U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
January 3February 6, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21048
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the
Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide
counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 63,000
active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of
Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified
command. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs increases in SOF force
structure, particularly in terms of increasing enabling units and rotary and fixed-wing SOF
aviation assets and units.
USSOCOM’s FY2013 Budget Request was $10.409 billion, 0.6% lower (due to decreases in
Operations & Maintenance, Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Procurement, and
Military Construction funding) than the FY2012 Appropriation of $10.477 billion. USSOCOM’s
FY2013 Budget Request also represented the first year some Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) funding will be migrated into USSOCOM’s baseline budget request. As part of
USSOCOM’s FY2013 Budget Request, it plans to add an additional 3,355 service members and
civilians, bringing it to a total of 66,594 personnel. During FY2013, USSOCOM plans to add its
fifth and final 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-mandated Special Forces Battalion, as
well as additional forces for the Ranger Regiment, Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and
Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations units. In a similar manner, Air Force
Special Operations plans to add additional personnel to a number of its units, and Naval Special
Warfare, in addition to adding combat support and service support personnel, plans to add
additional personnel to the Naval Special Warfare Center and School. The Marine Special
Operations Command plans to add additional combat support and service support personnel in
FY2013 as well.
The FY2013 NDAA recommends fully funding the Administration’s FY2013 request and adds an
additional $159 million to fulfill a critical unfunded requirement for high-definition Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. There are a number of legislative provisions
contained in the FY2013 NDAA impacting not only funding but authorities as well.
On January 5, 2012, the Administration unveiled its new strategic guidance refocusing U.S.
strategic efforts to the Pacific and the Middle East and, at the same time, proposing significant
cuts to ground forces. This new strategic direction has the potential to significantly affect U.S.
SOF. USSOCOM leadership continues to pursue additional authorities that would enable it to
control the movement of SOF units deployed to a theater of operations as well as give additional
authorities to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), which are allocated to each
geographic combatant command. Another possible issue for congressional consideration is the
balance between direct and indirect special operations activities in world-wide counterterrorism
operations. This report will be updated.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1
Command Structures and Components ..................................................................................... 1
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities .................................................................................... 1
Army Special Operations Forces ............................................................................................... 2
U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command Established ......................................... 3
Air Force Special Operations Forces ......................................................................................... 3
Naval Special Operations Forces............................................................................................... 4
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) .................................................................. 5
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) ............................................................................. 5
NATO Special Operations Headquarters ................................................................................... 6
Organizational and Budgetary Issues............................................................................................... 6
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related Directives ............................ 6
FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request ....................................................................................... 7
FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request Breakdown .............................................................. 7
FY2013 USSOCOM Force Structure Highlights ................................................................ 7
FY2013 Planned Force Structure Additions ........................................................................ 8
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 4310) ........................................ 8
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310) USSOCOM Legislative
Provisions .............................................................................................................................. 9
Potential Impacts of Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution for FY2013 on
USSOCOM ................................................................................................................................. 12
Selected USSOCOM Acquisition Activities .................................................................................. 12
Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1 Program ....................................................................... 12
CV-22 Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV) ........................................................................ 13
Potential Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................... 1213
New Strategic Guidance and SOF ........................................................................................... 1213
Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed
SOF ................................................................................................................................ 1314
The Future of Special Operations—Direct versus Indirect Approach............................... 1315
Tables
Table 1. FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request, by Funding Category ............................................ 7
Table 2. Planned USSOCOM Military and Civilian Growth in FY2013 ........................................ 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 1416
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
Overview
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite military units with special training and equipment that
can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations,
many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy specialized
training. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the training, doctrine,
and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.
Command Structures and Components
In 1986 Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning,
passed measures (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen special operations’ position within the defense
community. These actions included the establishment of USSOCOM as a new unified command.
USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. The commander of
USSOCOM is a four-star officer who may be from any military service. Navy Admiral William
H. McRaven is the current commander of USSOCOM. The USSOCOM Commander reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense, although an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) provides immediate civilian oversight over
many USSOCOM activities.
USSOCOM has about 63,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four
services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four
components, and one sub-unified command. USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM);
the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); and the Marine Corps Special Operations
Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM subunified command. Additional command and control responsibilities are vested in Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are theater-specific special operational headquarters
elements designed to support a Geographical Combatant Commander’s special operations
logistics, planning, and operational control requirements, and are normally commanded by a
general officer.
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities
In addition to Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional
responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM was given the responsibility for
synchronizing DOD plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global
operations against those networks.1 In this regard, USSOCOM “receives, reviews, coordinates
and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes
recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global
requirements.”2 In October 2008, USSOCOM was designated as the DOD proponent for Security
1
2
“Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2011, p. 4.
