Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 31October 6, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
95-1013
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Protests that erupted in Bahrain following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power
and economic opportunities were not satisfied by relatively limited efforts to include the Shiite
majority in governance. Most Sunnis in Bahrain believe the Shiite majority will be satisfied with
nothing less than outright rule. As protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain’s government,
contrary to the advice of the Obama Administration, invited
bucked U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other
neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council
countries, declareddeclaring a state of emergency, and moved to
forcefully end largeforcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arrest arresting
dissident leaders. Although the state of emergency
was ended on June 1, the continued arrests of
dissidents reduced prospects for a negotiated
political solution to be achieved in the course of a
national dialogue, which began on July 2, 2011
, and concluded in mid-Augustlater that month. The dialogue,
harmed by a pullout of the main opposition political
society shortly after it began, issued numerous recommendations which, for the most part, did not
reached
consensus on a few recommendations that did not satisfy the bulk of the Shiite opposition. The
main opposition organization has also announced it
will boycottalso boycotted special parliamentary elections on September 24, 2011
2011, and the boycott widened a sectarian disparity in the elected lower house of parliament.
Possibly because of concern that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could jeopardize the
extensive U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain, the Obama Administration has not called for a
change of the Al Khalifa regime and continues to meet regime leaders at high levels. Factoring
into the U.S. position is a perception in the United States and in the Bahraini government that Iran
seeks to take advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to bring a friendly regime to power and reduce
U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has criticized governmental use of force
and widescale arrests of peaceful protesters and urged further reform, but these criticisms have
been insufficient to satisfy those who believe the United States is treating Bahrain differently than
it has other Middle East cases in 2011.
The U.S.-Bahrain security relationship is deep and longstandinglong-standing. In exchange for a tacit security
guarantee against Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by
hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and
small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of the
instability in Bahrain, there is concern that U.S. use of the naval headquarters facilities might
become untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. This facility has been pivotal to
U.S. strategy to deter any Iranian aggression as well as to interdict the movement of terrorists and
weapons-related technology on Gulf waterways. Beyond the naval facility, the United States
signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain as a “major nonNATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Bahrain receives small
amounts of U.S. security assistance. On regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain
also receives
small amounts of U.S. security assistance. New U.S. sales and aid are coming under criticism
from human rights groups that believe the United States should not be militarily helping a
government that is suppressing peaceful demonstrations. On regional issues such as the ArabIsraeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to take the lead in
formulating proposals or
representing the position of the Persian Gulf states, collectively.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is
poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. The country has tried to compensate
through diversification, particularly with banking and some manufacturing. In September 2004,
the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it
was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest in 2011 has further strained Bahrain’s
economy.
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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1
Post-Charter Elections ............................................................................................................... 2
2002 Elections..................................................................................................................... 3
2006 Elections..................................................................................................................... 3
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising................. 4
2011 Uprising ............................................................................................................................ 6
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands .................................................... 6
The Saudi/GCC Intervention and Crackdown..................................................................... 7
Post-GCC Intervention Situation ................................./End of State of Emergency ............................................ 8
National Dialogue and Results...................... 8
Outcomes of the National Dialogue .................................................................................... 9
September Special Election......................24-October 1 Special Election......................................................................... 1011
U.S. Posture on the Uprising............................................................................................. 1011
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 1214
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 1314
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 1315
Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 1315
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 1415
Executions and Torture...................................................................................................... 1415
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations..................................................................... 1416
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain ........................................................................................ 1516
Defense Pact and Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan....................... 1517
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation ........................................................... 1617
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid..................................................................................... 1718
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 1820
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran.......................................................................... 1820
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties....................................... 2022
Other Foreign Policy Issues..................................................................................................... 2123
Qatar Territorial Disputes.................................................................................................. 2123
Arab-Israeli Issues............................................................................................................. 2124
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 2224
Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 2427
Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 5
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain..................................................................................... 2325
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain............................................................................................... 2326
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2427
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The Al Khalifa family’s
arrival from the Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers.
The Al Khalifa subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant
power in the Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain in August 1971
after a 1970 U.N. survey (some refer to its as a “referendum”) determined that its inhabitants
preferred independence to Iranian control.
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 61 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). His son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 41 years old, is Crown Prince. Shaykh Salman
is U.S.-and U.K.-educated and, like the King, has long been considered a proponent of reform
and accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority—about 60%-70% of the 503,000-person
citizenry.2 (There are also an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain, according to the Central
Intelligence Agency’s “World Factbook” July 2010 estimate.) About 25% of the population is age
14 or younger.
To preserve its power, the Al Khalifa family has insisted on holding onto all strategic ministry
positions and at least half of all ministerial slots. Even before the unrest that has seen most senior
Shiites in government resign, there were only four Shiite ministers out of 23 cabinet positions
(plus one out of the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by Shiites have been
considered less critical. Shiites are also highly underrepresented in the security forces, serving
mainly in administrative tasks.
The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa,
along with other Sunni hard-liners including Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmad bin
Salman Al Khalifa3 and Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, have always been
skeptical of King Hamad’s reforms. They believe that the concessions that King Hamad made to
the Shiite majority prior to the 2011 unrest caused the Shiites to increase their political demands
rather than satisfy them. Others believe that level of unrest reached in February 2011 would have
been reached long ago had the King’s reforms not been enacted.
King Hamad’s reforms, although judged minor by the Shiite majority, are far more extensive than
those made by his father Amir Isa during his rule. In December 1992, Amir Isa established a 30member appointed Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws. In June 1996, he
1
Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (April 8, 2011); the International Religious Freedom Report for 2010 (November 17, 2010); and the
July – December 2010 (September 13, 2011);
and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 20102011 (June 14, 201027, 2011). CRS has no means to independently investigate the human
human rights situation in Bahrain or confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.
2
Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,”
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of
Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally
do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
3
The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.
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expanded it to 40 members. These reforms did not come close to quieting the demands of either
Shiites or Sunnis for the restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s
Sunnis are considered less hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was
provided for under the 1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of fear of
sectarian competition and tensions over control of the body. In the years just prior to Shaykh
Hamad’s accession to rulership, there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-1998,
although the unrest gradually took on a Shiite sectarian character.
As Hamad’s first reform steps after taking over, he changed his title to “King,” rather than
“Amir” and implying more accountability, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a new
“National Action Charter (constitution).” However, the Shiite majority population criticized the
National Action Charter because it established that the elected Council of Representatives (COR)
and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council were to be of equal size (40 seats each).
Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament) that serves as only a partial check on
government power. The King, through the prime minister, makes all cabinet appointments and
thus exercises direct rule; the Assembly does not appoint—or have power to reject—cabinet
appointments.
The COR can propose (but not actually draft) legislation and both chambers can question
ministers, although not in public session. The COR can, by a two-thirds majority, vote noconfidence against ministers and the prime minister and override the King’s veto of approved
legislation, although none of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The King has
the authority to dissolve the COR and amend the constitution. The Shura Council is formally
limited to amending draft legislation and, in concert with the COR, reviewing the annual budget,
but these powers provide the Shura Council with the ability to block action by the COR. The
government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members to the
Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the elected COR.
There is no “quota” for females in the National Assembly, as has been included in democratic
constitutions in post-Saddam Iraq and post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The National Assembly has tended to address primarily economic and social issues, and not
national security issues. For example, in May 2010, it voted to ban sale of alcohol to Muslims,
although subject to implementing regulations made by the King, through the government. Other
legislation considered in the Bahraini National Assembly in recent years included bills to combat
cyber crime, regulate the pharmaceutical sector, regulate the press, create an anti-corruption body,
and establish a higher council on social security. However, many of these bills stalled in the 20062010 parliament due to lack of consensus and broader Sunni-Shiite tensions.
Post-Charter Elections
Elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time marked by substantial tension
between the government and the Shiite majority. Formal political parties are banned, but factions
compete as “political societies” which serve as the functional equivalent of parties for election
purposes. In the COR elections, if no candidate in a contested district wins more than 50% in the
first round, a runoff is held one week later.
