Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
February 7April 24, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of
313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. In September 2011, the Navy began
briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that altered planned numbers for certain
ship categories while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. On January 31, 2012, the Navy
announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be completed in several months, that
could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy.
On January 26, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced certain program decisions
that are to be incorporated into DOD’s proposed FY2013 budget. The proposed changes include
the early retirement of nine Navy ships and the deferrals of certain ships in the Navy’s
shipbuilding plan. DOD also announced that it plans to maintain the current force of 11 aircraft
carriers and 10 carrier air wings.
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of 10 new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships included two Virginiaclass attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs),
one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime
prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2012FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy’s proposed
FY2012 budget, included a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the
55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in late
May 2011, does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 313-ship
goal over the long run. Among other things, the Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer and
attack submarine forces would drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the
30-year plan.
A June 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0
billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy
estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of
the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and
On March 28, 2012, the Department
of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force
structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310316-ship plan.
The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier; two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class
Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).
These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
The FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships—14 ships, or about
25%, less than the 55 ships in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan, and 16
ships less, or about 28%, less than the 57 ships that were planned for FY2013-FY2017 under the
FY2012 budget. Of the 16 ships no longer planned for FY2013-FY2017, nine were eliminated
from the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and seven were deferred to years beyond FY2017. The nine
ships that were eliminated were eight Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and one TAGOS ocean
surveillance ship. The seven ships deferred beyond FY2017 were one Virginia-class attack
submarine, two LCSs, one LSD(X) amphibious ship, and three TAO(X) oilers. The Navy’s
proposed FY2013 budget also proposes the early retirement of seven Aegis cruisers and the
placement into Reduced Operating Status (ROS) of two LSD-type amphibious ships.
The Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan, which was submitted to
Congress on March 28, 2012 (more than a month after the submission of the FY2013 budget on
February 13, 2012), does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s
310-316 ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the fleet would remain below 310
ships during the entire 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at various points in ballistic
missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The projected
cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls are smaller than they were projected to be under
the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, due in part to a reduction in the
cruiser-destroyer force-level goal and the insertion of additional destroyers and attack submarines
into the FY2013 30-year plan.
CBO is currently preparing its estimate of the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan. In its
June 2011 report on the cost of the FY2012 30-year plan, CBO estimated that the plan would cost
an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more
than the Navy estimated. CBO’s estimate was about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the
first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of
the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011Goal ....................................................... 1
January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment .......................................... 3
Navy’s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ..... 1
Newly Announced Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships ................................................ 3
Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan ............................1
Goal of About 310-316 Ships Is an Interim Target That May Be Refined.......................... 1
Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals .................................... 3
30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) 2
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding PlanPlans ................................................................... 6
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY20413
Five-Year (FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan .......................... 7
Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and Procurement
Reductions........................................................... 3
30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................... 9
January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions............................................ 106
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan............. 8
Oversight Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 1211
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary
Circumstances ...................................................................................................................... 12
Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective............................Strategic and Budgetary Changes ....................... 14 11
Sufficiency of FY2012FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................. 1415
Affordability of FY2012FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan .............................................................. 16
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs 15
Legislative Activity for FY2012 .................................................................................................... 17
FY2012 Funding Request........................................................................................................ 17
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81) .................................. 17
House (Committee Report) ............................................................................................... 17
House (Floor Consideration)............................................................................................. 20
Senate (S. 1867) ................................................................................................................ 20
Senate (S. 1253) ................................................................................................................ 21
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 22
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)........................................................................ 25
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 25
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)....................................................................... 25
House............................ 16
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels................................................................................. 17
Near-Term Options for Adding Ships and Reducing Ship Unit Procurement Costs ............... 17
Adding a Second Virginia Class Boat in FY2014—10 Boats in MYP ............................. 18
Adding a 10th DDG-51 to the DDG-51 MYP.................................................................... 19
Block Buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80..................................................................................................... 25
Senate 20
Legislative Activity for FY2013 ................................................................................................................................ 26
Conference ........... 24
FY2013 Funding Request............................................................................................................. 27 24
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 2724
Tables
Table 1. NavyCurrent 310-316 Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001.....................Goal Compared to Earlier Goals................................................ 2
Table 2. Navy FY2012FY2013 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 4
Table 3. Navy FY2012FY2013 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 7
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012FY2013 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................................................................... 89
Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 13
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
12
Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................................................................... 1617
Table BC-1. Comparison of Navy’s 313-310-316 ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel.......... ................................................................................. 3233
Table CD-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948. ..................................................... 3536
Table CD-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016FY2017 ..................................... 36
Appendixes
Appendix A37
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendixes
Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests........... 25
Appendix B. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels ............................. 2829
Appendix BC. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR .......................................................... 3031
Appendix CD. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate......................................................... 3435
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 3637
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress
concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the
Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the
past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
Background
Navy’s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011Goal
Newly Announced Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships
The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of
313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. The Navy in subsequent years
changed its desired quantities for certain ship types, and by mid-2011 the Navy’s desired fleet
appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships.
In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that
incorporated some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of
February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the revised
313-ship plan of September 2011 reduced the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels
(JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21.
Navy officials sometimes refer to the figure of 313 ships as a “floor,” meaning a minimum
required number. The Navy stated that the revised 313-ship plan of September 2011 “will provide
the capability and capacity to meet projected future missions with acceptable risk.”1
Table 1 compares the revised 313-ship goal of September 2011 to earlier Navy ship force
structure plans.
1
Source: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on
October 7, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
1
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001
Ship type
Revised
313-ship
plan of
September
2011
Changes to
February
2006 313ship plan
announced
through
mid-2011
February
2006
Navy plan
for 313ship fleet
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
12b
12b
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)
4
0c
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48
Aircraft carriers
11e
Cruisers and destroyers
Early-2005 Navy
plan for fleet of 260325 ships
260-ships
325ships
20022004
Navy
plan for
375-ship
Navya
14
14
14
14
14
4
4
4
4
2 or 4d
48
48
37
41
55
55
11e
11f
10
11
12
12
94
94g
88
67
92
104
Frigates
0
0
0
0
0
0
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
55
55
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
33
33h
31
17
24
37
36
MPF(F) shipsi
0j
0j
12i
14i
20i
0i
0i
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
30
30
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine warfare ships
0
0
0
0
0
26k
16
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
10l
21l
3
0
0
0
0
Otherm
16
24n
17
10
11
25
25
313
328
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
Total battle force ships
2001 QDR
plan for
310-ship
Navy
116
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. Source for revised 313-ship plan of September 2011:
Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on
October 7, 2011.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.On March 28, 2012, the Department
of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. In its report on the FY2013 30year shipbuilding plan, the Navy refers to this new goal as a goal for a Navy of about 300 ships—
perhaps in recognition of the ongoing naval force structure assessment discussed below—but the
numbers presented in the report add to a target fleet of about 310-316 ships.1
Goal of About 310-316 Ships Is an Interim Target That May Be Refined
The goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships is an interim target that may be further refined in
coming months. DOD states that
In response to the new strategic priorities and guidance found in [the January 2012 document
entitled] Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,2 the
Department of Defense is now reviewing and updating the requirements for naval presence
and forces and its operational plans for a variety of potential regional contingencies. When
these efforts are complete, the DoN [Department of the Navy] will revisit and reassess the
force structure judgments and decisions in a supporting Naval Force Structure Assessment
(FSA)....
This battle force [totaling about 310-316 ships] is fully capable of meeting the strategic
guidance found in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,
and adequately sustains the national shipbuilding and naval combat systems design and
industrial base.
1
Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, pp. 4 and 10.
2
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by
Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
Congressional Research Service
1
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
However the battle force inventory above should be considered an interim planning target
pending the outcome of a formal Force Struture Assessment (FSA) and the ongoing
Department of Defense review of its operational plans for potential regional contingencies.
The final FSA-derived inventory targets will remain valid as long as there are no further
changes to defense strategic guidance, the global force management allocation plan, or to
Department fiscal guidance. Should changes to any of these three things occur, a further
review and assessment of battle force requirements will be necessary.3
Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals
Table 1 compares the 310-316 ship goal to earlier Navy ship force structure plans.
Table 1. Current 310-316 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals
Early-2005 Navy
plan for fleet of 260325 ships
Ship type
Current
goal:
310-316
ship plan of
March 2012
Revised
313-ship
plan of
September
2011
Changes to
February
2006 313ship plan
announced
through
mid-2011
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
12-14b
12b
12b
14
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)
0-4c
4c
0c
Attack submarines (SSNs)
~48
48
11
11e
~90
325ships
20022004
Navy
plan for
375-ship
Navya
2001 QDR
plan for
310-ship
Navy
14
14
14
14
4
4
4
4
2 or 4d
48
48
37
41
55
55
11e
11f
10
11
12
12
94
94g
88
67
92
104
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
~55
55
55
55
63
82
56
0
~32
33
33h
31
17
24
37
36
0
0j
0j
12i
14i
20i
0i
0i
~29
30
30
30
24
26
42
34
0
0
0
0
0
0
26k
16
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
10l
10l
21l
3
0
0
0
0
Otherm
~23
16
24n
17
10
11
25
25
~310-316
313
328
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
Aircraft carriers
Cruisers and destroyers
Frigates
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
Amphibious ships
MPF(F)
shipsi
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
Dedicated mine warfare ships
Total battle force ships
February
2006
Navy plan
for 313ship fleet
260-ships
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately and signals that the number
in question may be refined as a result of the Naval Force Structure Assessment currently in progress.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
3
Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, pp. 8 and 10.
Congressional Research Service
2
116
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
b.
The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
c.
Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire, and the 328-ship presentation
reflected the post-2020s force level of zero SSGNs.
d.
The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD)DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into
SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a
plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
e.
With congressional approval, the goal will temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers during 33-month period
between for the period between
the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and the scheduled entry into
service of the carrier
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) in, currently scheduled for September 2015.
f.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
g.
The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.
h.
The Navy acknowledgesacknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
Congressional Research Service
2
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
i.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for example,
by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron were
counted by the Navy as battle force ships.
j.
The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure six ships that were previously planned for the MPF(F) squadron—three modified TAKE-1 class
cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships. These six ships are nowwere included in the total
shown for “Other” ships.
k.
The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includesincluded 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
l.
Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.
m.
This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
n.
The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal includesincluded the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.
January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment
On January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be
completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy. The Navy
stated that the force structure assessment will reflect a new strategic guidance document released
by the Administration on January 5, 2012.2
Navy’s FY2012 Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2012FY2013 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan.
2
Frank Oliveri, “Navy Structure Study Could Alter Minimum Number of Ships Required,” CQToday, February 1,
2012: 10; Mike McCarthy, “Navy Evaluating 313-Ship Goal,” Defense Daily, February 1, 2012; Michael Fabey, “U.S.
Navy Studies Force Structure,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 1, 2012: 4; Megan Eckstein, “Harvey:
Force Structure Review Will Take Into Account Fewer Ships,” Inside the Navy, February 6, 2012. See also Dan Taylor,
“Navy: No Decision On 313-Ship Floor Yet, Despite Cutbacks In Fleet,” Inside the Navy, January 30, 2012.
The strategic guidance document released on January 5, 2012, is Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp. For more on this document, see CRS Report
R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
FY2013-FY2017) shipbuilding plan.
Congressional Research Service
3
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. Navy FY2012FY2013 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-310-316 ship goal)
Ship type
FY12FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
Total
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
1
Total
1
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
21
2
2
2
109
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
2
1
2
2
2
1
89
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
4
4
4
4
3
19
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship2
2
16
1
1
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
12
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship
1
1
/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB)
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
1
1
1
1
TAO(X) oiler
TOTAL
2
1
10
7
8
9
1
7
41
Source: FY2013 Navy budget submission.
