Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry

Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Marc R. Rosenblum Specialist in Immigration Policy January 6, 2012May 3, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R42138 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Summary Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) effort to control illegalunauthorized migration, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the Bureau of Customs Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the lead agency along most of the border. Border enforcement enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when illegal immigration immigration to the United States first registered as a serious national problem; and border security has has received additional attention in the decade followingyears since the terrorist attacks of 2001. Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy of “prevention through deterrence”—the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized aliens from attempting to enter the United States. Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat entries and disrupt migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain unauthorized aliens, a set of policies known as “enforcement with consequences.” Twenty-five years after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603) marked the beginning of the modern era in border enforcement, this report reviews recent enforcement efforts, takes stock of the current state of border security, and considers lessons that may be learned about a quarter century of enhanced migration control efforts at U.S. borders. IRCA authorized a 50% increase in the size of the USBP, and at least 10 additional laws since then have included provisions related to migration enforcement and/or border security. Appropriations for the USBP have increased about 750% since 1989—a number which excludes many other programs related to border enforcement. On one hand, robust investments at the border have been associated with a sharp drop in the number of aliens apprehended, especially in the sectors first targeted for enhanced enforcement. The number and proportion of people apprehended more than once (recidivists) and those with serious criminal records are also at the lowest levels ever recorded. On the other hand, overall illegal inflows continued to increase in the 20 years after 1986, with the estimated unauthorized population more than tripling, even after almost 3 million aliens were granted amnesty as part of IRCA. The only significant decrease in unauthorized migration appears to have occurred since 2007, and it is unclear how much of the drop-off is due to increased enforcement and how much is a result of the U.S. economic downturn and other systemic factors. At the same time, enhanced border enforcement may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal entries—an effect that is also difficult to measure since deterrence ultimately involves decisions made in towns and villages far away from U.S. borders—such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that aliens are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter illegally and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. Thus, this report concludes by raising additional questions about future investments at the border, how to weigh such investments against other enforcement strategies, and the relationship between border enforcement and the broader debate about U.S. immigration policy.eventually described as “enforcement with consequences.” Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to “high consequence” enforcement outcomes. Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology. The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes; and this report describes trends in border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated got aways and turn backs. Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure illegal border flows or the degree to which the border is secured. Thus, the report also describes methods for estimating illegal border flows based on enforcement data and migrant surveys. Drawing on multiple data sources, the report suggests conclusions about the state of border security. Robust investments at the border were not associated with reduced illegal inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but a range of evidence suggests a substantial drop in illegal inflows in 2007-2011, followed by a slight rise in 2012. Enforcement, along with the economic downturn in the United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown. Enhanced border enforcement also may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal entries, such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that aliens are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter illegally and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. Congressional Research Service Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 BackgroundBorder Patrol History and Strategy .................................................................................................. 2 Border Patrol Strategic Plans ...................................................... 3 Border Control Strategy............................................... 3 National Strategic Plan .................................................................... 4 National Strategic Plan .................................... 3 National Border Patrol Strategy .......................................................................................... 4 National Border Patrol StrategyStrategic Plan ................................................................................................ 6 5 DHS Secure Border Initiative .................................................................................................... 5 CBP Consequence Delivery System .................. 7 Enforcement with Consequences................................................................................. 6 Budget and Resources............................ 8 2012 National Border Patrol Strategy...................................................................................... 12 Budget and Resources..................... 11 Border Security Appropriations ............................................................................................... 1211 Border Patrol Appropriations Personnel ................................................................................................... 12 Border Patrol Personnel........ 13 National Guard Troops at the Border ................................................................................ 14 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure ...................................................... 14 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure ................................... 15 Surveillance Assets ...................................................... 16 Surveillance Assets............................................................ 17 Aerial and Marine Surveillance...................................................... 18 Enforcement Outcomes................................................. 18 Border Patrol Enforcement Data.................................................................................................... 19 Alien Apprehensions ............................................................................................................... 2019 Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector ..................................................................... 21 The Limits of Apprehensions Data.20 Unique Subjects and Alien Recidivism ................................................................................... 22 Operational Control of the Border........................21 Estimated “Got Aways” and “Turn Backs” ............................................................................. 23 Additional Border Security Data: Migrant Surveys................................................................... 22 Additional Measures of Border Enforcement.... 23 Probability of Apprehension .......................................................................... 24 Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) System.......................... 24 Border Deterrence .............................. 24 Successful Illegal Entries .................................................................................................. 26 Smuggling Fees.. 24 Smuggling Fees ..................................................................................................................... 27 Probability of Apprehension.. 25 Metrics of Border Security ........................................................................................................... 29 Unintended and Secondary Consequences of Border Enforcement . 26 The Residual Method for Estimating Unauthorized Residents in the United States ............... 28 CBP Metrics of Border Security ............................................................. 30 Border-Area Crime and Migrant Deaths................................. 29 Operational Control of the Border ................................................................................. 30 Migration Flows: “Caging” Effects and Alternative Modes of Entry ... 29 Border Conditions Index .......................................... 33 Environmental Impact and Effects on Border Communities................................................... 35 Effects on Regional Relations...... 29 Border Patrol Effectiveness Rate ...................................................................................... 30 Estimating Illegal Flows Using Recidivism Data...................... 36 Legislative Issues......................................................... 30 How Secure is the U.S. Border? .................................................................................. 37 Border Patrol Personnel.................. 31 Unintended and Secondary Consequences of Border Enforcement .............................................. 34 Border-Area Crime and Migrant Deaths .............................................................................. 37 Surveillance Assets... 34 Migration Flows: “Caging” Effects and Alternative Modes of Entry ..................................... 37 Environmental Impact ............................................................................. 38 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure ................................ 38 Effects on Border Communities and Civil Rights ......................................................... 38 Access to Federal Lands.................... 38 Effects on Regional Relations ................................................................................................ 39. 40 Conclusion: Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Border Enforcement Betweenbetween Ports of Entry ....................................................................................................................................... 40 Congressional Research Service Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figures Figure 1. CBP “Figures Figure 1. Enforcement with Consequences, Selected Indicators, FY1999-FY2010” FY2005-FY2012 ........................................... 11. 9 Figure 2. U.S. Border Patrol Appropriations, FY1989-FY2012FY2013 .................................................... 1312 Figure 3. U.S. Border Patrol Agents, Total and by Region, FY1980-FY2011.FY2013 .............................. 15 Congressional Research Service Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry 14 Figure 4. Tactical Infrastructure Appropriations and Miles of Border Fencing, FY1996FY2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 1716 Figure 5. U.S. Border PatrolTotal USBP Apprehensions of Deportable Aliens, FY1991-FY2011 FY1960-FY2012 ............................. 20 Figure 6. U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions of Deportable Aliens, Southwest Border, by Selected Sectors, FY1992-FY2011.FY2012 ............................................................................................ 21 Figure 7. U.S. Border Patrol IDENT Apprehensions, 2000-2011.....USBP Southwest Border Unique Subjects and Recidivism Rates ............................................. 25 22 Figure 8. Smuggling Fees Paid by Unauthorized Mexican Migrants, 1980-20092010 ......................... 28 Figure 9. Property Crime Rates, Selected Southwest Border Cities, 1985-2010....26 Figure 9. Total Estimated Illegal Border Inflows, by Assumed Rate of Deterrence ....................... 31 33 Figure 10. Known Migrant Deaths, Southwest Border, 1985-2011.2012 .............................................. 3336 Tables Table 1. Miles of the Southwest Border Under “Effective Control” Consequence Delivery System Outcomes and Recidivism Rates.................................... 10 Appendixes Appendix. Capture-Recapture Methodology ................................................................. 23................ 42 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 4243 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 4243 Congressional Research Service Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Introduction Although theThe country’s immigration and naturalization laws have been subjects of episodic controversy controversy since America’s founding, but illegal immigration per se only became an issue beginning in the early 20th century, when Congress passed the first strict restrictions on legal admissions. Illegal immigration receded as a policy problem during the Great Depression, when very few immigrants entered the United States, Illegal immigration declined during the Great Depression and during and after World War II, when most labor migration occurred through the U.S.-Mexico Bracero program.1 MigrationImmigration control re-emerged as as a national concern during the 1970s, however, when the end of the Bracero program and new , new restrictions on Western Hemisphere migration along with, and growing U.S. demand for foreign-born workers caused the estimated unauthorized alien population to grow to about 1.7 million by 1979, and to about 3.2 million by 1986.2 Congress responded in 1986 by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, P.L. 99603). Among other provisions, IRCA described “an increase in the border patrol and other inspection and enforcement activities … in order to prevent and deter the illegal entry of aliens into the United States” as an “essential element” of immigration control, and it authorized a 50% increase in Border Patrol staffing.3 Border security has remained a topic of congressional interest since that time, and at least six additional laws have been passed to strengthen border enforcement per se, as discussed below.4 Despite a growing enforcement response, illegal immigration continued to increase over most of workers combined to cause a sharp increase in unauthorized migration flows.2 Congress responded in 1986 by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, P.L. 99603), which authorized a 50% increase in Border Patrol staffing, among other provisions. Border security3 has remained a persistent topic of congressional interest since then, and enforcement programs and appropriations have grown accordingly, as described in this report. Despite a growing enforcement response, however, illegal immigration continued to increase over most of the next three decades, with the estimated unauthorized population peaking at 11.8 million-12.4 million in 2007.512 million12.4 million people in 2007.4 Unauthorized migration has declined since 2007, with the estimated unauthorized population falling to 10.811.1 million-11.25 million in 2010,6 and apprehensions of illegal2011.5 Apprehensions of unauthorized migrants at the U.S.-MexicanMexico border reaching a 42-year low in 2011.7 Researchers estimate that unauthorized inflows to the United States averaged about 300,000 per year since 2007—just over one-third the level of inflows in 2000-2005, and about the same as the number of unauthorized aliens who return home each year.8 1 fell from about 1.2 million in 2005 to a 41-year low of 328,000 in 2011, before climbing slightly to 357,000 in 2012.6 The Obama Administration cites falling apprehensions, among other statistics, as evidence that the border is more secure than ever.7 Yet some Members of Congress and others disagree and have called on the Administration to do more to secure the border. Border security has been a recurrent theme in Congress’s debate about comprehensive immigration reform since 2005, and some Members of Congress have argued that Congress should not consider additional immigration reforms until the border is more secure.8 1 The Bracero program was a formal guest worker program managed jointly by the United States and Mexico that admitted about 4.6 million workers between 1942 and 1964. 2 The estimated population of unauthorized aliens was about 1.7 million by 1979 and about 3.2 million in 1986; most researchers consider earlier estimates of the unauthorized population to be unreliable. See Jennifer Van Hook and Jennifer Van Hook and Frank D. Bean, “Estimating Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States: Issues and Trends,” in Binational Study: Migration Between Mexico and the United States (Washington, DC: US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1998), pp. 538-540. Estimates of the unauthorized population prior to 1979 ranged from 2 to 12 million; see U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Population, Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States, Committee Print, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 16-17. Van Hook and Bean consider estimates of the unauthorized population prior to 1979 to be unreliable. 3 P.L. 109-63, § 111. 4 The laws include the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208, Div. C), the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT, P.L. 107-56), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Div. B), and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367). 5 1998), pp. 538-540. 3 Except as otherwise noted, this report focuses exclusively on border security as it relates to the prevention of unauthorized migration. On the relationship among unauthorized migration, illegal drugs and other contraband, international terrorists, and other types of border threats, see CRS Report R42969, Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, by Marc R. Rosenblum, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin Finklea. 4 CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 6 Ibid. 7 See Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 91; DHS, Annual Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2011, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 14. 8 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, US Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, Pew (continued...) Congressional Research Service 1 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry The Obama Administration cites falling apprehensions, among other statistics, as evidence that the border is more secure than ever.9 Yet some Members of Congress and others disagree with that characterization and have called on the Administration to do more to secure the border. Border security has been a recurrent theme in Congress’s broader debate about comprehensive immigration reform since 2005, with some Members of Congress arguing that Congress should not consider additional immigration reforms until the border is more secure.10 Concerns about illegal immigration have overlapped with public safety and national security considerations, including efforts to prevent the inflow of illegal drugs and other contraband, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction.11 Enforcement to combat these diverse illicit flows inevitably converges at international borders, partly because transnational criminals and other mala fide actors seek to exploit the geographic and jurisdictional complexity that borders create.12 Nonetheless, while policies to combat different illegal flows share some common features, each of these security tasks may demand a unique mix of policy tools, and lawmakers may set different standards for successful enforcement outcomes in each area.13 This report reviews border enforcement efforts in the 25 years since IRCA initiated the modern era in migration control, takes stock of the current state of border security, and considers lessons that may be learned about enhanced enforcement at U.S. borders. The report begins by reviewing the history of border control and the development of a national border control strategy during the 1990s. The following sections summarize appropriations and resources dedicated to border enforcement, indicators of enforcement outcomes, and possible secondary and unintended consequences of border enforcement. After discussing current legislative issues, the report concludes by describing what is known about the costs and benefits of the current approach and raising additional questions that may help guide the discussion of these issues in the future. (...continued) Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, September 1, 2010, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf; Damien Cave, “Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North,” The New York Times, July 6, 2011. 9 See, for example, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security and Immigration Enforcement,” press release, October 5, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/ speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategy-and-immigration-enforcement.shtm; also see Julian Aguilar, “Rebuffing Perry: ‘Border more Secure than Ever,’ Officials Say,” Texas Tribune, August 18, 2011. 10 See, for example, Senator Jon Kyl, “Border Security: Linking Words to Actions,” press release, June 14, 2010, http://kyl.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=325651. 11 On border-related counternarcotics efforts, see CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea; on DHS’ intelligence enterprise to prevent terrorists from entering the United States see CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by Jerome P. Bjelopera; on DHS’ effort to detect and prevent the admission of weapons of mass destruction at U.S. ports of entry see CRS Report RL34750, The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Dana A. Shea, John D. Moteff, and Daniel Morgan. 12 See CRS Report R41927, The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement, by Kristin M. Finklea 13 On the distinction between policies to combat illegal migration and policies to combat illegal narcotics, see, for example, Terry Goddard, How to Fix a Broken Border: Hit the Cartels Where it Hurts, Immigration Polic Center, Washington, DC, September 2011, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Goddard_How_to_Fix_a_Broken_Border_091211.pdf. Congressional Research Service 2 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Background Congress imposed few restrictions on international migration during the country’s first hundred years, but then passed a series of immigration restrictions beginning in 1872 and culminating with the passage of the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 (43 Stat. 153), which imposed permanent numeric restrictions on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere and barred most immigration from Asia. Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the Department of Commerce and Labor by an appropriations act two days later (Act of May 28, 1924; 43 Stat. 240) and charged the agency with securing all international borders between ports of entry. The USBP focused initially on preventing the entry of Chinese migrants excluded by the 1924 Act, combating southbound gun trafficking, and preventing alcohol imports during prohibition, with the majority of agents stationed on the northern border.14 The Border Patrol became part of the new Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1933, and the INS moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in 1940. The focus of border enforcement shifted to the Southwest border during World War II, and the Border Patrol undertook a major campaign in 1953-1954 to identify and return illegal Mexican migrants, resulting in 1.9 million deportations in two years.15 Nonetheless, during most of the 20th century, the United States did not place a high priority on preventing illegal migration across the Southwest border.16 Illegal migration increased after 1965 as legislative changes restricted legal migration from Mexico at the same time that social and economic changes caused stronger migration “pushes” in Mexico (e.g., inadequate employment opportunities) and “pulls” in the United States (e.g., employment opportunities, links to migrant communities in Mexico).17 Congress held hearings on illegal immigration beginning in 1971, and after more than a decade of debate passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603), which described border enforcement as an “essential element” of immigration control and authorized a 50% increase in funding for the Border Patrol, among other provisions.18 Congress passed at least 11 additional laws addressing illegal immigration over the next decade, seven of which included provisions related to the border and are discussed below.19 14 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Border Patrol History,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml; John Myers, The Border Wardens (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971). 15 See Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, 1992). 16 Ibid.; also see5 Ibid. 6 United States Border Patrol (USBP), “Southwest Border Sectors: Total Apprehensions by Fiscal Year,” http://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/appr_swb.ctt/ appr_swb.pdf. 7 See for example, the White House, “Fixing the Immigration System for America’s 21st Century Economy,” accessed March 7, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/fixing-immigration-system-america-s-21st-century-economy. 8 See for example, Alan Gomez, “Border Security Quandary Could Kill Immigration Bill,” USA Today, April 2, 2013. Congressional Research Service 1 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry This report reviews efforts to combat unauthorized migration across the Southwest border in the nearly three decades since IRCA initiated the modern era in migration control, takes stock of the current state of border security, and considers lessons that may be learned about enhanced enforcement at U.S. borders. The report begins by reviewing the history of border control and the development of a national border control strategy beginning in the 1990s. The following sections summarize appropriations and resources dedicated to border enforcement, indicators of enforcement outcomes, metrics for estimating unauthorized migration flows, and possible secondary and unintended consequences of border enforcement. The report concludes by reviewing the overall costs and benefits of the current approach to migration control and raising additional questions that may help guide the discussion of these issues in the future. Border Patrol History and Strategy Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the Department of Commerce and Labor by an appropriations act in 1924,9 two days after passing the first permanent numeric immigration restrictions.10 Numerical limits only applied to the Eastern Hemisphere, barring most Asian immigration; and the Border Patrol’s initial focus was on preventing the entry of Chinese migrants, as well as combating gun trafficking and alcohol imports during prohibition. The majority of agents were stationed on the northern border.11 The Border Patrol became part of the new Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1933, and the INS moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in 1940. The Border Patrol’s focus shifted to the Southwest border during World War II, but preventing illegal migration across the Southwest border remained a low priority during most of the 20th century.12 Illegal migration from Mexico increased after 1965 as legislative changes restricted legal Mexican immigration at the same time that social and economic changes caused stronger migration “pushes” in Mexico (e.g., inadequate employment opportunities) and stronger “pulls” in the United States (e.g., employment opportunities, links to migrant communities in Mexico).13 Congress held hearings on illegal immigration beginning in 1971, and after more than a decade of debate passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603), which described border enforcement as an “essential element” of immigration control and, as mentioned, authorized a 50% increase in funding for the Border Patrol, among other provisions.14 9 Act of May 28, 1924; (43 Stat. 240). Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 (43 Stat. 153). 11 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Border Patrol History,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml. 12 See Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, 1992); Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 17 13 See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum. Legislative changes included the termination of the U.S.-Mexican Bracero guest worker program in 1965 and the imposition of numeric limits on migration from Mexico and other Western Hemisphere countries pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (P.L. 89-236), beginning in 1968. On social and economic “pushes” and “pulls” during this period, see , for example, Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors; U.S. Domestic Council, Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report: Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, Washington, DC, December 1976. 18 The IRCA also included an amnesty for certain illegal immigrants, imposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrant workers, and revised the existing H-2 visa program to create the current H-2A and H-2B programs. 19 The four laws that did not include specific border-related measures were the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100690), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-93), the Antiterrorism (continued...) Congressional Research Service 3 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Border Control Strategy Seventy years after it began operations, the Border Patrol developed its first formal national border control strategy in 1994, the National Strategic Plan. The plan was updated in 2005 after the Border Patrol was directed to formulate a new national strategy following the 9/11 attacks, resulting in the 2005 National Border Patrol Strategy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also developed a broader Secure Border Initiative in 2005 to coordinate its overall approach to border security and immigration control. The Border Patrol is expected to publish a new national strategy for 2012-2016 in 2012.20 All three of the existing national plans were organized around an operational strategy of “prevention through deterrence.”21 Whereas the Border Patrol’s traditional approach to controlling illegal migration had been to arrest aliens after they entered the United States, the prevention through deterrence approach was to place personnel, surveillance technology, fencing, and other infrastructure directly on the border to deter illegal flows. As the strategy was described in 1994: Although a 100 percent apprehension rate is an unrealistic goal, we believe we can achieve a rate of apprehensions sufficiently high to raise the risk of apprehension to the point that many will consider it futile to continue to attempt illegal entry…. The prediction is that with traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement.22 CBP has also attempted to deter illegal entries by increasing the penalties imposed on people who attempt to cross the border illegally, an approach the agency describes as “enforcement with consequences.”23 By imposing more burdensome consequences on people who cross the border illegally, this effort seeks to disrupt smuggling cycles that often rely on multiple entry attempts and to raise the costs of illegal entry in order to discourage future attempts. The remainder of this section describes these plans and operational approaches in greater detail. National Strategic Plan The National Strategic Plan (NSP) was developed in 1994 in response to a widespread perception that the Southwest border was being overrun by unauthorized immigration and that drug (...continued) and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-215). The seven laws that included border-related provisions were the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208, Div. C), the USA-PATRIOT Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-56), the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107296), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (108-458), the REAL-ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 10913, Div. B), and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367). 20 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, December 14, 2011. 