Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 13August 21, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21968
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Summary
Relations among major political factions have worsened substantiallybroke down in late 2011 and have not
improved thus far in 2012, threateningthreaten Iraq’s stability and the perception of the achievements of
the
the achievements of the long U.S. intervention in Iraq. Yet, these tensions have not erupted into
all-out communal or
political violence, and remain confined to the institutions of governance. Sunni Arabs, always
fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-MalikialMaliki would seek unchallenged power for Shiite factions
allied with him, accuse him of authoritarianism as he
seeks to sideline high ranking Sunni Arabs
from government. Iraq’s Kurds have also become
increasingly distrustful of Maliki over
territorial, political, and economic issues, and are
threatening to limit or end their involvement in
the central government. More recently, the powerfulThe Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has joined
the other groups to try to oust Maliki to share power, although he remains susceptible to overtures
from Maliki, Iran, and other pro-Maliki entities. The political rift has stalled the movement on
national oil laws that had occurred during August-November 2011 and prevented major efforts to
improve key services, such as provision of electricity. Some Sunni insurgent groups apparently
seek to undermine the Shiite-led government by conducting high-profile attacks intended to
reignite sectarian conflict, although the attacks have
Moqtada Al Sadr expressed support for the other groups’ efforts in mid-2012 to try to oust Maliki,
but Iran has pressed Sadr to distance himself from that action, contributing to the failure of the
ouster drive thus far. The political rift has not halted governance or prevented oil export-led
growth, but the schisms have stalled the movement on national oil laws and prevented efforts to
improve key services nationwide, particularly provision of electricity. Further challenging Iraqi
governance and Iraq’ security forces are increasingly ambitious attacks by Sunni insurgent
groups, particularly Al Qaeda in Iraq, to undermine the Shiite-led government by conducting
high-profile attacks. The violence is intended to reignite sectarian conflict, but the attacks have
failed to spark such broad conflict to date.
The widening splits and continuing dysfunctions within Iraq’s government have called into
question the legacy of U.S. involvement in Iraq. In line with the letter of the November 2008 bilateral
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, President Obama announced on October 21, 2011, that U.S.
negotiations with Iraqi leaders failed to extend the agreement to allow for the presence of any
U.S. forces after 2011. A U.S. proposal to retain troops was based on lingering U.S. doubts over
the ability of Iraqi leaders and forces
would leave Iraq entirely at the end of 2011. Insufficient Iraqi political support caused the Iraqi
leadership to turn down a U.S. proposal to retain some U.S. troops after 2011. The proposal was
based on U.S. doubts over the ability of Iraqi security forces to preserve the earlier gains. However, as U.S.
troops withdrew ( and on a
U.S. view that a continued troop presence would ensure U.S. influence beyond 2011. As U.S.
troops completing the withdrawal onby December 18, 2011), Administration officials
asserted asserted
publicly that Iraq’s governing and security capacity is sufficient to continue to build a
building a stable and
democratic Iraq. Iraq’s security forces number nearly 700,000 members, increasingly
well-armed
and well-trained—observations the Administration says justify selling Iraq such
sophisticated sophisticated
equipment as U.S. F-16 aircraft.
The Administration added that it couldhas tried to continue to assist Iraq’s security, and limit Iranian
influence,
through standard State and Defense Department programs and mechanisms. The
Administration has planned for. These include U.S. training for Iraq’s
security forces to continue through various
institutions such as thethrough an Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department
police development program. However, as Iraqi leaders seek to this assistance has been hampered by Iraqi efforts to
emerge from U.S. tutelage,: the
police training program has shriveledwithered and some OSC-I efforts, which involve DoD personnel,
have have
thus far been limited by a lack of agreement with Iraq on their legal rights and privileges in
Iraq.
About 16,00012,500 U.S. personnel, including contractors, remain in Iraq under State Department
authority, but the State Department has assessed that number as too large for the existing missions
and a 25% Embassy staffing reduction is planned by the end of 2013.
As Iraq emerges from its U.S.-led transition, Iraqit is realigning itself in the region. Some see it
moving closer to Iran, and they cite Iraq’s reluctancefor example by refusing to call for Iran’s ally, Bashar Al Assad of
Syria, to
yield power amid major unrest. Others see Iraq trying to reestablish its historic role as a
major major
player in the Arab world, and to do so Iraq has been trying to rebuild relations with Sunni
Arab Arab
states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the
Arab Arab
fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012.
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Contents
Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition.......................................................................... 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System....................................................... 1
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government..................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ....................................................................................................... 2
December 15, 2005, Elections............................................................................................. 3
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S.-Assisted Reconciliation ................................................... 4
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge................................................................................................. 4
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi GovernmentIraqi Governance: 2008-2009 ............................................... 5
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections ............................................................................ 5
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Shiites Fracture and Sunnis Cohere ......................................... 7
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ........................................................................ 8
Election Parameters............................................................................................................. 9
Flashpoint: De-Baathification and Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis.............. 10
Election and Results .......................................................................................................... 11
Post-Election Government ................................................................................................ 12
Agreement on a New Government Reached (“Irbil Agreement”)..................................... 12
2010-2014 Government Formed ....................................................................................... 13
Unresolved Schisms and Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Collapse............................................... 14
Centralization of Power Disputes/Security Ministry Appointments ............................................................................................ 14
Security Ministerial Appointments.................................................................................... 15
National Council for Strategic Policies Dispute................................................................ 15
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and ReactionsSunni Moves to Form Separate Regions ........................................................... 16
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and Naqshabandis ............................ 16
Sunni Moves to Form Separate Regions ................ 15
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Reactions ........................................................... 16
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and Naqshabandis ............................ 1716
Sons of Iraq Fighters ......................................................................................................... 1718
KRG-Central Government Disputes........................................................................................ 18
Territorial Issues/“Disputed Internal Boundaries” ............................................................ 1819
KRG Oil Exports/Oil Laws ............................................................................................... 20
Intra-Kurdish Divisions..................................................................................................... 21
The Sadr Faction’s Continuing Ambition and Agitation ......................................................... 2122
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Crisis...................................................................................... 2223
The Crisis Abates but Defies Easy ResolutionResolution........................................................................... 23
Effect of the Crisis on Upcoming Elections...................................................................... 2425
Related Governance Issues ............................................................................................................ 25
National Oil Laws and Other Pending Laws/Budget ..................................................................... 25...... 25
Budget and Energy Sector Development................................................................................. 26
Response to Arab Spring-Related Demonstrations.................................................................. 2627
Protest-Prompted Governmental Reforms ........................................................................ 2627
General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 2728
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 2728
Media and Free Expression ............................................................................................... 28
Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 2829
Religious Freedom/Situation of the Christian Religious Minority.................................... 2829
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 2930
Corruption ......................................................................................................................... 29
30
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Mass Graves ...................................................................................................................... 30
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31
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 3031
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 3031
Iranian Opposition: People’s Mojahedin/Camp Ashraf and PJAK ................................... 3233
Syria......................................................................................................................................... 3233
Turkey...................................................................................................................................... 3334
Gulf States ............................................................................................................................... 3334
U.S. Military Withdrawal and Post-2011 Policy............................................................................ 3435
Question of Whether U.S. Forces Would Remain Beyond 2011............................................. 3436
U.S. Efforts to Convince Iraq to Request A Continued U.S. Military Presence................ 3536
President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal.............................................. 36
The Post-Withdrawal Presence..Structure of the Post-Troop Relationship .............................................................................................. 36
Structure of the Post-Troop Security Relationship .................................................................. 36 37
The Diplomatic and Economic Relationship..................................................................... 3738
Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections ................................................................... 8
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province ................................... 4142
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2013 ....................................................................... 4243
Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq.............................................................................. 4344
Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)......................................... 4445
Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005) .............................................................. 4546
Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks ...................................................................................... 4647
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 4849
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Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition
During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq completed a transition from the dictatorship
of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in which varying sects and ideological and
political factions compete in elections. A series of elections began in 2005, after a one-year
occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance. There
has been a consensus among Iraqi elites since 2005 to give each community a share of power and
prestige to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative claim of each
community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were
never fully resolved. The constant infighting among the major factions over their perceived share
of power and resources has interfered with the basic functions of governing and produced popular
frustration over a failure of government to deliver services.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). During that year, U.S. and Iraqi
negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), which became effective on March 4, 2004.1
After about one year of occupation, the United States, following a major debate between the CPA
and various Iraqi factions over the modalities and rapidity of a resumption of Iraqi sovereignty,
handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. That date was
two days ahead of the TAL-specified date of June 30, 2004, for the handing over of Iraqi
sovereignty and the end of the occupation period, which also laid out the elections roadmap
discussed below. The interim government was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader
of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction but whose supporters are mostly
Sunni Arabs. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them
were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president was Sunni tribalist Ghazi al-Yawar.
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government
Iraqi leaders who rose to prominence after the fall of Saddam Hussein had always assumed that a
series of elections would determine the composition of Iraq’s new power structure. The beginning
of the elections process was set for 2005 to produce a transitional parliament that would supervise
writing a new constitution, a public referendum on a new constitution, and then the election of a
full term government under that constitution.
In accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005. The voting was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
1
Text, in English, is at: http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html
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executive), four-year-term provincial councils in all 18 provinces, and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The election for the transitional Assembly was conducted according to the
“proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political
entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or personspeople). A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which 9 were multi-party coalitions.
Still restive over their displacement from power in the 2003 U.S. invasion, Sunni Arabs (20% of
the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only 1 seat on the 51-seat
Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), then led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. (In August 2003,
when Abd al-Aziz’s brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was assassinated in a bombing outside a
Najaf mosque, Abd al-Aziz succeeded his brother as ISCI leader. After Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s
death from lung cancer in August 2009, his son Ammar, born in 1971, succeeded him.)
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose armed faction (the militia operated under the name
Mahdi Army) was then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was
prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six
ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution2
The elected Assembly was to draft a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three
provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two
Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005,
the talks produced a draft, providing for:
•
The three Kurdish-controlled provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah to
constitute a legal “region” administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), which would have its own elected president and parliament (Article 113).
•
a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140).
•
designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation.
•
all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) to be applicable until amended (Article 126), and a “Federation Council”
(Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future
law (not adopted to date).
•
a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47).
•
families to choose which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only
primary education mandatory (Article 34).
2
Text of the Iraqi constitution is at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/
AR2005101201450.html.
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•
having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court
(Article 89). Many Iraqi women opposed this and the previous provisions as
giving too much discretion to male family members.
•
two or more provinces to join together to form new autonomous “regions”—
reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
•
“regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the
Kurds’ peshmerga militia (Article 117). This continue a TAL provision.
•
the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in
proportion to population, and for regions to have a role in allocating revenues
from new energy discoveries (Article 109). Disputes over these concepts
continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis
dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or gas deposits, and favor
centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.
However, these provisions left many disputes unresolved, particularly the balance between central
government and regional and local authority. With this basic question unresolved, Sunnis
registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four
months after a post-December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on
within another two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum). The Sunni
provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin (which includes Saddam’s home town of Tikrit) had a 97%
and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only
voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote three provinces to vote “no” by a two-thirds majority in three
provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election,
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives”
(COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats
had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19
multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose
the people who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime
ministerPrime
Minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies were
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq alHashimi, leader of thea broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which which
Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
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infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were
women.
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S.-Assisted
Reconciliation
The 2005 elections were, at the time, considered successful by the Bush Administration but did
not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure.
However, later events suggested that the elections in 2005 might have worsened the violence by
exposing and reinforcing the political weakness of the Sunni Arabs. With tensions high, the
bombing of a major Shiite shrine within the Sunni-dominated province of Salahuddin in February
2006 set off major sectarian unrest, characterized in part by Sunni insurgent activities against
government and U.S. troops, high-casualty suicide and other bombings, and the empowerment of
Shiite militia factions to counter the Sunni acts. The sectarian violence was so serious that many
experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing, an outcome that an
“Iraq Study Group” concluded was a significant possibility absent a major change in U.S. policy.3
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge
As assessments of possible overall U.S. policy failure multiplied, in August 2006, the
Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented,
might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was required for the
United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush
exercised the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September
1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been metIraqi performance on the benchmarks, as well as an outside assessment
of the Iraqi
security forces (ISF).
In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces (bringing
U.S. troop levels from their 2004-2006 baseline of about 138,000 to about 170,000 at the height
of the surge) intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab
rejection of extremist groups. The Administration cited the Iraq Study Group as recommending a
temporary surge of troops as well as linking the continued U.S. military presence to Iraqi leaders’
commitment to reconciliation. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major
Iraqi legislative benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that was attributed to
surge, the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However,
U.S. officials maintained that its extent and durability would depend on the degree of
implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued
attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 7.
3
“The Iraq Study Group Report.” Vintage Books, 2006. The Iraq Study Group was funded by the conference report on
P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of an Iraq
Study Group. The legislation did not specify the Group’s exact mandate or its composition.
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The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi GovernmentIraqi Governance: 2008-2009
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 considered crucial to reconciliation, continued reductions in
violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the continued turn of many Sunni militants away
from violence, enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki
against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the
Knights”) pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed—
willing to take on radical groups even if they were Shiite. This contributed to a decision in July
2008 by the Sunni-led Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the cabinet. During the period
in which the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi
were boycotting, there were 13 vacancies out of 37 cabinet slots.
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
The January 31, 2009, provincial elections followed adoption in 2008 of a “provincial powers
law” intended to decentralize Iraq somewhatgovernance by setting up powerful provincial councils that could
decide on local allocation of resources. The provincial councils in Iraq choose each province’s
governor and governing administrations—in contrast to Afghanistan, where provincial governors
are appointed by the president. Some central government funds are given as grants directly to
provincial administrations for their use, although most of Iraq’s budget is controlled centrally. Of
the provincial grants, there have been some efforts in 2012 in some provinces to consult with
district and municipal level officials to assure a fair distribution of provincial resources.
The first .
The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
when Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk into the KRG caused a presidential council
veto of
the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That draft provided for equal
equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally
resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed a
final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009, and putting off provincial
elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.4
In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arabdominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of
council seats per province was about 30,5 down from a set number of 41 seats per province
(except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This
yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in
number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.
The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s
slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
4
The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad.
5
Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
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widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.6 This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates were killed. There were virtually no major violent incidents on election
day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some expected. Some voters complained of
being turned away at polling places because their names were not on file. Other voters had been
displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were unable to vote in their new areas of
habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
selected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.
Outcomes: Maliki Strongest Among Shiites, and Sunni Tribalists Enter Politics
The hopes of some Maliki opponents that the provincial elections would empower local
authorities were dashed somewhat when Maliki’s “State of Law Coalition” was the clear winner
of the provincial elections. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally,
Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the
formerly powerful UIA. It fared poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained
control of the Baghdad provincial council, and ran very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of
the south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats). ISCI tied
Maliki’s list (seven seats each) in Najaf province, which it previously dominated and which,
because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity in southern
Iraq. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held
previously, and only 5 in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a
product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived
close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believed was exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics.
Others say ISCI was perceived as interested in political and economic gain for its supporters.
Although Maliki’s coalition fared well, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations
demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and a
Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists. The
provincial administrations that took shape are discussed in Table 5. Aside from the victory of
Maliki’s slate, the unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to Iraqi nationalism
and strong central government.
Another important trend noted in the 2009 provincial elections was the entry of ever more Sunnis
into the political process. Participating in the provincial elections were Sunni tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
6
The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists
had had
largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused
primarily primarily
on the severe violence in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar, and because of Al
Qaeda in
Iraq’s admonition that Sunnis stay out of the political process. However, in the 2009
provincial provincial
elections, as the violence ebbed, Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed
strength at the
expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
and the National
Dialogue Council. The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar
Province. The
tribalists benefitted from the decline of the IIP and other mostly urban Sunni
parties. In Diyala
Province, hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, the
provincial version
of the (Sunni Arab) Accord Front edged out the Kurds for first place, and
subsequently allied with
the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration.
