Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 29July 10, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21513
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because
of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the
United States. Kuwait isremains a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily, if necessary, in the northern
Persian Persian
Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the postSaddam post-Saddam
government in Iraq have been hampered by long-standing warmed significantly in recent years through resolution of many of the
territorial, economic, and
political issues unresolved from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but those issues have been
narrowed significantly since 2011. Kuwait is . Kuwait is
increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the
Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to
contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran
from exerting undue influence in post-withdrawal Iraq. Still,
Kuwait maintains relatively normal
economic and political relations with Iran so as not to
provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to
empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since
2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. Previously,The political disputes in Kuwait
had consisted of opposition within the elected National Assembly have
centered on opposition to the political dominance of
the Al Sabah family. These disputes aggravated—and been aggravated by—schisms within rival
branches of the ruling Al Sabah. The disputes produced five dissolutions of the National
Assembly and new elections since 2006, the latest of which occurred on October 8, 2012,
requiring new elections that were held on December 1, 2012.
During 2011-2012, there were relatively small demonstrations in Kuwait by opposition groups
over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. However,
protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge Sabah regime efforts to shape the
December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1
elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly pro-government Assembly.
Since the election, the opposition has continued its battle to reduce Sabah power through public
protests, but the demonstrations sometimes are suspended after compromises with the
government.
Even though opposition to Sabah rule has grown, the opposition still largely confines its demands
to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. And, Kuwait remains a relatively
wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring
about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. To try to contain the unrest, the
government has used financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as
well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of
political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval
for several major investment projects, such as development of major oil fields in northern Kuwait,
has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several
the Al Sabah family, as well as over official
corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. These disputes,
manifested primarily in the form of opposition to the Al Sabah family within the National
Assembly, have produced repeated dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections. The
latest suspension occurred on June 16, 2013 and triggered new elections to be held on July 27,
2013. Perhaps accelerated by the uprisings in several Arab countries since early 2011, the
disputes in Kuwait have also expanded beyond the Assembly to the general population. Public
protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge the Sabah regime’s unilateral alteration
of election rules to shape the December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists
boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly progovernment Assembly. The demonstrations sometimes have been suspended after compromises
with the government.
Yet, the ruling establishment in Kuwait retains substantial assets that will likely prevent major
political change. Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to
risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through
violence. Reflecting that sentiment, the opposition largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah
power rather than ending the family’s rule. To contain unrest, the government is able to use
financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some
repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political
paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for
several major investment projects has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic
vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.
On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to
consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council; this. This deference is evident in Kuwait’s
stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. On the
uprising Kuwait
has largely confined its support for the armed rebellion in Syria to financial aid. On the uprising
in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on
the side of
the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground
forces.
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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Contents
Kuwaiti Government Changes and Political ReformGovernment and Political Reform ............................................................................................. 1
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family ...... 1
Government Structure................................................. 1
Assembly Authorities ................................................................ 1
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family .......................................... 1
Political Factions .............. 2
Assembly Authorities .......................................................................................................... 2
The Franchise ...................................................................................................................... 3
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections 2
Political Factions in and Outside the National Assembly .............................................. 3
June 2006 Election..... 2
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections ............................................ 3
June 2006 Election .................................................................. 3
May 2008 Election ............................................ 4
May 2008 Election .................................................................. 3
May 2009 Election ............................................ 4
May 2009 Election ................................................................... 4
The Fall of Another Government and February 2012 Election ........................................... 6
No Abatement of the Crisis and Second Election in 2012 ................4
2012-2013: Cycle of Frequent Elections and Increasing Demonstrations .................................. 7 6
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests ............................................................ 9
Broader Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 10
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 10
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 11
Status of “Bidoons” ..................................and Other Expatriates ......................................................................... 11
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms ................................................................... 11
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 12
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 12
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation.......................................................................... 13
Assistance in Addressing the Threat from Iraq.....Iraq Invasion Deepens The U.S.-Kuwait Alliance................................................................... 13
Bilateral Defense Pact ......................Cooperation Agreement ................................................................................. 13
The Iraq Containment Era .............................................. 13
Joint Efforts to Address The Continuing Threat Posed by Saddam................................................... 14
Supporting the U.S.-Led Effort to Militarily Oust Saddam/Major Non-NATO Ally
Designation .................................................................................................................... 14
Helping U.S. Efforts to Stabilize Post-Saddam Iraq ................................................................ 14
Kuwait’s Role in Long-Term Gulf Security ............................................................................ 15
U.S. Security Assistance .......................................................................................................... 16
Arms Sales ........................................................................................................................ 16
International Military Education and Training (IMET)..................................................... 17
Foreign Policy Issues ..................................................................................................................... 18
Outstanding Bilateral Issues With Iraq .................................................................................... 18
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation ......................................... 18
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 2120
Arab-Israeli Dispute ................................................................................................................ 21
Positions and Actions on 2011 Uprisings Elsewhere in the Region ........................................ 22
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy ..................................................................... 23
Kuwaiti Economic Policy .............................................................................................................. 23
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait................................................................................................................ 2526
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Tables
Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2012 ......................................................... 9
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes ..................................................................................... 17
Table 3.Some Basic Facts .............................................................................................................. 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26
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Kuwaiti Government ChangesGovernment and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, soured after the January
15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Since then, Kuwait has lurched
from one political crisis to the next, producing a sense of economic and political stagnation. At
the time of Amir Jabir’s death, his successor, Shaykh Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah, was very ill
(he later died), and a brief succession dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family
ensued. It was resolved with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah becoming
Amir on January 29, 2006; about 83, he is the younger brother of the late Amir. The succession
dispute was unprecedented in Kuwait and the broader Gulf region for the first use of an elected
legislature’s constitutional ability to formally remove a leader.
Although the leadership question was resolved, it produced a suspension of the tacit agreement to
alternate succession between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family. Amir Sabah appointed
two members of his Jabir branch as crown prince/heir apparent and as prime minister (Shaykh
Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah and Shaykh Nasser al Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah
respectively). The highest-ranking member of the Salem branch in the government was Dr.
Mohammad Al Sabah, deputy prime minister and foreign minister until his resignation on
October 18,. Both resigned or were
replaced in 2011.
Tensions between the two branches of the family have since simmered, and no permanent
alternative mechanism has been agreed to replace the previous power-sharing pact between them.
The governmental infighting has provided rationale and additional political space for various
youth and other reform-oriented groups inspired by the Arab uprisings that began in early 2011,
and some in the ruling family have sided with the political opposition.
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family
The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longestserving all-elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 15
members of the cabinet—which is limited by the constitution to 16 members—serve in it exofficio. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006, 2008,
2009, 2011, and 2012), used their constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it
aggressively challenged the government—an action that mandates new elections within 60 days.
Assembly Authorities
While Kuwait’s constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, the Kuwait National Assembly
has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative body in the Persian Gulf. It can
introduce legislation as well as consider and vote on government-introduced legislation. The
Assembly does not have the power to confirm cabinet nominees (individually or en bloc), but it
can, by simple majority of elected members, vote “no confidence” and remove individual
1
Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2011 (released May
24, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186434#wrapper ; the
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 (July 30, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htmand the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2012 (June 19,
2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192596.pdf.
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Government Structure
The Amir is the head of state and ruler of Kuwait. He appoints a Prime Minister, as head of
government, who in turn appoints a cabinet. The Prime Minister has always been a member of the
Sabah family, and until 2003 the Prime Minister also was Crown Prince/heir apparent. In recent
years, there has been discussion within the Sabah family of restoring the concurrency of the
Prime Minister and Crown Prince position because the National Assembly is not able,
constitutionally, to question the Crown Prince. In typical Kuwaiti cabinets, three out of four
deputy prime ministers are members of the family, as is the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister,
and Interior Minister. Each Kuwaiti cabinet has typically had at least a few family members
heading other ministries as well. The current Prime Minister is Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al
Sabah, who took office in December 4, 2011. The cabinet currently has 28 ministers, plus a
Central Bank governor.
The Amir has additional broad powers. He serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
and all judges. The Amir, as noted below, has the power to suspend the National Assembly for
1
Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2012 (released April
19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper; the
International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 (May 20, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208398#wrapper; and the Trafficking in
Persons Report for 2013 (June 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf
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limited periods of time, and to commute prison sentences. Kuwait’s amirs can be as involved or
disengaged from day-to-day governance as they choose; Amir Sabah tends to be more active in
governance than was his predecessor.
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family
The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longestserving all-elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 15
members of the cabinet—which is limited by the constitution to 16 members—serve in it exofficio.
Assembly Authorities
While Kuwait’s constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, the Kuwait National Assembly
has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative body in the Persian Gulf. It can
introduce legislation as well as consider and vote on government-introduced legislation. The
Assembly does not have the power to confirm cabinet nominees (individually or en bloc), but it
can, by simple majority of elected members, vote “no confidence” and remove individual
ministers. When the Assembly takes that step, it generally does so after parliamentary questioning
of that minister, referred to as “grilling.” The Assembly can vote no confidence in the prime
minister by voting “inability to cooperate with the government,” and it can veto government
decrees issued during periods of Assembly suspension. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several
occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012), used their
constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it grilled or threatened to grill government
ministers. Suspension of the Assembly mandates new elections within 60 days.
Those opposing the government have tended to seek greater authority for the Assembly and a
limitation of the powers of the government and by extension, limitations of the political and
economic power of the Al Sabah. The opposition, in general, seeks a constitutional monarchy in
which the Assembly, or an elected majority faction within the Assembly, names a Prime Minister
who in turn assembles a cabinet. The opposition is described below.
Political Factions
Political parties are still not permitted, but factions are organized and compete as “currents,”
“trends,” or “political societies.” Many of these factions meet and plan their strategies at a
parallel Kuwaiti tradition called diwaniyyas—informal social gatherings, held at night, held by
elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds. There are a growing number of diwaniyyas
organized by women.
Factions in Kuwait
The Franchise
For at least two decades, the extent of the franchise has been a closely watched indicator of
Kuwait’s political liberalization, and there has been clear progress. The government has expanded
the electorate gradually, first by extending the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and
Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 (as opposed to 30) years. The long deadlock on female
suffrage began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to
give women the right to vote and run. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female
suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh
Sabah (now Amir) pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16,
2005 (35-23); the bill was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly elections.
Political Factions in and Outside the National Assembly
Political parties are still not permitted, but factions are organized and compete in Assembly
elections as “currents,” “trends,” or “political societies.” Many of these factions meet and plan
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their strategies at a parallel Kuwaiti tradition called diwaniyyas—informal social gatherings, held
at night, held by elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds. There are a growing number of
diwaniyyas organized by women. Factions in Kuwait, both in and outside the National Assembly,
are often fluid, but in general they group as follows:
The “Opposition”
•
“Liberals.” Highly educated elites who tend to form the core of the opposition to
the government. Many of the liberals had been part of Arab nationalist
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases have studied abroad. In
prior years they had operated under the banner “Kuwait Democratic Forum.”
Some liberal Kuwaitis often side with the government.