21 U.S. Border Patrol, Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond, July 1994, p. 6. (Hereinafter, National Strategic Plan.) 22 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 23 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border? testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. (Hereinafter Fisher testimony 2011.) Congressional Research Service 4 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry smuggling was a serious threat along the Southwest border. Border security had been a focus of a study commissioned by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which recommended that the INS change its approach from arresting illegal immigrants to preventing their entry.24 With Congress and the Clinton Administration focused on immigration reform, the Border Patrol adopted a strategic planning process focused on how to prioritize USBP efforts over time and by geographic areas and how to define and measure success.25 The NSP described a multi-phased approach to deploying and focusing USBP resources on the areas of greatest illegal entry of people and goods. Phase I of the NSP involved the “Hold the Line” program in El Paso, TX, and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, CA.26 Phase II included the expansion of Operation Rio Grande (1997) in the McAllen and Laredo sectors of Texas and Operation Safeguard (1999) in Tucson, AZ; and Phases III and IV involved the remaining areas of the Southwest border followed by the Gulf Coast and northern borders.27 Along the Southwest border, the NSP emphasized (in descending order of importance) personnel, equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure.28 In addition to placing more agents “on the line” (i.e., directly on the border), these operations utilized landing mat fencing,29 stadium lighting, and cameras and sensors to deter and detect unauthorized aliens. The northern border emphasized intelligence, cross-border collaboration, technology, equipment, and limited personnel.30 The implementation of Phase II and subsequent phases was to be based on the success of Phase I, with the plan describing a number of indicators of effective border enforcement, including the following: • initial increase of arrests and entry attempts, • eventual reduction of arrests and recidivism in main effort, • change in traditional traffic pattern, • increase in more sophisticated methods of smuggling at checkpoints, • increase in ports of entry activity including more legal admissions and use of fraudulent documents, • possible increase in complaints (Mexico, interest groups, etc.), • shift in flow to other areas of the border, • fee increase by smugglers, • fewer criminal aliens entering the country and reduced criminal activity along the borders, and 24 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Reclaiming Our Communities from Drugs and Violence (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/ 150489.pdf. 25 National Strategic Plan, p. 1. 26 National Strategic Plan, pp. 9-10. 27 National Strategic Plan, pp. 10-12. 28 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2003. 29 Landing mat fencing was constructed from equipment that had been used as temporary landing strips for airplanes during the Vietnam War. 30 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2003. Congressional Research Service 5 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry • fewer illegal immigrants in the interior of the United States.31 Many people viewed Operations Gatekeeper and Hold the Line as successful, at least within the San Diego and El Paso sectors. Apprehensions within these sectors fell sharply beginning in 1994-1995 (see “Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector”), and a 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report was cautiously optimistic about the strategy.32 “Prevention through deterrence” was embraced by Congress, with both House and Senate appropriators directing the INS in 1996 to hire new agents and to reallocate USBP agents from the interior to front line duty.33 Pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208), Congress also expressly authorized the construction and improvement of fencing and other barriers along the Southwest border and required the completion of a triple-layered fence along 14 miles of the border near San Diego where the INS had begun to install fencing in 1990.34 the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (P.L. 89-236). 14 The IRCA also included an amnesty for certain illegal immigrants, imposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrant workers, and revised the existing H-2 visa program to create the current H-2A and H-2B programs. 10 Congressional Research Service 2 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Congress passed at least 11 additional laws addressing illegal immigration over the next two decades, 7 of which included provisions related to the border.15 Border Patrol Strategic Plans Seventy years after it began operations, the Border Patrol developed its first formal national border control strategy in 1994, the National Strategic Plan. The plan was updated in 2004 and again in 2012. National Strategic Plan The National Strategic Plan (NSP) was developed in 1994 in response to a widespread perception that the Southwest border was being overrun by unauthorized immigration and drug smuggling, and to respond to a study commissioned by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The study recommended that the INS change its approach from arresting unauthorized immigrants after they enter the United States, as had previously been the case, to focus instead on preventing their entry.16 Under the new approach, the INS would place personnel, surveillance technology, fencing, and other infrastructure directly on the border to discourage illegal flows, a strategy that became known as “prevention through deterrence.” According to the 1994 INS plan, “the prediction is that with traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement.”17 The NSP described a multi-phased approach with Phase I including the “Hold the Line” program in El Paso, TX, and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, CA.18 Phase II included the expansion of Operation Rio Grande (1997) in the McAllen and Laredo sectors of Texas and Operation Safeguard (1999) in Tucson, AZ. Phases III and IV were to involve the remaining areas of the Southwest border followed by the Gulf Coast and Northern borders.19 The implementation of Phase II and subsequent phases was to be based on the success of Phase I, with the plan describing several expected indicators of effective border enforcement, including an initial increase of border arrests and entry attempt to be followed by an eventual reduction of arrests, a change in traditional traffic patterns, and an increase in more sophisticated smuggling 15 The seven laws that included border-related provisions were the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208, Div. C), the USA-PATRIOT Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-56), the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (108-458), the REAL-ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Div. B), and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367). The four laws that did not include specific border-related measures were the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-93), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-215). 16 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Reclaiming Our Communities from Drugs and Violence (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/ 150489.pdf. 17 U.S. Border Patrol, Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond, July 1994, pp. 6-7 (Hereinafter, National Strategic Plan). 18 National Strategic Plan, pp. 9-10. 19 National Strategic Plan, pp. 10-12. Congressional Research Service 3 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry methods.20 As predicted, apprehensions within the San Diego and El Paso sectors fell sharply beginning in 1994-1995, and traffic patterns shifted, primarily to the Tucson and South Texas (Rio Grande Valley) sectors (see “Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector”). A 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report was cautiously optimistic about the strategy.21 Congress supported the prevention through deterrence approach. In 1996, House and Senate appropriators directed the INS to hire new agents and to reallocate personnel from the interior to front line duty.22 And the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) expressly authorized the construction and improvement of fencing and other barriers along the Southwest border and required the completion of a triple-layered fence along 14 miles of the border near San Diego where the INS had begun to install fencing in 1990.23 National Border Patrol Strategy In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the USBP refocused its priorities on preventing terrorist penetration, while remaining committed to its traditional duties of preventing the illicit trafficking of people and contraband between official ports of entry. Shortly after the creation of DHS, USBP was directed to formulate a new National Border Patrol Strategy (NBPS) that would better reflect the realities of the post-9/11 security landscape. In March 20052004, the Border Patrol unveiled the National Border Patrol Strategy, which placesplaced greater emphasis on interdicting terrorists and featuresfeatured five main objectives: • establishing the substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry; • deterring illegal entries through improved enforcement; • detecting, apprehending, and deterring smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; • leveraging “Smart Border” technology to multiply the deterrent and enforcement effect of agents; and • reducing crime in border communities, thereby improving the quality of life and economic vitality of those areas.3524 The NBPS was an attempt to lay the foundation for achieving “operational control” over the border, defined by the Border Patrol as “the ability to detect, respond, and interdict border penetrations in 31 areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other national security 20 National Strategic Plan, pp. 9-10. U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed, GAO/GGD-98-21, December 1997. 3322 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1996, report to accompany H.R. 2076, 104th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 104139 and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies For the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1996, and for Other Purposes, report to accompany H.R. 2076, 104th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 104-378. 3423 P.L. 104-208, Div. C §§ 102(a)-(b). 35102. 24 Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, “National Border Patrol Strategy,” March 1, 2005. Hereafter referred to asHereinafter, USBP National Strategy. 3221 Congressional Research Service 64 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other national security objectives.”36 The strategy emphasizesobjectives.”25 The strategy emphasized a hierarchical and vertical command structure, featuring a direct chain of command from headquarters to the field. The 2005 document builds on the “prevention through deterrence” strategy, but it places added emphasis ondocument emphasized the use of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence and sophisticated surveillance systems to assess risk and target enforcement efforts; and the rapid deployment of USBP agents to respond to emerging threats. This approach depends on tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence to assess risk and target enforcement efforts, relying in large part on sophisticated surveillance systems, including cameras, sensors, and other technologies. Additionally, the Border Patrol coordinates closely with CBP’s Office of Intelligence and other DHS and federal agencies’ intelligence apparatuses. Lastly, the Border Patrol National Strategy formulates different strategies for each of the agency’s three operational theaters: the Southwest border, the northern border, and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. Secure Border Initiative emerging threats. Additionally, the plan called for the Border Patrol to coordinate closely with CBP’s Office of Intelligence and other federal intelligence agencies. Border Patrol Strategic Plan CBP published a new Border Patrol Strategic Plan (BPSP) in May 2012 that shifted attention from resource acquisition and deployment to the strategic allocation of resources by “focusing enhanced capabilities against the highest threats and rapidly responding along the border.”26 From an operational perspective, the 2012 plan emphasizes the collection and analysis of information about evolving border threats; integration of Border Patrol and CBP planning across different border sectors and among the full range of federal, state, local, tribal, and international organizations involved in border security operations; and rapid Border Patrol response to specific border threats.27 DHS Secure Border Initiative The Border Patrol’s approach to border enforcement has been mirrored in broader DHS policies. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced a comprehensive multiyear plan, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal migration, reiterating many of the themes from the 1994 NSP and the 2005 NBPS.37 migration.28 Under SBI, DHS announced plans to obtain operational control of the northern and southern borders within five years by focusing attention in five main areas: • Increased staffing. As part of SBI, DHS announced the addition of 1,000 new Border Patrol agents, 250 new ICE investigators targeting human smuggling operations, and 500 other new ICE agents and officers.3829 • Improved detention and removal capacity. In October 2005, DHS announced plans to detain 100% ofHistorically, most non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until they could be processed for removal (see “Enforcement with Consequences”). SBI supported this goal by adding detention capacity, initially increasing bed space by 2,000 to a total of 20,000. As part of SBI, DHS also announced plans to expand its use of expedited removal proceedings for aliens apprehended within 100 miles of a U.S. land border (see “Enforcement with Consequences”).39 • Surveillance technology. SBI included plans to expand DHS’ use of surveillance technology between ports of entry, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, other aerial assets, remote video surveillance (RVS) systems, and ground sensors.40 These tools were to be linked into a common integrated system that became known as SBInet (see “Surveillance Assets” below). 36 apprehended at the border were placed in formal removal proceedings.30 Yet backlogs in the immigration court system meant that most such aliens were released on bail or on their own recognizance prior to a removal hearing, and many failed to show up for their hearings.31 In October 2005, DHS announced 25 USBP National Strategy, p. 3. This definition differs from the statutory definition found in Section 2 of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367); see in this report “Operational Control of the Border,” below. 37 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,” http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm. 38 Ibid. 39.” 26 CBP, 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan, Washington, DC: 2012, p. 7. 27 Ibid. 28 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,” http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm. Expedited removal is a form of formal removal with limited judicial review, and is generally reserved for arriving aliens who lack proper documentation or have committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to gain admission into the United States. Aliens subject to expedited removal are only entitled to a removal hearing (i.e., to seek relief from an immigration judge) if they indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution; see 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) and CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 40 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,” http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm. Congressional Research Service 7 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry • Tactical infrastructure. SBI continued DHS’ commitment to the expansion of border fencing, roads, and stadium-style lighting. With the announcement of SBI, DHS announced plans to complete triple-layer fencing along the original 14-mile stretch of border in the San Diego sector where construction had begun in 1990.41 • Interior enforcement. SBI also included plans to expand enforcement within the United States at worksites through state and local partnerships, jail screening programs, and task forces to locate fugitive aliens.42 DHS noted that these programs would initially focus on the Southwest land border between official ports of entry and that it would deploy a mix of personnel, technology, infrastructure, and response assets in order to “provide maximum tactical advantage in each unique border environment.”43 Enforcement with Consequences Although not the subject of a formal policy document like those discussed above, an additional component of DHS’s approach to border control over the last several years has been “enforcement with consequences.” Historically, immigration agents had returned most people apprehended at the border to Mexico with minimal processing or (in the case of non-Mexicans) allowed them to remain at large in the United States pending a formal deportation or removal hearing.44 Since 2005, DHS has implemented several policies designed to raise the costs to migrants of being apprehended to make it more difficult for illegal migrants to reconnect with smugglers following a failed entry attempt, thereby discouraging people who have been apprehended from making subsequent efforts to enter the United States illegally.45 The first46 element of DHS’s enforcement with consequences approach was the expansion of the use of expedited removal (ER). ER is a provision of the INA that allows certain aliens to be formally removed from the United States without appearing before an immigration judge.47 Thus, 41 Ibid. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=440470. 29 Ibid. 30 Prior to 1996, the INA included distinct provisions for the “exclusion” of inadmissible aliens and the “deportation” of certain aliens from within the United States. Pursuant to §§301-309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, Div. C), deportation and exclusion proceedings were combined into a unified “removal” proceeding (8 U.S.C. 1229a). This report uses “deportation” to refer to the compulsory return of aliens to their country of origin prior to the implementation of IIRIRA in 1997, and “removal” to refer to aliens returned under these provisions since 1997. 31 DHS estimated that there were 623,292 alien “absconders” in August 2006, many of whom had failed to appear for removal hearings after being apprehended at the border; see Doris Meissner and Donald Kerwin, DHS and (continued...) Congressional Research Service 5 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry plans to detain 100% of non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until they could be processed for removal. SBI supported this goal by adding detention capacity, initially increasing bed space by 2,000 to a total of 20,000.32 On August 23, 2006, DHS announced that the policy to “end catch and release” had been successfully implemented.33 • Surveillance technology. SBI included plans to expand DHS’s use of surveillance technology between ports of entry, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, other aerial assets, remote video surveillance (RVS) systems, and ground sensors.34 These tools were to be linked into a common integrated system that became known as SBInet (see “Surveillance Assets” below). • Tactical infrastructure. SBI continued DHS’s commitment to the expansion of border fencing, roads, and stadium-style lighting.35 • Interior enforcement. SBI also included plans to expand enforcement within the United States at worksites and through state and local partnerships, jail screening programs, and task forces to locate fugitive aliens.36 CBP Consequence Delivery System Although not the subject of a formal public policy document like those discussed above, an additional component of CBP’s approach to border control in recent years has been an effort to promote “high consequence” enforcement for unauthorized Mexicans apprehended at the border.37 Historically, immigration agents permitted most Mexicans apprehended at the border to voluntarily return to Mexico without any penalty.38 Since 2005, CBP has limited voluntary returns in favor of three types of “high consequence” outcomes: • Formal Removal.39 Aliens40 formally removed from the United States generally are ineligible for a visa (i.e., inadmissible) for at least five years,41 and they may (...continued) Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting Course, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, February 2009, p. 44, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_Feb09.pdf. 32 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,” https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=440470. 33 CBP, “DHS Secretary Announces End to ‘Catch and Release’ on Southern Border,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ admin/c1_archive/messages/end_catch_release.xml. 34 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,” https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=440470. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. Interior enforcement programs are not discussed in this report; see CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel; and CRS Report R40002, Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures, by Andorra Bruno. 43 Department of Homeland Security, DHS FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification, p. CBP-BSFIT 3. 44 Pursuant to §§ 37 Prior to development of the Consequence Delivery System, most non-Mexican aliens already were placed in formal removal proceedings and, after 2005, were normally detained until a removal order was implemented (see in this report “DHS Secure Border Initiative”). 38 Section 240B of the INA permits immigration agents and judges to allow certain removable aliens to “voluntarily depart” the United States. In contrast with aliens subject to formal removal, aliens subject to voluntary departure generally do not face additional immigration-related penalties. 39 Pursuant to §§301-309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, Div. C), deportation and exclusion proceedings were combined into a unified “removal” proceeding (8 U.S.C. 1229aINA §240); and immigration judges were given discretion to permit aliens who are subject to removal to “voluntarily depart” in lieu of facing formal removal proceedings (8 U.S.C. 1229c). This report uses “deportation” to refer to the compulsory return of aliens to their country of origin prior to the implementation of IIRIRA in 1997, “removal” and “voluntary departure” to refer to aliens returned under these specific provisions since 1997, and “return” to refer to compulsory return policies that encompass both formal removals and voluntary departures. 45 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. 46 The enforcement with consequences approach also depended on DHS having begun to collect biometric data from aliens apprehended at U.S. borders and to identify repeat offenders through the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system, which was implemented along the Southwest border beginning in 1999; see “Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) System.” 47 See CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 42 Congressional Research Service 8 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry ER orders can be implemented quickly and at minimal expense to CBP; but ER carries the same penalties for aliens as a standard removal order, including a five-year bar on receiving a visa to return to the United States and a 20-year bar for second and subsequent removal orders. Expedited removal was added to the INA in 1996, but the policy was initially reserved for aliens apprehended at ports of entry. In a series of four announcements between November 2002 and January 2006, DHS expanded the use of ER eventually to include certain aliens who had entered the United States within the previous two weeks and who were apprehended within 100 miles of any U.S. land or coastal border.48 A second element of enforcement with consequences has been a DHS policy to detain certain people facing removal until their orders are executed. Historically, most non-Mexicans apprehended at the border were placed in formal deportation or removal proceedings prior to being returned to their country of origin by airplane;49 but backlogs in the immigration court system meant that most such aliens were released on bail or on their own recognizance with an order to reappear at a later date, and many failed to show up for their hearings.50 Under a 2005 initiative to “end catch and release,” DHS announced plans to detain 100% of removable nonMexicans apprehended at the border until their removal orders could be finalized and executed.51 On August 23, 2006, DHS announced that the policy had been successfully implemented.52 Third, working with the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS has increased the proportion of people apprehended at the border who are charged with immigration-related criminal offenses. (Unauthorized aliens apprehended at the border may face federal immigration charges,53 but historically, most have not been charged with a crime; see Figure 1.) The most systematic effort to bring such charges has been Operation Streamline, a program through which CBP works with U.S. Attorneys and District Court judges in border districts to expedite criminal justice processing. The program permits groups of up to 40 criminal defendants to have their cases heard at the same time, rather than requiring judges to review individual charges, and arranges in most cases for aliens facing felony charges for illegal re-entry to plead guilty to misdemeanor illegal entry charges—a plea bargain that leads to the rapid resolution of cases.54 Although Operation 48 Ibid. Under the 2006 policy, most Mexicans apprehended at the Southwest border were not placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they had previous criminal convictions. 49 Most Mexicans were returned by bus to Mexico with minimal processing—an option that does not exist for aliens from non-contiguous countries. 50 DHS estimated that there were 623,292 alien “absconders” in August 2006, many of whom had failed to appear for removal hearings after being apprehended at the border; see Doris Meissner and Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting Course, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, February 2009, p. 44, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_Feb09.pdf. 51 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Comprehensive Immigration Reform II, testimony of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, 109th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2005. Several groups of aliens were already subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings, including aliens convicted of certain crimes and aliens in expedited removal proceedings; see CRS Report RL32369, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues, by Chad C. Haddal and Alison Siskin. 52 CBP, “DHS Secretary Announces End to ‘Catch and Release’ on Southern Border,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ admin/c1_archive/messages/end_catch_release.xml. 53 Aliens apprehended at the border may face federal immigration-related criminal charges for illegal entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325) or (on a second or subsequent apprehension) illegal re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1326), and in some cases the may face charges related to human smuggling (8 U.S.C. § 1324) and visa and document fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1546). Unlawful presence in the United States absent additional factors is a civil violation, not a criminal offense. See CRS Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Michael John Garcia; and CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel. 54 See Jennifer Chacon, “Managing Migration Through Crime,” Columbia Law Review, vol. 109 (2009), pp. 135-136. (continued...) Congressional Research Service 9 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Streamline has been described as a zero tolerance program leading to prosecutions for 100% of apprehended aliens, the program confronts limits in judicial and detention capacity, resulting in daily caps on the number of people facing charges in certain districts.55 Operation Streamline was established in the USBP’s Del Rio Sector in December 2005 and expanded to four additional sectors by June 2008.56 The program mainly consists of procedural arrangements among DHS and DOJ officials at the local level, and 15 CBP agents have been detailed to DOJ in three Border Patrol sectors to assist DOJ attorneys and U.S. Marshalls with prosecutions.57 A total of 164,639 people were processed through Operation Streamline through the end of FY2011.58 Mexicans who are apprehended in the United States and found to be smuggling aliens into the United States may also be subject to criminal charges in Mexico under the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASSIS). OASSIS is a U.S.-Mexican agreement in place since 2005 under which certain Mexican smuggling suspects who are apprehended in the United States are returned to Mexico to be prosecuted and, if convicted, serve time in that country. As of October 17, 2011, a total of 2,617 people have been transferred to Mexico for prosecution under the program since 2005.59 Finally, CBP also uses a pair of programs to disrupt smuggling operations by returning Mexicans to remote locations rather than to the nearest Mexican port of entry, thereby making it more difficult for people to reconnect with smugglers, who typically charge aliens a set fee to enter the United States regardless of the number of attempts. Under the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), certain Mexicans apprehended near the border are repatriated to border ports hundreds of miles away—typically moving people from Arizona to Texas or California.60 Under the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), certain Mexican nationals are repatriated to their home towns within Mexico rather than being returned just across the border.61 To manage these diverse programs, CBP has developed a “Consequence Delivery System … to uniquely evaluate each subject [who is apprehended] and identify the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.”62 Along stretches of the border, USBP agents use laminated cards with matrices describing the range of enforcement actions available for a particular alien as a function of the person’s immigration and criminal histories, among other (...continued) 2009. 55 In the Tucson sector, for example, the courts limits Streamline cases to 70 prosecutions per day; see National Research Council Committee on Estimating Costs of Immigration Enforcement in the Department of Justice, Budgeting for Immigration Enforcement: A Path to Better Performance (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011). 56 According to CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, Operation Streamline was initiated in the Yuma Sector in December 2006, Laredo Sector in October 2007, Tucson Sector in January 2008, and Rio Grande Valley Sector in June, 2008. 57 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, November 1, 2011. 58 Ibid. 59 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, October 17, 2011. 60 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 10 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry factors. According to public comments by CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, the goal of the Consequence Delivery System, in certain sectors of the border, is to ensure that virtually everyone who is apprehended faces “some type of consequence,” including criminal charges, formal removal, or one of the remote repatriation programs described above.63 Figure 1 depicts trends in two indicators of enforcement with consequences: removal cases initiated by the Border Patrol and immigration-related criminal charges brought in the federal court system, including illegal entry and illegal re-entry.64 As Figure 1 indicates, the number of immigration-related criminal cases more than tripled between 1999 and 2010 (from 28,764 to 84,388 cases), and USBP removals increased fourteen-fold from 12,867 to 189,653. These increases occurred at a time of falling alien apprehensions, as described below (see Figure 5), so the ratio of aliens facing enforcement with consequences relative to USBP apprehensions increased from 1% in 1999 to 58% in 2010.65 Figure 1. Enforcement with Consequences, Selected Indicators, FY1999-FY2010 Sources: Apprehensions data from DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics; removal data from USBP Office of Legislative Affairs, November 11, 2011; criminal case data from U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts. 63 Alan Bersin, The State of US/Mexico Border Security, Center for American Progress, August 4, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2011/08/usmexicoborder.html. Bersin indicated that certain aliens would not be subject to enforcement with consequences, such as aliens younger than 18 years old traveling without a parent or legal guardian (i.e., unaccompanied minors). 64 About two-thirds of immigration-related charges were brought in magistrate courts, overwhelmingly for misdemeanor illegal entry cases; and about three quarters of cases brought in federal district courts were for illegal entry or illegal re-entry cases, with the remainder including cases for immigrant smuggling, visa fraud, and other immigration offenses. 65 Not all people facing immigration-related criminal charges were apprehended by USBP, and not all aliens subject to removal by USBP were apprehended during the same fiscal year. Thus, the proportion of aliens facing enforcement with consequences as described in Figure 1 are not precisely defined as a percentage of USBP apprehensions, though USBP apprehensions represent the great majority of such cases. Congressional Research Service 11 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Notes: Apprehensions and removal data are for aliens apprehended by USBP. Removals include expedited removal, notice to appear, and reinstatement of order of removal initiated by USBP. Criminal charges include immigration-related cases identified among U.S. District Court immigration cases commenced and U.S. Magistrate Court cases petty offense cases disposed of. Immigration-related cases include alien smuggling, illegal entry, illegal re-entry, fraud and misuse of visa/permit, and other immigration offenses. 