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Shiites Fracture and Sunnis Cohere
After his slate’s strong showing in the January 2009 provincial elections, Maliki became the
immediate favorite to retain his position in the March 7, 2010, COR elections. The elected COR
chooses the full-term government. Maliki derived further political benefit from the U.S.
implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” (SA, sometimes referred to as the Status
of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), discussed below in the section on the U.S. military mission.
However, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by
several high-profile attacks. Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to
remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in
connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis
were killed and the buildings housing the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily
damaged. Makeshift Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009.
Politically, sensing Maliki’s weakness and a more open competition for prime minister, Shiite
unity broke down and a rival Shiite slate took shape as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law. The
“Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA
coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality.
To Sunni Arabs, the outwardly cross-sectarian Iraq National Movement (“Iraqiyya”) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal. There was an openly Sunni slate,
leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not
expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures were recruited
to join Shiite slates.
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Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
(slate no. 337)
Iraqi National Alliance
(slate no. 316)
Iraqi National Movement
(“Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333)
Kurdistan Alliance
(slate no. 372)
Unity Alliance of Iraq
(slate no. 348)
Iraqi Accordance
(slate no. 338)
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Included Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shiite sectarianism during the campaign by
backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party.
Formed in August 2009, was initially considered the most formidable challenger
to Maliki’s slate. Consisted mainly of his Shiite opponents and was perceived as
somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Included ISCI, the Sadrist
movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and
the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime Minister
Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible potential prime ministerial candidate from this bloc was
Deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate well respected by U.S. officials.
However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to
exclude candidates with Baathist ties—wanted to replace Maliki. This slate was
considered close to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not receive his formal
endorsement.
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shiite but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and Deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as
other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. Justice and
Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification Commission)
disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate, Dhafir al Ani, for
supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed their
disqualification, but the decision was legislatively reversed after the election).
Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran ran its own
separate list for the March 2010 elections. PUK’s ebbing strength in the north did
not jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis sought that
position.
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani was not previously affiliated with the large Shiite
parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly aligned with the Sadr faction
(which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in southeastern Iraq).
Considered non-sectarian, this list Includedincluded Sunni tribal faction led by Shaykh
Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni Awakening movement in
Anbar. The list included first post-Saddam defense minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, then-speaker of the COR. ViewedWas viewed as a weak
competitor for Sunni votes against Allawi slate.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
While coalitions formed to challenge Maliki, disputes emerged over the ground rules for the
election. The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January
31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage
and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
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Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, and the size of the next COR) shape the election
outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over its substance. These differences caused
the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute was over the election
system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system - whichthat gives the slates the
power to determine who occupies COR seats after the election - despite a call by Grand Ayatollah
Sistani. Others, backed by Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, called for an open list vote -, which allows voters to also vote for candidates as
well as coalition
slates. Each province served as a single constituency and a fixed number of seats
for each
province (see Table 2, for the number of seats per province).
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Tamim (Kirkuk) province,
where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented. The
version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version guaranteed only a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are
displaced—and Sunnis believed they would therefore be undercounted because it was mainly
Sunnis who had fled Iraq. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni
Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, 2009, sent the lawsending it back to the COR. A new
version was
adopted on November 23, 2009, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni
Arabs than the
first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi
again threatened
a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was
about to lapse, the
major factions, at the urging of U.S. diplomats, adopted a new law on
December 6, 2009.
Election Parameters
The compromise version, not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, provided for
•
Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s 7. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based on
taking 2005 population figures and adding 2.8% per year growth.7
•
The remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory
seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that
did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
•
No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their
votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
•
An open list election system.
•
An election date set for March 7, 2010.
7
Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/thehashemi-veto/.
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Flashpoint: De-Baathification and Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
The electoral process was at least partly intended to bring Sunni Arabs ever further into the
political structure and to turn them away from violence and insurgency. Sunnis boycotted the
January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in
all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, did participate in
the December 2005 parliamentary elections, an apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni
interests to remain permanently alienated from the political process.
The Sunnis’ commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a
major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 2010 elections. Although a Sunni boycott
of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be
unfair because of this dispute. The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when
the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the successor to the “De-Baathification
Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government)
invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many
different slates. The JAC was headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military
custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He was
perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the DeBaathification Commission. Both were part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are
Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude
prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The JAC argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate
backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The
IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010; disqualified candidates had
three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy,
Vice President
Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in
Iraq—all of
which feared a return to instability—the appeals court ruled that disqualified
candidates could run
in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.
However, about 300
disqualified candidates had already been replaced by other candidates on
their respective slates.
The slate most affected by the disqualifications was Iraqiyya, because two
of its leading
candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani,
both Sunnis,
were replaced on their slates. Still, the slate campaigned vigorously, and many
Sunnis seemed to
react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order to
achieve political
results through the election process. Even the JAC’s disqualification of an
additional 55 mostly
Iraqiyya candidates the night before the election did not prompt a boycott.
The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by General Ray Odierno, then
the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his deputy,
General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the
legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi was in close
contact with an Iraqi, COR member Jamal al-Ibrahimi, who is a purported ally of General Qasem
Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC).8 Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding
ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—caused particular U.S. alarm.
8
Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
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Possibly because of the disqualification dispute, Lami was assassinated on May 26, 2011,
presumably by Sunnis who viewed him as an architect
of the perceived discrimination. Chalabi,
now a member of parliament, as of the 2010 elections,
initially replaced Lami as manager of the JAC, but Maliki dismissed him in
that roleChalabi, appointing instead
the minister for human rights to serve in that role concurrently.
Election and Results
About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170
total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual
candidates as well as overall slates. The major blocs are depicted in Table 1. All available press
reports indicated that campaigning was vibrant and vigorous. Total turnout was about 62%,
according to the IHEC. Turnout was slightly lower, although somewhat lower than that in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent
insurgent bombings that took place there just as voting was starting.
The final count was announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC. As noted in Table 2, Iraqiyya
won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The
Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members
gets the first opportunity to form a government. On that basis, Allawi, leader of the Iraqiyya slate,
demanded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s
Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling that any group that forms after the election could be
deemed to meet that requirement, laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the
first opportunity to form a government.
The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wranglingdisputes delayed thisthe
certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a
statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC
respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded
that any recount decisions are under its purview and that a comprehensive recount would take an
extended period of time. Several international
observers, including then-U.N. Special
Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there
was no cause to suggest widespread
fraud. (Melkert was replaced in September 2011 by Martin Kobler.)
However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, 2010, an Iraqi court ordered a
recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats,
was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of seat totals. This followed a
few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any JAC disqualifications of winning
candidates. With the seat count holding
Kobler.)
After appeals of some of the results, Iraq’s Supreme Court certified the results on June 1,
2010,
triggering the following timelines:
•
Fifteen days after certification (by June 15, 2010), the new COR was to be seated
and to elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. (The deadline to convene was
met, although, as noted, the COR did not elect a leadership team and did not meet
again until November 11, 2010.)
•
After electing a speaker, but with no deadline, the COR is to choose a president
(by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the
“presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of
the first full-term government.)
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•
Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a
government. (The selection of a president occurred on November 11, 2010, and
Maliki was formally tapped to form a cabinet on November 25, 2010.)
•
Within another 30 days (by December 25, 2010), the prime minister-designate is
to present a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).
Post-Election Government
In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene
on convened on
June 15, 2010. However,, but the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political
deadlock, did not elect without electing a COR leadership
team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest
member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator
Fouad Massoum) became acting COR speaker. During
the period when no new government was
formed, the COR remained inactive, with most COR
members in their home provinces while still
collecting their $10,000 per month salaries. The
resentment over this contributed to the popular
unrest in February 2011.
Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in
May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the
“National Alliance.” However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee,
with the Sadr faction and ISCI opposing Maliki. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second
meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, this putative alliance splintered.
The various factions made little progress through August 2010, as Maliki insisted he remain
prime minister for another term. With the factional disputes unresolved, Maliki remained prime
minister in a caretaker role. Some observers assert that he continued to govern as a caretaker,
having and had little incentive to see a new government formed. With the end
of the U.S. combat
mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States reportedly
stepped up its
involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between Maliki and
Allawi’s bloc on a
U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for supporting Maliki,
would head a new
council that would have broad powers as a check and balance on the post of
prime minister.
Alternate proposals had Allawi being given the presidency, although the Kurds
refused to cede
that post to another community, fearing loss of leverage on other demands. An
expectation that
the August 10-September 11, 2010, Ramadan period would enable the blocs to
reach an
agreement was not met.
Part of the difficulty forming a government was the close result, and the dramatic implications of
gaining or retaining power in Iraq, where politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition.
Others blamed Allawi for the impasse, claiming that he was insisting on a large, powerful role for
himself even though he could not assemble enough COR votes to achieve a majority there.
Agreement on a New Government Reached (“Irbil Agreement”)
On October 1, 2010, Maliki received the backing of most of the 40 COR deputies of Shiite cleric
Moqtada Al Sadr. The United States reportedly was alarmed at the prospect that Maliki might be
able to form a government primarily by allying with Sadr, and by extension, Iran. However, in
early November 2010, the United States, Allawi, and many of the Sunni Arab regional states
acquiesced to a second Maliki term. The key question that remained was whether Maliki, and
Iraq’s Kurds would agree to form a broad based government that met the demands of Iraqiyya for
substantial Sunni Arab inclusion. Illustrating the degree to which the Kurds reclaimed their
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former role of “kingmakers,” Maliki, Allawi, and other Iraqi leaders met in the capital of the
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Kurdistan Regional Government-administered region in Irbil on November 8, 2010, to continue
to negotiate on a new government. (Sadr did not attend the meeting in Irbil, but ISCI/Iraq
National Alliance slate leader Ammar Al Hakim did.)
On November 10, 2010, with reported direct intervention by President Obama, the “Irbil
Agreement” was reached in which (1) Allawi agreed to support Maliki and Talabani to remain in
their offices for another term; (2) Iraqiyya would be extensively represented in government—one
of its figures would become COR Speaker, another would be defense minister, and another
(presumably Allawi himself) would chair the enhanced oversight body discussed above, though
renamed the “National Council for Strategic Policies;”9 and (3) amending the de-Baathification
laws that had barred some Iraqis, such as Saleh al-Mutlaq, from holding political positions.
Observers praised the agreement because it included all major factions and was signed with KRG
President Masoud Barzani and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey in attendance. The
agreement did not specify concessions to the Sadr faction.
2010-2014 Government Formed10
At the November 11, 2010, COR session to implement the agreement, Iraqiyya figure Usama alNujaifi (brother of controversial Nineveh Governor Atheel Nujaifi) was elected COR speaker, as
agreed. However, Allawi and most of his bloc walked out after three hours over the refusal of the
other blocs to readmit the three Iraqiyya members who had been disqualified from running for the
COR by the JAC (see above). The remaining COR members were sufficient for a quorum and
Talabani was
re-elected president after two rounds of voting. Fears were further calmed on
November 13, 2010,
when most of Allawi’s bloc attended the COR session and continued to
implement the settlement
agreement; Allawi himself did not attend. On November 25, 2010,
Talabani formally tapped
Maliki as the prime minister-designate, giving him 30 days (until
December 25) to name and
achieve majority COR confirmation for a new cabinet.
The stage was set for a new cabinet to be announced afterGovernmental formation advanced on December 19, 2010, when Allawi
reaffirmed his intent to
join the government. That assurance came the same day that the COR
His cooperation came when the COR voted (with barely a quorum achieved
after a Shiite walkout) to reinstate to politics the three
senior barred members of his bloc, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had been barred from politics by the
JAC, as discussed discussed
above. Mutlaq was subsequently named one of three deputy prime ministers.
On December 21, 2010, in advance of the December 25, 2010, deadline, Maliki presented a
cabinet to the COR (42 seats, including the posts of prime minister, 3 deputy prime ministers, and
38 ministries and ministers of state) receiving broad approval. No permanent appointments were
named for seven ministries. Still, the government formed was inclusive of all major factions.
Among major outcomes were the following:
•
9
As for the State of Law list, Maliki remained prime minister, and retained for
himself the Defense, Interior, and National Security (minister of state) posts
pending permanent nominees for those positions. The faction took seven other
cabinet posts, in addition to the post of first deputy president (Khudair al Khuzai
of the Da’wa Party) and deputy prime minister for energy issues (Hussein
Shahristani, previously the oil minister).
Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
The following information is taken from Iraqi news accounts presented in http://www.opensource.gov.
10
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of the Da’wa Party) and deputy prime minister for energy issues (Hussein
Shahristani, previously the oil minister).
•
For Iraqiyya, in addition to Mutlaq becoming a deputy prime minister, Tariq alHashimi remained a deputy president (the second deputy). The bloc also obtained
nine ministerial posts, including the key Finance Ministry (Rafi al-Issawi,
previously a deputy prime minister).
•
For the Iraqi National Alliance, a senior figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, remained one
of the three deputy presidents. The alliance also obtained 13 cabinet positions,
parceled out among its various factions. An INA technocrat, Abd al Karim
Luaibi, was appointed oil minister. A Fadilah party member, Bushra Saleh, is a
minister of state without portfolio and was the only woman in the cabinet until
the February 13, 2011, naming of Ibtihal Al Zaidy as minister of state for
women’s affairs (although she is not from the INA). Another Fadila activist was
named minister of justice.
•
Of the 13 INA cabinet seats, Sadr faction members head eight ministries,
including Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning (Ali Abd alNabi, appointed in April 2011), and Tourism and Antiquities. A Sadrist also is one
of two deputy COR speakers. However, these positions are relatively junior
within the cabinet. Still, the Sadr faction received some compensatory influence
when one of its members subsequently became governor of Maysan Province.
•
The Kurdistan Alliance received major posts. Talabani stayed president; and the
third deputy prime minister is Kurdish figure (PUK faction) Rows Shaways, who
has served in various central and KRG positions since the fall of Saddam. Arif
Tayfour is second deputy COR speaker. Alliance members have six other cabinet
seats, including longtime Kurdish (KDP) stalwart Hoshyar Zebari remaining as
foreign minister (a position he’s held since the transition governments that
followed the fall of Saddam). Khairallah Hassan Babakir, was named trade
minister in a February 13, 2011, group of ministerial appointments.
Unresolved Schisms and Post-U.S. Withdrawal
Political Collapse
The agreements that led to the 2010 government formation did not resolve the underlying
differences among the major communities. Subsequent disputes, particularly between Maliki and
the Iraqiyya bloc of Iyad al-Allawi (who is Shiite but most members of the bloc are Sunnis)
tarnished the U.S. assessment that Iraqi factions would permanently engage in power-sharing.
The partial unraveling of the Irbil Agreement in the aftermath of the December 18, 2011, U.S.
withdrawal cast some doubt on President Obama’s assertion, marking the U.S. withdrawal, that
Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.” The sections below also discuss the various
disagreements and their causes.
Centralization of Power Disputes/Security Ministry Appointments
Maliki critics cite numerous examples that demonstrate that Maliki seeks to centralize power in
his own and his faction’s hands. His attempts to purge leading Sunni Arabs from government are
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discussed below in the context of the post-U.S. withdrawal political crisis. Earlier, his critics cited
his request, in late 2010, that Iraq’s Supreme Court rule that several independent commissions—
including the Independent Higher Election Commission and the anti-corruption commission—be
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supervised by the cabinet. The court ruled in Maliki’s favor on January 23, 2011, although the
court also said in its ruling that the institutions must remain free of political interference.11 In
March 2012, Maliki also asserted governmental control over another institution that was to be
independent—the Central Bank.