Notes: The MLP/AFSB is a variant of the MLP with additional features permitting it to serve in the role of an
AFSB.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2013-FY2017)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
Total of 41 ships—16 ships, or 28% less than planned last year. The FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships—14 ships, or
about 25%, less than the 55 ships in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016)
shipbuilding plan, and 16 ships less, or about 28%, less than the 57 ships that
were planned for FY2013-FY2017 under the FY2012 budget.
•
The 16 ships eliminated or deferred. Of the 16 ships that are no longer planned
for FY2013-FY2017, nine were eliminated from the Navy’s shipbuilding plan
and seven were deferred to years beyond FY2017. The nine ships that were
eliminated were eight Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and one TAGOS ocean
surveillance ship. The seven ships that were deferred beyond FY2017 were one
Virginia-class attack submarine, two LCSs, one LSD(X) amphibious ship, and
three TAO(X) oilers.
•
Average of 8.2 ships per year. The FY2013-FY2017 plan includes an average of
8.2 battle force ships per year. The previous two five-year shipbuilding plans
included an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year. Given the singledigit numbers of battle force ships that were procured from FY1993 through
FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to increase the
shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. The steady-state
replacement rate for a fleet of 310-316 ships with an average service life of 35
years is about 8.9-9.0 ships per year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993
has been substantially below 8.9-9.0 ships per year (see Appendix D).
•
Five percent reduction in large combat ships. Although the FY2013-FY2017
five-year shipbuilding plan contains about 28% fewer ships than were planned
for FY2013-FY2017 under the FY02012 budget, the percentage reduction in
Congressional Research Service
4
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
large combat ships (defined here as aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and
amphibious ships) was much smaller. The total number of large combat ships
planned for FY2013-FY2017 dropped from 21 in the FY2012 budget to 20 in the
FY2013 budget—a reduction of about 5%.
•
Two-year stretch-out in aircraft carrier construction. Although the FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan retains FY2013 as the year of procurement
for the aircraft carrier CVN-79, the FY2013-F23017 plan defers the scheduled
delivery date of this ship by two years, to 2022, which is a delivery date that in
the past might have been expected for a carrier procured in FY2015. Although it
does not show in Table 2, the FY2013 budget also retains FY2018 as the year of
procurement for CVN-80, the next carrier after CVN-79. As with CVN-79, the
FY2013 budget defers the scheduled delivery date of CVN-80 by two years, to
2027, which is a delivery date that in the past might have been expected for a
carrier procured in FY2020.
•
Virginia-class submarine deferred from FY2014 to FY2018. The FY2013FY017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers one Virginia-class submarine from
FY2014 to FY2018. Navy leaders in testimony this year have expressed an
interest in finding a way to restore a second Virginia-class submarine to FY014.
The Navy this year is also seeking congressional approval for a multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangement4 for the nine Virginia-class boats currently
scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2018. Adding a second Virginia-class
boat to FY2014 would increase to 10 the number of boats that would be procured
under the proposed FY2014-FY2018 MYP arrangement.
•
Start of Ohio-replacement procurement deferred to FY2021. Although it does
not show in Table 2, the FY2013 budget defers the scheduled procurement of the
first Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two years, from
FY2019 to FY2021.
•
DDG-51 destroyer deferred from FY2014 to FY2016. The FY2013-FY2017
five-year shipbuilding plan defers the scheduled procurement of one DDG-51
destroyer from FY2014 to FY2016. The Navy this year is seeking congressional
approval for an MYP arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for
procurement in FY2013-FY2017.
•
LCS procurement reduced in FY2016-FY2017. The FY2013-FY2017 fiveyear shipbuilding plan reduces the LCS procurement rate in FY2016 and FY2017
from three ships per year to two ships per year. The Navy still plans on procuring
a total of 55 LCSs, so the two LCSs that are no longer planned for FY2016 and
FY2017 have been deferred beyond FY2017.
•
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship deferred from FY2016 to FY2017. The
FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers the scheduled procurement
of the next LHA(R) amphibious assault ship by one year, from FY2016 to
FY2017.
4
For an explanation of MYP, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in
Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
Congressional Research Service
5
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Start of LSD(X) amphibious ship procurement deferred to FY2018. The
FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers from FY2017 to FY2018 the
scheduled procurement of the first LSD(X) amphibious ship. LSD(X)s are to
replace aging LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships. The Navy testified last year
that an FY2017 start for LSD(X) procurement would have been ahead of need
(i.e., earlier than needed) for replacing the first retiring LSD-41/49 class ship.
The implication was that the FY2017 start date for the LSD(X) under last year’s
budget reflected industrial-base considerations, and that the Navy no longer feels
that adequately supporting the industrial base over the next few years requires an
FY2017 start date.
•
AFSB added in FY2014. The FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan adds
an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ship in FY2014. This ship will be a
variant of the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship. The Navy is also proposing
to build the third MLP, which was funded in FY2012, to the modified AFSB
design, producing an eventual force of two regular MLPs and two AFSBs. The
Navy has canceled the retirement of an existing LPD-type amphibious ship and is
now modifying that ship to serve as an interim AFSB, pending the delivery of the
two new-built AFSBs.
•
Start of TAO(X) oiler procurement deferred to FY2017. The FY2013-FY2017
five-year shipbuilding plan defers the start of TAO(X) oiler procurement three
years, from FY2014 to FY2017. The addition of the AFSB in FY2014 is intended
in part to mitigate the industrial-base impact of deferring the start of TAO(X)
procurement.
•
Eight JHSVs eliminated. The elimination of the eight JHSVs from the FY2013FY2017 shipbuilding plan reflects a reduction in the Navy’s JHSV force-level
goal from 21 ships down to 10 ships. A total of nine JHSVs have been procured
through FY2012; the JHSV requested for FY2013 is to be the 10th and final ship.
•
Early retirements for seven Aegis cruisers; ROS for two LSD-type
amphibious ships. The FY2013 budget also proposes the early retirement of
seven Aegis cruisers and the placement into Reduced Operating Status (ROS) of
two LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2014. The seven cruisers
would await foreign sale or disposal.
30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan, which
was submitted to Congress on March 28, 2012, more than a month after the submission of the
FY2013 budget on February 13, 2012,5 and which includes a total of 268 ships.
5
10 U.S.C. 231, as most recently amended by Section 1011 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
1540/ P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011), states that “The Secretary of Defense shall include [the 30-year shipbuilding
plan] with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year....”
Congressional Research Service
6
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 3. Navy FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
CVN
1
1
1
1
1
1
LSC
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
SSC
4
4
4
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
2
SSN
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
SSBN
AWS
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
CLF
Supt
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
Total
10
7
8
9
7
11
8
12
9
12
13
12
10
9
6
9
8
9
8
11
8
8
5
7
7
10
8
11
8
8
Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
In devising a 30-year shipbuilding plan to move the Navy toward its ship force-structure goal, key
assumptions and planning factors include but are not limited to the following:
•
ship service lives;
•
estimated ship procurement costs;
•
projected shipbuilding funding levels; and
•
industrial-base considerations.
The Navy’s report on the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan states that
This 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on several key assumptions:
Congressional Research Service
7
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
The battle force inventory target that forms the basis for the accompanying 30-year
shipbuilding report will not change substantially with the Navy Force Structure
Assessment or the ongoing Department of Defense review of its operational plans for a
variety of potential regional contingencies. Individual ship targets may vary slightly
based on a detailed analysis of Combatant Commander requirements in light of the new
defense strategy.
•
Yearly spending on Navy shipbuilding must increase starting in the second FYDP of the
near-term period [FY2013-FY2022], and remain at higher levels throughout the midterm planning period [FY2023-FY2032] before falling down to annual shipbuilding
levels nearer to historical averages. During the 2020s and early 2030s, a large number
of surface ships and submarines built during the Cold War build-up in the 1980s and
early 1990s—particularly the OHIO-class SSBNs—will reach the end of their service
lives. This will inevitably cause the annual shipbuilding expenditures from FY2020
through FY2032 to be higher than those seen from the mid-1990s through 2020.
•
All battle force ships—particularly Large Surface Combatants [i.e., cruisers and
destroyers]—will serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives. In this
fiscal environment, the DoN [Department of the Navy] can ill-afford to inflate future
shipbuilding requirements by retiring ships earlier than planned.
•
The Department of the Navy will be able to maintain cost control over its major
shipbuilding acquisition programs, especially once individual ship classes shift to serial
production. The Department will need to focus on limiting overruns for first ships-ofclass.
•
The Department of the Navy must still be able to cover the Manpower, Operations and
Maintenance (MPN/O&MN), Weapons Procurement navy (WPN), and Other
Procurement Navy (OPN) costs associated with this plan. DoN leaders are committed to
avoiding a “hollow force.”6
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2013-FY2042 that would result from
implementing the FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
6
Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, p. 19. Italics as in original.
Congressional Research Service
8
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
310-316 ship plan
11
~90
~55
~48
0-4
12-14
~32
~29
~33
~310-316
FY13
10
80
35
55
4
14
31
32
24
285
FY14
10
78
30
55
4
14
29
32
27
279
FY15
11
78
26
54
4
14
28
31
30
276
FY16
11
80
30
53
4
14
29
31
32
284
FY17
11
82
32
50
4
14
30
29
33
285
FY18
11
84
35
51
4
14
31
29
33
292
FY19
11
86
39
51
4
14
31
29
35
300
FY20
11
87
37
48
4
14
31
29
34
295
FY21
11
88
38
48
4
14
31
29
33
296
FY22
12
87
40
47
4
14
32
29
33
298
FY23
11
89
39
47
4
14
32
29
35
300
FY24
11
89
41
46
4
14
34
29
35
303
FY25
11
88
43
45
4
14
34
29
33
301
FY26
11
89
46
45
2
14
34
29
32
302
FY27
12
90
49
44
1
13
33
29
33
304
FY28
11
89
52
43
0
12
34
29
33
303
FY29
11
87
55
43
0
11
33
29
33
302
FY30
11
85
55
43
0
11
33
29
33
300
FY31
11
81
55
45
0
11
32
29
33
297
FY32
11
80
55
45
0
10
32
29
33
295
FY33
11
79
55
46
0
10
33
29
33
296
FY34
11
78
55
47
0
10
34
29
33
297
FY35
11
80
55
48
0
10
33
29
33
299
FY36
11
82
55
49
0
10
33
29
33
302
FY37
11
84
55
50
0
10
33
29
33
305
FY38
11
86
55
48
0
10
32
29
34
305
FY39
11
88
55
49
0
10
32
29
33
307
FY40
10
88
55
49
0
10
31
29
33
305
FY41
10
89
55
48
0
11
32
29
33
307
FY42
10
88
55
49
0
12
31
29
33
307
Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan2
TAO(X) oiler
TAGOS ocean surveillance ship
TOTAL
1
2
2
2
1
8
1
1
1
3
1
10
13
1
1
11
12
9
55
Source: FY2012 Navy budget submission.
Notes: The FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan also includes, in FY2012, an oceanographic ship that does not
count against the 313-ship goal.
Until FY2012, JHSVs were being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth
and final JHSV in FY2012; this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission and is not shown in this
table. In May 2011, the Navy and Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s
JHSVs to the Navy. In the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December
23, 2011), the JHSV that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212
budget submission.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2012-FY2016)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes a total of 55 battle force ships, or 5 more
than the FY2011-FY2015 plan. The net increase of five ships includes the
addition of six ships and the subtraction of one previously planned ship. The six
added ships include a second DDG-51 in FY2014, a fourth Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) in FY2012, three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016, and a TAGOS ocean
surveillance ship in FY2013. The ship that was subtracted was a second JHSV
that was previously planned for FY2016.
•
The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes an average of 11 battle force ships per year,
making this the second year in a row that the Navy has presented a five-year
shipbuilding plan showing an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year.
Given the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that have were procured from
FY1993 through FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to
increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. A rate of
10 battle force ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet
of 313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year (see Appendix C).