2012 National Border Patrol Strategy USBP is expected to release a new five-year national strategy early in 2012. Reflecting the fact that USBP and DHS have deployed many of the resources identified as priorities in previous strategic plans, the new strategy is expected to shift its focus from resource levels to a risk-based analysis that targets resources to the greatest border threats. Under such an approach, the Border Patrol is expected to work closely with other law enforcement agencies (both inside and outside of DHS) and with other stakeholders to identify top enforcement priorities; to move technology, manpower, and other resources around the border; and to draw on its full range of enforcement responses to maximize the overall effectiveness of DHS’s border enforcement efforts.66 Budget and Resources Statutory changes since 1986 and the strategic and operational changes described above are reflected in appropriations for border enforcement and in increased investments in each of the three core elements of border enforcement: personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology. This section reviews trends in each of these areas. Border Patrol Appropriations Figure 2 depicts U.S. Border Patrol appropriations for FY1989-FY2012. For the most part, appropriations for USBP have grown steadily over this period, rising from $232 million in 1989 to $1.3 billion in FY2002 (the last data available prior to the creation of DHS), $3.8 billion in FY2010, and a requested amount of $3.6 billion in FY2012—a nominal increase of 1,450% and an increase of 750% when accounting for inflation.67 The largest growth has come since the formation of DHS in FY2003, reflecting Congress’s interest in enhancing border security in the aftermath of 9/11. 66 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, December 14, 2011. See Figure 2 for sources. Due to the manner in which the Border Patrol collects and organizes its data, all statistics presented in this report (except where otherwise indicated) are based on the federal fiscal year, which begins October 1 and ends on September 30. All dollar amounts in this report are nominal values for the year from which data are reported, with adjustments for inflation here and below based on CRS calculations using Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator,” http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 67 Congressional Research Service 12 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 2. U.S. Border Patrol Appropriations, FY1989-FY2012 Sources: Appropriations as enacted reported in INS Congressional Budget Justification FY1991-FY2002; H.Rept. 108-280 (FY2004), H.Rept. 108-774 (FY2005); H.Rept. 109-241 (FY2006); H.Rept. 109-699 (FY2007); Explanatory Statement to Accompany P.L. 110-161 Div. E (FY2008); Explanatory Statement to Accompany P.L. 110-329 (FY2009); H.Rept. 111-298 (FY2010); S.Rept. 112-74 (FY2011); and H.Rept. 112-331(FY2012)(continued...) Congressional Research Service 6 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry be subject to criminal charges if they illegally reenter the United States.42 Prior to 2005, most unauthorized Mexicans apprehended at the border were not placed in removal proceedings, in part because standard removal procedures require an appearance before an immigration judge and are resource intensive. Since 2005, CBP has relied extensively on two provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that permit aliens to be formally removed with limited judicial processing. Under INA Section 235(b), certain arriving aliens are subject to “expedited removal” (ER) without additional hearing or review.43 ER was added to the INA in 1996, but initially was reserved for aliens apprehended at ports of entry. In a series of four announcements between November 2002 and January 2006, DHS expanded the use of ER to include certain aliens who had entered the United States within the previous two weeks and who were apprehended anywhere within 100 miles of a U.S. land or coastal border.44 Under INA Section 241(a)(5), an alien who reenters the United States after being formally removed or departing under a removal order is subject to “reinstatement of removal” without reopening or reviewing the original removal order.45 • Criminal Charges. Unauthorized aliens apprehended at the border may face federal immigration charges,46 but historically, most have not been charged with a crime. Working with the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS has increased the proportion of people apprehended at the border who are charged with immigration-related criminal offenses. About half of aliens facing criminal charges in Southwest border districts are prosecuted through the “Operation Streamline” program (see accompanying text box). Mexicans apprehended in the United States who are found to be smuggling aliens may also be subject to (...continued) depart” in lieu of facing formal removal proceedings (INA §240B). 40 “Aliens” is synonymous with non-citizens, including legal permanent residents, temporary nonimmigrants, and unauthorized aliens. 41 INA §212(a)(9). 42 INA §276. 43 Aliens who indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution are not subject to formal removal; for a fuller discussion of expedited removal see CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 44 Ibid. Under the 2006 policy, most Mexicans apprehended at the Southwest border were not placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they had previous criminal convictions. 45 CBP’s expanded use of reinstatement of removal depended, in part, on its ability to identify repeat offenders by enrolling their biometric data in the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system, a database of over 150 million individual records, making it the largest biometric database in the world. IDENT was implemented along the Southwest border beginning in 1999. For a fuller discussion of the US-VISIT system see archived CRS Report R42985, Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress, coordinated by William L. Painter; and CRS Report CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, by Lisa Seghetti and Stephen R. Vina. 46 Aliens apprehended at the border may face federal immigration-related criminal charges for illegal entry (8 U.S.C. §1325) or (on a second or subsequent apprehension) illegal re-entry (8 U.S.C. §1326), and in some cases they may face charges related to human smuggling (8 U.S.C. §1324) and visa and document fraud (18 U.S.C. §1546). Unlawful presence in the United States absent additional factors is a civil violation, not a criminal offense. See CRS Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Michael John Garcia. Congressional Research Service 7 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry criminal charges in Mexico under the U.S.-Mexican Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS).47 Operation Streamline Operation Streamline is a partnership program among CBP, U.S. Attorneys, and District Court judges in certain border districts to expedite criminal justice processing. The program permits groups of up to 40 criminal defendants to have their cases heard at the same time, rather than requiring judges to review individual charges, and arranges in most cases for aliens facing felony charges for illegal re-entry to plead guilty to misdemeanor illegal entry charges—a plea bargain that leads to the rapid resolution of cases. Although Operation Streamline has been described as a zero tolerance program leading to prosecutions for 100% of apprehended aliens, the program confronts limits in judicial and detention capacity, resulting in daily caps on the number of people facing charges in certain districts. In the Tucson sector, for example, the courts reportedly limit Streamline cases to about 70 prosecutions per day. Operation Streamline was established in the USBP’s Del Rio Sector in December 2005 and expanded to the Yuma Sector in December 2006, Laredo Sector in October 2007, Tucson Sector in January 2008, and Rio Grande Valley Sector in June 2008. The program mainly consists of procedural arrangements among DHS and DOJ officials at the local level, and 15 CBP agents have been detailed to DOJ in three Border Patrol sectors to assist DOJ attorneys and U.S. Marshalls with prosecutions. A total of 208,939 people were processed through Operation Streamline through the end of FY2012—about 45% of the 463,051 immigration-related prosecutions in Southwest border districts during this period. Sources: CBP Office of Congressional Affairs; National Research Council Committee on Estimating Costs of Immigration Enforcement in the Department of Justice, Budgeting for Immigration Enforcement: A Path to Better Performance (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011). • Remote repatriation. CBP uses a pair of programs to return Mexicans to remote locations rather than to the nearest Mexican port of entry. Under the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), certain Mexicans apprehended near the border are repatriated to border ports hundreds of miles away—typically moving people from Arizona to Texas or California—a process commonly described as “lateral repatriation.”48 Under the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), certain Mexican nationals are repatriated to their home towns within Mexico rather than being returned just across the border.49 In general, these high consequence enforcement outcomes are intended to deter illegal flows by raising the costs to migrants of being apprehended and by making it more difficult for them to reconnect with smugglers following a failed entry attempt.50 To manage these disparate programs, CBP has designed the “Consequence Delivery System.... to uniquely evaluate each subject [who is apprehended] and identify the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.”51 USBP agents use laminated cards with matrices describing the range of enforcement 47 A total of about 3,000 people were transferred to Mexico for prosecution under the program in FY2005-FY2012, according to data provided to CRS by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs. 48 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. 49 Ibid. 50 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. Most alien smugglers reportedly charge aliens a set fee to enter the United States regardless of the number of attempts, so one goal of the high consequence enforcement programs is to disrupt smugglers’ business model. 51 Ibid. The Consequence Delivery System was formally launched January 1, 2011. Congressional Research Service 8 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry actions available for a particular alien as a function of the person’s immigration and criminal histories, among other factors, and of the enforcement resources available in each Border Patrol sector. According to public comments by then CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, the goal of the Consequence Delivery System, in certain sectors of the border, is to ensure that virtually everyone who is apprehended faces “some type of consequence” other than voluntary return.52 As Figure 1 indicates, the effort to limit voluntary returns in favor of “high consequence” enforcement outcomes has, to a great degree, been implemented. The figure depicts Southwest border apprehensions (the solid line) and the four main types of enforcement outcomes (voluntary returns, criminal charges, formal removal, and remote repatriation—the shaded areas) for FY2005-FY2012. (Enforcement outcomes exceed apprehensions because some aliens face more than one outcome, such as formal removal along with lateral repatriation. In addition, certain aliens apprehended in one fiscal year do not complete their case processing until the following year.) As the figure illustrates, voluntary return fell from 77% of all enforcement outcomes in 2005 (956,470 out of 1,238,554) to 14% in FY2012 (76,664 out of 529,393). Conversely, the proportion of enforcement outcomes that were high consequence outcomes (i.e., criminal charges, formal removal, or remote repatriation) increased from 23% (282,084 out of 1,238,554) in FY2005 to 86% in FY2012 (452,664 out of 529,393). Figure 1. CBP “Enforcement with Consequences,” FY2005-FY2012 Southwest Border Sources: CRS presentation of data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs March 10, 2013; ICE Office of Congressional Affairs March 22, 2013; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 52 Alan Bersin, The State of US/Mexico Border Security, Center for American Progress, August 4, 2011. Under section 240B of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), immigration officers and/or immigration judges may permit certain aliens to depart the United States in lieu of (or at the termination of) a formal removal hearing, a process known as “voluntary departure” or “voluntary return.” Bersin indicated that certain aliens may still be eligible for voluntary return, such as aliens younger than 18 years old traveling without a parent or legal guardian (i.e., unaccompanied minors). Congressional Research Service 9 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Notes: Immigration-related criminal charges may include some U.S. citizens and lawful aliens. One factor that has facilitated the rise in the proportion of apprehensions subject to highconsequence enforcement has been a sharp drop in the number of aliens apprehended on the Southwest border, as discussed in this report (see “Alien Apprehensions”). Nonetheless, as Figure 1 also illustrates, CBP’s effort to expand high-consequence enforcement has resulted in an absolute rise in removals, prosecutions, and lateral/interior repatriations since 2007, even during a period of falling border apprehensions. With the implementation of the Consequence Delivery System, the Border Patrol has initiated a new system to estimate the deterrent effect of different enforcement outcomes. In particular, USBP tracks, for each of 10 different enforcement consequences, the percentage of aliens who were re-apprehended during the same fiscal year following repatriation (i.e., the recidivism rate). These recidivism rates are reported in Table 1. Table 1. Consequence Delivery System Outcomes and Recidivism Rates Southwest Border FY2011 Consequence Criminal Charges OASISS Formal Removal Remote Repatriation Number of Cases FY2012 Recidivism Rate Number of Cases Recidivism Rate 533 14.7% 429 10.2% Operation Streamline 36,871 12.1% 44,300 10.3% Standard Prosecution 31,130 9.1% 34,839 9.1% Notice to Appear 20,923 6.6% 23,491 3.8% Expedited Removal 39,855 16.6% 148,548 16.4% Reinstatement 74,106 16.9% 98,424 15.9% Quick Court 2,730 19.0% 1,070 18.3% MIRP 8,940 9.3% 0 NAa ATEP 75,966 27.8% 101,992 23.8% 129,207 29.4% 76,664 27.1% 318,883 19.8% 347,921 16.7% Voluntary Return Total Cases Source: CRS analysis based on data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 10, 2013. Notes: OASISS stands for the U.S.-Mexican Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security. See text for discussions of Operation Streamline, expedited removal, and reinstatement of removal. Standard Prosecution refers to criminal charges through the standard federal prosecution process. Notice to appear is the first stage in the standard formal removal process before an immigration judge. Quick court is a program involving expedited removal hearings before an immigration judge. MIRP stands for the Mexico Interior Repatriation Program. ATEP stands for the Alien Transfer Exchange Program. Total Cases refers to the total number of apprehensions and border-wide overall recidivism rate. The sum of the consequences exceeds the number of total cases because some people are subject to more than one consequence. a. MIRP did not operate in FY2012. As Table 1 indicates, several consequences were associated with recidivism rates well below the overall FY2012 average of 16.7%. These low recidivism consequences included standard removal proceedings following a notice to appear (3.8%), standard criminal prosecutions (9.1%), Congressional Research Service 10 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry criminal charges through the OASISS program (10.2%), and Operation Streamline (10.3%). Recidivism rates were also lower than the FY2011 average of 19.8% for aliens returned to Mexico through the MIRP program (9.3%) in that year. (MIRP did not operate in FY2012.) Conversely, recidivism rates in FY2012 were well above the overall average for aliens subject to voluntary return (27.1%) and for aliens subject to lateral repatriation through the ATEP program (23.8%). The differences in recidivism rates may not be wholly attributable to differences among the consequences because the Border Patrol takes account of aliens’ migration histories and other factors when assigning people to different enforcement outcomes. Nonetheless, these data suggest that standard removal and criminal charges have a stronger deterrent effect on future unauthorized migration than does voluntary return. Conversely, lateral repatriation appears to do little to discourage people from reentering the United States.53 Budget and Resources Statutory and strategic changes since 1986 are reflected in border enforcement appropriations and in CBP’s assets at the border, including personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology. This section reviews trends in each of these areas. Border Security Appropriations Figure 2 depicts U.S. Border Patrol appropriations for FY1989-FY2013. Appropriations have grown steadily over this period, rising from $232 million in 1989 to $1.3 billion in FY2002 (the last data available prior to the creation of DHS), $3.8 billion in FY2010, and $3.7 billion in FY2013—a nominal increase of 1,450% and an increase of 730% when accounting for inflation.54 The largest growth came following the formation of DHS in FY2003, reflecting Congress’s focus on border security in the aftermath of 9/11. 53 According to CBP Office of Congressional Affairs (April 24, 2013), aliens repatriated through the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) typically are voluntarily returned or subject to expedited removal. Thus, ATEP’s high recidivism rates are partly a result of the relatively high rates associated with these two outcomes. 54 See Figure 2 for sources. Due to the manner in which the Border Patrol collects and organizes its data, all statistics presented in this report (except where otherwise indicated) are based on the federal fiscal year, which begins October 1 and ends on September 30. All dollar amounts in this report are nominal values for the year from which data are reported, with adjustments for inflation here and below based on CRS calculations using Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator,” http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. Congressional Research Service 11 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 2. U.S. Border Patrol Appropriations, FY1989-FY2013 Sources: INS Congressional Budget Justification FY1991-FY2002; DHS Appropriations reports FY2004-FY2013. Notes: Appropriations for 1989-2002 reflect the “Border Patrol” sub-account of the INS Salaries and Expenses account of the DOJ annual appropriations. Appropriations for 2004-2012 reflect the “Border Security and Control between Ports of Entry” sub-account of the CBP Salaries and Expenses account of the DHS annual appropriations. Data are not available for FY2003 because neither the INS nor congressional appropriators provided a breakout of the salaries and expenses sub-accounts within the Enforcement and Border Affairs account during that year’s funding cycle. The overall Enforcement and Border Affairs account within INS for FY2003 was $2,881 million, up from $2,541 million in FY2001 and $2,740 million in FY2002. With the establishment of DHS, the former INS, customs inspections from the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol were merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection within DHS. As a result, data for years prior to FY2003 may not be strictly comparable with data for FY2004 and after. FY2005 figure includes a $124 million supplemental appropriation from P.L. 109-13. FY2006 figure does not include any portion of the $423 million in supplemental funding for CBP Salaries and Expenses in P.L. 109-234 because the law did not specify how much of this funding was for USBP; DHS reported in its FY2008 DHS Budget Justification that the Border Patrol received a $1,900 million appropriation in FY2006. FY2010 figure includes a $176 million supplemental appropriation from P.L. 111-230. Appropriations reported in Figure 2 are only a subset of all border security and immigration enforcement funding and should not be interpreted as a full accounting of spending at the border or spending on immigration controlfunding. These data do not include, for example, additional CBP subaccountssub-accounts funding Headquarters Management and Administration ($1.94 billion enacted in FY2012), in FY2013), and Border Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation at Ports of Entry ($2.5 billion), Air and Marine Operation Salaries ($288 million),3.2 billion); or additional CBP accounts funding Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology ($400324 million in FY2012); Air and Marine Operations ($504799 million) and Construction ($237 million).68 A substantial portion of all of these 68 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2055, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 15, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 13 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry accounts are Construction and Facilities Management ($234 million).55 A substantial portion of these accounts is dedicated to border security and immigration enforcement, as these terms are commonly used. The data in Figure 2 also exclude U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) appropriations, which totaled $5.4 billion for Salaries and Expenses for FY2011.69 According to DHS, about a quarter of ICE’s 20,000 personnel were deployed to the Southwest border in that year.70 And Figure FY2013.56 About a 55 Account-level data are from the House Explanatory Statement to accompany P.L. 113-6. Also see CRS Report R42644, Department of Homeland Security: FY2013 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter. 56 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 12 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry quarter of ICE’s 20,000 personnel reportedly are deployed to the Southwest border.57 And Figure 2 excludes border enforcement appropriations for other federal agencies—including the Departments of Justice, Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture, all of which also play a role in border security—as well as funding for the U.S. federal court system.7158 Border Patrol Personnel Accompanying this overall budget increase, Congress has passed at least four laws since 1986 authorizing increased Border Patrol personnel.72 Appropriators generally have supported such growth; USBP staffing has more than doubled over the past decade and increased more than ninefold since 1998 (see Figure 3). As of September 30, 2011, the USBP had 21,444 agents, including 18,506 posted at the Southwest border and 2,237 posted at the northern border.7359 USBP staffing roughly doubled in the decade after the 1986 IRCA, doubled again between 1996 and the 9/11 attacks, and doubled again in the decade after 9/11 (see Figure 3). As of January 2013, the USBP had 21,370 agents, including 18,462 posted at the Southwest border and 2,212 posted at the northern border.60 These numbers are up from a total of 2,268 Border Patrol agents in 1980 (including 1,975 at the Southwest border and 211 at the northern border) and 10,045 in 2002 (including 9,239 at the Southwest border and 492 at the northern border). (...continued) 2011, H.Rept. 112-331 (Washington: GPO, 2011), pp. 957-963. Also see CRS Report R41982, Homeland Security Department: FY2012 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter and Jennifer E. Lake. 69 Ibid. 7061 57 Department of Homeland Security, “Secure and Manage Our Borders,” http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/ gc_1240606351110.shtm. 71 For example, over58 Over one-third of all federal criminal cases commenced in 2009-10 were for immigration cases; see U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts - Criminal Cases Commenced, by Offense, Washington, DC, 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov/ Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/ D02CMar10.pdf. The prosecution of these cases involves expenditures by DOJ prosecutors, federal marshals, the federal bureau of prisons, and the U.S. district and magistrate court systems, among others. The costs of border enforcement borne by federal law enforcement and judicial officials outside of DHS are difficult to describe because these agencies do not list border-specific obligations in their budget documents. Also see National Research Council Committee on Estimating Costs of Immigration Enforcement in the Department of Justice, op. cit. 7259 The Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) authorized an increase of 1,000 Border Patrol agents; the IIRIRA (P.L. 104-208, Div. C) authorized an increase of a total of 5,000 Border Patrol agents in FY1997-FY2001; the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT, P.L. 107-56) authorized DHSINS to triple the number of Border Patrol agents at the northern border; and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) authorized an increase of 10,000 Border Patrol agents between FY2006 and FY2010. 73 USBP, “Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year,” http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/ border_patrol/usbp_statistics/staffing_92_10.ctt/staffing_92_10.pdf60 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, January 9, 2013. 61 See sources cited in Figure 3. Congressional Research Service 1413 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 3. U.S. Border Patrol Agents,Total and by Region, FY1980-FY2011FY2013 Source: 1980-1991: CRS presentation of data from Syracuse University Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse; 1992-2011: CRS presentation of data provided by USBPCBP Office of Congressional Affairs. Note: The total number of Border Patrol agents includes agents stationed in coastal sectors and at the Border Patrol headquarters. In addition to Border Patrol personnel, the National Guard USBP headquarters. National Guard Troops at the Border The National Guard also is authorized to support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) at the border. Basic authority for the Department of Defense (DOD, including the National Guard) to assist LEAs is contained in Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and DOD personnel are expressly authorized to maintain and operate equipment in cooperation with federal LEAs in conjunction with the enforcement of counterterrorism operations or the enforcement of counterdrug laws, immigration laws, and customs requirements.7462 DOD may assist any federal, state, or local LEA requesting counterdrug assistance under the National Defense Authorization Act, as amended.7563 Under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, National Guard personnel personnel also may serve a federal purpose, such as border security, and receive federal pay while remaining under the command control of their respective state governors.7664 National Guard troops were first deployed to the border on a pilot basis in 1988, when about 100 soldiers assisted the U.S. Customs Service at several Southwest border locations, and National Guard and active military units provided targeted support for the USBP’s surveillance programs throughout the following decade. The first large-scale deployment of the National Guard to the border occurred in 2006-2008, when over 30,000 troops provided engineering, aviation, identification, technical, logistical, and administrative support to CBP as part of “Operation Jump Start.”77 President Obama announced an additional deployment of up to 1,200 National Guard 7462 See CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. Chuck Mason. P.L. 101-510. Div. A, Title X, §1004; also see Ibid. 7664 32 U.S.C. §§ 502(a) and 502(f); also see CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. Chuck Mason. 77 See CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. Chuck Mason. 7563 Congressional Research Service 1514 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Start.”65 President Obama announced an additional deployment of up to 1,200 National Guard troops to the Southwest border on May 25, 2010, with the National Guard supporting the Border Patrol, by providing intelligence work and drug and human trafficking interdiction.7866 The 2010 deployment was originally scheduled to end in June 2011, but the full deployment was extended twice (in June and September 2011) before the. The Administration announced in December 2011 that the the deployment would be reduced to fewer than 300 troops beginning in January 2012.79 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure The second key element of DHS’s border enforcement strategy is tactical infrastructure, including , with National Guard efforts focused on supporting DHS’s aerial surveillance operations.67 In December 2012, DHS and the Department of Defense announced that the National Guard deployment would be extended through December 2013.68 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure Border tactical infrastructure includes roads, lighting, pedestrian fencing, and vehicle barriers. Tactical infrastructure is intended to impede illicit cross-border activity, disrupt and restrict smuggling operations, and establish a substantial probability of apprehending terrorists seeking entry into the United States.8069 The former INS installed the first fencing along the U.S.-Mexican border beginning in 1990, eventually covering the 14 miles of the border east of the Pacific Ocean near San Diego. Congress expressly authorized the construction and improvement of fencing and other barriers under Section 102(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208, Div. C), which also required (pursuant to Section 102(b)) the completion of a triple-layered fence along the original 14 milesmile border segment near San Diego. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) amended IIRIRA Section 102(b) with a requirement for doublelayered for double-layered fencing along five segments of the Southwest border, totaling about 850 miles.8170 IIRIRA was amended again by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008 (P.L. 110-161110161). Under that amendment, the law now requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct reinforced fencing “along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where fencing would be most practical and effective and provide for the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain operational control of the southwest border.”8271 The act further specifies, however, that the Secretary of Homeland Security is not required to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors fencing “in a particular location along an the international border of the United States, States if the Secretary determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control over the international border at such location.83 As of October 6, 2011, DHS had installed 351 miles of pedestrian fencing and 299 miles of vehicle fencing (total of 650 miles) out of 651 miles DHS had identified as appropriate for fencing and barriers in order to achieve and maintain operational control of the border (see 78 Ibid. such location.”72 65 See CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. Chuck Mason. Ibid. 67 Associated Press, “National Guard Troops at Mexico Border Cut to Fewer Than 300,” USA Today, December 20, 2011. 8068 Homeland Security Today, “Pentagon Extends Deployment of National Guard in CBP Air Support Mission,” December 7, 2012. 69 Customs and Border Protection, “Tactical Infrastructure: History and Purpose,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ border_security/ti/about_ti/ti_history.xml. 8170 P.L. 109-367 identified five specific stretches of the border where fencing was to be installed; CBP Congressional Affairs provided CRS with this estimate of the total mileage covered by the law on September 25, 2006. 8271 P.L. 110-161, Div. E, § 564. Unlike under prior law, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, as enacted, does not specify that reinforced fencing be “at least 2 layers.” See P.L. 104-208, Div. C, § 102(b), as amended by P.L. 109-367, § 3. Also see CRS Report RL33659, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, by Chad C. Haddal and Michael John Garcia. 833. 72 P.L. 110-161, Div. E, § 564. 