Maliki’s critics have long asserted that he has used his control over the security forces for
political purposes. In 2008, he began to restructure security organs to report to his office rather
than the Defense or Interior ministries. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he
commands direct command of the National Counterterrorism Force (about 10,000 personnel) as
well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. Reports quoting U.S.
commanders in Iraq in June 2011 said that lower-level commanders routinely bypass the official
chain of command and report directly to Maliki’s office. As discussed below, the post-U.S.
withdrawal disputes have included the intimidating deployment of tanksOn at least one occasion, he has
sometimes ordered tanks deployed around the homes and
offices of some of Maliki’s opponentsan opponent.
Security Ministerial Appointments
As part of this broader theme, Maliki’s critics accuse him of monopolizing control of the major
security posts. Maliki refutes Allawi’s interpretation of the Irbil Agreement as requiring
appointment of an Iraqiyya official as defense minister, asserting that a Sunni Arab, not
necessarily a member of the Iraqiyya faction, is required. With this dispute unresolved, Maliki has
appointed allies and associates as acting ministers of Defense, of Interior, and of National
Security. On August 16, 2011, Maliki appointed Sadun Dulaymi as acting defense minister—he is
a Sunni Arab but he is a member of the Iraq Unity Alliance, not Iraqiyya. He subsequently
appointed Falih al-Fayad, a Shiite in the faction of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, as
acting minister of state for national security, and Adnan al-Asadi, another Shiite aligned with
Maliki, as acting interior minister. No permanent choices for any of these posts have been
nominated to date.
National Council for Strategic Policies Dispute
Another issue has been the continuing stalemate over the formation of the National Council for
Strategic Strategic
Policies—a key provision of the Irbil Agreement. Some proposals from those
sympathetic to
Allawi called for the council to include the prime minister, president, their
deputies, and a
representative of all major blocs—and for decisions of the council to be binding
on Maliki if they
achieve support of 80% of the council members. Maliki and his supporters want
this council to
have as few powers as possible so as not to impinge upon the power of the prime
minister. The
body and its powers have not been voted on by the COR, and Allawi was always
considered considered
unlikely to chair the body unless it is given significant authorities.
11
Parker, Ned and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
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Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Reactions
Below the level of elites and factions, many Iraqi Sunnis continue to believe that Maliki and his
Shiite allies want to monopolize power. This belief flows not only from the factional disputes
discussed above, but also from a variety of government actions and policies discussed below. As
the U.S. withdrawal completion approached, fears of some Sunnis were inflamed in October and
November 2011 by a series of arrests by security forces. About 600 Sunnis were arrested,
ostensibly for involvement in an alleged plot revealed by the new leaders of Libya (based on
information captured from former leader Muammar Qadhafi and his regime) in which Sunni
Iraqis were attempting to organize a coup against the Iraqi government. Some Sunnis were
reportedly purged from the security forces, and 140 faculty members from the University of Tikrit
(Saddam’s home town) for alleged Baathist associations. There has been no movement
on this issue at all in 2012.
Sunni Moves to Form Separate Regions
In late 2011, local Sunni leaders attempted to use legal mechanisms to reduce central government
control. The provincial council of the mostly Sunni province of Salahuddin (which contains
Tikrit) voted on October 28, 2011, to start the process of forming a separate “region.”
Overwhelmingly Sunni Anbar province followed suit. The mixed province of Diyala took a
11
Parker, Ned and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
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similar step on December 12, 2011, setting off protests by Shiites in the province who might have
been instigated by the Shiite-dominated central government. Sunni members of the provincial
council subsequently fled into the Kurdish controlled areas just north of Diyala. Previously, the
mostly Shiite provinces of Basra and Wasit had begun similar processes, although doing so
requires parliamentary concurrence and a popular referendum of approval.
Seeking to squelch these moves, the Maliki government has essentially ignored these votes and
has not tasked the Independent Higher Election Commission (IHEC), which is a central
government body, to organize the referenda needed as part of the region formation process. The
IHEC is subject to Maliki’s control, giving him a de-facto veto over the region formation process
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Reactions
Within Iraqi society, there is a broad sense among many Iraqi Sunnis that Maliki and his Shiite
allies want to monopolize power. As the U.S. withdrawal completion approached, fears of some
Sunnis were inflamed in October and November 2011 by a series of arrests by security forces.
About 600 Sunnis were arrested, ostensibly for involvement in a coup plot alleged by the new
leaders of Libya. Some Sunnis were reportedly purged from the security forces, and 140 faculty
members from the University of Tikrit (Saddam’s home town) for alleged Baathist associations.
Many have since been reinstated.
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and Naqshabandis
The suspicions of the Sunni community might account for some of the high-profile attacks that
continue in Iraq, including those carried out by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). U.S. officials estimated
in November 2011 that there might be 800-1,000 people in Al Qaeda-Iraq’s network, of which
many are involved in media or finance of operations.12
Another Sunni group, linked to ex-Baathists, is the Naqshabandi faction, based in northern Iraq.
Former Ambassador-nominee to Iraq Brett McGurk said in his June 6, 2012, confirmation
hearings that
the Naqshabandis are responsible for most of the attacks on U.S. diplomatic
facilities in northern
Iraq (particularly Kirkuk). Still, according to McGurk, there are, although such attack number only about 2-3 such attacks per
week, a relatively low level compared to periods at the height of the U.S. military mission in Iraq.
The attacks might have contributed to the State Dept. decision in 2012 to close the Kirkuk
consulate.
Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on December 18, 2011, these groups, particularly
Sunni groups,
particularly AQ-I, have been conducting numerous high-profile suicide and other attacks against Shiite
Shiite religious pilgrims and neighborhoods throughout Iraq. These attacks, some of which AQ-I has
claimed responsibility for, are perceived as an
effort by Sunni insurgents and AQ-I to undermine
:undermine Maliki’s leadership,; to retaliate against his
perceived actions against Sunnis, and to possibly
; to dissuade moderate Sunnis from continuing to work with
Maliki’s government; and to possibly reignite sectarian conflict.
On The attacks have not, to any
significant extent, accomplished those objectives to date.
12
Michael Schmidt and Eric Schmitt. “Leaving Iraq, U.S. Fears New Surge of Qaeda Terror.” New York Times,
November 6, 2011.
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Among the most notable recent attacks: on February 7, 2012, the AQ-I affiliate Islamic State of
Iraq claimed responsibility for two of the
deadliest attacks on Shiites since the U.S. withdrawal—
on January 5 and January 14, 2012, which
killed 78 and 53 Shiite pilgrims, respectively. In one of
the most complex attacks in recent
months, on February 23, 2012, bombings in 12 Iraqi cities
killed over 50 personspeople; based on the
method and scope of the attacks, Iraqi observers attributed the
attacks to AQ-I. AQ-I claimed
responsibility for a broad series of attacks—encompassing six
cities—on March 20, 2012; over
40 persons 40 people were killed. Another spate of attacks took place in
Baghdad and Kirkuk on April 19,
2012, killing about 36 personspeople. On June 12, 2012, in attacks that
bear the hallmarks of AQ-I, there
were separate bombings in numerous cities, targeting Shiite
pilgrims, killing about 65 and
wounding 200. The attacks prompted Maliki to hold a meeting with security chiefs. wounding 200. This attack
came about one week after a bombing
of a Shiite religious office that sought to take control of
administering the Shiite mosque in Salahuddin that was bombed in 2006 (see above).
12
Michael Schmidt and Eric Schmitt. “Leaving Iraq, U.S. Fears New Surge of Qaeda Terror.” New York Times,
November 6, 2011.
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Still, U.S. officials note that aggregate levels of violence have not increased since the U.S.
pullout. Others fear that the attacks could represent a resurgence of AQ-I now that U.S. forces are
not there to help suppress the group. Suggesting that Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders do not want the
group to re-emerge, in early 2012, more than 60 leaders of tribes in Sunni-dominated areas of
Iraq—with the concurrence of local government and security officials—reached agreement to
authorize tribal leaders to enforce strict codes of justice against insurgents and their accomplices.
Since early 2012, there have been indications that AQ-I might be intervening in the unrest in
Syria.13 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified on February 16, 2012, that it
might have been responsible for several suicide bombings against security targets in Damascus.
Iraq’s position on the Syria unrest is discussed in greater detail below.
Sunni Moves to Form Separate Regions
In late 2011, Sunnis responded to the perceptions of inequity by attempting to use legal
mechanisms to reduce central government control. The provincial council of the mostly Sunni
province of Salahuddin (which contains Tikrit) voted on October 28, 2011, to start the process of
forming a separate “region.” Overwhelmingly Sunni Anbar province followed suit. The mixed
province of Diyala took a similar step on December 12, 2011, setting off protests by Shiites in the
province who might have been instigated by the Shiite-dominated central government. Sunni
members of the provincial council subsequently fled into the Kurdish controlled areas just north
of Diyala. Previously, the mostly Shiite provinces of Basra and Wasit had begun similar
processes, although doing so requires parliamentary concurrence and a popular referendum of
approval.
Seeking to squelch these moves, the government has essentially ignored these votes and has not
tasked the Independent Higher Election Commission (IHEC), which is a central government
body, to organize the referenda needed as part of the region formation process. The IHEC is
subject to Maliki’s control, giving him a de-facto veto over the region formation process
Salahuddin that was bombed in 2006 (see above). On July 4, 2012, attacks throughout Iraq killed
about 50 people, primarily Shiites killed in the bombs set off in Diwaniya.
Significant Increase in Violence
On July 23, AQ-I conducted numerous attacks in several cities, killing about 115 Iraqis; the
attacks came a day after AQ-I leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi announced a “Breaking Down Walls”
offensive against government targets. Shortly thereafter, Iraqi insurgents downed an Iraqi
helicopter. In late July 2012, the AQ-I offensive compelled 15 Diyala Province “mukhtars”chosen community liaisons with the central government—to resign, claiming the government is
not able to protect them. In mid-August, AQ-I insurgents briefly captured a local government
building in Haditha (Anbar Province) and raised an Al Qaeda battle flag over it. On August 17,
2012, 93 Iraqis, mostly in Shiite areas, were killed in a wide range of attacks around Iraq.
Prior to the spate of major attacks in summer of 2012, U.S. officials asserted that, by U.S.
measures of “security incidents” (attacks against diplomats, the government, or civilians) levels
of violence had not increased since the U.S. pullout, and remain roughly at a post-2003 low of
about 100 such incidents per week. However, the intensity of the summer 2012 attacks seemed to
lead to a reassessment of that analysis. A visit to Iraq by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin Dempsey on August 21, 2012, appeared intended to respond to Iraqi overtures to reengage of some of the U.S. military and police training programs that have languished throughout
2012—overtures motivated by increasing Iraqi nervousness about the ability of the Iraq Security
Forces (ISF) to prevent further such incidents.
Still, many Iraqi Sunnis do not want the AQ-I campaigns to succeed and are inclined to work wit
the government against AQ-I. In early 2012, more than 60 leaders of tribes in Sunni-dominated
areas of Iraq—with the concurrence of local government and security officials—reached
agreement to authorize tribal leaders to enforce strict codes of justice against insurgents and their
accomplices. Suggesting that the attacks may be intended to dissuade moderate Sunnis from
engaging with the government, one such moderate Sunni cleric, Shaykh Mahdi al-Sumaidaie, was
seriously injured in a bomb attack against his convoy on August 19, 2012.
Since early 2012, there have been indications that AQ-I might be intervening in the unrest in
Syria.13 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified on February 16, 2012, that it
might have been responsible for several suicide bombings against security targets in Damascus.
13
Sahar Issa. “Iraq Violence Dips Amid Rise in Syria.” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 21, 2012.
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Iraq’s position on the Syria unrest is discussed in greater detail below. In July 2012, Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari corroborated the U.S. accusations about AQ-I movement into Syria.
Sons of Iraq Fighters
One of the most significant long-standing Sunni grievances has been the slow pace with which
the Maliki government implemented its pledge to fully integrate the approximately 100,000
“Sons of Iraq” fighters (former insurgents who ended their fight and cooperated with U.S. forces
against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants) into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or provide them
with government jobs. During 2009 and 2010, there were repeated reports that some Sons of Iraq
had been dropped from payrolls, harassed, arrested, or sidelined, and that the Maliki government
might want to strangle the program. However, according to Ambassador-nominee Brett McGurk
in confirmation hearings on June 6, 2012, about 70,000 have been integrated into the ISF or given
civilian government jobs, while 30,000 continue to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and are paid
about $300 per month by the government.
13
Sahar Issa. “Iraq Violence Dips Amid Rise in Syria.” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 21, 2012.
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KRG-Central Government Disputes14
The United States has played a role since 1991 of protecting Iraq’s Kurds from the central
government, and the Kurds have tried to preserve this “special relationship” and use it to their
advantage. Iraq’s Kurdish leaders have long said they do not seek outright independence or
affiliation with Kurds in neighboring countries, but the Iraqi Kurds seek to preserve and expand
on the autonomy
they have achieved since 1991.
The increasing disillusionment of Kurdish leaders with Maliki could produce major political
unraveling unless the relationship is rebuilt. The issues long The issues dividing the KRG and Baghdad
include disputes over territory as well as disputes over the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the
KRG. These differences have manifested, in part, as a dispute over the not only KRG autonomy but also disputes over territory and resources, including the
ability of the KRG to
export its own oil. That difference underpins KRG-Baghdad disagreements over proposed
national oil laws. As of 2012, the Kurds are adopting the broader criticisms of many Sunni leaders
that Maliki seeks to concentrate power in his and his faction’s hands.
KRG
proposed national oil laws.
The increasing disillusionment of Kurdish leaders with Maliki could produce major political
unraveling. During 2012, the Kurds have adopted the Sunni Arab criticisms of Maliki2. KRG
President Masoud Barzani, who was directly elected by the residents of the Kurdish region
in July
2009, hinted at a potential break with Maliki on March 20, 2012, accusing him of
monopolizing power. He repeated this criticism numerous times during monopolizing
power. Following a visit to Washington,
DC, in early April 2012, which included accusations that Maliki might move against the KRG
militarily.15 On May 3, 2012, Barzani indirectly threatened to
allow a vote on Kurdish
independence unless Maliki resolves these issues with the KRG before
the Kurdish provincial
elections in September 2012. The widening of these differences has caused a Kurdish political
shift toward Iraq’s Sunnis, particularly the Iraqiyya bloc, to the point where15 In June 2012, the Kurds in the COR
have joined
Iraqiyya in a move, thus far unsuccessful, to vote no confidence against Maliki, as of June 2012. There had
been a
historic hesitancy among the Kurds to side with the Sunni Arabs because of the legacy of
repression of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein and other Sunni Iraqi leaders in the past.
Very few experts predict that these differences will produce all-out violent conflict between the
KRG and
Baghdad. However, in part to deter that possibility, the two main Kurdish factions
(Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP) continue to field
their own
force of peshmerga (Kurdish militiamen) numbering perhaps 75,000 fighters. They are generally
lightly armed.
generally lightly armed.
14
For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
15
Interview with Masoud Barzani by Hayder al-Khoie on Al-Hurra television network. April 6, 2012.
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Territorial Issues/“Disputed Internal Boundaries”
There has been virtually no progress in recent years in resolving the various territorial disputes
between the Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs—the most emotional of which is the Kurdish insistence that
Tamim Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk) be formally affiliated to the KRG. There was to
be a census and referendum on the affiliation of the province by December 31, 2007, in
accordance with Article 140 of the Constitution, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in
order to avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to
any such referendum been conducted. It was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, but was
then postponed until at least December 2010 to allow time for a full-term government to be put in
14
For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
15
Interview with Masoud Barzani by Hayder al-Khoie on Al-Hurra television network. April 6, 2012.
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place. It still has not begun, in part because of the broader political crisis (discussed below) as
well as differences over how to account for movements of populations into or out of the Kurdish
controlled provinces.
