U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
August 15, 2011June 12, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41349
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Summary
IncreasingBrazen violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is
threatening citizen security and governance in Mexico. According to Mexican government data,
organized crime-related violence claimed more than 34,500 lives in Mexico between January
2007 and December 2010. That toll may now exceed 40,000. Escalating violence has increased
some parts of Mexico, a country with which the
United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and $500 billion in annual trade. Although the
violence in Mexico has generally declined since late 2011, analysts estimate that it may have
claimed more than 60,000 lives between December 2006 and November 2012. The violence has
increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the
the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations
dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are now considered the greatest organized crime threat
facing the United States.
In recent years,
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result
of the development and
implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime
assistance package for
Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007.
Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in
Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican security forces engaged in
counterdrug effortsfirst funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on
training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing
the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups,
(2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to
intensify its anticrime efforts efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged
to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
With funding for the original Mérida Initiative technically ending in FY2010 and new initiatives
underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the
Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation.
That strategy, adopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2)
institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. The first two pillars largely build upon existing efforts, whereas pillars
three and four broaden the scope of Mérida programs to include efforts to facilitate “secure
flows” through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in violence-prone border cities.
Congress appropriated $143.0 million in Mérida assistance for Mexico for FY2011 in P.L. 11210. The Administration requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012. As of August 1,
2011, a total of $473.8 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico.
The 112th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative, as well as
examining the degree to which the U.S. and Mexican governments are fulfilling their pledges to
tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region. Congress may
also examine the degree to which the Administration’s new strategy for the Mérida Initiative
complements other counterdrug and border security efforts as outlined in the 2011 National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Given current budget constraints, Congress may
also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative programs.
Another congressional interest is likely to focus on whether human rights conditions placed on
Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient.
For related information, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel and CRS Report R41075, Southwest
Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin
M. Finklea. This report will be updated periodically
illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to continue
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent crime in
Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts,
adjustments which President Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the
primary entity through which Mérida training and equipment requests are coordinated and
intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased assistance for judicial
reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and
intelligence operations. As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida
programs are likely to be adjusted in order to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities.
The 113th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic initiatives, but may also consider supporting new programs. From FY2008 to FY2012,
Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1.2 billion of which
had been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama Administration asked for $234.0 million for
Mérida programs in in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its FY2014 request.
Congress may wish to examine how well the Mexican government’s security strategy supports
U.S. interests in Mexico. Congressional approval will be needed should the State Department
seek to reprogram some of the funding already in the pipeline for Mérida, or shift new funding to
better align with Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S.
priorities, Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. Congress may
also debate how to measure the impact of Mérida Initiative programs, as well as the extent to
which Mérida has evolved to respond to changing security conditions in Mexico. Another issue of
congressional interest involves whether Mexico is meeting the human rights conditions placed on
Mérida Initiative funding.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Concerns About Drug Trafficking-Related ViolenceViolence in Mexico ............................................................................................... 32
Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Mexico’s Security Strategy..Organized Crime, and Violence in Mexico .................................................. 32
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States .................................................................. 65
Development and Implementation of the Mérida Initiative ............................................................. 75
Evolution of U.S.- Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation .............................................................. 7
Implementation..............5
Developing Cooperation Through the Mérida Initiative ........................................................... 6
Funding the Mérida Initiative ............................................... 10
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative ..................................................... 7
Implementation ............... 11
Drug Demand .................................................................................................................... 11
Firearms Trafficking 8
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative .................................................................... 9
The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy and the Mérida Initiative .............................. 10
The Four Pillars of the Mérida Initiative .............................. 12
Money Laundering/Bulk Cash Smuggling........................................................................ 17
Beyond Mérida: the New Bilateral Security Strategy....12
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime ................................................................ 19 12
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized CrimeTwo: Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law and Respect for
Human Rights in Mexico .................................... 20
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico ................................................................. 2113
Reforming the Police......................................................................................................... 2114
Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems ....................................................................... 2316
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border” ....................................................................... 2518
Northbound and Southbound Inspections ......................................................................... 2719
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption ..................................................................... 2719
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities ........................................................ 2820
Issues.............................................................................................................................................. 3023
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative ...................................................................... 3023
Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico ....................................................................... 33........ 25
Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative Funding ................................. 3426
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico ............................................................... 3628
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest Border Initiatives .................... 3830
Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere .............................................. 39
The Way Forward 31
Outlook ..................................................................................................................................... 39..... 31
Figures
Figure 1. Rates of Drug TraffickingOrganized Crime-Related Killings in Mexico in 2011 by State in 2010 ....................................... 54
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States .............................................. 3224
Tables
Table 1. FY2008–FY2012FY2014 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure ............................................................................................................... 98
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2012FY2014 ........................................... 4133
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Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico ........................................................................................ 41
Appendix B. 33
Appendix B. U.S. Domestic Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative ................................... 34
Appendix C. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law Enforcement Partnerships ........................................ 4239
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 4441
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Introduction
Organized crime poses a serious challenge to governance in Mexico, a country with which the
United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and close to $400 billion in annual trade. Drug
For several years, violence perpetrated by warring criminal organizations has threatened citizen
security and governance in Mexico and presented serious challenges to the country’s justice
sector institutions. While the illicit drug trade has been prevalent in Mexico for decades, an
increasing number of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are fighting for control of lucrative smuggling smuggling
routes into the
United States and resisting the Mexican government’s campaign against them. According to
Mexican government estimates, this efforts against them. This
violence resulted in more than 34,50060,000 deaths in Mexico
between January 2007 and December 2010. That figure, which was released in January 2011 and
has not yet been updated, is higher than those that have been reported by Mexican media outlets.1
One media source, Grupo Reforma, recorded more than 6,400 drug-trafficking related killings in
the first half of 2011.
Targets of the drug trafficking-related between December 2006 and November
2012.1 According to government estimates, at least 6,000 additional organized crime-related
deaths have occurred during the first six months (December 2012-May 2013) of the new Peña
Nieto Administration.2
Targets of the violence in Mexico have often included rival criminal
organizations or affiliated gang members, but have also organizations, but also
included Mexican security forces and
public officials;, journalists;, and civilians, including
Americans.2 In August 2010, 72 Central and
South American migrants passing through Mexico were found massacred in Tamaulipas.
According to a survivor, the Zetas—one of the most violent DTOs—attempted to recruit the
migrants to assist in moving drugs and killed them when they refused. On February 15, In February 2011, two
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
were shot, one fatally, while driving to
Mexico City. This marked the first death of a U.S. law enforcement agent in Mexico since 1985.3
Drug-trafficking related violence and criminality have created regions in Mexico where the
government appears to be struggling to assert its authority4 leaving significant numbers of
Mexicans to question their government’s security strategy.5 The violence has also led to some
internal displacement within Mexico and refugees seeking asylum in the United States. DTOs
have corrupted and undermined police (particularly at the local level) and criminal justice
institutions. With impunity rates hovering around 98%,6 many Mexicans also doubt their
government’s ability to bring criminals to justice. J.P. Morgan’s chief economist for Mexico
estimated that drug trafficking-related violence cost the country some $4 billion in foreign direct
investment in 2010.7 The expanding techniques used by the DTOs, which has included the use of
car bombs and grenades, have led some scholars and U.S. officials to liken DTOs’ tactics to those
1
Mexican government data is available here: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/. In the
absence of updated government data, many analysts use data from Reforma, a Mexico-city based newspaper, to track
and analyze drug trafficking-related killings in Mexico. For a discussion of the different tallies of the casualties
reported by the Mexican media and those of the Mexican government, see Viridiana Ríos and David Shirk, Drug
Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010, Trans-Border Institute (TBI), University of San Diego, January
2011, http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence4.pdf.
2
That total includes two U.S. citizens connected to the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico that were killed on
March 13, 2010. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: Mexico, April 22, 2011.
3
In 1985, Drug Enforcement Administration agent, Enrique (Kiki) Camarena was kidnapped and killed in Mexico. For
more information, see http://www.justice.gov/dea/ongoing/red_ribbon/redribbon_history.html.
4
Adriana Gomez Licon and Katherine Corcoran, “Mexico Massacre Question: How did it Happen Twice?” Miami
Herald, Apr. 16, 2011.
5
According to a May 2011 survey, nearly 60% of those polled thought the Calderón government was losing its struggle
against organized crime. “58% Cree Que el Crimen va Ganando Lucha: Encuesta,” El Universal, June 1, 2011.
6
In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. See Guillermo Zepeda, Índice de
Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, Center of Research for Development (CIDAC), Mexico City, August 2009.
7
Nicholas Casey and James R. Hagerty, “Companies Shun Violent Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2010.
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of armed insurgencies.8 Criminality often associated with the illegal drug trade has also increased
the prevalence of related crimes, including kidnapping, robbery, and extortion.
Escalating violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover violence along the Southwest
border have focused congressional concern on the efficacy of the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic efforts in both countries. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion
for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico. Over roughly the same period, Mexico invested some
$26.0 billion of its own resources on security and public safety.9
Whereas U.S. assistance under the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping
Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak judicial and
law enforcement institutions and the underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug
trade to flourish in Mexico. The “Beyond Mérida” strategy announced by both governments in
March 2010 focuses on four pillars: (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2)
institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón reaffirmed their
commitment to the strategy during Calderón’s state visit in May 2010 and after a White House
meeting on March 3, 2011. Congress provided $143.0 million in Mérida assistance to Mexico in
P.L. 112-10. The Administration also requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012.
The 112th Congress is likely to continue overseeing how Mérida and related funds have been used
and the degree to which the Obama Administration’s strategy for Mexico complements other U.S.
counterdrug and border security efforts. Congress is likely to continue debating what types and
amounts of funding to provide for U.S.-Mexican security efforts and related domestic programs
for FY2012. Congress is likely to continue close scrutiny of U.S. efforts to reduce firearms
trafficking to Mexico in the wake of recent allegations that Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) officials allowed suspected straw purchasers to amass large quantities of
firearms, some of which were subsequently smuggled across the Southwest border (see “Firearms
Trafficking” below).10 Congress may also consider legislation that would define what role, if any,
U.S. National Guard troops should continue to play in supporting law enforcement efforts along
the Southwest border, which could have implications for U.S.-Mexican law enforcement efforts.11
enforcement agent in Mexico since 1985. In August 2012, two Central Intelligence Agency
employees were wounded as their vehicle came under heavy fire from Mexican Federal Police,
raising concerns about the competency and corruptibility of Mexican law enforcement.3
Violence in northern Mexico and the potential threat of spillover violence along the Southwest
border have focused congressional concern on the efficacy of the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic efforts in both countries. Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress appropriated more
than $1.9 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico (see Table 1). Over that period,
Mexico invested some $46.6 billion of its own resources on security and public safety.4 While
bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent weakness of Mexico’s criminal
justice system seems to have limited the effectiveness of anti-crime efforts.
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office
in December 2012 vowing to reduce violence in Mexico and adjust the current U.S.-Mexican
security strategy (see “The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy and the Mérida
Initiative”). As Mexico’s security strategy changes, Congress may need to examine how those
priorities align with U.S. interests. When considering the Obama Administration’s FY2014
budget request, Congress may analyze how Mérida and related funds have been used and the
degree to which U.S.-funded programs in Mexico complement other U.S. counterdrug and border
security efforts. Compliance with Merida’s human rights conditions is likely to be closely
monitored to ensure that anticrime efforts are carried out in a way that respects human rights and
the rule of law. Oversight of U.S. domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative may also continue,
particularly those aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. Congress could also explore how the
1
This figure is an estimate. Cory Molzahn, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico:
Data and Analysis Through 2012, Trans-Border Institute (TBI), February 2013, p. 14. Hereinafter TBI, February 2013.
2
F. Martínez, “Hubo en el País 6,247 Homicidios Dolosos en el Primer Semestre de Peña,” La Jornada, June 7, 2013.
3
Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office is still investigating the motive behind the attack. Thus far, 14 Federal Police
officers have been charged with attempted murder and five commanders are being investigated for allegedly ordering
those officers to lie about the circumstances surrounding the incident. “Mexico Focus on Police Commanders in CIA
Shooting,” Associated Press, November 19, 2012.
4
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011. Figure for
Mexico’s 2012 budget for security and public safety is from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies.
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use of newer tools—such as aerial drones that monitor criminal activity in the border region—
might bolster current security cooperation efforts under Mérida.
This report provides a framework for examining the current status and future prospects for U.S.Mexican security cooperation. It begins with a brief discussion of the scope of the threat that drug
trafficking and related crime and violence now pose to Mexico and the United States, followed by
an analysis of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative. It then analyzes key
aspects of the new U.S.-Mexican security strategy. The report concludes by raising some policy
issues that may affect U.S.-Mexican security cooperation.
8
See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Interview With Denise Maerker of Televisa, Interview, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Secretary of State, Guanajuato, Mexico, January 24, 2011.
9
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011.
10
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
11
The Obama Administration deployed 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border in July 2010 to support
counternarcotics enforcement pending Customs and Border Protection (CBP) staff increases. The National Guard
deployment was scheduled to end in June 2011, but has been extended until September 2011.
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Concerns About Drug Trafficking-Related Violence
Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Mexico’s Security Strategy12evolution of the Mérida Initiative. The report then provides an overview of the
Peña Nieto government’s security strategy and how it may affect the Mérida Initiative. The report
then then delves deeper into key aspects of the current U.S.-Mexican security strategy and
concludes by raising policy issues that may affect bilateral efforts.
Concerns About Violence in Mexico
Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in Mexico5
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and thea major transit country for more than 95% of the cocaine sold in the United
States (see “Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico”).13 States.6
Mexico is also increasingly
becoming a consumer of illicit drugs, particularly in northern states where criminal organizations
organizations have been paying their workers in product rather than in cash. Consumption of marijuana,
cocaine, and methamphetamine in Mexico increased from 2002 to 2008.14 Mexican drug
trafficking organizations control the most significant drug distribution operations along the
Southwest border. The most dominant DTOs include the Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana),
Beltran Leyva Organization, the Zetas, Sinaloa (La Federación), Carillo Fuentes Organization
(Juárez), Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. U.S. government reports have characterized Mexican
drug trafficking organizations as representing the “greatest organized crime threat” to the United
States today.15 Mexican DTOs have expanded their U.S. presence by increasing their
transportation and distribution networks, as well as displacing other Latin American traffickers,
primarily Colombians.16
In the past few years, the violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs haveIllicit drug use in
Mexico increased from 2002 to 2008, and then remained relatively level from 2008 to 2011.7
According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican drug trafficking organizations
and their affiliates “dominate [in] the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the
United States” and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities.8
The violence and brutality of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations escalated as they have
battled for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United States and local drug
distribution networks in Mexico. U.S. and Mexican officials now often refer to the DTOs as
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)17 due to the fact that since they have increasingly branched
out into other
criminal activities, including alien smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. For
example, the Zetas have taken control of migrant smuggling routes originating in Central
America, enacting harsh penalties on those who fail to pay them quotas or work for them.
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has focused on combating drug
trafficking and organized crime by, in part, increasing Mexico’s annual budget for security and
public safety from $7.3 billion in 2007 to $10.9 billion in 2011.18 Government enforcement
efforts, many of which have been led by Mexican military forces, have successfully taken down
some of the leaders of the major DTOs, either through arrests or deaths during operations to
12human trafficking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and extortion. From
2007 to 2011, kidnapping and violent vehicular thefts increased at even faster annual rates than
overall homicides in Mexico.9 The expanding techniques used by the traffickers, which have
included the use of car bombs and grenades, have led some to liken certain DTOs’ tactics to those
of armed insurgencies.10
5
For background, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
136
U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 20112013,
http://www.state.gov/pj/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/.
14
Marijuana use increased from 3.48 percent of the population in 2002 to 4.4 percent in 2008, cocaine from 1.23
percent to 2.5 percent, and methamphetamine from 0.08 percent to 0.5 percent. Ibid.
15
U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment,
December 2008, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf
16
NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/
index.htm.
17
See for example, Miguel R. Salazar and Eric L. Olson, A Profile of Mexico’s Major Organized Crime Groups,
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.
18
These budget figures include funding for the Ministry of Defense, the Navy, the National Security and Investigation
Center, the Federal Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and parts of the Ministries of Government and the
Presidency. Government of Mexico, June 2011, op. cit.
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detain them. The pace of these takedowns has accelerated since late 2009, partly due to increased
intelligence-sharing between the U.S. and Mexican governments.19 In 2009, the Mexican
government identified the country’s 37 most wanted criminals and by the end of 2010 at least 20
of those alleged criminals had been captured or killed.20 At the same time, the government’s focus
on dismantling the leadership of the major criminal organizations appears to have contributed to
brutal succession struggles, shifting alliances among the DTOs, and the replacement of existing
leaders and criminal groups with others that are even more violent.21
Even by conservative estimates, drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico resulted in more than
2,200 killings in 2007, 5,100 killings in 2008, 6,500 killings in 2009, and 11,500 killings in
2010—a more than 70% increase over the prior year.22 In 2010, a large percentage of the violence
occurred in the states of Chihuahua (along the U.S.-Mexico border), Sinaloa, Guerrero, and
Durango (see Figure 1). However, a split between the Gulf DTO and the Zetas (their former
enforcers) sparked violence in new areas of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León (also border states).
Feuding for control over the Beltrán Leyva organization increased violence in Morelos, and turf
battles invaded Nayarit and Jalisco as well.
Thus far in 2011, the incidence of violence in Mexico has spiraled higher and the geographic area
affected by the violence has spread. According to data from Reforma, the total number of drug
trafficking-related killings in Mexico this year may exceed last year’s total by 15% or more.23
While violence in border states like Baja California and Chihuahua has declined, the locus of
border violence has now shifted to Tamaulipas and Nuevo León. Monterrey, a major industrial
and financial hub, has been particularly hard hit by the struggle between the Gulf and Zetas
DTOs. Violence has remained high in Sinaloa and increased in the Pacific states of Nayarit,
Guerrero and Jalisco, as well as in the interior states of Durango and San Luís Potosí. The recent
discoveries of mass grave sites in Durango and Tamaulipas have added to the drug traffickingrelated death tolls in those states.
Many experts assert that, in order to regain popular support for its security policies, the Calderón
government will have to show success in dismantling the DTOs while also reducing drug
trafficking-related violence. President Calderón and his top advisers have responded to mounting
criticism of the government’s security policies by stressing the holistic nature of its public
security strategy. They describe the strategy as focused on: (1) carrying out joint police-military
operations to support local authorities and citizens; (2) increasing the operational and
technological capacities of the state (such as the Federal Police24); (3) initiating legal and
institutional reforms; (4) strengthening crime prevention and social programs; and (5)
strengthening international cooperation (such as the Mérida Initiative).25 As part of that strategy,
President Calderón has secured legislative approval of a number of constitutional reforms and
laws related to national security, including judicial reform (passed in 2008) and, more recently, an
19
STRATFOR, Mexico’s Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date, December 20, 2010.
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Actions and Achievements,” February 2011.
21
Patrick Corcoran, “A Survey of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations,” In Sight Organized Crime in the
Americas, June 27, 2011.
22
Ríos and Shirk, op. cit.
23
TBI, Justice in Mexico: June 2011 News Report, June 2011.
24
The size of the Federal Police has increased from 6,500 officers in 2006 to roughly 35,500 officers (including 7,000
college graduates) in 2010.
25
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011.
20
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anti-kidnapping law. The Calderón government has also used extradition as a major tool to
combat drug traffickers, extraditing 107 individuals to the United States in 2009 and another 94
individuals in 2010.
Figure 1. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by State in 2010
Source: Crime Indicator Database at the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego, adapted by
CRS. The data represented are from Reforma newspaper.
While some have urged the Calderón government to continue its current strategy with slight
modifications, others have suggested that the strategy be completely revised. Calderón
Administration officials consulted with local and state officials to change the government’s
military-led strategy for Ciudad Juarez after the massacre of 15 civilians, many of them teenagers,
at a private home there in late January 2010. The new strategy that the Calderón government has
implemented, “We Are All Juárez,” involves significant federal government investments in
education, job training, and community development programs to help address some of the
underlying factors that have contributed to violence in the city. It also involved an April 2010
shift from military to federal police control over security efforts in the city, a strategy shift which
appears to have yielded some results.26
26
Alejandor Martinez-Cabrera, “Mexican President Calderón Highlights Successes in Juárez,” El Paso Times, May 21,
(continued...)