Ibid.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Force Assistance (SFA).3 In this role, USSOCOM will perform a synchronizing function in global
training and assistance planning similar to the previously described role of planning against
terrorist networks. In addition, USSOCOM is now DOD’s lead for countering threat financing,
working with the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments on means to identify and disrupt terrorist
financing efforts.
Army Special Operations Forces
U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) includes approximately 28,500 soldiers from the Active Army,
National Guard, and Army Reserve organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special operations
aviation units, along with civil affairs units, military information units, and special operations
support units. ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces (SF)
Groups (Airborne),4 consisting of about 1,400 soldiers each, are stationed at Fort Bragg and at
Fort Lewis, WA; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Carson, CO; and Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Special
Forces soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in various skills, including foreign
languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout the world. In December 2005,
the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC, to
provide combat service support and medical support to Army special operations forces.5
In FY2008, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) began to increase the total
number of Army Special Forces battalions from 15 to 20, with one battalion being allocated to
each active Special Forces Group. In August 2008, the Army stood up the first of these new
battalions—the 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Groups (Airborne)—at Fort Campbell, KY.6 The
Army expects that the last of these new Special Forces battalions will be operational by FY2013.7
Two Army National Guard Special Forces groups are headquartered in Utah and Alabama. An
elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct action operations,8 the 75th Ranger
Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists of three battalions and a regimental
special troops battalion that provides support to the three Ranger Battalions. Army special
operations aviation units, including the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
(SOAR), headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY, feature pilots trained to fly the most sophisticated
Army rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day or night, and in adverse weather.
3
Information in this section is from testimony given by Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to the
House Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command, June 4, 2009. For a more in-depth treatment
of Security Force Assistance, see CRS Report R41817, Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force
Assistance, by Thomas K. Livingston.
4
Airborne refers to “personnel, troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation,
either by parachuting or touchdown.” Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, (As Amended Through 31 July 2010).
5
“United States Special Operations Command Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, p. 14 .
6
Sean D. Naylor, “Special Forces Expands,” Army Times, August 11, 2008.
7
Association of the United States Army, “U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint
Force,” Torchbearer National Security Report, March 2010, p. 3.
8
Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments, as well as employing specialized military capabilities
to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional
offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are civil affairs (CA) units, which provide
experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational
theaters. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit that exclusively
support USSOCOM. In September 2011 the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade was activated to support
U.S. Army General Purpose Forces (GPFs). All other CA units reside in the Reserves and are
affiliated with Army GPF units. Military Information Support Operations (formerly known as
psychological operations) units disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass
media. Two active duty Military Information Support Groups (MISG)—the 4th Military
Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne) and 8th Military Information Support Group
(MISG) (Airborne)—are stationed at Fort Bragg, and their subordinate units are aligned with
Geographic Combatant Commands.
U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command Established9
On March 25, 2011, the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC) was
activated at Ft. Bragg, NC. Commanded by a U.S. Army Aviation Brigadier General, USASOAC
will command the 160th SOAR and other affiliated Army Special Operations Aviation
organizations. USASOAC is intended to decrease the burden on the 160th SOAR commander (an
Army colonel) so he can focus on warfighting functions as well as provide general officer
representation at USASOC. In this role, the commander of USASOAC supposedly can better
represent Army Special Operations aviation needs and requirements and have a greater influence
on decisions affecting Army Special Operations Aviation.
Air Force Special Operations Forces10
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is one of the Air Force’s 10 major
commands with over 12,000 active duty personnel and over 16,000 personnel when civilians,
Guard, and Reserve personnel and units are included. While administrative control of AFSOC is
overseen by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), operational control is managed by the
USSOCOM commander. AFSOC units operate out of four major continental United States
(CONUS) locations and two overseas locations. The headquarters for AFSOC, the first Special
Operations Wing (1st SOW), and the 720th Special Tactics Group are located at Hurlburt Field,
FL. The 27th SOW is at Cannon AFB, NM. The 352nd and 353rd Special Operations Groups
provide forward presence in Europe (RAF Mildenhall, England) and in the Pacific (Kadena Air
Base, Japan) respectively. The Air National Guard’s 193rd SOW at Harrisburg, PA, and the Air
Force Reserve Command’s 919th SOW at Duke Field, FL, complete AFSOC’s major units. A
training center, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and Training Center (AFSOTC),
was recently established and is located at Hurlburt Field. AFSOC conducts the majority of its
specialized flight training through an arrangement with Air Education and Training Command
(AETC) via the 550th SOW at Kirtland AFB, NM. AFSOC’s four active-duty flying units are
composed of more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
9
Michael Hoffman, “Interview: Brig. Gen. Kevin Mangum,” Defense News, May 2, 2011, and U.S. Army Special
Operations Command Fact Sheet, May 2011.