7966 Congressional Research Service 16 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 4).84 Figure 4 also summarizes annual appropriations for tactical infrastructure (including surveillance technology) for FY1996-FY2012. Appropriations increased from $25 million in FY1996 to $298 million in FY2006, an eleven-fold increase (eight-fold when adjusting for inflation), and then jumped to $1.5 billion in FY2007 as DHS created a new Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account and appropriated money to pay for the border fencing mandate in the Secure Fence Act of 2006. BSFIT appropriations remained at over $1 billion in FY2008 before falling to $573 million in FY2011 and $400 million in FY2012. Figure 4. Tactical Infrastructure Appropriations and Miles of Border Fencing, FY1996-FY2012 Sources: FY1996-FY2002 tactical infrastructure funding is from the FY2003 INS Congressional Budget Justification. FY1996 construction funding is from P.L. 104-134. FY1997 funding is from P.L. 104-208. FY1998 construction funding is from P.L. 105-119. FY1999 construction funding is from P.L. 105-277. FY2000 construction funding is from the FY2001 INS Congressional Budget Justification and H.Rept. 107-278. FY2001 and FY2002 construction funding are from the FY2002 INS Congressional Budget Justification. FY2003 construction and tactical infrastructure funding is from the FY2005 DHS Congressional Budget Justification. FY2004-FY2005 construction and tactical infrastructure appropriations are from the FY2006 DHS Congressional Budget Justification. FY2006 construction and tactical infrastructure appropriations are from the FY2007 DHS Congressional Budget Justification. FY2007 construction and Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) appropriations are from P.L. 109-234 and P.L. 109-295. FY2008 BSFIT appropriation is from P.L. 110-161. FY2009 BSFIT appropriation is from P.L. 110-329 and P.L. 111-5. FY2010 BSFIT appropriation is from P.L. 111-83 and P.L. 111-230. FY2011 BSFIT appropriations is from P.L. 112-10. FY2012 BSFIT appropriation is from P.L. 112-7415 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 4. Tactical Infrastructure Appropriations and Miles of Border Fencing, FY1996-FY2012 Sources: INS Congressional Budget Justifications FY2001-FY2003; DHS Congressional Budget Justifications FY2005-2007; DHS Appropriations bills FY2007-FY2013. Notes: In FY2003, immigration inspections from the former INS, customs inspections from the former U.S. Customs Service, and USBP were merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection within DHS. As a result, data for years prior to FY2003 may not be comparable with the data for FY2004 and after. Data for FY1996-FY2002 include USBP construction and tactical infrastructure accounts. Construction account funding has been used to fund a number of projects at the border, including fencing, vehicle barriers, roads, and USBP stations and checkpoints. Funding for FY1998-FY2000 includes San Diego fencing as well as fencing, light, and 84 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs communication with CRS, October 6, 2011. Congressional Research Service 17 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry road projects in El Centro, Tucson, El Paso, and Marfa. Data for FY2003-FY2006 include DHS construction and tactical appropriations. Data for FY2007-FY2012 include DHS total appropriations to CBP’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account, created by appropriators in FY2007. This account funds the construction of fencing, other infrastructure such as roads and vehicle barriers, as well as border technologies such as cameras and sensors. Surveillance Assets The Border Patrol utilizes advanced technology to augment its agents’ ability to patrol the border. USBP’s primary system of border surveillance assets has its origins in the former INS’ Integrated Surveillance Information System (ISIS), initiated in 1998. ISIS was folded into a broader border surveillance system named the America’s Shield Initiative (ASI) in 2005, and ASI was made part of DHS’ Secure Border Initiative (SBI) the following year, with the surveillance program renamed SBInet and managed under contract by the Boeing Corporation. Under all three of these names, the system consisted of a network of Remote Video Surveillance technologies such as cameras and sensors. As of January 15, 2013, DHS had installed 352 miles of primary pedestrian fencing, 299 miles of vehicle fencing (total of 651 miles), and 36 miles of secondary fencing (see Figure 4). The Border Patrol reportedly had identified a total of 653 miles of the border as appropriate for fencing and barriers (i.e., 2 additional miles).73 Figure 4 also summarizes annual appropriations for tactical infrastructure (including surveillance technology) for FY1996-FY2013. Appropriations increased from $25 million in FY1996 to $298 million in FY2006, an 11-fold increase (8-fold when adjusting for inflation), and then jumped to $1.5 billion in FY2007 as DHS created a new Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account and appropriated money to pay for the border fencing mandate in the Secure Fence Act of 2006. BSFIT appropriations have fallen every year since FY2007, reaching $324 million in FY2013. 73 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano before the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2013. Congressional Research Service 16 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Surveillance Assets The Border Patrol uses advanced technology to augment its agents’ ability to patrol the border. USBP’s border surveillance system has its origins in the former Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS’s) Integrated Surveillance Information System (ISIS), initiated in 1998. ISIS was folded into a broader border surveillance system named the America’s Shield Initiative (ASI) in 2005, and ASI was made part of DHS’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) the following year, with the surveillance program renamed SBInet and managed under contract by the Boeing Corporation. Under all three of these names, the system consisted of a network of remote video surveillance (RVS) systems (including cameras and infrared systems), and sensors (including seismic, magnetic, and thermal detectors), linked into a computer network, known as the Integrated Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database. The system was intended to ensure seamless coverage of the border by combining the feeds from multiple cameras and sensors into one remote-controlled system linked to a central communications control room at a USBP station or sector headquarters. USBP personnel monitoring the control room screened the ICAD system to re-position RVS cameras toward the location where sensor alarms were tripped (although some camera positions are fixed and cannot be panned). Control room . Control room personnel then alerted field agents to the intrusion and coordinated the response. All three of these systems struggled to meet deployment timelines and to provide USBP with the promised level of “situational awareness” with respect to illegal entries.85border surveillance.74 DHS also faced criticism of ASI and SBInet for non-competitivenoncompetitive contracting practices, inadequate oversight of contractors, and cost overruns.8675 DHS Secretary Napolitano ordered a department-wide assessment of the SBInet technology project in January 2010 and suspended the SBInet contract in March 2010.8776 The review confirmed SBInet’s history of “continued and repeated technical 85 See, for example, testimony of DHS Inspector General Richard L. Skinner before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, New Secure Border Initiative, 109th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2005; GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086, September 22, 2008; and GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09896.pdf. 86 In FY2005, the General Services Administration’s Inspector General (GSA IG) released a report that criticized the USBP for its contracting practices regarding RVS system. The GSA IG found that the contracts were awarded without competition, and that in many cases the contractor failed to deliver the services that were stipulated within the contract, leading to RVS sites not being operational in a timely manner. In a 2005 report, the DHS Inspector General (DHS IG) noted that deficiencies in contract management and processes resulted in 169 incomplete RVS sites. DHS IG audits of SBInet similarly found that DHS did not have adequate organizational capacity to manage SBInet at program initiation or adequate controls and effective oversight of SBInet support service contact workers; see DHS IG, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, DHS OIG-09-80, Washington, DC, June 2009. And in 2010 the DHS IG reported additional oversight problems with respect to the completion of contracted program tasks; see DHS IG, Controls Over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved, DHS OIG-10-96, Washington, DC, June 2010. 87 SBInet’s history of “continued and repeated technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays, raising serious questions about the system’s ability to meet the needs for technology along the border.”77 DHS terminated SBInet in January 2011. Under the department’s current Arizona Surveillance Technology Plan, the Border Patrol deploys a mix of different surveillance technologies designed to meet the specific needs of different border regions. As of November 2012, deployed assets included 337 Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) consisting of fixed daylight and infrared cameras that transmit images to a central location (up from 269 in 2006), 198 short and medium range Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems (MVSS) mounted on trucks and monitored in the truck’s passenger compartment (up from zero in 2005) and 41 long range Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS, up from zero in 2005), 74 See, for example, testimony of DHS Inspector General Richard L. Skinner before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, New Secure Border Initiative, 109th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2005; GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086, September 22, 2008; and GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09896.pdf. 75 See DHS Inspector General (DHS IG), Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, DHS OIG-09-80, Washington, DC, June 2009; DHS IG, Controls Over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved, DHS OIG-10-96, Washington, DC, June 2010. 76 Testimony of CBP Assistant Commissioner Mark Borkowski before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, After SBInet–The Future of Technology on the Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 2011. 77 DHS, Report on the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Program, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 1. Congressional Research Service 1817 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays, raising serious questions about the system’s ability to meet the needs for technology along the border.”88 DHS terminated SBInet in January 2011.89 Under DHS’s new Alternative Surveillance Technology Plan, DHS plans to deploy a mix of Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) consisting of fixed daylight and infrared cameras that transmit images to a central location, Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) mounted on trucks and monitored in the truck’s passenger compartment, hand-held equipment, and existing SBInet integrated towers.90 A November 2011 GAO review of the new technology plan found that CBP’s analysis leading to the new plan did not adequately justify the specific mix of technologies to be deployed and that the planning process did not include sufficient risk and uncertainty analysis. GAO questioned the cost-effectiveness of some elements of the plan, including the deployment of SBInet Integrated Fixed Towers in certain parts of Arizona.91 In addition to these ground-based surveillance assets, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) deploys 270 aircraft and 280 marine vessels to conduct surveillance operations and contribute to the interdiction of unauthorized aliens and other smuggling operations.92 OAM operates nine unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), including four Predator B systems from the National Air Security Operations Center (NASOC) in Sierra Vista, AZ; two Predator B systems from NASOC in Grand Forks, ND; and maritime variants of the Predator B, known as Guardians, from NASOC stations in Cocoa Beach, FL, and two from Corpus Christi, TX.93 The UASs are used to conduct homeland security, law enforcement, and disaster relief missions in areas that are difficult to access or otherwise considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground.94 Enforcement Outcomes For many years, the INS and DHS have used apprehensions by the USBP as a proxy measure of illegal entries, 95 and changes in apprehensions as an indicator of border enforcement outcomes. 88 DHS, Report on the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Program, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 1. 89 See DHS, Annual Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2011, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 14. 90 Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and System Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and Oversight; and Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism; Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to Reassess and Better Manage Key Technology Program, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., Thursday, June 17, 2010. 91 GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs is Needed Before Proceeding, GAO-12-22, November 2011, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1222.pdf. 92 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: Office of Air and Marine, Washington, DC, January 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/marine/air_marine.ctt/air_marine.pdf. 93 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP receives Fourth Predator-B in Arizona,” press release, December 27, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/12272011.xml. 94 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “UAS Overview,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/air_marine/ uas_program/uasoverview.xml. CBP reportedly plans to expand its UAS fleet to 24 such systems, dependent on funding; see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border, GAO-11-856R, September 12, 2011; also see William Booth, “More Predator Drones Fly U.S.-Mexico Border,” Washington Post, December 21, 2011. 95 See , for example, CBP, Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, March 15, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/ (continued...) Congressional Research Service 19 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Apprehensions data are difficult to interpret, however, for several reasons discussed below. Thus, after discussing apprehensions data, this section describes DHS’s measure of operational control of the border as well as several additional metrics that may be used as indicators of border enforcement outcomes. Alien Apprehensions Figure 5 depicts total USBP apprehensions of deportable and removable aliens for FY1991FY2011. Apprehensions are easy to monitor and they allow for long-term comparisons because DHS and its predecessor agencies have been recording apprehension trends for almost 100 years.96 Thus, while apprehensions data alone should not be used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of border enforcement (see “The Limits of Apprehensions Data”), apprehensions are a key source of information about the number of people attempting to enter the country illegally. Figure 5. U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions of Deportable Aliens, FY1991-FY2011 Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Statistical Yearbook; DHS Annual Financial Report FY2011. Figure 5 suggests two distinct trends. Border patrol apprehensions generally increased between FY1991 and FY2000, climbing from 1.13 million to 1.68 million during that decade. And (...continued) fy2010_factsheet.xml; the fact sheet states that “Nationwide Border Patrol apprehensions of illegal aliens decreased from nearly 724,000 in FY 2008 to approximately 463,000 in FY 2010, a 36 percent reduction, indicating that fewer people are attempting to illegally cross the border.” 96 See DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics FY2010, Washington, DC, August 2011, Table 33, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk10En.shtm. Congressional Research Service 20 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry apprehensions have generally fallen since that time (with the exception of FY2004-FY2006), reaching 327,577 in FY2011—the lowest level since FY1970.97 Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Figure 6 depicts apprehensions along the Southwest border for FY1992-FY201012 hand-held agent portable medium range surveillance systems (APSS, up from zero in 2005), 15 Integrated Fixed Towers that were developed as part of the SBInet system (up from zero in 2005), and 13,406 unattended ground sensors (up from about 11,200 in 2005).78 According to CBP officials, the department’s acquisitions strategy now emphasizes flexible equipment and mobile technology that permits USBP to surge surveillance capacity in a particular region, and off-the-shelf technology in order to hold down costs and get resources on the ground more quickly. Rather than run surveillance monitoring through a station or sector dispatcher, the agency is also experimenting with “real time” dispatching that allows agents in the field to monitor surveillance equipment directly.79 Aerial and Marine Surveillance In addition to these ground-based surveillance assets, CBP deploys manned and unmanned aircraft as well as marine vessels to conduct surveillance. Air and marine vessels patrol regions of the border that are inaccessible to other surveillance assets, with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) deployed in areas considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground.80 In FY2012, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine deployed 19 types of aircraft and three classes of marine vessels, for a total of 269 aircraft and 293 marine vessels operating from over 70 locations.81 The agency reported 81,045 flight hours (down from about 95,000 in FY2011) and 47,742 underway hours in marine vessels (down from about 133,000 in FY2011).82 As of November 2012, CBP operated a total of 10 UAS up from zero in 2006, including 2 UAS on the Northern border, 5 on the Southwest border, and 3 in the Gulf of Mexico.83 UAS accounted for 5,737 flight hours in FY2012, up from 4,406 hours in FY2011.84 With support from Department of Defense (DOD), CBP conducted an evaluation of two unmanned aerostat (tethered blimp) systems during the summer of 2012: the Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) and the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID). In addition, CBP evaluated PGSS and RAID towers, which support aerostat deployment as well as groundbased technologies. These two systems have been deployed by the military to conduct area surveillance. As a result of the evaluation, CBP concluded that these systems could provide useful support to CBP operations on the border; and CBP reportedly is working with DOD to identify opportunities to transfer ownership of aerostats returning from overseas to CBP.85 78 2012 data from U.S. Border Patrol Office of Congressional Affairs November 8, 2012; FY2006 data from DHS Congressional Budget Justification 2006; 2005 data from GAO, “Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance Technology Program,” GAO-06-295, February 2006. 79 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 12, 2012. 80 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy Considerations, testimony of DHS Acting Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Tamara Kessler, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013. 81 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 19, 2013. 82 Ibid.; and CBP Office of Air and Marine, 2011 Air and Marine Milestones and Achievements,” http://www.cbp.gov/ xp/cgov/border_security/am/operations/2011_achiev.xml 83 Northern border UAS are based in Grand Forks, ND; Southwest border UAS are based in Sierra Vista, AZ (four systems) and Corpus Christi, TX (one system); and maritime UAS are based in Corpus Christi, TX (one system) and in Cape Canaveral, FL (two systems). 84 Ibid. 85 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 21, 2013. Congressional Research Service 18 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Border Patrol Enforcement Data For 90 years, the Border Patrol has recorded the number of deportable aliens apprehended in the United States;86 and alien apprehensions remain the agency’s primary indicator of immigration enforcement. The agency also collects several additional measures of immigration enforcement, including unique apprehensions, alien recidivism, and estimated turn backs and got aways. These enforcement outcomes provide insight into the state of the border, as discussed in this section, but they confront certain limitations when it comes to estimating illegal border inflows (see “Metrics of Border Security”). Alien Apprehensions Figure 5 depicts total USBP apprehensions of deportable and removable aliens for FY1960FY2012. Apprehensions are widely understood to be correlated with illegal flows, and the data in Figure 5 reflect historical trends in unauthorized migration (see “Border Patrol History and Strategy”). Thus, apprehensions were very low in the 1960s, but climbed sharply in the two decades after 1965. Apprehensions reached an all-time high of 1.7 million in 1986 and again in 2000, and an average of more than 1.2 million apprehensions per year were recorded 1983-2006, reflecting high levels of unauthorized migration throughout this period. As Figure 5 also illustrates, apprehensions have fallen sharply since 2000, and particularly since 2006. The 340,252 apprehensions observed in 2011 were the lowest level since 1971, and the 364,768 apprehensions in 2012 were the second-lowest level since that time. Falling apprehensions likely reflect fewer illegal inflows since 2006, though the degree to which reduced inflows are a result of effective enforcement versus other factors like the recent U.S. economic downturn remains subject to debate (see “How Secure is the U.S. Border?”). 86 Deportable aliens located refer to Border Patrol apprehensions and ICE administrative arrests. Prior to 1952, data refer to Border Patrol apprehensions. Congressional Research Service 19 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 5.Total USBP Apprehensions of Deportable Aliens, FY1960-FY2012 Source: U.S. Border Patrol. Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Figure 6 depicts apprehensions along the Southwest border for FY1992-FY2012, broken down by certain Border Patrol sectors. The sector-specific apprehension pattern generally adheres to the predictions of the 1994 National Strategic Plan. Increased enforcement in the El Paso and San Diego sectors was associated with high apprehensions in those sectors during the early 1990s, and then with falling apprehensions by the middle of the decade as unauthorized migrants adopted alternative approaches to enter the United States. Apprehensions in the San Diego and El Paso sectors remained well below their early-1990s levels throughout the following decade—findings findings that suggest border enforcement in those sectors has been broadly effective. Congressional Research Service 20 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 6. U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions of Deportable Aliens, Southwest Border, by Selected Sectors, FY1992-FY2011 Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics FY2010; USBP, Fiscal Year Apprehension Statistics 2011FY2012 Source: USBP, Total Apprehensions by Southwest Border Sectors. Falling apprehensions in San Diego and El Paso during the late 1990s initially were more than offset by rising apprehensions in the Tucson, AZ, sector and other Southwest border locations, however. And while apprehensions along the rest of the Southwest border returned to their early-1990s levels beginning in 2007, apprehensions in the Tucson sector remained above their historical 97 CRS calculations based on DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 91. The INS reported a total of 345,353 apprehensions of removable aliens in 1970, a figure which included apprehensions by the USBP and by INS Office of Investigations, within the United States. Historically, USBP apprehensions accounted for about 93% of total INS apprehensions, based on CRS calculations from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Congressional Research Service 21 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry levels—representing almost half of all Southwest border apprehensions—through 2010, before falling back below their 1994 level in 2011. Thus, it appears that some of the success in the San Diego and El Paso sectors came at the expense of other Border Patrol sectors, though apprehensions are down sharply across the entire border since 2007. The Limits of Apprehensions Data While apprehensions data are useful indicators of illegal inflow trends, they are problematic indicators of broader trends in illegal immigration—or of the effectiveness of U.S. enforcement— for at least three reasons. First, apprehensions data exclude three important groups: successful unauthorized aliens (including aliens who enter without inspection, aliens who use fraudulent documents to enter through a port of entry, and aliens who enter legally and overstay their visas); certain unsuccessful unauthorized aliens (including aliens who are denied entry by CBP officers at ports of entry; aliens who are apprehended by local, state, or federal law enforcement officials other than USBP; and aliens who die while crossing the border); and would-be unauthorized aliens who are deterred by border enforcement and do not migrate (including aliens who remain in their communities of origin, or cases of “remote deterrence,” and aliens who attempt to enter the United States but are dissuaded at the border, or cases of “immediate deterrence”). These excluded groups mean that apprehensions data are an incomplete picture both of unauthorized migration and of migration enforcement. Second, apprehensions data count events rather than people. Thus, an unauthorized migrant who is caught trying to enter the country three times in one year counts as three apprehensions in the data set. To the extent that apprehensions are interpreted as a direct indicator of illegal migration, the data therefore may overestimate the actual number of people trying to cross the border. Finally, individual and aggregate migration decisions are highly complex, reflecting not only the risk of apprehension and the costs of migration, but also—at least as importantly—a range of socio-economic “push” and “pull” factors at both ends of the migration chain, as well as social and family networks that facilitate migration.98 Thus, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of a change in alien apprehensions: do fewer apprehensions imply fewer illegal entry attempts, or a lower apprehension rate for the same number of entries? And even if attempted entries are falling, is it a function of increased enforcement or of other changes, such as the U.S. economic downturns in 2001-2002 and since 2007, and/or demographic changes in Mexico?99 Operational Control of the Border Section 2 of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all actions the Secretary determines necessary and appropriate to achieve and maintain operational control over the entire international land and maritime border of the United States.” The section defines operational control to mean “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of 98 See, for example, Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, and Graeme Hugo, et al., Worlds In Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 99 On the effects of Mexico’s falling birthrate on U.S. immigration, see Gordon H. Hanson, Esther Duflo, and Craig McIntosh, “The Demography of Mexican Migration to the United States,” American Economic Review, vol. 99, no. 2 (May 2009), pp. 22-27. Congressional Research Service 22 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.” The section also requires the Secretary to submit annual reports to Congress on the progress made toward achieving operational control. Most experts agree that preventing 100% of unlawful entries across any border is an impossible task—particularly a border as large and open as that of the United States.100 Through FY2010, the Border Patrol classified portions of the border as being under “effective” or “operational” control if the agency “has the ability to detect, respond, and interdict illegal activity at the border or after entry into the United States.”101 The agency conducted a five-level assessment of border security, with the two top levels (“controlled” and “managed”) defined as being under effective control, and the three remaining levels (“monitored,” “low-level monitored,” and “remote/low activity”) defined as not being under effective control.102 These evaluations were based on operational indicators of enforcement (e.g., apprehensions, known illegal entries) and qualitative assessments of border security by USBP officials at the sector and national levels. Table 1 summarizes the number of border miles under effective control for FY2005-FY2010. Table 1. Miles of the Southwest Border Under “Effective Control” Fiscal Year Miles Percent of Border 2005 288 15 2006 449 23 2007 599 31 2008 757 39 2009 939 48 2010 1,107 57 Source: DHS Annual Financial Report, FY2009; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, February 15, 2010. As of FY2011, USBP no longer uses this measure of effective control.103 DHS reportedly has begun to develop a more sophisticated quantitative indicator of border security, and according to CBP officials, effective control will be replaced by a “border condition index,” which will combine multiple dimensions of border security, public safety, and quality of life into a holistic “score” that can be calculated for different regions of the border. 104 100 See, for example, Edward Alden and Bryan Roberts, “Are US Borders Secure? Why We Don't Know, and How to Find Out,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011), pp. 19-26. 101 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measuers for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T, February 15, 2011, p. 7. 102 Ibid., p. 8. 103 DHS did not report on border miles under effective control in its FY2010 Annual Performance Report; see DHS, Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2010-2012, Washington, DC, April 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/cfo_apr_fy2010.pdf. 104 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, December 9, 2011; also see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level, testimony of Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 4, 2011. Congressional Research Service 23 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Additional Measures of Border Enforcement Given these limitations, this section describes other metrics that may offer added insight into illegal migration across U.S. borders and the effects of recent border enforcement efforts. Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) System In 1989, Congress authorized the INS to develop an automated fingerprint-based system to identify and track aliens.105 The system was conceived to identify serial border crossers and criminal aliens. In 1994, Congress appropriated funding for the INS to develop and deploy a biometric database, which grew into the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system. IDENT was first deployed in the Border Patrol’s San Diego sector in December 1994; by the end of 1995, it was installed at 52 Southwest border sites; and by the end of 1999, it was deployed at 408 INS sites, including all Border Patrol stations. The IDENT database, managed by DHS’ U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) division, combines photographs, 10 rolled fingerprints, and biographical data, and includes about 138 million individual records.106 The INS initially used a two-fingerprint-based system (index fingers only) to minimize processing time and because two prints were deemed adequate for identification purposes. USBP began collecting 10 rolled prints in 2004 and deployed workstations that are interoperable with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 10-print Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a biometric database that includes data on criminal records.107 By 2005, all Border Patrol stations were searching the IDENT and IAFIS biometric databases on persons in custody. In 2011, USBP also began automatic searches against biometric records in the Department of Defense (DOD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS). Today, the Border Patrol uses dedicated workstations that feature digital cameras and electronic fingerprint scanners to identify and track illegal aliens through IDENT. Biometric data submitted to IDENT is matched against similar information that is stored in multiple data sets, including the “recidivist” database, which is used to track repeat entrants, and the “lookout” database, which is used to identify criminal aliens. This process in IDENT takes approximately two minutes. The system also automatically searches the FBI IAFIS Criminal Master File and the DOD ABIS database, with results typically returned in less than 10 minutes. When a potential match is found in any of these searches, the station displays the fingerprints, photographs, and biographical information of the matched data. Based on this information, the Border Patrol agent determines whether the data indicate a probable match to the person in custody or whether to submit the subject for additional vetting by a certified fingerprint examiner.108 The IDENT database provides additional insight into border enforcement outcomes by describing the number of unique individuals apprehended by USBP per year (see Figure 7), rather than the number of apprehension events, as described above. (The data in Figure 7 reflect certain 105 Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649), Sec. 503 (b). CRS communication with US-VISIT Office of Congressional Affairs Dec. 16, 2011. 107 CRS communication with CBP Office of Congressional Affairs Dec. 12, 2011. For information on IAFIS see U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis. 108 CRS communication with CBP Office of Congressional Affairs Dec. 22, 2011. 106 Congressional Research Service 24 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry reporting differences from the overall USBP data. The figure therefore also includes total USBP apprehensions as reported in the IDENT database.) As Figure 7 indicates, the number of unique individuals apprehended by USBP fell from about 880,000 in 2000 to about 618,000 in 2003 before climbing back to about 818,000 in 2005 and then dropping sharply to about 269,000 individuals in 2011. Thus, perhaps more importantly, the ratio of total apprehensions to unique individuals apprehended also fell during this period: from an average of 1.63 apprehensions per individual in 2000 to an average of 1.27 apprehensions per individual in 2011. Figure 7. U.S. Border Patrol IDENT Apprehensions, 2000-2011 Source: CRS presentation of data provided by US-VISIT Office of Congressional Affairs, December 16. 