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Since August 2010, President Calderón has conducted a series of consultations with academics,
policy makers, and civil society leaders on the direction that Mexico’s broader public security
policy should take. Their recommendations include suggestions like focusing enforcement efforts
on the most violent criminal organizations, pressing governors to accelerate much-needed judicial
and police reforms, and concentrating crime control efforts and social programs in the country’s
most violent municipalities. 27 Other, more dramatic policy suggestions have also been put forth.
Among them: removing the military from the streets and urging the United States to
decriminalize drugs, beginning with marijuana, so as to cut into the DTOs’ profits.28
On June 23, 2011, President Calderón met with peace activists led by Javier Sicilia, a prominent
Mexican poet whose son was killed by drug gangs earlier this year. The activists urged President
Calderón to abandon his military-led strategy, which they say has caused violence and human
rights abuses by security forces. They urged him to consider a new approach focused on
combating the poverty, inequality, and unemployment that are contributing to violence.29
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States30
The prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the DTOs in Mexico—
and particularly in those areas of Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has generated concern
among U.S. policy makers that this violence might spill over into the United States. In particular,
an increase in violence in Mexican cities such as Juárez and Nuevo Laredo has sparked fears that
the violence may spill into the neighboring U.S. “sister cities” of El Paso and Laredo. For
instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a safety alert to law enforcement
officers in the El Paso area warning that DTOs and associated gangs may target U.S. law
enforcement.31 This alert came at a time when the Mexican DTOs had begun to direct more of
their violence at Mexican authorities and to use new forms of weaponry, including sniper rifles,
grenades, and car bombs.32
U.S. federal officials deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has
resulted in a significant spillover of violence into the United States, but recognize that incidents
of violence have occurred and that the potential for increased violence does exist.33 On May 25,
2010, in response to rising state and local concerns about border security, President Obama
(...continued)
2011.
27
Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La Ráiz de la Violencia,” Nexos en Línea, June 1, 2011; Alfredo Corchado, “Arrest
Signals Targeting of Zetas,” Dallas Morning News, July 5, 2011; Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Mexico’s Forever War,”
ForeignPolicy.com, December 22, 2010; Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “Como Reducir la Violencia en México,” Nexos
en Línea, November 3, 2010.
28
See, for example, “Jorge Castañeda, “The Way Forward,” Time, June 30, 2011.
29
Candace Vallantin, “Mexicans Campaign to End Drug War; Renowned Poet Puts Down his Pen to Focus on a
Caravan For Peace,” Toronto Star, June 7, 2011.
30
For background, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover
Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea.
31
“Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Mexican Assassin Teams Targeting U.S. Law Enforcement,” Homeland
Security Newswire, April 6, 2010.
32
INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
33
See for example, Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Border Security at the
University of Texas at El Paso,” press release, January 31, 2011.
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authorized sending up to 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border. The troops
began the deployment process on August 1, 2010, and are now serving in law enforcement
support roles in high-crime areas along the Southwest border through September 2011.
Congress faces several policy questions related to potential or actual spillover violence. The first
question involves whether the increasing violence between the drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico affects either the level or nature of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States.
Of note, violent drug trafficking-related crimes have previously existed and continue to exist
throughout the United States. However, data currently available on these crimes does not allow
analysts to determine whether or how these existing levels of drug trafficking-related violence in
the United States have been affected by the surge of violence in Mexico.
If there were evidence of such spillover violence, Congress may be confronted with the issue of
whether altering current drug or crime policies may aid in reducing drug trafficking-related
violence in the United States. If there were not significant spillover violence, policy makers may
debate best practices to prevent the possibility of future spillover violence. As such, another
question involves whether U.S. support to Mexico via the Mérida Initiative will be effective not
only in reducing drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico but in preventing this violence from
reaching the United States.
Development and Implementation of the
Mérida Initiative
Evolution of U.S.- 2013/vol1/204050.htm#Mexico.
7
According to data from Mexico’s National Survey of Addictions, the prevalence of illicit drug use in Mexico
increased from 0.8% of the population in 2002 to 1.4% in 2008, but remained relatively stable at 1.5% in 2011.
8
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment: 2011,
August 2011, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf. DOJ did not release a similar report in 2012.
9
From 2007 to 2011, the homicide rate per 100,000 people in Mexico increased by an annual average of 15.4% During
that same period, kidnappings increased at an average annual rate of 23.5% and armed vehicular robberies by 19.7%.
Mexico Evalúa, Indicadores de Víctimas Visibles y Invisiblesde Homicidio, Mexico, D.F., November 2012, available
at: http://mexicoevalua.org/descargables/413537_IVVI-H.pdf.
10
Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution Revisited: Third Phase Cartel Potentials and Alternative
Futures in Mexico,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 2010).
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The Felipe Calderón Administration (December 2006-November 2011) made combating drug
trafficking and organized crime its top domestic priority.11 Government enforcement efforts,
many of which were led by Mexican military forces, took down leaders from all of the major
DTOs, either through arrests or deaths during operations to detain them. The pace of those
takedowns accelerated beginning in late 2009, partly due to increased U.S.-Mexican intelligencesharing. In 2009, the Mexican government identified the country’s 37 most wanted criminals, and
by October 2012, at least 25 of those alleged criminals had been captured or killed.12 The
Calderón government extradited record numbers of criminals to the United States, including 93 in
2011 (see Figure 2); however few, if any, were successfully prosecuted in Mexico.13 At the same
time, Mexico also experienced record levels of drug trafficking-related violence, partially in
response to government efforts, as criminal organizations split and proliferated.14
Analysts estimate that drug trafficking or organized crime-related violence in Mexico may have
resulted in some 60,000 deaths over the course of Calderón’s presidency; another 25,000
individuals reportedly went missing over that period, although not all due to criminal activity.15
Several sources have reported that violence peaked in 2011, before falling in 2012, perhaps by
more than 25%. The violence has primarily taken place in contested drug production and transit
zones and remained concentrated in less than 10% of Mexican municipalities.16
Still, the regions of the country most affected by the violence have shifted over time to include
large cities (such as Monterrey, Nuevo León) and tourist zones (Acapulco, Guerrero). As seen in
Figure 1, there have been incidents of violence across the country, with the security situation in
particular areas sometimes changing rapidly. For example, violence spiked dramatically in
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, in 2008 and remained at extremely high levels through mid-2011,
before rapidly declining. A 2012 State Department Travel Warning cited security concerns in parts
of 19 of Mexico’s 32 states and urged U.S. citizens to “defer non-essential travel” to Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Durango, and Tamaulipas.17
Upon taking office, President Peña Nieto’s made violence reduction one of his top priorities.
Mexico’s Interior Ministry reportedly maintains that organized crime-related violence fell 16.5%
during the first six months of the Administration as compared to the same period last year.18
11
The Calderón Administration’s security strategy focused on: (1) carrying out joint police-military operations to
support local authorities and citizens; (2) increasing the operational and technological capacities of the state (such as
the Federal Police); (3) initiating legal and institutional reforms; (4) strengthening crime prevention and social
programs; and (5) strengthening international cooperation (such as the Mérida Initiative). Government of Mexico,
Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements, June 2011.
12
“Mexico’s Drug Lords: Kingpin Bowling,” The Economist, October 20, 2012.
13
William Booth, “Mexico’s Crime Wave has Left About 25,000 Missing, Government Documents Show,”
Washington Post, November 29, 2012.
14
Shannon K. O'Neil, "Drug Cartel Fragmentation and Violence," Council on Foreign Relations Blog, August 9, 2011.
15
TBI, February 2013; Booth op. cit. Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office is investigating how many of the
disappearances may have been linked to organized crime or rogue government actors.
16
TBI, February 2013.
17
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: Mexico, November 20, 2012, available at:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5815.html.
18
James Bargent, “Mexico Govt: Organized Crime Murders Down for May,” InsightCrime Organized Crime in the
Americas, June 7, 2013.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Experts have challenged the government’s numbers; maintaining that organized crime violence
has likely remained relatively stable or slightly declined since Peña Nieto took office.19
Figure 1. Organized Crime-Related Killings in Mexico in 2011 by State
Source: Map created by CRS using data from the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), University of San Diego.
Notes: Mexican government and TBI data drawn from presentation in Cory Molzahn, Viridiana Ríos, and David
A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011, Trans-Border Institute, March 2012. Data
limitations prevented TBI from producing a similar map for 2012.
Congress has expressed serious concerns about the impact that drug trafficking-related violence
has had on governability in Mexico, a neighbor and key U.S. ally. Congress has analyzed how the
violence has affected U.S. interests in Mexico, paying particularly close attention to the safety of
U.S. citizens in Mexico. The 111th and 112th Congress held several hearings on the violence in
Mexico, efforts by the Mexican and U.S. government to address the situation, and implications of
the violence for the United States. More recently, Congress has also taken an interest in the
effects of the violence, and government efforts to suppress it, on the quality of democracy and
respect for human rights in Mexico.
19
Alejandro Hope, “Mexico's Violent Crime Numbers Don't Add Up,” InsightCrime Organized Crime in the Americas,
April 24, 2013; Benito Jimémez, “Cuestionan Cifra Oficial de Muertos,” Reforma, June 8, 2013.
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Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States20
The prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the DTOs in Mexico—
and particularly in those areas of Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has generated concern
among U.S. policy makers that this violence might spill over into the United States. U.S. officials
deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a significant
spillover of violence into the United States, but acknowledge that the prospect is a real concern.21
Congress faces several policy questions related to potential or actual spillover violence. One
question involves whether the increasing violence between the drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico affects either the level or nature of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States.
Of note, violent drug trafficking-related crimes have previously existed and continue to exist
throughout the United States. However, data currently available on these crimes do not allow
analysts to determine whether or how these existing levels of drug trafficking-related violence in
the United States have been affected by the surge of violence in Mexico.
Development and Implementation of the
Mérida Initiative
Evolution of U.S.-Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation
The United States began providing Mexico with equipment and training to eradicate marijuana
and opium poppy fields in the 1970s, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after Enrique
Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, was assassinated in Mexico in
1985. From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled due to U.S.
mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and concerns about the Mexican government’s
tendency to accommodate drug leaders.3422 At the same time, the Mexican government was
reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its opposition to U.S. drug certification
procedures35procedures23 and to concerns about sovereignty. The Mexican government also expressed
opposition to the DEA and other U.S. agencies carrying out operations against drug trafficking
organizations in Mexican
territory without authorization. Mexican military officials proved
34
particularly reticent to
cooperate with the U.S. military due to concerns about past U.S. interventions in Mexico.24
20
For background, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover
Violence, by Kristin Finklea.
21
See for example, Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Border Security at the
University of Texas at El Paso,” press release, January 31, 2011.
22
Under this system, arrests and eradication took place, but due to the effects of widespread corruption, the system was
“characterized by a working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug lords” through the 1990s. Francisco E.
González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
3523
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug producing and drug transit
countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico usually was criticized for its efforts, which in turn led
to increased Mexican government criticism of the U.S assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process
enacted in September 2002 (P.L. 107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead
required the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably” to make
substantial counternarcotics efforts.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
particularly reticent to cooperate with their U.S. counterparts due to deeply held concerns about
past U.S. interventions in Mexico.36
24
Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface,” Strategic Forum, Institute for
(continued...)
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
U.S.-Mexican cooperation began to improve and U.S. assistance to Mexico increased after the
two countries signed a Binational Drug Control Strategy in 1998. U.S. assistance to Mexico,
which totaled some $397 million from FY2000- to FY2006, supported programs aimed at
interdicting interdicting
cocaine; combating production and trafficking of marijuana, opium poppy, and
methamphetamine; strengthening the rule of law; and countering money-laundering. In 2007, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while U.S. programs had helped improve
Mexico’s counterdrug efforts, drug seizures in Mexico remained relatively low, and corruption
continued to hinder bilateral efforts.37
As previously stated, upon taking office in December 2006, Mexican President Calderón made
combating drug trafficking and organized crime a top priority of his administration. In response to
the Calderón government’s request for increased U.S. cooperation, in October 2007 the United
States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a new package of U.S. assistance for Mexico
and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. The Mérida
25
Developing Cooperation Through the Mérida Initiative
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a package of
U.S. assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008.26 The Mérida
Initiative was developed in response to the Calderón government’s unprecedented request for
increased U.S. support and involvement in helping Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized
crime. As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican
government pledged to tackle crime and corruption and the U.S. government pledged to address
drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
The Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, sought to (1) break the power and impunity
of criminal
organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the
capacity of
justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand.
Congress appropriated roughly $1.5 billion to support the Mérida Initiative in P.L. 110-252, P.L.
111-8, P.L. 111-32, P.L. 111-117, P.L. 111-212, and, most recently, in P.L. 112-10 (see Table 1).
Each of these Acts contained human rights conditions on 15% of certain law enforcement and
military assistance provided (see “Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida
Initiative Funding” below). U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping military
and law enforcement officials engaged in counterdrug efforts, improving border security, and
reforming Mexico’s police and judicial institutions. (For overall U.S. assistance to Mexico, see
Table A-1 in Appendix A).
36
Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface,” Strategic Forum, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2009.
37
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but
the Flow of Illicit Narcotics into the United States Remains High, 08215T, October 2007.
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Table 1. FY2008–FY2012 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2008 Supp.
(P.L. 110-252)
Account
ESF
FY2009
Bridge (P.L.
110-252)
FY2009 (P.L.
111-8)
FY2009 Supp.
(P.L. 111-32)
20.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
INCLE
215.5
48.0
246.0
160.0
FMF
116.5
0.0
39.0
Total
352.0
48.0
300.0
FY2010 (P.L.
111-117)
15.0b
FY2010 Supp.
(P.L. 111-212)
FY2011 (P.L.
112-10)
Account
Totals
FY2012
Request
0.0
18.0
68.0
33.3
190.0
175.0
117.0
1,151.5
248.5
260.0
5.3
0.0
8.0
428.8
420.0
210.3
175.0
143.0
1,648.3
Not applicablec
281.8
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2012, FY2010 Supplemental Spending Plan; FY2011 653(a) allocation data
provided by the State Department.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.
a.
On April 14, 2011, Congress passed legislation to fund government programs for the remainder of FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). While the legislation reduced most foreign
aid accounts from FY2010 enacted levels, final funding by country and program has not been established.
b.
$6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
c.
Beginning in the FY2012 request, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
CRS-9
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
While U.S. and Mexican officials have described the Mérida Initiative as a “new paradigm” for
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, some observers have challenged that description, preferring
to describe the Mérida Initiative as a gradual expansion of existing bilateral efforts.38 Regardless
of whether it has resulted in a paradigm shift in U.S.-Mexican relations, the Mérida Initiative
signaled a major diplomatic step forward for U.S.-Mexican counterdrug cooperation, which in the
1990s had been at a low point. The Mérida Initiative has resulted in increased bilateral
communication and cooperation, from law enforcement officials engaging in joint operations on
the U.S-Mexico border to cabinet-level officials meeting regularly to discuss bilateral security
efforts. Bilateral coordination has been further advanced by the establishment of a Bilateral
Implementation Office in Mexico City where U.S. and Mexican personnel work together to plan
and implement joint activities and projects under the Merida Initiative. Perhaps most importantly
for Mexico, as part of the Mérida Initiative, both countries accepted a shared responsibility to
tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region, including U.S.
drug demand. Some Mexican analysts have concurred with these observations, while others assert
that the United States continues to largely dictate the bilateral agenda and that the Mérida
Initiative is not that different from previous counterdrug programs like Plan Colombia.39
Implementation
There has been concern in Congress about the slow delivery of Mérida assistance. On December
3, 2009, the GAO issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida
Initiative. The report found that $753 million of the $1.1 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for
Mexico as of September 2009 had been obligated by the State Department, but only $24 million
of the funds had actually been spent.40 The GAO attributed initial delays in Mérida
implementation to “(1) statutory conditions on the funds, (2) challenges in fulfilling
administrative procedures [required for obligation and expenditure of the funds], and (3) the need
to enhance institutional capacity on the part of both recipient countries and the United States to
implement the assistance.” According to a follow-up report by the GAO that was released on July
21, 2010, approximately $790.9 million in Mérida funding had been obligated by March 2010, of
which $121.2 million had been expended.41
Rather than tracking obligations and expenditures, State Department officials have preferred to
report on progress in Mérida implementation by compiling the value of equipment deliveries that
have been made and the value of capacity-building programs that have been provided. As of
August 1, 2011, a total of $473.8 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico,
including $324.0 million in equipment and $106.6 million worth of training. Significant
equipment deliveries thus far have included three UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, eight Bell 412
38
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation,”
October 22, 2007. For debates about whether or not the Mérida Initiative is a “new paradigm” for U.S.-Mexican
security relations, see Laura K. Stephens and José de Arimateia da Cruz, “The Mérida Initiative: Bilateral Cooperation
or U.S. National Security Hegemony, International Journal of Restorative Justice, 2008, vol. 4, no. 2.; Rafael
Velázquez Flores and Juan Pablo Prado Lallande eds. La Iniciativa Mérida: ¿Una Nueva Paradigma de Cooperación
Entre México y Estados Unidos en Seguridad? Mexico City : National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2009.
39
Ibid; see the chapters by Mario Cruz Cruz, Juan Pablo Prado Lallande, Jorge Rebolledo, and Alberto Lozano.
40
GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10253r.pdf.
41
GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better
Performance Measures, 10-837R, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
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helicopters, a case management system for the Attorney General’s Office, and non-intrusive
inspection equipment for scanning containers.42 For 2011, the State Department has committed to
delivering $500 million in assistance (equipment and training) to Mexico. Scheduled equipment
deliveries this year should include four UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, a CASA 235 maritime
surveillance aircraft, and a $13 million secure communications system for use by law
enforcement in sister cities along the U.S.-Mexico border. 43
U.S. assistance provided under the Merida Initiative has shifted away from providing expensive
equipment, like aircraft and IT equipment, toward a focus on institution-building through training
and technical assistance. As of August 1, 2011, more than 67,000 Mexican participants have been
reached through direct training, conferences, seminars, or other events. Some 6,885 federal police
investigators, 2,014 penitentiary staff, and 4,312 judicial sector personnel have completed U.S.funded courses.44 U.S. assistance is supporting training courses offered in new academies that are
either currently in operation or are being established for customs personnel, corrections staff,
canine teams, and police (federal, state, and local). Some of that training is designed according to
a “train the trainer” model in which the academies train instructors who in turn are able to train
their own personnel. Mérida assistance is also supporting curriculum and training programs
offered by Mexican institutions like the National Public Security System (SNSP), which sets
police standards and provides grants to states and municipalities for police training, and the
National Institute of Criminal Sciences (INACIPE), which provides training to judicial sector
personnel. Despite progress in accelerating the delivery of Merida assistance, Congress may
retain a particular interest in ensuring that Mérida Initiative equipment and training programs are
delivered in a timely manner.
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative
In the 2007 U.S.-Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government
pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demandrelated portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico.”45
Although not funded through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government has made efforts to
address each of these issues. When debating future support for the Mérida Initiative, Congress
may consider whether to simultaneously provide additional funding for these or other domestic
activities that would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges.
Drug Demand
Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. In 2009, about 21.8
million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users, representing 9% of individuals
aged 12 and older.46 High-ranking Administration officials and experts alike have acknowledged
42
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative at a Glance,” August 1, 2011.
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “The Mérida Initiative- What’s Coming in 2011,” May 2011, http://photos.state.gov/
libraries/mexico/310329/12may/2011_Major_Deliveries_FINAL.pdf.
44
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative at a Glance,” August 1, 2011.
45
U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
46
See the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including
residents of households, non-institutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and
(continued...)
43
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that U.S. domestic demand for illegal drugs is a significant factor driving the global drug trade,
including the drug trafficking-related crime and violence that is occurring in Mexico and other
source and transit countries.47 The Obama Administration released its 2010 National Drug
Control Strategy report on May 11, 2010, which includes an increased focus on reducing U.S.
drug demand, particularly among youth. In July 2011, the Obama Administration released its
2011 National Drug Control Strategy, which continues to emphasize the need to reduce U.S. drug
demand. Among several goals, the Strategy includes a five-year goal of cutting drug use among
youth by 15%. 48
Drug policy experts have praised the Administration’s focus on reducing consumption, but
criticized the Administration for requesting relatively modest budget increases in funding for
treatment programs.49 Some have questioned whether the federal government allocates enough of
the drug budget to adequately address the demand side; the FY2012 drug budget proposes to
continue to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction programs including drug crop
eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement efforts.50 It is
important to note, however, that many state, local, and nonprofit agencies also channel funds
toward demand reduction.