10
Information in this section is from Lt. Gen. Wurster’s presentation to the Air Force Association, September 14 2010,
http://www.afa.org/events/conference/2010/scripts/Wurster_9-14.pdf, and “United States Special Operations Command
Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, p. 18.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
In March 2009, Headquarters AFSOC declared initial operational capability (IOC)11 for the CV22.12 USSOCOM plans for all 50 CV-22s to be delivered to AFSOC by 2015.13 Since 2009,
AFSOC has completed three overseas deployments, to Central America, Africa, and Iraq, and
continues to be engaged currently in overseas contingency operations. Despite critical reviews of
the aircraft, AFSOC considers the CV-22 “central to our future.”14 AFSOC operates a diverse fleet
of modified aircraft. Of 12 major design series aircraft, 7 are variants of the C-130, the average
age of some of which is over 40 years old, dating from the Vietnam era. Because of the age of the
fleet, AFSOC considers recapitalization one of its top priorities.
AFSOC’s Special Tactics experts include Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Special
Operations Weather Teams, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs). As a collective group, they
are known as Special Tactics and have also been referred to as “Battlefield Airmen.” Their basic
role is to provide an interface between air and ground forces, and these airmen have highly
developed skill sets. Usually embedded with Army, Navy, or Marine SOF units, they provide
control of air fire support, medical and rescue expertise, or weather support, depending on the
mission requirements.
As directed in the 2010 QDR, AFSOC plans to increase aviation advisory manpower and
resources resident in the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). The 6th SOS’s mission is to
assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units with the intent to raise their capability and
capacity to interdict threats to their nation. The 6th SOS provides aviation expertise to U.S.
foreign internal defense (FID) missions.
Naval Special Operations Forces15
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is composed of approximately 8,900 personnel,
including more than 2,400 active-duty Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; 700 Special
Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); 700
reserve personnel; 4,100 support personnel; and more than 1,100 civilians. NSWC is organized
around 10 SEAL Teams, 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and 3 Special Boat Teams.
SEAL Teams consist of six SEAL platoons each, consisting of two officers and 16 enlisted
personnel. The major operational components of NSWC include Naval Special Warfare Groups
One, Three, and Eleven, stationed in Coronado, CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups Two,
Four, and Ten and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group in Little Creek, VA. These
components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams
worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contingency, and wartime requirements of theater
commanders. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action
missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well postured to fight a globally
dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability
11
According to DOD, IOC is attained when some units and/or organizations in the force structure scheduled to receive
a system (1) have received it and (2) have the ability to employ and maintain it.
12
The CV-22 is the special operations version of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft used by the Marine Corps.
13
USSOCOM Acquisitions and Logistics office, http://www.socom.mil/soal/Pages/FixedWing.aspx.
14
For further detailed reporting on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
15
Information in this section is from Naval Special Warfare Command website, http://www.public.navy.mil/nsw/pages/
Mission.aspxe, accessed January 6, 2012, and “United States Special Operations Command Fact Book 2012,”
USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, pp. 16-17.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based
units.
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC)16
On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. MARSOC consists of three subordinate units: the
Marine Special Operations Regiment, which includes 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations
Battalions; the Marine Special Operations Support Group; the Marine Special Operations
Intelligence Battalion; and the Marine Special Operations School. MARSOC Headquarters, the
2nd and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special Operations School, and the
Marine Special Operations Support Group and the Marine Special Operations Intelligence
Battalion are stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion is
stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA. MARSOC forces have been deployed worldwide to conduct a
full range of special operations activities. MARSOC missions include direct action, special
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information operations, and
unconventional warfare. MARSOC currently has approximately 2,600 personnel assigned.
MARSOC, reportedly at present, consists of 625 critical skills operators, 32 teams, and 9
companies but plans to expand to 844 critical skills operators, 48 teams, and 12 companies by
2016.17
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
According to DOD, JSOC “provides a joint headquarters to study special operations
requirements, ensures interoperability and equipment standardization, develops joint special
operations plans and tactics, and conducts joint special operations exercises and training.”18 While
not officially acknowledged by DOD or USSOCOM, JSOC, which is headquartered at Pope Air
Force Base, NC, is widely believed to command and control what are described as the military’s
special missions units—the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEAL Team Six, the 75th Ranger
Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the Air Force’s 24th Special
Tactics Squadron.19 JSOC’s primary mission is believed to be identifying and destroying terrorists
and terror cells worldwide.