•
Sunni Islamists. They are generally opposed to the government. Within this broad
category, there are two major groupings: those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood, and harder line Sunnis called Salafists. Those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood have often operated under a banner called the Islamic Constitutional
Movement (ICM).
•
Youths and Intellectuals. At the popular level, The broader opposition, outside the National Assembly,
the opposition includes youth and
intellectuals, many of whom have become
more active since the Arab uprisings
began in early 2011 but have been active in
Kuwait far longer than that. Since
2008, these groups have sometimes organized
during election campaigns to
support liberal deputies, using such names as the
“Orange Movement” or “Fifth
Fence.”
Government Supporters
•
“Tribalists.” Generally less educated but who dominate two out of the five
electoral districts and tend to support the government, although not universally.
At times, some tribalists in the Assembly have grouped into a faction widely
referred to as “service deputies”—Assembly members primarily focused on
steering government largesse and patronage to their constituents.
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•
Shiites. Most in the Assembly are Islamists, assembled in a bloc called the
National Islamic Alliance. They tend to side with the government, perhaps out of
greater concern about Sunni Islamists.
•
Women. When in the Assembly, women, both Shiite and Sunni, have tended to
align with the government. Many women outside the Assembly, however, have
participated in opposition demonstrations.
The Franchise
For at least two decades, the extent of the franchise has been a closely watched indicator of
Kuwait’s political liberalization, and there has been clear progress. The government has expanded
the electorate gradually, first by extending the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and
Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 (as opposed to 30) years. The long deadlock on female
suffrage began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to
give women the right to vote and run. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female
suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh
Sabah (now Amir) pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16,
2005 (35-23); the bill was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly elections.
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections
The post-2006 political deadlock has manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and
subsequent elections, none of which has resolved fundamental differences over the fundamental power
balances power balance
between the executive and the legislature. Only fiveFive months after becoming leader, Amir
Sabah Sabah
suspended the Assembly in May 2006 when 29 opposition members demanded to question
the prime minister the
Prime Minister over the government’s refusal to endorse a proposal to reduce the number of
electoral districts to 5five, from 25. The opposition wanted to increase the size of each district so that
that it would be more difficult to influence the outcome through alleged “vote buying” or tribal
politics.
politics.
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June 2006 Election
In the June 29, 2006, election, the opposition, which attracted youth support under the “Orange”
banner, won 34 out of the 50 seats. The election was the first in which women could vote or run,
but none of the 27 female candidates (out of 249) won. The amir did, however, ultimately accept
the opposition’s demand to women candidates won. After the election, the Amir accepted demands to
reduce the number of electoral districts to five; and a law to implement
that went into that change, as of the next
election, took effect.
May 2008 Election
The schisms between the opposition and the government produced another crisis in March 2008
when the Assembly insisted on pay raises for state employees as a response to spiraling inflation.
The government refused, the cabinet resigned, and the amirAmir dissolved the Assembly and set new
elections for May 17, 2008. With the compression to 5Perhaps benefitting from the move from 25 to five electoral districts implemented, Sunni
,
Sunni Islamists and conservative tribal leaders won a total of 24 seats—an increase of 4four. Their
allies—
the so-called “liberals”—won seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one, to
a total
of five seats. Pro-government and other independent tribalists held the remaining 14 seats.
As in
the 2006 election, none of the 27 women candidates was elected.
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Almost immediately after the 2008 elections and related
After the appointment of a post-election cabinet appointments, Islamists agitated
unsuccessfully unsuccessfully
against the appointment of two women to the cabinet. The two female cabinet
members werefemale ministers: Nuriya al-Sebih, who was reappointed as the
education minister (after surviving a
January 2008 no-confidence vote), and Mudhi al-Humoud, a
liberal academic, who was
appointed as state minister for two positions: housing affairs and development for development
affairs. Another
woman, Ms. Masouma Mubarak, who was the first female minister ever in
Kuwait, had resigned
in September 2007 after some members of parliament blamed her for the Assembly accused her of
mismanagement.
Sunni-Shiite tensions added to the dissension within the Kuwaiti elite. Possibly as a spillover of
sectarian tensions in post-Saddam Iraq, recriminations flared in February 2008 after several Shiite
politicians attended a public ceremony commemorating the killing earlier that month of Lebanese
Hezbollah militant Imad Mughniyah. The sectarian tensions erupted even though the Shiite
representation in the cabinet was expanded to two ministers, up from one that was customary. In
. In November 2008, the cabinet
resigned when three Sunni Assembly deputies requested to question
the prime minister over
corruption allegations and his decision to permit the visit of an Iranian
Shiite cleric who was perceived as having slighted Sunnis. On December 1, 2008, the Amir
radical Iranian Shiite cleric.
However, the Amir subsequently reappointed Shaykh Nasser as prime minister, pending formation of a new cabinet, but he and did not
suspend the Assembly.
May 2009 Election
The power struggle between the government and opposition deputies in the AssemblyAssembly deputies resumed in
March 2009, when the Assembly insisted on questioning the prime minister over his management
of the global financial crisis and alleged misuse of public funds. The disputes had held up passage
of a proposed $5 billion fiscal stimulus and financial guarantees program. On March 19, 2009, the
Amir again suspended the Assembly, triggering new elections by May 19, 2009, under the
constitution (60 days from suspension). Theywithin 60 days.
The elections were held on May 16, 2009; turnout. Turnout was relatively
light at about 55% of the
385,000 eligible voters, and produced more than 20 new
parliamentarians, including 4 women—
the first to be elected. They included Masouma Mubarak,
mentioned above (a Shiite); Rola
Dashti, who had been narrowly defeated in 2006; and professors
Aseel al-Awadhi and Salwa al-
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Jassar. Jassar.
Perhaps reflecting the strengthened government position, immediately after the election,
the Amir
reappointed Shaykh Nasser as prime minister. There had been pre-election speculation that the
Amir would appoint the crown prince, Shaykh Nawwaf, as prime minister, concurrently, because
the Assembly is not able, constitutionally, to question the crown prince. The move would have
restored the tradition of appointing one official to hold the two positions, a tradition which was
adhered to until July 2003.
that the
The election of the women, and the setback for Sunni Islamists, signaled to some that Kuwaiti
voters wanted an Assembly that would work with the government. However, those hopes were
dashed in November 2009, when Assembly members filed motions to question four ministers,
including the defense minister,the defense
minister for alleged corruption in the arms sale process. The Assembly also
, and it demanded to question Prime
Minister Nasser for corruption in the 2008 elections. On December
8, 2009, the prime minister Prime Minister
agreed to the questioning, marking the first time in the Gulf region
that a head of government had
been successfully summoned by an elected body. A motion by 10
members cited the prime
minister for “noncooperation” with the Assembly, but, on December 17,
2009, a new election was
avoided when deputies voted 35-13 on a separate motion to express
confidence in the prime minister.
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Yet, the political deadlock did not break. After the session of parliament opened on October 26,
2010, government allies were appointed to key permanent committees 2 and opposition deputies
threatened to question the Interior Minister Jabir for his release from custody offor releasing from prison two Iranian drug
traffickers.
Others sought to question why the government was slow to implement a privatization
law passed
in the winter-spring 2010 session, but which entered into force in September 2010.
The tensions that built throughout 2010 carried over into 2011. AAssembly session. Security forces broke up a demonstration by
parliamentarians and civil society activists on December 8, 2010, protesting against what they asserted
were were
government attempts to limit National Assembly powers, was broken up by security forces.
That. The incident sparked another call to formally question the prime minister on December 28, 2010,
(the eighth time he appeared before the Assembly) and a date of January 5, 2011, was set for a noconfidence motion. Of the 50 elected Assembly members, 22 supported the no-confidence motion
and 25 opposed it, with 1 abstention, and 2 not voting.3 Some saw the vote as indicating that the
formally question the Prime Minister. He narrowly survived a no-confidence vote on January 5,
2011 because only 22 of the 50 Assembly deputies supported the motion.3 Some saw the vote as
indicating that the government is losing support among tribal deputies mainly from the outer
districts of Kuwait
City, which are inhabited by generally less affluent, naturalized citizens.4 The
vote did not resolve the disputes between the Assembly and the Al Sabah.
2011:
2011: Broader Arab Uprisings Add to Kuwait’s Political Crises
The January 5, 2011, no-confidence vote did not resolve the conflict between the government and
opposition deputies. Concurrently, the broader Arab uprisings affected the schisms within Kuwait
by bringingArab uprisings that began shortly after the January 2011 no-confidence vote in Kuwait
brought broader opposition elements in society into the political struggles in Kuwait.
Opposition After the
vote, opposition deputies, supported by youths under a banner called the “Fifth Fence,” and who were
were inspired by the Arab uprisings that began in January 2011, called for the resignation of Interior
Minister Jabir al-Khalid
Al Sabah for failing to prevent the alleged torturing to death of a man in
custody for illegal liquor sales. February 8, 2011, was set for a public protest—the same day the
interior minister was to be questioned by the Assembly. However, in advance of the questioning,
the minister resigned and was replaced by Shaykh Ahmad al Humud Al Sabah, and the Fifth
Fence postponed the protest until March 8, 2011. The protest was held but attracted only a few
hundred participants.
Popular protests did not
sales. In advance of a February 8, 2011 public protest planned to coincide with his questioning by
the Assembly, the Interior Minister resigned. The Fifth Fence postponed the planned protest until
March 8, 2011, but it attracted only a few hundred participants. Popular protests in Kuwait did not
broaden substantially, suggesting that popular frustration with
governance in Kuwait governance was not as broad aswidespread
as it was in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, where leaders were
toppled by unrest eventually toppled. However, the crisis
within the elite continued. On March 31, 2011, Shiite
The disputes within elite circles continued unabated when Shiite parliamentarian Saleh Ashour, in
March 2011, asked to question the foreign ministerForeign Minister about Kuwait’s sending of
naval forces as part of a Gulf Cooperation Council military intervention to naval forces to
assist Bahrain’s
government in its struggle against the Shiite opposition there. Many of Kuwait’s
2
“Govt Controls Key Assembly Panels.” Kuwait Times, October 27, 2010.
“Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011.
4
Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
3
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Shiites opposed that decision as unjustly supporting the Sunni Bahraini monarchy. Rather than
face questioning on the Bahrain issue, the cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Nasser was reappointed to a caretaker government, and a new cabinet, with only the Oil Minister and
Commerce Minister changing, was formed on May 8, 2011 (the seventh cabinet formed by
Shaykh Nasser since he became prime minister in 2006).
against the Shiite opposition there. Many of Kuwait’s Shiites opposed that decision
as unjustly supporting the Sunni Bahraini monarchy. Rather than face questioning on the Bahrain
issue, the cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Nasser was re-appointed to a caretaker government,
and a new cabinet, with few changes, was formed on May 8, 2011—the seventh cabinet formed
by Shaykh Nasser since he became prime minister in 2006. (Only the ministers for oil and for
commerce were changed.) Two days later, two National Assembly deputies asked to question the
prime minister over economic issues, although the Assembly voted, on May 17, 2011 (37 out of
47 members presented), to put off the questioning for one year.