Firearms Trafficking51
Many view illegal gun trafficking from the United States as a significant factor in the escalating
drug-related violence in Mexico. It is unclear, however, whether that flow of illegal guns is an
“ant run” that has trickled across the border over decades, or an “iron river of guns” that has
surged in recent years as Mexico drug traffickers and other criminal syndicates have sought to
arm themselves against competitors and Mexican authorities with firearms that are commonly
available on U.S. markets. Those firearms reportedly include semiautomatic variants of AK-47s
and AR-15s, .50 caliber sniper rifles, and 5.7 FN pistols, as well as other semiautomatic pistols of
various calibers. 52
(...continued)
Human Services and is available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsP.pdf.
47
See, for example, testimony of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Transnational Drug Enterprises (Part II): U.S. Government Perspectives on the Threat to Global Stability and
U.S. National Security, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 2010. See also “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton Remarks With Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” March 23, 2010.
48
That strategy is available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/strategy/. For more information on the National
Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), see CRS Report R41535,
Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Kristin M. Finklea.
49
See, for example, Testimony of John T. Carnevale, President, Carnevale Associates, before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommitee on Domestic Policy, April 14, 2010.
50
Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Budget - FY 2012 Funding Highlights,
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/12budget/fy12Highlight_Exec_Sum.pdf.
51
This section was drafted by William Krouse, Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy. See CRS Report
R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.
52
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, p. 73; and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat
Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 17 .
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To stem the flow of illegal guns, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
has stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws in the four Southwest border states
under a program known as “Project Gunrunner.” However, ATF’s efforts to reduce illegal gun
trafficking have generated controversy on two counts. First, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
and ATF have obtained approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for an
information collection initiative under which federally licensed gun dealers in Southwest border
states would be required to submit multiple sales reports on certain rifles, as a means of more
readily identifying possible straw purchasers and gun traffickers.53 Second, ATF is alleged to have
allowed firearms to be transferred to suspected straw purchasers.54 Then, either intentionally or
unintentionally, ATF allowed those suspected criminals or their associates to smuggle those
firearms across the border, in an effort to build more complex investigations designed to uncover
and dismantle larger gun trafficking conspiracies.55 Some of those firearms were implicated in the
deaths of two U.S. federal agents, and perhaps hundreds have been seized by authorities in
Mexico.56 If these allegations should prove true, they have possibly serious international
implications, for neither DOJ nor ATF are reported to have informed their Mexican counterparts
about these investigations and the possibility that some of these firearms could be reaching their
country.57
As the lead federal agency charged with regulating firearms, ATF administers and enforces laws
that are designed to prevent the illegal diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. While
the United States does not maintain a registry of firearms or firearm owners (except for
machineguns and destructive devices), ATF and federally licensed gun dealers maintain a
decentralized system of transaction records, through which ATF can sometimes trace a firearm
from its manufacturer or importer to its first private owner of record. Over the years, successful
firearm traces have generated leads in criminal investigations and have generated data that
illustrate wider trafficking trends and patterns.
To undergird Project Gunrunner, ATF developed and deployed a Spanish language version of its
eTrace program for Mexican authorities to submit trace requests electronically to the United
States. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, from FY2007 through FY2010, ATF
processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities.58 A large, but unknown, percentage of
these trace requests involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the
United States for civilian markets.59 It should be underscored, however, that not all firearms
53
U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for
Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines,” press release, July 11, 2011.
54
A “straw purchase” occurs when a person, who is otherwise eligible to purchase a firearm, purchases a firearm from
a federally licensed dealer for another person, who is either prohibited from possessing a firearm or does not want a
paper trail linking him to the purchased firearm.
55
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
56
Ibid.
57
Kim Murphy, “AK-47s At Death Scene Were Part of ATF Probe,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2011.
58
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking,” April 2011.
59
Although ATF released limited trace data to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in June 2011, in a
departure from past practices, the agency arguably has released very little trace data to congressional requesters since
2009, despite the fact that GAO recommended in June 2009 that the Attorney General should direct ATF to regularly
update its reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends. See U.S. Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: A Report by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Charles
Schumer, and Sheldon Whitehouse, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 2011, p. 6; and U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges,
GAO-09-709, June 2009, pp. 5-6.
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seized by Mexican authorities are traced, and such trace submissions are more likely made for
firearms believed to have originated in the United States, such as those with a U.S. manufacturing
or import stamp. Moreover, problems persist with regard to the quality, quantity, and timeliness of
firearms trace requests made by Mexican authorities and resultant data.60 Data on some firearms,
for example, were submitted several times. If previous tracing trends hold true, moreover, about a
quarter of trace requests failed because the firearm make, model, or serial numbers were
erroneously entered into the system.61 It is also probable that ATF was only able to identify the
first private firearm owner of record or other possible source in the United States in about a
quarter of these trace requests.
In November 2010, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released an evaluation of
Project Gunrunner.62 While the OIG was somewhat critical of ATF’s eTrace program for yielding
few “usable investigative leads,”63 the OIG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to develop a
reporting requirement for multiple long gun sales because Mexican DTOs have demonstrated a
marked preference for rifles capable of accepting high-capacity magazines.64 In the past,
published ATF trace data have shown that many of these rifles were semiautomatic versions of
the AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles that were produced for civilian markets in the United States. In
addition, the OIG recommended that ATF focus its investigative efforts on more complex
criminal conspiracies involving high-level traffickers rather than on low-level straw purchasers.
In December 2010, DOJ and ATF requested that OMB approve a “60-day emergency notice of
information collection” by January 5, 2011 under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. §
3507).65 Under this proposed initiative, ATF would require federally licensed gun dealers to report
whenever they make multiple disposals of one or more rifles within five consecutive business
days to an unlicensed person. Such reporting would be limited to firearms that are (1)
semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22 caliber, and (3) capable of
accepting a detachable magazine. Several Members of Congress strongly opposed the proposal.66
They maintain that if Congress authorized multiple handgun sales reporting in statute in 1986,
then it is incumbent upon ATF to request similar statutory authority from Congress for multiple
rifles sales reporting. While OMB initially denied ATF emergency approval, it approved this
information collection request on July 11, 2011.67 In addition, instead of the of the one-year
60
Colby Goodman, Update on U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Mexico Institute, April 2011, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/
Goodman%20Update%20on%20US%20Firearms%20to%20Mexico.pdf
61
Ibid.
62
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
63
Ibid, p. 73.
64
Ibid, p. 38.
65
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of
Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 75 Federal
Register 79021, December 17, 2010.
66
Congressional Documents and Publications, “Rehberg Leads Bipartisan Letter to ATF Questioning New Firearm
Dealer Regulations,” Representative Denny Rehberg (R-MT) News Release, December 23, 2010. On February 19,
2011, the House adopted an amendment to the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) that would
have prohibited ATF from implementing that requirement. While the House passed H.R. 1, the Senate rejected this bill
on March 9, 2011, for budgetary considerations that went well beyond concerns about this policy rider. Meanwhile, the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10) does not include
a similar rider.
67
U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for
(continued...)
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“pilot” period originally requested by ATF, OMB approved the information collection request for
a three-year period (through July 31, 2014).68 Opponents of this initiative quickly responded. On
July 12, 2011, Representative Denny Rehberg successfully amended the FY2012 Commerce,
Justice, Science Appropriations bill in full committee markup to prohibit ATF from implementing
its information collection initiative by a vote of 25 to 16.
In February 2011, ATF and Project Gunrunner came under renewed congressional scrutiny for a
Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious. ATF whistleblowers have
alleged to Members of Congress that suspected straw purchasers were allowed to amass relatively
large quantities of firearms as part of long-term gun trafficking investigations.69 As a
consequence, some of these firearms are alleged to have “walked,” meaning that they were
trafficked to gunrunners and other criminals before ATF moved to arrest the suspects and seize all
of their contraband firearms.70 Two of these firearms—AK-47 style rifles—were reportedly found
at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian
Terry was shot to death.71 Questions, moreover, have been raised about whether a firearm—an
AK-47 style handgun—that was reportedly used to murder U.S. ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata
and wound Special Agent Victor Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by
a subject of a Houston, TX-based ATF Project Gunrunner investigation.72 Legislators in both the
United States and Mexico have voiced their concern about these allegations.73 U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder has called upon the DOJ Inspector General to conduct a third evaluation of
Project Gunrunner.74
On June 14, 2011, Representative Darrell E. Issa and Senator Charles E. Grassley issued a joint
staff report on Operation Fast and Furious,75 in which it is chronicled that ATF line supervisors
became increasingly concerned when they witnessed hundreds of firearms being illegally
transferred during surveillance operations, but were reportedly directed not to arrest the suspects
and interdict those firearms. Those agents contend that this was a questionable departure from
past investigative practices. On June 15, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held a hearing on these matters. Representative Issa, Chairman of that
committee, expressed his concern that DOJ had not been entirely cooperative with his
(...continued)
Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines,” press release, July 11, 2011; Evan Perez, “U.S.
News: New Rules on Border Gun Sales,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2011.
68
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last 30
Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control
Number: 1140-0100, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain;jsessionid=9f8e89cb30d6399089b4c8ac4da993b6c0e60ddbeff2.e34ObxiKbN0Sci0SbhaSa3aLchr0n6jAmlj
Gr5XDqQLvpAe.
69
James v. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post, February 2, 2011.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Dennis Wagner, “Gun Shop Told ATF Sting Was Perilous,” Arizona Republic, April 15, 2011, p. A1.
74
Jerry Seper, “ATF Knew Risks in Border Operation; Instructed Arizona Gun Dealer To Engage in ‘Suspicious Sales’
Despite Concerns,” Washington Times, April 15, 2011, p. 5.
75
U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents,
prepared for Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform & Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2011, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Reports/ATF_Report.pdf.
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committee’s efforts to investigate how some of those firearms found their way to crime scenes in
Mexico and on the Southwest border. Following the hearing, on June 29, 2011, Representative
Elijah E. Cummings, the committee’s ranking minority member, issued a report and held a forum,
during which the minority explored issues raised by some of those same ATF line supervisors,
who had suggested during the House hearing that the penalties for firearm straw purchases under
current law are arguably not stringent enough. The minority also discussed other gun control
proposals related to gun shows, semiautomatic assault weapons, sniper rifles, and additional
penalties for gun trafficking offenses.76
As called for originally by Senator Grassley, the House Appropriations Committee approved a
FY2012 Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations bill (H.R. 2596) that includes report
language recommending the appointment of “an outside, independent investigator,” who would
be charged with conducting “a thorough investigation of the allegations against ATF with respect
to Operation Fast and Furious and policies guiding this and similar operations.” 77 In addition, the
House committee called on both DOJ and ATF to cooperate fully with related oversight
investigations, whether they be conducted by congressional committees, the DOJ OIG, or an
independent investigator.78
On July 26, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a follow-up
hearing on Operation Fast and Furious. Prior to the hearing, a joint staff report was issued again.79
This report found that ATF and DOJ leadership had not informed its own personnel serving in
Mexico City, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, nor the Mexican authorities about the
investigation.80 The former ATF Mexico City Attaché indicated to the Committee that, as early as
October/November 2009, he and his deputy had noticed an unusual increase, “uptick,” in firearms
being recovered at crime scenes in Mexico that were linked to Phoenix, AZ.81 In February 2010,
Operation Fast and Furious was designated an Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task
Force Investigation, at which point the operation became “prosecutor-led” by the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the District of Arizona.82 By March 2010, ATF headquarters and DOJ officials were
briefed that the suspects under investigation had purchased over a 1,000 firearms and some those
firearms were being recovered at crime scenes in Mexico.83 When the ATF Dallas, Texas Special
Agent in Charge asked what was being done about this, a DOJ official responded that the
76
U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Minority Staff Report, Outgunned: Law
Enforcement Agents Warn Congress They Lack Adequate Tools to Counter Illegal Firearms Trafficking, 112th Cong.,
1st sess., June 30, 2011, available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
OUTGUNNED%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf. On July 15, 2011, Representative Carolyn
B. Maloney introduced the Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 2554). Original
cosponsors included Representative Cummings and Representative Carolyn McCarthy.
77
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2012, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2011, H.Rept. 112-169, p. 57.
78
Ibid.
79
U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence,
prepared for Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform & Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 2011, 60 pp.
80
Ibid, p. 27.
81
Ibid., p. 28.
82
Ibid., p. 40.
83
Ibid., p. 26.
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movement of these guns, and possibly more guns, to Mexico was “an acceptable practice.”84 In
the report and subsequent testimony, there is little to indicate that ATF investigators ever
interviewed the straw purchasers in the early stages of the operation, made sustained efforts to
track the firearms electronically, or engaged in long-term surveillance operations designed to
interdict the weapons before they reached the border. However, the prosecutors and investigators
secured several Title III wiretaps85 in their efforts to link the straw purchasers and other
traffickers to a “high-level plaza boss in the Sinaloa Drug Trafficking Organization.”86
To date, Operation Fast and Furious has resulted in the indictment of 20 individuals on multiple
counts of straw purchasing and other federal offenses related to firearms, drug trafficking, and
money laundering.87 Over the 15-month operation, they stand accused of trafficking 2,020
firearms, of which 227 have been recovered in Mexico and 363 have been recovered in the
United States.88 While 1,430 firearms remain unaccounted for, ATF officials maintain that the
investigation may yield additional arrests of “high-level traffickers.”89
Money Laundering/Bulk Cash Smuggling
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each
year.90 Much of the money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is
laundered to Mexico through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling. While bulk cash
smuggling has been a prominent means by which criminals move illegal profits from the United
States into Mexico, they have increasingly turned to stored value cards to move money. With
these cards, criminals are able to avoid the reporting requirement under which they would have to
declare any amount over $10,000 in cash moving across the border. Current federal regulations
regarding international transportation only apply to monetary instruments as defined under the
Bank Secrecy Act.91 Of note, stored value cards are not considered monetary instruments under
current law.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, intending to define “stored value” as “prepaid access”
and to implement regulations regarding the recordkeeping and suspicious activity reporting
requirements for prepaid access products and services.92 The proposed rule would not, however,
84
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 40.
86
Ibid., p. 26
87
Indictment, United States v. Avila, No. 11-cr-00126-JAT (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2011).
88
Sari Horwitz, “A Gunrunning Sting Gone Fatally Wrong: Operation Meant to Seize Firearms Bound for Cartels
Allows Weapons into the Streets,” Washington Post, July 26, 2011, p. A1.
89
Ibid.
90
DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
91
31 U.S.C. § 5312 defines a monetary instrument as “(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments,
bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and
(C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331 , checks, drafts,
notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not
in bearer form.”
92
U.S. Department of the Treasury, FinCEN, “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank
Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” 75 Federal Register, pp.
(continued...)
85
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directly address whether stored value or prepaid access cards would be subject to current
regulations regarding the international transportation of monetary instruments. Even if FinCEN
were to implement regulations requiring individuals leaving the United States to declare stored
value, GAO has identified several challenges that would remain.93 These challenges relate to law
enforcement’s ability to detect the actual cards and to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate
stored value on cards; travelers’ abilities to remember the amount of stored value on any given
card; and law enforcement’s ability to determine where illegitimate stored value is physically held
and subsequently freeze and seize the assets.
Aside from bulk cash smuggling and stored-value cards, Mexican traffickers move and launder
money by using digital currency accounts, e-businesses that facilitate money transfers via the
Internet, online role-playing games or virtual worlds that enable the exchange of game-based
currencies for real currency, and mobile banking wherein traffickers have remote access—via cell
phones—to bank and credit card accounts as well as prepaid cards.94 The proceeds may then be
used by DTOs and other criminal groups to acquire weapons in the United States and to corrupt
law enforcement and other public officials.
Countering financial crimes—including money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—is one
effort outlined by the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBCS).95 To curb
the southbound flow of money from the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, the SWBCS
includes several goals: stemming the flow of southbound bulk cash smuggling, prosecuting the
illegal use of MSBs and electronic payment devices, increasing targeted financial sanctions,
enhancing multilateral/bi-national collaboration, and empirically assessing the money laundering
threat.96
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This operation was reinitiated in January 2010, and between January 2010 and April 2011, Operation Firewall resulted
in eight arrests and the seizure of $6 million in U.S. currency.97 U.S. efforts against money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the federal level as well, as
experts have recommended.98 In December 2009, for example, ICE opened a bulk cash
smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies track and
disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the GAO has identified several ways in which CBP outbound
(...continued)
36589-36608, June 28, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-15194.pdf.
93
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, October 2010, pp. 48 – 49.
94
Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, p.
161, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Farah.pdf.
95
ONDCP, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11/
swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pdf. Herein after, SWBCS, 2011. The SWBCS is implemented by the Director of
National Drug Control Policy, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement as well as the DOJ
Office of the Deputy Attorney General.
96
Ibid., pp. 31 – 36.
97
U.S. Embassy, “Fact Sheet: Combating Money Laundering,” April 2011.
98
Farah, op. cit.
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inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash smuggling, particularly those aimed at
combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved.99
The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A
recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX.100 Information provided from studies such as these may
help inform policy makers and federal law enforcement personnel and assist in their decisions
regarding where to direct future efforts against money laundering.
Beyond Mérida: the New Bilateral Security Strategy
One of the most prominent criticisms of the original Mérida Initiative strategy was that it focused
too much on providing equipment to Mexican security forces engaged in counterdrug efforts and
not enough on promoting institutional reforms within Mexico. As part of the FY2011 budget
preparation process, U.S. and Mexican officials began to revise the strategic framework
underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, partially in response to some of those
criticisms. After several months of consultations, the Obama and Calderón governments agreed to
a new strategy, which has been called “Beyond Mérida,” that broadens the scope of bilateral
security efforts and focuses more on institution-building than on technology transfers. The Obama
Administration outlined the strategy in its FY2011 budget request, but did not formally announce
the new strategy until the Mérida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in Mexico City on
March 23, 2010. The State Department has since indicated that it intends to extend Mérida
assistance beyond 2012, when President Calderón leaves office, and to increase support for
Mexican states and municipalities.101
The U.S. and Mexican governments have remained committed to the Mérida Initiative under its
new strategy despite recent tensions that have emerged in the bilateral relationship. President
Obama welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a two-day state visit on May 19,
2010, during which the leaders pledged to continue working together to combat the organized
criminal groups that traffic drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash into Mexico.
After a March 3, 2011 meeting at the White House, President Obama and President Calderón
again vowed to bolster bilateral security cooperation. This public display of unity occurred even
as bilateral relations were being tested by several recent events. U.S.-Mexican relations have
reportedly been strained by the aforementioned shooting of two U.S. ICE agents working in
Mexico, one of whom was killed; the March 2011 resignation of the U.S. Ambassador Carlos
Pascual;102 and by the aforementioned “Fast and Furious” gunrunning scandal.103 Implementing
99
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73.
100
DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010.
101
U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Mérida and Post-Mérida, June 11, 2010.
102
Prior to his resignation, Ambassador Pascual was criticized by Presidentg Calderón for the comments he made about
deficiencies in Mexico’s antidrug efforts in confidential diplomatic cables that were leaked to the press. Denise
Dresser, “U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ousted ‘For Doing his Job,” Miami Herald, April 18, 2011.
103
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
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the Mérida Initiative will likely be one of the top priorities of the newly-confirmed U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico, Earl Anthony Wayne.
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of
Organized Crime
The Calderón government has, until recently, focused most of its efforts on dismantling the power
of drug trafficking organizations. To that end, the government has conducted joint police-military
operations to arrest DTO leaders, investigated and indicted public officials suspected of collusion,
and begun to go after the DTOs’ illicit assets.104 A significant percentage of U.S. assistance
appropriated during the first phase of the Mérida Initiative has been obligated to purchase
equipment to support those efforts, including $590.5 million worth of aircraft and helicopters.