A news release by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) News Service which
named Vice Admiral William McRaven as Admiral Olson’s successor seemingly adds credibility
to press reports about JSOC’s alleged counterterrorism mission. The USASOC press release
notes, “McRaven, a former commander of SEAL Team 3 and Special Operations Command
Europe, is the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. As such, he has led the
command as it ‘ruthlessly and effectively [took] the fight to America’s most dangerous and
16
Information in this section is from “United States Special Operations Command Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM
Public Affairs, January 2012, pp. 20-21.
17
Amanda Wilcox, “MarSOC Continues Growing Despite Marine Corps Drawdown,” Jacksonville (NC) Daily News,
November 25, 2012.
18
“United States Special Operations Command Fact Book 2012,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, January 2012, p. 22.
19
Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004
and Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
vicious enemies,’ Gates said.”20 Reports have also speculated about JSOC’s role in the mission to
eliminate Osama bin Laden.21
NATO Special Operations Headquarters22
In May 2010, NATO established the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). The
mission of NSHQ is to serve as the primary point of development, direction, and coordination of
all NATO special operations-related activities in order to optimize employment of special
operations forces, to include providing an operational command capability when directed by the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). NSHQ is commanded by an American general
officer. The NSHQ is located with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
Mons, Belgium, and will consist of 219 NATO personnel from 28 countries. Eighty nine U.S.
service members will be assigned to NSHQ. In addition to traditional headquarters functions,
NSHQ also runs the NATO Special Operations Forces School at Chievres Air Base in Belgium.
Organizational and Budgetary Issues
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related
Directives23
The 2010 QDR contains a number of SOF-related directives pertaining to personnel,
organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
•
To increase key enabling assets24 for special operations forces.
•
To maintain approximately 660 special operations teams;25 3 Ranger battalions;
and 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft.
•
The Army and USSOCOM will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters
(MH-47G) to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
•
The Navy will dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval
special warfare units.
•
To increase civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM.
20
U.S. Army Special Operations Command News Service, “Gates Nominates McRaven, Thurman for Senior Posts,”
Release Number: 110303-02, March 3, 2011, http://www.soc.mil/UNS/Releases/2011/March/110303-02.html.
21
Marc Ambinder, “The Secret Team That Killed Bin Laden,” National Journal, May 2, 2011 and David Ignatius,
“How the U.S. Found and Finished Bin Laden,” The Washington Post, May 2, 2011.
22
Information from this section is taken from a briefing provided to CRS by the NATO Special Operations
Headquarters Liaison Officer on June 21, 2010.
23
Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
24
Enabling assets are a variety of conventional military units that are assigned to support special operations forces.
25
These teams include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams; Navy Sea, Air, and Land
(SEAL) platoons; Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation
detachments.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
•
Starting in FY2012, purchase light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’s
6th Special Operations squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces
such aircraft might be appropriate, as well as acquiring two non-U.S. helicopters
to support these efforts.
The significance of these directives is that they serve as definitive goals for USSOCOM growth
and systems acquisition as well as directing how the services will support USSOCOM.
FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request26
USSOCOM’s FY2013 Budget Request was $10.409 billion, 0.6% lower (due to decreases in
Operations & Maintenance, Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Procurement, and
Military Construction funding) than the FY2012 Appropriation of $10.477 billion. USSOCOM’s
FY2013 Budget Request also represented the first year some Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) funding would be migrated into USSOCOM’s baseline budget request. USSOCOM notes
that 80% of funding is apportioned to operational forces and their organic support units—often
referred to as “tooth”—and the remaining 20% to the “tail”—other supporting units and
functions.
FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request Breakdown
Table 1. FY2013 USSOCOM Budget Request, by Funding Category
Funding Category
Base Budget
OCO
Total
Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
$5.091 billion
$2.503 billion
$7.594 billion
Procurement
$1.782 billion
$65 million
$1.847 billion
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
$427 million
$5 million
$432 million
Military Construction (MILCON)
$536 million
—
$536 million
Totals
$7.836 billion
$2.573 billion
$10.409 billion
Source: From U.S. Special Operations Command FY2013 Budget Highlights, February 2012, p. 9:
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_Budget_Highlights.pdf.
FY2013 USSOCOM Force Structure Highlights27
In FY2013 USSOCOM plans to grow the command as depicted in the following table. This force
structure growth reflects provisions contained in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs.
26
Information in this section is taken from U.S. Special Operations Command FY2013 Budget Highlights, February
2012, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_Budget_Highlights.pdf.