In the absence of movement on a process to integrate Kirkuk, the Kurds have attempted to
steadily assert control in the province. The current governor of Kirkuk is Najmaddin Karim, a
longtime Kurdish activist in the United States before he moved back to Iraq following the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The Property Claims Commission that is adjudicating claims from the Saddam
regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG region is functioning. Of the 178,000 claims
received, nearly 26,000 were approved and 90,000 rejected or ruled invalid, as of the end of 2011,
according to the State Department human rights report for 2011. Since 2003, more than 28,000
Iraqi Arabs settled in the KRG area by Saddam have relocated from Kirkuk back to their original
provinces. Attempting to resolve these long-standing disputes is another issue within the mandate
of UNAMI, and consultations with all parties are ongoing, according to UNAMI.16
Combined Security Mechanism at Kurd-Arab Frontier
In the absence of resolution, the territorial disputes have grown more acute since the 2009
provincial elections, in which Sunni Arabs wrested back control of the Nineveh (Mosul)
provincial council from the Kurds. The Kurds had won control of that council in the 2005
election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a
clear plurality of the 2009 Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial
administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose
Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity”
of the province. A member of the faction, Atheel al-Nufaiji, is the governor (brother of 2010-2014
COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi), and the Kurds have been preventing his visitation of areas of
Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates. In October 2011, the central government
ordered the Kurdish flags taken down from public buildings in Khanaqin, a Kurdish town in the
province; the Kurdish police in the city disobeyed the order.
In part to prevent outright violence between the KRG and the central government, in August 2009
then-top U.S. commander in Iraq General Raymond Odierno developed a plan to partner U.S.
forces with peshmerga units and with ISF units in the province to build confidence along the
frontier between the two forces. The process was also intended to reassure Kurdish, Arab,
Turkomen, and other province residents. Implementation of this “combined security mechanism”
(CSM) began in January 2010, consisting of joint (ISF-U.S-Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of 22
checkpoints, and U.S. training of participating ISF and peshmerga forces. The mechanism has
16
Meeting with congressional staff, February 24, 2011.
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been administered through provincial level Combined Coordination Centers. Disagreements are
referred to a Senior Working Group and a High Level Ministerial Committee.17 As of October
2010, the United States had ceased participating at four of the checkpoints, in concert with the
U.S. change of mission to a non-combat role (Operation New Dawn) on September 1, 2010.
Many who asserted that at least some U.S. forces should remain in Iraq after 2011 did so on the
grounds that U.S. troops are needed to continue to participate in CSM operations.18 However,
16
Meeting with congressional staff, February 24, 2011.
“Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops.” Rand Corporation, 2011.
18
Ibid.
17
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Major General David Perkins, commander of the 5,000 U.S. forces then in northern Iraq, said on
September 29, 2011, that the CSM continued to work well even after U.S. forces ceased
participating in the remaining joint checkpoints and patrols, and that there is not the need for a
substantial U.S. force in northern Iraq after 2011. The headquarters of the 750 U.S. troops in the
north closed on October 20, 2011.
The United States continues to participate in the process despite the completion of the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. Through Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I)
facilities in Nineveh Province, the United States helps coordinate the joint patrols and
checkpoints even though no U.S. forces participate in them. Previously, some have advanced
alternatives to U.S. force participation in the CSM, including giving the U.S. role to a United
Nations force, NATO, or civilians (Iraqi or international). It is not clear that any of these
alternative ideas are supported by Iraqi factions.
Kurdish leaders continue to criticize Maliki for opposing paying the peshmerga out of the
national budget, leaving the KRG to fund its operations. KRG President Barzani, during his U.S.
visit in April 2012, discussed the reform of the peshmerga into a smaller but more professional
and well trained force.
KRG Oil Exports/Oil Laws
The KRG and Baghdad are also locked in dispute over the ability of the Kurds to export oil that is
discovered and extracted in the KRG region. The Kurds view it as their right to develop their
resources, whereas Baghdad fears Kurdish oil exports can allowpotentially enable the Kurds to set up an
an independent, economically viable state. Under a Baghdad-KRG agreement, revenues from KRG
KRG oil exports go to theinto central government accounts, which distributes proceeds to the KRG and
pays the
international oil companies working in the KRG. The net proceeds of the sales are split
roughly equally between the KRG and the central government.
Oil exports from the KRG have been repeatedly
suspended, for varying periods of time, over
central government withholding of payments to the
international energy firms. The latest such
suspension of oil exports through the national oil grid
began in April 2012 after the KRG accused
Baghdad of falling $1.5 billion in arrears to the
companies extracting oil in the KRG region. At the same time, the Kurds are reportedly building
their own oil pipeline to the Turkish border that would reduce their dependence on the national oil
export grid.19 At
the time of the suspension, KRG oil exports had reached nearly 200about 175,000 barrels
of crude oil per
day, and some experts say this will rise to 500,000 barrels per day by the end of
2013, and could reach 1 million barrels per day by 2019.20
The two sides do not appear close to resolving differences over national oil laws. The KRG
adopted its own oil laws in 2007. The Kurds oppose oil laws adopted by the Iraqi cabinet in late
August 2011, and sent on to the COR for ratification, as favoring a centralized energy sector that
would impinge on KRG control of its energy resources. In connection with the visit of KRG
Prime Minister Barham Salih, Kurdish representatives told the author on November 8, 2011, that
it is likely that the oil laws would be taken up by the COR, after further negotiation, by the end of
19
International Crisis Group. “Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit.” April 19, 2012.
reach 1 million barrels per day by 2019.19 The dispute escalated in July 2012 when the KRG
began exporting crude oil by road to Turkey, some of which is being refined and returned as
17
“Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops.” Rand Corporation, 2011.
Ibid.
19
Jane Arraf. “Iraq’s Unity Tested by Rising Tensions Over Oil-Rich Kurdish Region.” Christian Science Monitor,
May 4, 2012.
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2011.21 However, in part due to the political crisis discussed further below, there has been no
further action on this issue to dategasoline to the KRG region. At the same time, the Kurds are reportedly building their own oil
pipeline to the Turkish border that would reduce their dependence on the national oil export
grid.20 However, the dispute was resolved and Kurdish exports through the national grid resumed
on August 9, 2012.
The October 2011 KRG signing of an energy development deal with U.S. energy giant ExxonMobil set off a furtherrepresents a further dimension of the energy row with Baghdad. The central government
denounced the deal as illegal,
in part because the oil fields involved are in or very close to
disputed territories. The KRG has
sought to defuse this consideration by saying that if the
territory of the oil fields is subsequently
judged to be part of central government-administered
territory, then the revenues would be
reallocated accordingly. Still, the central government
threatened to cancel the firm’s existing
contract to develop the West Qurna oil field near Basra,
which was signed with the central
government. On February 13, 2012, the central government
announced its sanction against the
firm as a prohibition on bidding for work on unexplored fields
to be tendered later in 2012. On
March 17, 2012, Baghdad claimed that Exxon-Mobil hashad frozen
the KRG contract, but the KRG
denies the company has stopped work in the KRG region. denies the company has stopped work in the KRG region. Further
disputes occurred over a July 2012 KRG deal with Total SA of France; in August 2012 the central
government told Total SA to either terminate its arrangement with the KRG or give up work on
the central government Halfaya field.
The two sides do not appear close to resolving differences over national oil laws. The KRG
adopted its own oil laws in 2007. The Kurds oppose oil laws adopted by the Iraqi cabinet in late
August 2011, and sent on to the COR for ratification, as favoring a centralized energy sector that
would impinge on KRG control of its energy resources. In connection with the visit of KRG
Prime Minister Barham Salih, Kurdish representatives said on November 8, 2011, that it is likely
that the oil laws would be taken up by the COR by the end of 2011.21 However, in part due to the
political crisis discussed further below, there has been no further action on this issue to date.
Some experts maintain that the KRG does not have sufficient leverage to compel advantageous
changes to the oil law; others assert that the status quo suits both the central government and the
KRG and that a resolution of the oil laws deadlock is unlikely.
Intra-Kurdish Divisions
Further complicating the political landscape are widening divisions within the Kurdish
community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A
breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an
unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the
PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP,
easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010
elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah
Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 COR seats held by Kurds, 14 are
held by parties other than the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran has 8, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has
4, and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan has 2.
These divisions may also have played a role in the popular demonstrations that occurred in
Sulaymaniyah in early 2011. The demonstrations reflected frustration over jobs and services but
20
21
International Crisis Group. “Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit.” April 19, 2012.
Author conversation with KRG Washington, DC, representative Qubad Talabani, November 8, 2011.
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possibly also over the monopolization of power in the KRG by the Barzani and Talabani clans.
Some of these were suppressed by peshmerga.
The Sadr Faction’s Continuing Ambition and Agitation
Within the broader Shiite community, the faction of the young Shiite cleric, Moqtada Al Sadr,
who is about
37 years old, sees itself as the main representative for Iraq’s Shiites, particularly
those who are
poor or working class. This has caused an inherent rivalry with Maliki and other
Shiite leaders in Iraq. As noted above,
Iraq. Although Sadr was part of the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi
National Alliance) for the
March 2010 national elections, but laterhe reached a political arrangement
with Maliki that paved the way
for Maliki’s achieving another term. Sadrists were given several
seats in the cabinet and a Sadrist
governor was later installed in Maysan Province, which includes
the Sadrist stronghold of
Amarah.
Suggesting that Sadr often shifts so as to maximize his
faction’s leverage, in May 2012 Sadr
himself participated in meetings in the KRG region with
other anti-Maliki factions to put pressure
on Maliki to increase power sharing. In June 2012,
21
Author conversation with KRG Washington, DC, representative Qubad Talabani, November 8, 2011.
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Sadrist deputies in the COR signed onto a
letter requesting a vote of no-confidence against
Maliki, discussed further below.
Moqtada Al Sadr’s political shift against Maliki in mid-2012 represents a continuation of a high
level of activity he has However,
Iranian figures, including Sadr’s mentor, Ayatollah Abdol Kazem Haeri, successfully persuaded
Sadr to end his discussions with Maliki’s opponents and rally behind him. However, many
experts believe Sadr could still shift against Maliki again if doing so benefits his faction.
Sadr’s political shift against Maliki represents a continuation of a high level of activity he has
exhibited since he returned to Iraq, from his studies in Iran, onin January 5,
2011. After his return, he
gave numerous speeches that, among other themes, insisted on full
implementation of a planned
U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011. Sadr’s position on the U.S.
withdrawal appeared so firm that,
in an April 9, 2011, statement, he threatened to reactivate his
Mahdi Army militia if U.S. forces
remained in Iraq beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline. His
followers conducted a large march
in Baghdad on May 26, 2011, demanding a full U.S. military
exit. The threats were pivotal to the
Iraqi decision not to retain U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011.
Sadr’s threats to instigate violence were considered not idle. In June and July 2011, U.S. officials
accused Shiite militia offshoots of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia of causing an elevated level of U.S.
troop deaths in June 2011 (14 killed, the highest in any month in over one year). These militias
operate under names including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, League of the Righteous), Khata’ib
Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions), and Promised Day Brigade. U.S. officials accused Iran of
arming the militias with upgraded rocket-propelled munitions, such as Improvised Rocket
Assisted Munitions (IRAMs), in an effort to ensure a full U.S. withdrawal and to claim credit for
forcing that withdrawal. U.S. officials reportedly requested that the ISF act against these militias
and to prevail on Iran to stop aiding the militias. Press reports and U.S. commander comments in
August and September 2011 suggested the strategy had, at least temporarily, succeeded in
reducing, actions that subsequently, but temporarily,
quieted the Shiite attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. Journalists reported that, after the withdrawal, some
Some rocket attacks continued against the U.S.
consulate in Basra, which has nearly 1,000 U.S.
personnel (including contractors). However,
Ambassador-nominee McGurk stated at his
confirmation hearings on June 6, 2012, that AAH,
Khata’ib Hezbollah, and Promised Day
Brigade had all become less active since the U.S. military
withdrawal because the U.S. exit
removed their justification for armed activity. Sadr’s Mahdi
Army has integrated into the political
process in the form of a charity and employment network
called Mumahidoon or “those who pave
the way.”
the way.”
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Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Crisis
All the political disputes discussed above intensified as U.S. forces drew down until the final
withdrawal on December 18, 2011. As the last U.S. forces were exiting, and even as Maliki
visited Washington, DC, on December 12, 2011, to meet with President Obama, the carefully
constructed political power-sharing arrangements were breaking down. As a part of what Sunni
Iraqis—and also KRG President Barzani—have called a clear power grab by Maliki, Iraq is in the
midst of its worst political crisis since the U.S. invasion of 2003, and it is still possible that the
Iraqi central government might unwind completely. Still, Iraqi factions have, in the past, cobbled
together agreements when faced with the alternative of political collapse.
The day of the final U.S. withdrawal (December 18, 2011), Maliki asked the COR to vote no
confidence against Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, a senior Iraqiyya figure and
prominent Sunni (discussed above in the 2010 election disqualification crisis). That day, Iraqiyya
parliamentarians walked out of the COR and most of the Iraqiyya members of the cabinet
suspended their work. On December 19, 2011, the government announced an arrest warrant
against Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi, another major Iraqiyya figure, accusing him of
ordering his security staff to commit acts of assassination. Three such guards were shown on
television “confessing” to assassinating rival politicians at Hashimi’s behest. Hashimi fled to the
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KRG region for meetings with President Talabani and refused to return to face trial in Baghdad,
as is demanded by the judiciary, unless his conditions for a fair trial there are met. On several
occasions, Maliki threatened the Kurds with unspecified action if they continue to shelter
Hashimi. One theme he stressed in a December 21, 2011, news conference, which was praised by
U.S. officials, was that he envisions a government in which each faction works on behalf of the
country and not its own interests. The assertion that Maliki sought a comprehensive purge of
Sunnis gained additional strength during January 19-20, 2012, when security forces raided the
homes of two Sunni politicians in Diyala province and arrested the Sunni vice chairman of the
Baghdad provincial council.
With political inclusiveness seeming to unravel, U.S. officials, including Vice President Biden,
attempted to promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The Vice President’s efforts were joined
by Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and CIA Director Petraeus, who traveled to Iraq in late
December 2011 for meetings with some of the close contacts he developed when he was overall
U.S. commander in Iraq. On January 5, 2012, Ambassador Jeffrey tried to calm tensions by
stating that the Maliki government appears to be allowing the judiciary to conduct a fair
investigation of the charges against Hashimi—an indication that the United States does not
necessarily concur with the Sunni view that the arrest warrant represented a power grab by
Maliki. Deputy President Hashimi remained in KRG-controlled territory until early April 2012,
when he left for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and then Turkey, where he remains. Some criticized the
Administration for failing to rein in Maliki’s efforts against his opponents by muting its
opposition to his moves against them.
The Crisis Abates but Defies
The Crisis Abates but Defies Easy Resolution
The U.S. diplomatic intervention—as well as the fear among all Iraqi factions of sparking all-out
political warfare—seemed to calm the crisis somewhat, although only temporarily. Iraqiyya COR
deputies resumed their duties in late January 2012. The Iraqiyya ministers returned to their offices
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on February 8, 2012. For his part, Maliki arranged the release of some of the Baathists arrested in
recent monthsearly 2012 and he agreed to legal amendments to give provinces more autonomy over their
budgets and the right of consent when national security forces are deployed.22 Deputy President
Hashimi remained in KRG-controlled territory until early April 2012, when he left for Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and then Turkey, where he remains. A trial in absentia began in Baghdad in early
May 2012 and is continuing.
In a potentially positive sign for Iraqi democracy amid the crisis, a cross-sectarian, secular
political opposition party called the Union of Patriotic Figures was formed on February 12, 2012.
It announced that it would monitor both the government and the COR.