The Mexican government has increasingly begun to conceptualize the DTOs as for-profit
corporations. Consequently, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has begun to focus more
attention on disrupting the criminal proceeds used to finance DTOs’ operations. These efforts, as
well as increased intelligence-sharing and cross-border law enforcement operations and
investigations (such as those that have occurred in areas around Nogales, AZ105) have been
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation.
One question that may arise for policy makers as they review the Administration’s current and
future budget requests for the Mérida Initiative is whether proposed funding would be used to
expand existing bilateral partnerships or whether it would be used to establish new partnerships.
The answer to this question may depend on the effectiveness of current partnerships, as well as
whether new partnerships are needed to address emerging law enforcement challenges. For
example, Mexico recently began conducting southbound inspections of commercial and noncommercial vehicles entering the country, deploying more canine detection teams, and employing
risk analysis techniques to improve its ability to detect and seize illicit goods. Under pillar three
of the new strategy (discussed below), the Mexican government may seek increased training from
CBP and ICE, as well as equipment for the new customs training academy that it is constructing
in Querétaro. Should the Mexican Congress enact proposed legislation to create a border police
unit within the SSP, that unit could seek increased U.S. support as well. If the DTOs continue to
employ new weapons, such as grenades and car bombs, specific training to combat those new
threats could be needed.
Also, as the DTOs increasingly evolve into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a partial result
of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts have also urged both
governments to focus more on combating other types of organized crime, such as kidnapping,
human trafficking and alien smuggling.106 Some may therefore question whether the funding
104
The Mexican Congress has recently enacted an asset forfeiture law. The Mexican government has also imposed
limits on the amount of U.S. dollars that individuals can exchange or deposit each month. “Mexico Targets Dirty
Dollars,” BBC News, June 15, 2010.
105
CBP and the Mexican Federal Police within the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) have been conducting parallel
patrols along the Arizona border since September 2009. On February 18, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano signed an
agreement to expand that type of cooperation with the SSP. In addition, ICE, CBP, and the Mexican Attorney General’s
Office (PGR) have had an agreement in place that has enabled the PGR to prosecute drug smuggling cases that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Arizona declines to prosecute. That program is now being extended to El Paso.
106
Edgardo Buscaglia, a Mexican expert in organized crime, has estimated that between 52 and 55% of the illicit
profits earned by Mexican organized criminal groups now come from illicit activities other than drug trafficking. Dolia
(continued...)
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provided under the Mérida Initiative will be used to address all forms of transnational organized
crime. Examples of current U.S.-Mexico law enforcement partnerships are discussed in
Appendix B.
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico
Many security experts maintain that the Mexican government needs to focus more on addressing
the country’s weak law enforcement and judicial institutions. Federal police reform is well
underway, but serious questions remain as to when and how the federal police will take over the
anti-drug functions currently being carried out by the Mexican military. President Calderón has
indicated that the military will remain engaged in public security functions through the end of his
term in 2012. Another major challenged will be to expand police reform efforts to the state and
municipal level, possibly through the establishment of state level unified police commands. Some
Mérida funding is being used to extend U.S.-funded police training and prison reform efforts to
states and municipalities, beginning with Ciudad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua.
With impunity rates hovering around 98%,107 experts maintain that it is crucial for Mexico to
implement the judicial reforms passed in the summer of 2008 and to focus on fighting corruption
at all levels of government. In order for Mexico to transition its criminal justice system to an
accusatorial system with oral trials by 2016, some argue that U.S.-funded judicial training
programs may have to be significantly expanded.108 Others also maintain that the country’s
overcrowded federal and state prisons, whose inmate populations have grown partially as a result
of increasing drug-related arrests and the use of pre-trial detentions, merit increased attention.109
Reforming the Police
Police corruption has presented additional challenges to the campaign against DTOs in Mexico.
In October 2008, an elite unit within the Attorney General’s Office for Special Investigations of
Organized Crime (SIEDO) was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive
information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 officials fired or arrested.110 In November
2008, the former head of SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a DTO. The
former investigative agency within the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), the Federal Agency of
Investigations (AFI), which was created in 2001, was, by 2005, widely criticized for corruption,
and largely disbanded in June 2009.111 Corruption has also plagued federal, state, and municipal
police forces.
(...continued)
Estévez, “Juárez: El Futúro de México?” Poder 360, March 12, 2010.
107
In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. This figure is widely cited, see, for
example, Guillermo Zepeda, Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, Center of Research for Development
(CIDAC), Mexico City, August 2009, p. 9.
108
Eric L. Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May
2010.
109
Federal police reform in Mexico began in 2008. Between FY2008 and FY2010, some $14 million in Mérida
assistance were set aside for providing “technical assistance in prison management.”
110
Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
111
Robert E. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds., Police and Public Security in Mexico, San Diego, CA: University
(continued...)
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President Calderón has taken steps to reform Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal police forces
by enhancing police training at the federal level, creating a national database through which
police can share information and intelligence, and accelerating implementation of a national
police registry.112 Calderón initially proposed the creation of one unified federal police force
under the SSP, but two laws passed in 2009 created a Federal Police (FP) force under the SSP and
a Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) force under the PGR to replace the discredited AFI, both with
some investigative functions.113 It took the Mexican government another year to issue regulations
delineating the roles and responsibilities of these two new police entities.
Whereas initiatives to recruit, train, and equip the FP under the Secretariat for Public Security
(SSP) have rapidly advanced (with support from the Mérida Initiative), efforts to build the PGR’s
police forces (the PFM) have lagged behind. According to the State Department, Mérida funding
will support specialized training courses to improve federal police investigations, intelligence
collection and analysis, and anti-money laundering capacity, as well as the construction of
regional command and control centers.114 The Calderón government has also sought U.S.
technical assistance in developing in-service evaluations and internal investigative units to
prevent and punish police corruption and human rights abuses. Mérida assistance has recently
begun to support the PFM as well as the FP, but the success of U.S.-funded efforts could be
hindered without a clear division of labor between the two entities and guidance on how they will
collaborate in investigating and developing cases with prosecutors from the PGR.
Thus far, state and local police reform has lagged behind federal police reform efforts. In October
2010, the Calderón government submitted a proposal to reform article 115 of the Mexican
Constitution in order to have the country’s roughly 2,022 municipal police forces absorbed by
state-level police agencies that would then coordinate their efforts with the SSP.115 Mexico’s 2011
budget includes funding for its implementation, which is moving forward in some states, but the
proposal has encountered significant opposition in the Mexican Congress.116 Proponents of the
reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the SSP and bring efficiency,
standardization, and better trained and equipped police to municipalities. Skeptics argue that
police corruption has been a major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system,
including the state and federal police, and argue that there is a role for municipal police who are
trained to deal with local issues.
(...continued)
Readers, 2010, p. 228.
112
A State Department report submitted to congressional appropriators on April 2, 2010, as required by the Joint
Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, described Mexico’s national police registry, which was started in 2001, as now
being “fully functional,” but stated that “not all [Mexican] states and municipalities have permanent, real-time
connectivity to the system.” The State Department plans to devote up to $8.8 million in Mérida funding to enhance the
registry and make it available across the country. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Mexican Federal Registry of
Police Personnel, April 2, 1010.
113
Daniel Sabet, Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Sabet.pdf
114
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Mérida Initiative Spending Plan for Mexico, June 10, 2010.
115
In order to take effect, the measure would have to be approved by the Mexican Congress and then a majority of the
state legislatures, a process which could take several months to a year or more.
116
Melissa Pitts, Mexico Update: Addressing Police Reform and Climate Changes, Council of the Americas, December
2, 2010.
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Regardless of whether the aforementioned proposal moves forward, many analysts have urged the
Mexican government to implement the vetting and certification procedures for state and local
police that were codified in the January 2009 public security law; strengthen the National Public
Security System (SNSP), which is overseeing state and local police reform; and continue
rewarding state and municipal units whose officers meet certain standards with federal subsidies.
The SNSP recently reported that just 9.2% of Mexican police have met the professional standards
established in the 2009 law and only one third of Mexican states were on track to ensure that their
police forces meet the law’s standards by January 2013.117
The outcome of the aforementioned reform effort could have implications for U.S. initiatives to
expand Mérida assistance to state and municipal police forces, which is already occurring in the
state of Chihuahua.118 The U.S. and Mexican governments are expanding the training programs
developed for the SSP training institute at San Luis Potosi to support a new national police
academy that is now under construction in Puebla. Roughly $4 million in Mérida funds is
supporting the creation that police academy. Training courses offered to state and local police
might have a slightly different emphasis than those given to federal forces, with more emphasis
on, for example, community-oriented policing and dealing with street crime.
In order to complement these efforts, analysts have maintained that it is important to provide
assistance to civil society and human rights-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Mexico in order to strengthen their ability to monitor police conduct and provide input on
policing policies. Combined with internal control mechanisms and stringent punishments for
police misconduct, some maintain that citizen participation councils can have a positive impact
on police performance and police-community relations.
Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate, and an inability to secure
convictions. Press reports citing data provided by the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) maintain
that the vast majority of drug trafficking-related arrests that have occurred since President
Calderón took office have not resulted in successful prosecutions.119 The PGR has also been
unable to secure charges in many high-profile cases involving the arrests of politicians accused of
collaborating with organized crime, such as Gregorio Sanchez, the former mayor of Cancun.120
Analysts are debating whether recent purges within the PGR may mean that the new Attorney
General Marisela Morales will be able to improve the performance of that institution.121
117
“Mexico Struggling to Reform Police Forces,” EFE, June 10, 2011; Antonio Baranda, “Avanzan 9 Estados en
Evaluación Policial,” Reforma, May 8, 2011.
118
The U.S. government plans to help Mexico develop a standard curriculum for state and municipal police officers; to
provide equipment, training, and advisors to state and municipal forces; and to help create a major crimes task force
comprised of federal and state police.
119
“Cárteles Perturban al Sistema Carcelario,” El Universal, June 18, 2010.
120
Patrick Corcoran, “Mayor Goes Free, Mexico Fails Again to Prosecute ‘Corrupt’ Politicians,” In Sight Organized
Crime in the Americas, July 21, 2011.
121
Ken Ellingwood, “Bravery May Not be Enough to Bring Justice to Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2011;
Mariano Castillo, “Mexican Attorney General Shakes up Her Ranks,” CNN World, July 21, 2011.
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Mexican prisons are also in need of significant reforms. Increasing arrests have caused the prison
population to expand by approximately 8% in the past three years, with inmates housed in
facilities that are, on average, 30% over capacity.122 Many inmates (perhaps 40%123) are awaiting
their trials. Those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by the authorities for
40 days without access to legal council, with a possible extension of another 40 days.124
In June 2008, President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of
Congress and Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform,
Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a
closed-door process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are
expected to adopt additional means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make it
more flexible and efficient thereby relieving some of the pressure on the country’s prison system.
Implementing these judicial reforms has brought major challenges, including the need to revise
federal and state criminal procedure codes (CPCs), build new courtrooms, retrain current legal
professionals, update law school curricula, and improve forensic technology.
Implementation of judicial reform has advanced in many states, but experts maintain that “the
lack of any serious movement [to implement judicial reforms] at the federal level sends an
unfortunate signal that reform is not a priority.”125 The Mexican Congress has yet to approve a
new federal CPC, a key element needed to guide both federal and state reform efforts. Prior to
2008, six states had already adopted judicial reforms, many with assistance from USAID, while
three others had approved but not yet implemented state-level reforms.126 In January 2011, the
federal commission tasked with monitoring implementation of judicial reforms at the state and
federal level reported that eight states have implemented the reforms and three more states are
scheduled to do so in 2011. The commission’s goal is for all 32 states to have approved the
minimum legal changes necessary to comply with the reforms before President Calderón leaves
office. Its ability to spur reform efforts has reportedly been hindered, however, by budget
constraints and a limited ability to exert pressure on other government entities such as the PGR.127
From the beginning, many analysts had predicted that progress in advancing judicial reform in
Mexico was “likely to be very slow as capacity constraints and entrenched interests in the judicial
system delay any changes.”128 Others expressed concerns that the Calderón government appeared
122
Silvia Otero, “No Investigan 95% de Muertes en ‘Guerra,’” El Universal, June 21, 2010.
Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2010, available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010.
124
This practice, known as “arraigo” (pre-charge detention) first came into existence in the 1980s, and was formally
incorporated into the Mexican Constitution through a constitutional amendment passed in 2008 as a legal instrument to
fight organized crime. Its use has been criticized by several United Nations bodies, the Inter-American Commission for
Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and international and Mexican human rights organizations. For
more, see Janice Deaton, Arraigo and Legal Reform in Mexico, University of San Diego, June 2010.
125
Andrew Selee and Eric L. Olson, Steady Advances, Slow Results: U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation After Two
Years of the Obama Administration, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2011.
126
Chihuahua, Mexico State, Morelos, Oaxaca, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas adopted reforms prior to 2008. As of that
time, Baja California, Durango, and Hidalgo had adopted but not yet implemented state-level reforms. Matthew
Ingraham, State-Level Judicial Reform in Mexico: The Local Progress of Criminal Justice Reforms, TBI Working
Paper, May 2010.
127
David Shirk, Justice Reform in Mexico: Changes and Challenges in the Judicial Sector, Woodrow Wilson Center,
Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, April 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/
Shirk.pdf.
128
“Mexico Risk: Legal and Regulatory Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit-Risk Briefing, January 8, 2010.
123
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to be devoting more funding and political will towards modernizing the police than strengthening
the justice system (including the courts and the PGR).129 Some analysts questioned whether it
would be feasible to revamp the judicial system at a time when the government was under
pressure to get tough on organized crime since accountability and due process within the judicial
system are sometimes portrayed as impediments to law enforcement efforts.
Despite these challenges, many analysts are hopeful that Mexico will be able to follow the
examples of countries like Chile and Colombia that have successfully transformed their judicial
systems. In order for that transformation to take place, Mexico would likely benefit from
increased training and technical assistance from the United States and other Latin American
countries. USAID has been supporting code reform, judicial exchanges, alternative dispute
resolution, and Citizen’s Participation Councils, as well as training justice sector operators in five
Mexican states since 2004. Using roughly $19 million of the Economic Support Funds (ESF)
appropriated thus far for the Mérida Initiative, USAID is now working comprehensively in seven
of Mexico’s 32 states. With $11.5 million in FY2010 supplemental funds, USAID will continue
and expand its justice sector reform at the state level.130 However, at a time when Mexico is
supporting the reforms through significant in-kind financial investments, demand appears to be
outpacing USAID resources.131 For its part, DOJ is administering at least $19 million in State
Department and USAID funding in the areas of (1) prosecutorial capacity building; (2)
strengthening the internal control systems of the SSP and the PGR; (3) extradition training; (4)
asset forfeiture; (5) forensics; and (6) witness protection.132 Since no one, including the Mexican
government, has published an estimate of how much it is likely to cost to implement the 2008
reforms, the adequacy of Mexican and U.S. investments is difficult to measure.
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border”
Policy makers have questioned not only what it means to have a 21st century border, but
specifically how this will enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat the drug trafficking
organizations and reduce the related violence. In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a
border is necessarily more complex than a physical line between two sovereign nations.
Consequently, the proposed 21st century border is based on (1) enhancing public safety via
increased information sharing, screenings, and prosecutions; (2) securing the cross-border flow of
goods and people; (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in
personnel, technology, and infrastructure; (4) engaging border communities in cross-border trade;
and (5) setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.133
129
Eric L. Olson, Police Reform and Modernization in Mexico, 2009. Woodrow Wilson Center, September 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Brief%20on%20Police%20Reform%20and%20Modernization.pdf.
130
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mérida Initiative/Mexico,
November 9, 2010.
131
In December 2010, USAID officials estimated that it would require $21 million in additional funding to establish a
permanent presence in the seven states where it has already been working and $35 million to deal with the pending
requests it had received. E-mail from USAID official, December 16, 2010. USAID will receive $11.5 million in
FY2010 supplemental funding to support judicial sector programs, including prosecutorial training at the state level.
132
U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and
Training (OPDAT), “OPDAT Mexico Mérida Initiative Resident Legal Advisor Program,” press release, April 2010.
That figure does not include funds from the FY2010 supplemental appropriations measure.
133
U.S. Department of State, “United States - Mexico Partnership: A New Border Vision,” press release, March 23,
2010.
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Policy makers may question whether this combination of efforts aimed at creating a 21st century
border will simultaneously enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat organized crime and
prevent drug trafficking-related violence from spilling over into the United States.
On May 19, 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing
the U.S.-Mexican border.134 To head this initiative, they have established a Twenty-First Century
Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC). On December 15, 2010, the ESC held its
inaugural meeting in Mexico City during which it adopted a bi-national action plan. The plan is
focused on coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment
programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo pre-clearance, and improving information sharing
among law enforcement agencies.135 The ESC also issued a joint declaration on preventing border
violence, including the use of lethal force by either U.S. or Mexican law enforcement officers.136
As part of the binational effort to modernize the border, three new ports of entry opened in 2010.
Both the United States and Mexico spend significant funds—outside of Mérida—related to border
security. Because border policies and practices have been different along the U.S. side of the
Southwest border and the Mexican side, each country’s goals in further developing the border
may necessarily differ as well. A related issue is whether funds appropriated under the revised
Mérida Initiative should be divided equally or equitably between border initiatives on the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border.
While policy makers may generally question what constitutes a “21st century border,” they may
more specifically question which aspects of this border will be mutually beneficial to both U.S.
and Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. Although a key goal of the Mérida Initiative is to
combat the DTOs and their criminal activities, the U.S. border strategy does not discriminate
between combating drug trafficking-related illicit activities and other illegal behaviors along the
border. The current U.S. border strategy strives to secure and manage the U.S. border through
obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying
and disrupting transnational criminal organizations.137 As such, it remains to be seen whether
enhancements to the border will specifically support the Mérida Initiative’s goal of combating the
DTOs or whether the funds put toward border development will result in a general strengthening
of the security of the border—and, as a byproduct, aid in disrupting drug trafficking-related
activities.
134
The White House, “Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The Government Of The
United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As
mentioned, U.S. - Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. This ESC is
one of the most recent developments in the bilateral cooperation.
135
A draft version of the binational plan is available at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/plan-eng.pdf.
136
“Mexico-US Joint Statement on the Prevention of Violence in the Border Region,” press release,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/fronteriza-eng.pdf.
137
For more information on the U.S. border strategy, see CRS Report R41237, People Crossing Borders: An Analysis
of U.S. Border Protection Policies, by Alison Siskin. CRS was unable to locate an official Mexican border strategy for
comparison with the U.S. border strategy. For information on the roles of various U.S. agencies in border security, see
CRS Report RS21899, Border Security: Key Agencies and Their Missions, by Chad C. Haddal. For information on the
U.S. Border Patrol, see CRS Report RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Chad C.
Haddal.
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Northbound and Southbound Inspections138
One element of concern regarding enhanced bilateral border security efforts is that of southbound
inspections of people, goods, vehicles, and cargo. In particular, both countries have
acknowledged a shared responsibility in fueling and combating the illicit drug trade. Policy
makers may question who is responsible for performing northbound and southbound inspections
in order to prevent illegal drugs from leaving Mexico and entering the United States and to
prevent dangerous weapons and the monetary proceeds of drug sales from leaving the United
States and entering Mexico. Further, if this is a joint responsibility, it is still unclear how U.S. and
Mexican border officials will divide the responsibility of inspections to maximize the possibility
of stopping the illegal flow of goods while simultaneously minimizing the burden on the
legitimate flow of goods and preventing the duplication of efforts.
