is widely considered to favor rural, traditionally pro-monarchy Bedouin
constituencies. For example, Amman is allotted 25 seats for 2.4 million residents, while rural Tafileh has four seats
for 88,000 residents. In its preliminary assessment of the election, the National Democratic Institute concluded that
“systemic distortions remain. The unequal size of districts and an electoral system that amplifies family, tribal and
national cleavages limit the development of a truly national legislative body and challenge King Abdullah’s stated aim
of encouraging full parliamentary government.” Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry praised the electoral
process, saying that “The turnout is higher than any time previously, which shows a full and robust participation by
the Jordanian people in the election process.”
been dissolved.23 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary
scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article
195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with
criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic
Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security
offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a
palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.
22
The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
23
New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
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The Economy
With few natural resources24 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,25 and the service
sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (15%-30%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 13% but thought by many
analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.26 Youth unemployment is nearly 30%. Corruption27 is
particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”
(connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of
social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.28 Each year, thousands of Jordanians go
abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a
“brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop
incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by
far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s
payroll.
24
Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been
discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country
contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves. In 2006, Royal Dutch/Shell signed an oil shale exploration
agreement with the Jordanian government. Estonia’s Enefit Eesti Energia AS also has signed agreements on oil shale
projects. In 2012, the Canadian company, Global Oil Shale Holdings (GOSH), reached an agreement with the
Jordanian government to produce oil shale as well. For further background, see, “Amman Unlocks Energy Potential,”
Middle East Economic Digest, August 7, 2009.
25
It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.)
reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.
26
One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry,
Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.
27
Jordan was ranked 49 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
28
In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken
on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing
project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).
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Figure 3. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing
Source: Gallup, “Fewer Jordanians Than Ever Are "’Thriving,’" July 12, 2013.
The Government’s Chronic Fiscal Deficit
Due to sluggish domestic growth (In October 2013, the IMF forecasted GDP growth of 3.3% in
2013, rising to 3.5% in 2014), high energy/food subsidies and a bloated public sector workforce,
Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $25 billion) which it partially
offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. For 2014, the
government is projecting expenditures of $11.4 billion against domestic revenues of $5.86 billion.
The government anticipates that foreign grants will help off-set this shortfall, and according to the
Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan’s total budget deficit in 2014 will be just over 4% of GDP.29
Credit agencies downgraded Jordan’s rating in 2013, projecting that the total debt-to-GDP ratio
will hit 84% in 2013 and reach close to 90% of GDP in 2014.30 Five years ago total debt to GDP
was 60%.
In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2
billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is expected to cut spending and may
increase consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and
contracts. However, when the government cut subsidies which raised the prices of cooking gas,
diesel, kerosene, and gasoline in 2012, large scale protests broke out across the country, and the
king subsequently reversed some cuts though others have remained in place. In Jordan, protests
over economic issues could be the likeliest trigger of changes to government policy, as well as
perhaps to its political system.
29
30
“2014 budget is Criticised by local Economists,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 20, 2013.
“Moody's Downgrades Jordan Credit Rating two Notches to B1,” Reuters, June 26, 2013.
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According to one member of Jordan’s parliament, “Unlike political protests and parties that lack
unity or a voice that represents Jordanians, the labor strikes have focused on demands that
improve their livelihoods.... They come with a list of specific demands and they have largely
succeeded.”31 Jordanian lawmakers also at times challenge the King’s decision-making on
subsidies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “On most political issues the legislature
can generally be counted on to support the regime, but MPs regularly challenge the government
on economic policy, and in particular on any attempts at structural reform and economic
liberalization.”32
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.83 billion.
The Five-Year Aid Deal
On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the
United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a
five-year period (FY2010-FY2014). Under the terms of their non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future
congressional appropriation and availability of funds, to providing $360 million per year in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).33 According to the Jordanian government, the agreement “reaffirms the strategic
partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Coming at a time when the overall
budget for foreign aid was constrained by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deal was a
testament to strong U.S.-Jordanian relations. In 2014, the United States and Jordan may negotiate
the terms of a new five-year aid deal.
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.
Approximately 53% of Jordan’s ESF allotment goes toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in
Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and
education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S.
assistance has supported capacity building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the
Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train,
among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water
sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce
water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is
31
“In Jordan, Protests Focus on Prices and Economy,” New York Times, May 30, 2012.
“Parliament puts Pressure on Government over Fuel Prices,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 7th 2013.
33
Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
32
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currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian
cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.