27
Ibid., pp 10-11.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. Planned USSOCOM Military and Civilian Growth in FY2013
Military
Civilian
Total
Army FY2012
30,819
2,320
33,139
Army FY2013
32,420
2,479
34,899
Air Force FY2012
14,658
2,555
17,213
Air Force FY2013
15,287
2,524
17,811
Marine Corps FY2012
2,527
0
2,527
Marine Corps FY2013
2,984
138
3,122
Navy FY2012
9,049
1,311
10,360
Navy FY2013
9,524
1,238
10,762
USSOCOM FY2012
57,053
6,186
63,239
USSOCOM FY2013
60,215
6,379
66,594
Source: From U.S. Special Operations Command FY2013 Budget Highlights, February 2012, p. 10
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_Budget_Highlights.pdf, p. 10.
FY2013 Planned Force Structure Additions28
•
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): Increases the
authorization for one Special Forces Battalion (the fifth of the five mandated by
the 2006 QDR); increases aircrews assigned to the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment; increases 75th Ranger Regiment personnel; increases military
personnel for the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 4th Military Information
Support Operations (MISO) Group; and increases authorizations for military
personnel providing combat support/service support to USASOC.
•
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): Increases authorizations
to provide support for the 1st Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations
Wing, 27th Special Operations Group, and 352nd Special Operations Group.
•
Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC): Increases authorizations for the
Naval Special Warfare Center and School as well as providing increased combat
support/service support to NSWC.
•
Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC): Increases
authorizations for combat support/combat service support.
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 4310)29
The FY2013 NDAA recommends fully funding the Administration’s FY2013 request and adds an
additional $159 million to fulfill a critical unfunded requirement for high-definition Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities.
28
Ibid., p. 11.
House Armed Services Committee, Fact Sheet: FY13 National Defense Authorization Act Highlights of the
Conference Report, December 18, 2012.
29
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310) USSOCOM
Legislative Provisions 30
Major USSOCOM-specific provisions are highlighted in the following sections:
SEC. 156. SHALLOW WATER COMBAT SUBMERSIBLE PROGRAM.
(a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in
coordination with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:
(1) A description of all efforts under the Shallow Water Combat Submersible program and
the United States Special Operations Command to improve the accuracy of the tracking of
the schedule and costs of the program.
(2) The revised timeline for the initial and full operational capability of the Shallow Water
Combat Submersible, including details outlining and justifying the revised baseline to the
program.
(3) Current cost estimates to meet the basis of issue requirement under the program.
(4) An assessment of existing program risk through the completion of operational testing.
(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—
(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Assistant Secretary, in coordination with
the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall submit to the
congressional defense committees on a quarterly basis updates on the schedule and cost
performance of the contractor of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible program, including
metrics from the earned value management system.
(2) SUNSET.—The requirement in paragraph
(1) Shall cease on the date the Shallow Water Combat Submersible has completed
operational testing and has been found to be operationally effective and operationally
suitable.
SEC. 1062. REPORT ON COUNTERPROLIFERATION CAPABILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS.
6 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a report
outlining operational capabilities, limitations, and shortfalls within the Department of
Defense with respect to counterproliferation and combating weapons of mass destruction
involving special operations forces and key enabling forces.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include each of the
following elements:
30
Report 112-705, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Conference Report to Accompany H.R.
4310, December 18, 2012.
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(1) An overview and assessment of current counterproliferation and combating weapons of
mass destruction capabilities, capacity, and limitations of special operations forces and key
enabling capabilities provided by other supporting elements of the Department of Defense
and other Government agencies.
(2) An assessment of the unique capabilities of special operations forces to counter a
proliferant’s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, including all phases of
weaponization.
(3) An overview and assessment of current and future training requirements and gaps,
including the adequacy and availability of training facilities relative to paragraphs (1) and
(2).
(4) An assessment of technical capability gaps relative to paragraphs (1) and (2), including
an identification of any gaps that are unique to special operations forces.
(5) An assessment of interagency coordination capabilities and gaps, including intelligence
support to countering weapons of mass destruction.
(6) An assessment of current international bi1lateral and multilateral partnerships and the
limitations of such partnerships, including an assessment of existing authorities to build
partnership capacity in countering weapons of mass destruction unique to special operations
forces.
(7) A description of efforts to address the limitations and gaps referred to in paragraphs (1)
through (6), including timelines and requirements to address such limitations and such gaps.
(8) Any other matters the Secretary considers appropriate.