In addition to its inbound/northbound inspections, the United States has undertaken steps to
enhance its outbound/southbound screening procedures. Currently, DHS is screening 100% of
southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, cash, and drugs. Also, as previously mentioned,
CBP scans license plates along the Southwest border with the use of automated license plate
readers (LPRs). CBP is expected to deploy additional LPR equipment to more than 42 locations
along the Southwest border by the end of FY2011.139 In FY2010, Congress provided $20 million
for CBP to acquire Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) to aid in southbound inspection
and processing of travelers and shipments. As of April 2011, Mérida funding had enabled 30 ion
scanner vapor tracers, 23 ZBV Backscatter Vans, 10 mobile X-Ray Minivans, and 2 Railroad
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems.140
Historically, Mexican Customs had not served the role of performing southbound (or inbound)
inspections. As part of the revised Mérida Initiative, CBP is helping to establish a Mexican
Customs training academy to support professionalization and promote the Mexican Customs’ new
role of performing inbound inspections. Additionally, CBP is assisting Mexican Customs in
developing an investigator training program and, as of April 2011, had trained 58 canines and 44
handlers to assist with the inspections.141
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption
Another point that policy makers may question regarding the strengthening of the Southwest
border is how to prevent the corruption of U.S. and Mexican border officials who are charged
with securing the border. On March 11, 2010, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration held a hearing on the corruption of U.S. border officials by Mexican DTOs. According
to testimony from the hearing, in FY2009, the DHS Inspector General opened 839 investigations
of DHS employees. Of the 839 investigations, 576 were of CBP employees, 164 were of ICE
employees, 64 were of Citizen and Immigration Services (CIS) employees, and 35 were of
138
There is a dearth of open-source data that currently measures the extent of inbound and outbound inspections
performed by both the United States and Mexico along the Southwest border. Rather, existing data tends to address
seizures of drugs, guns, and money as well as apprehensions of suspects. Therefore, this section addresses current U.S.
and additional initiatives to bolster cross-border inspections.
139
SWBCS, 2011, p. 77.
140
Embassy of Mexico, Fact Sheet: A 21st Century Border Vision, April 2011.
141
Ibid.
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees.142 It is unknown, however, how many
of these cases involve alleged corruption by Mexican DTOs or how many involve suspected
corruption of DHS employees working along the Southwest border.
To date, the Administration’s proposal for a 21st century border has not directly addressed this
issue of corruption. Congress may consider whether preventing, detecting, and prosecuting public
corruption of border enforcement personnel should be a component of the border initiatives
funded by the Mérida Initiative. If the corruption is as pervasive as officials say,143 resources
provided for new technologies and initiatives along the border may be diminished or negated by
corrupt border personnel. For instance, at the end of 2009, CBP was able to polygraph between 10
and 15% of applicants applying for border patrol positions, and of those who were polygraphed,
about 60% were found unsuitable for service.144 If this pattern holds true and 85%-90% of current
new hires were not subjected to a polygraph, anywhere between 51% and 54% of all CBP newhires may not be found suitable for service. Further, between October 1, 2004, and March 11,
2010, 103 CBP officers were arrested or indicted on “mission-critical corruption charges
including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering and conspiracy.”145 Congress may
decide to increase funding—as part of or separately from Mérida funding—for the vetting of new
and current border enforcement personnel.
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities
This pillar is a relatively new focus for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the overall goal of which is to
build strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. It
includes existing programs in support of school-based “culture of lawfulness”146 courses, as well
as new “cultural of lawfulness” courses that are being taught to Federal Police and state police in
five northern border states. Pillar Four also includes ongoing Mérida-funded programs in the area
of demand reduction. Those programs are helping to create a network to connect Mexico’s 334
prevention and treatment centers, to develop curricula for drug counselors and volunteers at the
centers, and to help certify Mexican drug counselors.
142
See testimony by Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
143
See testimony by Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
144
See testimony by James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
145
Ibid.
146
A “culture of lawfulness” may be defined as a culture in which the overwhelming majority of the population is
convinced that the rule of law offers the best long term chance of securing their rights and attaining their goals. Culture
of Lawfulness (CoL) programs aim to combine “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to educate all sectors of
society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Key sectors that CoL programs seek to involve include law
enforcement, security forces, and other public officials; the media; schools; and religious and cultural institutions.
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New programs under this pillar will consist primarily of targeted efforts to (1) improve strategic
planning and communication to reduce risk factors that lead to crime/violence; (2) help
subnational governments to collaboratively address community needs; and (3) prepare youth to be
responsible members of their communities. Funding and implementation of pillar four is
primarily the responsibility of the Mexican government, with some support from multilateral
institutions like the World Bank. The Mexican government began its efforts under pillar four in
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, but has started to expand some social programs to other cities. U.S.funded efforts are focusing on pilot projects in Ciudad Juárez, but, with additional funds, could
potentially be expanded to other cities.
For the past few years, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, a city across the border from El Paso, TX, has
been at the epicenter of Mexico’s drug trafficking-related violence and is now among the world’s
most violent cities. Violence has escalated as the Juárez and Sinaloa DTOs have battled for
control over the El Paso drug smuggling route or “plaza,” youth gangs have fought over local
drug distribution networks, and criminal groups have struggled against Mexican law enforcement
and military forces. The violence captured international attention after the massacre of 15
civilians, many of them teenagers, by armed gunmen at a private home in late January 2010, an
event which also sparked strong criticism in Mexico of President Calderón’s military-led drug
strategy. Mistrust between the citizens of Ciudad Juárez and government officials, as well as
amongst officials from different agencies and levels of the Mexican government had reportedly
reached an untenable level that was hindering law enforcement efforts.147
In an attempt to heal those rifts and counter the escalating violence, President Calderón and his
top advisers began consulting with state and local officials to revise the government’s military-led
strategy for Ciudad Juárez. After those consultations, the Calderón government launched a new
“We Are All Juárez” strategy in mid-February 2010 that includes significant federal government
investments in education, job training, and community development programs to help address
some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the violence.148 Critics argued that the
hastily conceived strategy concentrated too much on amplifying existing programs rather than
developing new ones to meet the particular needs of the Juárez community. More broadly, some
observers maintain that any social programs are likely to fail in Ciudad Juárez unless the security
situation and rampant corruption now plaguing the city are brought under control.149 Possibly in
response to those concerns, efforts are being made to concentrate federal efforts in certain “safe
zones” that will enable the Juárez government to demonstrate to citizens the benefits that come
with successful government control over neighborhoods.
U.S. efforts in Ciudad Juárez have involved the expansion of some existing Mérida-funded
initiatives, such as school-based “culture of lawfulness” programs and demand reduction and
treatment services, as well as supporting some new initiatives. USAID has reprogrammed
existing funding, both Mérida and bilateral, to support an urban mapping project (Mérida) and an
at-risk youth program (non-Mérida) administered by international organizations with experience
working in the city. Some of USAID’s Mérida funding has also been dedicated to supporting
147
Eric L. Olson, Shattered Dreams and Restoring Hope: Organized Crime and Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Woodrow Wilson Center, February 22, 2010.
148
The Mexican government plans to implement 160 concrete policy actions that will involve government investments
of more than $3.4 billion pesos (roughly $274.0 million dollars). A progress report on how implementation of the
strategy is advancing is available in Spanish at http://www.todossomosjuarez.gob.mx/estrategia/avances.html.
149
Katherine Corcoran,” Mexico Program to Clean up Violence-Plagued Border City Ciudad Juárez has Long Way to
go,” Associated Press, January 3, 2011.
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social development projects in Ciudad Juárez. In April 2010, USAID launched a program by
which civic organizations in Ciudad Juárez could submit proposals to receive grants of up to
$100,000 to support community development projects. By October 2010, roughly 17 grants worth
roughly close to $1 million had been approved.150
USAID is receiving $14 million in FY2010 supplemental funding to implement pillar four
activities in Ciudad Juárez. Those activities may include grant funding for crime prevention
programs; support for human rights NGOs; assistance to help civic organizations influence local
and state politics; municipal exchanges to share best practices in reducing violence; and, support
for the development of community crime prevention strategies.151
According to the Obama Administration’s FY2012 budget request, some of the $33.3 million in
ESF funds requested would be used to support pillar four activities in targeted areas.152
Issues
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative
Policy makers and analysts have debated how to measure the success of the Mérida Initiative.153
How one evaluates the Mérida Initiative largely depends on how one has defined the goals of the
program. While the U.S. and Mexican governments’ long-term goals for the Mérida Initiative
may be similar, their short-term goals and priorities may be different. For example, both countries
may strive to ultimately reduce the overarching threat posed by the DTOs—a national security
threat to Mexico and an organized crime threat to the United States. However, as the 2012
elections approach, U.S. and Mexican goals may differ. Mexico may focus more on reducing drug
trafficking-related crime and violence, while the United States may place more emphasis on
aggressively capturing DTO leaders and seizing illicit drugs.
One basic measure by which Congress has evaluated the Mérida Initiative has been the pace at
which equipment has been delivered and trainings have been carried out. As previously
mentioned, a December 2009 GAO report identified several factors that had slowed the pace of
Mérida implementation.154 It is unclear whether more expeditious equipment deliveries to Mexico
may result in a more positive evaluation of Mérida because this is one of many metrics that may
be used for measuring success. Another means by which Mérida success may be measured is
through the impact of training programs, such as the number of individuals completing each
course. If, for example, the speed of equipment deliveries or the number of Mexican officials
trained are used as benchmarks for success, it is unclear whether the Mérida Initiative may still be
considered a success if equipment is delivered and training programs are carried out, but the
150
Email from USAID official, January 18, 2011.
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mérida Initiative/Mexico,
November 9, 2010.
152
U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs FY2012.
153
See, for example, Andrew Selee, Success or Failure? Evaluating U.S.-Mexico Efforts to Address Organized Crime
and Violence, Center for Hemispheric Policy- Perspectives on the Americas Series, December 20, 2010.
154
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009.
151
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Mexican government is still unable to make significant inroads against drug trafficking
organizations and organized criminal groups.
U.S.-funded antidrug programs in source and transit countries (of which Mexico is both) have
also traditionally been evaluated by examining the number of DTO leaders arrested and the
amount of drugs and other illicit items seized, along with the price and purity of drugs in the
United States. The State Department included a list of similar performance measures for each
portion of the Mérida Initiative in its FY2008 supplemental spending plan.155 As noted in the July
2010 GAO report that was previously discussed, the State Department has yet to update those
measures to reflect the new four-pillar strategy for Mérida.156 In the Joint Explanatory Statement
to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress directed the State
Department to submit a report to congressional appropriators on progress that has been made thus
far in implementing the Mérida Initiative. The report, which was submitted on June 11, 2010,
continues to document progress in terms of the amount of equipment that has been delivered and
training courses that have been carried out, but does not include information on any other
performance indicators.
Nevertheless, State Department fact sheets and remarks have shown that, with respect to arrests
and seizures of some drugs (i.e., cocaine and methamphetamine), the Mérida Initiative may have
had some success. Arrests and seizures on both sides of the border have increased.157 U.S.
officials have also highlighted the fact that cocaine availability and purity in United States has
been on a downward trend since 2006 as evidence of the success of Mérida and other U.S.-funded
antidrug efforts.158
However, a principal challenge in assessing the success of Mérida is separating the results of
those efforts funded via Mérida from those efforts funded through other border security and
bilateral cooperation initiatives. The data available does not allow U.S. officials or analysts to
determine the success that can be directly attributed to Mérida. Changes in seizure data and drug
prices may not be directly related to U.S.-Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. It is equally
difficult to parcel out the reasons for periodic fluctuations in drug purity in the United States.
Many experts have argued that Mexican President Calderón needs to reduce drug traffickingrelated violence in order to recover popular support for his anti-drug efforts. Should a decrease in
drug trafficking-related deaths be used as an indicator of success for the Mérida Initiative, or is an
imminent decline in the violence unrealistic given other countries’ experiences combating
entrenched organized criminal groups? Studies have shown that violence tends to escalate after a
government launches a major law enforcement initiative against a DTO or other organized
criminal group.159 In addition to a decline in drug trafficking-related violence, others have
suggested that success would be evidenced by, among other things, increases in popular trust in
155
For a complete list of those indicators, see U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008, pp. 16-39.
156
GAO 10-837.
157
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Achievements,” press release, May 2011,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/16may/Law%20Enforcement%20May%202011%20Final.pdf.
158
ONDCP, 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, July 11, 2011.
159
International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence:
Evidence from a Scientific Review, 2010.
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the police and courts, and the return of a free press, particularly in parts of Mexico where attacks
on journalists have led to virtual self-censorship.160
Still others, including U.S. officials, have maintained that the success of the Mérida Initiative may
be measured by a general increase in bilateral cooperation. Some officials have stated that the
increasing ability of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement to work collaboratively may be a
byproduct of enhanced cooperation fostered in part by Mérida.161 For instance, the State
Department has cited the arrests and killings of high-profile DTO leaders that have been made
since late 2009 as examples of the results of increased bilateral law enforcement cooperation.
Another example of Mérida success—in the form of bilateral cooperation—cited by the State
Department is the high number of extraditions from Mexico to the United States: 107 in 2009 and
94 in 2010. As illustrated in Figure 2, however, these extraditions may be more a reflection of
President Calderón’s commitment to combating the DTOs than of Mérida successes. Extraditions
began to increase before the Mérida Initiative was authorized in October 2007 and before the first
funds obligated for equipment and training were realized in Mexico.
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States
1995–2010
Source: 1995—2006 data from U.S. Embassy of Mexico, U.S. - Mexico at a Glance: Law Enforcement at a Glance,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/eataglance_law.html. Data for 2007—2008 from the Trans-Border
Institute, Justice in Mexico, News Report January 2009, January 2009, http://www.justiceinmexico.org/news/pdf/
justiceinmexico-january2009news-report021709.pdf. Data for 2009 from the U.S. Department of State, “United
160
Diana Villers Negroponte, Measuring Success in the Drug War: Criteria to Determine Progress in Mexico’s Efforts
to Defeat Narco-traffickers, The Brookings Institution, May 25, 2010.
161
Testimony by Roberta S. Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27,
2010.
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States - Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” press release, May 19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142019.htm. 2010 figures from electronic communication with U.S. Department of Justice.
Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico
Mexico is not only a transit country for Andean cocaine bound for the United States, but also a
major producer of cannabis (marijuana), opium poppy (used to produce heroin), and
methamphetamine. In recent years, U.S. government estimates indicate that marijuana and opium
poppy cultivation in rural Mexico has expanded significantly. In 2009, estimated marijuana
production in Mexico rose to 17,400 hectares, a 45% increase over 2008 and the highest level
recorded since 1992. Similarly, opium production rose to 19,000 hectares, a 31% increase over
2008.162 At the same time, despite Mexican government import restrictions on precursor
chemicals, the production of methamphetamine in clandestine labs also appears to have increased
significantly.163 Despite these trends, neither drug eradication nor alternative development
programs have been a focus of Mérida Initiative programs to date.
The Mexican government has engaged its military in drug crop eradication efforts since the
1930s, but personnel constraints have inhibited recent eradication efforts. Indeed, increases in
drug production have occurred as President Calderón has assigned more military forces to public
security functions, including anti-DTO operations, than to drug crop eradication efforts. As
Mexicans become increasingly wary of President Calderón’s strategy of using the military to
perform police functions, there may be calls for the troops to return to more traditional antidrug
functions. Similarly, if drug production in Mexico continues to expand, particularly production of
the potent and dangerous “black tar” variety of heroin, U.S. policy makers may decide to direct
some Mérida assistance to support eradication efforts in Mexico.
The Mexican government has not traditionally provided support for alternative development even
though many drug-producing regions of the country are impoverished rural areas where few licit
employment opportunities exist. Alternative development programs have traditionally sought to
provide positive incentives for farmers to abandon drug crop cultivation in lieu of farming other
crops, but may be designed more broadly to assist any individuals who collaborate with DTOs out
of economic necessity. In Colombia, recent studies have found that the combination of jointly
implemented eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the
independent application of any one of these three strategies.164 Despite those findings, alternative
development often takes years to show results and requires a long-term government and donor
commitment to promoting rural development, two factors which may lessen its appeal as a policy
tool for Mexico.
162
2010 figures are not yet available. U.S. Department of State, INCSR, March 2011.
Ibid.
164
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Joel M. Jutkowitz, Sergio Rivas, et al. Assessment of the Implementation of the United States
Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, report produced for review by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), April 17, 2009.
163
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Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida
Initiative Funding
Both the Mexican police and military have poor human rights records. According to the State
Department’s human rights report covering 2010, there have been credible reports of police
involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture.165 There has also been
increasing concern that the Mexican military, which has had less human rights training and is less
accountable to civilian authorities than the police, is committing human rights abuses as it is
increasingly tasked with carrying out public security functions.166 According to Mexico’s Human
Rights Commission (CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by the Mexico’s Department of
Defense increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,791 in 2009 before falling to 1,415 in 2010. The CNDH
also reported that 111 civilians were killed during federal police or army operations in 2010.167
In addition to expressing concerns about current human rights abuses, Mexican and international
human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and
police officials accountable for past abuses. On July 13, 2009, Human Rights Watch issued a
statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single member of the
military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”168 The Mexican army has since
created a unit to handle citizen complaints about human rights abuses and developed a website to
track cases of human rights abuses that are being handled in military courts. As of December
2010, one officer and seven soldiers had been convicted of abuses.169
Given these concerns, in 2008, Congress debated what type of human rights conditions should be
placed on Mérida assistance beyond the requirements in Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance
Act (FAA) of 1961. Section 620J of the FAA states that units of a foreign country’s security
forces are prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible
evidence” that such units have committed “gross violations of human rights.” In the end, the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of
Mérida funding, had softer human rights conditions than earlier House and Senate versions, in
large part because of Mexico’s objections that some of the conditions would violate its national
sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action
in four human rights areas:
1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
165
U.S. Department of State, 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011.
See, for example, Jorge Rocha Quintero, “Public Security and Human Rights,” in Police and Public Security in
Mexico, edited by Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk. San Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010; Maureen Meyer,
Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez, Washington Office of Latin America/Centro Prodh, September 2010.
167
Statistics are available in annual reports of Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (CNDH), available at
http://www.cndh.org.mx; “Ciento Once Civiles Ajenos a Guerra Contra Crimen Murieron en 2010 en México,” EFE,
January 27, 2011.
168
Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009.
169
Ignacio Alzaga. “Sedena se Abre al Escrutinio Público; Sube Quejas a Web.” Milenio. July 28, 2010; U.S.
Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: Mexico, April 2011.
166
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Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Similar human rights conditions have been included in subsequent appropriations measures that
have funded the Mérida Initiative.170 Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion
of these human rights conditions in Mérida Initiative appropriations legislation, although some
thought they could have been more tightly worded.
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted a human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remain, the report outlined steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police
transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture.171 Human rights groups criticized the State
Department report, and the release of Mérida funds that were on hold. They urged the State
Department not to issue another favorable human rights progress report to Congress until
measurable improvements have been made.172
On September 2, 2010, the State Department submitted a second human rights progress report on
Mexico to Congress.173 According to that report, the Mexican government had demonstrated
enough progress to enable $36 million in FY2009 and FY2010 regular funds that had been on
hold to be released. The report credited the Calderón government with initiating legislation to
170
In P.L. 110-252, the human rights conditions applied to 15% of the funding for INCLE and FMF, or approximately
$57 million dollars. In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the 15% conditions applied to all of the
funding accounts but excluded amounts for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law
activities, which were earmarked at not less than $75 million, or roughly $33.75 million. In the FY2009 Supplemental
(P.L. 111-32), the conditions effectively only applied to the $160 million in the INCLE account, or $24 million,
because the $260 million in FMF funds designated for aircraft for the Mexican navy was excluded from the scope of
the 15% withholding requirement. In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), the 15%
withholding applies to all of the accounts but it excludes assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anticorruption and rule of law activities.170 In the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212), the conditions
applied to 15% of the INCLE appropriated or roughly $26 million. The same conditions that were included in P.L. 111117 will apply to assistance provided in the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act (P.L. 112-10).
171
U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
172
Fundar et al., “Obama Administration’s Alleged Release of Mérida Funds: A Violation of U.S. Law That Will
Encourage Serious Human Rights Violations in Mexico,” August 2009; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
et al., “Joint Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Human Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of
State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico,” May 27, 2010.
173
U.S. Department of State, Mexico-Mérida Initiative Report, September 2, 2010.
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strengthen the authority of the CNDH, carrying out human rights training for military and police
officials, and formalizing a bilateral dialogue on human rights issues with the United States.
While acknowledging the aforementioned progress, the State Department report stated that
further progress had to be made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity in order for
roughly $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds on hold to be released. The State Department
urged the Mexican Congress to approve pending legislation that would, among other measures,
strengthen the power of the CNDH and the Calderón government to submit legislation to reform
the Military Justice Code so that military officials accused of human rights crimes against
civilians would be tried in civilian courts. In October 2010, President Calderón submitted
legislation to the Mexican Congress that would reform the Military Justice Code to establish
civilian jurisdiction in cases where soldiers are accused of forced disappearance, rape, and
torture.174 That legislation is still pending. On July 12, 2011, the Mexican Supreme Court
rendered a decision that may imply that the current Military Justice Code should be reinterpreted
so that cases involving credible allegations of human rights abuses committed by military forces
against civilians are tried in civilian courts.175 In March 2011, the Mexican Congress approved a
series of reforms that elevate human rights conditions in international treaties signed by Mexico
to the level of the Constitution and strengthen the power of the CNDH and state-level human
rights commissions.176 The reforms were promulgated in June 2011.