2
“Govt Controls Key Assembly Panels.” Kuwait Times, October 27, 2010.
“Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011.
4
Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
3
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After a few months of relative quiet, the government came under renewed popular pressure in
September 2011 following reports that two of Kuwait’s largest banks had deposited $92 million
into the accounts of two National Assembly members—suggesting that the government had
sought to buy the loyalty of parliamentarians. The transfers, and those to seven other
parliamentarians, were placed under government investigation. The corruption case caused
thousands of Kuwait protesters to take to the streets on September 21, 2011, to call for the
resignation of the prime minister. On October 18, 2011, Deputy Prime and Foreign Minister Dr.
Mohammad Al Sabah, discussed earlier, resigned in protest of the alleged corruption. Two days
later, what many called the biggest demonstration in Kuwait of the year (an estimated 10,000)
demanded the prime minister’s resignation. Probably as a direct response to the allegations, on
September 25, 2011, the cabinet adopted an anti-corruption draft law.
The protests were accompanied by strikes in the oil industry and the state-run banking and health
care industry in September 2011. However, these job actions did not appear directly related to the
political disputes, but rather to disputes over pay, benefits, and working conditions.
The Fall of Another Government and February 2012 Election
On October 26, 2011, the prime minister opened the 2011-2012 National Assembly session by
blaming the parliamentary opposition for the lack of progress on key issues, but the challenges
did not abate. 2012-2013: Cycle of Frequent Elections and Increasing Demonstrations
The 2011-2012 National Assembly opened in late October 2011 with continued recriminations.
Opposition deputies boycotted committee meetings, and moderate liberals defected
and joined
with opposition deputies, giving the opposition enough votes for a successful noconfidence no-confidence
motion against the prime minister. On November 16, 2011, opposition deputies and
oppositionists in the publicoppositionist in and outside the
Assembly, including the Fifth Fence, forced their way into the Assembly
building and demanded the prime minister
the Prime Minister’s resignation. The Amir issued a decree tightening
security at the building, but
the political pressure continued and on November 28, 2011, Prime
Minister Nasser resigned.
Amir Switches Prime Ministers
Rather than again reappointing Shaykh Nasser as a caretaker, the Amir appointed another royal
family member, then Defense Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, as prime minister. He
was sworn in, but without first naming a new cabinet, on December 4, 2011. Two days later, on
December 6, 2011, he recommended (and the Amir- and Amir Sabah concurred with)- dissolution of the National
Assembly and new elections. Although some questioned the constitutionality of the dissolution
because a new government had not been fully formed, the dissolution was accepted by major
political blocs and the country started preparing for Assembly elections within the constitutionally
mandated 60 days. The election was set for February 2, 2012country started preparing for Assembly
elections set for February 2, 2012 (within the constitutionally mandated 60 days).
Subsequently, opposition deputies began nominating themselves as candidates. Primary elections
are formally banned, although some tribes hold informal “tribal primaries” to determine who their
candidate will be. On December 6, 2011, a group of 20 opposition deputies announced they
would compete as one “Opposition Bloc.” Opposition youth leaders announced they would back
opposition deputies who would push for a fully elected government in which the prime minister is
selected by the Assembly, legalization of political parties, and election law changes. Such
announcements confirmed the fears of the royal family that dissolving the Assembly and holding
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new elections would empower oppositionists sympathetic to the 2011 Arab uprisings. However,
refusing to call a new election would have portrayed the government as attempting to cover up its
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own alleged corruption. Some secular oppositionists feared that a new election would increase the
ranks of Islamist deputies, who are well organized.
February 2, 2012, Election ResultsAnd Aftermath
Many of the mainstream predictions appeared to be realized in the February 2, 2012, election. As
shown in Table 1 below, groups opposed to the government won at least 32 of the 50 seats.
Islamist groups increased their influence markedly and they and their allies who oppose the
government took control of the Assembly’s agenda. They benefitted at the expense of the progovernment independent deputies who were defeated decisively, many of whom were the
Assembly members alleged to have received government funds in the scandal discussed above.
Kuwaiti liberals lost support and, in a blow to secular Kuwaitis, none of the 19 women who ran,
including the 4 incumbents, was elected. Turnout was about 62%, up from the 58% of the 2009
election. A leading opposition figure, Ahmad al-Sadun, a previous speaker (1985-1999), returned
to that post when the Assembly convened in February 2012, replacing the relatively progovernment Jassim Al-Khurafi, a major figure in Kuwait’s merchant community.
The new government formed after the election was again headed by Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir
al-Mubarak Al Sabah. He appointed about 10 new ministers and retained the remainder. No
women were appointed. And, theThe government refused opposition demands to appoint
oppositionists to at least 9 of the 16 cabinet positions—the government only appointed 4 such
ministers, contributing to the Assembly’s assertiveness in challenging the government.
No Abatement of the Crisis and Second Election in 2012
Almost immediately after a new cabinet took over, the seeming intractability of the political crisis
was reaffirmed. In
at least nine cabinet positions, appointing instead four such ministers. And, as expected, the new
Assembly immediately asserted itself: in March 2012, Shiite deputy Ashour filed a successful
motion to question the
prime minister about alleged failure to fully investigate official corruption
allegations—an issue
that had caused the Central Bank governor to resign in February 2012. The prime minister was
Prime Minister was questioned on March 28, 2012, but opponents did not file a vote of no-confidencenoconfidence motion. In May
2012, the finance minister resigned after a parliamentary “grilling,”
and, on June 12, 2012, the
minister of social affairs and labor Minister of Social Affairs and Labor resigned rather than face
parliamentary grilling on the issue of
risingabout high food prices.
With the Assembly insisting on grilling the interior ministerInterior Minister, on June 18, 2012, the Amir exercised
exercised his prerogative under Article 106 of the constitution to suspend the Assembly for one
month—a
temporary suspension renewable for another two months (but with the concurrence of the
the Assembly). The suspension extended nearlyalmost to the holy month of Ramadan, at which time the
Assembly is not in session anyway, meaning the Assembly would be closed until October 2012.
Court Reinstates 2009 Assembly
That attempt to reduce tensions was thrown into disarray on June 20, 2012, when a constitutional
Second Election in 2012 Triggered by Court Decision
On June 20, 2012, Kuwait’s constitutional court ruled that the December 20122011 suspension was not
conducted in accordance with the
constitution, on the grounds that a new cabinet had not been
sworn in before the Amir’s suspension was
ordered. The court ordered the previous (elected in
2009) Assembly reinstated. Although the reinstated
Assembly was, by composition, less confrontational2009 Assembly was friendlier to the government than
the one elected in
February 2012, the matter was unsettled. The previous Assemblyruling increased political turmoil in Kuwait. The Assembly
elected in February 2012 questioned the court’s voiding
of the election, and the reinstated 2009
Assembly did not meet at all.
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New Elections Set
The government, for its part,
The government requested the constitutional court revisit the number of election districts—a
motion that its critics said was a prelude to gerrymandering districts to ensure a pro-government
majority emerges from subsequent elections
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majority. The court ruled against the government on
September 26, 2012, and, on October 8,
2012, the Amir formally disbanded the National
Assembly under the constitution, requiring new elections within 60 days. On October 19, 2012,
the Amir announced an. He later set a
new election date of December 1, 2012, along withand simultaneously issued a decree altering the
election election
law to allow voters in each district to vote for only one candidate—not the four per
district in
prior law. The Amir’s decision—announced as an effort to avoid chaos produced by the
continued continued
government-Assembly power struggle—was seen as likely to produce a progovernment Assembly because it complicates by the opposition as an effort to complicate
opposition efforts to forge alliances in each district.
Some observers said the Amir’s election
decree did not necessarily favor any side—in part
because the opposition could benefit from “one
man one vote” just as easily as the government
could. According to many observers, opposition
anger at the decree was fueled mainly by the
perception of the Amir’s arbitrary exercise of power by the Amir.
The opposition rallied against the revised election rules—on October 21, 2012, it held an
unprecedented demonstration, consisting of an estimated 50,000-150,000 Kuwaitis marching
toward the iconic Kuwait Towers landmark. The demonstration was suppressed by security
forces; there were injuries reported, but no deaths, and some parliamentarians and even some
younger members of the Sabah family were arrested. Smaller demonstrations took place
subsequently and up until the December 1 election, including, including one held on October 31, 2012, to call calling for the
freeing of outspoken
oppositionist Musallam al-Barrak, a former parliamentarian who was
arrested on October 15, 2012, for alleged insults to
2012 for allegedly insulting the Amir. On November 2, 2012, following a
night of clashes
between protesters and security forces, the government announced it would act to
enforce an October
2012 ban on gatherings of over 20 persons.
Election Held, Results, and Implications
In concert with its demonstrations, the opposition announced it would boycott the December 1
elections. It and formed “boycott committees” to try to persuade Kuwaitis not to run or to vote. Still,
broaden that effort. Still, the government
went forward with the vote, under and implementation of the Amir’s controversial election decree. The government
government reported turnout wasof about 40% of the approximately 400,000 eligible voters. The vote produced
an Assembly that is overwhelming—almost entirely—
produced an Assembly overwhelming “pro-government.” It consisted” and consisting of many
new members .
because 38 out of the 50 incumbents did not run for re-election. Seventeen
Shiites— including
five Islamist Shiites of the National Islamic Alliance—were elected,
approximately double the
highest total the Shiites have ever had in the Assembly. Three females,
including Masouma
Mubarak, were elected. Some Sunni Islamists were elected, but—with the
exception of two in the
Salafi grouping—they were generally not affiliated with the Sunni
Islamist political societies that
have been present in the Assembly for decades.
On December 5, 2012, the Amir asked the previous Prime Minister, Shaykh Jabir Mubarak, to
form a new cabinet. The opposition has continued demonstrating to try to force change on the Al
Sabah. However, the government, has tried , and demonstrations, some of them large, have become a regular occurrence in Kuwait.
Kuwaiti diplomats say that some demonstrations have been called off after talks with the
government, and that the opposition is committed to nonviolence. Still, the government has tried
to move forward on long stalled legislation with a
solidly supportive Assembly. One bill that was
enacted by the Assembly on March 20, 2013,
gives about 4,000 “bidoons” (stateless residents, discussed below) citizenship.
Although the government has sought to use its overwhelming majority in the Assembly to move
forward on legislation, the political crisis in Kuwait has expanded from what was mainly a
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dispute among elites into an broader struggle between the regime and many segments of the
population. Demonstrations are now a regular occurrence in Kuwait, and some of them are large.
There has not been the use of violence by demonstrators, but some experts express concern that
the political situation in Kuwait could evolve into an all-out uprising.
On the other hand, opposition demands continue to remain relatively confined to calls for a
constitutional monarchy, in which the elected parliament selects the cabinet. Kuwaiti diplomats
say that some demonstrations have been called off after talks with the government, and that the
opposition is committed to nonviolence. Kuwait’s long tradition of electoral politics and political
openness will help the government avoid a call for outright regime replacement. And, many
experts say, the general economic well-being in Kuwait means that Kuwaitis have a lot to lose if
the society splits outright, and these concerns are dividing and weakening the opposition. On the
other hand, those assessments might change if the government uses excessive force against
protests and there are substantial protester deaths.