Congressional Research Service
4
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 21% of the ships in the Navy’s
planned force structure (65 of 313 ships), they account 49% of the ships in the
FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan (27 of 55 ships). In this sense, these relatively
inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding plan relative
to their portion of the 313-ship goal, making it easier to procure an average of 11
ships per year within available resources. Starting a few years from now, when
the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding
plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic
missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year
will become a considerably more expensive proposition. In this sense, the
FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding program’s average of 11 ships per year does not
necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces concerning the
long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.
•
The addition of the fourth LCS in FY2012 brings planned annual LCS
procurement quantities into line with those called for in the dual-award
acquisition strategy that Congress approved in December 2010 for the LCS
program.3
•
The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 is to be
the 11th and final ship in the class. The 33-ship force-structure goal for
amphibious ships includes 11 LPD-17s.4
•
The FY2011-FY2015 plan requested the first of three planned Mobile Landing
Platform ships (MLPs) in FY2011, and the second and third MLPs in FY2012
and FY2013. As part of its action on the FY2011 defense budget, Congress
funded the procurement of two MLPs in FY2011 (i.e., one more than requested).
Congress completed its action on the FY2011 budget after the Navy submitted its
proposed FY2012 budget, and the FY2012 budget submission does not account
for the funding of a second MLP in FY2011. The Navy states that since two
MLPs were funded in FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in
FY2013.
•
The addition of the three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016 reflects an
acceleration of the start of this program from FY2017 to FY2014. This
acceleration was one of a series of measures that the Navy announced on
September 17, 2010, for sustaining the shipbuilding capability in Louisiana.5 The
Navy plans to compete the TAO(X), so it is not certain that the program will be
awarded to a shipyard in Louisiana, such as the Avondale shipyard near New
Orleans that forms part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, is generally considered to
be a likely competitor for the program.
3
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
5
For the text of the Navy’s announcement, see http://www.wwltv.com/news/Sec-of-Navy-remarks-on-shipyard-inAvondale-103150169.html.
Congressional Research Service
5
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan
The Navy did not submit an FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in February
2011, in conjunction with the proposed FY2012 budget.6 At the request of the House Armed
Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding
plan in late May 2011.7 Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041)
shipbuilding plan. The first five years of this plan include the same ships as those in the FY2012
five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 2. The FY2012 30-year (FY20122041) plan includes a total of 276 ships.8
6
Section 1023 of the FY2011 defense authorization act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011) amended the law
(10 U.S.C. 231) that had required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year. As amended by Section 1023,
10 U.S.C. 231 now requires DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that
DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Regarding the three years between each QDR, the joint
explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R. 6523 stated:
The committees expect that, following the submission of the President’s budget materials for a
fiscal year, the Secretary of the Navy, at the written request of one of the congressional defense
committees, will promptly deliver the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan used to develop the
President’s budget request for that fiscal year, as well as a certification from the Secretary of the
Navy that both the President’s budget request for that fiscal year and the budget for the future-years
defense program is sufficient to fund the construction schedule provided in that plan. The
committees expect that such a plan would include the quantity of each class of ship to be
constructed in that fiscal year and the nine following fiscal years.
7
The Navy’s cover letter for the plan is dated May 23, 2011. CRS received the plan on May 24, 2011. The Navy’s
cover letter states that the plan was submitted in response to a letter dated February 15, 2011, from Representative
Todd Akin, the chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee, requesting a 30-year plan.
8
The total of 276 ships includes a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship in FY2013. The Navy says that, as a result of
Congress funding two MLPs in FY2011, or one more than the Navy requested for FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to
request an MLP in FY2013. Subtracting this MLP from the plan would leave a total of 275 ships.
Congressional Research Service
6
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 3. Navy FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
CVN
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
1
1
1
1
1
1
LSC
SSC
SSN
1
4
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
SSBN
1
AWS
Supt
Total
1
2
10
1
1
4
2
3
1
3
3
2
2
13
11
12
9
12
10
12
8
9
9
11
8
8
7
7
8
10
8
8
9
10
7
9
8
11
9
8
7
8
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
CLF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
2
1
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2012-FY2041 that would result from
implementing the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Congressional Research Service
7
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
Goal in 313-ship plan
11
94
55
48
4
12
33
30
26
313
FY12
11
84
41
54
4
14
30
31
21
290
FY13
10
84
35
55
4
14
30
30
25
287
FY14
10
85
30
55
4
14
30
30
28
286
FY15
11
86
26
54
4
14
30
30
31
286
FY16
11
90
31
52
4
14
31
30
34
297
FY17
11
91
32
50
4
14
33
29
37
301
FY18
11
93
36
50
4
14
33
30
40
311
FY19
11
95
36
51
4
14
33
30
42
316
FY20
12
97
40
49
4
14
33
30
43
322
FY21
12
97
40
49
4
14
34
30
44
324
FY22
12
96
42
48
4
14
34
30
45
325
FY23
11
95
40
48
4
14
36
30
47
325
FY24
11
95
41
46
4
14
36
30
47
324
FY25
12
93
42
45
4
14
36
30
45
321
FY26
12
90
44
44
2
14
36
30
44
316
FY27
12
88
46
43
1
13
36
30
45
314
FY28
11
86
47
41
0
13
36
30
45
309
FY29
11
82
49
40
0
13
35
30
45
305
FY30
12
78
50
39
0
12
33
30
45
299
FY31
12
74
52
41
0
12
34
30
45
300
FY32
11
72
53
41
0
12
32
30
45
296
FY33
11
70
54
42
0
12
32
30
45
296
FY34
11
68
54
43
0
12
33
30
45
296
FY35
12
69
55
44
0
12
31
30
45
298
FY36
11
71
55
45
0
12
30
30
45
299
FY37
11
73
55
46
0
12
30
30
45
302
FY38
11
75
57
45
0
12
29
30
45
304
FY39
11
77
58
45
0
12
30
30
43
306
FY40
11
77
58
45
0
12
30
30
43
306
FY41
11
78
56
45
0
12
30
30
43
305
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011.
Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the
Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
Congressional Research Service
8
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and
Procurement Reductions
Press reports in September and October 2011 stated that the Navy, in response to anticipated
reductions in planned levels of defense spending, was examining options for maintaining a fleet
with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the
ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned ship
procurements.9 The Administration’s January 26, 2012, announcement of selected program
decisions for the FY2013 budget (see next section) suggests that at least some of these options
were scaled back or not implemented.
9
A September 1, 2011, press report stated that the Navy was considering the following options, among others:
•
reducing the Navy to a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240-ship fleet that includes 8
aircraft carriers (a fleet with 9 carriers is another option);
•
retiring (rather than performing a nuclear-refueling overhaul on) the aircraft carrier George Washington
(CVN-73), which would be one measure for reducing the size of the carrier force;
•
delaying the procurement of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) by two years, to FY2015 (an
option that was first reported in July 2011 );
•
eliminating six aircraft squadrons;
•
retiring at least some of the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers;
•
reducing the planned number of next-generation Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBN[X]s)
by two boats, from 12 to 10, and consequently delaying the procurement of the first SSBN(X), perhaps by
two years; and
•
maintaining funding for procurement of two Virginia-class submarines per year, and for Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).
(Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon,
September 1, 2011.)
An October 6, 2011, press report similarly stated that the Navy was examining the option of retiring the rather than
performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73). (Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S.
Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” DefenseNews.com, October 6, 2011.) Implementing this option
would reduce the Navy’s carrier force a few years from now from 11 ships to 10.
An October 14, 2011, press report stated that the Navy is considering retiring four Aegis cruisers in FY2013, another
five Aegis cruisers in FY2014, and three Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships in
FY2014. The report also mentioned the option of retiring rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft
carrier George Washington (CVN-73), the option of delaying the procurement of the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to
FY2015, and the option of shifting carrier procurement generally to seven-year intervals. (Carlo Munoz, “Navy Delays
Carrier, Cuts Cruisers, Amphibs In Draft Budget,” AOL Defense (http://defense.aol.com), October 14, 2011.) A blog
entry identified the four cruisers that would be retired in FY2013 as Normandy (CG-60), Anzio (CG-CG-68), Vicksburg
(CG-69), and Cape St. George (CG-71), the five cruisers that would be retired in FY2014 as Princeton (CG-59),
Cowpens (CG-63), Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), and the four amphibious ships that
would be retired in FY2014 as Whidbey Island (LSD-41), Fort McHenry (LSD-43), and Tortuga (LSD-46). (“ALT
POM Early Decommission Plans,” Information Dissemination (www.information diseemination.net), October 17,
2011.)
In a December 2011 journal article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy in
2025 “may be smaller than [it is] today as a result of fiscal constraints” and that “Budget limitations over the next 10 to
15 years may constrain the number of ships and aircraft the Navy can buy.” (Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward
Warfighters,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 19 and 22.)
Congressional Research Service
9
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions
On January 26, 2012, the Administration issued a 16-page document outlining selected program
decisions that will appear in the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) proposed FY2013 budget. The
document states the following in part:
The focus on the Asia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces
while sustaining ground force presence. The Middle East has been dominated by ground
force operations over the last decade; however, as we gradually transition security in
Afghanistan and reestablish peacetime ground force presence, this region will also become
increasingly maritime. Therefore we: ...
•
Maintained the aircraft carrier fleet at 11 ships and 10 [carrier] air wings
•
Maintained the big-deck amphibious fleet ... 10
•
Budgeted to forward station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and patrol craft in
Bahrain
•
Funded development of a new afloat forward staging base that can be dedicated to
support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as countermine operations
For these forces to remain capable, we had to invest in capabilities required to maintain our
military’s continued freedom of action in the face of new technologies designed to frustrate
access advantages. Consequently, we increased or protected investment in capabilities that
preserve the U.S. military’s ability to project power in contested areas and strike quickly
from over the horizon, including:...
•
Design changes to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class submarines11
•
Design of a conventional prompt strike option from submarines12
•
Upgraded radars for tactical aircraft and ships
To ensure sufficient resources to protect these strategic priorities, we will reduce the number
of ships by slowing the pace of building new ships and by accelerating the retirement of
some existing ships. These include:
•
Retiring 7 cruisers early – 6 did not have ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, and
the seventh with BMD capability is in need of costly hull repairs13
10
This is a reference to the Navy’s inventory of LHA- and LHD-type amphibious assault ships. These ships, which
resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers, are often referred to as big-deck or large-deck amphibious ships because their
flight decks are much larger than those of the Navy’s smaller (i.e., LPD- and LSD-type) amphibious ships.
11
This appears to be a reference to a plan to build future Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines to a lengthened
design that includes an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) containing four largediameter vertical launch tubes for firing cruise missiles and other payloads. For more on the VPM, see CRS Report
RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
12
This appears to refer to a new, fast-flying weapon that would be launched from submarines.
13
The Navy currently has 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers; retiring seven early would reduce the
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
10
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Slipping a large deck amphibious ship (LHA) by 1 year14
•
Slipping 1 new Virginia class submarine outside the FYDP [Five Year Defense Plan]
•
Reducing Littoral Combat Ships by 2 ships in the FYDP15
•
Reducing Joint High Speed Vessels by 8 in the FYDP16
•
Retiring 2 smaller amphibious ships (LSD) early and moving their replacement outside
the FYDP ... 17
This strategic precept puts a premium on self- and rapidly-deployable forces that can project
power and perform multiple mission types. This reinforces the need to maintain existing
numbers of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, and bombers. Furthermore, as the
Marine Corps withdraws from the ground in Afghanistan, it will return to afloat posture, with
the capability to rapidly respond to crises as they emerge. These choices are consistent with
our strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, but are applicable
anywhere on the globe where U.S. national security or vital interests are threatened....
Under the new strategic guidance, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent.... However, we will delay the new Ohio submarine replacement by two years
without undermining our partnership with the UK.18 While this delay will create challenges
in maintaining current at-sea presence requirements in the 2030s, we believe this risk can be
managed....