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico
In contrast to Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative does not include an active U.S. military
presence in Mexico, largely due to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty stemming from
past conflicts with the United States.177 The Department of Defense (DOD) did not play a primary
role in designing the Mérida Initiative and is not providing assistance through Mérida aid
accounts. However, DOD is administering assistance provided through the FMF account. As an
implementing agency, DOD’s role has largely involved overseeing the procurement and delivery
of Mérida-funded equipment for Mexican security forces.
Despite its limited role in the Mérida Initiative, DOD assistance to Mexico has been increasing,
as has military cooperation between the two countries and Mexican participation in DOD training
programs in the United States. These trends that have accelerated since President Calderón
deployed the military to confront the DTOs.178 Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own
legislative authorities to provide certain counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are
174
Some human rights groups and Member of Congress have criticized President Calderón’s proposal for exempting
many crimes, including extrajudicial killings, from civilian jurisdiction. Washington Office on Latin America,
“Members of U.S. Congress Urge Secretary Clinton to Raise Human Rights Concerns with Mexico,” press release,
March 3, 2011.
175
“Mexican Supreme Court Says Military Rights Violations Should be Reviewed by Civilian Courts,” Associated
Press, July 13, 2011.
176
Maureen Meyer, “Al Día: Historic Human Rights Reforms Passed in the Mexican Senate; now State Congresses
Should Follow Suit,” March 16, 2011.
177
See testimony of Roderic Ai Camp before the Congressional Policy Forum, “Role of Military to Military
Cooperation and the Implications and Potentials Risks to Civil-Military Relations,” May 9, 2008.
178
Roderic Ai Camp, Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges, Woodrow Wilson
Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010; Richard D. Downie, “Critical
Decisions in Mexico: the Future of U.S./Mexican Defense Relations,” Strategic Issues in U.S.-Latin American
Relations, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 2011).
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overseen by the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which is located at Peterson Air Force
Base in Colorado. DOD can provide counterdrug assistance under guidelines outlined in Sec.
1004 of P.L. 101-510, as amended through FY2011, and can provide additional assistance to
certain countries as provided for in Sec. 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended through FY2011. DOD
counternarcotics support to Mexico totaled roughly $34.2 million in FY2009, $89.7 million in
FY2010, and $71.7 million in FY2011. DOD is developing a plan to use some $50 million in
FY2011 per Sec.1033 of P.L. 105-85 funds to improve security along the Mexico-GuatemalaBelize border. Total DOD support to Mexico in FY2012 may exceed $75.5 million.179
In March 2010, then Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike
Mullen traveled to Mexico along with Secretary Clinton to participate in a Mérida High-Level
group meeting and to offer increased military assistance to their Mexican counterparts. In July
2010, Admiral James Winnefeld, then Commander of NORTHCOM, said that he saw a
“tremendous opportunity” to strengthen ties between the U.S. and Mexican militaries through
training and intelligence-sharing. As an example, he said that the Mexican government had asked
NORTHCOM to help it establish a joint intelligence center.180 Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen participated in another Mérida High-Level Group meeting held in late April 2011 to
review progress and plan future efforts. While DOD is unlikely to provide Mexico with the same
amount of funds it has provided to Colombia, the same variety of programs may be funded.
Future training programs may focus on how to work with police forces to conduct intelligencedriven operations and investigations. According to press reports, in response to a request from the
Mexican government, DOD has begun sending unmanned aerial vehicles into Mexico to gather
intelligence on criminal organizations.181 These reports provide evidence of an expanding U.S.Mexican defense relationship, but what that relationship will look like may depend on who wins
the 2012 Mexican presidential election and what role, if any, that person envisions for the armed
forces to play in Mexico’s future counterdrug and anticrime efforts.182
Since DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is not
required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, obtaining recent data
on DOD programs and plans for Mexico may be difficult. Regardless, policy makers may want to
receive periodic briefings on those efforts in order to guarantee that current and future DOD
programs are being adequately coordinated with Mérida Initiative efforts. They may also want to
ensure that DOD-funded programs are not inadvertently reinforcing the militarization of public
security in Mexico. Experts have urged the United States “not to focus too much on military
assistance and neglect other, more effective forms of aid … [such as assistance for] the
development, training, and professionalization of Mexico’s law enforcement officers.”183
179
DOD response to CRS request, March 21, 2011. These data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD
counternarcotics support provided or efforts in these nations/regions; DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs
by regions/countries, but by program. These figures reflect both “direct” support to those countries (e.g., training,
equipment, information sharing, infrastructure and other categories) and “indirect” support via DOD and other U.S.
Government counterdrug operations with regard to those countries (e.g., transportation, communications, intelligence
analysis, radar, air and maritime patrol, liaison personnel, and other categories) as well as operation of Forward
Operating Locations.
180
“NORTHCOM Chief Cites Mexico Partnership as Top Priority,” U.S. Fed. News, June 2, 2010; Bill Gertz,
“NORTHCOM’s New Leader Boosts Focus on Mexico,” Washington Times, July 5, 2010.
181
Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
182
Downie, op. cit.
183
Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
(continued...)
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Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest
Border Initiatives184
The Mérida Initiative was designed to complement domestic efforts to combat drug demand, drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. These domestic counter-drug initiatives
are funded through regular and supplemental appropriations for a variety of U.S. domestic
agencies. As the strategy underpinning the Mérida Initiative expands to include efforts to build a
more modern border (pillar three) and to strengthen border communities (pillar four), policy
makers may consider how best to balance the amount of funding provided to Mexico with support
for related domestic initiatives.185
Regarding support for law enforcement efforts, some would argue that there needs to be more
federal support for states and localities on the U.S. side of the border that are dealing with crime
and violence originating in Mexico. Of those who endorse that point of view, some are
encouraged by President Obama’s decision to send about 1,200 National Guard troops to the
border, whereas others maintain that those steps are insufficient to secure the border. In contrast,
some maintain that it is impossible to combat transnational criminal enterprises by adopting a
“fortress-like” mentality solely focused on the U.S. side of the border, and that domestic
programs must be accompanied by continued efforts to build the capacity of Mexican law
enforcement officials. They warn that if recent U.S. efforts are perceived as an attempt to
“militarize” the border, they may damage U.S.-Mexican relations and hinder bilateral security
cooperation efforts. Further, Mexican officials from across the political spectrum have been
critical of Arizona’s recently enacted state law against illegal immigration (S.B. 1070) and have
expressed concerns about the treatment of Mexican migrants in the United States.
With respect to pillar four of the updated strategy, Mexico and the United States have discussed
the possibility of launching pilot programs to strengthen communities in the Ciudad Juárez-El
Paso and possibly Tijuana-San Diego areas. In targeting those cities most affected by the
violence, greater efforts will necessarily be placed on community building in Ciudad Juárez and
Tijuana than on their sister cities in the United States. However, if the U.S. government provides
aid to these communities in Mexico, some may argue that there should also be federal support for
the adjacent U.S. border cities. Take, for example, initiatives directed at providing youth with
education, employment, and social outlets such that the allure of joining a DTO or local gang is
reduced. Some may contend that providing these services on the U.S. side of the border as well as
the Mexican side could prevent youth in the U.S. from becoming involved in a local gang with
ties to drug trafficking.
In August 2010, the 111th Congress passed legislation (P.L. 111-230) that provides $600 million in
supplemental funding to strengthen U.S. border security efforts. That total includes $394 million
for DHS: $244 million to hire new CBP officers and Border Patrol agents, $84 million to hire new
ICE agents, $32 million for two unmanned aerial detection systems, $6 million for bases for
Border Patrol agents, $14 million for communications equipment, and $8 million to train new law
(...continued)
no. 4 (July/August 2010).
184
For background, see CRS Report R41237, People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection
Policies, by Alison Siskin.
185
The SWBCS, 2011 includes a new chapter on U.S. efforts to promote strong communities by, in part, increasing
crime prevention efforts and drug prevention and treatment programs in U.S. border communities.
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enforcement personnel. The supplemental funds also include $196 million to support DOJ efforts
on the Southwest border. Those funds are enabling the creation of seven new ATF Gunrunner
units and five FBI Hybrid Task Forces, as well as supporting additional DEA agents, federal
attorneys, prosecutors, and immigration judges.
Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere186
U.S. State Department-funded drug control assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere are
currently undergoing a period of transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean
region is in decline after record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia
in FY2000. Conversely, antidrug funding for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean has
increased as a result of the Mérida Initiative, which began in FY2008, and two related programs
that received initial funding in FY2010, the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI)187 and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The strategy undergirding the
Mérida Initiative has broadened from primarily providing equipment and training to Mexican
officials engaged in combating DTOs to place more of an emphasis on building democratic
institutions. It also includes a new focus on facilitating “secure flows” of people and goods
through the U.S.-Mexico border and promoting social and economic development in violenceprone communities. Similarly, CARSI and CBSI include some anti-drug components as part of
broader regional security packages that are also aimed at institutional strengthening and
community development.
The Obama Administration has recently taken steps to better coordinate the aforementioned
country and regional antidrug programs and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the
efforts of partner governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator
within the State Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned
regional security assistance packages. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is
also working with other federal agencies, as well as independent policy experts, to develop a
Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Strategy that is scheduled to be published later this year.
According to ONDCP, the strategy will emphasize interdiction and disrupting transnational
criminal organizations, institutional strengthening, building strong and resilient communities, and
drug demand reduction. The Administration is encouraging countries that have received U.S.
assistance in the past—particularly Colombia—to share technical expertise with other countries
in the region, a strategy that analysts have recommended. One area in which closer cooperation
between the United States, partner governments, and other donors will likely be necessary is in
efforts to better secure the porous Mexico-Guatemala and Mexico-Belize borders.
The Way Forward
On April 29, 2011, Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa chaired
another meeting of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Group in Washington D.C. after which both
governments “ratified their shared commitment to achieving long-term solutions to challenges to
186
This section is drawn from CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and
U.S. Counterdrug Programs , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
187
CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by
Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
the rule of law posed by transnational organized crime.”188 Both governments pledged, among
other measures, to increase efforts to accelerate judicial reform in Mexico, expand Mexican
police reform to the state and local levels, and counter illicit financing and weapons trafficking.
This meeting signaled the commitment of both governments to advance bilateral efforts under the
Mérida Initiative despite recent tensions in the U.S.—Mexican relationship and upcoming
elections in both countries in 2012.
The Mérida Initiative was designed in response to the Calderón Administration’s request for
specific forms of U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance. Increased U.S. operational
support for Mexico’s struggle against organized crime has recently included, among other things,
the deployment of U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles to gather intelligence on DTO activities. This
support, however, has only occurred in accordance with requests by the Mexican government.189
As such, while the Mérida Initiative’s broad four-pillar strategy is likely to remain in place, the
specific type of assistance and the depth of U.S. involvement, as requested by Mexico, may
change over time, particularly after the 2012 elections.190
Analysts have been weighing in about how the Calderón government and/or its successor might
adjust Mexico’s current security strategy. They have also debated how the U.S. will advance its
pledges of reducing drug demand, firearms trafficking, and bulk cash smuggling. Similarly,
experts have also suggested ways in which the Mérida Initiative might be adjusted in the future.
Those suggestions have included
•
Bolstering U.S. domestic efforts to combat drug demand, firearms trafficking,
and bulk cash smuggling;
•
Conceptualizing the DTOs as businesses and increasing U.S., Mexican, and
bilateral efforts against money laundering and bulk cash smuggling;
•
Expanding bi-national intelligence-sharing and U.S. operational support for
targeted operations against DTO leaders;
•
Focusing law enforcement efforts on combating all activities of organized crime,
including kidnapping, human trafficking and alien smuggling, as Mexican DTOs
are increasingly evolving into poly-crime organizations;
•
Concentrating Mexican crime control efforts on the country’s most violent cities
and paying increased attention to helping state and local police combat street
crimes, such as robbery and extortion, in those cities; and
•
Increasing development assistance to Mexico to help address the underlying
societal problems—poverty, inequality, unemployment, a large informal sector,
and a lack of opportunities for at-risk youth—that have enabled the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico.
188
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on U.S.- Mexico Merida High Level Consultative Group on Bilateral
Cooperation Against Transnational Criminal Organizations,” press release, April 29, 2011.
189
Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
190
Duncan Wood, Mexico’s 2012 Election and U.S.-Mexican Relations, Center for Strategic & International Studies,
May 2011.
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Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2012
(U.S. $ millions)
FY2007
FY2008a
FY2009b
FY2010
FY2011
(est.)
FY2012
(req.)
INCLE
36.7
242.1
454.0c
365.0d
117.0
248.5
ESF
11.4
34.7
15.0
15.0
18.0
33.3
299.0e
5.3
8.0
8.0
1.7
Account
FMF
0.0
116.5
IMET
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.0
1.1
NADR
1.3
1.4
3.9
3.9
5.7
GHCSf
3.7
2.7
2.9
3.5
3.5
3.7
DA
12.3
8.2
11.2
10.0
25.0
33.4
TOTAL
65.4
405.9
786.8
403.7
178.3
328.6
n/a
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2012,
FY2010 Supplemental Spending Plan; FY2011 653(a) allocation data provided by the State Department.
Notes: GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
Funds are accounted for in the fiscal year for which they were appropriated as noted below:
a.
FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b.
FY2009 assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
110-252) and funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).
c.
$94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
d.
$175 million provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212) and counted here as FY2010 funding was
considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2011
request.
e.
$260 million provided under a FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was
considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
request.
f.
Prior to FY2008, the Global Health and Child Survival account was known as Child Survival and Health.
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Appendix B. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law
Enforcement Partnerships
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
The BEST Initiative is a multi-agency initiative, led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), wherein task forces seek to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security—both
along the Southwest border with Mexico as well as along the Northern border with Canada.191
Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Coast Guard; and U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices; as well as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) or federal police is a partner along
the Southwest border. There are currently 21 BEST teams around the country, 12 of which are
along the Southwest border and one in Mexico City. BEST is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms
Trafficking Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border Liaison Program.
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety
and Security (OASISS)
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at
enhancing both countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the
Southwest border.192 Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien
smugglers apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in August 2005
through May 2010, OASISS generated 2,031 cases.193 This program is supported by the Border
Patrol International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
Illegal Drug Program (IDP)
The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) is an agreement between ICE and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) wherein ICE can transfer cases of Mexican nationals smuggling drugs
191
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces, November 3, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
192
See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. - Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26,
2006.
193
Testimony by Allen Gina, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida
Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
into the United States to the PGR for prosecution.194 The program was initiated in Nogales, TX, in
October 2009 and subsequently adopted in El Paso, TX. Under the IDP, the U.S. Attorneys’
Offices review the cases and then transfer them to the PGR rather than to local law enforcement
agencies, as was previously done. The PGR has agreed to accept any drug smuggling case
referred by the U.S. Attorneys, regardless of quality, quantity, or type of illegal drug seized.
Project Gunrunner195
Project Gunrunner is an initiative led by ATF in DOJ. Its goal is to disrupt the illegal flow of guns
from the United States to Mexico. In addition to its domestic objectives, Project Gunrunner also
aims to bolster U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination along the border in firearms and
violent crime cases as well as to train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify
firearms traffickers. Between FY2005 and FY2010, ATF investigations in those border states
have led to the seizure of over 8,700 guns and the indictment of 1,705 defendants, of whom 1,170
were convicted, in federal court.196 Project Gunrunner has recently been criticized, in part, for not
systematically and consistently sharing information with Mexican and U.S. partners as well as for
focusing investigations on gun dealers and straw purchasers over high-level traffickers.197 In
September, 2010, ATF released a new strategy, “Project Gunrunner—A Cartel Focused Strategy,”
that reportedly addresses these issues.198
Electronic Trace Submission System199
ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission
System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. In
January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine
U.S. consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).200 More recently, ATF has developed and deployed a
Spanish language version of its eTrace program that enables Mexican authorities to submit
firearm trace requests electronically to ATF officials in the United States. From FY2007 through
FY2010, ATF processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities.201 Most of those requests
194
For more information on the IDP, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE, Mexican authorities meet
and agree to prosecution plan for drug smugglers captured at the border: DHS, Government of Mexico announce new
agreement to help curb narcotics smuggling,” press release, April 15, 2010, http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1004/
100415elpaso.htm.
195
For more information on Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
196
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2012, February 2011, p. 5.
197
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, pp. iii-v, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
198
Ibid., p. ix.
199
For more information on the Electronic Trace Submission System, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
200
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to
Combat Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008.
201
U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking, April 2011.
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involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the United States for civilian
markets.202
Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training
(MALLET)
The FBI created Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training (MALLET) seminars
in 1988.203 These week-long seminars, hosted at least four times annually in the United States
throughout the four Southwest border states, train Mexican law enforcement officers on various
topics including law enforcement management and investigative techniques. The Mexican law
enforcement officials participating in these trainings come from all levels of government—
federal, state, and municipal. These seminars provide not only training, but opportunities for
building trusted partnerships on both sides of the border. The MALLET seminars are funded
through the FBI’s Office of International Operations.204
Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA)
The Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA) is a nonprofit organization that was established
in 1978 and has continued to enhance international law enforcement communication and train
officers in laws and procedures across borders.205 With nearly 500 representatives from various
levels of Mexican and U.S. government, PISA promotes training and mutual assistance to
extradite fugitives and solve crimes from auto thefts to homicides. For example, state and local
law enforcement from Arizona have been involved in providing tactical, SWAT, and money
laundering training to Mexican police.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov, 7-6259
202
It is highly probable that most of these firearms were illegally smuggled into Mexico, because the Mexican
government only authorizes a relatively small number of firearms to be imported for civilian markets.
203
For more information, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, On the Border: Training Our Mexican Colleagues, May
11, 2009, http://elpaso.fbi.gov/boader051109.htm.
204
From CRS communication with FBI representative, April 27, 2010.
205
For more information on PISA, see the website at http://www.azpisa.org/.
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demand. U.S. funds provided for the first goal far surpassed all other aid categories. The U.S.
government also provided extensive intelligence-sharing and operational support for Mexican
military and police personnel engaged in anti-crime efforts.
Acknowledging that Mexico cannot effectively confront organized crime with tactical victories
alone, in March 2010, the Obama Administration and the Mexican government agreed to a new
strategic framework for security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative.27 Whereas U.S.
assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces for counternarcotic
purposes, it has shifted toward addressing the weak government institutions and underlying
societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to thrive in Mexico. The strategy focuses more
on institution-building than on technology transfers and broadens the scope of bilateral efforts to
include economic development and community-based social programs, areas where Mexico had
not previously sought U.S. support. There is also increasing funding at the sub-national level for
Mexican states and municipalities. The four pillars of the current strategy are:
1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized criminal groups.
(...continued)
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2009.
25
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but
the Flow of Illicit Narcotics into the United States Remains High, 08215T, October 2007, available at:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071018.pdf.
26
In FY2008 and FY2009, the Mérida Initiative included U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America. Beginning in
FY2010, Congress separated Central America from the Mexico-focused Mérida Initiative by creating a separate Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
27
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral
Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime,” March 29, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
2. Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human
rights).28
3. Creating a 21st century border.
4. Building strong and resilient communities.
For a detailed discussion of each of the pillars, see: “The Four Pillars of the Mérida
Initiative” below.
U.S. and Mexican officials have described the Mérida Initiative as a "new paradigm" for bilateral
security cooperation. As part of Mérida, the Calderón government put sovereignty concerns aside
to allow extensive U.S. involvement in Mexico’s domestic security efforts. The two governments
increased cooperation through the establishment of a multi-level working group structure to
design and implement bilateral security efforts that included annual cabinet-level meetings. It
appears that those meetings will continue to occur during the Peña Nieto government.