By March 2012, the easing of the crisis appeared to pave the way for the start of a “national
conference” to be chaired by President Talabani, the purpose of which would be to achieve
durable solutions to the outstanding fundamental Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish issues. A “preparatory
committee” was named to establish an agenda and format, but the committee repeatedly failed to
meet. The March 20, 2012, comments by KRG President Barzani, accusing Maliki of a power
grab by harnessing control of the security forces, dimmed prospects for holding the conference
were dim. On April 1, 2012, Maliki nonetheless formally issued invitations to the major factions
to convene on April 5, 2012. Barzani kept intact his plans to visit the United States at that time
and the conference was not held, nor was a new date for it set.
22
Tim Arango. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis.” New York Times, February 28, 2012.
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With the prospects of reaching accommodation with Maliki diminishing, Barzani, in comments
during the visit, stated that it is possible that anti-Maliki factions might organize a vote of no
confidence against him.
During April 27-28, Maliki critics met in the KRG region at the
invitation of Barzani; also . Also
attending the meetings were Iraqiyya leader Allawi, Iraqiyya member
and COR speaker Nujaifi,
and Moqtada Al Sadr, in what reportedly was his first ever visit to the
Kurdish north. At the
conclusion of the meetings, the four reportedly issued a letter to Maliki
threatening a vote of no-confidencenoconfidence within 15 days unless he adheres to the “principles and
framework” of a more democratic approach to governance. Even though he signed the letter, Sadr
reportedly refuses to throw his faction’s support behind a no-confidence motion, stating instead
that Maliki has said he would not try to remain as prime minister after the next national elections
in 2013 or 2014. Still, Sadr’s signature on the purported letter represented additional pressure on
Maliki to compromise
democratic approach to governance.
During late May and early June 2012, the Maliki opponents obtained the signature of 176
deputies requesting a no-confidence vote. Under Article 61 of the constitution, signatures of only
20% of the 325 COR deputies (65 signatures) are needed to trigger a vote, but President Talabani,
who is required to present a valid request to the COR to hold the vote, determined that factions
must demonstrate they have enough support to win such a vote. On June 10, 2012, Talabani stated
that there were only 160 valid signatures, after some deputies asked their signatures be removed,
and on.
On that basis he declined to ask the COR to go forward with the no-confidence vote. Some
experts attributed the signature withdrawals to pressure by Iran, through the Sadr faction, to keep
Maliki in office. As indicators, experts noted that Sadr unexpectedly went to Tehran for talks
before the petition was presented, and Sadr’s Iran-based mentor, Ayatollah Abdol-Karim Kazem
Haeri, issued a religious ruling (fatwa) that indicated that Iraq’s government should remain in
office.2323 Some Maliki opponents may have been dissuaded from continuing the effort
by Maliki’s counter-threat to call early national elections. This suggested that Maliki believed the
political battle has solidified his popularity with much of the Shiite community. Others say that
rival Shiite leaders, particularly ISCI’s leader Ammar al-Hakim, proved an able and successful
mediators, perhaps in an effort to position himself for national leadership in the future elections.
In part to cause the no-confidence vote effort to falter, or to calm the political situation in general,
some observers say Maliki has reached out to Sunni leaders. The Hashimi trial in absentia began
in Baghdad in early May 2012 and is continuing, and Maliki reportedly has succeeded in
convincing observers that there is evidence to support the allegations against Hashimi. Deputy
Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq has resumed his duties, signaling an end to another of Maliki’s
efforts against Sunni leadership figures.
22
23
Tim Arango. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis.” New York Times, February 28, 2012.
“Embattled Iraqi PM Holding On To Power for Now.” Associated Press, June 12, 2012.
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Effect of the Crisis on Upcoming Elections
The political crisis could have a direct effect on several upcoming elections in Iraq. The mandate
of the current nine-member IHEC expired at the end of April 2012. The April 2012 arrest of the
IHEC chairman, Faraj al-Haidari, has complicated the naming of a new panel. The IHEC is
needed to run the upcoming elections scheduled or possible.
KRG Elections. As noted above, provincialProvincial elections in the KRG-controlled provinces were not
held during the
January 2009 provincial elections in the other areas of Iraq. Nor, nor were they held
during the March 7, 2010, COR vote. There was discussion about holding them in November
2010, and then again by the end of 2011, but neither schedule was met.
7, 2010, COR vote. These elections now are
scheduled for September 27, 2012.
Provincial Elections. As noted above, the terms of the provincial councils are four years. New
provincial elections in the central government controlled provinces are due by early 2013.
Kirkuk Referendum. There is also to be a vote on a Kirkuk referendum at some point, if a
negotiated settlement is reached. However, a settlement does not appear within easy reach as of
early 2012 and no referendum is scheduled.
23
“Embattled Iraqi PM Holding On To Power for Now.” Associated Press, June 12, 2012.
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District and Sub-District Elections. District and sub-district elections throughout Iraq were
previously slated for July 31, 2009. However, those have been delayed as well, and no date has
been announced.
Constitutional Amendments. There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005
constitution if and when the major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the
constitutional review commission (CRC). There has been no movement on this issue for at least
three years, and no indication such a referendum will be held in the near future.
Next National Elections. The term of the existing COR expires no later than early 2014, but,
depending on when applicable election laws are adopted, and subject to negotiations among the
factions, the next COR elections might be held in late 2013. That schedule could change if the
political crisis leads to early elections, as discussed above.
Related Governance Issues
The political crisis has dashed hopes that Iraq was well on its way to permanent stability, theto
strengthening of democracy and institution-building, and a turning ofto enabling Iraqi official attention to
toward basic governance and economic issues. That hope was expressed by President Obama
after his meeting with Prime Minister Maliki on December 12, 2011, and in President Obama’s
statement marking the December 18, 2011, completion of the withdrawal that Iraq is “sovereign,
stable, and self-reliant.”
National Oil Laws and Other Pending Laws/Budget
Adopting national oil laws has been considered key to attracting foreign investment in Iraq’s
sizeable energy resources. Substantial progress appeared near in August 2011 when both the COR
and the cabinet drafted
the oil laws long in the works to rationalize the energy sector and clarify
the rules for foreign
investors. However, there were differences in their individual versions: the
version drafted by the
Oil and Natural Resources Committee was presented to the full COR on August 17, 2011. The
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August 17, 2011. The cabinet adopted its separate version on August 28, 2011; there was some
expectation that the
COR would take up the issue when it reconvened on September 6, 2011, after
the Eid al-Fitr
celebration marking the end of Ramadan. It was unclear which version would form
the basis of
final legislation, amid opposition from the Kurds to what they see as an overly
centralized energy
industry encapsulated in the cabinet’s draft law. The opposition and the
presence of two
competing versions of the oil laws accounted for the postponement of further
COR action until at
least the end of 2011, and the political crisis has prevented movement on it since then
since then, as discussed above on the section on the KRG and its oil exports.
Also not passed are laws addressing the environment, other elections, consumer protections,
intellectual property rights, building codes, and the permanent rules for de-Baathification. Others
say that the failure to adopt new laws governing investment, taxation, and property ownership
account for the slow pace of building a modern, dynamic economy, although others say the
success of Iraq’s energy sector is overriding these adverse factors.
One On the other hand, on April 30,
2012, the COR enacted a law to facilitate elimination of trafficking in persons, both sexual and
labor-related.
Budget and Energy Sector Development
Another issue delayed by the political crisis was the adoption of a 2012 budget. A $100 billion budget
budget was adopted by the cabinet in December 2011, and it was adopted by the COR on
February 24,
2012. It is based on an $85 price for a barrel of oil, and, with prices about that level,
the budget
will likely be close to balanced. (The cabinet budget predicted a $10 billion deficit.) Iraq
About 90% of Iraq’s budget is derived from oil export revenues, meaning the developing its
energy sector is crucial to its financial future. Iraq possesses a proven 143 billion barrels of oil,
and increasing exports should enable Iraq’s GDP to
grow by about 12% in 2012, according to the
World Bank. Iraq’s oil exports recovered to about
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2.1 million barrels per day by March 2012,
roughly the level achieved during Saddam’s rule.
Production reached the milestone 3 million
barrels per day mark in February 2012, which Iraqi
leaders trumpeted as a key milestone in Iraq’s recovery. Iraqi leaders say they want to increase
recovery, and again reached that level in August 2012. For July 2012, Iraq was a larger oil
producer than Iran, a development that might have been unthinkable five years earlier. Iraqi
leaders say they want to increase production to over 10 million barrels per day by 2017, although
then Ambassador-nominee McGurk
testified on June 6, 2012, that the United States believes
they’ll achieve about half that level—
about 5 million barrels per day by 2017. Iraq sold $17
billion worth of oil and related products during 2011.
What is helping the Iraqi production is the involvement
of foreign firms, including BP, Exxon-MobilExxonMobil, Occidental, and Chinese firms. U.S. firms assisted
Iraq’s export capacity by developing
single-point mooring oil loading terminals to compensate for
deterioration in Iraq’s existing oil export infrastructure in Basra and Umm Qasr.
export infrastructure in Basra and Umm Qasr.
The growth of oil exports appears to be fueling a rapid expansion of the consumer sector. Press
reports in 2012 have noted the development of several upscale malls and other consequences of
positive economic progress.
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Response to Arab Spring-Related Demonstrations
Iraq’s government, although flawed, is the product of democratic choices. Therefore, many
experts were surprised when protests (which built to the point where they ousted leaders in Egypt
and Tunisia) began in several provinces of Iraq on February 6, 2011, and later expanded to
numerous provinces. Protests resulted in 20 deaths on the February 25, 2011, “Day of Rage”
demonstrations called by activists. Most experts agree that the protesters, although to some extent
inspired by the uprisings throughout the Middle East, did not have the similar objective of
toppling Iraq’s leadership because Iraq’s government is the product of democratic processes.
Still, the spread of unrest into Iraq suggested to many that Iraqis have been frustrated by what
they perceive as a nearly exclusive focus of the major factions on politics rather than governing or
improving services. Many protesters expressed particular outrage at the still severe shortages of
electricity in Iraq, as well as the lack of job opportunities and perceived elite corruption. Iraqis
who cannot afford their own generators (or to share a generator with a few others) face repeated
power outages every day. Many of the protests that took place were instigated by the Sadr faction,
which sought to capitalize politically on governmental failures. The demonstrations caused the
resignations of provincial governors in Wasit and Basra provinces and of several municipal
leaders in Anbar Province. In sympathy with the protests, Jafar Al Sadr, who obtained the secondmost votes in the March 2010 elections on Maliki’s list (after Maliki himself), resigned from the
COR on February 17, 2011.
Unrest in the KRG region appeared to reflect deep frustrations and was more intense than in the
rest of Iraq. The unrest in Sulaymaniyah resulted in the deaths of at least three protestors at the
hands of peshmerga and Kurdish intelligence (Asayesh), and iswas said to rattle the top Kurdish
leaders, who fear the KRG’s image as an oasis of stability and prosperity in Iraq is beingwas clouded.
Demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah on February 17, 2011, also revived long-standing but suppressed
suppressed tensions between the PUK and the KDP as the KDP retaliated for protester attacks on
some of its
offices.
Protest-Prompted Governmental Reforms
The government was able to defuse popular unrest with varied measures. In February 2011,
Maliki announced a voluntary cut in his salary (from about $350,000 per year to half that) and
indicated he would not seek a third term when his current term expires in 2014. On February 27,
2011, he announced that his new cabinet would have “100 days” to prove its effectiveness or face
replacement. That deadline expired on June 7, 2011, without significant incident, although U.S.
diplomats say the government began public works projects and provided some fuel supplies as
part of its efforts to show results by that time. In addition, on May 31, 2011, third deputy
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president Adel Abdul Mahdi resigned in an effort to show that the government is committed to
cutting its bloated bureaucracy. To reinforce that commitment, the COR voted on July 30, 2011,
to back Maliki’s plan to reduce the number of cabinet posts from the current 42 to 29.
Another component of the response was to appoint several technocrats to permanently fill cabinet
slots in ministries that deliver services to the public. In a wave of appointments on February 13,
2011, an Iraqiyya technocrat, Raad Shallal, was appointed minister of electricity and power. In
addition, Municipality and Public Works Minister Adel Mohder was named, as were
appointments to be ministers of state for tribal affairs, civilian community affairs, and national
reconciliation. Shallal was removed in August 2011, most likely as a scapegoat for continued
electricity shortages, although the stated cause of his removal was a failure to follow proper
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procedures in signing $1.7 billion worth of power plant construction contracts with Canadian and
German firms.
The government also used a modest amount of repression. In early June 2011, in advance of the
June 7 “100 day” deadline, the government detained several dozen activists in order to preempt
protests. Additional steps have been taken since to curb protests, including tolerating progovernment thugs to beat demonstrators on June 10, 2011. Either because of the repression or
because of lack of popular support, subsequent demonstrations have been scattered and small.
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. and international officials say they expect the 2010-2014 government to make further
progress establishing rule of law and adherence to international standards of human rights. The
State Department’s report on human rights for 2011 released May 24, 2012, largely repeated the
previous years’ criticisms of Iraq’s human rights record and the attribution of deficiencies in
human rights practices to the overall security situation and sectarian and factional divisions.24 The
State Department report cited a wide range of human rights problems committed by Iraqi
government security and law enforcement personnel, including some unlawful killings; torture
and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison facilities; denial of fair public trials;
arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist threats; lack of protection of stateless
persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human trafficking; and limited exercise of labor
rights. Many of these same abuses and deficiencies are discussed in the Human Rights Watch
World Report for 2012, released January 22, 2012.
Trafficking in Persons
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 20112012, released on June 27, 201119, 2012, places
Iraq in “Tier 2 Watch List.”” for the fourth year in a row. This is one rank below Tier 3, the lowest ranking. The relatively
negative rating is on the grounds that, during the reporting period, Iraq did not demonstrate
evidence of significant efforts to punish traffickers or proactively identify victims. The report says
the Iraqi government has a written plan that, if implemented, would go a long way toward
complying with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, for that reason, was not
given a Tier 3 ranking.
24
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186428#wrapper
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ranking. For 2012, Iraq received a waiver from automatic downgrading to Tier 3 (which happens
if a country is “watchlisted” for three straight years) because it has a plan to make significant
efforts to meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, is devoting significant
resources to that plan.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. One issue that troubles human rights activists is a law, passed by the COR in
August 2011, called the “Journalist Rights Law.” The new law purports to protect journalists but
left left
many of the provisions of Saddam-era libal and defamation laws in place. For example, the
new new
law leaves in place imprisonment for publicly insulting the government. The State
Department Department
human rights report for 2011 notesnoted continuing instances of harassment and
intimidation of
journalists who write about corruption and the lack of government services. Much
of the private
24
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186428#wrapper
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media that operate is controlled by individual factions or powerful personalities.
There are no
overt government restrictions on access to the Internet.
In March 2012, some observers reported a setback to free expression, although instigated by
militias or non-governmental groups, not the government. There were reports of 14 youths having
been stoned to death by militiamen for wearing Western-style clothes and haircuts collectively
known as “Emo” style. In late June 2012, the government ordered the closing of 44 new
organizations that it said were operating without a license. Included in the closure list were the
BBC, Voice of America, and the U.S.-funded Radio Sawa.
Labor Rights
A 1987 (Saddam era) labor code remains in effect, restricting many labor rights, particularly in
the public sector. Although the 2005 constitution provides for the right to strike and form unions,
the labor code virtually rules out independent union activity. Unions have no legal power to
negotiate with employers or protect workers’ rights through collective bargaining.
Religious Freedom/Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
In regard to human rights, a major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian
population, which is concentrated and other
religious minority populations (Yazidis, Shabaks, Sabeans, for example), which are concentrated
in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. Since the 2003 U.S.
intervention, more than half of the 1
million-1.5 million Christian population that was there
during Saddam’s time have left. Recent
estimates indicate that the Christian population of Iraq is
less than 500,000.