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2002 Elections
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite
opposition “political societies,” including Al Wifaq, (formally, the Al Wifaq National Islamic
Society, also known as the Islamic National Accord Association—a large faction, led by Shaykh
Ali al-Salman), boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting the COR and the Shura
Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered turnout (about 52%) and
helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the COR seats. Of the 170 total candidates, 6six were women, but
none of the women were elected.
2006 Elections
As was widely expected by experts, Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the
November 25, 2006, parliamentary and municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the
Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.backed elections and that the Bahraini majority was entitled to a similar result. In the fall of 2006,
some Shiites protested, particularly after allegations, some of which were publicly corroborated
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights
organization, that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni candidates.
It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the
demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.
In the November 2006 elections, two Shiite opposition blocs, Wifaq and the National Democratic
Action Association, participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. Wifaq is avowedly Islamist in
political orientation. A harder-line Shiite opposition faction, Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and
Democracy), boycotted. The opposition, led by Wifaq, won 17 seats, virtually all those it
contested. The Shiite opposition was therefore the largest single bloc in the COR, but it was short
of a majority.
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslims won 23 total seats. Of those, 8eight were won by
by secular Sunnis and 15 were won by Islamist Sunnis (8eight from the Salafists trend and 7 Muslim
seven
Muslim Brotherhood members). Only one woman (Latifa al Qaoud, who was unopposed in her
district)
won, out of 18 female candidates (down from 31 female candidates in the 2002
elections). As
evidence of continued friction, Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and
incumbent COR
Speaker Khalifa al-Dhahrani was reelected speaker.
The King subsequently named a new Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and 1one Christian (a
(a female). Ten women were appointed. However, the Shiites appointed were not all aligned with
opposition factions, and several were considered “pro-government.” Therefore, the Shura Council
was not a bastion of opposition to the government even though Shiites held half of its seats. In a
nod to the increased Shiite strength as a result of the elections, the government appointed a Shiite
(Jawad al-Araidh) as one of the four deputy prime ministers and another (who is close to Wifaq)
as a minister of state for foreign affairs. Three other Shiites remained in the cabinet.
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and accused some of being part of a
foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain. Some were accused of undergoing guerrilla or
terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009, the government arrested three leading Shiite
activists, including the wheelchair-bound Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima,
both leaders of Al Haq. They were tried during February-March 2009 but, along with other Shiite
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activists, were pardoned and released in April 2009. Alsingace has visited the United States
several times to highlight the human rights situation in Bahrain. (As noted below, Alsingace was
arrested again in August 2010. Mushaima subsequently went into exile in Europe. Mushaima was
arrested after his return and both are on trial in connection with the 2011 unrest.)
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising
The resentments over the 2006 election, and the still unfulfilled demand of Bahrain’s Shiites for
greater political power and an end to economic discrimination, carried over to the 2010 election.
The election was held on October 23, 2010, with a second round runoff for some districts on
October 30. There were only a limited number of international observers, primarily from various
international human rights organizations. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog groups, the
Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency Society, again (for the third time)
reached agreement to jointly monitor the 2010 elections. Municipal elections were held
concurrently.
The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40 districts spread throughout five
governorates. As was the case in the 2006 elections, Shiite oppositionists accused the government
of drawing district boundaries so as to prevent the election of a Shiite majority. Registration of
candidates took place during September 12-16, 2010. About 200 people registered to run, of
whom seven were women. However, one woman withdrew after registering, leaving a field of six
female candidates. Of the six, only one was formally endorsed by a political society, the National
leftleaning, nonsectarian National Democratic Action Society (Waad, which means “promise” in
Arabic). She is Munira Fakhro, a
prominent Shiite woman who was exiled prior to the political
reform process underbegun by King Hamad.
In 2006, she narrowly lost to a Sunni Islamist (Minbar, or
“platform,” faction). At least four
candidates in districts where there was no opposition were
declared winners by September 28,
2010. One of them was a Wifaq member.
Wifaq, still by far the most prominent Shiite political society, fielded candidates. Its leader,
Shaykh Ali Salman, was not a candidate, preferring to continue to lead the faction from the
background. Al Haq again boycotted, as it did in 2006. In the run-up to the election, the
government cracked down on Shiite activitists, particularly those who supported boycotting the
election. For example, on September 4, 2010, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on charges of
attempting a violent overthrow of the government. They were among about 160 Shiites arrested
in August and September, under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that gives the government broad arrest
and prosecution powers. Among those arrested was Dr. Alsingace (see above), on August 13,
2010, upon his return from abroad. Alsingace remained incarcerated and told his lawyers that he
was being beaten and deprived of sleep. A prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Hussein Mirza alNajati, said to be close to the most senior Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had his Bahrain
citizenship revoked on September 20, 2010.
Some observers asserted that the government crackdown would drive Bahraini Shiites to
politically support boycotting harder-line movements, such as Al Haq, and in so doing suppress
the election turnout among Shiites. The crackdown did not prompt Wifaq to reverse its decision to
compete. The crackdown might have helped the government’s election strategy but it also led to
stepped up demonstrations by Shiite youth in Shiite neighborhoods. The tensions are also widely
blamed for resulting in a bombing that damaged four police cars on September 15, 2010. The
tensions over the election almost certainly were a catalyst for the major unrest that has occurred
in February 2011, discussed further below.
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Among Sunni political societies, there are two that are considered Islamist. They include Minbar,
mentioned above, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a
harder-line “Salafist” political society. As noted below, in the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and
Minbar members held a combined 15 seats.
2010 Election Results
Despite the preelectionpre-election tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence. Turnout
Turnout was about 67% between the two rounds. The results, some unexpected, included:
•
The increase of Wifaq’s representation from 17 seats in the 2006-2010 COR to 18
seats. However, the 18 is still short of a majority.
•
Unexpected losses by Sunni Islamist factions, reducing their total to 5five seats from
from 15. Minbar and Asala each saw dramatic reductions in their seats from
2006:
Minbar (Muslim Brotherhood) decreased to 2two seats (from 7seven) and
Asala decreased
to 3three seats (from 8eight). Most of the seats were picked up by
Sunni independents, who
won 17 seats, up from 9nine in the 2006-2010
parliament. In addition, the secular and
generally leftwing ideological Waad won
no seats at all. These results appeared
to represent a rejection of Islamist
ideology, and even all ideological candidates,
in favor of pragmatists who would
address Bahrain’s economic difficulties.
•
The same one woman won who had won in 2006.
•
In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the parliamentary term, the King named the 20102014 Shura Council. Thirty of the 40 serving Council members were reappointed, leaving only 10
newly appointed members. A total of 19 Shiites were appointed, including the speaker. The
Council has four women, substantially fewer than the 2006-2010 Council that had nine women.
Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about
40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala Qarrisah). Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians. The
Council speaker, Ali al-Salih, a Shiite, was reappointed.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly
2006 Lower House (COR)
Shiite Islamist (Wifaq) in Elected
COR
2010 Lower House (COR
17
18
Sunni Independent (mostly secular)
in COR
8
17
Sunni Islamist (Minbar, Muslim
Brotherhood, moderate Islamist) in
COR
7
2
Sunni Islamist (Asala, Salafi,
conservative Islamist in COR
8
3
Sectarian Composition in COR
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
Sectarian, Religious Composition
Upper House (Shura Council)
20 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1 Christian
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22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
19 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1 Christian, 1 Jew
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2010
Post-By-Election
(October 2011)
Council of Representatives (COR)
Wifaq (Shiite Islamist)
17
18
0
Shiite Independent
0
0
8
Sunni Independent (mostly
secular) in COR
8
17
27
Moderate Sunni Islamist
(Minbar, Muslim
Brotherhood)
7
2
2
Conservative Sunni
Islamist (Asala, Salafi)
8
3
3
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COR Sect Composition
Women in COR
2006
2010
Post-By-Election
(October 2011)
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
32 Sunni, 8 Shiite
1
1
4
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed)
Sectarian, Religious
Composition Upper
House (Shura Council)
20 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1
Christian
19 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1
Christian, 1 Jew
Same as before
9
4
same
Number of Women
2011 Uprising
King Hamad’s efforts to accommodate Shiite aspirations were demonstrated to have failed when
a major uprising began on February 14, 2011, in the wake of the success of an uprising in Egypt
that forced the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. After a few days of protests and
relatively minor confrontations with the mostly Bahraini Sunni and expatriate Sunni security
forces, the mostly Shiite demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, “Pearl
Roundabout,” named after a statue that depicted Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The uprising took
place after King Hamad had authorized the latest annual iteration of a $2,700 payment to citizens.