Weak government institutions and underlying societal problems have allowed the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico; and many Mexican analysts welcomed the Mérida Initiative’s 2010 shift in
focus. Observers continue to argue, however, that border modernization and community building
programs have been underfunded. In addition, most Mexicans continue to have reservations about
the anti-organized crime efforts under Merida’s pillar one because of the perception that they
contributed to record levels of violent crime. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments have also
struggled to fulfill their domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative.
Funding the Mérida Initiative
Congress, with the power of the purse, has played a major role in determining the level and
composition of Mérida funding for Mexico. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated
more than $1.9 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative (see Table 1for Mérida
appropriations and Table A-1 in Appendix A for overall U.S. assistance to Mexico). In the
beginning, Congress included funding for Mexico in supplemental appropriations measures in an
attempt to hasten the delivery of certain equipment. Congress has also earmarked funds in order
to ensure that certain programs are prioritized, such as efforts to support institutional reform.
From FY2012 onward, funds provided for pillar two have exceeded all other aid categories.
Congress has sought to influence human rights conditions and encourage efforts to combat abuses
and impunity in Mexico by placing conditions on Mérida-related assistance. Congress directed
that 15% of certain assistance provided to Mexican military and police forces would be subject to
certain human rights conditions. The conditions included in the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) are slightly different than in previous years (see “Human Rights
Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative Funding”). In H.Rept. 112-331 accompanying P.L.
112-74, the conferees directed the Secretary of State to provide a report within 90 days of the
enactment of the act detailing how U.S. programs are helping to achieve judicial and police
reform in Mexico. They also called upon the State Department to develop and implement a
coordinated border security strategy with Mexico.
28
See: CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Table 1. FY2008–FY2014 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2008
Supp.
(P.L. 110252)
FY2009
(P.L. 1118)
FY2009
Supp.
(P.L. 11132)
FY2010
(P.L. 111117)
FY2010
Supp.
(P.L. 111212)
FY2011
(P.L. 11210)
FY2012
(P.L. 11274)
20.0
15.0
0.0
15.0a
0.0
18.0
33.3
101.3
35.0
35.0
INCLE
263.5
246.0
160.0
190.0
175.0
117.0
248.5
1,400.0
199.0
148.1
FMF
116.5
39.0
260.0
5.3
0.0
8.0
Total
400.0
300.0
420.0
210.3
175.0
143.0
Account
ESF
Not
applicableb
281.8
Account
Totals
428.8
FY2013
Request
Not
applicable
1,930.1
234.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2014.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
a.
$6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
b.
Beginning in FY2012, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
Although the appropriations committees in both houses of Congress reported out their respective
versions of the FY2013 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act (H.R. 5857 and S. 3241) in May 2012, consideration of the FY2013
appropriations bills did not occur until after the November 2012 elections. Both the House and
Senate appropriations committees’ versions of the foreign operations bill would have increased
funding for Mérida above the Administration’s request. In September 2012, Congress enacted a
six-month continuing resolution (P.L. 112-175) that continued funding the Mérida Initiative at
FY2012 levels. Prior to the expiration of that stopgap measure, Congress approved new
legislation to fund federal programs through FY2013 on March 21, 2013 that was signed into law
by President Obama on March 26 (P.L. 113-6). Under P.L. 113-6, most State-Foreign Operations
accounts are funded at the same level as in FY2012. These accounts are subject to the budget
sequestration process that is currently in effect, which may significantly reduce the actual funding
levels that are made available to agencies. Given uncertainty regarding how sequestration will be
applied to particular programs, it is currently unclear how much funding will be provided through
Mérida in FY2013. The aid that is provided through P.L. 113-6 will be subject to the same
conditions as those enacted in FY2012 (P.L. 112-74).
Implementation
Over the past few years, Congress has maintained an interest in ensuring that Mérida-funded
equipment and training is delivered efficiently. 29 After initial delays in 2009-2010, deliveries
accelerated in 2011, a year in which the U.S. government provided Mexico more than $500
million worth of equipment, training, and technical assistance. As of November 2012, some $1.1
billion worth of assistance had been provided. That total included roughly $873.7 million in
29
In H.Rept. 112-494, House appropriators maintained that Congress “continues to be concerned with the delivery of
assistance to Mexico” and urge agencies to “use all appropriate means necessary to ensure the prompt delivery of
equipment and training.”
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FY2014
Request
Not
applicable
183.1
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
equipment (including 21 aircraft30 and more than $100 million worth of non-intrusive inspection
equipment) and $146.0 million worth of training.
As of April 30, 2013, deliveries had inched upwards to $1.2 billion ($900 million in equipment
and $147.7 million worth of training). While $95 million in FY2012 INCLE funding is being
withheld due to a congressional hold, roughly $600 million in Mérida funding appropriated prior
to FY2013 has yet to be delivered. Recent delays in implementation have occurred partially due
to the fact that the Peña Nieto government is still honing its security strategy and determining the
amount and type of U.S. assistance needed to support that strategy. According to Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William Brownfield,
“We don't yet have a defined strategy [from the Mexican government] that we can say we can
program…and implement against.”31 The new procedure for processing all requests from
Mexican ministries for Mérida support through the Interior Ministry, which is discussed below,
has also reportedly contributed to implementation delays.32
U.S. assistance has increasingly focused on supporting efforts to strengthen institutions in Mexico
through training and technical assistance. U.S. funds support training courses offered in new
academies for customs personnel, corrections staff, canine teams, and police (federal, state, and
local).33 Some of that training is designed according to a “train the trainer” model in which the
academies train instructors who in turn are able to train their own personnel. As of May 2013,
some 19,000 law enforcement officers (including 4,000 federal police investigators) had
completed U.S. courses. Another 8,500 federal and 22,500 state justice sector personnel had
received training on their roles in Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system.34 Despite these
numbers, high turnover rates within Mexican criminal justice institutions, particularly since the
transition from PAN to PRI rule, has limited the impact of some U.S. training programs.35
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative
In the 2007 U.S.-Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government
pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demandrelated portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico.”36
Although not funded through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government has made efforts to
address each of these issues (see Appendix B for how those efforts have advanced); some have
been more successful than others. When debating future support for the Mérida Initiative,
30
Aerial equipment deliveries thus far have included four CASA 235 maritime surveillance aircraft, nine UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopters, and eight Bell 412 helicopters. The only pending aircraft delivery is an Intelligence Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) Dornier 328-JET aircraft that has been contracted for the Federal Police.
31
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico
Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative 2008–Present, 113th Cong., 1st sess., CQ Congressional
Transcripts, May 23, 2013. Hereinafter: An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
32
CRS interviews with State Department officials and Mexican analysts in Mexico City, May 6-8, 2013.
33
Mérida assistance is also supporting Mexican institutions like the National Public Security System (SNSP), which
sets police standards and provides grants to states and municipalities for police training, and the National Institute of
Criminal Sciences (INACIPE), which provides training to judicial sector personnel.
34
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, op. cit.
35
CRS interviews with State Department officials and Mexican analysts in Mexico City, May 6-8, 2013.
36
U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
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Congress may consider whether to simultaneously provide additional funding for these or other
domestic activities that would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges.
The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy
and the Mérida Initiative
PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, took office on
December 1, 2012. Upon his inauguration, the centrist PRI, a nationalistic party that governed
Mexico from 1929 to 2000, retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the conservative
National Action Party (PAN). The PRI also controls a plurality (but not a majority) in Mexico's
Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
Upon his inauguration, President Peña Nieto announced a reformist agenda with specific
proposals under five broad categories: (1) reducing violence; (2) combating poverty; (3) boosting
economic growth; (4) reforming education; and (5) fostering social responsibility. The
overarching aim of those proposals is to bolster Mexico’s competitiveness. Leaders from the PAN
and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) signed on to President Peña Nieto’s “Pact
for Mexico,” an agreement aimed at advancing the reform agenda. Two of the thirteen priority
proposals Peña Nieto mentioned at his inauguration included introducing a proposal for a unified
code of criminal procedure for the country to advance judicial reform and launching a national
crime prevention plan.
On December 17, 2012, President Peña Nieto outlined a strategy that aims to achieve a “Mexico
in Peace” where human rights are respected and protected by implementing a “State” security
policy that involves binding commitments from all levels of government. The six pillars of the
strategy include (1) planning; (2) prevention; (3) protection and respect of human rights; (4)
coordination; (5) institutional transformation; and (6) monitoring and evaluation.37 Six months
later, analysts and U.S officials maintain that many details of the Peña Nieto government’s
security strategy—particularly how it plans to combat criminal groups without exacerbating
violence—are still being fleshed out.38
In order to better plan, integrate, and evaluate security efforts, President Peña Nieto secured
approval from the Mexican Congress to place the Secretariat of Public Security (Federal Police)
and intelligence functions under the authority of the Interior Ministry. That ministry is now the
focal point for security collaboration and intelligence-sharing with foreign governments, as well
as with coordination with state and municipal authorities. The states have in turn been divided
into five geographic regions and are being encouraged to stand up unified state police commands
to coordinate with federal forces. Some critics appear to be concerned that too much power is
concentrated in the Interior Ministry.39
In addition to strengthening the role of the Interior Ministry in security efforts, the Peña Nieto
government envisions a revamped and modernized Attorney General’s Office. Peña Nieto’s
37
The strategy is outlined in some detail in Spanish on the Mexican Presidency’s website:
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/ii-sesion-extraordinaria-del-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-publica.
38
An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
39
Julián Aguilar, “In Mexico, a New Approach to Stanching Drug Violence,” New York Times, December 29, 2012.
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security strategy calls for accelerated implementation of the judicial reforms passed in 2008, a
key priority of pillar two (institutional reform) of the Mérida Initiative. It also calls for a reduced
usage of preventive detention and prison reform that includes rehabilitation and reinsertion.
Peña Nieto’s security strategy explicitly prioritizes human rights, citizen participation, and crime
prevention; this could portend an increase in bilateral efforts under Mérida’s pillar two (to protect
human rights through institutional reform) and pillar four (to build resilient communities). Peña
Nieto’s strategy pledges to increase victims’ assistance as per the Victim’s Law enacted in
January 2013, transfer cases of military abuses against civilians to civilian courts, and find
missing persons while also preventing future disappearances. Human rights groups are
monitoring how those pledges are translated into specific actions; some have been critical of
government efforts to translate rhetoric into reality. The government has launched a national
prevention program with a $9 billion budget for 2013 that includes socioeconomic, education,
infrastructure and drug treatment programs. The program is being focused on 57 high-crime
communities, but that includes additional actions in 251 municipalities.
While U.S. and Mexican interests have recently coalesced around security concerns along the
border, analysts maintain that there is potential for broader cooperation focused on economic
dynamism under pillar three of the Mérida Initiative (creating a 21st century border). 40 President
Peña Nieto has expressed support for creating a border police force, using technology and risk
analysis to speed up border crossings, and developing a regional fund for North American
infrastructure.41 Hastening bilateral plans to reach the goal of developing a “21st Century Border”
could support Peña Nieto’s goal of bolstering U.S.-Mexican economic integration.
Many details of Peña Nieto’s security strategy that will have implications for U.S.-Mexican
cooperation under pillars one and two of Mérida have yet to be announced, much less
implemented. For example, the strategy envisions a continued role for the Mexican military in
public security efforts through at least 2015; whether and how the role of the military will be
different than under the Calderón government still needs to be clarified. According to one security
analyst, some 30% of the military forces that had been deployed to conduct antidrug operations
under the Calderón government were initially sent back to their barracks by the Peña Nieto
government. Security conditions then reportedly deteriorated in some of those areas.42 For
instance, military forces recently had to be re-deployed to counter deteriorating security
conditions in Michoacán.
Although President Peña Nieto has committed to reform, rather than dismantle, the Federal
Police, how the force will be reconfigured to focus on investigations and combating key crimes
(such as kidnapping and extortion) remains to be seen. In addition to a reconfigured Federal
Police, President Peña Nieto also proposes to create a new militarized police entity, the National
Gendarmerie, whose forces may initially be drawn from the military but placed under the control
of the Interior Ministry.43 The Gendarmerie, rather than the Federal Police, may replace military
40
Arizona State University Center for Transborder Studies, Realizing the Strength of Our 21st Century Border: Trade,
Education, and Jobs, Conference Report, October 2012.
41
Miriam Castillo, “Peña Quiere Patrulla Fronteriza Mexicana,” Milenio, October 9, 2012; Enrique Peña Nieto,
México, la Gran Esperanza (Mexico, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2011), p. 149.
42
CRS interview with Raul Benitez Manaut, National Autonomous University of Mexico, May 7, 2013.
43
The Gendarmerie is to begin with roughly 10,000 forces drawn from the Army and the Navy. It may expand,
however, to include some 50,000 officers. Questions remain, however, about how responsibilities would be divided
between the Federal Police and the Gendarmerie, including whether the gendarmes would only operate in rural areas
(continued...)
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forces currently charged with assisting municipalities overwhelmed by violence and guarding
border crossings, ports, and airports.
In general, President Peña Nieto and his cabinet appear more wary of overt U.S. involvement in
security operations in Mexico than the previous Calderón government. The Interior Ministry has
notified U.S. agencies operating in Mexico that all requests for new Mérida-funded training or
equipment made by Mexican government entities must be approved by a central office in that
ministry. Ongoing programs are not affected by the new procedure. According to U.S. officials,
this process has thus far proven to be slow and cumbersome.44 The Peña Nieto government has
also removed some U.S. personnel from fusion centers established by the previous government
and centralized the handling of sensitive intelligence, reportedly prompting concern from U.S.
law enforcement personnel that cooperation could suffer.45
The Four Pillars of the Mérida Initiative
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of
Organized Crime
During the Calderón Administration, Mexico focused much of its efforts on dismantling the
leadership of the major DTOs. U.S. assistance appropriated during the first phase of the Mérida
Initiative (FY2008-FY2010) enabled the purchase of equipment to support the efforts of federal
security forces engaged in anti-DTO efforts. That equipment included $590.5 million worth of
aircraft and helicopters, as well as forensic equipment for the Federal Police and Attorney
General’s respective crime laboratories. As the DTOs continue to employ new weapons, new
types of training and/or equipment may be needed to help security officials combat those new
threats. As the Peña Nieto government moves to establish a National Gendarmerie, assistance
may be requested to assist that entity, as well as existing federal forces.
The Mexican government has increasingly been conceptualizing the DTOs as for-profit
corporations. Consequently, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has begun to focus more
attention on disrupting the criminal proceeds used to finance DTOs’ operations. In August 2010,
the Mexican government imposed limits on the amount of U.S. dollars that individuals can
exchange or deposit each month. In October 2012, the Mexican Congress approved an antimoney laundering law establishing a financial crimes unit within the Attorney General’s office
(PGR), subjecting industries vulnerable to money laundering to new reporting requirements, and
creating new criminal offenses for money laundering. Future Mérida assistance could be used to
provide additional equipment and technical assistance to units within the Finance Ministry and
the PGR that are investigating money laundering cases.
As mentioned, the DTOs are increasingly evolving into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a
partial result of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits. As a result, many have urged
(...continued)
(as they have in many countries), or in urban zones as well.
44
CRS interviews with State Department officials in Mexico City, May 6, 2013.
45
Dana Priest, “U.S. Role at a Crossroads in Mexico’s Intelligence War on the Cartels,” Washington Post, April 27,
2013; Nick Miroff, “In Mexico, Restrictions on U.S. Agents Signal Drug War Shift,” Washington Post, May 14, 2013.
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both governments to focus on combating other types of organized crime, such as kidnapping and
alien smuggling. Some may therefore question whether the funding provided under the Mérida
Initiative is being used to adequately address all forms of transnational organized crime.
Intelligence-sharing and cross-border law enforcement operations and investigations have been
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation. During the Calderón Administration, U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence officials supported Mexican intelligence-gathering efforts in
northern Mexico and U.S. drones gathered information that was shared with Mexican officials.46
While bilateral intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation has continued under the
Peña Nieto government, its exact scope and nature is still being determined.47
A more general question that may arise for policy makers as they review the Administration’s
budget requests for the Mérida Initiative is whether proposed funding would be used to expand
existing bilateral partnerships (described in Appendix B), or whether it would be used to
establish new partnerships. This may depend on the effectiveness of current partnerships, as well
as whether new partnerships are needed to address emerging law enforcement challenges. And, as
U.S. assistance increasingly flows to state-level law enforcement, policy makers may consider if
and to what extent those forces should participate in bilateral law enforcement partnerships.
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law
and Respect for Human Rights in Mexico48
Reforming Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as a
crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen
security and human rights in the country.49 Due to concerns about the corruption and
ineffectiveness of police and prosecutors, less than 13% of all crimes are reported in Mexico.50
Even so, recent spikes in violence and criminality have overwhelmed Mexico’s law enforcement
and judicial institutions, with record numbers of arrests rarely resulting in successful convictions.
Increasing cases of human rights abuses committed by authorities at all levels, as well as
Mexico’s inability to investigate and punish those accused of abuses, are also pressing concerns.
Federal police reform got underway during the Calderón Administration, although recent cases of
police misconduct have highlighted lingering concerns about federal forces. Serious questions
also remain as to when and how the National Gendarmerie will take over the anti-drug functions
currently being carried out by the Mexican military. President Peña Nieto has indicated that the
military will remain engaged in public security functions for the foreseeable future. Another
major challenge will be to expand police reform efforts to the state and municipal level, possibly
through the establishment of state level unified police commands. Some Mérida funding is being
46
Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Widens Role in Battle Against Mexican Drug Cartels,” New York Times, August 6, 2011;
Mary Beth Sheridan, “Mexico Confirms Use of U.S. Drones in Drug War,” Washington Post, March 16, 2011.
47
CRS interviews with State Department officials in Mexico City, May 6, 2013.
48
For more information on this pillar, see: CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in
Mexico: The U.S. Role.
49
David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2011,
available at: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262.
50
Gobierto Federal de Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía (INEGI), 2012 Encuesta Nacional de
Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública.
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used to extend U.S.-funded federal police training and prison reform efforts to the states of
Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora, and Puebla.
With impunity rates hovering around 82% for homicide and even higher for other crimes,51
experts maintain that it is crucial for Mexico to implement the judicial reforms passed in the
summer of 2008 and to focus on fighting corruption at all levels of government. In order for
Mexico to transition its criminal justice system to an accusatorial system with oral trials by 2016,
many have argued that U.S.-funded judicial training programs need to be expanded. And, while
U.S. assistance has helped federal prisons expand and improve, thousands of federal prisoners are
still being housed in state prisons that are overcrowded and often extremely insecure.52
Reforming the Police
Police corruption has presented additional challenges to the campaign against DTOs in Mexico.
While corruption has most often plagued municipal and state police forces, in June 2012 corrupt
Federal Police officers involved in running a drug smuggling ring out of the Mexico City airport
killed three of their colleagues. Corrupt officials have also been dismissed from the PGR’s
organized crime unit, as well as its police force.
The Calderón Administration took steps to reform Mexico’s police forces by dramatically
increasing police budgets, raising selection standards, and enhancing police training and
equipment at the federal level. It also created a national database through which police at all
levels can share information and intelligence, and accelerated implementation of a national police
registry. President Calderón initially proposed the creation of one unified federal police force
under the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), but two laws passed in 2009 created a Federal
Police (FP) force under the SSP and a Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) force under the PGR,
both with some investigative functions.53 It took the Mexican government another year to issue
regulations delineating the roles and responsibilities of these two police entities. It remains to be
seen how the Peña Nieto government’s placement of the SSP under the authority of the Interior
Ministry and its plan to create a new National Gendarmerie will affect bilateral efforts. U.S.
officials have offered to help Mexico develop national policing standards.54
Whereas initiatives to recruit, vet, train, and equip the FP under the SSP rapidly advanced (with
support from the Mérida Initiative), efforts to build the PGR’s police forces have lagged behind.
According to the State Department, Mérida funding supported specialized training courses to
improve federal police investigations, intelligence collection and analysis, and anti-money
laundering capacity, as well as the construction of regional command and control centers.55 The
51
In other words, about 82% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. Guillermo Zepeda, Seguridad y Justicia
Penal en los Estados: 25 Indicadores de Nuestra Debilidad Institucional, Mexico Evalúa, March 2012.
52
Federal prison reform in Mexico began in 2008. Since that time, the Mexican government has invested $6.4 billion in
prison reform and the U.S. government has provided $23 million in Mérida assistance. U.S. training and equipment
supported the establishment of a federal penitentiary academy in Veracruz; the expansion of federal prison capacity
through the construction of nine new facilities; and the accreditation of eight of México’s federal facilities by the
American Correctional Association.