The current situation of Christians and other religious minorities is addressed in the State
Department’s “July–December 2010 Religious Freedom Report,” released September 13, 2011.
The report noted “no change” in the status of respect for religious freedom by the government for
the reporting period, but did list numerous attacks on the community’s houses of worship and its
clergy. The report praised the COR’s November 2010 approval of a document calling on the
government to protect Iraq’s Christians.
Attacks on members of the community appear to occur in waves. The body of Chaldean Catholic
archbishop Faraj Rahho was discovered in Mosul on March 13, 2008, two weeks after his
reported kidnapping. An attack on the Yazidis in August 2007, which killed about 500 people,
appeared to exemplify the precarious situation for Iraqi minorities. In the run-up to the January
2009 provincial elections, about 1,000 Christian families reportedly fled the province in October
2008, although Iraqi officials report that most families returned by December 2008. The issue
faded in 2009 but then resurfaced late in that year when about 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq,
fearing bombings and intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009.
On October 31, 2010, a major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad (Sayidat
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al-Najat Church) was besieged by militants and as many as 60 worshippers were killed. The siege
shook the faith of the Christian community in their security. Many Christian families fled their
homes after the church attack, often going to live with relatives in Christian-inhabited locations
around Iraq. Partly as a result, Christian celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be
subdued—following three years in which Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that
holiday openly. Several other attacks appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since.
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Some Iraqi Christians blame all the various attacks on them on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still
somewhat strong in Nineveh Province and which associates Christians with the United States.
Some human rights groups allege that it is the Kurds who are committing abuses against
Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh Plains, close to the KRG-controlled region.
Kurdish leaders deny the allegations, and the State Department human rights report for 2010 says
the KRG has permitted Christians fleeing violence in Baghdad to relocate into KRG-controlled
areas. Some Iraqi Christian groups advocate a “Nineveh Plains Province Solution,” in which the
Nineveh Plains would be turned into a self-administering region, possibly its own province but
affiliated or under KRG control. Supporters of the idea claim such a zone would pose no threat to
the integrity of Iraq, but others say the plan’s inclusion of a separate Christian security force
could set the scene for violence and confrontation. Even at the height of the U.S. military
presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because
Christian leaders do not want to appear closely allied with the United States.
The FY2008 consolidated appropriation earmarked $10 million in ESF from previous
appropriations to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. A supplemental appropriation for 2008 and
2009 (P.L. 110-252) earmarked another $10 million for this purpose. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar provision for FY2010, although
focused on Middle East minorities generally and without a specific dollar figure mandated for
Iraqi Christians. In the 112th Congress, a bill, H.R. 440, which would establish a post of Special
Envoy to promote religious freedom in the Middle East and South Central Asia, passed the House
on July 29, 2011, by a vote of 402-20.
Women’s Rights
Iraq has a tradition of secularism and liberalism, and women’s rights issues have not been as large
a concern for international observers and rights groups as they have in Afghanistan or the Persian
Gulf states, for example. Women serve at many levels of government, as discussed above, and are
well integrated into the work force in all types of jobs and professions. By tradition, many Iraqi
women wear traditional coverings but many adopt Western dress. On October 6, 2011, the COR
passed legislation to lift Iraq’s reservation to Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2011 contains substantial detail on the continuing
lack of progress in curbing governmental corruption. The report discusses political and other
factors that have caused anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity (COI)
and the Joint Anti-Corruption Council, to be regularly thwarted or hampered in attempts to
investigate and prosecute corruption. The Joint Anti-Corruption Council is tasked with
implementing the government’s 201-14 Anti-Corruption Strategy. The State Department report
states, in a three month period in 2011, over 200 corruption investigations were halted on the
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authority of Iraqi ministers—presumably because they did not want their departments or poltical
allies investigated. The COR has its own Integrity Committee that oversees the executive branch
and the governmental anti-corruption bodies. And, the KRG has its own separate anti-corruption
institutions, including an Office of Governance and Integrity in the KRG council of ministers.
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Mass Graves
As is noted in the State Department report on human rights for 2010, the Iraqi government
continues to uncover mass graves of victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the
authority of the Human Rights Ministry. On April 15, 2011, a mass grave of more than 800 bodies
became the latest such discovery. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla,
that contained 3,000 bodies; the grave was discovered in 2003, shortly after the fall of the regime.
Regional Dimension
For Iraq’s neighbors as well as for the United States, the stakes in the outcome of the political
process in Iraq have been high. Still at odds with Iran on virtually every issue in the Middle East,
the United States has considerable concerns about the potential for increased Iranian influence in
Iraq now that U.S. forces are no longer there. Yet, Iraq appears to seek primarily to reintegrate
into the Arab fold—of which Iran is not a part—after more than 20 years of ostracism following
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. That motive mitigates, to some extent, Iranian
influence in Iraq because the Arab world is primarily composed of Sunni Muslims and much of
the Arab world is either at odds with or highly suspicious of Iran.
Iraq’s reintegration into the Arab fold took a large step forward with the holding of an Arab
League summit in Baghdad during March 27-29, 2012. Iraq hailed the gathering as a success
primarily because of the absence of major security incidents during the gathering. However, only
9 heads of state out of the 22 Arab League members attended, and only one Persian Gulf leader,
Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah of Kuwait, attended. Building on that success, and on its
relations with both the United States and Iran, on May 23-24, 2012, Iraq hosted nuclear talks
between Iran and the six negotiating powers (United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and
,
and China).
Iraq is also sufficiently confident to begin offering assistance to other emerging Arab
democracies. Utilizing its base of expertise in chemical weaponry during the Saddam Hussein
regime, Iraq has provided some technical assistance to the post-Qadhafi authorities in Libya to
help them clean up chemical weapons stockpiles built up by the Qadhafi regime. It has also
donated $100,000 and provided advisers to support elections in Tunisia after its 2011 revolution.25
Iran
Despite Iraq’s attempts to rebuild bridges in the Arab world, some argue that the withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Iraq represented a success for Iranian strategy and that Iranian influence in Iraq
is preponderant. Others argue that U.S. policy created the ideal opportunity for Iran’s exercise of
25
Tim Arango. “Iraq Election Official’s Arrest Casts Doubt on Prospects for Fair Voting.” New York Times, April 17,
2012.
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influence in Iraq by bringing to power in Iraq, through election, Shiite Islamist politicians long
linked to Iran.
To counter the impression that Iran might benefit from the complete U.S. pullout, Secretary of
State Clinton said on October 23, 2011, that:
25
Tim Arango. “Iraq Election Official’s Arrest Casts Doubt on Prospects for Fair Voting.” New York Times, April 17,
2012.
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I think Iran should look at the region. We may not be leaving military bases in Iraq, but we
have bases elsewhere. We have support and training assets elsewhere. We have a NATO ally
in Turkey. The United States is very present in the region.
That theme was echoed by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. That same day, he said Iraq, even
without U.S. troops present there, would be able to counter any threat from Iranian influence or
from Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias. These militias are perceived as a threat particularly to U.S.
personnel in southern Iraq. As noted, the U.S. consulate in Basra has come under some rocket fire
from Sadrist and other Shiite militias.
Prime Minister Maliki has tried to calm fears that Iran will exerciseexercises undue influence over postU.S. post-U.S.
military Iraq. In so doing, he has stressed themes that are advanced by many experts that
Iraqi nationalism will resist Iraqi
nationalism is resisting Iranian influence. Experts also note lingering distrust of Iran from the
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which an estimated 300,000 Iraqi military personnel (Shiite and
Sunni) died. In his December 5, 2011, op-ed in the Washington Post, entitled “Building a Stable
Iraq,” Maliki wrote:
Iraq is a sovereign country. Our foreign policy is rooted in the fact that we do not interfere in
the affairs of other countries; accordingly, we oppose foreign interference in Iraqi affairs.
Defense and security ties between Iran and Iraq have been forecast but little has materialized. In
an interview with CNN broadcast on October 23, 2011, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
said Iran planned a closer security relationship with Iraqi forces after U.S. troops depart. In the
days after the U.S. withdrawal that was completed December 18, 2011, Iran announced it would
welcome closer defense ties to Iraq, including training Iraqi forces, although no such training has
been reported to date. However, in May 2012, Iraqi courts acquitted and Iraq released from prison
a purported Hezbollah commander, Ali Musa Daqduq, although he reportedly remains under
house arrest. He had been in U.S. custody for alleged
activities against U.S. forces but, under the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (discussed below) he
was transferred to Iraqi custody in December 2011
2011. In July 2012, U.S. officials asked Iraqi leaders to review the Daqduq case or extradite him
to the United States.
Iraq’s Shiite clerics also resist Iranian interference and take pride in Najaf as a more prominent
center of Shiite theology and history than is the Iranian holy city of Qom. In late 2011,
representatives of Ayatollah Mahmud Shahrudi, an Iraqi cleric long resident in Iraq, opened
offices in Najaf, Iraq. This was widely seen as an effort to promote Shahrudi as a possible
successor as marja taqlid (“source of inspiration,”—the most senior Shiite cleric) to the
increasingly frail Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. During an April 22-23, 2012, visit to Iran,
Maliki met with Shahrudi, in addition to meeting senior Iranian figures. However, observers say
the offices have not created a wave of support for Shahrudi as successor to Sistani.
Some assess that evidence of Iranian influence can be seen in Iraq’s alignment, in general, with
Iranian policy that seeks to keep Bashar Al Assad in power in Syria. This is discussed further
below.
Still others see Iranian influence as less political than economic. Observers report that Iran is
heavily promoting brands of its products, such as yogurt and jams, in Iraqi shops primarily in
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southern Iraq. Some Iraqi businessmen are said to resent what they believe is Iranian dumping of
cheap products in Iraq, which is depressing the development of Iraqi industries. On the other
hand, oil exports from Iraq now may exceed the 2.2 million in Iranian oil exports, and Iraq
reportedly is supplying oil customers who, in cooperation with U.S. sanctions against Iran, are
Some reports say
Iraq is helping Iran circumvent some U.S. and international sanctions, such as interacting with
Iran’s energy sector and its banking system. In July 2012, the Treasury Dept. imposed sanctions
on the Elaf Islamic Bank of Iraq for allegedly conducting financial transactions with the Iranian
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banking system that violated the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2012 (CISADA, P.L. 111-915). On the other hand, in at least one way Iraq is assisting U.S.
policy toward Iran by supplying oil customers who, in cooperation with U.S. sanctions against
Iran, are cutting back buys of oil from Iran.
Iranian Opposition: People’s Mojahedin/Camp Ashraf and PJAK
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf, a camp in which over 3,500
Iranian oppositionists (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) have resided, is an
indicator of the government performance on human rights. The residents of the camp accuse the
government of repression and of scheming to expel the residents or extradite them to Iran, where
they might face prosecution or death. An Iraqi military redeployment at the camp on April 8,
2011, resulted in major violence against camp residents in which 36 of them were killed.
Maliki reiterated in November 2011 that theIn November 2011, Maliki insisted that camp will close at the end of 2011, and the U.N.
High High
Commissioner for Refugees, the European Union, and other organizations worked to broker
a a
solution that avoids violence or forcible expulsion. In late December 2011 Maliki announced
that the residents could be relocated as late as April 2012softened that
demand, and he signed an agreement on
December 26, 2011, with the United Nations to relocate
the population to former U.S. military
base Camp Liberty. The PMOI later accepted the
agreement, dropping demands that U.S. troops
guard the residents during any relocation, and the
2,000 Ashraf residents are in the process of
completinghave completed their relocation to a former U.S. base, Camp Liberty
(renamed Camp Hurriya). There,
each case is being evaluated by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees for the potential for
relocation outside Iraq. relocation outside Iraq. In July 2012, the United States criticized
the group for halting the relocation process over complaints that Camp Liberty lacks acceptable
infrastructure to accommodate the remaining 1,200 Ashaf residents. The PMOI said on August
21, 2012, that another convoy of 400 Ashraf residents would move to Camp Liberty in the next
few days. This issue is discussed in substantially greater detail in CRS Report
RL32048, Iran:
U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Iran has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq. The Free Life
Party (PJAK) consists of Iranian Kurds, and it is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that
opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on several
occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of such
Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.
Syria
As noted above, Iraq has been viewed as unhelpful to U.S. policy toward Syria—which is to oust
President Bashar Al Assad—in large part because Maliki’s government sees the likely successors to Bashar
al-Assad of Syria, should he fall, to be Sunni Arabs. Such a Syrian government would likely be
close to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, and next rulers
of Syria will almost certainly be Sunni Arabs. Syria would then likely align with Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, nd Jordan, and become less friendly to Iraq than Assad is now. During
March 2011-August March 2011August 2011, Iraq, as did Iran, refrained from sharp criticism of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad
for using military force against protests. During that same period, Maliki
received high-level
business and other delegations from Syria in a show of support for his
government. In September
2011 Iraq moved closer to the Iranian position by calling on Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad to
make major reforms or risk unrest that could spill into Iraq itself.
Iraq opposed the 22-country
Arab League move in November 2011 to suspend Syria’s
membership—although it formally
abstained on the vote, with Yemen and Lebanon the only two
“no” votes, but Iraq voted for a
January 22, 2012, Arab League plan for a transition of power in Syria. Still, Iraq reportedly has
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Syria. Still, Iraq reportedly has allowed Iranian arms supplies to overfly Iraq en route to Syria,26
although some U.S. officials and reports say Iraq has stopped some shipments.26 Suggesting it believes Assad
might fall, or perhaps as part of its movement back to the Arab fold, Iraq has been attending the
meetings of the “Friends of Syria” group of countries that is attempting to arrange a transition
from the regime of Bashar Al Assad.
Aside from official Iraqi policy, the unrest in Syria has generated a scramble among Iraqi factions
to affect the outcome there. Some reports suggest that Sadrist and other Shiite militiamen might
be entering Syria to help the Assad government.As discussed above, AQ-I members have reportedly entered Syria to
help the mostly Sunni opposition to President Assad. The Iraqi government announced in
February 2012 that it was tightening its border with Syria to prevent the movement of Iraqi
militants and arms into Syria. The KRG appears to be using its influence with Syrian Kurds to
persuade them to more decisively revolt against Assad. The KRG has hosted meetings of Syrian
Kurds intended to promote that stanceassisting the Syrian Kurds, who joined the
revolt against Assad in July 2012. KRG President Barzani has hosted several meetings of Syrian
Kurds to promote unity and a common strategy among them.
Turkey
Turkey’s concerns focus mostly, although not exclusively, on northern Iraq, which borders
Turkey. Turkey has historically been viewed as concerned about the Iraqi Kurdish insistence on
autonomy and Iraqi Kurds’ ethnically based sympathies for Kurdish oppositionists in Turkey. The
anti-Turkey Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long maintained camps inside Iraq, along the
border with Turkey. Turkey continues to conduct periodic bombardments and other military
operations against the PKK encampments in Iraq. For example, in October 2011, Turkey sent
ground troops into northern Iraq to attack PKK bases following the killing of 24 Turkish soldiers
by the PKK. However, suggesting that it has built a pragmatic relationship with the KRG, Turkey
has emerged as the largest outside investor in northern Iraq and is building an increasingly close
political relationship with the KRG as well.
Relations between Turkey and the Iraqi government have worsened since the beginning of 2012
because of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi’s refuge there. Maliki and his allies sought his
extradition for trial, but Turkey has not turned him over. On August 2, 2012, Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davotoglu visited the city of Kirkuk, prompting a rebuke from Iraq’s Foreign
Ministry that the visit constituted inappropriate interference in Iraqi affairs.
Gulf States
Iraq also has unresolved disputes with several of the Sunni-led Persian Gulf states who have not
fully accommodated themselves to the fact that Iraq is now dominated by Shiite factions.