Because we will continue to be engaged in counter terrorism operations around the globe, we
protected key components of the force that are adept in executing this mission:...
•
Sea-based unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such
as Fire Scout – important ISR assets where ground basing is not available....19
Our ability to project power is a key component of our strategic guidance. We protected...
aircraft carriers, surface combatant modernization.... We also protected capabilities that
allow us to project power in denied environments. In addition to those discussed earlier, such
(...continued)
inventory of these ships to 15.
14
Under the FY2012 budget submission, the next LHA-type ship was to be procured in FY2016; the deferral would
thus appear to be FY2017.
15
This may be a deferral of the procurement of two LCSs, but not a reduction in the planned total LCS procurement of
55 ships.
16
This may reflect a reduction in the JHSV force-level goal from 21 ships to 10.
17
The Navy currently operates 12 LSD-type amphibious ships; retiring two early would reduce the inventory to 10.
The planned replacement for these LSDs is a new ship class called the LSD(X). The Navy had previously announced
that the first LSD(X) was to be procured in FY2017; the new announcement here suggests that the procurement date for
this ship has been deferred to a later year.
18
Under the FY2012 budget submission, the first Ohio Replacement ballistic missile submarine was to be procured in
FY2019; the announcement suggests that the procurement date for this ship has been deferred to FY2021. The United
States is cooperating with the UK on the design of a common missile compartment to be used on both the Ohio
Replacement boats and a new class of UK ballistic missile submarines.
19
The Fire Scout is an unmanned helicopter that can be operated from Navy ships.
Congressional Research Service
11
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
as... increasing the cruise missile capacity of future submarines, we protected anti-submarine
warfare and counter-mine capabilities....
In support of the strategic guidance’s tenet of reversibility, this budget plan sustains, where
possible, these segments of the industrial base.... For example, adding the afloat forward
staging base addresses urgent operational shortfalls and will help sustain the shipbuilding
industry in the near-term and mitigate the impact of reducing ship procurement in the
FYDP.20
Oversight Issues for Congress
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic
and Budgetary Circumstances9
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan and resulting projected force levels include the following:
•
Total of 268 ships; average of about 8.9 per year. The plan includes a total of
268 ships to be procured, compared to 276 ships in the FY2012 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. The total of 268 ships equates to an
average of about 8.9 ships per year, which is the approximate average
procurement rate (sometimes called the steady-state replacement rate) that would
be needed over the long run to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 310-316
ships, assuming an average life of 35 years for Navy ships.
•
Projected fleet remains below 310 ships. Although the FY2013 30-year plan
includes an average of about 8.9 ships per year, the FY2013 30-year plan, like
previous 30-year plans, results in a fleet that does not fully support all elements
of the Navy’s ship force structure goal. The distribution of the 268 ships over the
30-year period, combined with the ages of the Navy’s existing ships, results in a
projected fleet that would remain below 310 ships during the entire 30-year
period and experience shortfalls in ballistic missile submarines, cruisersdestroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships.
•
New projected shortfall in ballistic missile submarines. As a result of the
decision in the FY2013 budget to defer the scheduled procurement of the first
Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two years, from
FY2019 to FY2021, the ballistic missile submarine force is projected to drop to a
total of 10 or 11 boats—one or two boats below the 12-boat SSBN force-level
goal—during the period FY2029-FY2041.
•
Smaller projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines.
The cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls under the FY2013 30-year
plan are smaller than they were projected to be under the FY2012 30-year plan,
due in part to the reduction in the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal to about 90
ships (compared to the previous goal of 94 ships) and the insertion of additional
destroyers and attack submarines into the FY2013 30-year plan.
•
18 more destroyers and 2 more attack submarines in plan. The FY2013
30-year shipbuilding plan includes 70 destroyers and 46 attack submarines,
compared to 52 destroyers and 44 attack submarines in the FY2012 30-year
plan. Fifteen of the 18 additional destroyers in the FY2013 plan were added
during the final 20 years of the 30-year plan.
•
Cruiser-destroyer force now projected to bottom out at 78 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the cruiser-destroyer force is projected to bottom
out in FY2014-FY2015 and FY2034 at 78 ships—12 ships, or 13.3% less
than the goal of about 90 ships. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the cruiserdestroyer force was projected to bottom out in FY2034 at 68 ships—26 ships,
27.7% less than the goal under that plan of 94 ships.
•
Attack submarine force now projected to bottom out at 43 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the attack submarine force is projected to bottom
out in FY2028-FY2030 at 43 ships—5 ships, or 10.4% less than the goal of
about 48 boats. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the attack submarine force
was projected to bottom out in FY2030 at 39 boats—9 boats, or 18.8% less
than the goal of 48 boats.
Congressional Research Service
10
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Shortfall in amphibious ships. The Navy projects that there will be a shortfall
of one to four amphibious ships (i.e., 3.1% to 12.5% of the goal of about 32
ships) during the first nine years (FY2013-FY2021) of the 30-year period.
Oversight Issues for Congress
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and
Budgetary Changes
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the planned size and structure of the Navy.
Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the appropriate
future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the Navy.
Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the
growth of China’s military capabilities.217 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on
reductions reductions
in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011
(S. 365/P.L.
112-25 of August 2, 2011).
On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a
stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region.228 Since the Asia-Pacific region is to a significant degree
a maritime and aerospace theater for the United States, this shift in strategic focus is expected by
many observers to result in a shift in the allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air
Force.
As mentioned earlier (see “January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment” in
“Background”), on January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure
assessment, to be completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for
the Navy.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 5 shows
some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy’s 313-ship
goal of September 2011.
20
Department of Defense, Defense Budget: Priorities and Choices, January 2012, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13.
The Navy’s current goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships reflects a number of assumptions and
planning factors, including but not limited to the following:
•
current and projected Navy missions in support of U.S. military strategy,
including both wartime operations and day-to-day forward-deployed operations;
•
current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries, including their antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities;
•
regional combatant commander (COCOM) requests for Navy forces;
•
the individual and networked capabilities of current and future Navy ships and
aircraft;
•
basing arrangements for Navy ships, including numbers and locations of ships
homeported in foreign countries;
7
For more on the growth in China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required
U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
228
Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine
Dale and Pat Towell.
21
Congressional Research Service
1211
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
In assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, Congress may consider
various factors, such as potential future defense spending levels, U.S. interests and potential
threats to those interests, the value of naval forces in defending those interests, and the relative
cost-effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.23•
maintenance and deployment cycles for Navy ships; and
•
fiscal constraints.
With regard to the third point above, Navy officials have testified at least three times this year that
a Navy of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet COCOM requests for Navy forces
(see Appendix A). The difference between a fleet of more than 500 ships and the current goal for
a fleet of about 310-316 ships can be viewed as one measure of the operational risk associated
with the goal of a fleet of about 310-316 ships. A goal for a fleet of more than 500 ships might be
viewed as a fiscally unconstrained goal.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 5 shows
some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy’s 310-316
ship goal of March 2012.
Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure
Sustainable
Defense
Task Force
(June 2010)
Center for a
New
American
Security
(CNAS)
(November
2008)
Center for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b
Navy’s 313ship goal of
September
2011310316 ship
goal of
March 2012
Heritage
Foundation
(April
2011)
Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a
Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)
SSBN
12-14
14c
6
14
7
14
12
SSGN
0-4
4
0
4
4
0
2
SSN
~48
55
40
55
37
40
41
CVN
11
11
8
11
9
8
11
CVE
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
94~90
88
22
n/a
18
14
65
n/a
56
73
14
n/a
0
0
9e
4
n/a
25
48
55
0
n/a
0
40
0f
Ship type
Submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Cruiser
Destroyer
Frigate
0
LCS
0
Frigate
LCS
~55
SSC
0
28d
0
85
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious ships
33~32
37
23
n/a
27
36
33
MPF(F) ships
0
0
0
n/a
n/a
0
3g
LSD station ships
0
0
0
n/a
n/a
n/a
7h
0
0
0
36
40
230
300Amphibious ships
Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW
0
14
11
0
CLF ships
30~29
33
21
n/a
Support ships
26
25
27
n/a
313
309
241
346
TOTAL battle
force ships
31
31
326i
23
Another possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to compare them to
historical figures for total Navy fleet size. As discussed in Appendix A, however, historical figures for total fleet size
might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the
Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
Congressional Research Service
13
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress~33
25
27
n/a
MIW
Congressional Research Service
31
31
12
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Ship type
TOTAL battle
force ships
Navy’s 310316 ship
goal of
March 2012
Heritage
Foundation
(April
2011)
Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a
Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)
~310-316
309
241
346
Sustainable
Defense
Task Force
(June 2010)
Center for a
New
American
Security
(CNAS)
(November
2008)
Center for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b
230
300
326i
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National
Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 2526. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,
Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional
information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel
Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and
Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS:
Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington,
Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US
Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2008. p. 81 (Figure 5).
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a.
Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.
b.
Figures shown are for the year 2028.
c.
The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20
SLBM tubes.
d.
The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface
combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—as a way of collectively
referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS
report are separate from and smaller than the LCS.
e.
Maritime Security Frigates.
f.
Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.
g.
Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
h.
T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.
i.
The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 313-310-316 ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.
Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective
Sufficiency of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2012 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough
ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship goal over the long run:
Congressional Research Service
14
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
The Navy projects that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented,
the fleet would grow from 290 ships in FY2012 to a peak of 325 ships in
FY2022-FY2023, decline to 296 ships in FY2032-FY2034, and then increase
back to 305 ships by FY2041.
•
The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level
of 94 ships in 2025, reaches a minimum of 68 ships in FY2034, and remains
below 94 ships through FY2041. The projected number of attack submarines
drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2024, reaches a minimum of 39
boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through 2041.
•
There would also be shortfalls in certain years in small surface combatants (i.e.,
frigates and LCSs) and amphibious ships.
The projected shortfalls in cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other ships could make
it difficult or impossible for the Navy to fully perform its projected missions, particularly during
the latter years of the 30-year plan. In light of the projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and
attack submarines, policymakers may wish to consider two options:
•
increasing planned procurement rates of destroyers and attack submarines,
perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement, and
•
extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling
older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40 or more years.
Regarding the second option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the
first 28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688)
attack Congressional Research Service
13
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
A potential key question for Congress concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be
large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world. Some
observers are concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budgetdriven reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence
and demoralize U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby make it harder for the United
States to defend its interests in the region.9 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
•
Under the Administration’s plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime antiaccess forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S.
policymakers around the world?
•
What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?
•
Are the proposed early retirements of nine Aegis cruisers and the placing of two
LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships into Reduced Operating Status (ROS)
consistent with the stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region in DOD’s new
strategic guidance? What are the potential operational implications of these early
retirements? What steps, if any are being taken to preserve a potential for
reactivating these nine ships, should circumstances warrant their reactivation?
•
If the Navy is reduced in size and priority is given to maintaining Navy forces in
the Pacific, what will be the impact on Navy force levels in other parts of the
world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea,
and consequently on the Navy’s ability to adequately perform its missions in
those parts of the world?
•
To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship
numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., “Sea Swap”)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?
•
Particularly in a situation of constrained DOD resources, if enough funding is
allocated to the Navy to permit the Navy in coming years to maintain a fleet of
about 310-316 ships including 11 aircraft carriers, how much would other DOD
programs need to be reduced, and what would be the operational implications of
those program reductions in terms of DOD’s overall ability to counter improved
Chinese military forces and perform other missions?10
9
See, for example, Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com),
October 26, 2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean
Cheng, Sea Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576,
July 11, 2011, p. 10.
10
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
14
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Sufficiency of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2013 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As discussed earlier (see “Navy’s Projected Force Levels
Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan”), the plan does not include enough ships to
fully support all elements of the 310-316 ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the
fleet would remain below 310 ships during the entire 30-year period and experience shortfalls at
various points in ballistic missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships.