The initial demands of the protesters were numerous, but generally centered on such political
reforms as altering the constitution to expand the powers of the COR; ending gerrymandering that
prevents Shiites from winning a majority in the COR; providing more jobs and economic
opportunities; and, among some protesters, replacing hard-line Prime Minister Khalifa. A
consistent theme among protesters appeared to be to end the sense among Shiites that they are
“second class citizens” or “not trusted” as Bahraini citizens. On February 15, 2011, King Hamad
spoke to the nation and announced the formation of a committee to investigate the use of force
against protestors, which had killed two until that time.
The unrest took on new dimensions in the early morning of February 17, 2011, when security
forces surrounded the thousands of demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout, many of whom were
asleep, and used rubber bullets and tear gas to remove them from the location. At least four
demonstrators were killed; others died subsequently. The government asserted it had warned of
the impending move, an account disputed by the protesters. At a news conference later on
February 17, Foreign Minister Khalid Al Khalifa claimed that the Pearl Roundabout was cleared
to avoid a “sectarian abyss”—all-out civil conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis. Despite heavy
security patrols, additional protests took place on February 18, 2011, and security forces
apparently shot several demonstrators. Politically, Wifaq pulled all 18 of its deputies out of the
COR immediately following the February 17 crackdown. Britain closed its embassy in Bahrain
after the February 17, 2011, crackdown, and announced it might ban further arms exports to
Bahrain.
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands
In part at the reported urging of the United States, the government changed tactics on February
19, 2011, pulling security forces back from confronting protesters. That day, demonstrators reenteredre-
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entered Pearl Roundabout and held large demonstrations at or around that location subsequently.
A February 22, 2011, demonstration was said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history,
although some accounts say that a demonstration three days later, which spanned miles of
downtown roads, was even larger. The February 22 demonstration followed by one day a large
counter-demonstration by mostly Sunni supporters of the government.
At the same time, the government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the
representatives of the protesters to begin a formal dialogue to try to agree on reforms. That effort
was supported by a gesture by King Hamad on February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308
Bahrainis, including the exiled leader of the hardline Al Haq, Hassan Mushaima (who returned to
Bahrain from exile in Europe on February 27, 2011). According to the government, these persons
were tried not for political views, per se, but rather for committing or advocating violence. On
February 26, 2011, King Hamad changed several cabinet posts; this included dropping two Al
Khalifa family members from the cabinet. The posts changed were those that can influence job
opportunities and living conditions.
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The pulling back of the security forces, offers of dialogue, and the cabinet reshuffles did not
prevent the protesters’ demands from escalating or cause them to leave Pearl Roundabout. The
government concessions exposed long-standing splits in the opposition, such as that between the
more moderate Wifaq and the more hardline Al Haq. Anger at the government’s initial use of
force appeared to shift many demonstrators closer to Al Haq, which, as of the beginning of March
2011, demanded a resignation of the monarchy outright. Wifaq and other more moderate groups
appeared willing to accept the formation of a constitutional monarchy, as discussed further below,
and efforts to promote more job opportunities for Shiites. Six smaller hardline Shiite political
societies reportedly joined Al Haq in insisting on maximalist demands.4 The regime’s offer of
dialogue was not taken up consistently or systematically by the more moderate groups, and only
informal meetings took place in search of a political solution.
The Saudi/GCC Intervention and Crackdown
With no systematic dialogue begun, protests escalated. On March 1, 2011, demonstrators blocked
the entrance to the parliament building and delayed the meeting of its bodies for six hours. The
protests also began to spark Sunni-Shiite clashes which some Bahrainis believed were evolving
into outright sectarian conflict at the mass level—whereas previously sectarianism had been a
concept mainly confined to power struggles among the elites. On March 13, 2011, protesters
blockaded the financial district of the capital, Manama, prompting governmental fears that the
unrest could choke this major economic sector. Security forces were overwhelmed.
On March 13, Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a
member, send additional security forces to protect key sites. In response to the request, on March
14, 2011, a GCC force (from the GCC joint Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported
1,200 Saudi forces (in 20 tanks and in other armored vehicles) and 600 UAE police crossed into
Bahrain and took up
positions at key locations in and around Manama. Kuwait sent naval forces
to help Bahrain secure
its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared a three-monththreemonth state of emergency
technically headed by BDF Chief of Staff Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmad
Al Khalifa, and Bahraini
security forces, freed up by the GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout
4
“Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go. Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
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from Pearl Roundabout (and demolished the pearl monument itself on March 18, 2011).5 Some
additional protester deaths
were reported in this renewed crackdown. In conjunction, seven Shiite
leaders were arrested,
including Al Haq’s Mushaima. Wifaq’s leader, Shaykh Ali Salman, was not
arrested. The
remaining Shiite ministers in the cabinet, many of the Shiites in the Shura Council,
and many
Shiites in other senior posts in the judiciary and elsewhere resigned, although a few subsequently
subsequently returned to service.
Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states had begun to fear that the Bahrain unrest
could spread to other GCC states. It was also feared that Iran might be able to exploit the
situation. None of the other GCC states has a Shiite majority (like Bahrain), but most of them,
including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The GCC states met at the foreign
minister level on February 16, 2011, and expressed solidarity with the government of Bahrain.
King Hamad visited Saudi Arabia on February 23, 2011, for consultations on how to handle the
unrest, and Crown Prince Salman visited UAE on March 2, 2011. Those countries have arranged
4
“Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go. Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force have participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC
force is only guarding key locations and infrastructure.
5
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for large pledges of aid (some reports mention $20 billion) to help the Bahrain government (and
that of Oman, which also has faced unrest) create jobs for Shiites. Some warned that Saudi
intervention would prompt a wider conflict by prompting Iranian intervention on the side of the
Shiite protesters. Allegations of Iranian involvement in the unrest are discussed later in the
section on Bahrain’s foreign policy.
Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency
Most public protests ceased subsequent to the GCC intervention, although some, mostly
neighborhood-based demonstrations continue despite a heavy security force presence around
Manama. Human rights groups, including those testifying at a May 13, 2011, hearing of the Tom
Lantos Human Rights Commission, reported a broad crackdown in which hundreds were in
detention, including at least 50 medical professionals who helped tend to injured protestors. Over
1,500 people, mostly Shiites, had been dismissed from their jobs, although labor movement
officials say the figure exceeds 2,600. To date, according to Bahraini government figures, 30
Bahraini protesters have died in the violence, although opposition figures are much higher. Some
sources say the government bulldozed about 30 Shiite mosques as a measure to prevent Shiites
from gathering.
Prominent Dissidents Arrested
As part of what U.S. officials and many observers called an excessive crackdown, in early April
2011, the government closed the pro-opposition newspaper Al Wasat; it editor-in-chief, Mansour
al-Jamri, went on trial on May 18, 2011, for inciting violence. A well-known human rights
activist, Bahrain Center for Human Rights founder Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, was arrested April 9,
2011, and his daughter, Maryam, subsequently undertook a
hunger strike. On April 15, 2011, the
government announced that Wifaq and another Shiite
political society, the Islamic Action
Association, were being investigated for harming national
unity and could potentially be
disbanded. On May 2, 2011, two Wifaq officials who had resigned
from the COR because of the
unrest, Matar Matar and Jawad Fairuz, were arrested. On May 8,
2011, 14 oppositionists,
5
Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force have participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC
force is only guarding key locations and infrastructure.