However, Iraq has tried, with some success, to settle some of these issues to encourage maximum
Gulf participation in the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad. All the Gulf states
were represented at the summit but, among Gulf rulers, only Amir Sabah of Kuwait attended.
Qatar sent a very low-level delegation which it said openly was meant as a protest against the
Iraqi government’s treatment of Sunni Arab factions.
Saudi Arabia had been widely criticized by Iraqi leaders because it has not opened an embassy in
Baghdad, a move Saudi Arabia pledged in 2008 and which the United States has long urged. This
issue was mitigated on February 20, 2012, when Saudi Arabia announced that it had named its
ambassador to Jordan, Fahd al-Zaid, to serve as a non-resident ambassador to Iraq concurrently.
However, it did not announce the opening of an embassy in Baghdad. The Saudi move came after
a visit by Iraqi national security officials to Saudi Arabia to discuss greater cooperation on
26
Kristina Wong, “ Iraq Resists U.S. Prod, Lets Iran Fly Arms to Syria.” Washington Times, March 16, 2012.
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However, it did not announce the opening of an embassy in Baghdad. The Saudi move came after
a visit by Iraqi national security officials to Saudi Arabia to discuss greater cooperation on
counterterrorism and the fate of about 400 Arab prisoners in Iraqi jails. The other Gulf countries
have opened embassies and all except the UAE have appointed full ambassadors to Iraq.
The relationship with Kuwait has always been considered difficult to resolve because of the
legacy of the 1990 Iraqi invasion. However, a possible indication of greater acceptance of the
Iraqi government by the state it once occupied (1990-1991) came when Kuwait’s prime minister
visited Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited Kuwait on February 16, 2011.
These key exchanges took place after the U.N. Security Council on December 15, 2010, passed
three resolutions (1956, 1957, and 1958) that had the net effect of lifting most Saddam-era
sanctions on Iraq, although the U.N.-run reparations payments process remains intact (and
deducts 5% from Iraq’s total oil revenues). A U.N. envoy, Gennadi Tarasov, remains empowered
by the Security Council to clear up the issues of Kuwaitis and other nationals missing from the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the issue of the missing Kuwaiti national archives that Iraq
allegedly took out of Kuwait. Very little progress on these issues has been made in recent years,
as was made clear in a Security Council statement of December 15, 2011 (SC/10490). Other
mutual suspicions persist—in August 2011 Iraqi politicians accused Kuwait of intruding on Iraq’s
oil through slant drilling at the border.
Some of these unresolved issues moved forward during the March 15, 2012, visit of Maliki to
Kuwait. After Maliki’s meetings, the two announced that Iraq had agreed to pay its share of
compensation to maintain border markings between the two. Iraq agreed to pay $300 million to
the Kuwaiti government and to invest $200 million in a joint venture of the two as settlement for
Kuwait Airways’ claim for $1.2 billion in compensation for planes and parts allegedly stolen by
Iraq during the 1990-1991 occupation. These agreements paved the way for Amir Sabah to attend
the Arab League summit in Baghdad. Subsequently, Iraq-Kuwait direct flights resumed, and an
agreement was reached for Iraq to pay its share of the costs of maintaining border markings.
The government of Bahrain, which is mostly Sunni, also fears that Iraq might work to empower
Shiite oppositionists who have demonstrated for a constitutional monarchy during 2011.
Ayatollah Sistani is revered by many Bahraini Shiites, and Iraqi Shiites have demonstrated in
solidarity with the Bahraini opposition, but there is no evidence that Iraq has had any direct role
in the Bahrain unrest.
U.S. Military Withdrawal and Post-2011 Policy
A complete U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011 was a specific stipulation of
the November 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), which took effect on January 1, 2009.
Following the SA’s entry into force, President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S.
troop drawdown plan that provided for a drawdown of U.S. combat brigades by the end of August
2010, with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq Security Forces, to remain
until the end of 2011. An interim benchmark in the SA was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S.
combat troops from Iraq’s cities. These withdrawal deadlines were strictly adhered to, including
the deadline for a final withdrawal.
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Question of Whether U.S. Forces Would Remain Beyond 2011
During 2011, with the deadline for a complete U.S. withdrawal approaching, continuing highprofile attacks, fears of expanded Iranian influence, and perceived deficiencies in Iraq’s 650,000
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nearly
700,000 member security forces caused U.S. officials to seek to revise the SA to keep some U.S.
troops in
Iraq after 2011. Renegotiating the SA to allow for a continued U.S. troop presence required
discussions with the Iraqi government and likely a ratification vote of the Iraqi COR.
In seeking a revision of the SA, some Iraq after 2011. Some U.S. experts feared the potential for rifts among major
ethnic and sectarian
communities to widen to the point wherewere still wide enough that Iraq could still become a “failed
state” unless some U.S. troops remained. Still others believed that U.S. troops were required to
ensure that the Kurd-Arab tensions in northern Iraq did not escalate into all-out conflict. U.S.
officials couched
troops remained—although U.S. officials emphasized that their ongoing concerns about the ISF as questions about
centered on Iraq’s ability to defend
its airspace and borders, and the ISF’s need for ongoing U.S. training. Iraqi comments, such as an
October October
30, 2011, statement by Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Babaker Zebari to
the effect
that Iraq would be unable to execute full external defense until 2020-2024, reinforced
those who
asserted that a U.S. force presence was still needed.27 Renegotiating the SA to allow for a
continued U.S. troop presence required discussions with the Iraqi government and a ratification
vote of the Iraqi COR.
U.S. Efforts to Convince Iraq to Request A Continued U.S. Military Presence
Several high-level U.S. visits and statements urged the Iraqis to consider extending the U.S. troop
presence. On April 22, 2011, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, on
a visit to Iraq, said U.S. logistical and operational considerations required that an Iraqi request for
U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2011 come within a few weeks.28 Maliki told visiting
Maliki told visiting Speaker of the House John Boehner, during an April 16, 2011, visit
to Baghdad, that Iraqi forces
were capable of securing Iraq after 2011, but that Iraq would
welcome U.S. training and arms
after that time.2928 Subsequent to Boehner’s visit, Maliki,
anticipating that a vote of the COR would
be needed for any extension, stated that a request for
U.S. troops might be made if there were a
“consensus” among political blocs, which he defined as
at least 70% concurrence.3029 This
appeared to be an effort to isolate the Sadr faction, which was
the most vocal opponent of a
continuing U.S. presence.
In his first visit to Iraq as Defense Secretary on July 11, 2011, Leon Panetta urged Iraqi leaders to
make a decision, and an affirmative one, soon. His visit, and another one a few weeks later by
Mullen, appeared to galvanize the Iraqi political system to agree on a decision and, on August 3,
an affirmative decision, and soon. On August 3, 2011, major factions gave Maliki their
backing to negotiate an SA extension. With the prospects
appearing promising,, and Secretary Panetta said on August 20, 2011, that it was
likely that Iraq would
request a continued U.S. presence primarily to train the ISF. In September
2011, a figure of about
15,000 remaining U.S. troops, reflecting recommendations of the U.S.
military, was being widely
discussed.3130 However, the issue became a subject of substantial debate
when the New York Times
reported on September 7, 2011, that the Administration was considering
proposing to Iraq to
retain only about 3,000-4,000 forces, mostly in a training role, after 2011.32 31
Many experts and
some Members of Congress criticized that figure as too low to ensure force
protection and carry
out the intended missions.
27
“Iraq General Says Forces Not Ready ‘Until 2020.’” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011.
Schmidt, Michael and Tim Arango. “Iraq Must Decide Within Weeks If U.S. Troops Will Stay Past 2011, Top
Official Says.” New York Times, April 23, 2011.
29
President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal
The difficulty in the negotiations—primarily a function of strident Sadrist opposition to a
continued U.S. presence—became clearer on October 5, 2011, when Iraq issued a statement that
some U.S. military personnel should remain in Iraq as trainers but that Iraq would not extend the
27
“Iraq General Says Forces Not Ready ‘Until 2020.’” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011.
Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
3029
Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
3130
Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011.
3231
Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers. “Plan Would Keep Military in Iraq Beyond Deadline.” September 7, 2011.
28
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President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal
The difficulty in the negotiations—primarily a function of strident Sadrist opposition to a
continued U.S. presence—became clearer on October 5, 2011, when Iraq issued a statement that
it agreed on the need to keep U.S. military personnel in Iraq as trainers, but that Iraq would not
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
legal protections contained in the existing SA. That stipulation failed to meet the
requirements of
the Defense Department, which feared that trying any American soldier under the
Iraqi constitution (which states that no Iraqi law shall contradict Islam) Iraqi
constitution could lead to serious
crises at some stage.
With little evident Iraqi flexibility, onOn October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that the
United States and Iraq had agreed
that, in accordance with the November 2008 Security
Agreement (SA) with Iraq, all U.S. troops
would leave Iraq at the end of 2011. With the formal
end of the U.S. combat mission on August
31, 2010, U.S. forces dropped to 47,000, and force
levels dropped steadily from August to
December 2011. The last U.S. troop contingent crossed
from Iraq into Kuwait on December 18, 2011.
The withdrawal—and perhaps the political crisis that broke out immediately after the completion
of the withdrawal—has provoked some criticism of the Administration. Somecaused some to argue that U.S.
gains have been jeopardized by the full pullout gains were jeopardized and that the
Administration should have pressed
Iraqi leaders harder to allow a U.S. contingent to remain.
Those who support the Administration
view say that political crisis was likely no matter when the
United States withdrew and that it is
the responsibility of the Iraqis to resolve their differences.
The Post-Withdrawal Presence
There are approximately 16,000 total U.S. personnel in Iraq, about half of which are contractors.
Of the total, about 2,000 are U.S. diplomats.33 Of the contractors, most are security contractors
protecting the U.S. Embassy and consulates, and other State Department and Office of Security
Cooperation-Iraq facilities throughout Iraq.
Structure of the Post-Troop Security Structure of the Post-Troop Relationship
After the withdrawal announcement, senior U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta, stated that the United States would be able to continue to help Iraq secure itself using
programs commonly used with other countries. Some detail was provided at a hearing on
November 15, 2011, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at which Secretary Panetta
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey testified.34 Other material was
provided by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in May 2012.
33
Tim Arango. “U.S. Plans to Cut Its Staff by Half at Iraq Embassy.” New York Times, February 8, 2012.
Senate Armed Services Committee. “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq Security Issues.”
November 15, 2011.
34
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human RightsAdministration officials stressed that the U.S.
political and residual security-related presence would be sufficient to exert influence and leverage
to ensure that Iraq remained stable, allied to the United States, continuing to move toward full
democracy, and economically growing and vibrant.
At the time of the withdrawal, there were about 16,000 total U.S. personnel in Iraq, about half of
which were contractors. Of the contractors, most are security contractors protecting the U.S.
Embassy and consulates, and other State Department and Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
facilities throughout Iraq. However, staff cuts discussed below have left the total number of U.S.
personnel in Iraq at about 12,500 as of the end of June 2012.
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)
The Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), operating under the authority of the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, is the primary Iraq-based U.S. institution that continues to train and mentor
the Iraqi military. It is funded with the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds discussed in the
aid table below. When fully staffed, OSC-I will beOSC-I is the largest U.S. security cooperation office in
the world, with nearly 1,000 personnel, plus nearly 5,000 security and support contractors. It will
work out of the world. It works out of
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and eight other locations around Iraq, such as the
Kirkuk Regional Airport Base.
Of the staff, 296 are to be Defense Department personnel, and a large percentage of those (about
260) will be military personnel. Of the 296, 46 of the staff will administer the Foreign Military
five other locations around Iraq (Kirkuk Regional Airport
Base, Tikrit, Besmaya, Umm Qasr, and Taji), but OSC-I plans to transfer its facilities to the Iraqi
government by the end of 2013.
Of the staff, 178 are U.S. military personnel and 11 are Defense Department civilians. About 46
of the staff administers the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and other security assistance
programs such as the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. Since 2005,
DOD has administered 231 U.S.-funded
FMS cases totaling $2.5 billion, and 201 Iraq-funded
cases totaling $7.9 billion. The largest FMS
case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft
to Iraq, notified to Congress in two equal
tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12,
2011 (Transmittal No. 11-46). The total
value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all
parts, training, and weaponry are
included.
The remaining 250 Defense Department personnel in OSC-I included. Iraq has paid $2.5 billion of that amount, to date.
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The remaining OSC-I personnel intend to conduct train and assist
programs for the Iraq military. The intent is that these personnel will
These personnel are to cooperate with Iraq’s forces
on counterterrorism, naval and air defense,
and conduct joint exercises. It is envisioned that U.S.
personnel will be “embedded” with Iraqi
forces as trainers not only tactically, but at the
institutional level by advising Iraqi security
ministries and its command structure. However, the
However, to date, these missions are not in effect because the United States and Iraq have not, to date,
agreed on a document that outlines the responsibilities
and size of these missions, and OSC-I
personnel lack the ability to carry weapons inside Iraq.
This limitation precludes some of the missions envisioned. There is no currently operative Status
of of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, which would be needed for combined joint exercises.
Police Development Program
An October 2011 audit by the SIGIR (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction)
identified deficiencies in the U.S.-funded training program for the Iraqi police forces (Police
Development Program) as that responsibility was transferred from Department of Defense to
Department of State on October 1, 2011.35 That program draws on International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. However, Iraq’s drive to emerge from U.S. tutelage has
produced apparent Iraqi disinterest in the program. It now consists of only 50 advisers, a small
portion of what was envisioned as an advisory force of 350. Some press reports say there is
Administration consideration of discontinuing the program entirely.36 In
some cases, not limited to OSC-I personnel, Iraq has been detaining U.S. security contractors at
checkpoints, complicating not only the U.S. security assistance effort but also the U.S. effort to
protect its own personnel and facilities.
Police Development Program
A separate program is the Police Development Program, which is the largest program that has
transitioned from DOD to State Department lead. An October 2011 audit by the SIGIR (Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) identified deficiencies in the U.S.-funded training
program for the Iraqi police forces (Police Development Program, PDP) as that responsibility was
transferred from DOD to State on October 1, 2011.32 That program draws on International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. However, Iraq’s drive to emerge from U.S.
tutelage has produced apparent Iraqi disinterest in the PDP. It now consists of only 36 advisers,
about 10% of what was envisioned as an advisory force of 350. Two facilities built with over
$200 million in U.S. funds (Baghdad Police College Annex and part of the U.S. consulate in
Basra) are to be turned over the Iraqi government by December 2012. Some press reports say
there is Administration consideration of discontinuing the program entirely.33
Is Iraq Reconsidering Downplaying Security Programs?
The AQ-I offensive as of July 2012 may have shaken the Iraqi leadership’s confidence in the ISF,
and possibly prompted some rethinking of the disengagement with the OSC-I and PDP programs
discussed above. On August 19, 2012, en route to a visit to Iraq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey said that “I think [Iraqi leaders] recognize their capabilities may
require yet more additional development and I think they’re reaching out to us to see if we can
help them with that.” This could lead to an Iraqi rededication to the programs discussed above or
it could lead to discussion of joint exercises with the United States and other U.S. training and
security cooperation.34
The Diplomatic and Economic Relationship
In his withdrawal announcement, President Obama stated that, through U.S. assistance programs,
the United States would be able to continue to develop all facets of the bilateral relationship with
35
3632
http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-006.pdf#view=fit.
Tim Arango. “U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Policy.” New York Times, May 13, 2012.
34
“U.S. Hopes For Stronger Military Ties With Iraq: General” Agence France-Presse, August 19, 2012.
33
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Iraq, and help Iraq strengthen its institutions, and “partner with an Iraq that contributes to regional
security and peace.”37.”35 The bilateral civilian relationship was the focus of a
visit to Iraq by Vice
President Biden in early December 2011, just prior to the December 12,
2011, Maliki visit to the
United States, which reportedly focused on these issues but also exposed
some U.S.-Iraq
disagreements, such as over policy toward Syria.