Although the projected cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls are smaller under the
FY2013 30-year plan than they were under the FY2012 30-year plan, the shortfalls in ballistic
missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships projected under
the FY2013 30-year plan could make it difficult for the Navy to fully perform its projected
missions in certain years. In light of these projected shortfalls, policymakers may wish to consider
various options, including but not limited to the following:
•
keeping in active service some or all of the seven Aegis cruisers that the Navy’s
FY2013 budget proposes for early retirement, and/or the two LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships that the Navy’s FY2013 budget proposes shifting to Reduced
Operating Status (ROS);
•
increasing planned procurement quantities of destroyers and attack submarines,
perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement; and
•
extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling a
small number of older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40
or more years.
The Navy estimates that keeping in service the seven Aegis cruisers proposed for early retirement
would cost a total of a little more than $4 billion over the period FY2013-FY2017. This figure
includes costs for conducting maintenance and modernization work on the ships during those
years, for operating the ships during those years (including crew costs), and for procuring,
crewing, and operating during those years helicopters that would be embarked on the ships.11
Regarding the third option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the first
28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack
submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines.
Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear.
Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine
pressure hull life.
Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their
maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the
ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life
extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently
programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently
planned service lives.
Affordability of FY201211
Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Vice Admiral William Burke, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet
Readiness and Logistics, before the Readiness subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22,
2012.
Congressional Research Service
15
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently
planned service lives.
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship service lives. The Navy in past years has, for various reasons,
retired numerous ships, including surface combatants and attack submarines, well before the ends
of their expected service lives. Many of these retirements were due the decision to reduce the size
of the Navy following the end of the Cold War. Other instances were due to the material condition
of the ships or the projected costs of keeping them mission-effective through the ends of their
service lives. If ship service lives in some cases turn out to be shorter than assumed under the 30year plan, than Navy ship force levels will be smaller in certain years than shown in Table 4.
Affordability of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the
FY2012FY2013 30-year (FY2012-FY2041FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan. In assessing this issue, a key factor to
consider is the estimated cost to implement the plan. In recent years, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has estimated that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to
implement than the Navy has estimated, and this is again the case for the Navy’s FY2012 30-year
shipbuilding plan. A June 2011 CBO report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year
in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s
estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10%
Congressional Research Service
15
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than
the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.24 Some of the difference between CBO’s
estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference
between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes
the Navy and CBO estimates of the FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the June
2011 CBO report.
the prospective affordability
of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, key factors that Congress may consider include
estimated ship procurement costs and future shipbuilding funding levels.
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship procurement costs. If one or more Navy ship designs turn out to
be more expensive to build than the Navy estimates, then the projected funding levels shown in
the 30-year shipbuilding plan will not be sufficient to procure all the ships shown in the plan.
Ship designs that can be viewed as posing a risk of being more expensive to build than the Navy
estimates include Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers (a program currently
experiencing cost growth), Ohio-replacement (SSBNX) class ballistic missile submarines, the
Flight III version of the DDG-51 destroyer, and the LSD(X) amphibious ship.
In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that certain Navy ships
would be more expensive to procure than the Navy estimates, and consequently that the Navy’s
30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated. CBO is
currently preparing its estimate of the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan. In its June
2011 report on the cost of the FY2012 30-year plan, CBO estimated that the plan would cost an
average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more
than the Navy estimated. CBO’s estimate was about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the
first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of
the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.12 Some
of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years
of the plan, was due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy
shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of the FY2012 30-year
shipbuilding plan, as presented in the June 2011 CBO report.
12
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2
(page 9).
Congressional Research Service
16
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2011 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2012-FY2021)
Next 10 years
(FY2022-2031)
Final 10 years
(FY2032-FY2041)
Entire 30 years
(FY2012-FY2041)
Navy estimate
14.6
17.2
14.7
15.5
CBO estimate
15.7
19.0
19.2
18.0
% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates
7%
10%
31%
16%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table
2 (Page 9).
The June 2011 CBO report also estimates the cost of a revised 30-year shipbuilding plan created
by CBO that would fully meet the various force-level goals in the apparent 328-ship force-level
objective of mid-2011. Compared to the Navy’s FY2012 30-year plan, this revised 30-year plan
would include 24 additional destroyers, 5 additional attack submarines, and 2 additional largedeck (i.e., LHA-type) amphibious assault ships. CBO estimated the cost of implementing this
revised plan at an average of $19.7 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars, including an
average of $19.1 billion per year for the first 10 years of the plan, an average of $21.3 billion per
year for the second 10 years of the plan, and an average of $18.6 billion per year for the final 10
years of the plan.25
As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding
plan with a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year, within available resources in part
because almost half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few
years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the
shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic
missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a
considerably more expensive proposition.
The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and is working to reduce the estimated unit
procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.26 To
help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding
24
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2
(page 9).
25
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2
(page 9).
26
For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
Congressional Research Service
16
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
funding profile in the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan included a “hump” of
approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the years (FY2019-FY2033)
when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the FY2011 30-year plan,
however, contained little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in shipbuilding
funding would be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no real growth in
coming years. If the $2-billion-per-year hump were not realized, the total number of ships of
various kinds procured in FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the FY2011
30-year plan. If so, the shortfalls projected for cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and
other categories of ships could be larger than those shown in Table 4.
Legislative Activity for FY2012
FY2012 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class
attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one
LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime
prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are funded through
the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, except for the MLP, which is funded
through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81)
House (Committee Report)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R.
1540, recommends approving, with two exceptions, the Navy’s requests for FY2012 procurement
and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF accounts for construction of new battle
force ships. (See pages 345-346 and 460 of the report.)
One exception concerns LHA-7, an amphibious assault ship that was authorized in FY2011 but is
being partially funded in FY2012. The committee’s report recommends a net reduction of $50
million from the amount requested for LHA-7 for FY2012. The recommended net reduction of
$50 million includes a $200 million reduction for “contract delay” and a $150 million increase for
“program increase.” Section 1604 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee provides for the
recommended $150 million increase. Section 121 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee
would permit the final increment of procurement funding for LHA-7 to be provided in FY2013.
Regarding LHA-7, the committee’s report states:
The delivery of the first ship of the America-class, LHA-6, has been significantly delayed.
According to the Department of Defense “Selected Acquisition Report” of December 31,
2010, the delays are “due to changing conditions in the shipyard portfolio which are driving
labor demands in various trades”. These delays have had a cascading effect on LHA-7,
which was scheduled to go on contract for detail design and construction in November 2010,
but now the Navy estimates the contract will be delayed until the end of fiscal year 2011.
Elsewhere in this title, the committee includes a provision that would authorize the Navy to
conclude funding for LHA-7 in fiscal year 2013. (page 33)
Congressional Research Service
17
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The second exception is that the committee’s report recommends an undistributed increase of
$150 million in the SCN account for advance procurement and economic order quantity (EOQ)
funding, and an offsetting undistributed reduction of $150 million in the SCN account for
“program decrease.”
The committee’s report also states:
The committee is pleased that the Navy has turned around the downward spiral in battle
force ship quantities, and the plan to achieve the floor of 313 ships appears to be achievable.
To obtain the required capability and to provide the required stability to the fragile
shipbuilding industrial base, the committee believes the following programs are crucial.
(page 33)
The report at this points goes on to discuss the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program, the Virginia class
attack submarine program, the Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program,
the DDG-51 destroyer program, and amphibious ships.
Section 1021 of H.R. 1540 as reported states:
SEC. 1021. BUDGETING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Plan- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification
`(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan and Certification- The Secretary of Defense
shall include with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year—
`(1) a plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy developed in
accordance with this section; and
`(2) a certification by the Secretary that both the budget for that fiscal year and the futureyears defense program submitted to Congress in relation to such budget under section 221 of
this title provide for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is sufficient
for the procurement of the vessels provided for in the plan under paragraph (1) on the
schedule provided in that plan.
`(b) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- (1) The annual naval vessel construction plan
developed for a fiscal year for purposes of subsection (a)(1) should be designed so that the
naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the national security
strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of
the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a),
except that, if at the time such plan is submitted with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year, a national security strategy report required under such section 108 has not been
submitted to Congress as required by paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), if applicable, of
subsection (a) of such section, then such annual plan should be designed so that the naval
vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the ship force structure
recommended in the report of the most recent quadrennial defense review.
`(2) Each such naval vessel construction plan shall include the following:
`(A) A detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy
over the next 30 fiscal years.
Congressional Research Service
18
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
`(B) A description of the necessary naval vessel force structure to meet the requirements of
the national security strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense
review, whichever is applicable under paragraph (1).
`(C) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the program, together with
a discussion of the procurement strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funding
are based.
`(c) Assessment When Vessel Construction Budget Is Insufficient to Meet Applicable
Requirements- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of
naval vessels at a level that is not sufficient to sustain the naval vessel force structure
specified in the naval vessel construction plan for that fiscal year under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment
that describes and discusses the risks associated with the reduced force structure of naval
vessels that will result from funding naval vessel construction at such level. Such assessment
shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the combatant commands.
`(d) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a)(1), the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the
sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to
the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(e) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification’.
Regarding Section 1021, the committee’s report states:
This section would repeal an amendment made by section 1023 of the Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383). This section would
require that a 30-year shipbuilding plan be delivered to Congress periodically. The section
that would be repealed changed the periodicity from an annual requirement to once every 4
years to be delivered with the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The committee believes that returning to an annual submittal of the plan would promote
stability and continuity in the planning process, both in the plan itself, and in the
shipbuilding industrial base. One aspect of the section that would be retained is the
requirement that the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, within 60 days of
Congressional Research Service
19
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
submittal of the plan, provide an assessment of the sufficiency of funds to execute the plan in
the budget year and Future Years Defense Program to the congressional defense committees.
(page 208)
Section 1094 of H.R. 1540 as reported states:
SEC. 1094. NUMBER OF NAVY CARRIER AIR WINGS AND CARRIER AIR WING
HEADQUARTERS.
The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Navy maintains—
(1) a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and
(2) for each such carrier air wing, a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
House (Floor Consideration)
On May 26, 2011, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1540, the House rejected, 176-241,
H.Amdt. 335, which would have deleted Section 1604, which provides for $150 million in
procurement funding for LHA-7 (see “House (Committee Report)” above).
Senate (S. 1867)
S. 1867, an original measure reported by Senator Levin on November 15, 2011, without written
report, in effect supersedes S. 1253 (see below). S. 1867 recommends approving the Navy’s
requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF
accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See Sections 4101 and 4401 of the bill as
reported by Senator Levin. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant tables within these two
sections appear on pages 611 and 662.)
Section 1021 of S. 1867 states:
SEC. 1021. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
Congressional Research Service
20
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Section 1022 of S. 1867 states:
SEC. 1022. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Senate (S. 1253)
S. 1253 has been, in effect, superseded by S. 1867 (see above). S. 1253 as reported by the Senate
Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommends approving the Navy’s
requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF
accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See Sections 4101 and 4401 of the bill as
reported by the committee. In the printed version of the bill as reported by the committee, the
relevant tables within these two sections appear on pages 606 and 647.)
Section 1021 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1021. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:
Congressional Research Service
21
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Limitation on availability of funds for placing Maritime Prepositioning Ships
squadrons on reduced operating status (sec. 1021)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funding to place a maritime
prepositioning ship squadron (MPSRON), or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until: the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) submits a report to Congress
assessing the impact on military readiness for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating
status; the Chief of Naval Operations describes the Navy’s plan and comments on the CMC’s
report for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating status; and the Secretary of Defense
certifies to Congress that the risks to readiness of placing such MPSRON on reduced
operating status are acceptable. (Page 175)
Section 1022 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1022. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:
Modification of conditions on status of retired aircraft carrier ex-John F. Kennedy (sec.