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including Mushaima and Alsingace, went on trial before a state security
court; seven others went
on trial in absentia.. On May 31, a key activist, the head of the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights,
Nabeel Rajab, was summoned before the military court prosecuting
alleged agitators. On June 6,
2011, 47 doctors and nurses were put on trial for aiding protesters.
State of Emergency Ends June 1 and National Dialogue Begins On September 29, 2011, 20
medical personnel were sentenced by a military court to jail time ranging from five to 15 years, a
sentence harshly criticized by human rights activists worldwide. The government said the
sentences were not for helping protesters medically, but for inciting sectarian hatred, possession
of illegal weapons, and forcibly occupying a public building. Following international criticism,
on October 5, 2011, the government announced they would be retried in a civilian court.
Perceiving the regime had gained the upper hand, the King announced in early May that the state
of emergency would end on June 1, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The government held to
that schedule; and the GCC forces that deployed to Bahrain, including the Kuwaiti naval force,
began began
to depart in late June 2011. The departures are believed to have been complete, although some
oppositionists assert that some GCC forces remain as of October 2011. King . King
Hamad spoke to the
population on May 31 to mark the end of the emergency, offering
unconditional dialogue with the opposition beginning July 1, 2011.
After extensive internal debate, Wifaq accepted the offer to participate in the dialogue, which
began on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. The “National
Dialogue” began with about 300 delegates, of which the Shiite opposition had 35-50 delegates.
Of those, five belonged to Wifaq.6 The dialogue, which was to last several weeks, addressed
political, economic, social, and human rights issues; each had 15 sub-themes and each sub-theme
6
Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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has 90 topics. Senior Bahraini officials said the intent of the dialogue was to outline a vision of
Bahrain rather than necessarily reach agreement on specific steps.
Possibly contributing to Wifaq’s decision to participate was the King’s formation, a few days
prior, of a five-person commission headed by Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the
government’s response to the unrest that began in February, and to file its report by October 30,
2011. It held a public forum on July 24. The government also released about 150 of those who
had been imprisoned for the unrest. Earlier, possibly in an effort to divide the opposition, on June
23, 2011, the judiciary sentenced eight harder-line Shiite oppositionists, including Mushaima and
Alsingace, to life in prison on charges of plotting a coup.7 On July 29, 2011, an unknown number
of Shiite demonstrators held a licensed demonstration, but an attempt to march on the U.S.
Embassy in Manama was reportedly blocked by security forces.
opposition beginning July 1, 2011.
Commission of Inquiry Formed
On June 29, 2011, as a further gesture toward the opposition, the King of a five-person “Bahrain
Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the
government’s response to the unrest that began in February, and to file its report by October 30,
2011. It held a public forum on July 24, but has come under criticism from Shiite opposition
figures who have interpreted certain Bassiouni statements as a bias in favor of exonerating top
government officials and blaming human rights abuses on lower level security officers.
National Dialogue and Results
After extensive internal debate, Wifaq accepted the offer to participate in the dialogue, which
began on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. The “National
Dialogue” began with about 300 delegates, of which the Shiite opposition had 35-50 delegates.
Of those, five belonged to Wifaq.6 The dialogue, which was to last several weeks, addressed
political, economic, social, and human rights issues; each had 15 sub-themes and each sub-theme
has 90 topics. Senior Bahraini officials said the intent of the dialogue was to outline a vision of
Bahrain rather than necessarily reach agreement on specific steps.
The government also released about 150 of those who had been imprisoned for the unrest. Earlier,
possibly in an effort to divide the opposition, on June 23, 2011, the judiciary sentenced eight
harder-line Shiite oppositionists, including Mushaima and Alsingace, to life in prison on charges
of plotting a coup.7 On July 29, 2011, an unknown number of Shiite demonstrators held a licensed
demonstration, but an attempt to march on the U.S. Embassy in Manama was reportedly blocked
by security forces.
6
7
Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
Erika Solomon. “Bahrain Sentences 8 Activists to Life Terms.” Washington Post, June 23, 2011.
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Outcomes of the National Dialogue
Outcomes of the National Dialogue were difficult to predict. Many in the opposition maintained
that the continuing detention of many oppositionists does not augur well for progress. The
prospects further diminished on July 18, 2011, when Wifaq, which had always asserted that it
would pull out of the talks if and when it became clear that its proposals for a fully elected
parliament with legislative powers would not be met, announced its withdrawal. That major step
built on an earlier decision by the group on July 7, 2011, to cease participating in the economic
and social issues meetings. Others took note of the fact that the Crown Prince, the principal
champion of dialogue within the upper ranks of the regime, did not chair the dialogue. This
suggests he remains in eclipse by harder line Al Khalifa members allied with the prime minister.
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 and issued numerous recommendations. The core of the
recommendations were after reaching consensus on a few recommendations,
which were endorsed by the government on July 29. The core of the recommendations were
centered on the same seven points for reforms articulated by Crown
Prince Salman at the start of
the unrest: an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded
powers; a government “reflecting
the will of the people;” “fairly” demarcated electoral
boundaries; reworking of laws on
naturalization and citizenship; combating financial and
administrative corruption; efforts to
reduce sectarian divisions; and the disposition of state
property. There were reportedly 82
economic recommendations, including new mechanisms to
provide food subsidies to only the
most needy citizens. The government subsequently appointed a
committee to implement the
recommendations, headed by former Foreign Minister and now
deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa. He and other officials conducted rounds
of meetings with both
houses of the National Assembly and with government ministries to begin
implementation.
For the opposition, the National Dialogue was largely a failure. The Dialogue did not endorse the
ideas of Wifaq and other groups proposals for a fully elected parliament with legislative powers,
or for the direct selection of the prime minister by the largest coalition in the elected legislature.
Wifaq was unsatisfied that the Dialogue did not endorse reducing the size and powers of the
appointed Shura Council, or the specific pledge to redraw electoral boundaries. To the opposition,
the lack of such a pledge signals that the government will continue to gerrymander districts to
ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house.
7
Erika Solomon. “Bahrain Sentences 8 Activists to Life Terms.” Washington Post, June 23, 2011.
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Nor did the opposition achieve other gains, either as a result of the Dialogue or separately. A
widely discussed interim compromise has been the replacement of Prime Minister Khalifa, who is
widely despised by the opposition, with Wifaq leader Shaykh Ali Salman or another moderate
opposition figure. The government has not agreed to this step even though, throughout the crisis,
some Bahrainis have said that the dismissal of Prime Minister Khalifa Al Khalifa, was likely.8
Another interim compromise, not adopted to date, could include a broad reshuffling of the cabinet
to give Shiites many more ministerial posts and control of key economic ministries. Wifaq already
holds the majority of seats on several elected municipal councils, although these bodies do not
have national legislative authority.
Still, widespreadWidespread Shiite demonstrations did not erupt after the conclusion of the Dialogue,
although a
youth was killed by security forces at one protest on August 31, 2011. In part as a
gesture of
reconciliation after the Dialogue concluded, on August 8 the government released the
two jailed
Wifaq COR deputies Matar and Fairuz, along with several other jailed activists. In a
speech on
8
Author conversations with representatives of and observers close to the regime. April 2011.
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August 28, 2011, near the conclusion of the holy month of Ramadan, King Hamad
announced the
pardoning of some protesters, and the reinstatement of some employees who had
been fired and some students who had been expelledof the approximately 2,700 of those
who had been fired for alleged participation in unrest.
Some believe the GCC intervention and subsequent crackdown hardened Shiite demands to the
point where government gesture will be dismissed and any implementation of the national dialogue consensus recommendations will be
dismissed and any further compromise is difficult. Harder line
Shiite groups believe that no
compromise is possible with the Al Khalifa regime still in power.