2011, and CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 22, 2011. Notes: Apprehensions events refers to the total number of USBP apprehensions enrolled in the US-VISIT IDENT database; unique individuals refers to the number of different people apprehended based on IDENT’s Fingerprint Identification Number (FIN), the system’s unique biometric identifier. The recidivism rate is the percentage of unique individuals who are apprehended two or more times in a given fiscal year. The criminality rate is the number of apprehension events (i.e., not unique apprehensions) in which subjects are found to have a previous conviction for a major crime based on searches of IAFIS and IDENT’s lookout database. Major crimes include assault, dangerous drugs, homicide, kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assault. Due to a software error, IAFIS records were not captured during the first half of FY2009, and data are not available for that year. Figure 7 also presents IDENT data since FY2005 on the percentage of unique subjects apprehended by the Border Patrol more than once in a fiscal year (the recidivism rate) and the percentage of subjects with a prior conviction for a major crime (i.e., assault, dangerous drugs, homicide, kidnapping, robbery, or sexual assault) based on searches of the IDENT lookout database and FBI IAFIS database. The recidivism rate during these years peaked at 28% in 2007, and fell to 20% in FY2011, the lowest level since USBP began collecting recidivist data. With respect to criminality, the proportion of people apprehended by the Border Patrol with previous convictions for major crimes hovered between 1.9% in 2005 and 2.5% in 2008 before falling to 0.9% in FY2011, the lowest level since USBP began matching records against IAFIS. A total of 90,700 people with major criminal records were apprehended in FY2005-FY2011 (excluding FY2009, when a software error prevented data from being recorded), a figure which may include Congressional Research Service 25 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry multiple records for certain individuals. Fewer than 10,000 aliens with major criminal records were apprehended by the Border Patrol in FY2010 and FY2011 combined. Successful Illegal Entries One way to use apprehensions data to gauge the effectiveness of border enforcement would be to compare apprehensions to the total number of illegal border crossers (i.e., successful illegal entrants), and thus describe the proportion of border crossers that is apprehended.109 Precise estimates of how many aliens successfully evade capture and enter the country illegally do not exist, however. Most numbers cited are based on changes in the estimated unauthorized alien population in the United States, which grew from about 3.5 million in 1990, to 7 million-8.5 million in 2000, to 11.8million-12.4 million in 2007, before falling to 10.8 million-11.2 million in 2010, according to widely cited sources.110 Based on these data, the total unauthorized population, on average, grew by about 385,000 people per year in the 1990s, by about 1 million per year in 2000-2007, and by about 300,000 per year during the 2000s overall. These estimates should be interpreted with caution, however, because they are based on a residual analysis of U.S. Census data, which is necessarily somewhat imprecise.111 Moreover, changes in the total unauthorized population do not correlate precisely with successful illegal entries for two reasons. First, not all unauthorized aliens enter the United States illegally; previous research suggests that between one-third and one-half enter the country legally and overstay their visas.112 For this reason, changes in the total unauthorized population over-estimate the number of illegal border crossers. Second, annual data on the total unauthorized population do not account for unauthorized migrants who enter the country, stay temporarily, and then leave. Because some unauthorized migrants leave the country (including as a result of being deported), and some may leave and re-enter multiple times, changes in the total unauthorized population also under-estimate the number of people successfully entering the country each year. Bearing these caveats in mind, the Pew Hispanic Center has estimated unauthorized inflows per se, a figure which accounts for some return flows, and found that unauthorized inflows (including illegal border crossers and visa overstayers) averaged 850,000 people per year in 2000-2005, 550,000 per year in 2005-2007, and 300,000 people per year in 2007-2009.113 CBP also reportedly plans in 2012 to introduce a measure of total illegal crossings at the Southwest border 109 In the words of House appropriators, CBP should develop better measures of “the number of illegal crossers and volume of contraband coming across the border” to provide a “better quantification of the denominators”; see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2012, Report to Accompany H.R. 2017, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 6, 2011, H.Rept. 11291 (Washington: GPO, 2011), p. 33. 110 See CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 111 The residual methodology estimates the unauthorized population by subtracting citizens and authorized aliens from the total population identified by the U.S. Census Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS asks about citizenship, but not about legal status, so the estimate is based on a demographic model of the unauthorized population, adding uncertainty to the estimate. In addition, estimates must account for the fact that unauthorized migrants have incentives to under-report their presence. For a discussion of the methodology see Passel and Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply. 112 CRS Report RS22446, Nonimmigrant Overstays: Brief Synthesis of the Issue, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 113 Passel and Cohn, US Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply. This estimate is also based on the residual methodology discussed in footnote 111, and subject to similar uncertainty. Congressional Research Service 26 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry based on a statistical model using apprehensions, recidivism data, and data from external sources, such as U.S. Census data; these successful illegal entry data will be incorporated into CBP’s border conditions index.114 Overall, existing estimates of the unauthorized population and of unauthorized inflows are inconclusive with respect to the effectiveness of border enforcement, though all of the data point to a substantial drop in unauthorized flows since about 2007. Smuggling Fees The majority of unauthorized migrants to the United States make use of human smugglers (often referred to in Mexico as “coyotes” or “polleros”) to facilitate their illegal admission to the country. Indeed, whereas about 80% of unauthorized migrants from Mexico reportedly relied on human smugglers during the 1980s, about 90% did so in 2005-2007, though the use of smugglers may have declined a bit during the recent economic downturn.115 Migrants’ reliance on human smugglers, along with prices charged by smugglers, are an additional potential indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. border enforcement efforts, as more effective enforcement should increase the costs to smugglers of bringing migrants across the border, with smugglers passing such costs along to their clients in the form of higher fees.116 Figure 8 summarizes available time-series data describing average smuggling fees paid by certain unauthorized migrants from Mexico to the United States. The data come from a pair of long-term projects conducted by academic research teams at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and Princeton University. In both cases, the data reflect reported smuggling fees based on surveys conducted with unauthorized migrants in the United States and in Mexico (i.e., after migrants had returned home), with fees adjusted for inflation and reported in 2010 dollars. 114 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, Dec. 22, 2011; also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Giscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan, GAO-12-106R, November 17, 2011, slide 53, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12106r.pdf. 115 See Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, “Access to Border-Crossing Guides and Family/Friends on First Undocumented Trip,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/002coyote-en.aspx. 116 See Bryan Roberts, Gordon Hanson, and Derekh Cornwell, et al., An Analysis of Migrant Smugglng Costs along the Southwest Border, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC, November 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/ xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-wp.pdf. The extent to which smugglers may pass their costs along to migrants also depends on the elasticity of migration with respect to such costs, as Roberts et al. discuss; smuggling fees may also therefore depend on the broader migration context, including economic “pulls” and “pushes” in the United States and its migration partner states. Congressional Research Service 27 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 8. Smuggling Fees Paid by Unauthorized Mexican Migrants, 1980-2009 Source: Princeton University Mexican Migration Project and University of California, San Diego Mexican Migration Field Research Program. Notes: Data based on surveys of unauthorized Mexican migrants about their most recent unauthorized trip to the United States, with reported amounts adjusted for inflation using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index Research Series Using Current Methods (CPI-R-US). MMFRP data are a weighted two-year moving average for 1981-2007 to account for a small sample size, and a weighted three-year average (including three observations from 2009) for 2008. MMP data are a weighted two-year average for 2007 to account for a small sample size, and a weighted four-year average (including four observations from 2009 and six observations from 2010) for 2008. According to these data, smuggling fees were mostly flat throughout the 1980s, at about $750$1,000, with an average annual growth rate of less than 1.5%.117 Smuggling fees began to rise during the early 1990s, climbed by an average of over 7% per year throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to $2,400-$2,700 in 2005-2006, and have remained roughly flat since that time— possibly because lower earnings since 2007 by intending migrants’ U.S.-based families have placed an economic constraint on what smugglers may charge.118 Thus, these data suggest that 117 Smuggling fees averaged $752 and increased by 1.5% per year in 1980-1990 according to the MMP; fees averaged $1,002 in 1980-1990 and increased by 1.1% per year according to the MMFRP. Other research indicates that smuggling fees were $675 - $1,200 (converted by CRS to 2010 dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator”) during the 1970s, and that about 25-40% of Mexican immigrants relied on smugglers during the 1970s; see U.S. Domestic Council, Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report, Washington, DC, December 1976, p. 143; U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Population, Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States, Committee Print, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 13; Comptroller General of the United States, More Needs to Be Done to Reduce the Number and Adverse Impact of Illegal Aliens in the United States, B-125051, July 1973, pp. 20-21. 118 Smuggling fees averaged $1,763 and increased by 9.6% per year in 1991-2006 according to the MMP; fees averaged $1,776 and increased by 7.3% per year in 1992-2005 according to the MMFRP. Fees averaged $2,634 and decreased by 2.6% per year in 2007-08 according to the MMP; and fees averaged $2,254 and decreased by 0.1% per year in 2006-08 according to the MMFRP. Congressional Research Service 28 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry crossing the border illegally became somewhat more difficult (or at least most expensive) in the decade after the USBP began to implement its national strategy. Probability of Apprehension The UCSD and Princeton surveys also provide data on the probability of apprehension among some migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally. CBP also reportedly plans in 2012 to introduce its own measure of the probability of apprehension, which will contribute to the “border conditions index” now being developed.119 Both existing data sources indicate that the majority of Mexican migrants who attempt to enter without inspection eventually succeed, though many are apprehended one or more times prior to their successful entry. According to the UCSD data, a growing proportion of Mexicans who attempt to migrate illegally are apprehended at the border at least once. Among migrants from Jalisco, Mexico, for example, the once-or-more apprehension rate increased from 28% for aliens attempting to enter prior to 1986 to 41% for aliens attempting entry in 2002-2009.120 According to the Princeton data, the probability of being apprehended on any given crossing has hovered around 25% since 1965. The probability of apprehension fell somewhat during the 1990s to less than 20% in 2001, possibly as a function of increased use of smugglers during this period. This trend was reversed between 2001 and 2006, as the probability of apprehension climbed to an all-time high of about 35%; but by 2011 the probability of apprehension had once again fallen below 20%.121 Nonetheless, these surveys have found little change in overall success rates of intending illegal immigrants (i.e., in their ability to cross the border illegally on one or more attempts during a single trip to the border). In the UCSD surveys, 98% of intending migrants from Jalisco, Mexico, eventually managed to enter the United States before 1986, and 97% eventually succeeded in 2002-2009.122 Overall, the UCSD researchers recorded eventual success rates of 92% or higher in four different surveys conducted between 2005 and 2009.123 Similarly, 99% of Mexicans in the Princeton data reported being able to enter the United States illegally after one or more attempts.124 Taken together, the UCSD and Princeton data offer additional evidence that it became somewhat more difficult to cross the Southwest border illegally in the decade after 1994, but that the border remains broadly vulnerable to illegal crossers. 119 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, Dec. 22, 2011; also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Giscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan, GAO-12-106R, November 17, 2011, slide 53, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12106r.pdf. 120 UC San Diego MMFRP data provided to CRS Sept. 23, 2010. 121 Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, “Probability of Apprehension on an Undocumented Border Crossing,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/008apprehension-en.aspx. 122 Ibid. 123 Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen, and Jorge Narvaez, “Double Jeopardy: How U.S. Enforcement Policies Shape Tunkaseno Migration,” in Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Davide FitzGerald, Pedor Lewin Fischer, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2010), p. 66. 124 CRS analysis of Princeton University MMP migratory experience (MIG) database, http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/ mmp/. Congressional Research Service 29 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Unintended and Secondary Consequences of Border Enforcement The preceding discussion includes estimates of what may be described as the primary costs and benefits of border enforcement, defined in terms of congressional appropriations and deployment of enforcement resources on one hand, and alien apprehensions and other indicators of successful enforcement on the other. A comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of border enforcement policies must also consider possible unintended and secondary consequences of border enforcement. Such consequences may produce both costs and benefits—many of which are difficult to measure—in at least four areas: border-area crime and migrant deaths, migrant flows, environmental impacts and effects on border communities, and U.S. foreign relations. Border-Area Crime and Migrant Deaths Illegal border crossing has always been associated with a certain level of border crime and violence and, in the most unfortunate cases, with deaths of illegal border crossers and border-area law enforcement officers. Illegal migration may be associated with crime and mortality in at least three distinct ways. First, illegal migration is associated with crime—apart from the crime of illegal entry per se—because most unauthorized migrants contract with immigrant smugglers, as noted above, and unauthorized migrants may engage in related illegal activity, such as document fraud. (On the other hand, fear of the police may make unauthorized aliens less likely to engage in other types of criminal activity, and most research on the subject finds low immigrant criminality rates, especially when accounting for education levels and other demographic characteristics.125) Second, illegal migrants may also be likely to be targeted and become crime victims, including victims of violent crime, because they often carry large amounts of cash and may be reluctant to interact with law enforcement officials.126 Third, illegal border crossers face risks associated with crossing the border at dangerous locations, where they may die from exposure to extreme conditions or from drowning.127 Border enforcement therefore may affect crime and migrant mortality in complex ways.128 On one hand, the concentration of enforcement resources around the border may exacerbate adverse outcomes by making migrants more likely to rely on smugglers, as noted above (see “Smuggling Fees”), and likely to cross in more dangerous locations. Indeed, the 1994 National Strategic Plan predicted a potential short-term rise in border violence for these reasons.129 On the other hand, to the extent that enforcement successfully deters illegal crossers, such prevention should reduce 125 See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel. 126 See Debra A. Hoffmaster, Gerard Murphy, and Shannon McFadden, et al., Police and Immigration: How Chiefs are Leading Their Communities through the Challenges, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC, 2010,http://www.policeforum.org/library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf; 127 In 2011, for example, of the 238 migrants deaths for which DHS was able to determine a cause of death, 139 were attributed to exposure to heat or cold or water-related; data provided to CRS by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs December 15, 2011. 128 Also see Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez, et al., “Death at the Border,” International Migration Review, vol. 33, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 430-454. 129 National Strategic Plan, p. 11-12. Congressional Research Service 30 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry crime and mortality. The concentration of law enforcement personnel near the border may further enhance public safety and migrant protection, especially where CBP has made a priority of protecting vulnerable populations.130 The empirical record suggests that crime rates have fallen faster in certain Southwest border cities than in other cities of a similar size, but the impact of border enforcement on border-area crime and migrant mortality is unknown because available data cannot separate the influence of border enforcement from other factors.131 Figure 9 depicts trends in property crime rates for 1985-2009 for San Diego, CA; Tucson, AZ; and El Paso, TX—the three cities most closely associated with enhanced border enforcement since the 1990s—as well as overall U.S. property crime rates, which include both urban and rural areas. Figure 9. Property Crime Rates, Selected Southwest Border Cities, 1985-2010 Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. Notes: Crime rates are based on the number of reported offenses, by police departments (for San Diego, Tucson, and El Paso data) and/or sheriff departments, per 100,000 population based on population covered by the reports submitted by the particular agencies. The U.S. crime rate includes urban and rural areas. Tucson property crime rate for 2009 excludes larceny-theft crimes. Tucson data are not available for 1989, 2005-2008, and 2010. As Figure 9 illustrates, property crime rates in these three cities were one-and-a-half to two times the national average in 1985. Property crime climbed to record high levels around 1990, with San 130 The USBP’s Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) is comprised of agents with specialized skills and training for tactical medical search and rescue operations. BORSTAR agents provide rapid response to search and rescue and medical operations, including rescuing migrants in distress. According to CBP Office of Legislative Affairs (Dec. 9, 2011), BORSTAR agents rescued 1,070 migrants in FY2011. 131 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data provide the most information about crime rates, but they are not sufficiently fine-tuned to provide information on the diverse factors affecting such trends; see CRS Report RL34309, How Crime in the United States Is Measured, by Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council. Congressional Research Service 31 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Diego, El Paso, and Tucson having the 11th, 26th, and 28th lowest people crime rates, respectively, out of 33 large cities (i.e., cities of at least 500,000 people) in that year.132 Property crime rates fell throughout the country in the following two decades, with these three border cities being among the cities with the most dramatic decreases in property crime rates during this period. In 2009, the most recent year for which data for all three cities are available, Tucson, San Diego, and El Paso had the 1st, 5th, and 6th lowest property crime rates, respectively, out of 34 large cities.133 Violent crime rates displayed less variation over this time period but also showed relative improvements in two of the three border cities discussed here: Tucson, El Paso, and San Diego had the 7th, 8th, and 12th lowest violent crime rates, respectively, out of 32 large cities in 1990; and San Diego, El Paso, and Tucson had the 3rd, 4th, and 15th lowest crime rates, respectively, out of 33 large cities in 2009.134 Thus, crime rates are lower in these border cities than in other large cities, and crime rates appear to have fallen faster in these border cities than in other large cities during the period of enhanced border enforcement since 1990. As noted above, however, changes in crime rates also reflect a number of factors unrelated to migration and the impact of enhanced border enforcement on crime rates is unknown. Available data about migrant deaths along the Southwest border are presented in Figure 10. The figures come from academic research based on local medical investigators’ and examiners’ offices in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas between 1985 and 1998 (the University of Houston’s Center for Immigration Research, CIR); Mexican foreign ministry and Mexican media counts compiled by the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego; and data compiled by DHS based on bodies recovered on the U.S. side of the border.135 All three data sources reflect known migrant deaths, and therefore undercount actual migrant deaths since some bodies may not be discovered, especially in the case of migrants who drown while crossing the border, migrants who die from exposure in remote locations, and homicide victims.136 Additionally, U.S. data sources generally do not include information from the Mexican side of the border and therefore further undercount migration-related fatalities. Nonetheless, changes in known migrant deaths over time may offer insight into changes in migrant mortality. 132 CRS calculation from FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics – UCR Data Online. Tucson data are biased downward because they exclude theft and larceny statistics. The FBI warns against using UCR data to rank cities by their urban crime rates, though such data may be more useful for making comparisons over time, as in Figure 9; see FBI, “Caution Against Ranking,” http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ranking.cfm. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 See Stanley Bailey, Karl Eschbach, and Jacqueline Hagan, et al., “Migrant Death on the US-Mexco Border 19851996,” University of Houston Center for Immigration Research Working Paper Series, vol. 96, no. 1 (1996); Jimenez, “Humanitarian Crisis,” 2009. 136 The Border Patrol has drawn criticism from human rights activists who claim that the agency’s migrant death count understates the number of fatalities. Some contend that the Border Patrol undercounts fatalities by excluding skeletal remains, victims in car accidents, and corpses discovered by other agencies or local law enforcement officers; see , for example, Raymond Michalowski, “Border Militarization and Migrant Suffering: A Case of Transnational Social Injury,” Social Justice, Summer 2007. Congressional Research Service 32 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 10. Known Migrant Deaths, Southwest Border, 1985-2011 Source: University of Houston Center for Immigration Research; Jimenez, “Humanitarian Crisis,” 2009; CBP Office of Congressional Affairs. As Figure 10 illustrates, data from the CIR indicate that known migrant deaths fell from a high of 344 in 1988 to a low of 171 in 1994 before climbing back to 286 in 1998. According to DHS data, known migrant deaths climbed from 250 in 1999 to 492 in 2005, and averaged 431 deaths per year in 2005-2009 before falling to an average of 360 per year in 2010-2011. The largest growth in migrant deaths, and the highest totals overall, were recorded by the ACLU, which found that known migrant deaths increased from an average of just 80 per year for 1993-1996 to 496 per year in 1997-2007. The apparent increase in migrant deaths is particularly noteworthy in light of the declining number of alien apprehensions (i.e., estimated unauthorized entries) during the same period, as noted above (see “Alien Apprehensions”). Overall, these data offer evidence that border crossings have become more hazardous since the “prevention through deterrence” policy went into effect in the 1990s, though once again the precise impact of enforcement on migrant deaths is unknown. Migration Flows: “Caging” Effects and Alternative Modes of Entry With illegal border crossing becoming more dangerous and more expensive, some unauthorized aliens appear to have adapted their behavior to avoid crossing the border via traditional pathways. First, social science research suggests that border enforcement has had the unintended consequence of encouraging illegal aliens to settle permanently in the United States rather than working temporarily and then returning home, as was more common prior to the mid-1980s.137 137 In general, see Wayne Cornelius, “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy,” Population and Development Review, vol. 27, no.4 (December 2001); Wayne Cornelius, “Evaluating Recent US Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us,” in Crossing and Controlling Borders: Immigration Policies and Their Impact on Migrants’ Journeys, ed. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, and Kerstin Rosenhow (Farmington, MI: Budrich Unipress Ltd, 2011); Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 33 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry The primary evidence for this so-called “caging” effect is that illegal migrants appear to be staying longer in the United States and raising families here more often rather than making regular trips to visit families that remain in countries of origin.138 Although other factors also likely contribute to these changes,139 survey results appear to confirm that border enforcement has been an important factor behind these longer stays.140 A second unintended consequence of enhanced border enforcement between ports of entry has been an apparent increase in illegal entries through ports of entry and other means. According to UCSD Mexico Migration Field Research Program research, illegal Mexican migrants from one community in Mexico interviewed in 2009 used six different methods to enter the United States illegally, with one in four such aliens passing illegally through a port of entry by using borrowed or fraudulent documents or by hiding in a vehicle.141 Based on three different surveys conducted between 2008 and 2010, UCSD researchers found that the probability of being apprehended while passing illegally though a port of entry was about half as high as the probability of being apprehended while crossing between the ports.142 Data from CBP on the number of aliens denied admission at ports of entry also seems to confirm increased illegal flows through the ports since 2006, though many other factors may also influence the number of aliens denied admission, including CBP screening procedures.143 There is also anecdotal evidence that unauthorized aliens have recently turned to maritime routes and border tunnels as alternative strategies to cross the U.S.-Mexican border.144 (...continued) Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 138 Whereas almost half of unauthorized aliens from Mexico who arrived in 1980 remained in the United States for less than a year, fewer than 20% of unauthorized Mexicans who entered in 2010 returned home within a year; see Mexican Migration Project, “Probability of Return within 12 Months,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/010returnpersen.aspx. Also see Hicken et al. “Double Jeapardy,” 56-57. And whereas an estimated 60-90% of unauthorized migrants during the 1970s were single men, by 2008 men only accounted for an estimated 53% of unauthorized aliens, with women representing 34% and the remainder children; see U.S. Domestic Council, Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report, Washington, DC, December 1976, p. 137; Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, April 14, 2009, p. 4, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf. 139 For example, changes in U.S. labor markets have resulted in more permanent (non-seasonal) employment opportunities for unauthorized aliens as well as more employment opportunities for unauthorized women; See CRS Report R41592, The U.S. Foreign-Born Population: Trends and Selected Characteristics, by William A. Kandel. 140 Half of the Mexico-based family members of unauthorized aliens interviewed by the UC, San Diego MMFRP in 2009 indicated that they had a relative who had remained in the United States longer than they had intended because they feared they would be unable to reenter the United States if they returned home; see Hicken et al. “Double Jeapardy,” 57-58. 141 Hicken et al., “Double Jeopardy,” pp. 60-61. 142 Probability of apprehension on an alien’s most recent attempt to illegally pass through a port of entry was 0.36, compared to 0.73 on the most recent entry attempt between ports of entry; UC San Diego MMFRP data provided to CRS Sept. 23, 2010. 143 According to CBP data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs on Nov. 14, 2011, a total of 264,317 aliens were denied admission at land ports of entry in FY2006, including 138,188 at northern ports and 126,129 at southwestern ports; and a total of 1,460,281 aliens were denied admission at such ports in FY2011, including 880,951 at northern ports and 579,330 at southern ports. 144 See , for example, Richard Marosi, “Border Battle Over Illegal Immigration Shifts to Beaches,” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2011; Associated Press, “Major Drug Tunnel Found in San Diego,” Washington Post, November 30, 2011. Border tunnels are mainly used to smuggle narcotics into the United States, rather than for illegal migration. Congressional Research Service 34 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Environmental Impact and Effects on Border Communities A third set of potential unintended consequences of border enforcement are environmental impacts and the effects of enforcement on border communities. As with the effects of enforcement on border crime and violence, the effects of enforcement on the environment and border communities are complex because they reflect changes in migrant behavior and the secondary effects of enforcement per se. On one hand, border enforcement benefits local communities because unauthorized migration imposes a number of costs on local schools and other public programs and undermines the rule of law. Many illegal border crossers also transit through sensitive environmental areas, cutting vegetation for shelter and fire, causing wildfires, increasing erosion through repeated use of trails, and discarding trash.145 Thus, to the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal flows, enforcement benefits local communities by reducing these undesirable outcomes. In addition, the deployment of enforcement personnel and other resources may have a stimulative effect on border-community economies. On the other hand, the deployment of border enforcement personnel and infrastructure also entails a number of costs at the local level. First, the construction of fencing, roads, and other tactical infrastructure may damage border-area ecosystems. These environmental considerations may be especially important because much of the border runs through remote and environmentally sensitive areas.146 For this reason, even when accounting for the possible environmental benefits of reduced illegal border flows, some environmental groups have opposed border infrastructure projects because they threaten rare and endangered species as well as other wildlife by damaging ecosystems and restricting the movement of animals, and because surveillance towers and artificial night lighting have detrimental effects on migrant birds.147 Border enforcement may also have detrimental social and economic effects on border communities. Business owners on the Southwest and northern borders have complained that certain border enforcement efforts threaten their economic activities, including farming and ranching activities that are disrupted by the deployment of USBP resources to the border and commercial activities that suffer from reduced regional economic activity.148 More generally, some people have complained that the construction of barriers divides communities that have straddled international land borders for generations.149 Some people are concerned that Operation 145 Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Impact Statement for the Completion of the 14-mile Border Infrastructure System, San Diego, California (July 2003), pp. 1-11. 