1022)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1011 of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364) to allow the
Navy to dispose of the ex-John F. Kennedy. The provision would amend section 1011 to
remove the requirement that the Navy ensure the ship is maintained in a status that would
permit the Navy to return the ship to active service in event of a national emergency. (Page
176)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of
December 31, 2011 recommends approving the procurement of all the ships requested by the
Navy for FY2012, but recommends reductions to the specific amounts the Navy had requested for
some of the ships (see pages 811-812 for the ships funded through the SCN account, and page
941 for the MLP ship funded through the NDSF).
Section 1011 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1011. BUDGETING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Plan- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification
`(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan and Certification- The Secretary of Defense
shall include with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year—
Congressional Research Service
22
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
`(1) a plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy developed in
accordance with this section; and
`(2) a certification by the Secretary that both the budget for that fiscal year and the futureyears defense program submitted to Congress in relation to such budget under section 221 of
this title provide for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is sufficient
for the procurement of the vessels provided for in the plan under paragraph (1) on the
schedule provided in that plan.
`(b) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- (1) The annual naval vessel construction plan
developed for a fiscal year for purposes of subsection (a)(1) should be designed so that the
naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the national security
strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of
the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a),
except that, if at the time such plan is submitted with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year, a national security strategy report required under such section 108 has not been
submitted to Congress as required by paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), if applicable, of
subsection (a) of such section, then such annual plan should be designed so that the naval
vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the ship force structure
recommended in the report of the most recent quadrennial defense review.
`(2) Each such naval vessel construction plan shall include the following:
`(A) A detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy
over the next 30 fiscal years.
`(B) A description of the necessary naval vessel force structure to meet the requirements of
the national security strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense
review, whichever is applicable under paragraph (1).
`(C) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the program, together with
a discussion of the procurement strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funding
are based.
`(c) Assessment When Vessel Construction Budget Is Insufficient to Meet Applicable
Requirements- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of
naval vessels at a level that is not sufficient to sustain the naval vessel force structure
specified in the naval vessel construction plan for that fiscal year under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment
that describes and discusses the risks associated with the reduced force structure of naval
vessels that will result from funding naval vessel construction at such level. Such assessment
shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the combatant commands.
`(d) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a)(1), the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the
sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to
the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(e) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
Congressional Research Service
23
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification’.
Section 1013 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1013. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Section 1016 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1016. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Section 1093 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1093. NUMBER OF NAVY CARRIER AIR WINGS AND CARRIER AIR WING
HEADQUARTERS.
Congressional Research Service
24
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Navy maintains—
(1) a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and
(2) for each such carrier air wing, a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)
Conference
In final action, H.R. 2055 became a “megabus” appropriations vehicle incorporating nine
appropriations bills, including the FY2012 DOD appropriations bill, which was incorporated as
Division A. The conference report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L.
112-74 of December 23, 2011, approves the procurement of all the ships requested by the Navy
for FY2012, but reduces the specific amounts the Navy had requested for some of the ships (see
pages 628-629 for the ships funded through the SCN account, and page 734 for the MLP ship
funded through the NDSF).
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-110 of June 16, 2011) on H.R.
2219, supports the procurement of the new-construction ships requested by the Navy for FY2012,
but recommends reductions to the Navy’s requested funding amounts for some of the ships.
(Pages 153-154 and, for the MLP program, page 255). As detailed on page 276 of the report,
Section 8040 of the bill as reported would rescind, among other funds, $110.351 million in
FY2011 advance procurement funding for the LCS program. Section 8072 of the bill as reported
details the use of $73.992 million in funding provided on page 153 of the committee’s report for
the completion of prior-year shipbuilding programs. The report also states:
SHIPBUILDING OVERSIGHT
The Committee understands that a number of issues related to quality have recently been
identified on Navy ships. Most recently, a failed weld joint caused structural damage to a
mast mounted antenna on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Incorrect installation of key
subsystems on several Virginia-class submarines required corrections to avoid jeopardizing
the mission performance of the submarines. Faulty welds were identified on a number of
ship classes, including at least four aircraft carriers. Additionally, several issues have arisen
regarding the LPD–17 class of amphibious transport dock ships. These issues were severe
enough to cause the USS San Antonio to miss a scheduled deployment.
The Committee directs the Comptroller General to review the Navy’s process for quality
assurance in shipbuilding. This review should identify the extent to which quality assurance
processes identified known quality problems, including an examination of what analyses the
Navy has performed and what actions have been taken to address identified problems. The
review should also examine the extent to which the American Bureau of Shipbuilding plays a
role in quality assurance in Navy shipbuilding and how this role complements or duplicates
Congressional Research Service
25
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
reviews conducted by Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Conversion personnel. As part
of this analysis, a comparison should be made between the Navy, commercial shipbuilders,
and commercial ship buyers’ approaches to quality assurance. The results of this review
should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after
enactment of this Act. (Page 155)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-77 of September 15, 2011) on
H.R. 2219, recommends fully funding all of the Navy ships requested for procurement in the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account (page 120), but recommends denying the
request for $425.9 million in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) for the procurement of a
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (page 221). Regarding the MLP, the committee’s report
states:
Mobile Landing Platform [MLP].—The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes
$425,865,000 to procure one Mobile Landing Platform [MLP]. The Navy has a requirement
for three MLPs, and the Committee notes that in its previous budget submission, the Navy
proposed procuring the three MLPs over the course of 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2011.
The fiscal year 2012 budget submission proposes to condense this acquisition to 3 years,
concluding in fiscal year 2013. However, the Committee notes that the fiscal year 2012
budget submission does not take into account that Congress adjusted the MLP acquisition
profile in the Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations Act by accelerating
the planned schedule by 2 years and procuring two MLPs in fiscal year 2011 instead of one.
The Committee notes that this acceleration, coupled with procuring an additional MLP in
fiscal year 2013, as the Navy has planned for the last two budget cycles, concludes the
program’s acquisition in 3 years, as the Navy proposes in its fiscal year 2012 budget
submission. The Committee believes that a further acceleration of the MLP acquisition
schedule is unwarranted and high-risk and does not allow for sufficient learning to occur, nor
cost efficiencies to be absorbed prior to initiating construction of the third and final ship of
the class. The Committee notes that Navy has already procured long lead materials for the
third ship to avoid shipyard production breaks prior to award of the fiscal year 2013 MLP.
Therefore, the Committee recommends denying the proposed additional acceleration of the
program and recommends that the Navy retain its original plan of procuring a MLP in fiscal
year 2013. (Pages 221-222)
The committee’s report also states:
Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] Capable Ships.—The Committee notes that the Navy has
established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large
surface combatants (including ballistic missile defense [BMD] capability), but the Navy’s
fiscal year 2012 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the Navy will achieve the 94-ship
goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, with force levels declining thereafter.
Specifically, the Navy projects that it will have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024
before declining to 65 in 2034. The Committee is concerned about this projected shortfall
and believes that the Navy should begin to review and consider options to close this gap. The
Navy has indicated that it intends to pursue a multiyear procurement contract for DDG–51
vessels in fiscal year 2013 that could result in significant cost savings. Historic production
rates of three DDG–51s per fiscal year reflected substantial unit cost savings in the past and
would likely be realized by procuring DDG–51 ships at a more economical procurement rate
than currently planned. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report,
at the same time as the President submits the budget request for fiscal year 2013, which
provides options for closing this gap. (Page 121)
Congressional Research Service
26
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Conference
For the conference version of the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act, see the above discussion of
H.R. 2055.
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and
modernization programs, see the following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
27
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess
Proposed Force Levels
One possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to
compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size,
however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the
future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few
years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,27 and as of October 13, 2011, had declined to a total of 284 battle force ships. The
FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on
countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while the October 2011 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission
requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based
military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese
military forces and non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed
substantially from the October 2011 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided airdelivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.28
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 284-ship fleet of October 2011 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
27
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
28
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Congressional Research Service
28Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about future shipbuilding funding levels. It has been known for some time
that funding requirements for the Ohio-replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine
program will put considerable pressure on the shipbuilding budget during the middle years of the
30-year plan. Although the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan reduces procurement of other types
of ships in the middle years of the plan to help accommodate the SSBN(X) program, the Navy
still projects that the shipbuilding budget would need to be substantially higher during the middle
10 years of the plan than during the first or last 10 years of the plan. The Navy estimates that, in
constant FY2012 dollars, implementing the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an
average of $15.1 billion per year during the first 10 years of the plan, $19.5 billion per year
during the middle 10 years of the plan, and $15.9 billion per year during the final 10 years of the
plan. The figure of $19.5 billion per year for the middle 10 years of the plan is about 26% higher
than the average of $15.5 billion per year for the first and last 10 years of the plan.
If the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle 10 years of the 30-year plan is not
achieved, numerous ships shown for procurement during the middle 10 years of the plan might
not be procured. A potential oversight question for Congress is whether the Navy has received a
commitment or assurance of some kind from DOD leaders that the Navy will be able to budget
for the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan without
reducing funding for other Navy program priorities.
Near-Term Options for Adding Ships and Reducing Ship Unit
Procurement Costs
Congressional review to date of the Navy’s FY2013 5-year and 30-year shipbuilding plans have
included, among other things, discussion of near-term options for adding ships to the plan and
reducing ship unit procurement costs. These options include the following:
•
adding a second Virginia-class attack submarine to FY2014 and, as a
consequence, increasing to 10 the number of Virginia-class submarines procured
under the proposed FY2014-FY2018 multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement
for the Virginia-class program;
Congressional Research Service
17
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
adding a 10th DDG-51 destroyer to the proposed FY2013-FY2017 MYP
arrangement for the DDG-51 program; and
•
procuring the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80 under a block buy
arrangement.
The first two options could mitigate operational risks associated with the projected cruiserdestroyer and attack submarine shortfalls. The third option could reduce the cost of implementing
the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Adding a Second Virginia Class Boat in FY2014—10 Boats in MYP
Navy officials have testified this year that the second Virginia-class boat that had been
programmed for FY2014 was deferred to FY2018 in the FY2013 budget submission because
FY2014 has become a tight budget year for the Navy, and that the Navy is interested in finding a
way, if possible, to restore the procurement of a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014.13
The question of whether to procure a second boat in FY2014 is an issue for FY2013 because
procuring a second boat in FY2014 could involve adding advance procurement funding for that
boat in FY2013. The Navy has testified that procuring a second boat in FY2014 could require
about $777 million in advance procurement funding in FY2013 (and a balance of more than $1.2
billion in FY2014).14 Providing advance procurement funding for the boat in FY2013 would
permit the boat to be constructed on a schedule that is more-or-less consistent with what one
might expect for a boat procured in FY2014.
Adding advance procurement funding in FY2013, however, is not absolutely required to procure
a second boat in FY2014—the boat can be procured in FY2014 without any advance procurement
funding in FY2013. Doing so might result in the boat being built on a schedule closer to what one
might expect for a boat procured in FY2015, but the boat would still enter service years earlier
than it would if it is procured in FY2018.
Finding a way to procure a second Virginia-class boat in FY2014 could involve the use of
incremental funding (as opposed to full funding) in the Virginia-class program, at least for the
second boat in FY2014, if not also for one or more other Virginia-class boats. Incrementally
funding a second boat in FY2014 would involve providing some of the boat’s procurement cost in
FY2014 and deferring the remainder to one or more subsequent years.
Incremental funding is normally used only for procuring aircraft carriers and LHD/LHA-type
amphibious assault ships,15 but there have been rare cases when individual ships of other types
have, for various reasons, been procured with incremental funding. Examples include the third
13
See, for example, the spoken testimony of Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to the House Armed Services
Committee on February 16, 2012.
14
Source: Spoken testimony of Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, at an April 19, 2012, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, as reflected in the transcript of the hearing.