The overthrow of the , and that increased protests and
actions intended to collapse the economy will force the government to fall. The overthrow of the
government and the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is possible, although
the GCC determination
to prevent this makes this outcome less likely, at least in the short term.
On the regime side,
compromise has been made more difficult by the apparent political eclipse of
the Crown Prince,
who favors dialogue and negotiation, and the ascendancy within the regime of
the prime minister
and other hardliners.
September Special Election
The resignations of the 19 Wifaq COR deputies necessitated by-elections to fill their seats. The
elections are scheduled for September 24, 2011, with a second round to be held on October 1, if
needed. However, the legitimacy of the elections have been clouded by the announcement by
Wifaq on August 14, 2011 that it would boycott the elections. That position was based on Wifaq’s
decision that the national dialogue’s reform recommendations were not sufficiently extensive.
U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The U.S. response to the unrest in Bahrain has been colored by the vital U.S. security interests in
Bahrain. The U.S. concern is that a fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led
government could increase Iran’s influence and lead to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of
Bahrain’s military facilities. In phone calls to their counterparts after the February 17, 2011,
clearing of Pearl Roundabout, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates
reportedly expressed concern to the Bahrain government for using force against the protesters.
These contacts reportedly contributed to the government decision to exercise restraint at that time.
8
Author conversations with representatives of and observers close to the regime. April 2011.
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24-October 1 Special Election
Although activists say demonstrations take place in Shiite villages every night, the main
commercial areas of Bahrain remained mostly calm from the time of the national dialogue until
the special elections to fill the seats vacated by the 18 Wifaq COR deputies that had resigned at
the outset of the unrest. The elections were scheduled for September 24, 2011, with a second
round to be held on October 1, if needed. However, the legitimacy of the special elections was
clouded by the announcement by Wifaq on August 14, 2011, that it would boycott the elections.
That position was based on Wifaq’s decision that the national dialogue’s reform recommendations
were not sufficiently extensive. Several anti-government demonstrations took place in the run-up
to the elections and on the days of the election, mostly in Shiite neighborhoods.
In advance of the elections, four winners were declared (including one woman) because they
were running unopposed. In both rounds of voting, turnout was assessed as very low, at about
20%, although the government put out official turnout figures of close to 50%. After the first
round on September 24, five additional seats were decided. The October 1 runoff decided the
remaining nine seats. As shown in Table 1, of the 18 seats decided in the special election, 10 were
won by Sunnis, largely because of the Wifaq boycott and low turnout. This suggests that most
Shiites viewed the special election as illegitimate, but the net result is that Sunnis now
overwhelmingly dominate the COR, with 32 seats to only eight Shiite seats. The special election
resulted in the addition of three women COR deputies.
The next major benchmark in the unrest and the Bahraini response will be the release of the
Independent Commission of Inquiry report by October 30.
U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The U.S. response to the unrest in Bahrain has been colored by the vital U.S. security interests in
Bahrain. The U.S. concern is that a fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led
government could increase Iran’s influence and lead to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of
Bahrain’s military facilities. The seeming priority of these considerations to U.S. officials have
prompted criticism from human rights organizations, Bahrain’s opposition, and other regional
governments that the United States applies different standards in its response to unrest in allied
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countries such as Bahrain than it does to countries in which a change of regime might not harm
U.S. interests, such as Libya or Syria.
The Administration has stressed that it has been highly critical of Bahrain’s use of force against
protesters. In phone calls to their counterparts after the February 17, 2011, clearing of Pearl
Roundabout, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly expressed
concern to the Bahrain government for using force against the protesters. These contacts
reportedly contributed to the government decision to exercise restraint at that time.
Just prior to the GCC intervention and subsequent crackdown, Secretary of State Clinton and
other U.S. officials had praised the release of political prisoners and called on all parties to take
up the offer by the Crown Prince for a broad political dialogue on reform.9 In a statement,
President Obama praised the February 26 cabinet reshuffle and King Hamad’s restatements of his
commitment to reform.10
The U.S. position did not change immediatelysubstantially following the GCC intervention, but it has since
becamethe United
States did become somewhat more critical as the crackdown hassubsequent crackdown proceeded. The U.S. view isU.S. officials
expressed the view that the crackdown is
likely towould further inflame unrest over the long term, rather
than achieve quiescence and stability.
On March 19, 2011, Secretary Clinton reiterated the U.S.
support for the Crown Prince’s offer of
dialogue, and said:
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
On April 30, 2011, according to the White House, President Obama spoke by phone to King
Hamad and reportedly stated that Bahrain’s stability depends on respect for the universal rights of
the people of Bahrain, and a process of meaningful reform. At a May 5, 2011, House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing, State Department officials testified that the United States is “deeply
concerned” by the “campaign of retribution” against the political opposition, adding that “security
operations will not resolve the challenges Bahrain faces.” President Obama’s May 19, 2011,
speech on the uprisings in the Middle East was critical of Bahrain, saying that the prospects for
success of a dialogue with the opposition are compromised by the jailing of opposition figures.
This U.S. position was restated in separate June 7, 2011, meetings between the Crown Prince and
Secretary Clinton and President Obama. According to a White House statement, Presiedent
Obama President Obama
stressed to the Crown Prince that those Bahraini forces or officials responsible for human
rights abuses should be held “accountable.”
U.S. officials have not called for the Al Khalifa to step down and yield to a political transition,
and there are no indications the Administration might take that position. As noted above, senior
U.S. officials continue to meet with the Bahraini regime at high levels, although some observers
say the United States advised King Hamad not to visit the United States in May 2011 to attend his
son’s college graduation. The U.S. position has been criticized by some as a U.S. “double
standard,” compared to the U.S. response to the 2011 unrest in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. The
Administration did not send an official to testify at the May 13 Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission hearing discussed above. Some believe the government did not adequately protect a
U.S. diplomat responsible in Manama responsible for human rights issues, Ludovic Hood. The
State Department returned him to the United States in June 2011 because of perceived threats
rights
abuses should be held “accountable.”
The criticism continued in the course of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York in
September 2011; in his September 21, 2011, speech to the body, President Obama said:
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that,
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that
9
Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc.
10
“Obama Welcomes Bahrain Cabinet Reshuffle.” Reuters, February 27, 2011.
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brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.
The same day, the Ambassador-nominee to Bahrain, Thomas Krajeski, testified in confirmation
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his testimony, he reiterated
Administration criticisms of the government response, saying the government “overreacted” to
the unrest, as well as praise of its long record of reform and accommodation of some Shiite
demands.
Critics of the U.S. position say that U.S. officials have not called for the Al Khalifa to step down
and yield to a political transition, and there are no indications the Administration might take that
position. As noted above, senior U.S. officials continue to meet with the Bahraini regime at high
levels, although some observers say the United States advised King Hamad not to visit the United
States in May 2011 to attend his son’s college graduation. The U.S. position has been criticized
by some as a U.S. “double standard,” compared to the U.S. response to the 2011 unrest in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya. The Administration did not send an official to testify at the May 13 Tom
Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing discussed above. Some believe the government did
not adequately protect a U.S. diplomat responsible in Manama responsible for human rights
issues, Ludovic Hood. The State Department returned him to the United States in June 2011
because of perceived threats from Bahrainis who felt he was too critical of the government.
At the same time, the Administration has undertaken some efforts to help mediate in the crisis.
Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman was sent to Bahrain in March 14,
2011, to attempt to achieve the beginning of a sustained dialogue between the government and the
9
Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc
10
“Obama Welcomes Bahrain Cabinet Reshuffle.” Reuters, February 27, 2011.
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opposition. He visited again in mid-April. Outgoing Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg,
along with Feltman and an NSC official, visited on May 17, 2011, meeting with senior Bahraini
officials and again urging them to try to start dialogue with the opposition. The State Department
issued a statement on July 2, 2011, praising the start of the National Dialogue.