Some experts are concerned that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, among other Gulf states, might be
encouraging the Sabah family to initiate a firm crackdown that might only stoke opposition
activity further. The increase in government arrests of activists who criticize the Amir on social
media
discussed below) citizenship.
Another Court-Triggered Election in July 2013
The Amir’s election decree remained under challenge since the December 2012 election. On June
16, 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Amir’s decree that each person would vote for
only one candidate (reduced from four) was constitutional, but it dissolved the Assembly on the
basis of improper technicalities in the Amir’s election decree. The Kuwaiti cabinet subsequently
set new elections (to be the sixth election in five years) for July 27, 2013. A total of 418
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candidates have registered, of which eight are female. Some opposition societies announced a
boycott but others announced they would participate, leading observers to predict that turnout of
the 435,000 eligible voters would exceed the 40% of the December 2012 election.
Although Kuwait remains in political turmoil, opposition demands continue to remain relatively
confined to calls for a constitutional monarchy, in which the elected parliament selects the
cabinet. Kuwait’s long tradition of electoral politics and political openness will help the
government avoid a call for outright regime replacement. And, many experts say, the general
economic well-being in Kuwait means that Kuwaitis have a lot to lose if the society splits
outright, and these concerns are dividing and weakening the opposition. On the other hand, those
assessments might change if the government begins to use signficant force against protests and
there are substantial protester deaths.
Some experts are concerned that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, among other Gulf states, might
encourage the Sabah family to initiate a firm crackdown that might only stoke opposition activity
further. The increase in government arrests of activists who criticize the Amir on social media
might support those taking this view.
Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2012
Ideology/Affiliation
Sunni Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood and
Salafi, including tribalists. generally opposes
the government)
Post-2008 Election
Post-2009 Vote
Post-Feb. 2012
Vote
Post December
2012 Vote
24
14
23
4
Liberals (generally opposition)
7
8
5
1
Popular Action Bloc (generally opposition)
0
2
4
0
Shiite (generally pro-government)
5
9
7
17
14
17
11
28
0
4
0
3
Sunni Independents (includes tribalists,
pro-business deputies and women).
Generally pro-government
Women (generally pro-government)
Included in categories above
Source: CRS, based on articles and analysis from various observers.
Note: Some members of the National Assembly might span several different categories and several sources
often disagree on precise categorizations of the members of the Assembly.
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests
Perhaps because the unrest in Kuwait was relatively minor until late 2012, and conducted within a
constitutional framework, the Obama Administration has
made few comments on it. However,
apparentlyApparently concerned that the situation might behave been deteriorating,
on October 23, 2012—following
the large protest discussed above—the State Department said the
United States “call[s] on all
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sides to exercise restraint.” The statement indirectly criticized the
government’s ban on large
public gatherings. Still, there has been no overall alteration of the
U.S.-Kuwait relationship as a
result of Kuwait’s handling of the unrest, although some U.S.
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officials are concerned that a
deteriorating situation in Kuwait could complicate U.S. efforts to
maintain a capable military
presence in the northern Persian Gulf region. Other U.S. officials reportedly are concerned that
prolonged unrest in Kuwait could help Islamist extremist there gain strength, as has happened in
other countries in the Middle East since the Arab uprisings began in 2011.Persian Gulf region.
As an example of potential implications for the United States, in September 2012 some Kuwaiti
Islamist parliamentarians called for a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait to
condemn the “Innocence of Muslims” video produced privately in the United States. The
parliamentarians who attended the September 13, 2012 protest withdrew from it after some
demonstrators called for storming the Embassy. Kuwaiti forces pushed protesters from the
Embassy grounds and the Embassy was not attacked. Anti-U.S. sentiment among oppositionists
in Kuwait, currently relatively muted, could increase substantially if the opposition-government
confrontation acceleratesThe Embassy was not attacked, but anti-U.S.
sentiment could increase if the government uses violence against protesters.
The unrest has not caused a suspension ofan interruption or alteration to U.S. democracy programs in Kuwait, including
including discussions with Kuwaiti leaders, public diplomacy, and building civil society using
funds from
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and other accounts. In Kuwait, MEPI
funds have
been used to enhance the capabilities of the media, to promote women’s rights, to support
support democracy initiatives, and to provide a broad spectrum of educational opportunities.
Broader Human Rights Issues
On broader human rights issues, the latest State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 20112012, released May 24, 2012, reiterated comments in previous reports that there are
limitations in citizens’ rights to change their government, and that authorities restrict freedom of
speech and assembly. On May 10,April 19, 2013, largely reiterated the criticisms of previous reports. In
May 2011, Kuwait took over Syria’s bid for a seat on the U.N.
Human Rights Council when Syria, violently suppressing serious popular unrest, decided to
compete for the seat in 2013 instead of 2011 Human Rights Council.
Women’s Rights
Women have made significant strides in achieving their rights in Kuwait over the past several
years, as exemplified by their running and winning election to the National Assembly. However,
the election of women has not translated into an expansion of women in the cabinet; there was
only one. There was
one woman in the 2011 cabinet—Dr. Amani Khalid Burisli, who served as minister of commerce
and industry. No women were elected in the February 2, 2012, election—although that election
was overturned and the women in the prior Assembly were technically reseated—and none was
appointed to the cabinet that took office in February 2012. In mid-September 2012, the Higher
The current cabinet has former parliamentarian Rola Dashti serving as Minister of
State for Development Affairs. As discussed above, three women were elected in the December
2012 election. In September 2012, the Higher Judicial Council decided to appoint seven women
as public prosecutors—, a decision that drew
strong criticism from Kuwaiti Islamists.
More broadly, women in Kuwait can drive, unlike their counterparts in neighboring Saudi Arabia,
and there are several nongovernmental organizations run by Kuwaiti women, such as the Kuwait
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, that are dedicated to improving rights for women and to
agitating on several different issues unrelated to gender. Still, women are subject to a broad array
of discriminatory practices and abuses. For many years, successive State Department human
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rights reports have noted that violence against women, particularly expatriate women working in
domestic service roles, is allegedly frequent. Kuwaiti law, for example, does not specifically
prohibit domestic violence. A New York Times investigative report of August 2, 2010, described
difficulties faced by expatriate female domestic workers in Kuwait, including nonpayment of
wages, physical or sexual abuse, and withholding of passports.5example, the law does not specifically prohibit
domestic violence, although courts try such cases as assault. Successive State Department and
outside human rights reports have asserted that violence particularly against expatriate women
working in domestic service roles is frequent. Some expatriate women have also been subjected
to nonpayment of wages and withholding of passports.5
5
Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
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Trafficking in Persons
Kuwait was, for the sixth year in a row, designated by the State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons report for 20122013 (issued June 19, 20122013, cited earlier) as ain “Tier Three” (worst level)
country. The Tier Three . The
designation has been maintained because, according to the 20122013 report,
Kuwait is “not making
sufficient efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination
of trafficking. The
report emphasizes that the National Assembly still has not enacted a
comprehensive draft anti-trafficking law that has been on its agenda since November 2009.
Status of “Bidoons”notes that Kuwait adopted an anti-trafficking law in March 2013, but did not demonstrate
significant efforts to prosecute and convict trafficking offenders using previously existing laws,
and there is now lead national anti-trafficking coordinating body.
Status of “Bidoons”and Other Expatriates
Non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and approximately 106,000 stateless residents (known as “bidoons”)
continue to face discrimination. On October 26, 2010, then Prime Minister Nasser said the government
government would soon implement a plan to resolve the legal and economic status of the bidoons, although
although the lack of resolution contributed to the March 11, 2011, demonstration discussed above.
Following that demonstration, the government set up a “Central System for Remedying the Status
of Illegal Residents,” with a mandate to resolve the status of the bidoons within five years. During
2011, the government granted citizenship to several hundred bidoons but 80100,000 bidoon
citizenship requests were pending at the end of 20112012. As noted above, legislation was passed by
the National Assembly in March 2013 to give 4,000 bidoons citizenship.
Still, the issue of citizenship and immigration policy remains at issue. On September 20, 2012,
security forces raided a suburb of Kuwait City and arrested over 2,100 persons. The detainees
were alleged violators of residency laws, mostly Asians.
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms
Official press censorship ended in 1992, assisting the growth of a vibrant press, but successive
State Department human rights reports have asserted that the government does not always respect
the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and the press. The government monitors
Internet communications for defamation and security reasons. And, by law, newspaper publishers
must be licensed by the Ministry of Information. The law also prohibits material that insults
Islam, the amir, the constitution, or the judicial system.
As noted, Government attempts to monitor and act against critics has increased as governmentopposition tensions have increased in recent years. One case of alleged repression against a
journalist and blogger, Mohammad Abd al Qadir al-Jasem, attracted attention from human rights
groups and some Kuwait parliamentarians. Al-Jasem was arrested in 2009 and then arrested again
on May 10, 2010, for allegedly “instigating to overthrow the regime” by slandering the prime
minister at a diwaniyya. Supporters say his treatment reflected unwarranted and unconstitutional
5
Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
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repression against a government critic, and Al-Jasem reportedly conducted a hunger strike while
in jail. A Kuwaiti judge ordered his release on bail on June 28, 2010. He was sentenced to one
year in jail in November 2010 but was released in February 2011.
Arrests and prosecutions have increased since the Arab uprisings began. In June 2011, two people
were arrested in Kuwait for Internet postings critical of the Kuwaiti and Bahraini leadership. In
April 2011, security officers arrested and deported 21 Egyptian nationals resident in Kuwait for
attending meetings in support of Egyptian opposition figure Dr. Mohammad El Baradei. In March
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2012, a Kuwaiti court suspended the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Dar for allegedly publishing articles
that insulted Shiites and could incite sectarian strife. In April 2012, Kuwaiti writer Mohammad alMulaifi was sentenced to seven years in prison for writing on Twitter about sectarian divisions in
Kuwait. Since 2012, the Public Prosecution Office has charged 35 Kuwaitis with offending the
Amir for criticizing him on Twitter, Facebook, or other media. However, suggesting that some in
Kuwait do not want to impinge on free expression as a reaction to the unrest, in February 2013
courts acquitted five persons charged with offending the Amir.
Labor Rights
The government allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the
Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic
workers, are allowed to join unions, and the government has tended not to impede strikes. As
mentioned above, on October 26, 2011, the prime minister criticized the strikes in key sectors in
September and October 2011 as “tantamount to attacks on the state’s status, sovereignty, its
interests, and its citizens,” and “cannot be tolerated.”
Religious Freedom
On religious freedom, the State Department religious freedom report for July-December 2010
(released September 13, 2011) reported “no change” in the status of respect for religious freedom
by the Kuwaiti government during the reporting period. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s
population) continue to report official discrimination, including limited access to religious
education and the perceived government unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite
mosques. Unlike in Bahrain, Shiites are well represented in the police force and the
military/security apparatus, although they generally are not offered leadership positions in those
institutions. On the other hand, in early April 2012, the Kuwaiti ministry that oversees houses of
worship said it will begin monitoring Shiite mourning houses known as Husseiniyas, but it also
stated that it is considering providing state funds to Shiite mosques, as it does for Sunni mosques.