SEC. 1272. NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2541), as amended by section 1242
of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law
111– 383; 124 Stat. 4405), is further amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2011’’ and inserting ‘‘each of fiscal years 2013, 2014, and
2015’’;
(2) by striking ‘‘section 301(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 301’’; and
(3) by inserting ‘‘for such fiscal year’’ after ‘‘$50,000,000’’.
(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Such section, as so amended, is further amended by adding at the
end the following: ‘‘(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report regarding
support for the NSHQ. Each report shall include the fol1lowing:
‘‘(1) The total amount of funding provided by the United States and other NATO nations to
the NSHQ for operating costs of the NSHQ.
‘‘(2) A description of the activities carried out with such funding, including—
‘‘(A) the amount of funding allocated for each such activity;
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‘‘(B) the extent to which other NATO nations participate in each such activity;
‘‘(C) the extent to which each such activity is designed to meet the purposes set forth in
paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b); 24 and
‘‘(D) an assessment of the extent to which each such activity will promote the mission of the
NSHQ. ‘‘(3) Other contributions, financial or in kind, provided by the United States and
other NATO nations in support of the NSHQ.
(4) Any other matters that the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.’’.
SEC. 1283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EFFORTS TO REMOVE OR APPREHEND
JOSEPH KONY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD AND END THE ATROCITIES OF
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.
Consistent with the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery
Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–172), it is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the ongoing United States advise and assist operation to support the regional
governments in Africa in their ongoing efforts to remove or apprehend Joseph Kony and his
top commanders from the battlefield and end atrocities perpetuated by his Lord’s Resistance
Army should continue as appropriate to achieve the goals of the operation;
(2) the Secretary of Defense should provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets, as authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this Act, to support the
ongoing efforts of United States Special Operations Forces to advise and assist regional
partners as they conduct operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa;
(3) United States and regional African forces should increase their operational coordination
on efforts to remove or apprehend Joseph Kony from the battlefield and end the atrocities of
the Lord’s Resistance Army; and
(4) the regional governments should recommit themselves to the Regional Cooperation
Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army authorized by the African
Union.
SEC. 1534. PLAN FOR TRANSITION IN FUNDING OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND FROM SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING FOR OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TO RECURRING FUNDING UNDER THE
FUTURE-YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for the transition of funding of
the United States Special Operations Command from funds authorized to be appropriated for
overseas contingency operations (commonly referred to as the ‘‘overseas contingency
operations budget’’) to funds authorized to be appropriated for recurring operations of the
Department of Defense in accordance with applicable future-years defense programs under
section 221 of title 10, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘‘base budget’’).
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Potential Impacts of Sequestration and a Continuing
Resolution for FY2013 on USSOCOM31
Reports suggest while defense budget sequestration would have an impact on USSOCOM
funding, if Congress opts to adopt another continuing resolution (CR) to fund the Pentagon for
the rest of 2013, USSOCOM stands to lose about $1 billion in funding. Admiral McRaven
reportedly stated in the event of a CR, priority of funding would be to “protect warfighting
capability” and some things of lower priority would not be funded, although no specific programs
or initiatives were mentioned as possible candidates for reduced funding. Another USSOCOM
official noted the “open-checkbook approach to SOF is past.” Illustrative of this concern the
commander of USSOCOM’s European Command (SOCEUR) reportedly stated his command
could lose about 23% of his funding for building partner capacity operations under a CR scenario.
Past building partner capacity operations in the European theater have included training with
Eastern European SOF and efforts with regional allies to counter powerful drug cartels believed
responsible for shipping heroin and cocaine from Africa.
Selected USSOCOM Acquisition Activities
Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1 Program
The Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1 Program is intended to replace about 1,000 of
USSOCOM’s GMV 1.0 modified High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), which
are considered too heavy and not internally transportable by the MH-47 helicopter. While the
services are involved in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Program32 to replace its heavier
HMMWVs, USSOCOM reportedly claims the JLTV will be too heavy as USSOCOM is looking
for a non-developmental vehicle less than 10,000 lb.33 At present, AM General is providing
USSOCOM with the HMMWV-based GMV 1.0 vehicle.
In June of 2012, USSOCOM accepted bids for the non-developmental GMV 1.1 program and
was said to be prepared to award a single $320 million, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity
contract for 1,297 vehicles in March 2013.34 USSOCOM reportedly wants the GMV 1.1 to be
able to drive off the MH-47 helicopter configured for immediate entry into combat without
modification, be able to infiltrate and exfiltrate from terrain previously untraversable by the GMV
1.0, and have a scalable, add-on armor capability.35
31
Information in this section is taken from Pat Host, “Continuing Resolution will Hurt SOCOM More than
Sequestration, McRaven Says,” Defense Daily, January 30,2013 and Paul McLeary, “U.S. SOCOM Braces for $1 B
Loss,” Defense News, February 4, 2013.