The Obama Administration, which presented its FY2012 budget request on February 14, 2011,
just as the unrest in Bahrain was growing, has not announced any alteration of its military and
anti-terrorism assistance or arms sales policy for Bahrain. However, pressPress reports say arms sales
to Bahrain
and other U.S. allies are under review because of the unrest in the region.11 It is
possible that outside experts and some in Congress might object to further sales to Bahrain,
particularly of equipment that couldregion11 although, as noted
below, new sales to Bahrain were announced in September 2011. These sales have incurred strong
objections from human rights activists, although the sales do not appear to include equipment that
would be used against protesters. Levels of those sales and aid are
discussed in the sections
below.
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights
Well before the 2011 unrest began, successive U.S. Administrations have been accused by human
rights groups and Bahraini Shiites of downplaying abuses against Bahrain’s Shiite community.
Critics point to Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring
to the October 2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government
has to the democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own
experience.”12
11
12
Adam Entous. “U.S. Reviews Arms Sales Amid Turmoil.” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011.
Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
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On the other hand, for many years prior to the 2011 unrest, the United States has sought to
accelerate political reform in Bahrain and to empower its political societies through several
programs, including. The primary vehicle has been the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).” Some,” which
began funding programs in Bahrain in 2003. MEPI funds have been used
to help Bahrain build an
independent judiciary and strengthen the COR. Other U.S.-funded programs
focus on women’s empowerment, media training, educational opportunities, and civil society
, to strengthen the COR, to empower women, to conduct media training, and
to promote legal reform. MEPI funds have also been used to fund AFL-CIO projects with
Bahraini labor
organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain
Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program director of the National Democratic Institute
(NDI), and
did not allow the office to reopen. NDI is conducting programs to enhance parliamentary
parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. In February 2010, the MEPI office of State
Department signed
a memorandum of understanding with Bahrain to promote entrepreneurship
there and promote
opportunities for trade with U.S. small businesses.
According to the State
Department’s International Religious Freedom report for 2010 (November
17, 2010July-December 2010 (September 13,
2011), “The U.S. government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as
part part
of its overall policy to promote human rights.” The religious freedom report also noted that
the U.S. government sponsored the visit to the United States of a prominent Sunni cleric, Shaykh
Salah Al-Jowder, to discuss religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.
Other Human Rights Issues
Many of the general human rights issues are directly tied to the schism between the Sunni-led
regime and the Shiite majority, as noted in U.S. government reports on human rights and religious
11
12
Adam Entous. “U.S. Reviews Arms Sales Amid Turmoil.” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011.
Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
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freedom in Bahrain. Beyond that issue, State Department reports, such as the human rights report
for 2010, note problems for non-Muslims and for opponents of the government. Bahrain allows
freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the
official religion. It should be noted that the State Department human rights report, released April
5, 2010, covers the period of calendar year 2010 and does not address the government response to
the 2011 unrest.
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes. As
noted above, two of the most prominent such groups are the Bahrain Human Rights Society and
the Bahrain Transparency Society. Another is the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, founded by
Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, who is serving a life sentence for opposition activities.
Women’s Rights
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. However, as is the
case with its neighbors, Bahrain’s practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. Women can
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, although religious courts may refuse a
woman’s divorce request. Some prominent women are campaigning for a codified family law that
would enhance and secure women’s rights, running into opposition from Bahraini clerics who are
against granting more rights for women. The campaign for the law is backed by King Hamad’s
wife, Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is the preeminent
association that promotes women’s rights in Bahrain.
To try to showcase its progressiveness, the government has promoted several women to high
positions. The number of women in both chambers of the National Assembly are provided in
Table 1, above. Since 2005, there have been two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights
and Social Development Fatima Social Affairs Fatima
bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture
Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa.
A previous female minister of health, Nada Haffadh, resigned in
October 2007 following
allegations of corruption in her ministry by conservatives who oppose women occupying highranking
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women occupying high-ranking positions. Two other women, including the president of the
University of Bahrain, have
ministerial rank. Ms. Huda Azar Nunu, an attorney and formerly the
only Jew in the Shura
Council, is ambassador to the United States.
Religious Freedom
On freedoms for religions other than Islam, the November 17, 2010July-December 2011, State Department report on
international religious freedom, in the section on Bahrain, says that respect for religious freedom
exhibited “no change” since the prior report. Most of the report focuses on Sunni-Shiite
differences, which are discussed as political issues above. According to the report, non-Muslims
non-Muslims have been able
to practice their religion privately without government interference, and to
maintain places of
worship. However, the government requires licenses for churches to operate,
and has in the past
threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian expatriates. The
Baha’i faith, declared
blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against in Bahrain. A Baha’i
congregation was repeatedly denied an official license
Bahrain, although otherrecent State Department reports
(human rights reports for 2008 and for 2009) say that the Baha’i community
now gathers and
operates openly.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including non-citizensnoncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain. The Shura Council has vetoed a proposed law
that would have authorized formation of more than one union per company. All unions must join
the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU).
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Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2011, released
June 27, 2011, keeps Bahrain’s placement at Tier 2, on the grounds that it is investigating and
prosecuting forced prosecution cases and convicted nine trafficking offenders during the reporting
period. This is the same ranking Bahrain had following release of the 2010 Trafficking in Persons
Report (June 14, 2010), when the “Watch List” designation was dropped. The 2009 report (June
16, 2009) assessed Bahrain as “Tier 2 - Watch List,” with explanatory language similar to that of
the 2008 report. That report had elevated Bahrain to Tier 2 Watch List, from the Tier 3 ranking
(worst level) of the 2007 report.
Executions and Torture
Another issue that predated the 2011 unrest is that of executions. Human Rights Watch and other
groups asserted that Bahrain is going against the international trend to end execution. In
November 2009, Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a
citizen of Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006,
there were no executions in Bahrain.
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Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures are widespread.13 Witnesses at the May 13,
2011, hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used
regularly on those arrested in the post-GCC intervention crackdown.
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations14
U.S.-Bahrain relations are intimatelong-standing, intimate, and mutually reinforcing, thereby raising the stakes for the
the United States in the February 2011 unrestunrest that has occurred there during 2011. A U.S. Embassy in Manama,
Bahrain’s capital, opened
in September 1971, when in conjunction with Bahrain’s independence. At that
time, the threat level in the Persian Gulf was perceived as relatively low.
Since then, defense
issues have become a central feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations. Although Iraq
is no longer a
strategic threat to the region because it cannot project power outside its borders,
Iran’s nuclear
program is considered a growing threat to the Persian Gulf states, including
Bahrain. There is also
the issue of terrorism and piracy in the Gulf, as exemplified by a July 28,
2010, explosion on a
Japanese oil tanker in that waterway. The explosion is widely suspected to
have been a terrorist
attack, and a faction linked to Al Qaeda (Abdullah Azzam Brigades) claimed
responsibility.
In large part to keep powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the
United States, and U.S. efforts to address threats in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan have benefitted
from access to Bahraini facilities. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President
Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales.
13
Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux. “ February 2010.
Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
14
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U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” The facility now covers
over 100 acres, and about 2,300 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are assigned there.15 Some smaller
U.S. ships (minesweepers) are docked there, but the Fifth Fleet also consists of a Carrier Battle
Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and various other ships that are afloat or which dock
elsewhere in the region.
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction
program in Bahrain. Construction began in May 2010 to allow larger ships to dock at the naval
facility; the project is expected to be completed, in several phases, by 2015. A January 2008 lease
agreement between the United States and Bahrain allowed for the expansion by making available
the decommissioned Mina (port) Salman. The bulk of the construction program is to expand the
naval facility, but $45 million of the funds is to be used to expand an apron at Shaykh Isa Air
13
Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux. “ February 2010.
Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
15
Unclassified information provided to CRS by the Department of Defense. Figures are as of June 30, 2010.
14
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Base and $19 million is to be used for a Special Operations Forces facility. Recent appropriations
and requests to fund the construction include: $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110161); no funds for FY2009; $41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011
(Bahrain. P.L. 112-10); and $100 million requested for FY2012.
Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that
step, likely alternatives would include UAE or Qatar, although neither has expressed a position on
whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility.
Defense Pact and Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and
and Afghanistan
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Expanding on
the agreement under which Bahrain hosted U.S. naval headquarters, Bahrain and the United
States signed a 10-year defense pact signed on October 28, 1991, seven months after the ousting
of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The pact was renewed in October 2001, and was presumably to be
up for renewal in October 2011. However, press and expert accounts in August 2011 indicate that,
a few months after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the Bush Administration
may have extended the pact a further five years, to 2016. The U.S. Defense Department has not
publicly confirmed these stories, although one U.S. official, on background, said the pact was
previously extended beyond October 2011.16 The pact not only provides the United States access
to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions),
15
16
Unclassified information provided to CRS by the Department of Defense. Figures are as of June 30, 2010.
“U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
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but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises
and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.17
Following the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, there were about 1,300 U.S. military
personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war; Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which
three hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in
Iraq during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a
U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has reportedly
stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.18
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation
The naval headquarters, the U.S. use of which predated the defense pact, has been used to
coordinate the operations of over 20 U.S. warships performing support missions for U.S. and
16
“U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
18
Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
17
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allied naval operations related to the U.S. military operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These ships are also part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the
movement of terrorists, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and
narcotics across the Arabian Sea. These task forces also seek to counter piracy in the Arabia Sea.
In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it commanded again
in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in
October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the United
States to fly combat missions from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in both OEF and the war to
oust Saddam Hussein in March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF
and OIF, Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect
U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about
4,000 U.S. military personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there.
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. Because
of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in Kuwait on April 22,
2008. That process was suspended in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized and the United States has begun
the process of withdrawal, expected to be complete by the end of 2011. On October 16, 2008,
Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in
Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008. Some of the other
Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, have still not established a full embassy in Iraq, in part
due to differences between Saudi Arabia and the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri alMaliki.
17
Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
18
Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
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U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues,
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported
military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. The main recipient of such assistance is the relatively
small Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), which has about 13,000 personnel (plus about 1,200
National Guard). The BDF and the police are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but are said to supplement
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid Sunni Muslim recruits from neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Until 1998, Bahrain’s internal security
services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who had a reputation
among Shiites for using repressive measures. The current director of the internal security service
is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the royal family.
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States transferred
the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA in July 1997. According to the State
Department’s FY2012 budget request, the U.S. Navy is supporting providing another frigate (an
“extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the Subha is approaching the end of its
service life. In 1996, the United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3
tanks; title subsequently passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for
Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF.
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Recent FMF (and funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2006, P.L. 109-163), have been provided to help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to
enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and
upgrade the avionics of its F-16 fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. As an
example, the United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly
provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.19 Some funds
have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces. The Defense Department
estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, as of FY2008, about 45% of Bahrain’s forces are
fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition.
As noted in the tableTable 3, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. During FY2010, 26 Bahraini students attended
U.S. military schools.
Purchases With National Funds
Despite its limited funds (Bahrain’s total government budget was about $6 billion in 2009),
Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs
from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s, although some
Members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf.
Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the
only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the
United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been
19
“Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Op. cit.
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repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S.
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. (A notification of
a possible sale to Bahrain of 30 ATACM missiles and associated equipment, valued at about $70
million, was sent to Congress on November 4, 2010. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for
the missiles.)
Among recent sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
are a sale, worth up to $42 million, of: 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units; a
sale, worth up to $252 million, of nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters; a sale, notified August 3,
2007, of42 million; nine UH60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to $252 million; six Bell search and recovery helicopters,
valued at about $160 million; and a sale,
notified on July 28, 2009, of, notified August 3, 2007; up to 25 AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile
Systems Corp.) and
associated equipment, valued at about $74 million.
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain. As noted above, U.S. arms sales policy to Gulf allies and
other Middle Eastern countries is said to be under review in light of regional unrest that began in
early 2011, including associated equipment, valued at about $74 million, notified on July 28, 2009.
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale. One sale, notified on September 14, 2011, is
increasingly controversial because it was announced seven months after the unrest began, and has
been agreed to despite U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s crackdown. It is for a proposed sale of 44
“Humvee” armored vehicles and several hundred TOW missiles (of which 50 are to be “bunker
busters”), along with associated equipment and support, worth an estimated $53 million.
Although not considered large in dollar terms, or of particularly sophisticated equipment, the sale
has incurred opposition from several human rights groups who assert that the sale represents U.S.
downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini government in the course of the unrest.
19
“Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Op. cit.
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Human rights groups and Bahraini opposition figures say the regime could use the Humvees, in
particular, in their efforts to crack down on protests. State Department officials said the sale
would not violate the intent of the “Leahy amendment”—a provision of foreign aid and defense
appropriations laws that forbids U.S. sales of equipment to security units that have committed
human rights abuses. 20 The notification came several months after U.S. arms sales policy to Gulf
allies and other Middle Eastern countries was reportedly placed under review in light of regional
unrest that began in early 2011, including in Bahrain. Press reports say some in Congress are
circulating draft resolutions to try to block the sale. To block a proposed arms sale would require
passage of a joint resolution to do so, and with a veto-proof majority, because President Obama
could veto a joint resolution of disapproval in order to complete the sale.
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Bahrain’s cooperation in post-September 11 regional security operations was discussed above. As
far as terrorists operating inside Bahrain itself, the State Department’s report on international
terrorism for 2010 (released August 18, 2011) again credits Bahrain for having “worked to
actively counter terrorist finance,” as well as for enhanced border control capabilities, for a
realignment of institutional responsibilities that resulted in greater capacity and interagency
cooperation, and for successfully prosecuting a number of cases under its 2006 counterterrorism
law. The report for 2010 dropped the criticism of the previous year’s report that Bahrain had not
overcome legal constraints that have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and prosecute
suspected terrorists.
Bahrain also continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENA/FATF) secretariat and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central
Bank), and local banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money
laundering. As noted by the State Department in the FY2012 budget justification, some of the
U.S. assistance to Bahrain (NADR funds) are used to provide training to its counter-terrorism
institutions and to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S. diplomatic and military
facilities in Bahrain. The Bahraini Ministry of Interior is the lead agency that receives this support
and, according to the FY2012 budget justification, the Administration is “reviewing” the use of
this aid to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest.
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran
As noted previously, Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which has purportedly
demonstrated an ability to aggravateinfluence Bahrain’s domestic turmoilsecurity to a greater degree than has any
other regional power. Bahrain perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite groups against
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Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government, although in recent years, and in the current crisis,
evidence of direct Iranian interference in Bahrain has been limited
Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government. In December 1981, and then
again in June 1996—a time
when Iran was actively seeking to export its Islamic revolution—
Bahrain publicly accused Iran of
20
James Lobe. “Bahrain: U.S. Congress Urged to Reject Arms Sales.” IPS News Service, September 29, 2011.
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trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, IFLB).