On June 6, 2012, the amir refused to sign (vetoed) a National Assembly bill stipulating the death
penalty for those who curse the major In mid-April 2013, outspoken
former parliamentarian Musallam al-Barrak, mentioned earlier, was sentenced to five years in
prison for insulting the Amir; his sentence was overturned on May 27, 2013. That followed the
February 2013 acquittal of five persons charged with offending the Amir.
Labor Rights
The law protects the right of workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain
collectively, but contains significant restrictions. The government allows one trade union per
occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF).
Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are allowed to join unions, and the
government has tended not to impede strikes.
On October 10, 2011, about 3,000 customs officers went on strike demanding higher wages and
better working conditions; the action caused a temporary halt to Kuwaiti oil exports. On October
26, 2011, the government criticized the strikes as “tantamount to attacks on the state’s status,
sovereignty, its interests, and its citizens,” and “cannot be tolerated.” In early 2012, strikes briefly
grounded state-owned Kuwait Airways.
Religious Freedom
The State Department religious freedom report for 2012 (released May 20, 2013), cite earlier,
reported that the “trend” in the government’s respect for religious freedom “did not change
significantly” during 2012. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s population) continue to report
official discrimination, including limited access to religious education and the perceived
government unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite mosques. Unlike in Bahrain,
Shiites are well represented in the police force and the military/security apparatus, although they
generally are not offered leadership positions in those institutions. On the other hand, in early
April 2012, the Kuwaiti ministry that oversees houses of worship said it will begin monitoring
Shiite mourning houses known as Husseiniyas, but it also stated that it is considering providing
state funds to Shiite mosques, as it does for Sunni mosques. On June 6, 2012, the Amir refused to
sign (vetoed) a National Assembly bill stipulating the death penalty for those who curse the major
figures and symbols of Islam, including the Quran.
Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches to serve the approximately 450,000
Christians (mostly foreign residents) in Kuwait. However, press reports in April 2012 said that
Islamists in the Kuwaiti National Assembly, empowered by the results of the February 2012
elections, announced that they would introduce legislationNational Assembly
have sometimes sought to prevent the building of new
churches in Kuwait.6 Members of religions
not sanctioned in the Quran—including about 400 Baha’i’s, 100,000 Buddhists, and 600,000
Hindus, and 10,000 Sikhs—are mostly non-citizens working in Kuwait and have not been
allowed to operate official places of worship. They have been permitted to worship in their
homes.
6
Middle East Media Research Institute. “In Kuwait, Public Debate Over Demand to Demolish Churches,” April 10,
2012.
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6
Middle East Media Research Institute. “In Kuwait, Public Debate Over Demand to Demolish Churches,” April 10,
2012.
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Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs—are not allowed to operate official places of worship, but they are
allowed to worship in their homes. These religions are practiced mostly by the South Asian and
East Asian workers resident in Kuwait.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation
Kuwait has been a pivotal partner of the United States through three Gulf wars: the Iran-Iraq War,
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (overthrow of Saddam Hussein). In all
three cases, Kuwait’s security was directly at stake, but U.S. officials stress that Kuwait went to
extraordinary lengths to support U.S. policy and operations. As a result of the complete U.S.
troops withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, Kuwait’s cooperation could become even more
crucial to U.S. efforts to ensure Iraq’s stability.
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an embassy upon
Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state to establish relations
with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the United States until the IranIraq War (1980-1988). Kuwait and the United States grew politically and militarily close during
that war because of its spillover to Kuwait. Through intimidation, Iran sought to compel Kuwait
not to support Iraq in that war. Iran fired at and struck some Kuwaiti oil facilities, including the Al
Ahmadi terminal, with Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles. In 1987-1988, the United States
established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international
shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). As part of the skirmishes between
the United States and Iran in the course of that operation, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti oil installation
(Sea Island terminal).
Assistance in Addressing the Threat from IraqIraq Invasion Deepens The U.S.-Kuwait Alliance
Believing Saddam Hussein would reward Kuwait for assisting Iraq financially and logistically
during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the August 1990 Iraqi invasion. Iraq’s
public justification was an accusation that Kuwait was overproducing oil and thereby harming
Iraq’s ability to repay its debts and recover economically from the long war with Iran. However,
most experts believe that the invasion was a result of Saddam’s intent to dominate the Persian
Gulf politically, economically, and militarily. Kuwait was liberated by the U.S.-led January 16February 28, 1991, “Desert Storm” offensive that expelled Iraqi troops, and its leaders, who spent
the occupation period in exile in Saudi Arabia, were restored to power in Kuwait.
Bilateral Defense PactCooperation Agreement
The U.S.-led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War led to a
deepening of the U.S.-Kuwait security relationship, the cornerstone of which was a broad 10-year
defense pact signed on September 19, 1991. Although the text is classified, the pact reportedly
provides for mutual discussions in the event of a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. evaluation
of, advice to, and training of Kuwaiti forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning of U.S. military
equipment (armor for a U.S. brigade); and U.S. access to a range of Kuwaiti facilities, such as Ali
al-Salem Air Base, Camp Arifjan, and Camp Buehring.7 A related Status of Forces Agreement
7
Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
(continued...)
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(SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law—a
common feature of such arrangements. In September 2001, the pact was renewed for another 10
years, and it was widely assumed among experts on Kuwait that renewal in September 2011
7
Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute. p. 27.
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would be a formality. However, neither the Defense of the State Department has announced
whether this presumed renewal schedule is operative, raising the possibility that it had earlier
been extended beyond September 2011.8
The Iraq Containment Era
EffortsJoint Efforts to Address The Continuing Threat Posed by Saddam
U.S. and allied efforts to contain Saddam Hussein after the 1991 war depended heavily on
Kuwait. Kuwait
contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent Iraq containment
efforts—it paid $16.059
billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm and funded two-thirdstwothirds of the $51 million
per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
(UNIKOM) that
monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait also contributed about $350 million
per year for U.S.
military costs of Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations, including the 1992-2003
19922003 enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch), involving
1,000
Kuwait-based U.S. Air Force personnel. During the 1990s, the United States prepositioned
enough armor in Kuwait to outfit one combat brigade, and there were generally about 4,000 or
more U.S. troops stationed there at any given time. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces
during the major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, which ousted the Taliban from
power in Afghanistan.
Supporting the U.S.-Led Effort to Militarily Oust Saddam/Major Non-NATO
Ally Designation
Given that Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, Kuwait enthusiastically supported, although
quietly, the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation
Iraqi Freedom [OIF]). It hosted the vast bulk of the U.S. invasion force of about 250,000 forces,
as well as the other coalition troops that entered Iraq. To secure that force, Kuwait closed off its
entire northern half for weeks before the invasion. It also allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its
international airport, and sea ports; and provided $266 million in burden sharing support to the
combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.
Recognizing Kuwait’s consistent and multi-faceted cooperation, particularly with U.S. operations
in Iraq, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Afghanistan obtained that
designation in 2012.
Helping U.S. Efforts to Stabilize Post-Saddam Iraq
During 2003-2011, when U.S. troops were in Iraq, there were an average of 25,000 U.S. troops
based in Kuwait (not including those rotating into Iraq) at a given time, primarily supporting the
(...continued)
Studies Institute. p. 27.
8
The executive branch has not provided CRS with requested information on the current status of the pact, including its
duration and whether it has been modified in recent years.
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U.S. forces moving into or out of Iraq. The main U.S. staging facility in Kuwait is Camp Arifjan
and a desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring; it is at these locations that equipment from the
Iraq battlefield has been cleaned, repaired, and packed up for return to the United States or stored
in regional prepositioning sites. U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces
in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005.
8
The executive branch has not provided CRS with requested information on the current status of the pact, including its
duration and whether it has been modified in recent years.
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In order to promote Iraqi stability after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait took a number of
major steps: it built a water line into Iraq, and it ran a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that
gave over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis from 2003-2011. A Kuwaiti company, First Kuwaiti
General Trading and Contracting, was lead contractor on the large U.S. embassy in Iraq that
opened in January 2009. On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s
stability, which included the United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries. On July 18,
2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a
retired general. Momen is a Shiite Muslim, and his appointment signaled Kuwait’s acceptance
that Iraq is dominated politically by Shiites.
According to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed about $210 million per
year in similar in-kind support to help defray the costs incurred by U.S. military personnel that
have rotated through Kuwait into or out of Iraq for operations in Iraq. For FY2012, Kuwait
contributed $350 million for these purposes, according to the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). Kuwaiti contributions ran higher in FY2012 than in prior years
because of the work that was done in Kuwait to clean, store, and return to the United States
weapons and equipment withdrawn from Iraq.
Kuwait served as the key exit route for U.S. troops as they implemented President Obama’s
February 27, 2009, drawdown plan and then his October 21, 2011, announcement that all U.S.
troops would be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The United States and Iraq discussed retaining
3,000—15, 000 U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011 to continue training Iraqi forces. However, Iraq
and the United States were unable to agree on a legal status framework for retaining U.S. troops,
and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011.
Kuwait’s Role in Long-Term Gulf Security
Prior to the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, there was discussion that the United States might build up
forces in Kuwait, with potential to intervene in Iraq if the Iraqi Security Forces run into
difficulty.9 A substantial U.S. force in Kuwait would also presumably add to U.S. capabilities to
confront Iran if disputes with the United States over its nuclear program and its role in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf were to escalate.
Even though violence in Iraq has continued, including some multi-locations high profile attacks
in July and August 2012, there has been no significant increase in U.S. forces in Kuwait. At the
time of the withdrawal, deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told journalists that “There
are not really plans to have any substantial increases in any other parts of the Gulf as this war
winds down.”10 A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published June 19,
9
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_iraq1201_09_26.asp; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee
Myers. “U.S. Is Planning Buildup in Gulf After Iraq Exit.” New York Times, October 30, 2011; Pauline Jelinek,
“Kuwait, U.S. Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
10
“The Cable: Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin.” Washington Post, December 22, 2011. p. 17.
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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
2012, said that the United States will keep about 13,500 troops in Kuwait indefinitely —
somewhat less than the 25,000 there during the U.S. presence in Iraq. TheThen Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta noted, in his last trip to Kuwait in that post in December 2012, that there were about
13,500 U.S. troops in Kuwait.11
The troops assigned to Kuwait during the Iraq mission were mostly support forces. Some of the
Some of the U.S. forces stationed in Kuwait since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are combat
troops, not purely
support forces.12 This alteredenhanced mix of U.S. forces in Kuwait indicates that the
United States wants
to retain combat power in close proximity to both Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, the Defense
Department closed a logistics hub in Kuwait in late 2012, suggesting that the Department is not as
9
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_iraq1201_09_26.asp; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee
Myers. “U.S. Is Planning Buildup in Gulf After Iraq Exit.” New York Times, October 30, 2011; Pauline Jelinek,
“Kuwait, U.S. Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
10
“The Cable: Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin.” Washington Post, December 22, 2011. p. 17.