Food Aid
Jordan periodically receives U.S. food aid administered by the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) under Title I of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480), under the Section 416(b) program
permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949, and under the Food for Progress Act of
1985 as a grant. Between FY1999 to FY2006, Jordan received approximately $238.52 million in
food aid to purchase wheat. Jordan received no food assistance between FY2007 to FY2010. In
FY2011, the United States provided Jordan with $19 million aid to purchase 50,000 metric tons
of wheat. In September 2012, the United States agreed to provide Jordan with 50,000 metric tons
of wheat valued at $17 million.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold
country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of
directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. Even prior to
the selection, the possible choice of Jordan had come under severe criticism. Freedom House, the
organization whose annual Index of Freedom is drawn upon for two of the “Ruling Justly”
indicators, urged the MCC board to bypass countries that had low scores on political rights and
civil liberties. It argued that countries like Jordan that fall below 4 out of a possible 7 on its index
should be automatically disqualified. Jordan, however, did well on 3 of the 6 other indicators in
this category. Several development analysts further argued that Jordan should not be eligible,
asserting that it is already one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, has access to private sector
capital, and is not a democracy. In selecting Jordan, the MCC board appears not to have been
swayed by these arguments.
In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million
compact with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to increase the supply of water available to
households and businesses in the
cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also will help improve
the efficiency of water delivery,
wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates
hold true, the clean drinking water
generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to
supply almost 1 million Jordanian
citizens with freshwater.
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Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. In 1996, the United
States granted Jordan Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other
things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of
equipment for cooperative research and development. Since 2009, Jordan has received excess
U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million.2934
U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure
and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan
34
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Country Information Paper, Jordan.
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enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase
of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror
capability. Jordan is currently the single largest provider of civilian police personnel and fifthlargest provider of military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. In addition to
large-scale military aid grants for conventional weapons purchases, Jordan also receives grants of
U.S. antiterrorism assistance from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs account (NADR). Jordan received $24.6 million in NADR funds in FY2010 and $12.5
million in FY2011 to support local authorities in customs inspection and border patrol. Jordan
also receives small sums of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INLCE) aid to
support police training in forensic criminal investigation procedures to combat gender-based
violence, anti-money laundering, and enforcement of intellectual property rights laws
(approximately $1.5 million in FY2010 and $250,000 in FY2011).
Trade
Jordan ranked 74th and from International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLCE) account.
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan
•
Appropriations: On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-76,
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 which Congress passed days earlier.
The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic aid and $300 million in
military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under title VIII
designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not
less than $340 million above the levels included in the Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and Jordan shall be made available for
the extraordinary costs related to instability in the region, including for security
requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to authorize
foreign aid to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an
enterprise fund. Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee
Assistance funding (MRA) to help countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian
refugee crisis.
•
Excess Defense Articles: According to the Defense Department, in December
2013 the United States delivered 35 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPS) to Jordan as requested by the Jordanian military earlier in 2013.
•
Loan Guarantee: In September 2013, the United States announced that it was
providing its first-ever loan guarantee35 to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID
notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESFOCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
According to the State Department, “this guarantee reinforces the firm U.S.
commitment to the people of Jordan by strengthening the Government of
Jordan’s ability to maintain access to international financing, while enabling it to
achieve its economic development and reform goals.
•
Cash Transfer: During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama
pledged to work with Congress to deliver an additional $200 million in direct
budget support to Jordan to help it cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. In
April 2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200 million cash transfer in keeping
35
Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. The Department of State and
USAID intend to transfer and merge $120 million appropriated in FY 2013 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) OCO
funding, into ESF OCO for additional subsidy costs related to the bond issuance.
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with Obama’s pledge ($100 million in FY 2012 Economic Support Funds (ESF)
and $100 million in FY 2013 ESF-OCO).
U.S.-Jordanian Trade
Jordan ranked 73th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United States in 2012.
According to the United States Trade Commission, in 2012 Jordan exported over a billion dollars
in goods and services to the United States, a large percentage of which consisted of apparel and
clothing accessories. In 2012, Jordanian imports from the United States reached $1.6 billion.
Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and
appliances, vehicles, and cereals. Two measures, in particular—the Free Trade Agreement and
Qualifying Industrial Zones—have helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create
more opportunities for U.S. investment in Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement
On October 24, 2000, then-President Clinton and King Abdullah II witnessed the signing of a
U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to
bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released
on September 26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S.
production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce
existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, thenPresident Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade
Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador
29
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Country Information Paper, Jordan.