32
For additional information on the JLTV Program, see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
33
Eric Beidel, “Special Ops Trucks: More Punch in Smaller Packages,” National Defense, May 2012.
34
Tony Bertuca, “SOCOM’s Next Generation Ground Mobility Vehicle Contract in Play at AUSA,”
InsideDefense.com, October 19, 2012.
35
Tony Bertuca, “SOCOM Accepts Bids from Industry for New Ground Mobility Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, June
15, 2012.
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CV-22 Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV)36
USSOCOM is reportedly planning a competition for a non-developmental, highly mobile vehicle
capable of being transported inside of the CV-22 Osprey. The request for proposal was planned to
be released at the end of January 2013, and industry would have 30 days to submit proposals. The
vehicle would undergo a one-year evaluation and a three-month certification period. The Marines
fielded an internally transportable vehicle for its V-22 Ospreys in 2009, and USSOCOM had once
been involved in the Marines’ vehicle program but later withdrew for unspecified reasons. It is
not known how many of these vehicles USSOCOM plans to procure or what the per vehicle cost
target will be.
Potential Issues for Congress
New Strategic Guidance and SOF
On January 5, 2012, President Obama, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey publically unveiled new strategic guidance that not only
rebalances U.S. strategic posture toward Asia and the Middle East but also will result in a
“smaller and leaner” U.S. military.3137 During this unveiling, Secretary Panetta noted the following:
As we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect, and in some cases increase, our
investments in special operations forces, in new technologies like (intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance), and unmanned systems, in space—and, in particular, in cyberspace—
capabilities, and also our capacity to quickly mobilize if necessary.3238
While specific details on force structure cuts have not yet been made public, there has been a
great deal of speculation that the Army and Marines will undergo significant downsizing over the
next decade. With fewer general purpose forces available and USSOCOM’s self-imposed growth
limitations to preserve the quality of the force, U.S. SOF might find its operational tempo
increased. There are also aspects of this new strategic guidance that require further explanation.
For example, defense officials offer that a reliance on smaller teams operating in innovative ways
will be a central tenet of this new strategy.3339 This seemingly suggests an expanded role for U.S.
SOF although few details have been made available. While DOD has indicated a willingness to
increase its investment in SOF, there are limitations on how much SOF can expand due to the
stringent standards—particularly for operators—and long training lead times required for most
special operations specialties. As part of continued debate on the new strategic guidance, it might
prove useful to examine the question of how DOD envisions employing SOF under this new
strategy, SOF’s capacity for expansion, and SOF’s ability to take on new mission requirements as
general purpose forces are drawn down.
36
Information in this section is taken from Christopher J. Castelli, “SOCOM to Issue RFP for V-22 Internally
Transportable Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, January 16, 2013.
37
DOD News Release, “Statement as Prepared by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on the Defense Strategic
Guidance,” No. 009-12, January 5, 2012.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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In partial response to this new strategic guidance and also as a means to expand relationships with
foreign SOF forged during 11 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, USSOCOM is reportedly
seeking to establish regional SOF coordination centers.3440 The basic concept is to adopt a NATO
Special Operations headquarters-type construct in conjunction with the existing Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs).3541 While such SOF regional coordination centers could prove
valuable, particularly in establishing and cultivating new relationships with regional forces, it is
not known what types of authorities would be required, if this function would conflict with the
geographic combatant command’s engagement plans, and what types of budgetary and personnel
resources would be needed for these regional SOF coordination centers.
31
DOD News Release, “Statement as Prepared by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on the Defense Strategic
Guidance,” No. 009-12, January 5, 2012.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Paul McLeary, “U.S. SOCOM Seeks to Broaden Ties With Foreign Forces,” Defense News, December 3, 2012.
35
Ibid.