146 According to the GAO, about 25% of the northern border and 43% of the Southwest border consist of federal and tribal lands overseen by the U.S. Forest Service and Department of the Interior; see GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177, November 2010, pp. 4-5. 147 See , for example, Defenders of Wildlife, “Wildlife and Border Policy,” http://www.defenders.org/ programs_and_policy/habitat_conservation/federal_lands/border_policy/. 148 See , for example, Mark Harrison, “Beefed Up Border Patrol Jolts Farmers, Cows,” Seattle Times, November 13, 2011; Rafael Carranza, “Leaders Blame Lost Business Deals on Border Fence,” KGBT Channel 4 News, November 2, 2009, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=371266#.Tt0oAmNM8rs Also see U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Steps to a 21st Century U.S.-Mexico Border, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/ 2011_us_mexico_report.pdf. 149 See, for example, Associated Press, “Quebec-Vermont Border Communities Divided by Post-9/11 Security,” CBC News: Canada, August 14, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2011/08/14/quebec-vermontborder.html?ref=rss Congressional Research Service 35 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Streamline and related programs overwhelm district courts and divert scarce enforcement resources away from more serious crimes.150 Some residents of border communities see enhanced border enforcement as leading to racial profiling, wrongful detentions, and other adverse consequences.151 And migrant rights groups have argued that CBP detention facilities subject aliens to abusive conditions.152 Few systematic efforts have been made to measure these secondary costs of border enforcement. Effects on Regional Relations What are the effects of U.S. border enforcement policies on U.S. relations with its continental neighbors, Mexico and Canada? The United States and Canada have a strong record of collaborative border enforcement, including through 15 binational, multi-agency Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) operating at 24 locations at and between U.S.-Canadian ports of entry. President Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper also signed a joint declaration on February 4, 2011, the Beyond the Border agreement, intended to deepen security cooperation and move toward a common approach to perimeter security. The countries released an Action Plan on December 7, 2011, to implement the agreement.153 While questions about how to balance public safety and national security concerns against the protection of individual rights and the efficient flow of commercial traffic at U.S.-Canadian ports of entry appear to have contributed to a slowerthan-expected implementation of the 2011 agreement,154 border enforcement between the ports has not been identified as a significant source of bilateral tension. The United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border; but with Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts and with the United States being the primary market for illicit drugs from Mexico as well as a source of illegal weapons flowing into Mexico, border enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension.155 On one hand, given that Mexicans represent a majority of all unauthorized migrants in the United States and of aliens apprehended at the border,156 and given that drug-related violence in Mexico raises persistent concerns about 150 See, for example, National Immigration Forum, The Costs of Operation Streamline, Washington, DC, December 2010, http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2010/OperationStreamlineCosts.pdf; See, for example, Joanna Lydgate, Assembly Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity, Berkeley, CA, January 2010, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf; 151 See, for example, NY School of Law, NY Civil Liberties Union, and Families for Freedom, Justice Derailed: What Raids On New York’s Trains And Buses Reveal About Border Patrol’s Interior Enforcement Practices, New York: November, 2011, http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb.pdf; Lornet Turnbull and Roberto Daza, “Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants,” Seattle Times, June 26, 2011. 152 No More Deaths/No Mas Muertes, A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border Patrol Custody, 2011, http://www.cultureofcruelty.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CultureofCrueltyFinal.pdf; 153 DHS, “Beyond the Border Action Plan,” December 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/beyond-theborder-action-plan.shtm; also see CRS Report 96-397, Canada-U.S. Relations, coordinated by Carl Ek and Ian F. Fergusson. 154 See Gar Pardy, Shared Vision or Myopia: The Politics of Permiter Security and Economic Competitiveness, Rideau Institute, Ottawa, ON, September 2011. 155 See, for example, Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/USMexico-cooperation.pdf. 156 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, Pew Hispanic Center, February 1, 2011. Congressional Research Service 36 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry “spillover” violence on the U.S. side of the border,157 the U.S.-Mexican border is inevitably a major focus of U.S. enforcement. On the other hand, while Mexico does not question U.S. authority to make and enforce its own immigration laws, Mexicans from across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths, and the protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups of migrants.158 More generally, the use of military technology and the heavy presence of law enforcement personnel at the U.S.-Mexican border may work against the diplomatic and commercial goals of a closer economic and political partnership among the United States, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. Legislative Issues Border security between ports of entry has been an ongoing issue of congressional concern over the last three decades, especially since the 9/11 attacks. Border security has also been a persistent topic in the context of Congress’ ongoing debate about visa reform, legalization, and other aspects of “comprehensive immigration reform.” The 112th Congress focused on several issues related to border security during its first session, and this section discusses four topics that may receive additional attention in 2012. Border Patrol Personnel The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) included a raise for Border Patrol agents and fully funded USBP personnel at levels proposed by the Administration.159 Several bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress that would authorize additional increases in Border Patrol personnel and/or National Guard deployments to the Southwest border.160 At the same time, however, some members of Congress may be concerned about the pace of growth in the Border Patrol since the 1990s. One inevitable effect of such growth has been a decline in the average experience level of Border Patrol agents. A 1999 GAO report noted that the percentage of agents with less than two years of experience had almost tripled, from 14% to 39%, between 1994 and 1998.161 The GAO report also found that rising attrition rates made it difficult for USBP to meet its hiring objectives. Rapid hiring also presents challenges for CBP integrity 157 CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea. 158 See , for example, Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/USMexico-cooperation.pdf. 159 H.Rept. 112-331, p. 957; also see CRS Report R41982, Homeland Security Department: FY2012 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter and Jennifer E. Lake. 160 For example, H.R. 152 would direct the Department of Defense to deploy 10,000 U.S. National Guard troops to the Southwest border until DHS certifies that it has achieved operational control of border; the Border Security Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 1507/S. 803) would authorize the deployment of 6,000 National Guard troops and an increase of 5,000 USBP personnel by FY2016; and the Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2011 (SAVE Act, H.R. 2000) would authorize DHS to hire 6,000 additional USBP agents by FY2016. 161 U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not Met, GAO/GGD-00-39, December 1999, p. 2. Congressional Research Service 37 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry programs, including the agency’s ability to subject new and continuing employees to background investigations and polygraph examinations, an issue Congress held hearings on in 2011.162 Surveillance Assets Congress may consider additional mechanisms to strengthen CBP’s surveillance capability, including by expanding the agency’s use of unmanned aerial systems and other Department of Defense surveillance technology—subjects that were raised in congressional hearings and proposed bills in 2011.163 At the same time, historical problems associated with border surveillance technology contracting and system performance, along with questions raised by GAO in its 2011 review of CBP’s current surveillance plan,164 may cause Congress to subject CBP’s surveillance programs to strict oversight, including through the appropriations process. Congressional appropriators have regularly subjected funding for surveillance technology to special reporting requirements in recent years.165 House and Senate Appropriations Committees both proposed cuts to border surveillance funding in their FY2012 Committee Reports, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74) reduced Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology funding by $128 million compared to the Administration’s request while directing CBP to provide the committee with a detailed expenditure plan as well as a multiyear investment and management plan.166 Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) required DHS to construct 700 miles of fencing along the Southwest border, but it also appears to allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine the amount of fencing required to achieve and maintain operational control of the border. Under this provision, DHS had installed 650 miles of pedestrian and vehicle fencing as of October 6, 2011, out of a total of 651 miles DHS has identified as 162 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General’s Office Collaboration in the Fight to Prevent Corruption, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2011; and testimony of CBP Assistant Commissioner James F. Tomasheck before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2010. 163 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Protecting the Homeland: How Can DHS Use DOD Technology to Secure the Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 2011; also see, for example the Border Security Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 1507/S. 803), H.R. 1921, and the SAVE Act, all of which would encourage greater DHS-DOD collaboration, including by expanding DHS’ use of unmanned aerial surveillance systems. 164 GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs is Needed Before Proceeding, GAO-12-22, November 2011, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1222.pdf. 165 Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for fencing, infrastructure, and technology at the border in FY2007 (see Figure 4), but included a provision requiring the DHS IG to evaluate all contracts or task orders over $20 million awarded in conjunction with SBI projects; see H.Rept. 109-699, p. 124. Congress also expressed concern about the overall coordination of SBI program in FY2008 and directed DHS to provide a briefing within 120 days of enactment on how the program is being effectively coordinated and how FY2007 funds had been obligated; and the Appropriations Acts in FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 all withheld portions of SBI funding until expenditure plans for each year were received and approved; See Division E of P.L. 110-161; H.R. 2638, as Enrolled by the House and the Senate, pp. 8384. 166 H.Rept. 112-331, pp. 961-962; also see CRS Report R41982, Homeland Security Department: FY2012 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter and Jennifer E. Lake. Congressional Research Service 38 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry appropriate (see “Fencing and Tactical Infrastructure,” above). Nonetheless, several bills have been proposed in the 112th Congress that would authorize or require DHS to construct additional fencing.167 Access to Federal Lands As mentioned, about 25% of the northern border and 43% of the Southwest border consist of federal and tribal lands administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI).168 Border security on federal lands has been challenging because these areas are geographically remote and have limited law enforcement coverage. Border control efforts on certain federal lands was blocked or delayed by lawsuits based on environmental laws and regulations prior to 2008.169 And border security may have been hindered at times by problems related to differences in missions and jurisdictional complexity among USDA, DOI, and DHS.170 Thus, problems related to border security on federal lands have been a subject of ongoing congressional attention in recent years.171 Congress and the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have taken steps to ensure that neither environmental laws and regulations nor jurisdictional complexity hinder border enforcement. First, legislative and regulatory action since 2005 has given DHS broad authority to waive any environmental laws and regulations deemed necessary by DHS for the expeditious construction of fencing and tactical infrastructure.172 Second, USDA, DOI, DHS, and CBP signed a total of four memoranda of understanding that appear to have addressed the jurisdictional disputes that had been identified on federal lands.173 Nonetheless, GAO still found in 2010 that 167 For example, the Unlawful Border Entry Prevention Act of 2011 (H.R. 1091) would authorize DHS to construct an additional 350 miles of border fencing; the Border Security Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 1507/S. 803) would require DHS to replace single-layer fencing with double- or triple-layer fencing at locations to be determined by the Secretary; and the Build the Fence Now Act of 2011 (H.R. 1921) would require DHS to build double-layer fencing along the entire Southwest and northern borders, except in parts of the border expressly exempted from the requirement by a subsequent act of Congress. 168 See GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177, November 2010, pp. 4-5. 169 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (2008); Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2008); County of El Paso v. Chertoff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83045 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008), cert denied, County of El Paso v. Napolitano, 129 S. Ct. 2789 (2009). 170 See GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177, November 2010 171 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, The Border: Are Environmental Laws and Regulation Impeding Security and Harming the Environment? 112th Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 2011. 172 Section 102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Div. B) authorized DHS to waive all legal requirements deemed necessary by the Secretary for the expeditious construction of authorized border infrastructure, and DHS published five notices in the Federal Register between September 22, 2005 and April 8, 2008 to exercise this waiver authority for certain laws along several sections of the border. See 70 Fed. Reg. 55622-23, Sept. 22, 2005; 72 Fed. Reg. 2535-36, Jan. 19, 2007; 72 Fed. Reg. 2535-36, Jan. 19, 2007; 73 Fed. Reg. 18293-94, Apr. 3, 2008; and 73 Fed. Reg. 19078-80, Apr. 8, 2008. 173 Memorandum of Understanding among DHS, DOI and USDA Regarding Cooperative National Security and Counter-terrorism Efforts on Federal Lands Along the United States’ Borders, March 24, 2006; Memorandum of Understanding among DHS, DOI and USDA Regarding Secure Radio Communication, July 10, 2008; Memorandum of Agreement between CBP and DOI Regarding Natural and Cultural Resource Mitigation Associated with Construction and Maintenance of Border Security Infrastructure along the Border of the United States and Mexico, Jan. 14, 2009; (continued...) Congressional Research Service 39 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry federal lands on the Southwest border in parts of Arizona are “high-risk areas for cross-border threats related to marijuana smuggling and illegal migration.”174 Thus, some Members of Congress remain concerned that federal lands are a point of vulnerability, and bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress to broaden DHS’ exemption from environmental laws and its authority to conduct law enforcement activities related to border security on federal lands.175 Conclusion: Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Border Enforcement Between Ports of Entry The United States has focused an unprecedented amount of resources along its land borders to prevent and control illegal migration since the 1980s, but more is known about the direct costs of these efforts than their intended and unintended effects. Congressional appropriations for the U.S. Border Patrol have increased 750% since 1989. This number understates total spending at the border, which also includes a number of additional local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as associated judicial costs. Looking back at the 25 years since IRCA’s passage, almost 20 years of investments in “prevention through deterrence,” and over five years of increased “enforcement with consequences,” the Southwest border has been transformed—mostly in ways that were predicted by the Border Patrol’s 1994 National Strategic Plan. Measuring the overall effects of border enforcement is more difficult. On one hand, Border Patrol apprehensions have fallen sharply since climbing to a high-point in 2000, and they reached a 42year low in FY2011. The Border Patrol’s IDENT database also indicates a declining proportion of aliens apprehended more than once (recidivists), and that less than 1% of aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol in FY2011 had serious criminal records. These data are consistent with evidence that illegal inflows have fallen sharply since the mid-2000s. Yet the direct effects of enforcement are impossible to measure because DHS’ enforcement strategy seeks to deter millions of potential migrants up to thousands of miles from U.S. borders—a process that cannot be observed. On the other hand, there is also some evidence that migrants have adapted to more difficult conditions at the border by using other means to enter the United States and by remaining here longer. A comprehensive accounting for the effects of border enforcement must also consider the effects of border infrastructure, surveillance technology, and personnel on the civil rights of legal residents and U.S. citizens in the border region and migrants’ human rights, on the quality of life (...continued) and Memorandum of Agreement for Coordination and Review between DOI and CBP for the Secure Border Initiative, Jan. 11, 2008. All four memoranda available at http://robbishop.house.gov/UploadedFiles/DHS.pdf. 174 See GAO, Southwest Border: Border Patrol Operations on Federal Lands, GAO-11-573T, April 15, 2011, p 13. GAO (p. 9) found that 22 out of 26 USBP agents-in-charge with jurisdictions including federal lands reported that the border security status of their area had not been affected by land management laws. USBP Deputy Chief Ronald Vitiello testified in April 2011 that existing agreements with DOI and USDA allow CBP to carry out its border security mission; see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, The Border: Are Environmental Laws and Regulation Impeding Security and Harming the Environment? testimony of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Deputy Chief Ronald Vitiello, 112th Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 2011. 175 Under the National Security and Federal Lands Protection Act (H.R. 1505), for example, 35 environmental and other laws would be waived within 100 miles of all international land and marine borders; and USDA and DOI would not be authorized to impede, prohibit, or restrict DHS border security activities on public lands. Congressional Research Service 40 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry in border communities, on the environment and wildlife, and on U.S.-regional relations—all of which suffer at least some adverse effects from the build-up around the border. DHS’ forthcoming “Border Conditions Index” may offer a more sophisticated tool for evaluating these overall effects of border enforcement. Even with better measures of border outcomes, however, the immigration system remains highly complex. In particular, the recent drop in illegal inflows has been correlated not only with enhanced border enforcement, but also with reduced labor demand in the United States and with some signs of reduced migration pushes in Mexico. This correlation makes it impossible to draw conclusions about the relative importance of these factors in explaining recent patterns, or to predict how illegal migration flows will be affected if and when demand for low-skilled labor returns to historic levels. What do these findings mean for Members of Congress who oversee border security? Especially in light of current fiscal constraints, some Members of Congress may evaluate future border enforcement in terms of expected returns on America’s investments, and they may consider the possibility that certain additional investments at the border may be met with diminishing returns. Border fencing may offer the best example: with 650 miles of fencing already in place along the Southwest border, including in all of the high-flow areas DHS has identified as requiring such barriers, each additional mile of fencing would be in ever more remote locations, and therefore more expensive to install and maintain and more likely to deter fewer unauthorized migrants. Similarly, some Members of Congress may question the concrete benefits of deploying more sophisticated surveillance systems across the entire northern and southern borders, including vast regions in which too few personnel are deployed to respond to the occasional illegal entry that may be detected. Deciding how to allocate border resources therefore requires a clear definition of the goals of border security. Zero admissions of unauthorized migrants may not be a realistic goal when it comes to migration control, as noted above, and may be a higher standard than is expected of most law enforcement agencies. Indeed, with estimated illegal inflows at or below estimated outflows (i.e., with no new net illegal migration) and few people with serious criminal records being apprehended, some people might describe the border as already being secure with respect to illegal migration under current conditions. While this report focuses on migration control at U.S. borders, border security also encompasses the detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), narcotics, and other illicit goods; policies to combat human trafficking; and other security goals. These diverse goals are often conflated in an undifferentiated debate about “border security”; but each of these goals may suggest a different mix of border investments, as well as different metrics and different standards for successful enforcement outcomes. Should policies to prevent illegal migration be held to the same standards as policies to prevent the entry of WMDs, for example? Finally, when viewed from this perspective, the costs and benefits of additional investments at the border may also be weighed against alternative enforcement strategies and placed in a broader policy context. The border is a key locus of enforcement, but migration control also occurs within the United States, at ports of entry, and within countries of origin. To the extent that existing policies have already substantially raised the costs of illegal entry between ports of entry, some Members of Congress may believe that future investments should focus on screening admissions at ports and on enforcement away from the border, including within the United States and in countries of origin. Similarly, to the extent that existing policies have already accomplished a Congressional Research Service 41 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry degree of border security, additional investments in migration control may offer limited returns in the absence of more systemic changes to reduce the underlying causes of illegal migration. Author Contact Information Marc R. Rosenblum Specialist in Immigration Policy mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov, 7-7360 Acknowledgments Portions of this report are based on CRS Report RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by former CRS analyst Chad C. Haddal; and on CRS Report RL22659, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, by former CRS analyst Chad C. Haddal and CRS legislative attorney Michael Garcia. CRS Graphics Specialist Amber Hope Wilhelm prepared the figures for this report. Congressional Research Service 42including the Laredo and Del Rio, TX, sectors. Since FY2011, apprehensions in Tucson have fallen back to their lowest level since 1993, but apprehensions in the Rio Grande Valley have increased, and now account for more than a quarter of Southwest border apprehensions.87 Thus, since the initiation of the prevention through deterrence approach in the mid-1990s, it appears that success in San Diego and El Paso may have come at the expense of Tucson and other sectors; and recent enforcement in Arizona may be pushing some unauthorized flows into South Texas. Unique Subjects and Alien Recidivism Overall apprehensions data record apprehension events, and therefore count certain individuals more than once because they enter and are apprehended multiple times. Since 2000, the Border Patrol also has tracked the number of unique subjects the agency apprehends per year by analyzing biometric data (i.e., fingerprints and digital photographs) of persons apprehended.88 As Figure 7 illustrates, trends in unique subjects apprehended are similar to total apprehensions: 87 Also see Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer, “Border Security and Migration: A Report from South Texas,” Washington Office on Latin America, http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2013/ Border%20Security%20and%20Migration%20South%20Texas.pdf. 88 Biometric data of persons apprehended are recorded in the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system. When Border Patrol agents enter aliens’ biometric data in the IDENT system, the data are automatically checked against DHS’ “recidivist” database, which is used to track repeat entrants, and its “lookout” database, which is used to identify criminal aliens. US-VISIT workstations also are fully interoperable with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 10-print Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a biometric database that includes data on criminal records and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), which contains national security data. Congressional Research Service 21 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry falling from 2000-2003, climbing in 2004-2005, and then falling sharply from about 818,000 in 2005 to about 247,000 individuals in 2011, before climbing back to 284,000 in FY2012. Figure 7. USBP Southwest Border Unique Subjects and Recidivism Rates FY2000-FY2012 Source: CRS presentation of data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 10, 2013. Notes: Total apprehensions refer to the total number of USBP apprehensions in Southwest border sectors; unique subjects refers to the number of different people apprehended based on biometric records. The recidivism rate is the percentage of unique individuals apprehended two or more times in a given fiscal year. Significantly, the gap between total and unique apprehensions has steadily narrowed, with unique subjects representing 54%-55% of total apprehensions in 2000-2001, 65%-70% in 2002-2010, and 75%-80% in 2011-2012. Put another way, each unique subject is being apprehended fewer times, on average, with the aggregate average number of apprehensions per person apprehended (i.e., total apprehensions divided by unique subjects) falling from 1.9 apprehensions per person in 2000 to 1.3 apprehensions per person in 2012.89 This trend is explained, in part, by the bars in Figure 7, which depict annual Southwest border recidivism rates, which USBP has tracked since 2005. The Border Patrol defines the annual recidivism rate as the percentage of unique subjects apprehended more than once in a given fiscal year. A goal of the Consequence Delivery System has been to deter aliens from re-entering—that is, to reduce recidivism. As Figure 7 illustrates, recidivism rates increased slightly between 2005 (25%) and 2007 (29%), but have fallen since that time, reaching 17% in 2012. 89 These calculations are based on aggregate date provided to CRS; individual-level IDENT data could be used to calculate the median number of apprehensions per individual in the data set, which may be a more precise indicator. Congressional Research Service 22 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Estimated “Got Aways” and “Turn Backs” Border Patrol stations and sectors estimate the number of illegal entrants who successfully travel to the U.S. interior and who USBP ceased pursuing, or “got aways.”90 Stations and sectors also estimate “turn backs,” the number of people who illegally cross the border but then cross back to Mexico. USBP uses the sum of got aways, turn backs, and apprehensions to estimate the total number of known illegal entries (also see “Border Patrol Effectiveness Rate”). The agency has used these data since 2006 to inform tactical decision making and to allocate resources across Southwest border sectors, but the Border Patrol has not published them or viewed them as reliable metrics of border security because of challenges associated with measuring got aways and turn backs across different border sectors.91 Additional Border Security Data: Migrant Surveys Apart from Border Patrol data on enforcement outcomes, a second major source of information about unauthorized migration and border security is survey data based on interviews with migrants and potential migrants. Much of the research on unauthorized migration across the Southwest border focuses on Mexicans because Mexico historically accounts for about 95% of persons apprehended at the Southwest border.92 An advantage to surveys is that they may collect more information about their subjects than is found in enforcement data. In addition, because surveys are conducted within the U.S. interior as well as in migrant countries of origin (i.e., Mexico), surveys may capture more information about successful illegal inflows and about the deterrent effects of enforcement. In 2011, DHS commissioned a comprehensive study by the National Research Council (NRC) on the use of surveys and related methodologies to estimate the number of illegal U.S.-Mexico border crossings; and the NRC recommended that DHS use survey data along with enforcement data to measure illegal flows and the effectiveness of border enforcement.93 Two binational (U.S.-Mexican) surveys may be particularly useful for estimating illegal flows because they have examined migration dynamics in migrant-sending and –receiving communities for a number of years. The surveys are the Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP) based at the University of California-San Diego (UCSD) and the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) based at Princeton University. These targeted surveys ask a number of questions about U.S. immigration enforcement and how it affects respondents’ migration histories and future plans. While analysts must account for the likelihood that unauthorized migrants may be less than forthcoming with interviewers and may be under-represented in certain survey samples, 90 For a fuller discussion, see U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Border Patrol: Key Elements of Strategic Plan not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25, December 2012 (hereafter: GAO, Key Elements of Strategic Plan.) Also see Elliot Spagat, “Under Pressure, Border Patrol Now Counts Getaways,” Associate Press, April 22, 2013. 91 Ibid., p. 30. 