15
Incremental funding is allowed for procuring aircraft carriers and LHD/LHA-type amphibious assault ships because
using full funding to procure these ships—which are very expensive and which are procured once every several
years—can cause a one-year “spike” in Navy shipbuilding funding requirements that can be disruptive to other
acquisition programs.
Congressional Research Service
18
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
and final Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarine, whose procurement was reinstated in
FY1996, and each of the three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers that were procured in
FY2007-FY2009.16 It can also be noted that ships procured through the National Defense Sealift
Fund (NDSF)—including DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships—in practice are frequently
acquired with incremental funding, even though they are nominally funded by Congress with full
funding.17
The Navy estimates that adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the
number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement would reduce by roughly $700 million the
total cost of the other 9 boats in the arrangement.18 The reduction in cost would come from
maintaining a smooth, two-per-year production rate at the GD/EB and NNS, from increased
spreading of fixed overhead costs at the shipyards, and from reduced costs for components
procured from suppliers in batches of 10 rather than batches of 9. Since the figure of roughly
$700 million is roughly equivalent to one-quarter the cost of a Virginia-class submarine, the
Navy, in effect, is estimating that adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing
to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement would be roughly 25% selffinancing.
Adding a 10th DDG-51 to the DDG-51 MYP
Regarding the possibility of adding a 10th DDG-51 to the proposed FY2013-FY2017 MYP
arrangement for the DDG-51 program, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive), stated the
following at a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and
Projection Forces subcommittee, in response to a question about the FY2013 budget’s deferral to
FY2016 of a second DDG-51 that was previously programmed for FY2014:
I’d like to address the question regarding the second destroyer in 2014. A couple of
important facts: First, the—we restarted DDG-51 construction in—in [FY]2010 and we’ve
got four ships under contract, and a result of the four ships that we’ve placed under contract
is we have prior year savings in this program that are—work in our favor when we consider
future procurement for the [DDG-]51s.
We also have a unique situation where we’ve got competition on this program—two builders
building the 51s, and the competition has been healthy with both builders. We also have a
very significant cost associated with government-furnished equipment, so not only did we
restart construction at the shipyards, we also restarted manufacturing lines at our weapon
systems providers.
So in this process we were able to restart 51s virtually without skipping a beat, and we’re
seeing the continued learning curve that we left off on back with the [FY]2005 procurement.
16
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year incremental
funding) in FY2007-FY2008. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009 and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010.
17
DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships can be acquired this way because the full funding provision does not
apply to ships procured through the NDSF the same way that it applies to ships funded through the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account. For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement:
Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and
CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
18
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), March 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
19
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
So when we march into this third multiyear for the 51s we’re looking to capitalize on the
same types of savings that we saw prior, and our top line, again, allowed for nine ships to be
budgeted, but when we go out with this procurement we’re going to go out with a
procurement that enables the procurement of 10 ships, where that 10th ship would be the
second—potentially the second ship in [FY]2014 if we’re able to achieve the savings that
we’re targeting across this multiyear between the shipbuilders in competition as well as the
combat systems providers as well as all of the other support and engineering associated with
this program.
So we want to leverage the strong learning, we want to leverage the strong industrial base,
we want to leverage the competition to get to what we need in terms of both affordability and
force structure, and I think we have a pretty good shot at it.19
Block Buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80
The Navy currently plans to procure the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80 separately, as oneship procurements. Procuring the two ships together in a block buy could reduce their combined
procurement cost. Procuring two aircraft carriers together in a two-ship block buy has been done
on two previous occasions. The Navy procured two Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft carriers
(CVN-72 and CVN-73) together in a block buy in FY1983, and procured another two Nimitzclass aircraft carriers (CVN-74 and CVN-75) together in a block buy in FY1988. The Navy
proposed these block buys in the FY1983 and FY1988 budget submissions.20
When the FY1983 block buy was proposed, the Navy estimated that the block buy would reduce
the combined cost CVN-72 and CVN-73 by 5.6% in real terms.21 When the FY1988 block buy
was proposed, the Navy estimated that the block buy would reduce the combined cost of CVN-74
and CVN-75 by a considerably larger percentage. GAO testified that the savings would be
considerably less than the Navy estimated, but agreed that a two-ship acquisition strategy is less
expensive than a single-ship acquisition strategy, and that some savings would occur in a twoship strategy for CVN-74 and CVN-75.22
19
Source: Transcript of hearing. See also Megan Eckstein, “Navy Looking Into Feasibility Of Procuring 10th DDG In
Multiyear Contract,” Inside the Navy, April 2, 2012.
20
It can also be noted that the Air Force is procuring two Advanced EHF (AEHF) satellites under a two-satellite block
buy that the Air Force proposed and Congress approved in FY2012.
21
See General Accounting Office, Request to Fully Fund Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in Fiscal Year 1983,
MASAD-82-87 (B-206847), March 26, 1982, 10 pp. The figure of 5.6 was derived by dividing $450 million in noninflation cost avoidance shown on page 5 by the combined estimated cost of the two ships (absent a block buy) of
$8,024 million shown on page 4.
22
See General Accounting Office, Procurement Strategy For Acquiring Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers, Statement of
Frank Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the
Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense Subcommittee and Projection Forces and Regional Defense Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 1987, T-NSIAD-87-28, 5 pp. The testimony states on page 2 that “A
single ship acquisition strategy is more expensive because materials are bought separately for each ship rather than
being combined into economic order quantity buys under a multi-ship procurement.” The testimony discounted the
Navy’s estimated savings of $1,100 million based on this effect on the grounds that if CVN-74 and CVN-75 were not
procured in the proposed two-ship block buy, with CVN-74 procured in FY1990 and CVN-75 procured FY1993, it was
likely that CVN-74 and CVN-75 would subsequently be procured in a two-ship block buy, with CVN-74 procured in
FY1994 and CVN-75 procured in FY1996. For the discussion here, however, the comparison is between the Navy’s
current plan to procure CVN-79 and CVN-80 separately and the potential alternative of procuring them together in a
block buy.
The GAO testimony commented on an additional $700 million in savings that the Navy estimated would be derived
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
20
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The FY1983 and FY1988 block buys each involved procuring two aircraft carriers in a single
year. Procuring two carriers in the same year, however, is not mandatory for a two-ship aircraft
carrier block buy. The Navy, for example, proposed the block buy for CVN-74 and CVN-75 in
the FY1988 budget submission as something that would involve procuring CVN-74 in FY1990
and CVN-75 in FY1993. (Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to not only approve
the two-ship block buy, but also accelerate the procurement of both CVN-74 and CVN-75 to
FY1988.23) A block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 could leave intact the FY2013 procurement
date for CVN-79 and the FY2018 procurement date for CVN-80. This would permit the funding
for the two ships to be spread out over the same fiscal years as currently planned, although the
amounts of funding in individual years would likely change.
It is too late to implement a complete block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80, because some of CVN79, particularly its propulsion plant, has already been purchased. Consequently, the option would
be to implement a partial block buy that would include the remaining part of CVN-79 and all of
CVN-80.
To illustrate the notional scale of the savings that might result from using a block buy strategy on
CVN-79 and CVN-80, it can be noted that if such a block buy were to achieve one-third as much
percentage cost reduction as the FY1983 block buy—that is, if it were to reduce the combined
procurement cost of CVN 79 and 80 by about 1.9%—that would equate to a savings of roughly
$470 million on the currently estimated combined procurement cost of CVN-79 and CVN-80.
More refined estimates might be higher or lower than this notional figure of $470 million.
At a March 19, 2012, briefing for CRS and CBO on the CVN-78 program, CRS asked the Navy
whether it was considering the possibility of a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80. The Navy
stated that it had looked into a narrower option of doing joint purchases of some materials for the
two ships. CRS asked the Navy to examine the broader option of a block buy along the lines
described above, and to inform CRS and CBO of the Navy’s estimate of how much it might
reduce the combined procurement cost of CVN-79 and CVN-80.
Implementing a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 would require committing to the
procurement of CVN-80. Whether Congress would want to commit to the procurement of CVN80, particularly in light of current uncertainty over future levels of defense spending, is a factor
that Congress may consider in assessing the option of doing a block buy. If budgetary
(...continued)
from improving production continuity between CVN-73, CVN-74, and CVN-75 by stating on page 3 that “It is logical
to assume that savings are possible through production continuity but the precise magnitude of such savings is difficult
to calculate because of the many variables that affect the outcome.” It is not clear how significant savings from
production continuity might be in a two-ship block buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80 if the procurement dates for the two
ships (FY2013 and FY2018, respectively) are not changed.
The GAO testimony noted that the Navy estimated $500 million in additional savings from avoided configuration
changes on CVN-74 and CVN-75 if the ships were procured in FY1990 and FY1993 rather than FY1994 and FY1996.
It is not clear how significant the savings from avoided configuration changes might be for a two-ship block buy for
CVN-79 and CVN-80.
See also CRS Issue Brief IB87043, Aircraft Carriers (Weapons Facts), 13 pp., updated February 10, 1988 and archived
March 24, 1988, by Ronald O’Rourke. The report includes a discussion of the above GAO testimony. The CRS report
is out of print and available directly from the author.
23
See CRS Issue Brief IB87043, Aircraft Carriers (Weapons Facts), 13 pp., updated February 10, 1988 and archived
March 24, 1988, by Ronald O’Rourke. The report is out of print and available directly from the author.
Congressional Research Service
21
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
circumstances were to lead to a decision to end procurement of Ford-class carriers after CVN-79,
then much or all of the funding spent procuring materials for CVN-80 could go to waste.
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Sean Stackley, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition
executive), stated the following when asked by Representative Robert Wittman about the
possibility of a two-ship block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80:
Yes, sir. Let me focus on affordability of the CVN-78 class. We are right now about 40
percent complete construction of the CVN-78 and we’re running into some very difficult
cost growth issues across the full span—design, material procurement, and production—
material procurement on both contractor and government side.
So our first focus right now is to stabilize the lead ship. Let’s get cost under control so we
can complete this ship as close to schedule at the lowest cost possible.
But in parallel, the Navy is working very closely with the shipbuilder to take a step back and
say, one, what are all the lessons we just learned on CVN-78? Two, CVN-78 is a very
different ship from the Nimitz [CVN-68]; we cannot expect to build the [CVN-]78 the way
we build the [CVN-]68 and—and get to an affordable ship construction plan. So we’re
pressing on the way the carrier is built—the build plan for the carrier—to arrive at a more
affordable CVN-79.
Now, in the process of doing that we’ll take a hard look at what opportunity there is across
[CVN-]79 and [CVN-]80, recognizing that we’re going to be limited, again, by [budget] top
line. But there are going to be some opportunities that jump out at us. We don’t want to have
to replan each carrier. We have a vendor base that is stretched out with the carrier build cycle
that for some components that are carrier-unique, that vendor base is—is just struggling to
hold on between the five-year gaps.
So we have to take a hard look at where does it make sense after we’ve gotten to what I’m
calling an optimal build plan for CVN-79 and then be able to come back and—and say, OK,
here—on CVN-79 here are some opportunities that if we could, in fact, reach out to CVN-80
we can either avoid a gap in a production line or avoid unnecessary cost growth on that
follow ship.24
Later in the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE RICK LARSEN:
Finally, we had some discussion about this question with regard to CVNs and trying to find a
way to squeeze some costs out, and one of the ideas was to do some—do block buy of
certain components of—of—of CVN components. And have you considered that, and what’s
your thought on that on block buy on components from [CVN-]79 to [CVN-]80, or whatever,
[CVN-]79, [CVN-]79 to [CVN-]80, and so on?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SEAN STACKLEY:
24
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
22
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Yes, sir. At this point in time the Navy and the shipbuilder are sitting side by side putting
together a build plan for CVN-79. We’re 40 percent complete construction of the [CVN-]78;
we’ve got a lot that we’ve got to, I’ll say, do different on the [CVN-]79 and follow from the
lead ship. It’s a very different ship class [compared to the Nimitz class].