The issue of alleged Iranian involvement in the 2011 unrest has risen to the surface of the debate
in Bahrain and the United States. To date, there has been little evidence of direct Iranian
intervention. Iranian leaders have criticized the Bahraini crackdown, however, and Bahrain and
Iran have withdrawn their ambassadors from each others’ capitals. On March 21, 2011, King
Hamad indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had been
foiled by the GCC assistance and on April 17, 2011, the Bahraini government sent a letter to U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon formally alleging that the pro-Iranian Shiite faction Hezbollah is
seeking to destabilize Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but clearly
referring to Iran). Secretary of Defense Gates has not accused Iran of instigating the unrest but
has warned that the protraction of the crisis allows Tehran opportunities to exploit it, perhaps by
urging the hardliners among Bahrain’s Shiites not to compromise.20 On April 14, 2011, U.S.
officials, speaking on background, told journalists that Tehran is debating how much aid, if any,
to provide to Bahrain’s opposition, and that there was some information to indicate that Iran
might have transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini oppositionists.21 On May 16, 2011,
Iranian warships began an effort to transport 150 pro-Bahrain opposition Iranian Shiites to
Bahrain, but turned back the following day for fear of provoking a clash with GCC ships. This
event came two days after Iran’s Foreign Minister praised a speech by King Hamad that appeared
intended to lower tensions with Iran by “offering friendship” to TehranAmbassador Krajeski (see above) testified on September 21 that
the United States “saw no evidence of Iranian instigation” of the unrest, but that the United States
is concerned “about Iranian exploitation” of it. U.S. officials reportedly believe that Iran has
urged hardline Bahraini Shiite factions not to compromise.21 On April 14, 2011, U.S. officials,
speaking on background, told journalists that Tehran is debating how much aid, if any, to provide
to Bahrain’s opposition, and that there was some information to indicate that Iran might have
transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini oppositionists.22
Bahraini leaders have issued far stronger allegations. On March 21, 2011, King Hamad indirectly
accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had been foiled by the GCC
assistance and on April 17, 2011, the Bahraini government sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki Moon formally alleging that the pro-Iranian Shiite faction Hezbollah is seeking to
destabilize Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but clearly referring to Iran).
The two countries withdrew their ambassadors in mid-March 2011. In an event that gave the
Bahraini government some justification for its criticism, on May 16, 2011, Iranian warships
began an effort to transport 150 pro-Bahrain opposition Iranian Shiites to Bahrain, but turned
back the following day for fear of provoking a clash with GCC ships. This event came two days
after Iran’s Foreign Minister praised a speech by King Hamad that appeared intended to lower
tensions with Iran by “offering friendship” to Tehran. The foreign ministers of the two countries
held talks on September 27, 2011, at the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New
York.
Well before the 2011 unrest, Bahrain’s fears about Iran had been infused by lingering suspicions,
sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey
giving Bahrain independence rather than integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these
official determinations, Bahrain had considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian
contestation of Bahraini sovereignty. Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of
Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3,
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17,
2007. In March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an advisor
to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referring to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign
Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s
sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.
20
21
http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532.
Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
2122
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sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.
In connection with its own concerns about Iran, Bahrain has supported the U.S. position that Iran
is not fully cooperating with U.N. Security Council requirements to verifiably demonstrate that its
nuclear program is not a cover for a nuclear weapons program. In the joint news conference with
Secretary Clinton on December 3, 2010, referenced earlier, the foreign minister restated Bahrain’s
support for Iran’s right to nuclear power for peaceful uses. However, it stated forthright that
“when it comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that
is something that we can never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”2223
At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders have
sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the one-day
suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an editorial by a
Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders. Bahrain regularly supports the
invitation of high-ranking Iranian officials to the annual International Institute for Security
Studies (IISS) conference in Bahrain called the “Manama Dialogue,” held every December. At
times, there have been expectations that U.S. officials might meet with Iranian officials at the
margins of the conference, although such meetings have not taken place in practice. Iranian
officials have sometimes been known to cancel their travel to the meeting on short notice,
particularly if they sense that the conference will feature U.S. or other criticism of Iran.
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties
Another way in which Bahrain stays engaged with Iran is through discussions of major energy
projects with Iran and by conducting normal trade and banking ties with it. The 2007
Ahmadinejad visit resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet
per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. The deal would have
involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and 16 of Iran’s South Pars gas
field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain would import. The March
2009 comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension of this deal. On October
21, 2009, Bahrain’s Minister of Oil and Gas Abd al-Husayn Mirza said talks on the deal would
“resume soon,” although the 2011 unrest and withdraw of mutual ambassadors clouded the
prospects for the deal. Still,.” There is a widespread assumption that the 2011 unrest has clouded the prospects
for the deal, but Bahraini officials said in June 2011 that the prospective dealit has not
been cancelled outright.
There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain commerce has been affected by the 2011 unrest.
Energy market observers say that Bahrain energy firms are still supplying gasoline to Iran. No
U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of
gasoline to Iran. Some energy firms in the Gulf, including in Kuwait, reportedly have become
reticent to continue supplying gasoline to Iran because of the U.S. action, but Bahrain is not
known to have publicly disavowed further gasoline sales to Iran.23
In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in
Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under
Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
22
Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
23
CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July – September 2010.
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24
23
Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
24
CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July–September 2010.
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In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in
Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under
Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The Bank
remains in operation.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by
its turn to Saudi Arabia to help it deal with the 2011 unrest. Virtually all the GCC states have
political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities
(although not majorities, as Bahrain does). Saudi Arabia’s Shiites (about 10% of the population)
are located mostly in the eastern provinces, across a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects
the two countries. This linkage partly explains Saudi concerns about the unrest shaking the royal
family in Bahrain. Because of historic property and other ties between their two royal families
Kuwait was briefly touted as a potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Kuwaiti Shiites
in Kuwait’s parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly with the Al Khalifa regime.
However, the Kuwaiti government has, as noted, at least symbolically joined the GCC military
deployments to Bahrain on the side of the government. Kuwait’s Prime Minister visited Bahrain
on July 5, 2011. Unlike Qatar and UAE, Bahrain did not play a significant role in assisting the
Libyan opposition to the rule of Col.Colonel Muammar Al Qadhafi.
Qatar Territorial Disputes24Disputes25
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the BahrainQatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute,
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were awarded to Qatar.
25
See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.
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Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. Bahrain has not taken a leading role in recent
efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, for example. On the other hand,
Bahrain is not inactive on the issue: On July 16, 2009, Crown Prince Salman authored an op-ed
24
See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.
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calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli people on their
ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.2526 Following on that idea, on October 1, 2009, the
foreign minister called for direct talks with Israel. In the previously cited December 3, 2010, joint
press conference with the foreign minister, Secretary of State Clinton expressed appreciation for
Bahrain’s support of Palestinian Authority leaders who are trying to build viable institutions and
rule of law in the Palestinian territories. However, like most Arab states, Bahrain is supporting the
efforts of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State
of Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to granting such recognition without an overall Palestinian
peace settlement with Israel.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
Islamist hard-liners in Bahrain have accused the government of trying to “normalize” relations
with Israel, citing the government’s sending a delegate to the November 27, 2007, summit on
Middle East peace in Annapolis, the foreign minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N.
meetings in September 2007, and by proposing (in October 2008)its October 2009 proposal of a “regional organization” that
would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. That proposal has not been implemented to
date. In late October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to
five years in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which has
not proceeded to become law (concurrence by the upper house, and acceptance by the King),
apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was to
obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounced the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to
run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing
the government more to borrow funds. Bahrain hashad been hoping the unrest would not force
26
“Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” The Washington Post. July 16, 2009.
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cancellation of a high-cancellation of a high profile, funds-generating Formula One auto race in October 2011, but race
organizers are said to be considering whether to pulldecided not to hold the event from Bahrain.
Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 2. Without the ample oil or gas
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares
25
“Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” Washington Post op-ed. July 16, 2009.
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equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The
United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum.
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.
In 2010, the United States exported $1.25 billion worth of goods to Bahrain, and imported $420
million in goods from that country. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million,
suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA.
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 740,000, of which 503,000 are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$28 billion (2009)
Budget
$5.81 billion revenues, $5.86 billion expenditures (2009)
External Debt
$11 billion (2009)
Inflation Rate
3% (2009)
GDP Real Growth Rate
2.9% in 2009, down from over 6% in 2008
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
request
8.0
19.0
15.46
25.0
0.622
.661
.670
.700
.700
.776
0.744
.500
1.10
1.5
.500
24.54
4.3
16.2
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FMF
90.0
24.6
18.847
15.593
14.998
3.968
IMET
0.448
0.600
0.649
0.651
0.616
1.489
2.761
5.3
NADR
“Section
1206”
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the
Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110252) as well as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds are from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111117). FY2011 funds are appropriated by P.L. 112-10, Continuing Appropriations for FY2011.
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Figure 1. Bahrain
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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