92 Mexicans accounted for about 59% of unauthorized migrants in the United States in 2011; see Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC, March 201. For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum. 93 NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries, pp. 5-4 – 5-15. Congressional Research Service 23 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry a body of social science research has made use of these data and developed commonly cited methodologies to account for these and other challenges.94 Probability of Apprehension The UCSD and Princeton surveys both include data, based on self-reporting by people who have previously attempted to migrate illegally, on the probability that an alien will be apprehended on any given attempted crossing. According to the Princeton data, the probability of being apprehended on any given crossing averaged about .37 in the two decades before IRCA’s passage, ranging from a low of .31 to a high of .42 during this period. The probability of apprehension was somewhat lower in the decade after IRCA’s passage, ranging from .22 to .32 between 1986 and 1995, and averaging .26 for the decade. Between 1996 and 2010, the last year for which sufficient data are available, the apprehension rate returned to an average of .36, with a low of .29 and a high of .50 during these years.95 The UCSD data suggest slightly higher apprehension rates, and show broadly similar trends. According to these data, the probability of being apprehended on any given crossing averaged .51 between 1974 and 1983, ranging from .32 to .67 during this period. After peaking at .67 in 1981, the probability of apprehension fell steadily to a low of .34 in 1992-1993. Since 1994 the probability of apprehension has averaged .49, ranging from .30 to .58 during this period.96 The UCSD and the Princeton estimates of apprehension rates are substantially lower than the Border Patrol’s current estimate, which is between .67 and .86.97 Border Deterrence While the Princeton and UCSD surveys thus find that unauthorized migrants are apprehended about a third to one-half of the time on any given crossing attempt, both surveys find that most aliens who attempt to cross illegally eventually succeed, meaning border deterrence rates are low. According to the Princeton data, between 75% and 90% of aliens apprehended at the border between 1965 and 2009 made a subsequent attempt to re-enter the United States and between 55% and 88% eventually succeeded. Border deterrence (i.e., the proportion of aliens who failed to re-enter the United States) averaged 37% in the two decades before IRCA’s passage; averaged 26% between 1986 and 1995, reaching an all-time low of 21% in 1989; and averaged 34% in 1996-2009, the last year for which sufficient data are available. The UCSD survey finds at-theborder deterrence rates below 10% for the entire post-1980 period.98 94 See for example, Wayne A. Cornelius and Idean Salehyan, “Does border enforcement deter unauthorized immigration? The case of Mexican migration to the United States of America,” Regulation & Governance 1.2 (2007): pp. 139-153; Manuela Angelucci, “U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 60, 2 (2012):311-357. 95 CRS Calculations based on data provided by Princeton University Mexico Migration Project. All figures are based on three-year moving averages of annual apprehension probabilities. 96 CRS calculations based on data provided by University of California-San Diego Mexico Migration Field Research Project. All figures are based on three-year moving averages of annual apprehension probabilities. Figures are based on total apprehensions divide by total trips, not once-or-more apprehension rates by individual migrants. 97 Estimates provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, April 24, 2013. Border Patrol reportedly estimates apprehensions using a methodology broadly similar to the capture-recapture method discussed elsewhere in this report (see “Estimating Illegal Flows Using Recidivism Data”). 98 Survey data on at-the-border deterrence may under-estimate deterrence rates due to the difficulty of measuring (continued...) Congressional Research Service 24 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Smuggling Fees Princeton and UCSD surveys indicate that the majority of unauthorized migrants to the United States make use of human smugglers (often referred to in Mexico as “coyotes” or “polleros”) to facilitate their illegal admission to the country. Indeed, whereas about 80% of unauthorized migrants from Mexico reportedly relied on human smugglers during the 1980s, about 90% did so in 2005-2007, though the use of smugglers may have declined a bit during the recent economic downturn.99 Migrants’ reliance on human smugglers, along with prices charged by smugglers, are an additional potential indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. border enforcement efforts, as more effective enforcement should increase the costs to smugglers of bringing migrants across the border, with smugglers passing such costs along to their clients in the form of higher fees.100 Figure 8 summarizes data from the Princeton and UCSD surveys describing average smuggling fees paid by certain unauthorized migrants from Mexico to the United States. In both cases, the data reflect reported smuggling fees based on surveys conducted with unauthorized migrants in the United States and in Mexico (i.e., after migrants had returned home), with fees adjusted for inflation and reported in 2010 dollars. (...continued) successful entry on a single trip, versus successful entry over the course of a lifetime. 99 See Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, “Access to Border-Crossing Guides and Family/Friends on First Undocumented Trip,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/002coyote-en.aspx. 100 See Bryan Roberts, Gordon Hanson, and Derekh Cornwell et al., An Analysis of Migrant Smugglng Costs along the Southwest Border, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC, November 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/ xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-wp.pdf. The extent to which smugglers may pass their costs along to migrants also depends on the elasticity of migration with respect to such costs, as Roberts et al. discuss; smuggling fees may also therefore depend on the broader migration context, including economic “pulls” and “pushes” in the United States and its migration partner states. Congressional Research Service 25 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 8. Smuggling Fees Paid by Unauthorized Mexican Migrants, 1980-2010 Source: Princeton University Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and University of California, San Diego Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP). Notes: Data based on surveys of unauthorized Mexican migrants about their most recent unauthorized trip to the United States, with reported amounts adjusted for inflation using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index Research Series Using Current Methods (CPI-R-US). Data are a weighted three-year average to account for a small sample size. MMFRP estimate for 2010 may be unreliable due to a small sample size for that year. According to these data, smuggling fees were mostly flat between 1980 and 1993, at about $600$850, with an average annual real growth rate of 1.5%-02.0%. Smuggling fees in both samples began to rise beginning around 1994, and climbed by an average of 11% per year between 1994 and 2002, reaching about $2,000 in both samples by 2002. Growth in smuggling fees has been slower since then, averaging 3.7% per year in the Princeton sample and 1.8% in the UCSD sample (excluding data from 2010, a year in which a small sample may have resulted in an unreliable annual estimate).101 Thus, these data suggest that crossing the border illegally became somewhat more difficult—or at least most expensive—in the decade after the USBP began to implement its 1994 national strategy. Metrics of Border Security Some Members of Congress and others have asked the Border Patrol to provide a clear measure of how many aliens cross the border illegally and/or of the overall state of border security,102 but measuring illegal border flows is difficult for the obvious reason that unauthorized aliens seek to 101 All data are CRS calculations based on data provided by Princeton University Mexico Migration Project and UCSD Mexican Migration Field Research Project. 102 See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Borders and Maritime Security, Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Border Security: Measuring Progress and Addressing the Challenges, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 14, 2013. Congressional Research Service 26 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry avoid detection. While the Border Patrol has accurate data on various enforcement outcomes, these enforcement data were not designed to measure overall illegal inflows. Thus, DHS officials have testified that current enforcement data do not offer a suitable metric to describe border security.103 Apprehensions data are imperfect indicators of illegal flows because they exclude two important groups when it comes to unauthorized migration: aliens who successfully enter and remain in the United States (i.e., enforcement failures) and aliens who are deterred from entering the United States (i.e., certain enforcement successes). Thus, analysts do not know if a decline in apprehensions is an indicator of successful enforcement, because fewer people are attempting to enter, or of enforcement failures, because more of them are succeeding.104 A further limitation to apprehensions data is that they count events, not unique individuals, so the same person may appear multiple times in the dataset after multiple entry attempts. Unique apprehensions and USBP’s estimate of got aways and turn backs are designed, in part, to address these limitations, but they offer only partial solutions. Unique apprehensions address the “overcount” problem associated with recidivism, but still misses information about certain enforcement failures (got-aways) and certain enforcement successes (deterrence). Estimated got aways and turn backs attempt to grapple with the latter problem; but (like apprehensions) they count events rather than individuals. Moreover, because estimated got-aways and turn backs attempt to measure enforcement outcomes that do not result in apprehensions, they are heavily dependent on the subjective judgment of individual border agents.105 To the extent that agents—or the agency—are rewarded for effective enforcement, some people may question the credibility of a measure based on such judgments. Indeed, some media reports already have raised questions about the accuracy of the got away and turn back data.106 The Border Patrol issued new guidance in September 2012 designed to impose greater consistency on turn back and got away data collection and reporting,107 but data from the new system have not yet been analyzed. A further limitation of enforcement data is that all such data depend on enforcement resources. In general, USBP enforcement outcomes (e.g., apprehensions, estimated got aways) are a function of (1) the underlying illegal flows and (2) the agency’s ability to detect such flows. Enforcement data alone cannot disentangle these two factors. As a result, enforcement data may tend to overestimate illegal flows where resources are robust, and to under-estimate such flows where resources are scarce. 103 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Borders and Maritime Security, Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, testimony of Assistant Commissioner of Homeland Security Mark Borkowski, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Borders and Maritime Security, Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, testimony of Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013. Also see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, What Does a Secure Border Look Like, testimony by Marc R. Rosenblum, 113th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2013. 104 See Edward Alden and Bryan Roberts, “Are U.S. Borders Secure? Why We Don’t Know and How to Find Out,” Foreign Affairs 90, 4 (2011): pp. 19-26. 105 For a fuller discussion, see GAO, Key Elements of Strategic Plan, pp. 28-31. 106 See for example, Andrew Becker, “New Drone Radar Reveals Border Patrol ‘Gotaways’ in High Numbers,” Center for Investigative Reporting, April 4, 2013. 107 GAO, Key Elements of Strategic Plan, p. 24. Congressional Research Service 27 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Given the limits of existing border enforcement data, DHS and outside researchers have developed several different metrics for estimating illegal border flows and describing border security. Three different methods for estimating illegal migration stocks and flows are described in the remainder of this section, and broad conclusions based on these metrics are described below (see “How Secure is the U.S. Border?”).108 The Residual Method for Estimating Unauthorized Residents in the United States Arguably the most well-developed approach to measuring unauthorized migration focuses on the number of unauthorized migrants residing in the United States. For many years, analysts within DHS and other social scientists have used the so-called “residual method” to estimate this number. In essence, the method involves using legal admissions data to estimate the legal, foreign-born population, and then subtracting this number from the overall count of foreign-born residents based on U.S. census data.109 The residual method provides limited information about the border per se because many unauthorized residents enter the United States through ports of entry, lawfully or otherwise.110 Nonetheless, estimates of the size of the unauthorized population may offer several advantages over the border metrics discussed below. First, for many people, how many unauthorized aliens reside within the United States ultimately is a more important question than how many cross the border. After all, if illegal border flows fall to zero, but many people continue to enter illegally through ports of entry or by overstaying nonimmigrant visas, many people would consider such an outcome problematic. Second, for this reason, the size of the unauthorized population more comprehensively reflects how well immigration policy and immigration enforcement function, including for example the effectiveness of worksite and other interior enforcement as well as how well visas meet employer and family demands. Third, estimates of the unauthorized population offer the advantage of a nearly 30-year track record and a relatively uncontroversial methodology. As long ago as 2001, the Department of Justice used the total estimated stock of unauthorized migrants in the United States as a key performance metric for the department’s evaluation of its border security efforts.111 108 For a fuller discussion of border metric methodologies and additional estimates of border security, also see Bryan Roberts, John Whitley and Edward Alden, Managing lllegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective is Enforcement? New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2013 (hereafter: Roberts et al., Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States). 109 For a clear discussion of this methodology, see Jeffrey S. Passel, “The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.,” Pew Hispanic Center, March 6, 2006, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/03/07/sizeand-characteristics-of-the-unauthorized-migrant-population-in-the-us/. Also see CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 110 In general, unauthorized migrants enter the United States three ways: by crossing the border without inspection between ports of entry (the focus of this report); by entering illegally through ports of entry, either by using a fraudulent document or by hiding in a vehicle; or by entering legally and then overstaying a temporary visa or becoming deportable for some other reason. 111 See Department of Justice, FY2001 Performance Report & FY2002 Revised Final, FY2003 Performance Plan, Washington, DC 2001, pp. 120-122. Congressional Research Service 28 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry CBP Metrics of Border Security Operational Control of the Border Section 2 of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) defines operational control of the border to mean “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.” Most experts agree that preventing 100% of unlawful entries across U.S. borders is an impossible task;112 and through FY2010, the Border Patrol classified portions of the border as being under “effective” or “operational” control if the agency “has the ability to detect, respond, and interdict illegal activity at the border or after entry into the United States.”113 The agency conducted a fivelevel assessment of border security, with the two top levels (“controlled” and “managed”) defined as being under effective control, and the three remaining levels (“monitored,” “low-level monitored,” and “remote/low activity”) defined as not being under effective control.114 In February 2010, the Border Patrol reported that 1,107 miles (57%) of the Southwest border were under effective control.115 Beginning in FY2011, USBP stopped using this measure of effective control.116 The agency reportedly no longer views operational or effective control as a useful metric because station and sector chiefs could not accurately and reliably use the five-level coding scheme to assess different border regions.117 In addition, given the dynamic nature of border threats, the agency does not view it as useful to evaluate border security on a mile-by-mile basis.118 Border Conditions Index In May 2011, DHS announced that CBP was developing a new “border conditions index” (BCI).119 Reportedly, the BCI will include measures of estimated illegal flows between ports of entry, wait times and the efficiency of legal flows at ports of entry, and public safety and quality of life in border regions. These three components will be combined to develop a holistic “score” calculated for different regions of the border.120 With these different components, the BCI 112 See, for example, Edward Alden and Bryan Roberts, “Are US Borders Secure? Why We Don't Know, and How to Find Out,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011), pp. 19-26. 113 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measuers for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T, February 15, 2011, p. 7. 114 Ibid., p. 8. 115 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Securing Our Borders: Operational Control and the Path Forward, 112th Congress, 1st sess., February 15, 2010. 116 DHS did not report on border miles under effective control in its FY2010 Annual Performance Report; see DHS, Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2010-2012, Washington, DC, April 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/cfo_apr_fy2010.pdf. 117 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 15, 2013. 118 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Borders and Maritime Security, Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, testimony of Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013. 119 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level, testimony of Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 4, 2011. 120 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 9, 2011. Congressional Research Service 29 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry includes some of the same information some Members of Congress and others may consider to be of interest with respect to describing border security; but DHS officials have emphasized that the BCI encompasses a broader set of issues than “border security” as this term is normally used, and that the BCI therefore may not satisfy demands for a single comprehensive measure of border security.121 Officials have also testified that the BCI remains in the development phase.122 Border Patrol Effectiveness Rate By dividing apprehensions and estimated turn backs (i.e., successful enforcement outcomes) by estimated known illegal entries (see “Estimated “Got Aways” and “Turn Backs””), USBP calculates an estimated enforcement effectiveness rate. Some people have proposed using this effectiveness rate as a measure of border security. While using enforcement data to measure border security raises a number of methodological concerns (see “Metrics of Border Security”), the effectiveness rate would have an advantage over other enforcement metrics because, as a ratio, it may be somewhat less sensitive to the level of enforcement resources in place.123 As with the BCI, it is difficult to evaluate USBP’s effectiveness rate as a border metric because little is known about the agency’s new protocols for collecting got away and turn back data. Estimating Illegal Flows Using Recidivism Data For many years, social scientists have used the so-called “capture-recapture” method to estimate unauthorized flows based on recidivism data.124 The capture-recapture method estimates the total flow of unauthorized migrants based on the ratio of persons re-apprehended after an initial enforcement action to the total number of persons apprehended.125 In the basic model, the probability of apprehension is calculated by taking the ratio of recidivist apprehensions to total apprehensions; and the total illegal inflow is calculated by dividing total apprehensions by the odds of apprehension.126 See Appendix for more details. An advantage to the capture-recapture method is that it relies on observable administrative enforcement data—apprehensions and recidivists—to calculate key border security metrics: apprehension rates and illegal flows. Yet the basic model assumes that all intending unauthorized 121 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Borders and Maritime Security, Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, testimony of Assistant Commissioner of Homeland Security Mark Borkowski, 113th Congress, 1st sess., March 20, 2013. 122 Ibid. 123 That is, whereas using apprehensions as a metric of border security is problematic because apprehensions depend on border resources, the ratio of apprehensions to got aways is somewhat less problematic because both apprehensions and estimated known got aways depend on resources, so the ratio may more accurately reflect the proportion of aliens that successfully enters. Nonetheless, the ratio may still be sensitive to border resources if estimating inflows is less (or more) resource-intensive than apprehending aliens. And the enforcement rate by itself may not be an acceptable metric without also considering data on total illegal attempts: many would consider a 10% effectiveness rate based on 100 entry attempts to be more effective than a 90% rate based on a million attempts, for example. 124 According to CBP Office of Congressional Affairs December 20, 2011 and more recent CRS conversations with DHS officials, DHS reportedly plans to use a capture-recapture model as one element of the border conditions index (BCI). 125 Thomas J. Espenshade, “Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier,” International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 545-565. 126 In statistical methods, the odds of apprehension equal the probability of apprehension divided by one minus the probability of apprehension; see Ibid. Congressional Research Service 30 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry migrants eventually succeed (i.e., that none are deterred at the border).127 To the extent that the build-up in border enforcement resources and the deployment of the Consequence Delivery System cause some would-be unauthorized migrants to give up and return home, the capturerecapture method underestimates successful enforcement and overestimates illegal flows. Likewise, the basic model assumes that all border crossers originate in—and are repatriated to— Mexico, facilitating re-entry attempts. As the proportion of border crossers from countries other than Mexico increases—as it has in recent years—128repatriated aliens may be less likely to attempt re-entry, an additional reason the capture-recapture model may over-estimate illegal inflows. Thus, to estimate illegal flows based on the capture-recapture method, enforcement data on apprehensions and repeat apprehensions must be supplemented with additional information about the proportion of migrants deterred, and must control for lower recidivism rates among nonMexicans.129 Estimates of illegal flows based on this methodology are discussed below (see “How Secure is the U.S. Border?”). How Secure is the U.S. Border? While no single metric accurately and reliably describes border security (see “Metrics of Border Security”), most analysts agree, based on available data, that the number of illegal border crossers fell sharply between about 2005 and 2011, with some rise in illegal flows in 2012. This conclusion is supported by key Border Patrol enforcement data described above, including the drop in total apprehensions, the drop in unique apprehensions, and the drop in estimated got aways and total estimated known entries across eight out of nine Border Patrol sectors. Survey data confirm an apparent drop in illegal inflows, and measure such effects away from the border. For example, according to data collected by the Princeton Mexican Migration Project, an average of about 2% of all Mexican men initiated a first unauthorized trip to the United States each year between 1973 and 2002; but that percentage has fallen sharply since 2002, to below 0.4% in 2008-2011.130 Estimates of the unauthorized population based on the residual method report drops of about 1 million unauthorized migrants living in the United States, from about 12.4 million in 2007 to 11.1 million in 2011.131 And the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that net (i.e., 127 Ibid. The basic model also assumes that that the odds of being apprehended are the same across different border regions and across multiple attempts to cross the border. 128 Mexicans accounted for 87% of USBP apprehensions in FY2010, 84% in FY2011, and 73% in FY2012, the three lowest proportions ever recorded. 129 See Roberts et al., Managing lllegal Immigration to the United States); Panel on Survey Options for Estimating the Flow of Unauthorized Crossings at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Washington, DC: National Research Council, 2012 (hereafter: NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries). Accounting for deterrence, flows are estimated to be equal to the number of total apprehensions divided by the the odds of successful enforcement; and the probability of successful enforcement is defined as the number of recidivists divided by total apprehensions, divided by one minus the probability of deterrence. 130 Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, “Probability of a Mexican Taking a First U.S. Trip,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/009firsttrip-en.aspx. 131 Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized Immigrants: 11.1 Million in 2011,” Pew Hispanic Center, December 6, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/unauthorized-immigrants-11-1-million-in-2011/; also see CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. Congressional Research Service 31 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry northbound minus southbound) unauthorized migration from Mexico fell to about zero in 2011, and that outflows may have even exceeded inflows.132 According to GAO’s analysis of Border Patrol metrics, eight out of nine Border Patrol sectors (all except the Big Bend sector) showed improved effectiveness rates between FY2006 and FY2011.133 In the Tucson sector, the main focus of GAO’s analysis, the effectiveness rate improved from 67% to 87% during this period. The San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, and El Paso sectors all had effectiveness rates in FY2011 of about 90%; the Del Rio and Laredo sectors (along with Tucson) had rates above 80%; and the Big Bend and Rio Grande Valley sectors had rates between 60% and 70%. CRS estimates based on USBP recidivism data and using the capture-recapture method also suggest that illegal flows between ports of entry fell substantially between 2005 and 2011, before rising somewhat in 2012 (see Figure 9). The shaded area in Figure 9 depicts total estimated illegal inflows, which are equal to the total number of apprehensions divided by the estimated odds of successful enforcement. (See Appendix for a discussion of the methodology used to generate Figure 9.) Based on available data, the figure assumes deterrence rates in 2000-2012 were between 20% (the estimates depicted by the upper bound of the shaded area) and 40% (the lower bound). As the figure indicates, total estimated illegal inflows fell from a high of between 760,000 and 1.4 million in 2004 to a low of between 340,000 and 580,000 in 2009-2010.134 The model estimates that total illegal inflows were between 400,000 and 660,000 in 2012. Although recidivism data are not available to make similar calculations for previous years, apprehension levels and survey data from the 1980s and 1990s suggest that total illegal inflows likely were lower in 2007-2012 than at any other point in the last three decades. 132 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less,” Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, May 3, 2012. 133 GAO, Key Elements of Strategic Plan, pp. 74-82. Effectiveness rates in this paragraph are defined as the proportion of known illegal entrants who are apprehended or return to Mexico; effectiveness rates are lower if turn-backs are not counted in the numerator. 134 As Figure 9 illustrates, the model estimates that illegal inflows reached their lowest point in 2009 if deterrence is assumed to be 40%, while inflows reached their lowest point in 2011 if deterrence is assumed to be 20%. Congressional Research Service 32 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 9.Total Estimated Illegal Border Inflows, by Assumed Rate of Deterrence FY2000-FY2012 Source: CRS Analysis based on data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs. Notes: See text for discussion of methodology. Border enforcement is only one of several factors that affect illegal migration.135 Thus, if illegal entries indeed fell after 2006, to what degree is this change attributable to enforcement versus other developments, such as the U.S. economic downturn since 2007, and/or economic and demographic changes in Mexico and other countries of origin?136 Disentangling the effects of enforcement from other factors influencing migration flows is particularly difficult in the current case because many of the most significant new enforcement efforts—including a sizeable share of new border enforcement personnel, most border fencing, new enforcement practices at the border, and many of the new migration enforcement measures within the United States—all have occurred at the same time as the most severe recession since the 1930s. Nonetheless, the drop in recidivism rates suggests that an increasing proportion of aliens are being deterred by CBP’s enforcement efforts, a finding that also appears to be reflected in survey data from the Princeton survey (see “Border Deterrence”). Surveys of unauthorized migrants repatriated to Mexico in 2005 and 2010 also suggest that enforcement is increasingly likely to deter future immigration.137 As Figure 9 illustrates, the more unauthorized migrants are being 135 See, for example, Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, and Graeme Hugo et al., Worlds In Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 136 On the effects of Mexico’s falling birthrate on U.S. immigration, see Gordon H. Hanson, Esther Duflo, and Craig McIntosh, “The Demography of Mexican Migration to the United States,” American Economic Review, vol. 99, no. 2 (May 2009), pp. 22-27. Also see CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum. 137 Among Mexicans who migrated illegally to look for work (83% of those in the survey), 60% of those repatriated in 2010 reported that they intended to return to the United States immediately, and 80% reported that they intended to return eventually, down from 81% and 92%, respectively, in 2005. Among new unauthorized migrants (those who had spent less than a week in the United States before being repatriated to Mexico), 18% of those repatriated in 2010 (continued...) Congressional Research Service 33 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry deterred by U.S. enforcement efforts, the lower is the number of successful illegal inflows implied by current enforcement data. Academic research from 2012 also provides evidence that border enforcement has contributed to a reduction in illegal flows.138 These findings are noteworthy, in part, because they contradict earlier academic research, much of which found that border enforcement had a limited impact or even was counter-productive when it came to migration control efforts (also see “Migration Flows: “Caging” Effects and Alternative Modes of Entry”).139 This research suggests that the recent build-up in immigration enforcement at the border and within the United States may have had a greater deterrent effect on illegal migration than earlier efforts.140 Nonetheless, some uncertainty will remain about the true level of border security as long as U.S. employment demand remains below historic levels. Unintended and Secondary Consequences of Border Enforcement The preceding discussion includes estimates of what may be described as the primary costs and benefits of border enforcement, defined in terms of congressional appropriations and deployment of enforcement resources on one hand, and alien apprehensions and other indicators of successful enforcement on the other. A comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of border enforcement policies may also consider possible unintended and secondary consequences. Such consequences may produce both costs and benefits—many of which are difficult to measure—in at least five areas: border-area crime and migrant deaths, migrant flows, environmental impacts, effects on border communities, and U.S. foreign relations. Border-Area Crime and Migrant Deaths Illegal border crossing is associated with a certain level of border crime and violence and, in the most unfortunate cases, with deaths of illegal border crossers and border-area law enforcement officers. Unauthorized migration may be associated with crime and mortality in at least three distinct ways. First, unauthorized migration is associated with crime—apart from the crime of (...continued) reported that they would not return to the United States compared to 6% in 2005. See Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—And Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf, pp. 24-25. 