The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship is the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). The
SFA, signed and entered into effect at the same time as the SA, presents a framework for longterm U.S.-Iraqi relations, and is intended to help orient Iraq’s politics and its economy toward the
West and the developed nations, and reduce its reliance on Iran or other regional states.
The SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):
•
U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the United States will
not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third countries, and will not
seek permanent bases.
•
U.S support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional and
international organizations.
•
U.S.-Iraqi dialogue to increase Iraq’s economic development, including through
the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement.
•
Promotion of Iraq’s development of its electricity, oil, and gas sector.
•
U.S.-Iraq dialogue on agricultural issues and promotion of Iraqi participation in
agricultural programs run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID.
•
Cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as the Youth
Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership Program.
State Department-run aid programs are intended to fulfill the objectives of the SFA, according to
State Department budget documents. These programs, implemented mainly through the
Economic Support Fund account, and based on the State Department budget justification for
foreign operations for FY2013, are intended to:
3735
•
Promote Iraqi political reconciliation and peaceful dispute resolution.
•
Strengthen the ability of COR deputies to represent their constituents.
•
Make the electoral institutions, such as the IHEC, more effective.
•
Strengthen the delivery of services to citizens.
•
Improve primary education.
•
Assist local governing bodies, such as the provincial councils.
•
Promote Iraqi economic growth and the development of the private sector,
particularly the financial sector.
•
Continue counterterrorism operations (NADR funds).
•
Institute anti-corruption initiatives.
Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq.” http://www.whitehouse.gov, October 21, 2011.
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•
Institute anti-corruption initiativesU.S. officials stress that the United States does not bear the only burden for implementing the
programs above, in light of the fact that Iraq is now a major oil exporter. For programs run by
USAID in Iraq, Iraq matches dollar for dollar the U.S. funding contribution.
The State Department as Lead Agency
Virtually all of the responsibility for conducting the bilateral relationship now falls on the State
Department, which became the lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011. With the transition
completed, the State Department announced on March 9, 2012, that its “Office of the Iraq
Transition Coordinator” has closed. In concert with that closure, the former coordinator,
Ambassador Pat Haslach, assumed a senior post in the bureau for Conflict and Stabilization
Operations.another State Department bureau. Of the total
U.S. personnel in Iraq, about 1,200 are U.S. diplomats or other civilian employees of the U.S.
government.36
In July 2011, as part of the transition to State leadership in Iraq, the United States formally
opened consulates in Basra, Irbil, and Kirkuk. An embassy branch office was considered for
Mosul but cost and security issues have kept the U.S. facility there limited to a diplomatic office.
Not only have U.S. plans for some consulates been altered, but the size and cost of the U.S.
civilian presence in Iraq is undergoing reduction. In part this is because Iraqi leaders chafe at
further U.S. tutelage and advice, and are less welcoming of frequent U.S. diplomatic visits. Press
reports say the Iraqis are increasingly displacing foreign firms and contractors from the
International Zone (Green Zone) in favor of Iraqi institutions, and U.S. diplomats have trouble
going outside the Zone for official appointments because of security concerns. The Kirkuk
consulate close at the end of July 2012 in part due to security concerns and to save costs.
Ambassador-nominee to Iraq Brett McGurk stated in his June 6, 2012, confirmation hearings that
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, built at a cost of about $750 million, is too large and carries too
much staff relative to the remaining mission. He said the State Dept.Department plan is to cut the staff
at the
embassy by about 25% by the end of 2013. The process of reducing staff in part accounts
for the fall in the total number of U.S. personnel in Iraq to about 12,500 from nearly 17,000 at the
time of the completion of the U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011.
As shown in Table 3 below (in the note), the State
Department request for operations (which
includes costs for the Embassy as well as other
facilities and all personnel in Iraq) is about $2.7
billion for FY2013, down from $3.6 billion
requested for FY2012—with FY2012 considered a
“transition year” to State Department
leadership, and requiring high start-up costs. In addition,
press reports say the Central Intelligence
Agency is planning to reduce its staff to about 40% of
the 700 personnel it had in Iraq at the
height of the U.S. military presence there.3837
The debate over staff is separate from but related to the debate over whether the State
Department, using security contractors, can fully secure its personnel in Iraq. A staff report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released January 31, 2011, expressed substantial
skepticism.39 Still, no U.S. civilian personnel in Iraq have been killed or injured since the troop
withdrawal.
Regional Reinforcement Capability
In conjunction with the withdrawal, Defense Secretary Panetta stressed that the United States
would retain a large capability in the Persian Gulf region, presumably to be in position to assist
the ISF were it to falter, and to demonstrate continuing U.S. interest in Iraq’s security as well as to
38
Siobhan Gorman and Adam Entous. “CIA Prepares Iraq Pullback.” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2012.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
39
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36
37
Tim Arango. “U.S. Plans to Cut Its Staff by Half at Iraq Embassy.” New York Times, February 8, 2012.
Siobhan Gorman and Adam Entous. “CIA Prepares Iraq Pullback.” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2012.
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
skepticism.38 Still, no U.S. civilian personnel in Iraq have been killed or injured since the troop
withdrawal.
Status of the Ambassador Post. Another issue is the Ambassador position itself. As noted above,
Brett McGurk was nominated and had his Senate confirmation hearings on June 6, 2012. Shortly
thereafter, he withdrew after revelations of an extramarital relationship with an Iraq-based U.S.
journalist during his prior service at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. No replacement has been
named to date; there has been speculation in foreign policy circles that former Ambassador to
Syria Robert Ford is under consideration.
Regional Reinforcement Capability
In conjunction with the withdrawal, Defense Secretary Panetta stressed that the United States
would retain a large capability in the Persian Gulf region, presumably to be in position to assist
the ISF were it to falter, and to demonstrate continuing U.S. interest in Iraq’s security as well as to
deter Iran. The United States has about 50,000 military personnel in the region, including about
15,000 mostly U.S. Army forces in Kuwait, which are to transition toa portion of which are, as of mid-2012, combat ready
rather than
support forces; purely support forces. There are also about 7,500 mostly Air Force personnel in Qatar;
5,000 mostly Navy personnel in
Bahrain; and about 3,000 mostly Air Force and Navy in the
UAE, with very small numbers in
Saudi Arabia and Oman. The remainder are part of at least one
(and often two) aircraft carrier
task force in or near the Gulf at any given time. The forces are in
the Gulf under defense
cooperation agreements with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states that give the United
States access to their military facilities and, in several cases, to station
forces and preposition
even heavy armor.
The United States reportedly considered stationing about 4,000 additional U.S. forces in Kuwait
to provide enhanced capability to support Iraq, were that necessary.40 At the November 15, 2011,
hearing cited above, Joint Chiefs Chairman Dempsey advanced a version of this option, saying “it
would be my view that we should have some kind of rotational presence [of additional U.S.
forces in Kuwait], ground, air, and naval.” However, suggesting this option has been discarded,
deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told journalists that “there are not really plans to
have any substantial increases in any other parts of the Gulf as this war winds down.”41 Still, the
transition of U.S. forces in Kuwait from support to combat forces, mentioned above, could
represent a scaled-down version of that idea.
40
41
Pauline Jelinek. “Kuwait, US Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
“The Cable: Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin.” Washington Post, December 22, 2011. p. 17 even heavy armor.
38
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
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Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
Province
Elected Seats in
COR
Results
Baghdad
68
Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority
reserved: 2 seats
Nineveh (Mosul)
31
Iraqiiya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity
(Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3
Qadisiyah
11
Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2
Muthanna
7
Maliki: 4; INA: 3
Dohuk
10
Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved:
1
Basra
24
Maliki: 14 ; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3
Anbar
14
Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2
Karbala
10
Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1
Wasit
11
Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2
Dhi Qar
18
Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1
Sulaymaniyah
17
Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9
Kirkuk (Tamim)
12
Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6
Babil
16
Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3
Irbil
14
Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4
Najaf
12
Maliki: 7; INA: 5
Diyala
13
Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1
Salahuddin
12
Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2
Maysan
10
Maliki: 4; INA: 6
Total Seats
325
Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91
(310 elected + 8
minority reserved + 7
compensatory)
Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43
Unity (Bolani): 4
Accordance: 6
other Kurdish: 14
minority reserved: 8
Source: Iraqi Higher Election Commission, March 26, 2010.
Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact allocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi
law. Total seat numbers include likely allocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total
seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2013
(appropriations/allocations in millions of $)
FY
‘03
04
IRRF
ESF
Democracy
Fund
IFTA
(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
NADR
Refugee
Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)
IDA
Other
USAID
Funds
INCLE
FMF
IMET
DOD—ISF
Funding
DOD—
Iraq Army
DOD—
CERP
DOD—Oil
Repair
DOD—
Business
Support
2,475
—
18,389
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Total
05
06
07
08
10
1,535.4
—
1,677
—
—
—
—
—
3.6
39.6
22
.1
—
470
—
––
—
11
Total
03-12
09
10
12
—
429
—
541.5
—
382.5
—
325.7
––
299
20,874
5,190
250
75
—
—
—
––
325
13.0
—
2.8
18.4
—
20.4
—
35.5
—
30.3
—
29.8
––
32
15.8
170
—
7.1
—
.3
78.3
45
278
85
260
51
316
42
280
17
––
––
1,252
269
—
—
––
1.2
—
—
––
—
—
91.4
––
—
—
170
––
1.1
23.8
85
––
—
—
20
––
2
—
702
––
2
—
114.6
––
1.7
––
500
850
2
494
1,683
850
10
—
—
5,391
3,007
5,542
3,000
1,000
1,000
1,500
—
20,440
51.2
—
210
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
261
—
140
718
708
750
996
339
263
44.0
—
3,958
802
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
802
—
—
—
—
50.0
50.0
74.0
—
—
—
174
3,859
18,548
6,329
5,365
8,584
5,042
2,323
2,738
2,313
1,683
56,768
FY’13
Request
262.9
30.3
850
900
2
2,045.2
Sources: State Department FY2013 Executive Budget Summary, February 2012; SIGIR Report to Congress,
January 30, 2012; and CRS calculations. FY2012 appropriations in Consolidated Appropriation, P.L. 112-74.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, on February 17, 2012. This table does not
contain agency operational costs, including CPA, State Department, and PRTs, except where these are
embedded in the larger reconstruction accounts. Estimated operational costs to date are an additional $9.3
billion, including $3.6 billion estimated for FY2012. Approximately $2.7 billion is requested by State Department
for these costs in FY2013. Possible cuts in staff at the U.S. embassy and other locations is addressed in this
report. IG oversight costs estimated at $417 million. IMET=International Military Education and Training;
IRRF=Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq
Security Force; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ISF= Iraqi Security Forces.
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Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current $)
FY2009
FY2010 (act.)
FY2011
FY2012
32.45
33.3
16.5
29.75
143.64
117.40
90.33
100.5
Political
Competition/Consensus-Building
41.00
52.60
30.00
16.25
Civil Society
87.53
83.6
32.5
55.5
304.62
286.9
169.33
202.0
Rule of Law and Human Rights
Good Governance
Totals
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, March 2011. Figures for these accounts are included in the overall
assistance figures presented in the table above.
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Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one
Sabean and one Christian set-aside
seat
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9%
(5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Allawi)—
8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ; National
Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one
Christian seat
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). Governor :
Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one
set aside each for Shabaks, Yazidis,
and Christians
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa took control of
provincial council and administration. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi (Hadbaa).
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—
1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—
3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid
Tuman (Sadrist); Governor—Salman Zirkani (Maliki list)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—
6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—
3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%;; Allawi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%;
Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair:
Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4);
Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. Governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State
of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Allawi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%;
ISCI—2.9%. Council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Allawi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Allawi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. Governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.
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Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats)
and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz alHakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
independents (30).
140
128
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
vote.
40
25
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
2005 vote.
—
11
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Bloc/Party
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
2007,
Admin.
Report
Benchmark
GAO
(Sept.
07)
Sept. 14,
2007,
Admin.
Report
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
report, International Compact with Iraq
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Weekly Status Reports
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional
Review Committee (CRC)
and completing review
(S)
satisfactory
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major
issues remain unresolved and require achievement of
consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and
implementing laws on DeBaathification
(U)
unsatisfact.
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008.
Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to
regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. Could allow for
judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and bars exSaddam security personnel from regaining jobs. DeBaathification officials used this law to try to harm
the prospects of rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and
implementing oil laws that
ensure equitable
distribution of resources
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws long stalled
over KRG-central government disputes, but draft
legislation still pending in COR. Revenue being
distributed equitably, including 17% revenue for KRG.
Kurds also getting that share of oil exported from
fields in KRG area.
4. Enacting and
implementing laws to form
semi-autonomous regions
S
partly
met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low
threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council
members) to start process to form new regions, took
effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of
Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to
start forming a region) to convert Basra province
into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more
were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
Najaf, Diyala, Salahuddin, and Anbar have asked for a
referendum to become a region.
5. Enacting and
implementing: (a) a law to
establish a higher electoral
commission, (b) provincial
elections law; (c) a law to
specify authorities of
provincial bodies, and (d)
set a date for provincial
elections
S on (a)
and U on
the others
overall
unmet;
(a)
met
S on (a) and
(c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial
governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect
April 2008. Implementing election law adopted
September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections
by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as
discussed above.
6. Enacting and
implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for
former insurgents
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraqheld detainees passed February 13, 2008. Most of
these have been released. 19,000 detainees held by
U.S. were transferred to Iraqi control under SA.
7. Enacting and
implementing laws on
militia disarmament
no rating
unmet
Same as July
March 2008 Basra operation, discussed above, viewed
as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki
demanded all militias disband as condition for their
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on
militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political,
media, economic, and
services committee to
S
met
met
No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S.
troops now out of Iraq.
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July 12,
2007,
Admin.
Report
Benchmark
GAO
(Sept.
07)
Sept. 14,
2007,
Admin.
Report
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
report, International Compact with Iraq
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Weekly Status Reports
(and various press sources)
support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained
and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
S
partly
met
S
No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to
assist the surge when it was in operation.
10. Providing Iraqi
commanders with
authorities to make
decisions, without political
intervention, to pursue all
extremists, including Sunni
insurgents and Shiite
militias
U
unmet
S to pursue
extremists
U on
political
interference
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over
the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of
Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
ISF—favoring Shiites. Some politically motivated
leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to
include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and
file than one year ago.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) providing
even-handed enforcement
of law
U
unmet
S on
military, U
on police
U.S. interpreted March 2008 Basra operation as
effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly.
Widespread Iraqi public complaints of politicallymotivated administration of justice.
12. Ensuring that the surge
plan in Baghdad will not
provide a safe haven for
any outlaw, no matter the
sect
S
partly
met
S
No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethnosectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
13. (a) Reducing sectarian
violence and (b) eliminating
militia control of local
security
Mixed. S
on (a); U
on (b)
unmet
same as July
12
Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated outright,
although there are fears the political crisis in
December 2011 could reignite sectarian conflict.
14. Establishing Baghdad
joint security stations
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad
at the height of U.S. troop surge. Closed in
compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pull out from the
cities.
15. Increasing ISF units
capable of operating
independently
U
unmet
U
ISF now securing Iraq under the SA. Iraqi Air Force
not likely to be able to secure airspace and DOD has
approved potential sale to Iraq of F-16s and other
major equipment.
16. Ensuring protection of
minority parties in COR
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by
Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a
minimum seat allocated in 2010 election law.
17. Allocating and spending
$10 billion in 2007 capital
budget for reconstruction.
S
partly
met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for
capital projects was spent.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi
authorities not falsely
accusing ISF members
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF
officers still observed.
Source: Compiled by CRS.
Congressional Research Service
4748
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Congressional Research Service
4849