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Marwan Muasher exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to
resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were
designed to allay concerns on the part of some Members over the possible use of sanctions to
enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which
implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to
Washington, DC, following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS
Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones
One outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying
Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and
Israeli input can enter the United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act
amended previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free
trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt.
QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding
commercial ties between Jordan and Israel. Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.Jordanian trade, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 43,000 people (working eighthour days, six days a week), 74% of whom are foreign workers from Southeast Asian nations
South and Southeast Asian
nations including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In general, foreign laborers are viewed as
Employers apparently view foreign
laborers as more skilled and productive than localnative Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to
recruit local
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employers to recruit native Jordanians since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant
to separate
from their families, though in some areas localnative Jordanians are provided with free
transportation to
the QIZs. According to one Jordanian labor leader, foreign workers are attractive
to employers
because “they are like slaves. They work them day and night.”3036 Labor rights
activists also have
complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new
minimum wage law.
Military Cooperation
Military Sales
The United States is helping Jordan to modernize its armed forces, which have been the
traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian military forces, though
well trained and
disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of has less personnel and weaponry than the militaries in each of
Jordan’s neighboring forcescountries. In recent
years, Jordan has used U.S. military assistance grants to
purchase Advanced Medium Range AirtoAir-to-Air Missiles, upgrades for its fleet of F-16 fighters
(approximately 70-80), and Black Hawk
helicopters. The United States also delivered three
Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early
2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations in Iraq.
30
“Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
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in Iraq.
Table 1. RecentPossible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime Contractor
FY2006
National Command & Control System
$450 million
Northrop Grumman Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million
BAE Company
FY2008
Border Security System
$390 million
DRS Technologies Corp
FY2009
AMRAAM Missiles
$131 million
Raytheon
FY2009
Artillery Rocket Systems
$220 million
Multiple Companies
FY2010
Repair of F-16 Engines
$75 million
Pratt & Whitney
FY2010
JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
$388 million
Javelin Joint Venture
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Joint Exercises and Training
A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. Nearly 300 Jordanian
military personnel study in the United States each year. In recent years, Jordan ishas been among
the top
three recipients of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. In
FY2013, approximately 257 Jordanian officers will participateparticipated in this program.3137 IMET also funds
the equipping of English language labs in Jordan. Combined training exercises by U.S. and
Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan (dubbed “Early Victor”), at least on an
annual basis and sometimes more often. The above-mentioned courses conducted by Jordan for
Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the United States under a program called
the New Iraqi Army Training Project.32In June 2013, U.S. troops participated in a multinational
training exercise in Jordan known as “Eager Lion.” In addition, the United States has supported the
the construction of the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations Training (KASOTC). The
center, which has been partially financed by the United States, including with $99 million in
36
37
“Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Country Information Paper, Jordan.
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appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13). It serves as a
regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training.38 In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations
Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within
the military.
According to one recent report, the United States may be discussing plans with the Iraqi and
Jordanian governments to train Iraqi troops inside Jordan on techniques to combat Islamist
insurgents who have recently attempted to hold territory in Iraq’s Western Anbar province.39
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
including with $99 million in
appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13), serves as a
regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training.33 In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations
Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within
the military.
Other Activities
Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, thenPresident Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on
November 13, 1996. According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan
eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already
31
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Country Information Paper, Jordan.
Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army—in Jordan,” Defense News, February 9, 2004, p. 8.
33
According to one description of the new U.S.-Jordanian facility, “If special forces have to conduct house-to-house
searches, KASOTC provides that infrastructure in a training environment.... If they have to rescue hostages on an
airplane, KASOTC provides the plane. If they have to rescue hostages from an embassy, KASOTC provides an
embassy structure.” See, Joan Kibler, “KASOTC,” Special Operations Technology Online Edition, volume 6, issue 2,
March 19, 2008.
32
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appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases, the
stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium munitions.”
According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military hospitals to
Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health care professionals to the
two facilities. Both facilities provide critical health care to numerous patients, including civilians.
The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more than 650 patients a day, having treated more than
500,000 since it was first deployed in December 2001. In Iraq, Jordan helped train 50,000
policemen, helped the United States reach out to Sunni tribes and politicians in order to facilitate
reconciliation, and still maintains a field hospital in Fallujah.
Jordan also regularly contributes peacekeeping forces to United Nations missions abroad.34 In
November 2006, a Jordanian United Nations peacekeeping patrol in the Haitian capital, Port-auPrince, was killed while on patrol. Jordan has about 1,500 troops in the Brazilian-led U.N. force,
which includes more than 8,000 soldiers and police supported by some 1,000 civilian personnel.