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Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed
SOF36SOF42
Reports suggest USSOCOM will continue to push for more control over deployed special
operations forces. At present, once U.S. SOF deploys into a region, they are controlled by a
geographic combatant commander and USSOCOM can no longer control where they go or what
mission they perform. According to USSOCOM officials, “Admiral McRaven is looking for the
freedom to move forces where he needs them and when he needs them.”3743 This requirement
seemingly suggests USSOCOM is currently allocating its SOF units to combatant commands
with little to no mission guidance which, in itself, might be considered problematic. Given
USSOCOM’s counterterrorism mandate, it would appear thatseemingly USSOCOM could task these SOF
units with
missions at the national level, which would be mutually supportive of the combatant
commander’s regional missions for the SOF unit. If USSOCOM gets expanded authorities, it
would exert enhanced control primarily through TSOCs, which currently work exclusively for
each combatant commander, but USSOCOM contends that TSOCs operate “without any greater
centrality to recognizing how the actions of one TSOC in his regional area of responsibility can
do things that influence another region.”3844 If USSOCOM gets the additional authorities it has
requested, it could give the USSOCOM Commander the ability to have a direct relationships with
the TSOCs. USSOCOM argues this expanded authority would better permit the USSOCOM
commander to oversee his forces around the world as well as integrate their operations and
intelligence sharing making for a more effective counterterrorism campaign. While these
While these enhanced authorities might benefit USSOCOM, they might also violate
the principal of “unity of
command” despite USSOCOM’s insistence that combatant commanders
would have to approve
any of USSOCOM’s moves of deployed SOF units.
Some Arguments Against Expanded USSOCOM Authorities
One report suggests that “turning SOCOM into a global combatant command would create
constant constant
friction with regional commands” and that efforts to gain additional authorities were
perceived by
some as a “power grab.”3945 The potential for a dual chain of command could result in
unnecessary friction between USSOCOM and geographic combatant commands and host
countries, possibly having an unintended detrimental impact on the deployed SOF unit. Because
there appears to be a number of contentious issues regarding enhanced USSOCOM authorities,
Congress might choose to examine these issues in greater detail.
The Future of Special Operations—Direct versus Indirect Approach40 unnecessary
40
Paul McLeary, “U.S. SOCOM Seeks to Broaden Ties With Foreign Forces,” Defense News, December 3, 2012.
Ibid.
42
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Paul McLeary, “U.S. Spec Ops Head Wants More
Control Over Deployed Operators,” Defense News, December 3, 2012.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 91,
(continued...)
41
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friction between USSOCOM and geographic combatant commands and host countries, possibly
having an unintended detrimental impact on the deployed SOF unit. Others argue by giving
USSOCOM broader control over worldwide operations, it could distract USSOCOM from more
discrete engagements as USSOCOM could become “overwhelmed” with managing geographic
battlespaces.46 Still others have expressed concern in the foreign affairs community that as
USSOCOM “seeks to strengthen its global presence, we could wind up subverting long-term
objectives in return for short-term needs,” by means of reliance on military power as opposed to
smaller aid projects.47 Because there appears to be a number of contentious issues regarding
enhanced USSOCOM authorities, Congress might choose to examine these issues in greater
detail.
The Future of Special Operations—Direct versus Indirect Approach48
A recent article by Linda Robinson in Foreign Affairs offers both observations and
recommendations that could prove useful in future congressional debates on the future and
“proper” role of U.S. SOF. The author suggests the U.S. approach to counterterrorism over the
past decade has relied too heavily on raids by U.S. SOF and the use of armed drones, referred to
by many as the “direct approach.” While these raids and drone strikes have been deemed
necessary to address dire and immediate threats to the United States, special operations leaders
are said to favor complementing these direct actions with working with and through non-U.S.
partners to achieve counterterrorism security objectives—referred to as the “indirect approach.”
36
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Paul McLeary, “U.S. Spec Ops Head Wants More
Control Over Deployed Operators,” Defense News, December 3, 2012.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 91,
Number 6, November/December 2012.
40
Information in this section is taken from Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and
Capture,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 91, Number 6, November/December 2012.
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The author contends the indirect approach has received only high-level rhetorical support by the
special operations community and the past two presidential Administrations and believes the
indirect approach offers the prospect of lasting benefits with a smaller footprint and lower cost—
important considerations in a time of fiscal austerity.
The direct versus indirect approach debate is by no means a new debate, having been raised a
number of times by both military and civilian leadership during the campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan and in association with world-wide counterterrorism operations. With the projected
end of NATO involvement in Afghanistan in 2014 and the growing belief that the U.S. defense
budget will be in a relative state of decline for the foreseeable future, it might be prudent to
reexamine the emphasis placed on the indirect approach. Such a re-look of the indirect approach
would occur as the United States is shifting its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region, largely
by means of engagement which, in and of itself, is a type of indirect approach to national security.
(...continued)
Number 6, November/December 2012.
46
Jen Judson, “One-Star Argues Against Greater SOF Clout on the Battlefield,” InsideDefense.com, November 2,
2012.
47
Paul McLeary, “U.S. Special Operations at Critical Turning Point,” Defense News, February 4, 2013.
48
Information in this section is taken from Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and
Capture,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 91, Number 6, November/December 2012.
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Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
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