11
Thom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East. New York Times, December 11,
2012.
12
Michelle Tan. “15,000 in Kuwait, At Least For Now.” Army Times, January 16, 2012.
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hand, the Defense Department closed a logistics hub in Kuwait in late 2012, suggesting that the
Department is not as dependent on a Kuwait presence as it was when U.S. troops were in Iraq.
Possibly signaling that Kuwait wants to be fully integrated into post-U.S. withdrawal security
structures, including with other U.S. partners, it was reported in December 2011 that NATO is
discussing
discussed with Kuwait opening a center in Kuwait City. This iswas a follow-on to a decision taken in
in Istanbul in June 2004 under the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).” Kuwait joined the ICI in
in December 2004. The NATO center in Kuwait has not opened, to date, in part because the ICI
has languished as NATO member states face significant financial constraints.
U.S. Security Assistance
Although the threat from Iraq is low compared to what it was during the Saddam era, the United
States continues to bolster Kuwait’s defense capabilities. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait
defense relationship, enhanced by thein recent years by small amounts of U.S. assistance shown in
Table 2 below,
has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. Kuwait receives very
has received very small amounts of U.S. assistance because of its ability to fund its own security
requirements and,
as noted above, Kuwait has been mainly a donor to U.S. operations rather than
a recipient of U.S.
funds. As a result of Kuwaiti recruitment efforts, its military has now nearly
regained its pre-Iraq
invasion strength of 17,000. In 2008, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
established in Kuwait
a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the
region—among its
objectives is to help Kuwait establish a more capable navy.
Arms Sales
U.S. arms sales have sought to enhance Kuwait’s capability. In 2010, Kuwait agreed to purchase
$1.6 billion in U.S. defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales Program.
U.S. sales to Kuwait are intended to comport with the overall goals of the “Gulf Security
Dialogue” program designed to contain Iran by enhancing the individual and joint capabilities of
the Gulf states. Kuwait is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles. Major post-1991
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) include the following:
•
218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993. Delivery was completed in
1998.
•
A 1992 sale of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210
Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million. Delivery was completed by 1998.
11
Thom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East. New York Times, December 11,
2012.
12
Michelle Tan. “15,000 in Kuwait, At Least For Now.” Army Times, January 16, 2012.
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Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at
Kuwait in the 2003 war.
•
A 1992 sale of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 is under
consideration).
•
A September 2002 sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the
Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940 million.
•
A December 4, 2007, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification
to Congress reported a sale to Kuwait of 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60
PAC-2 missiles and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion.
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•
On September 9, 2008, DSCA notified a sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and
services, with a total value of $178 million.
•
On August 11, 2010, the Administration notified Congress of another potential
Patriot-related sale—of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced Missile-T” (GEM-T)
missiles valued at $900 million. The prime contractor for that system is
Raytheon.
•
On February 27, 2012, the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of
80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER missiles, and associated parts and support, with an
estimated value of $105 million. The sale, if completed, would help Kuwait
modernize its fighter aircraft and enhance interoperability with U.S. aircraft.
•
On July 20, 2012, the Administration notified a potential sale of 60 Patriot
missiles and 20 Patriot launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total
value of the sale could reach $4.2 billion.
•
On April 17, 2013, the Adminsitration notified a potential sale to Kuwait of one
C-17 cargo aircraft and associated equipment, with an estimated total cost of
$371 million.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
As noted in Table 2 below, in recent years Kuwait has received very small amounts of funding
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. However, Kuwait
sends military students to U.S. military institutions to study intelligence, pilot training, and other
disciplines. In FY2010, Kuwait spent about $9.7 million to provide such education for 216
Kuwaiti military students. IMET funding that has been provided to Kuwait has been primarily to
get Kuwait a discount for Kuwait-funded trainees in U.S. programs.
There have been no U.S.
assistance to Kuwait since FY2010.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)
FY2006FY06
International Military
Training
Military Training
and Education
(IMET).
Non-Proliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, DeMining and Related
(NADR).
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
-
19
14
0
10
0
0
0
628
1,025
0
0
0
0
0
0
Congressional Research Service
De-Mining and
Related (NADR).
Congressional Research Service
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
-
19
14
0
10
628
1,025
0
0
0
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Foreign Policy Issues
Kuwait and the United States largely share a common threat perception and cooperate on a wide
range of regional issues. After the United States, Kuwait’s most important security alliance is with
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of fellow Gulf monarchies. However, the
GCC is not perceived as able to provide Kuwait, or any of its members, with as extensive a
security umbrella as can the United States. In May 2012, Saudi Arabia proposed a close political
union among the GCC states—a position that ran into opposition from several GCC states,
including Kuwait, and was not adopted. Kuwait has a much longer experience with elections and
parliamentary process than does Saudi Arabia or the other GCC states, and most Kuwaitis are
perceived as fearful of backsliding on democracy were there to be such a GCC union.
Outstanding Bilateral Issues With Iraq
Even though Iraq no longer poses a strategic threat to Kuwait, Iraq’s stability and the bilateral
Iraq-Kuwait relationship remain paramount Kuwaiti foreign policy concerns. As noted, Kuwait
Kuwait has tried to
build political ties to the dominant Iraqi factions in order to ensure there is no repeat
of the 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the Iraqi Shiite-led violence that rocked Kuwait in the
1980s. Iraq’s
U.S.-built post-Saddam military is judged insufficiently strong to commit
aggression against a
neighbor. The presence of U.S. forces in Kuwait further diminishes the
possibility of conventional
military conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. On July 18, 2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador
to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a retired general. Momen is a Shiite
Muslim, and his appointment signaled Kuwait’s acceptance that Iraq is dominated politically by
Shiites.
Violence emanating from extremist groups in Iraq is a more viable threat to Kuwait. The
December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted
assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party. This is the party that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki heads, although the party no
longer has a militia wing. Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks, and Da’wa
activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987. In July 2011, an Iraqi Shiite militia supported
by Iran (the militia of cleric Moqtada Al Sadr) rocketed Kuwait’s embassy in Iraq and caused
Kuwait to temporarily bring its diplomats back to Kuwait. In July 2011, another Iraqi Shiite
militia, Khata’ib Hezbollah, threatened to attack workers building the Mubarak the Great port
(named after a past ruler) on Bubiyan Island, as discussed below. These and other Iraqi Shiite
militias continue to operate in southern Iraq, and a munition was fired into Kuwaiti territory in
August 2011, but these Shiite groups are said to be evolving into political movements and deemphasizing their armed wings.
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation
The Kuwait-Iraq relationship remains colored by the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, which lasted until U.S.-led forces in “Operation Desert Storm” expelled
Iraqi forces by February 28,1991. Relations remained frozen during the rest of Saddam Hussein’s
rule, and Kuwait remained wary of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments that were dominated by
Shiite Muslims.
The potential for a major breakthrough in Iraq-Kuwait relations occurred on
January 12, 2011,
when then Prime Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait prime minister to Prime Minister to
visit Iraq since the
Iraqi invasion. Kuwaiti leaders reportedly appreciated the statement by Iraqi Prime Minister
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Prime Minister Maliki, a few days before the visit, that Iraq’s former ambitions against Kuwait “have gone
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“have gone forever and will never return again.”13 These statements paved the way for Iraqi
Prime Minister
Nuri al- Maliki’s first visit to Kuwait on February 16, 2011.
By JulyIn 2011, some of the mutual suspicions and recriminations began to resurfacebriefly resurfaced. On July 23,
2011, Iraqi
parliamentarians called on Kuwait to suspend construction for its Mubarak the Great
port because
it would impinge on Iraq’s attempts to expand its access to the Persian Gulf at the tip
of the Faw
peninsula. Other parliamentarians alleged that Kuwait was slant drilling in the area
and therefore
stealing oil from Iraq. The disputes were reminiscent of the arguments made by
Saddam Hussein
to try to justify his invasion of Kuwait in 1990; he claimed that Kuwait sought
to economically strangle Iraq.
These recriminations ceasedquieted, paving the way for some bilateral issues to be resolved during a
March 15,
2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait. TheThat visit paved the way for Amir Sabah’s attendance at
the March
27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad—an event Iraq considered crucial to its
efforts to
return to the Arab fold after decades of isolation. In August 2012, the Iraqi government
said “Iraq
will end all pending issues with Kuwait before the start of [2013].” Still, theThe Iraqi
statement could be intended not necessarily as a bilateral overture to Kuwait, but rather to garner
statement appeared
to be an Iraqi effort to garner support for the U.N. Security Council to remove any remaining
“Chapter 7” (of the U.N. Charter)
mandates on Iraq stemming from the 1990 invasion.
Kuwait’s Prime Minister Jaber is expected to visit Iraq in April 2013 to discuss overall relations
and whether Kuwait will concur in new mechanisms to replace those below, which have been in
effect since the 1991 war under Chapter 7. A U.N. Secretary General’s report of December 14,
2012 (U.N. Document S/2012/931) indicated some possible mechanisms, including: retaining
existing mechanisms; transferring the issues to the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq
(UNAMI)—an option said to be favored by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and generally
acceptable to both Iraq and Kuwait; or adopting new mechanisms under Chapter VI of the U.N.
Charter, which does not carry enforcement mechanisms as those adopted under Chapter VII.
However, the U.N. Security Council did not alter the existing resolutions mechanisms at its
December 2012 meeting, and will not take up alternative options again until June 2013.
The outstanding issues are discussed below.
Reparations Payments Continue. Kuwait has to date refused to drop its insistence on full U.N.supervised
Prime Minister Jaber visited Iraq on June 12, 2013 and reached agreement on taking some of the
bilateral issues involving missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property out of the Chapter 7 supervision
of the United Nations and replacing them with alternative mechanisms, as discussed below.
Issues Still Outstanding Between Iraq and Kuwait
Reparations Payments Continue. Kuwait has not dropped its insistence on full U.N.-supervised
reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion. Iraq wants the
reparations issue
closed out to cease the deduction of 5% of all its revenue that is used to pay
compensation to the
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As of December 2012To date, the U.N.
Compensation Commission (UNCC)
created by the post-Desert Storm U.N. resolutions has paid
out over $38 billion to over 100
governments, encompassing nearly 1.5 million claimants.
However, about $13.6 billion is still
owed to Kuwaiti claimants, and the U.N. Secretary General’s
December 14, 2012 report says it
expects to complete the compensation process by April 2015.
On December 15, 2010, the U.N.
Security Council passed three resolutions—1956, 1957, and
1958 that ended Saddam-era
sanctions against Iraq, but the resolutions did not end the “Chapter
7” U.N. mandate on Iraq and
continued the 5% automatic revenue deductions.
Missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti National Archives. The U.N. resolutions adopted December 15,
2010, also continued the effort, required under post-1991 war U.N. resolutions (most notably
13
“No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
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687), to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis and third party nationals missing and presumed dead
from the 1991 war, as well as that of the missing Kuwaiti national archives. A special U.N. envoy,
Gennady Tarasov, was U.N. High-Level Coordinator for these issues. In September 2011 and in
June 2012, Iraq called for an end to the mandate of Tarasov and for Iraq and Kuwait to pursue the
issue bilaterally, but the U.N. Security Council did not act on those requests. Tarasov retired on
December 31, 2012 and, in the absence of Security Council
action on an alternative mechanism,
the U.N. Secretary General appointed Victor Poliakov to
assume Tarasov’s duties pending future
Security Council action on the High-Level Coordinator concept.
To date, the .
13
“No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
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To date, the search process has resulted in finding the remains of 236 Kuwaitis. The cases of 369
Kuwaitis remain unresolved. In 2010, Kuwait made a $1 million grant to the Iraqi Ministry of
Human Rights, which is the lead Iraqi agency trying to determine the fate of the Kuwaitis. A
Tripartite Commission on the issue (Kuwait, Iraq, International Committee of the Red Cross) met
on May 18, 2011, for the first time in many years. To date, more than 10,000 trenches have been
dug to search for remains and jailed members of the Saddam regime have been interviewed.
However, the December 14, 2012 U.N. report says no progress has been made recently, and
Kuwaiti officials realize that the High-Level Coordinator mandate probably cannot be continued
until all remains are locatedand June 17, 2013 U.N. reports on these issues said no progress
has been made recently, although there have been some excavations undertaken in Iraq in 2013.
As far as the Kuwaiti National Archives, the U.N. U.N. reports on December 14, 2012 reports saysand June 17, 2013 ts
say there has been
no progress locating the archives. However, Iraq has agreed to place ads in its media asking Iraqis
for information on their whereabouts. In June 2012, Iraq did return to Kuwait numerous boxes of
recovered tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, as well as books belonging to Kuwait University, and
keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank—items removed from Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation.
Kuwait-Iraq Border. There has also been a dispute over the Iraq-Kuwait border. Under post-1991
Gulf war U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.-demarcated
border between them. Kuwait has sought that the post-Saddam government in Iraq formally
acknowledge its commitments under the resolution to pay some of the costs of border markings
and signs. Kuwait’s foreign minister again called on Iraq to fulfill these commitments, at the U.N.
General Assembly meetings in September 2011. In July 2010, Kuwait gave preliminary approval
to open a special border crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of international oil
companies working in Iraq. And, as a consequence of the March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait,
Iraq agreed to pay its portion of the costs of maintaining the border markings. Still, the issue of
the sea border markings and other issues remain outstanding, and Kuwait has insisted that all
border marking issues be resolved before Kuwait agrees to terminate the mandate of the HighLevel Coordinator, no progress locating the archives. However, Annex I to the June 17, 2013
report (U.N. document S/2013/357) contains a list of all the Kuwaiti property returned to Kuwait
by Iraq since 2002. Most recently, in June 2012, Iraq did return to Kuwait numerous boxes of
recovered tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, as well as books belonging to Kuwait University, and
keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank.
The June 16, 2013 visit of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister resulted in Iraq-Kuwait joint action to
remove these issues of missing property and persons from the Chapter 7 U.N. mandate. That was
recommended in the U.N. Secretary General’s report of June 17, 2013 (cited above) and
contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013. The Resolution formally
transferred the continuing supervision of these issues to the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq
(UNAMI)—under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (which does not carry enforcement
mechanisms as those adopted under Chapter VII).
Kuwait-Iraq Border. Disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait border have also been mostly resolved. Under
post-1991 Gulf war U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.demarcated border between them. Kuwait has sought that the post-Saddam government in Iraq
formally acknowledge its commitments under the resolution to pay some of the costs of border
markings and signs. In July 2010, Kuwait gave preliminary approval to open a special border
crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of international oil companies working in Iraq.
And, as a consequence of the March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait, Iraq agreed to pay its
portion of the costs of maintaining the border markings. The issue of the sea border markings and
related issues was resolved in early 2013. The resolution of these issues paved the way for
Kuwait to support the termination of the High Level Coordinator mandate on the missing Kuwaiti
persons and property issue discussed above.
Other Outstanding Bilateral Disputes/Iraqi Airways. Among other residual issues from the
Saddam era, in 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion
Saddam era debt, but it has not written off the debt to date. Iraq is hoping that the April 2013 visit
of Kuwait’s Prime Minister will yield agreement on that issue.
Another major dispute concerned
Kuwait Airways’ lawsuits alleging that Iraq owed Kuwait $1.2
billion for planes and parts stolen
during the Iraqi invasion; the actions led to the long-term
impoundment of Iraqi Airways jets. The
March 15, 2012, Maliki visit resolved the issue with
agreement for Iraq to pay Kuwait $300
million in compensation, and to invest $200 million in an
Iraq-Kuwait joint venture to form a
small new airline. Subsequent to the visit, Iraq-Kuwait direct
flights resumed.
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flights resumed.
Iran
For the years after the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait supported Iran as a potential counterweight to
Saddam Hussein. Kuwait often hosted pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite oppositionists against Saddam,
even though these same Shiite groups had conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s.
, as noted.
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Since Saddam’s fall, Kuwait has largely joined U.S. efforts to contain Iran and to enact strict
international sanctions to compel it to curb its nuclear program. In December 2009, Kuwait
declined to invite Iran to the GCC summit in Kuwait that month. (Qatar angered some Gulf
leaders by inviting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the GCC summit in 2007.) In
May 2010, Kuwait confirmed May 2010, Kuwait confirmed
that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless
residents for allegedly working on
behalf of the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran in
a plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.14 (The Qods Force, named as a terrorism supporting
entity by the United States, is the IRGC The Qods Force, a subject of
U.S. sanctions under several executive orders, is the unit that supports pro-Iranian movements
and conducts
espionage in neighboring and other foreign countries.) The Qods Force activity in Kuwait
suggested that Iran might be looking to pressure Kuwait because of its alliance with the United
States. In March 2011, a Kuwait The arrests could suggest that
Iran might be looking to Kuwait to exert leverage on the United States, presumably by
positioning Iran to be able to attack U.S. forces withdrawing from Iraq. In March 2011, a Kuwait
court sentenced two Iranians and a Kuwaiti to death in the
alleged plot. Subsequently, Kuwait
Kuwait expelled three Iranian diplomats, and Iran expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats
in response.
However, a visit to Kuwait The sentences were commuted to life in prison on May 28, 2012. A visit to Kuwait
by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi on May 19, 2011, partly
calmed tensions; both resulted in agreement for both
sides agreed to return their respective ambassadors. In November 2011,
Iran arrested several
individuals in Iran who it alleged were “Kuwaiti spies.”
Kuwait also is cooperating with the growing global consensus to sanction Iran. This cooperation
has come despite the comments by the Amir in November 2009 endorsing Iran’s right to purely
peaceful nuclear energy. In July 2010, a U.S. law, P.L. 111-195 (the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010) was enacted that would penalize firms
that supply gasoline to Iran. A Kuwaiti gasoline trading firm, Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum
Group, was reported to be a supplier of gasoline to Iran,15 although the firm has told U.S. officials
it stopped doing so as of September 2010. In September 2012, Kuwaiti naval forces—as well as
those of all the Gulf Cooperation Council states—participated in U.S.-led mine clearing exercises
in the Persian Gulf—exercises apparently intended to signal to Iran the strength of a U.S.-led
coalition to contain Iran.
Arab-Israeli Dispute
For many years after Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, the Iraqi invasion and occupation colored
Kuwait’s foreign relations. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait was more critical than were the
other Gulf states of the late
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he had opposed war to liberate
Kuwait. Because of Arafat’s stance, Kuwait Kuwait from Iraq. Kuwait
expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after
liberation. Kuwait has liberation, viewing them as disloyal. Kuwait
subsequently maintained consistent ties to Arafat’s Palestinian antagonist, Hamas, and in March
2006, Kuwait pledged $7.5
million per month in aid to the then Hamas-led government in the
Palestinian territories. Kuwait has supported Qatari and
Saudi efforts to broker Fatah-Hamas
reconciliation and unity governments. At a March 2, 2009,
conference in Cairo, Kuwait pledged
$200 million for Gaza reconstruction following the Israel14
“Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
15
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
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Israel-Hamas War of December 2008-January
2009. Still, possibly because it is distracted by its internal
political crises,
Still, Kuwait has not, as have Saudi Arabia and Qatar, stepped forward as a major
mediator in
intra-Palestinian disputes, nor. Nor has it publicly advanced its own proposals for
resolving the Israeli-PalestinianIsraeliPalestinian dispute. It supports U.N. recognition of the State of Palestine,
requested formally by
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at the U.N. General
Assembly meetings in September 2011.
September 2011.
14
“Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
15
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
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During the period of active Gulf-Israel negotiations (1992-1997), Kuwait attended multilateral
working group peace talks with Israel—sessions on arms control, water resources, refugees, and
other issues that were begun as part of the “Oslo Accords process” between Israel and the
Palestinians. However, Kuwait did not host any sessions of the multilaterals. In 1994, Kuwait was
key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade with
firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with blacklisted firms)
Arab boycotts of Israel. However, Kuwait did not, as did Qatar and Oman, subsequently
exchange trade offices with Israel, amounting to a renunciation of the primary boycott (boycott
on direct trade with Israel).
Positions and Actions on 2011 Uprisings Elsewhere in the Region
Kuwait has acted in concert with other GCC states on the uprisings in the Middle East that began in 2011.
Of the uprisings,
in 2011. Kuwait’s support for regional efforts that coincide with U.S. interests, such as in Syria,
were the main topic of Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Kuwait on June 26, 2013.
Kuwait has paid the closest attention to the situation in Bahrain, which is a
fellow Gulf state. As noted above, Kuwait supported fellow GCC; Kuwait
sent a naval unit to support the March 14, 2011, intervention of the
GCC’s “Peninsula Shield” unit
to assist Bahraini security forces’ suppression of unrest there.
However, the. The nearly 2,000 GCC ground forces that entered Bahrain were
Saudi troops and UAE police,
and Kuwait sent only a naval unit ostensibly to help Bahrain protect its maritime boundaries. The
. The Kuwaiti naval unit returned to Kuwait in July 2011 following
the end of the state of emergency and
beginning of a national dialogue between the Bahrain government and its oppositionthere. The GCC
intervention was at odds with the United States, which supportsU.S. policy to
support dialogue between Bahrain’s
government and protesters, and not repression. It also, as noted, put the Kuwaiti government
somewhat at odds with many The Kuwaiti
intervention also put the Sabah government at odds with Kuwaiti Shiites. At the risk of Kuwaiti
Shiite criticism, then Prime
Minister Nasser visited Bahrain during July 9, 2011.
On Libya, Kuwait supported the Arab League position in favor of U.N.-mandated intervention to
protect civilians but, initially, it stopped short of recognizing the Transitional National Council
(TNC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (an action that Qatar and the UAE
have taken). In April 2011, it did pledge about $177 million in financial aid to the TNC. It
recognized the TNC as the sole legitimate representative after the fall of Tripoli in August 2011.