So we’re taking a hard look at the build plan [for CVN-78]. We need to get that locked
down. And associated with that is the complete bill of materials for the Ford class.
At that point in time we'll be able to take a look at...
LARSEN:
On this, call it bill of materials, what does it make sense—what makes sense in terms of
looking long term, beyond the immediate ship?
STACKLEY:
Right.
LARSEN:
Are there areas of the industrial base that are stressed to the point that it does make sense to
look at coupling the CVN-79 and CVN-80 buy?
STACKLEY:
We’re not at that point yet. I described earlier that I think after we get through this build plan
review then we'll be able to come back in ‘14 [FY2014] and identify potential critical items
that warrant a block buy approach.25
Later in the hearing, Matthew Mulherin, President of NNS and Corporate Vice President of HII,
stated the following when asked by Representative Robert Wittman about the possibility of a twoship block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80:
Yes, sir. You know, historically you go back, you were exactly right, if you look at the
contracts that bought the CVN- 72 and [CVN-]73 there was huge savings that flowed to the
second ship, both in the ability to go buy materials, a block buy and get—get discounts there,
but also that you did the engineering up front the first time for both hulls so the second ship
you really just had the answer, problem, paper [sic] and some of those kind of things the—
the kind of the normal course of business to support the waterfront.
So I wouldn’t see any different. I think if we were able to do it both for material, for—for the
engineering to be able to go pump out drawings that had two-ship applicability—plus, I think
it brings the—the—the CVN—if we were to do a two-ship buy for [CVN-]79 and [CVN-]80
it would ensure CVN-80 was a copy of CVN-79, no change into the contract or very
minimal, you’re not having a—on the material side you get economic order savings, you
don’t have to deal with obsolescence.
So absolutely. I think there’s huge opportunity to go do that. You know, you talk to the—the
vendor base. They would love to see it. It gives them the ability to go look at—at what
25
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
23
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
investments they need, what work is out in front of them, and go invest in—in training and
tools to—to be able to go support that.26
Legislative Activity for FY2013
FY2013 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier; two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class
Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).
These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and
modernization programs, see the following CRS reports:
26
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
24
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy
Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests
This appendix presents three instances of when Navy officials this year have testified that a Navy
of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet combatant commander COCOM requests
for Navy forces.
March 22, 2012, Hearing
At a March 22, 2012, hearing on Navy readiness before the Readiness subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES:
We have a lot of requests for our combatant commanders—of the validated requests that
come from combatant commanders. How many ships would it take in our navy, based on
your estimation, to meet all of the validated requests from our commanders, combatant
commanders?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Let me—give me just a minute on that, sir.
FORBES:
Please. And if you’d like, on any of these questions, if you’d rather take them for the record
and get back I’m OK with that, too.
BURKE:
I’m—no, I'm happy to answer the question. I just want to make sure I elaborate a little to
make sure we get—get the point right.
FORBES:
Please.
BURKE:
The—the combatant commander requests come in to the—to the services, and then the—
there’s a—a very high number of requirements from the services, or from the—the
combatant commanders which are then prioritized and adjudicated by the joint staff.
Essentially, a way to adjudicate supply—a lesser supply and a greater demand. So—so
those—of those requests that come in, some are determined to be more valid than others, if
you will. But to get to your exact question, of those requests that come in from the combatant
commanders, if we ...
(CROSSTALK)
Congressional Research Service
25
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
FORBES:
Admiral, could—could I just—on the nomenclature, just make sure I’m right, too. As they
come in, one of the first weed-out processes is we determine whether they’re validated or
not. In other words, we go through and make sure they’re legal, they don't have the other
asset somewhere. And—and then we stamp them as validated.
And then like you said, they go through a process where we then look at the resources we
have and allocate what we can. And we adjudicate which ones we can give and which ones
we can’t. So I want the top number. The—the ones that we have validated and said, “Yes,
this is legal, it’s a proper request.”
Of those combatant commander requests, approximately how many ships would it take us to
be able to meet those if we had them?
BURKE:
It would take a navy of over 500 ships to meet the combatant commander requests. And, of
course, it would take a similar increase in the aircraft and—and other parts of the—of the
Navy, as well, to meet the combatant commander requests.27
March 29, 2012, Hearing
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN D. HUNTER:
If you were to build the amphibs [i.e., amphibious ships] where would you prioritize? I
mean, where would you take money out of to be able to get the Marine Corps to where they
need to be?
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN TERENCE BLAKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES:
Here’s the issue we deal with: I don’t have the luxury of dealing with any single issue in
isolation; I have to deal with it across the entire...
HUNTER:
Well, we can. That’s why I'm asking.
BLAKE:
Well, we have to deal with it, though, across the entire portfolio.
HUNTER:
Sure.
27
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
26
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
BLAKE:
And so what we have to do is we have to balance the requirement for amphibs, the
requirement for surface combatants, the requirement for the carriers, the submarines—every
category of ships that we have. And so when we do that we then have to say, all right, as we
balance across that where are we going to be able to assume more risk? And that’s how we—
that’s how we end up where we are.
HUNTER:
So you’re saying there is less risk but still risk in the Marine Corps being short on amphibs
than there are in the other—the rest of the picture?
BLAKE:
No. I’m saying that we have assumed risk in all areas. The best example I can give you: It
was only a short time ago, if we tried to fill all the COCOM needs we said the number was
around 400 ships we’d need in the fleet. Today—and we see no abatement in that
commitment or the...
HUNTER:
No (inaudible) signal.
BLAKE:
Today we look at it and we see that we would—if we wanted to hit 100 percent of all the
COCOM requirements we’d need in excess of 500 ships. So what we end up having to do is
we go through the—the global management process and we look at it and we say, here are
our highest priorities, these are how we are going to address them, and then we—we have
those units available and we push that...
HUNTER:
I understand.
I’m going to yield back in just one second.
So I would take from your statement, then, that you did go through a prioritization process
and the amphibs are not at the top of that list. And second, when you say that you assume
risk all the way around I would argue that when you do your risk assessment and you
prioritize your needs the fact that the COCOMs wanted more ships and needed more ships
due to the international environment and where we find ourselves with the world today,
going down is probably – it’s going the wrong way.
We all know that, but I—I would—I would argue that your prioritization—I would like to
see that, if you don’t mind, the—the way that you analyzed this and the—and the way that
you said, hey, we’re going to—we’re going to keep them there to make sure that we have
this over here. That’s all I'm asking for.
Congressional Research Service
27
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
BLAKE:
OK. When we put it together we do it across the entire spectrum; we don’t—and by that I
mean, as we look at the entire requirement we say, this is what we need to do in order to be
able to meet the COCOM demand signal.28
April 19, 2012, Hearing
At an April 19, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR ROGER WICKER:
Admiral Burke and General Mills, from an operational perspective, the Navy budget cost for
decreases in large amphibious ships among other categories, in my opening statement, I
mentioned that the requests from combatant commanders for amphibious ships has increased
over 80 percent in the last five years—a very dramatic number. What is the reason for that
and what will be the impact if these requests are—are not met?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Senator, thanks for the question. You're right, the COCOM demand signal has gone up
significantly to the point where if we were to meet their—all their requirements, it would
take a Navy of greater than 500 ships.
So, I certainly am not here to begrudge the COCOM demand signal because they have
challenges that they’re trying to deal with. But—but we can’t meet—meet all their demands.
So there is a process in the—in the Pentagon run by the joint staff called the Global Force
Management process by which they take in the COCOM requirements and adjudicate that
along with the forces we have to come to a reasonable allocation of—of force. And so that’s
the—that’s a process we’re dealing with today. We’ve been using that process for a number
of years, and I would expect we will continue to use that process in the future to—to bridge
the gap between supply and demand.29
28
29
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
28
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess
Proposed Force Levels
One possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to
compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size,
however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the
future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few
years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,30 and as of April 24, 2012, had declined to a total of 282 battle force ships. The FY1987
fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering
Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the
April 2012 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered
on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential
regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese military forces and non-state
terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the April
2012 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.31
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 282-ship fleet of April 2012 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
30
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
31
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Congressional Research Service
29
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.29
2932
32
Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
Total ships
Attack submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Amphibious ships
600-ship
~600
100
15e
242/228g
~75h
Base Force
~450/416a
80/~55c
12
~150
51i
1993 BUR
346
45-55
11+1f
~124
41i
1997 QDR
~305/310b
50/55d
11+1f
116
36i
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
Congressional Research Service
2930
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix BC. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that
the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent
panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report
recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.3033 The
report stated the following, among other things:
•
“The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)
•
“In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)
•
“The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)
•
“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)
•
“Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The
3033
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
Congressional Research Service
3031
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
•
“To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)
In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table BC-1 compares the Navy’s 313-ship goal
of September 2011310-316 ship
goal of March 2012 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in
subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.
Congressional Research Service
3132
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table BC-1. Comparison of Navy’s 313-310-316 ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel
Ship Type
Navy’s 313-ship goal of
310-316 ship goal
of September 2011
Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) (1993)
2010 QDR
Independent
Review Panel
(July 2010)
12-14
18
14
SSBNs
(SSBN force was later
reduced to 14 as a result of
the 1994 Nuclear Posture
Review)
SSGNs
0-4
0
4
(SSGN program did not yet
exist)
SSNs
~48
45 to 55
55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term
goal of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
11 active
11 active + 1
operational/reserve
11 active
149~145
124
n/a
(114 active + 10 frigates in
Naval Reserve Force; a total
of 110-116 active ships was
also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
94
Frigates
~90
n/a
n/a
Frigates
0
n/a
n/a
0
n/a
(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs
~55
(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
33~32
41
(33 30 operational ships
needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)
(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)
0
26
(to be replaced by LCSs)
(LCS program did not exist)
CLF ships
30~29
43
n/a
Support ships
26~33
22
n/a
313~310-316
346
346
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
TOTAL ships
n/a
n/a
(numbers above add to
331-341)a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
Congressional Research Service
3233
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
a.
The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in
numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships.
In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the
Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s)
fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the thenplanned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.31
3134
34
Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.
Congressional Research Service
3334
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix CD. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table CD-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.3235 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 284282 battle force ships as of October 13, 2011April 24, 2012.
As discussed in Appendix AB, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends
over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the
direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of
ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions
is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might
not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the
fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because
average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be
increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.
3235
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
Congressional Research Service
3435
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table CD-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1970
769
1992
466
1949
690
1971
702
1993
435
1950
634
1972
654
1994
391
1951
980
1973
584
1995
373
1952
1,097
1974
512
1996
356
1953
1,122
1975
496
1997
354
1954
1,113
1976
476
1998
333
1955
1,030
1977
464
1999
317
1956
973
1978
468
2000
318
1957
967
1979
471
2001
316
1958
890
1980
477
2002
313
1959
860
1981
490
2003
297
1960
812
1982
513
2004
291
1961
897
1983
514
2005
282
1962
959
1984
524
2006
281
1963
916
1985
541
2007
279
1964
917
1986
556
2008
282
1965
936
1987
568
2009
285
1966
947
1988
565
2010
288
1967
973
1989
566
2011
284
1968
976
1990
547
2012
1969
926
1991
526
2013
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.
Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table CD-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2011FY2012) and requested (FY2012-FY2016FY2013-FY2017) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
Congressional Research Service
3536
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table CD-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016FY2017
(Procured FY1982-FY2011FY2012; requested FY2012-FY2015FY2013-FY2017)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
5
5
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
6
6
6
5
7
8
4a
5a
3a
8
7
10
11b
13
11
12
910
7
8
9
7
Source: CRS compilation based on Navy budget data and examination of defense authorization and
appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships
that do not count toward the
313- 310-316 ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a.
The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006,
another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.
b.
The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were
being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in
FY2012, and this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and
Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the JHSV
that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget
submission. The four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to FY2012, however, are
not included in the annual totals shown in this table.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Congressional Research Service
3637