Two other Jordanian soldiers were killed in January 2006. In 2009, five more Jordanian
peacekeepers were killed in a plane crash during a border surveillance mission while serving in
Haiti. Three more Jordanian soldiers were killed during the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan
Although the Jordanian government had publicly acknowledged a limited humanitarian presence
in Afghanistan since major NATO operations began there in 2001, the December 30, 2009,
terrorist attack against a CIA base in Khost, in which a Jordanian intelligence agent and royal
family member was killed, shed light on Jordan’s deeper cooperation against Al Qaeda and their
Taliban allies.35 Officially, Jordan has not acknowledged its intelligence role in Afghanistan.
Numerous reports of joint CIA-GID cooperation have illustrated Jordan’s long-standing, but
unacknowledged cooperation with U.S. global counterterrorism. According to one unnamed U.S.
source, “we have a close partnership with the Jordanians on counterterrorism matters…. Having
suffered serious losses from terrorist attacks on their own soil, they are keenly aware of the
significant threat posed by extremists.” Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al Rafa'i stated that
“Being part of this world, we have to coordinate with other countries and exchange information
about the location of terrorist groups…. We will be everywhere as long as this is necessary for
our national security.”
In March 2010, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen officially requested that
Jordan play a role in training the Afghan Army. In response, Jordan has sent an unspecified
34
To date, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) have contributed 57,000 troops to 18 different United Nations
peacekeeping missions.
35
On December 30, 2009, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian terrorist who had been serving as an
informant for the Central Intelligence Agency and Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, detonated a suicide vest
bomb killing eight people outside CIA Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan. His Jordanian
handler, Captain Sharif Ali bin Zeid, a member of the royal family, was killed as well. Al Balawi, a physician, held
virulent anti-American and anti-Israeli views expressed in various Jihadist online forums. Prior to his attack, he had
managed to convince U.S. and Jordanian intelligence officials that he knew the whereabouts of Ayman Al Zawahiri,
who is Al Qaeda’s second-in-command. In a video filmed before his death, Al Balawi swore revenge for the August
2009 killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and appeared with Mehsud’s cousin and successor
Hakimullah Mehsud. Months later, a second video emerged showing Al Balawi urging militants to target Jordan for
terrorist attacks.
Congressional Research Service
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
number of instructors from its armed forces and security service to Afghanistan. Reportedly,
Jordan has already trained 2,500 members of the Afghan special forces at the King Abdullah II
Special Operations Training Centre.36 Jordan also is helping to promote religious toleration by
training Afghan imams.
In June 2011, a Jordanian Al Qaeda operative named Mahmoud Hamdan Nizal (aka Abu Dher al
Urduni) was killed in a clash with U.S. troops in eastern Afghanistan. Nizal was from the city of
Zarqa and was killed in a U.S. air or artillery strike.
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
36
EconSpt
Food
Devel
0
0
1991
35.0a
1992
30.0b
20.0
1993c
5.0
1994d
PeaceCp
FMF
IMET
Totals
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f
150.0
0
0
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1.6
223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004
250.0
0
0
2.3
206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005
250.0
0
0
1.6
206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006
247.5
0
0
1.6
207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
“Jordan Trained 2,500 Afghan Special Forces: Minister,” Agence France Presse, May 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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According to one description of the new U.S.-Jordanian facility, “If special forces have to conduct house-to-house
searches, KASOTC provides that infrastructure in a training environment.... If they have to rescue hostages on an
airplane, KASOTC provides the plane. If they have to rescue hostages from an embassy, KASOTC provides an
embassy structure.” See, Joan Kibler, “KASOTC,” Special Operations Technology Online Edition, volume 6, issue 2,
March 19, 2008.
39
“US developing plans to train Iraqis in Jordan,” Associated Press, January 23, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF
IMET
Totals
2006
247.5
0
0
1.6
207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.30i
2008
361.4
0
0
0
298.3
2.9
662.60
2008 (Suppl.)
200.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
250.00
2009
263.5
0
0
0
235.0
3.1
501.60
2009 (Suppl.)
150.0
0
0
0
(150.0 in FY2010
Advanced funding)
0
150.00
2010
363.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.8
666.8
2010 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
150.0
2011
362.0
0
0
0
299.4
3.7
665.1
FY2012 (Estimate)2012
460.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
763.7
FY2013 (Request)
360.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.8
663.82013
443.529
0
0
0
284.829
3.608
731.966
Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or
amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.
a.
Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b.
Released in late July 1993.
c.
Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d.
FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e.
Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special
drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.
These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g.
For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h.
Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.
Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in
NADR funds.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
1719