138 See for example, Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts “The Decision to Emigrate From Mexico,” presentation at the Society of Government Economists annual conference, November 6, 2012; Manuela Angelucci, “U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 60, 2 (2012):311-357; Rebecca Lessem. “Mexico-US Immigration: Effects of Wages and Border Enforcement,” Carnegie Mellon University, Research Showcase, May 2, 2012. 139 See for example, Wayne Cornelius, “Evaluating Recent US Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us,” in Crossing and Controlling Borders: Immigration Policies and Their Impact on Migrants’ Journeys, ed. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, and Kerstin Rosenhow (Farmington, MI: Budrich Unipress Ltd, 2011); Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 140 See Manuela Angelucci, “U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 60, 2 (2012):311-357. Congressional Research Service 34 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry illegal entry—because some unauthorized migrants contract with immigrant smugglers and because unauthorized migrants may engage in related illegal activity, such as document fraud. Yet fear of the police may make unauthorized aliens less likely to engage in other types of criminal activity, and research on the subject finds low immigrant criminality rates, especially when accounting for education levels and other demographic characteristics.141 Second, unauthorized migrants may also be likely to be targeted and become crime victims, including victims of violent crime, because they may carry large amounts of cash and may be reluctant to interact with law enforcement officials.142 Third, illegal border crossers face risks associated with crossing the border at dangerous locations, where they may die from exposure or from drowning.143 Border enforcement therefore may affect crime and migrant mortality in complex ways.144 On one hand, the concentration of enforcement resources around the border may exacerbate adverse outcomes by making migrants more likely to rely on smugglers, as noted above (see “Smuggling Fees”). The 1994 National Strategic Plan predicted a short-term rise in border violence for these reasons.145 On the other hand, to the extent that enforcement successfully deters illegal crossers, such prevention should reduce crime and mortality. The concentration of law enforcement personnel near the border may further enhance public safety and migrant protection, especially where CBP has made a priority of protecting vulnerable populations.146 The empirical record suggests that there is no significant difference in the average violent crime rate in border and non-border metropolitan areas.147 Indeed, the border cities El Paso, TX, and San Diego, CA, are regularly listed among the safest large cities in the country based on their rankings among similarly sized cities in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report.148 The specific impact of border enforcement on border-area crime is unknown, however, because available data cannot separate the influence of border enforcement from other factors.149 141 See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel. 142 See Debra A. Hoffmaster, Gerard Murphy, and Shannon McFadden et al., Police and Immigration: How Chiefs are Leading Their Communities through the Challenges, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC, 2010, http://www.policeforum.org/library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf. 143 In 2011, for example, of the 238 migrants deaths for which DHS was able to determine a cause of death, 139 were attributed to exposure to heat or cold or water-related; data provided to CRS by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs December 15, 2011. 144 Also see Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez et al., “Death at the Border,” International Migration Review, vol. 33, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 430-454. 145 National Strategic Plan, p. 11-12. 146 The USBP’s Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) is comprised of agents with specialized skills and training for tactical medical search and rescue operations. BORSTAR agents provide rapid response to search and rescue and medical operations, including rescuing migrants in distress. According to CBP Office of Congressional Affairs (December 9, 2011), BORSTAR agents rescued 1,070 migrants in FY2011. 147 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, by Kristin Finklea. 148 See for example, Daniel Borunda, “El Paso Ranked Safest Large city in U.S. for 3rd Straight Year,” El Paso Times, February 6, 2013, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_22523903/el-paso-ranked-safest-large-city-u-s. 149 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data provide the most information about crime rates, but they are not sufficiently fine-tuned to provide information on the diverse factors affecting such trends; see CRS Report RL34309, How Crime in the United States Is Measured, by Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council. Congressional Research Service 35 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Figure 10. Known Migrant Deaths, Southwest Border, 1985-2012 Source: University of Houston Center for Immigration Research (CIR); Jimenez, “Humanitarian Crisis,” 2009 (ACLU); CBP Office of Congressional Affairs March 13, 2013 (DHS). With respect to mortality, available data about migrant deaths along the Southwest border are presented in Figure 10. The figures come from academic research based on local medical investigators’ and examiners’ offices in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas between 1985 and 1998 (the University of Houston’s Center for Immigration Research, CIR); Mexican foreign ministry and Mexican media counts compiled by the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego; and data compiled by DHS based on bodies recovered on the U.S. side of the border.150 All three data sources reflect known migrant deaths, and therefore undercount actual migrant deaths since some bodies may not be discovered.151 Additionally, U.S. data sources generally do not include information from the Mexican side of the border and therefore further undercount migration-related fatalities. As Figure 10 illustrates, data from the CIR indicate that known migrant deaths fell from a high of 344 in 1988 to a low of 171 in 1994 before climbing back to 286 in 1998. According to DHS data, known migrant deaths climbed from 250 in 1999 to 492 in 2005, and averaged 431 deaths per year in 2005-2009. DHS’s count fell to an average of 369 per year in 2010-2011, but increased to 463 in FY2012. And the ACLU found that known migrant deaths increased from just 80 per year in 1993-1996 to 496 per year in 1997-2007. The apparent increase in migrant deaths is noteworthy in light of the apparent decline in unauthorized entries during the same period. These 150 See Stanley Bailey, Karl Eschbach, and Jacqueline Hagan et al., “Migrant Death on the US-Mexco Border 19851996,” University of Houston Center for Immigration Research Working Paper Series, vol. 96, no. 1 (1996); Jimenez, “Humanitarian Crisis,” 2009. 151 The Border Patrol has drawn criticism from human rights activists who claim that the agency’s migrant death count understates the number of fatalities. Some contend that the Border Patrol undercounts fatalities by excluding skeletal remains, victims in car accidents, and corpses discovered by other agencies or local law enforcement officers; see , for example, Raymond Michalowski, “Border Militarization and Migrant Suffering: A Case of Transnational Social Injury,” Social Justice, Summer 2007. Congressional Research Service 36 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry data offer evidence that border crossings have become more hazardous since the “prevention through deterrence” policy went into effect in the 1990s,152 though (as with crime) the precise impact of enforcement on migrant deaths is unknown. Migration Flows: “Caging” Effects and Alternative Modes of Entry With illegal border crossing becoming more dangerous and more expensive, some unauthorized aliens appear to have adapted their behavior to avoid crossing the border via traditional pathways. Most notably, social science research suggests that border enforcement has had the unintended consequence of encouraging unauthorized aliens to settle permanently in the United States rather than working temporarily and then returning home, as was more common prior to the mid1980s.153 The primary evidence for this so-called “caging” effect is that unauthorized migrants appear to be staying longer in the United States and raising families here more often rather than making regular trips to visit families that remain in countries of origin.154 Although other factors also likely contribute to these changes,155 survey results appear to confirm that border enforcement has been a factor behind these longer stays.156 A second unintended consequence of enhanced border enforcement between ports of entry may have been an increase in illegal entries through ports of entry and other means. According to UCSD Mexico Migration Field Research Program research, unauthorized Mexican migrants from one community in Mexico interviewed in 2009 used six different methods to enter the United States illegally, with one in four such aliens passing illegally through a port of entry by using borrowed or fraudulent documents or by hiding in a vehicle.157 Based on three different surveys conducted between 2008 and 2010, UCSD researchers found that the probability of being 152 Also see Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer, “Border Security and Migration: A Report from South Texas,” Washington Office on Latin America, http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2013/ Border%20Security%20and%20Migration%20South%20Texas.pdf. 153 See Wayne Cornelius, “Evaluating Recent US Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us,” in Crossing and Controlling Borders: Immigration Policies and Their Impact on Migrants’ Journeys, ed. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, and Kerstin Rosenhow (Farmington, MI: Budrich Unipress Ltd, 2011); Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 154 Whereas almost half of unauthorized aliens from Mexico who arrived in 1980 remained in the United States for less than a year, fewer than 20% of unauthorized Mexicans who entered in 2010 returned home within a year; see Mexican Migration Project, “Probability of Return within 12 Months,” http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/010returnpersen.aspx. Also see Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen, and Jorge Narvaez, “Double Jeopardy: How U.S. Enforcement Policies Shape Tunkaseño Migration,” in Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, David FitzGerald, Pedro Lewin Fischer, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2010), pp. 56-57. And whereas an estimated 60-90% of unauthorized migrants during the 1970s were single men, by 2008 men only accounted for an estimated 53% of unauthorized aliens, with women representing 34% and the remainder children; see Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, April 14, 2009, p. 4, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf. 155 For example, changes in U.S. labor markets have resulted in more permanent (non-seasonal) employment opportunities for unauthorized aliens as well as more employment opportunities for unauthorized women; See CRS Report R41592, The U.S. Foreign-Born Population: Trends and Selected Characteristics, by William A. Kandel. 156 Half of the Mexico-based family members of unauthorized aliens interviewed by the UC, San Diego MMFRP in 2009 indicated that they had a relative who had remained in the United States longer than they had intended because they feared they would be unable to reenter the United States if they returned home; see Hicken et al. “Double Jeopardy,” 57-58. 157 Hicken et al., “Double Jeopardy,” pp. 60-61. Congressional Research Service 37 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry apprehended while passing illegally though a port of entry was about half as high as the probability of being apprehended while crossing between the ports.158 CBP’s Passenger Compliance Examination (COMPEX) System reportedly detects very little illegal migration through ports of entry, however.159 There is also anecdotal evidence that unauthorized aliens have recently turned to maritime routes as alternative strategies to cross the U.S.-Mexican border.160 Environmental Impact A third set of potential unintended consequences concern the effect of border enforcement on the environment. As with the effects of enforcement on border crime and violence, the effects of enforcement on the environment are complex because they reflect changes in migrant behavior and the secondary effects of enforcement per se. On one hand, many illegal border crossers transit through sensitive environmental areas, cutting vegetation for shelter and fire, potentially causing wildfires, increasing erosion through repeated use of trails, and discarding trash.161 Thus, to the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal flows, enforcement benefits the environment by reducing these undesirable outcomes. On the other hand, the construction of fencing, roads, and other tactical infrastructure may damage border-area ecosystems. These environmental considerations may be especially important because much of the border runs through remote and environmentally sensitive areas.162 For this reason, even when accounting for the possible environmental benefits of reduced illegal border flows, some environmental groups have opposed border infrastructure projects because they threaten rare and endangered species as well as other wildlife by damaging ecosystems and restricting the movement of animals, and because surveillance towers and artificial night lighting have detrimental effects on migrant birds.163 Effects on Border Communities and Civil Rights Although economists disagree about the overall economic impact of unauthorized migration, unauthorized migrants may impose a number of costs at the local level, including through their use of schools and other public programs.164 Some are also concerned that illegal migration 158 Probability of apprehension on an alien’s most recent attempt to illegally pass through a port of entry was 0.36, compared to 0.73 on the most recent entry attempt between ports of entry; UC San Diego MMFRP data provided to CRS September 23, 2010. 159 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs March 21, 2013. 160 See for example, Adolfo Flores and Ruben Vives, “New Panga Incident Investigated as Possible Smuggling Operation,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2012; Dave Graham, “By Land or by Sea, Tougher U.S. Border Tests Illegal Immigrants,” Reuters, March 20, 2013. Border tunnels are mainly used to smuggle narcotics into the United States, rather than for illegal migration. 161 Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Impact Statement for the Completion of the 14-mile Border Infrastructure System, San Diego, California (July 2003), pp. 1-11. 162 According to the GAO, about 25% of the northern border and 43% of the Southwest border consist of federal and tribal lands overseen by the U.S. Forest Service and Department of the Interior; see CRS Report R42346, Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, by Carol Hardy Vincent, Laura A. Hanson, and Marc R. Rosenblum. 163 See for example, University of Texas School of Law, “The Texas-Mexico Border Wall,” http://www.utexas.edu/ law/centers/humanrights/borderwall/. 164 See CRS Report R42053, Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born Population, by William A. Kandel. Although the overall economic effects of migration—and unauthorized migration in particular—are difficult to estimate, research suggests that fiscal costs of migration are disproportionately borne at the local level. Congressional Research Service 38 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry undermines the rule of law. For these reasons, successful border enforcement may benefit border communities by reducing illegal inflows. Yet some business owners on the Southwest and Northern borders have complained that certain border enforcement efforts threaten their economic activities, including farming and ranching activities that are disrupted by the deployment of USBP resources to the border and commercial activities that suffer from reduced regional economic activity.165 More generally, some people have complained that the construction of barriers divides communities that have straddled international land borders for generations.166 Some people have raised additional concerns about the effects of border enforcement on civil rights. Some residents of Southwest and Northern border communities see enhanced border enforcement as leading to racial profiling and wrongful detentions.167 On top of this general concern, some people argue that Operation Streamline raises additional questions about whether migrants receive adequate legal protections during fast-tracked criminal procedures.168 And some have argued that mistreatment and abuse are widespread in CBP detention facilities.169 An additional concern that some have raised about CBP’s focus on high consequence enforcement is the possibility that focusing scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources on immigration enforcement diverts attention from more serious crimes.170 A 2013 Justice Department study found that the number of immigration defendants in federal courts increased 664% between 1995 and 2010 (from 5,103 to 39,001); and that immigration cases accounted for 60% of the overall increase in pretrial detentions during that period.171 More generally, immigration offenders accounted for 46% of federal arrests in 2010, outnumbering all other crimes and up from 22% a decade earlier.172 A 2008 study by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts found that while Congress had provided short-term funding to allow the courts to 165 See, for example, Mark Harrison, “Beefed Up Border Patrol Jolts Farmers, Cows,” Seattle Times, November 13, 2011; Rafael Carranza, “Leaders Blame Lost Business Deals on Border Fence,” KGBT Channel 4 News, November 2, 2009, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=371266#.Tt0oAmNM8rs Also see U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Steps to a 21st Century U.S.-Mexico Border, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/ 2011_us_mexico_report.pdf. 166 See, for example, Associated Press, “Quebec-Vermont Border Communities Divided by Post-9/11 Security,” CBC News: Canada, August 14, 2011. 167 See, for example, NY School of Law, NY Civil Liberties Union, and Families for Freedom, Justice Derailed: What Raids On New York’s Trains And Buses Reveal About Border Patrol’s Interior Enforcement Practices, New York: November, 2011, http://www.nyclu.org/publications/report-justice-derailed-what-raids-trains-and-buses-reveal-aboutborder-patrols-interi; Lornet Turnbull and Roberto Daza, “Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants,” Seattle Times, June 26, 2011. 168 See for example, American Civil Liberties Union, “Immigration Reform Should Eliminate Operation Streamline,” http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/operation_streamline_issue_brief.pdf. 169 See for example, Alan Gomez, “Lawsuits Allege abuses by Border Patrol Agents,” USA Today, March 13, 2013; Judith Greene and Alexis Mazón, “Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive, Unsafe, Unenecessary,” Justice Strategies, September 13, 2012; No More Deaths/No Mas Muertes, A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border Patrol Custody, 2011. 170 See, for example, National Immigration Forum, Operation Streamline: Unproven Benefits Outweighed by Costs to Taxpayers, Washington, DC, September 2012. 171 Thomas H. Cohen, Special Report: Pretrial Detention and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 1995-2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 239673, Washington, DC, February 2013. 172 Mark Motivans, Immigration Offenders in the Federal Justice System, 2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 238581, Washington, DC, July 2012. Congressional Research Service 39 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry respond to increased prosecutions, the courts faced a shortage of suitable courthouse and detention facilities in some border locations.173 Effects on Regional Relations What are the effects of U.S. border enforcement policies on U.S. relations with its continental neighbors, Mexico and Canada? The United States and Canada have a strong record of collaborative border enforcement, including through 15 binational, multi-agency Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) operating at 24 locations at and between U.S.-Canadian ports of entry. In February 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper signed the Beyond the Border declaration, which described their shared visions for a common approach to perimeter security and economic competitiveness; and the countries released an Action Plan on December 7, 2011, to implement the agreement.174 While some Canadians have raised objections to some of the information sharing and joint law enforcement provisions of the agreement,175 border enforcement between the ports has not been identified as a significant source of bilateral tension. The United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border.176 Yet immigration enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension. And with Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts, some Mexicans have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths, and the protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups, among other issues related to immigration enforcement.177 Conclusion: Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Border Enforcement between Ports of Entry The United States has focused substantial resources along its land borders to prevent and control illegal migration since the 1980s, with investments in personnel, fencing, and surveillance assets all up significantly in the post 9/11 period, in particular. Since 2005, CBP also has transformed its approach to managing enforcement outcomes, through its Consequence Delivery System. Measuring the effects of border enforcement is difficult. On one hand, after reaching a high point in 2000, Border Patrol apprehensions fell sharply in 2007-2011, reaching a 42-year low in FY2011. The Border Patrol’s IDENT database also indicates a declining proportion of aliens is apprehended more than once (i.e., recidivism is down). Estimates based on enforcement and 173 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report on the Impact on the Judiciary of Law Enforcement Activities Along the Southwest Border, Washington, DC: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, July 2008. 174 DHS, “Beyond the Border Action Plan,” December 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/beyond-the-borderaction-plan.shtm; also see CRS Report 96-397, Canada-U.S. Relations, coordinated by Carl Ek and Ian F. Fergusson. 175 See for example, Dana Gabriel, “Toward a North American Police State and Security Perimeter: U.S.-Canada ‘Beyond the Border Agreement,’” Global Research, May 14, 2012. 176 See CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea 177 See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum; Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/USMexico-cooperation.pdf. Congressional Research Service 40 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry survey data and accounting for estimated apprehension and deterrence rates suggest that total illegal inflows in 2009-2011 were well below levels observed in the two decades after IRCA’s passage, but that illegal inflows increased somewhat in 2012. On the other hand, there is also some evidence that migrants have adapted to more difficult conditions at the border by using other means to enter the United States and by remaining longer. A comprehensive accounting also may consider various potential unintended consequences of border enforcement on the civil rights of legal residents and U.S. citizens in the border region, on migrants’ human rights, on the quality of life in border communities, on the environment and wildlife, and on U.S.-regional relations. What do these findings mean for Members of Congress who oversee border security and immigration policy? Especially in light of current fiscal constraints, some Members of Congress may evaluate future border enforcement in terms of expected returns on America’s investments, and they may consider the possibility that certain additional investments at the border may be met with diminishing returns. Border infrastructure may offer an example: with 651 miles of fencing and barriers already in place along the Southwest border, each additional mile would be in ever more remote locations, and therefore more expensive to install and maintain and likely to deter fewer unauthorized migrants. Similarly, some Members of Congress may question the concrete benefits of deploying more sophisticated surveillance systems across the entire northern and southern borders, including vast regions in which too few personnel are deployed to respond to the occasional illegal entry that may be detected. Deciding how to allocate border resources therefore requires a clear definition of the goals of border security. Zero admissions of unauthorized migrants may not be a realistic goal when it comes to migration control, as noted above, and is a higher standard than is expected of most law enforcement agencies. While this report focuses on migration control at U.S. borders, border security also encompasses the detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), narcotics, and other illicit goods; policies to combat human trafficking; and other security goals. These diverse goals are often conflated in an undifferentiated debate about “border security”; but each of these goals may suggest a different mix of border investments, as well as different metrics and different standards for successful enforcement outcomes. Should policies to prevent unauthorized migration be held to the same standards as policies to prevent the entry of WMDs, for example? Regardless of how these questions are answered in principle, debates about immigration control and border security may benefit from better metrics of border security and illegal migration, and from a more analytical approach to program design. The Border Patrol has taken a step in this direction by analyzing recidivism data as a function of different enforcement outcomes through its Consequence Delivery System. This report also identifies several metrics for measuring border security, all of which have advantages and disadvantages. In the context of immigration policy and a possible immigration reform bill, Members of Congress may choose to focus on the total number of unauthorized aliens in the United States, in addition to border flows, since border enforcement is just one of many factors (along with interior enforcement, visa policies, etc.) influencing the size of the unauthorized population, and because more is known about the population number than about border flows. Congressional Research Service 41 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Appendix. Capture-Recapture Methodology The capture-recapture methodology for estimating unauthorized migration flows based on total and recidivist alien apprehensions was first proposed by the sociologist Thomas Espenshade in 1995.178 Espenshade’s original model assumed that all intending migrants (i.e., everyone who makes an initial crossing attempt) eventually succeed—an assumption supported by academic research at the time.179 Likewise, the model focused exclusively on unauthorized Mexican migrants, a population of particular interest since Mexicans represented 96% of all alien apprehensions during the 1990s,180 and since Mexico’s long shared border with the United States creates unique enforcement dynamics, including high recidivism rates. The basic capture-recapture model works backwards from the total number of apprehensions and recidivist apprehensions to calculate total illegal flow and the odds of apprehension. First, by definition, the number of apprehensions is related to the total number of illegal crossings multiplied by the probability of being apprehended on any given attempt. For example, if 1,000 aliens attempt to cross, and the probability of being apprehended on a given trip is 50%, then the number of apprehensions would be 500. If unsuccessful migrants always make a second (and subsequent) attempt to enter, the number of aliens making a second attempt is equal to number of initial apprehensions (i.e., 500 in the previous example); and the number of apprehensions among one-time repeat crossers would be 250. In the following period, 250 would attempt entry and 125 would succeed, and so on. By adding up these iterations, Espenshade shows that the total number of apprehensions (A) is equal to the total flow of unauthorized aliens (F) times the odds of apprehension, where odds are defined statistically as the probability of apprehension (P) divided by one minus the probability of apprehension.181 Re-arranging this statement to solve for flow: F = A/[P/(1-P)] (1) Second, the ratio of repeat apprehensions to total apprehensions is used to calculate the probability of apprehension on a given attempt. In short, the formula for repeat apprehensions is simply the formula for total apprehensions times the probability of being apprehended. As a result, repeat apprehensions (R) divided by total apprehensions (A) yields the probability of apprehension (Papprenehsion) on a given trip:182 Papprenehsion = R/A (2) The methodology used in this report adapts Espenshade’s model to account for the fact that some aliens do not make a second or subsequent attempt after being apprehended—that is, that some are deterred.183 This modified capture-recapture model also has been used in a 2013 Council on 178 Thomas J. Espenshade, “Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier,” International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 545-565. 179 Ibid., pp. 549-550. 180 CRS analysis of apprehensions data from DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics FY2011, Washington, DC: DHS, 2012. Mexicans accounted for 90% of all apprehensions in 2000-2009, before falling to 83% in 2010 and 76% in FY2011. (Mexicans represent a lower proportion of all apprehensions than of Border Patrol apprehensions; total apprehensions data for FY2012 were not available when this report was released.) 181 Espenshade, “Using INS Border Apprehension Data,” pp. 551-552. 182 Ibid., p. 554. 183 The Consequence Delivery System seeks to reduce recidivism by increasing the proportion of aliens subject to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 42 Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Foreign Relations report;184 and DHS officials have indicated that DHS’s Border Conditions Index, now under development, employs a similar method to estimate illegal flows between ports of entry.185 In the modified model, the estimated probability of apprehension defined in equation (2) is divided by one minus the probability of deterrence to calculate the probability of successful enforcement (Penforcement): Penforcement = (R/A)/(1-D) (3) Figure 9 in this report was generated by using equation (3) to estimate the probability of successful enforcement at the Southwest border and equation (1) to estimate total Southwest border illegal flows. In the absence of country-specific recidivism rates (and in light of the higher costs to reentry following deportation of non-Mexicans), CRS’s analysis assumes non-Mexicans do not re-enter in the same fiscal year. Thus, the calculations for equation (3) use CBP data on total recidivists divided by CBP data on Mexican apprehensions to calculate a Mexico-specific apprehension rate.186 Based on available survey and USBP turn back data, deterrence rates were assumed to fall between 20 and 40%. CRS further assumed that Mexican and non-Mexican aliens are apprehended at the same rate, and thus uses the value of P calculated in equation (3), along with CBP data on total Southwest border apprehensions, to estimate total Southwest border illegal inflows based on equation (1). Author Contact Information Marc R. Rosenblum Specialist in Immigration Policy mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov, 7-7360 Acknowledgments Portions of this report are based on archived CRS Report RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by former CRS analyst Chad C. Haddal; and on archived CRS Report RL22659, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, by former CRS analyst Chad C. Haddal and CRS legislative attorney Michael Garcia. CRS Graphics Specialist Amber Hope Wilhelm prepared the figures for this report. (...continued) formal removal, criminal charges, and/or remote repatriation (see “CBP Consequence Delivery System”). And unauthorized aliens from countries other than Mexico (i.e., 73% of USBP apprehensions in FY2012) typically are deported to their home countries, substantially raising the cost of re-entry. 184 Roberts et al., Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States. 185 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 20, 2011. 186 DHS also reportedly restricts its recidivism analysis to Mexican aliens, but may uses country-specific recidivism data to calculate apprehension rates, and may therefore estimate a somewhat lower probability of successful enforcement based on this methodology. Congressional Research Service 43