As a GCC state, Kuwait cooperated with developing and implementing the GCC plan for a
peaceful transition of power in Yemen. That effort bore fruit with the departure of President Ali
Abdullah Saleh in January 2012 and the subsequent presidential elections in March 2012.
Because Syria is aligned with Iran, Kuwait and the other GCC states are hoping that Bashar Al
Assad of Syria will be brought downousted—an outcome that would likely bring Sunni Muslims to
power instead of the Alawite community and weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region. Along
with its GCC partners, Kuwait has criticized Syria’s extensive use of force against peaceful
protesters in the uprising there in 2011 and, along with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, withdrew its
ambassador from Damascus in August 2011. In November 2011, all
the Alawite community and weaken Iran strategically. All the GCC countries voted
with other
Arab League countries to suspend Syria’s membership in that body. Following
escalation of violence in February-March 2012, all the GCC states closed their embassies in
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Damascus. In in November 2011 and they
all closed their embassies there entirely by April 2012. Also in April 2012, the GCC states
proposed provided $100 million in funding to the armed
opposition, and Kuwait is reported to be contributing funds to the Syrian rebels. Some of the
GCC states—reportedly not including Kuwait—are also providing arms to the rebels. On January
30, 2013, Kuwait hosted a
contributing funds, but apparently not arms, to the Syrian rebels. There reportedly are also efforts
by wealthy Kuwaitis to contribute funds to the rebels.16 On January 30, 2013, Kuwait hosted a
major donors’ meeting to aid Syrian civilian victims of the conflict;
$1.5 billion was pledged at
that meeting, including $300 million from Kuwait.
Kuwait has not contributed troops to the U.S. and NATO stabilization operation in Afghanistan.
Other GCC states Bahrain and UAE have contributed forces or police to that mission. In July
2011, Kuwait contributed $1 million to help relieve the effects of drought in Somalia.
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy16
The State Department report on global terrorism for 2011 (released July 31, 2012) credited
Kuwaiti leaders with attempting to counter terrorism and violent extremism, despite Kuwait’s
lack of a clear legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes. A draft law submitted to
the National Assembly in December 2009 that strengthens laws against terrorism financing has
not been enacted to date. On the other hand, in April 2011 Kuwait introduced biometric
fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and plans to extend that system to land and sea
entry points. On November 27, 2011, security services arrested three Kuwaiti military officials on
suspicion of links with a terrorist cell plotting to attack locations in Bahrain and Qatar.
The State Department terrorism report also repeats praise for Kuwait’s programs to encourage
moderation in Islam in Kuwait. The NADR funds shown above have been used, in large part, to
assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export controls.
Some Kuwait-based organizations have proved problematic in the past. On June 13, 2008, the
Treasury Department froze the assets of a Kuwaiti charity with alleged links to Al Qaeda—the
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society—under Executive Order 13224.
Kuwaiti Economic Policy
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused unrest in Kuwait over falling stock prices and the
effects of lower oil prices. As noted above, executive-legislative disputes delayed passage of
stimulus measures to address the crisis. However, as the crisis abated, the Assembly passed
legislation, which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait economy.
The planned privatization of Kuwait Airways is reportedly moving forward as well. However,
some Kuwaitis, particularly those newly naturalized and less affluent than longtime citizens, fear
that privatization will bring higher unemployment.
Still, the IMF and other observers say that Kuwait has underinvested in capital infrastructure, and
overspent on public sector salaries and subsidies. The Kuwaiti budgets in 2011 and 2012 appear
intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up for long-term growth. In August
2012, the Ministry of Finance released data showing that it has a budget surplus of about $47
billion—primarily because the political crisis has stalled capital investment. In addition, the
political deadlock in Kuwait has caused foreign direct investment in Kuwait to lag that of its
16
For the 2011 State Department country report on terrorism, see: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195544.htm.
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neighbors significantly. Only $800 million has been invested in Kuwait in the past 10 years. In
contrast, in the same time period, $10 billion was invested in Bahrain, $73 billion in UAE, and
$130 billion in Saudi Arabia.17
The government-Assembly political deadlock has prevented movement on several major
initiatives, the most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti
government, would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about
500,000 barrels per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project
for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no
compromise is in sight. As far as a project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8
billion, the Assembly blocked the project in 2008 by alleging that the contracts awarded by the
state oil company did not comply with procedures set out by Kuwait’s Central Tenders
Committee, which handles all public sector contracts. It has not advanced.
The economic stagnation since 2006 has led to ever-increasing labor unrest. On October 10, 2011,
about 3,000 customs officers went on strike demanding higher wages and better working
conditions; the action caused a temporary halt to Kuwaiti oil exports. In early 2012, strikes briefly
grounded state-owned Kuwait Airways.
The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, also caused Kuwait to shelve the
formation of a joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On
December 29, 2008, in the face of National Assembly opposition to the project, the government
cancelled the venture. It was to have required a Kuwaiti investment of $7.5 billion by state-run
Petrochemical Industries Co. Kuwait and Dow Chemical had finalized the joint venture
agreement in November 2008, and Dow Chemical expressed surprise at Kuwait’s cancellation
only four weeks later. Dow had planned to use the proceeds of the investment to fund its purchase
of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm, although that deal ultimately went through anyway.
The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export
earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait
(about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were about $2.7 billion in 2011,
roughly the same as the few preceding years, consisting mostly of foods, industrial equipment,
and automobiles. Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2011 were about $7.8 billion In April 2013, Kuwait pledged another $300
16
Joby Warrick. “Wealthy Donors Influence Syria War.”
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million in humanitarian aid for the Syria crisis - $275 million to nine U.N. agencies and $25
million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Kuwait has not contributed troops to the U.S. and NATO stabilization operation in Afghanistan.
Other GCC states Bahrain and UAE have contributed forces or police to that mission. In July
2011, Kuwait contributed $1 million to help relieve the effects of drought in Somalia.
On Egypt, Kuwait has adopted a position somewhat at odds with some other GCC states. Qatar
was the major Gulf financial benefactor of Egypt during the presidency of Muslim Brotherhood
senior figure Mohammad Morsi. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are wary of the
Brotherhood and did not aide Morsi’s government during his rule. After Morsi was deposed by
the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013, both Kuwait and the UAE announced large financial
pledges to help the beleaguered Egyptian economy. Kuwait announced it would give Egypt a $2
billion loan; a $1 billion grant; and a grant of $1 billion worth of oil and other petroleum
products.17
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy18
The State Department report on global terrorism for 2012 (released May 30, 2013) credited
Kuwaiti leaders with maintaining efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism, despite
lacking of a clear legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes or terrorism financing.
There were no significant attacks attributed to terrorist or terrorist organizations in Kuwait in
2012. On November 27, 2011, security services arrested three Kuwaiti military officials on
suspicion of links with a terrorist cell plotting to attack locations in Bahrain and Qatar. ProIranian groups and agents are in Kuwait are discussed in the sections above on Iran and Iraq.
Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (FATF), but it
has been identified by that body as having deficiencies in combating terrorism financing. Kuwait
has developed an action plan with the FATF to address the weaknesses. Some Kuwait-based
organizations have proved problematic in the past. On June 13, 2008, the Treasury Department
froze the assets of a Kuwaiti charity with alleged links to Al Qaeda—the Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society—under Executive Order 13224. Past State Department terrorism reports have
praised Kuwait’s programs to encourage moderation in Islam in Kuwait.
In April 2011 Kuwait introduced biometric fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and has
since extended that system to land and sea entry points. The NADR funds shown above have
been used, in large part, to assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export
controls.
Kuwaiti Economic Policy
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused unrest in Kuwait over falling stock prices and the
effects of lower oil prices. As noted above, executive-legislative disputes delayed passage of
stimulus measures to address the crisis. However, as the crisis abated, the National Assembly
17
18
“Kuwait Offers Egypt $4B Aid, Fuel Package.” Associated Press, July 10, 2013.
For the 2012 State Department country report on terrorism, see: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm.
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passed legislation, which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait
economy. The planned privatization of Kuwait Airways is reportedly moving forward as well.
However, some Kuwaitis, particularly those newly naturalized and less affluent than longtime
citizens, fear that privatization will bring higher unemployment.
Still, the IMF and other observers say that Kuwait has underinvested in capital infrastructure, and
overspent on public sector salaries and subsidies. The Kuwaiti budgets in 2011 and 2012
appeared intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up for long-term growth. In
August 2012, the Ministry of Finance released data showing that it has a budget surplus of about
$47 billion—primarily because the political crisis has stalled capital investment. In addition, the
political deadlock in Kuwait has caused foreign direct investment in Kuwait to lag that of its
neighbors significantly. Only $800 million has been invested in Kuwait in the past 10 years. In
contrast, in the same time period, $10 billion was invested in Bahrain, $73 billion in UAE, and
$130 billion in Saudi Arabia.19
The political deadlock in Kuwait has also prevented movement on several major initiatives, the
most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti government,
would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about 500,000 barrels
per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project for over a decade
because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no compromise is in sight. A
project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8 billion, also has not advanced.
The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, also caused Kuwait to shelve the
formation of a joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On
December 29, 2008, the government cancelled the venture. It was to have required a Kuwaiti
investment of $7.5 billion by state-run Petrochemical Industries Co. – Kuwait, and Dow
Chemical had finalized the joint venture agreement in November 2008. Dow had planned to use
the proceeds of the investment to fund its purchase of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm,
although that deal ultimately went through anyway. In May 2013, an arbitrator decided in favor of
Dow Chemical, ordering the Petrochemical Industries Co. – Kuwait to pay Dow $2.2 billion in
damages for severing the venture.
The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export
earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait
(about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were about $2.7 billion in 2012, the
the same as the few preceding years, consisting mostly of automobiles, industrial equipment, and
foodstuffs. Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2012 were about $13 billion, of which almost all
was crude oil and other petroleum products.
Like other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important to its economy,
although doing so always raises fears among some in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere
about the ultimate intentions of developing a nuclear program. Kuwait is cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear
work in Kuwait.
There are ongoing discussions about reviving the project. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and
19
“Kuwait in Crisis As Ruling Family Splits, MP’s Rebel.” Reuters, June 7, 2011.
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Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude
to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks. Kuwait gave $500 million worth
of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
17
“Kuwait in Crisis As Ruling Family Splits, MP’s Rebel.” Reuters, June 7, 2011.
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Table 3.Some Basic Facts
Leadership
Amir: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Crown Prince/heir
apparent: Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Prime Minister:
Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah
Population
About 2.7 million, of which 1.4 million are citizens.
GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP)
$166 billion (2012)
Religions
Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shiite 30%); other (Christian, Hindu, Parsi)
15%
GDP per capita (PPP)
$43,800/yr (2012)
GDP growth rate
6.3% (2012)
Inflation
3.2% (2012)
Oil (proven reserves)
102 billion barrels (7% of world proven reserves)
Oil exports
2.15 million barrels per day (mbd)
Source: CRS; CIA, The World Factbook reports, IMF Public Information Notice, June 15, 2012.
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait
Source: CRS.
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Figure 1. Map of Kuwait
Source: CRS.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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