53
Daniel Sabet, Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico
Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Sabet.pdf.
54
An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
55
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Mérida Initiative Spending Plan for Mexico, June 10, 2010.
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Calderón government also sought U.S. technical assistance in developing in-service evaluations
and internal investigative units to prevent and punish police corruption and human rights abuses,
although experts maintain that much more could be done in that area. Mérida assistance has also
begun to support the PFM, although not to the same degree. Additional U.S. training could be
requested to bolster the PFM, as Peña Nieto has pledged to do, as well as to support new FP units
dedicated to combating kidnapping and extortion.
Thus far, state and local police reform has lagged behind federal police reform efforts. A public
security law codified in January 2009 established vetting and certification procedures for state
and local police to be overseen by the National Public Security System (SNSP). Federal subsidies
have been provided to state and municipal units whose officers meet certain standards.
Nevertheless, as of November 2012, the head of the SNSP at that time reported that only six
states had complied with the 2009 law’s requirement that all state and municipal police officers
be vetted by January 2013; that deadline since has been extended. Still, concerns have been raised
about the tests’ reliability. And, even in states where vetting requirements have been met, a
significant percentage of officers who failed the tests have remained on the job.56
The establishment of unified state police commands that could potentially absorb municipal
police forces has been debated in Mexico for years.57 The Mexican Congress failed to pass a
constitutional reform proposal put forth by the Calderón government to establish unified state
police commands. Nevertheless, President Peña Nieto is helping states move in that direction. In
the meantime, some states have moved forward with plans to do away with municipal forces.58
The outcome of the aforementioned reform efforts could have implications for U.S. initiatives to
expand Mérida assistance to state and municipal police forces, particularly as the Mexican
government determines how to organize and channel that assistance. Mérida funding has
supported state-level academies in Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Puebla, and Sonora. Those
academies may be turned into regional training hubs, an idea that President Peña Nieto has
endorsed. U.S. funds could potentially help stand up intelligence task forces in several states, as
well as accredited state police units. Training courses offered to state and municipal police might
have a slightly different emphasis than those given to federal forces, but a focus on building
investigatory capacity is likely to be needed in order for all police to function in the new
accusatorial justice system.
In order to complement these efforts, analysts have maintained that it is important to provide
assistance to civil society and human rights-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Mexico in order to strengthen their ability to monitor police conduct and provide input on
policing policies. Some maintain that citizen participation councils, combined with internal
control mechanisms and stringent punishments for police misconduct, can have a positive impact
on police performance and police-community relations. Others have mentioned the importance of
establishing citizen observatories to develop reliable indicators to track police and criminal justice
system performance, as has been done in some states.
56
“Mexico: the Tough Task of Cleaning up the Police,” Latin American Weekly Report, November 15, 2012.
Proponents of the reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the federal government and bring
efficiency, standardization, and better trained and equipped police to municipalities. Skeptics argue that police
corruption has been a major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system and argue that there is a role for
municipal police who are trained to deal with local issues.
58
CRS phone interview with State Department officials, November 8, 2012.
57
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Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate, and an inability to secure
convictions. The vast majority of drug trafficking-related arrests that have occurred over the last
six years have not resulted in successful prosecutions. The PGR has also been unable to secure
charges in many high-profile cases involving the arrests of politicians accused of collaborating
with organized crime, such as Gregorio Sanchez, the former mayor of Cancun.59
Mexican prisons, particularly at the state level, are also in need of significant reforms. Increasing
arrests have caused prison population to expand significantly, as has the use of preventive
detention. Those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by the authorities for
40 days without access to legal counsel, with a possible extension of another 40 days, a practice
known as “arraigo” (pre-charge detention) that has led to serious abuses by authorities.60 Many
inmates (perhaps 40%)61 are awaiting trials, as opposed to serving out sentences. As of July 2012,
prisons were at 26% over-capacity.62 Prison breaks are common in state facilities, many of which
are controlled by crime groups.
In June 2008, then-President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval
of Congress and Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform,
Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a
closed-door process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are
expected to adopt additional means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make it
more flexible and efficient, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the country’s prison system.
To implement the reforms, Mexico will need to revise federal and state criminal procedure codes
(CPCs), build new courtrooms, retrain current legal professionals, update law school curricula,
and improve forensic technology—a difficult and expensive undertaking.
Five years into the reform process, progress has stalled at the federal level. From the beginning,
analysts had predicted that progress in advancing judicial reform was “likely to be very slow as
capacity constraints and entrenched interests in the judicial system (including judges) delay any
changes.”63 Still, the Calderón government devoted more funding and political will towards
modernizing the police than strengthening the justice system.64 In addition, some of the tough
measures for handling organized crime cases it included in the 2008 judicial reforms appear to
59
Patrick Corcoran, “Mayor Goes Free, Mexico Fails Again to Prosecute ‘Corrupt’ Politicians,” In Sight Organized
Crime in the Americas, July 21, 2011.
60
This practice first came into existence in the 1980s, and was formally incorporated into the Mexican Constitution
through a constitutional amendment passed in 2008 as a legal instrument to fight organized crime. Its use has been
criticized by several United Nations bodies, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights of the Organization of
American States, and international and Mexican human rights organizations. For more, see Janice Deaton, Arraigo and
Legal Reform in Mexico, University of San Diego, June 2010.
61
U.S. Department of State, 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, April 2013,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.Hereinafter: Country Report: Mexico, 2012.
62
Ibid.
63
“Mexico Risk: Legal and Regulatory Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit-Risk Briefing, January 8, 2010.
64
Andrew Selee and Eric L. Olson, Steady Advances, Slow Results: U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation After Two Years
of the Obama Administration, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, April 2011.
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run counter to the spirit of the reforms, which include protections for the rights of the accused.65
Former President Calderón proposed a new federal CPC—a key element needed to guide reform
efforts—in September 2011, but it was not enacted.
President Peña Nieto has repeatedly pledged to advance judicial reform and overhaul the PGR.
The Mexican Congress is currently considering different versions of a unified code of criminal
procedure that would cover the federal and state levels. It may also limit or do away with arraigo.
Experts have praised the Peña Nieto government’s apparent embrace of judicial reform and
pledge to use arraigo only sparingly, but remain unsure of how its backing of a unified code of
criminal procedure will affect reform efforts.
In contrast to this lack of progress at the federal level, the reform has moved forward in many
Mexican states. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico’s 32 states had enacted new criminal
procedure codes and 12 states had begun operating under the new system.66 Reform states have
seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less
pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial.67 Still, daunting challenges
remain, including the need to improve the investigative capacity of police and prosecutors,
counter-reform efforts, and opposition from judges and other key justice sector operators.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is concentrating most of its work in
support of judicial reform at the state level. USAID had been supporting code reform, judicial
exchanges, alternative dispute resolution, and Citizen’s Participation Councils, as well as training
justice sector operators in five Mexican states since 2004. USAID expanded its rule of law efforts
with roughly $104 million in FY2008-FY2012 Mérida assistance, a significant portion of which
is supporting comprehensive judicial reform programs in seven of Mexico’s 32 states. USAID
plans to expand its programs into at least 13 other states, with assistance to each state tailored to
the stage that it is at in the reform process.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is supporting judicial reform at the federal level, including the
adoption of a federal CPC. DOJ is administering some $46 million in State Department funding.
In 2012, DOJ worked with the PGR to design and implement a national training program known
as Project Diamante through which 7,700 prosecutors, investigators, and forensic experts were
trained to work as a team rather than in isolation (as was customary). DOJ has also started a
training program in Puerto Rico for Mexican federal judges. The future of DOJ programming in
Mexico may depend upon the extent to which Mexico’s Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam
embraces the Diamante model.
Congress has expressed support for the continued provision of U.S. assistance for judicial reform
efforts in Mexico in appropriations legislation, hearings, and committee reports. Congressional
funding and oversight of judicial reform programs in Mexico is likely to continue for many years.
Over time, Congress may consider how best to divide funding between the federal and state
65
For a discussion of these concerns and the reform process in general, see: David Shirk, "Criminal Justice Reform in
Mexico: An Overview," Mexican Law Review, vol. 2, no. 3 (January-June 2011).
66
Matthew C. Ingram, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico: Where Things Stand Now, Woodrow Wilson Center's
Mexico Institute, Working Paper, December 2012.
67
USAID, Justice Studies Center of the Americas, and Coordination Council for the Implementation of the Criminal
Justice System and its Technical Secretariat (SETEC); Monitoring the Implementation of the Criminal Justice Reform
in Chihuahua, the State of Mexico, Morelos, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas: 2007-2011, November 2012.
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levels; how to sequence and coordinate support to key elements within the rule of law spectrum
(police, prosecutors, courts); and how the efficacy of U.S. programs is being measured.
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border”
Policy makers have questioned not only what it means to have a 21st century border, but
specifically how this will enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat the drug trafficking
organizations and reduce the related violence. In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a
border is necessarily more complex than a physical line between two sovereign nations.
Consequently, the proposed 21st century border is based on (1) enhancing public safety via
increased information sharing, screenings, and prosecutions; (2) securing the cross-border flow of
goods and people; (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in
personnel, technology, and infrastructure; (4) engaging border communities in cross-border trade;
and (5) setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.68
On May 19, 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing
the U.S.-Mexican border.69 Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee
(ESC) that met in December 2010, December 2011, and April 2013 to develop bi-national action
plans for the subsequent year.70 The plans are focused on setting measurable goals within broad
objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment
programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo pre-clearance, improving cross-border commerce
and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law enforcement agencies.
Both the United States and Mexico spend significant funds—outside of Mérida—related to border
security. Because border policies and practices have been different along the U.S. side of the
Southwest border and the Mexican side, each country’s goals in further developing the border
may necessarily differ as well. A related issue is whether funds appropriated under the revised
Mérida Initiative should be divided equally or equitably between border initiatives on the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border.
While policy makers may generally question what constitutes a “21st century border,” they may
more specifically question which aspects of this border will be mutually beneficial to both U.S.
and Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. Although a key goal of the Mérida Initiative is to
combat the DTOs and their criminal activities, the U.S. border strategy does not discriminate
between combating drug trafficking-related illicit activities and other illegal behaviors along the
border. The current U.S. border strategy strives to secure and manage the U.S. border through
obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying
and disrupting transnational criminal organizations.71 As such, it remains to be seen whether
68
U.S. Department of State, “United States - Mexico Partnership: A New Border Vision,” press release, March 23,
2010.
69
The White House, “Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The Government Of The
United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As
mentioned, U.S. - Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. This ESC is
one of the most recent developments in the bilateral cooperation.
70
The 2010 Action Plan is available at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/plan-eng.pdf. The 2011 Action Plan is
available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/15dec11/Action-Plan_15_DIC.pdf.
71
For a fuller discussion of U.S. border security policies, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum. CRS was unable to locate an official Mexican border
strategy for comparison with the U.S. border strategy.
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enhancements to the border will specifically support the Mérida Initiative’s goal of combating the
DTOs or whether the funds put toward border development will result in a general strengthening
of the security of the border—and, as a byproduct, aid in disrupting drug trafficking activities.
Northbound and Southbound Inspections72
One element of concern regarding enhanced bilateral border security efforts is that of southbound
inspections of people, goods, vehicles, and cargo. In particular, both countries have
acknowledged a shared responsibility in fueling and combating the illicit drug trade. Policy
makers may question who is responsible for performing northbound and southbound inspections
in order to prevent illegal drugs from leaving Mexico and entering the United States and to
prevent dangerous weapons and the monetary proceeds of drug sales from leaving the United
States and entering Mexico. Further, if this is a joint responsibility, it is unclear how U.S. and
Mexican border officials will divide the responsibility of inspections to maximize the possibility
of stopping the illegal flow of goods while simultaneously minimizing the burden on the
legitimate flow of goods and preventing the duplication of efforts.
In addition to its inbound/northbound inspections, the United States has undertaken steps to
enhance its outbound/southbound screening procedures. Currently, DHS is screening 100% of
southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, cash, and drugs. Also, CBP scans license plates
along the Southwest border with the use of automated license plate readers (LPRs). In FY2010,
CBP deployed 17 new mobile Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems and 22 more large-scale
NII technology imaging systems to aid in inspection and processing of travelers and shipments.73
Historically, Mexican Customs had not served the role of performing southbound (or inbound)
inspections. As part of the revised Mérida Initiative, CBP has helped to establish a Mexican
Customs training academy to support professionalization and promote the Mexican Customs’ new
role of performing inbound inspections. Additionally, CBP is assisting Mexican Customs in
developing an investigator training program and, as of May 2012, had donated 192 canines and
trained 192 handlers to assist with the inspections.74
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption
Another point that policy makers may question regarding the strengthening of the Southwest
border is how to prevent the corruption of U.S. and Mexican border officials who are charged
with securing the border. On March 11, 2010, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration held a hearing on the corruption of U.S. border officials by Mexican DTOs. According
to testimony from the hearing, in FY2009, the DHS Inspector General opened 839 investigations
of DHS employees. Of the 839 investigations, 576 were of CBP employees, 164 were of ICE
employees, 64 were of Citizen and Immigration Services (CIS) employees, and 35 were of
72
There is a dearth of open-source data that currently measures the extent of inbound and outbound inspections
performed by both the United States and Mexico along the Southwest border. Rather, existing data tends to address
seizures of drugs, guns, and money as well as apprehensions of suspects. Therefore, this section addresses current U.S.
and additional initiatives to bolster cross-border inspections.
73
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Securing America's Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet,
March 15, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml.
74
Embassy of Mexico, Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative—An Overview, May 2012.
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees.75 It is unknown, however, how many
of these cases involve alleged corruption by Mexican DTOs or how many involve suspected
corruption of DHS employees working along the Southwest border.
To date, the Administration’s proposal for a 21st century border has not directly addressed this
issue of corruption. Congress may consider whether preventing, detecting, and prosecuting public
corruption of border enforcement personnel should be a component of the border initiatives
funded by the Mérida Initiative. If the corruption is as pervasive as officials say,76 resources
provided for new technologies and initiatives along the border may be diminished or negated by
corrupt border personnel. For instance, at the end of 2009, CBP was able to polygraph between
10% and 15% of applicants applying for border patrol positions, and of those who were
polygraphed, about 60% were found unsuitable for service.77 If this pattern holds true and 85%90% of current new hires were not subjected to a polygraph, anywhere between 51% and 54% of
all CBP new-hires may not be found suitable for service. Further, between October 1, 2004, and
March 11, 2010, 103 CBP officers were arrested or indicted on “mission-critical corruption
charges including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering and conspiracy.”78
Congress may decide to increase funding—as part of or separately from Mérida funding—for the
vetting of new and current border enforcement personnel.
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities
This pillar is a new focus for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the overall goals of which are to address
the underlying causes of crime and violence, promote security and social development, and build
communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. Pillar four is unique in that it
has involved Mexican and U.S. federal officials working together to design and implement
community-based programs in high-crime areas in municipalities near the U.S.-Mexico border.
Pillar four seeks to empower local leaders, civil society representatives, and private sector actors
to lead crime prevention efforts in their communities.
In January 2010, in response to a violent massacre of 15 youth with no apparent connection to
organized crime in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, the Mexican government began to prioritize crime
prevention and community engagement. Responding to criticisms of its military-led strategy for
the city, federal officials worked with local authorities and civic leaders to establish six task
forces to plan and oversee a strategy for reducing criminality, tackling social problems, and
improving citizen-government relations. The strategy, aptly titled “Todos Somos Juarez” (“We
Are All Juárez”), was launched in February 2010 and involved close to $400 million in federal
75
See testimony by Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
76
See testimony by Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
77
See testimony by James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
78
Ibid.
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investments in the city.79 While federal officials began by amplifying access to existing social
programs and building infrastructure projects throughout the city, they later sought to respond to
local demands to concentrate efforts in certain “safe zones.” At the same time, control over public
security efforts in the city shifted from the Mexican military to the Federal Police, and finally to
municipal authorities.80
Prior to the endorsement of a formal pillar four strategy, the U.S. government’s pillar four efforts
in Ciudad Juárez involved the expansion of existing initiatives, such as school-based “culture of
lawfulness”81 programs and drug demand reduction and treatment services.82 They also included
new programs, such as support for an anonymous tip line for the police. USAID supported a
crime and violence mapping project83 that enabled Ciudad Juarez’s municipal government to
identify hot spots and respond with tailored prevention measures as well as a program to provide
safe spaces, activities, and job training programs for youth at-risk of recruitment to organized
crime. USAID also provided $1 million in grants to local organizations working in the areas of
social cohesion in Ciudad Juarez, with activities focused specifically on education, mental health,
and at-risk youth, among others.
It may never be determined what role the aforementioned efforts played in the significant
reductions in violence that has occurred in Ciudad Juaréz since 2011.84 Nevertheless, lessons can
be gleaned from this example of Mexican and U.S. involvement in municipal crime prevention.
Analysts have praised the sustained, high-level support Ciudad Juárez received from the Mexican
and U.S. governments; community ownership of the effort; and coordination that occurred
between various levels of the Mexican government. The work of the security task force (Mesa de
Seguridad) proved crucial for developing trust between citizens and authorities, communication
among authorities, and citizen oversight of government efforts.85 The strategy was not welltargeted, however, and monitoring and evaluation of its effectiveness has been relatively weak.86
79
Adam Thompson, “Troubled Juárez starts to breathe again,” Financial Times, October 11, 2012.
80
Each of these forces has committed human rights violations and exhibited corruption. Despite concerns about his
aggressive tactics, the current municipal police chief in Ciudad Juárez has won praise by some for reducing crime rates.
William Booth, “In Mexico’s Murder City, the War Appears Over, Washington Post, August 20, 2012; Damien Cave,
“A Crime Fighter Draws Plaudits, and Scrutiny,” New York Times; December 23, 2011.
81
Culture of Lawfulness (CoL) programs aim to combine “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to educate all
sectors of society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Key sectors that CoL programs seek to involve
include law enforcement, security forces, and other public officials; the media; schools; and religious and cultural
institutions. The U.S. government is supporting school-based “culture of lawfulness” programs, as well as “culture of
lawfulness” courses that are being taught to federal and state police.
82
U.S.-funded demand reduction programs are helping to create a network to connect Mexico’s 334 prevention and
treatment centers, to develop curricula for drug counselors at the centers, and to help certify Mexican drug counselors.
83
The project has gathered available data on where violence is occurring in the city. See
http://www.observatoriodejuarez.org/.
84
While many analysts credit the decline in violence to the end of a turf war between the Sinaloa and Juárez DTOs,
federal and local officials have variously taken credit for the reduction. See, for example, “Looking Back on the
Calderón Years,” The Economist, November 22, 2012.
85
Lucy Conger, "The Private Sector and Public Security: The Cases of Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey," in forthcoming
volume: Building Resilient Communities: Civic Responses to Violent Organized Crime in Mexico (Woodrow Wilson
Center's Mexico Institute and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, Expected in 2013).
86
Diana Negroponte, Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Merida:’ Addressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related Crime
and Violence in Mexico, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, May 2011, available at:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1.pdf
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In April 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments formally approved a bi-national pillar four
strategy.87 The strategy focuses on three objectives: (1) strengthening federal civic planning
capacity to prevent and reduce crime; (2) bolstering the capacity of state and local governments to
implement crime prevention and reduction activities; and (3) increasing engagement with at-risk
youth.88 U.S.-funded pillar four activities complement the work of the Mexico’s National Center
for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation, an entity within the Interior Department that
implemented projects in high crime areas in 237 cities in 2012 where local authorities were
making similar investments in crime prevention.
In support of this new strategy, USAID launched a three-year, $15 million Crime and Violence
Prevention program in nine target communities identified by the Mexican government in Ciudad
Juárez, Monterrey, Nuevo León, and Tijuana, Baja California. The program supports the
development of community strategies to reduce crime and violence in the target localities,
including outreach to at-risk youth, improved citizen-police collaboration, and partnerships with
private sector enterprises. More recently, USAID awarded $10 million in local grants to six civil
society organizations for innovative crime prevention projects that engage at-risk youth and their
families. USAID also supports a $1 million evaluation of crime in the target communities that
will help the U.S. and Mexican governments understand the risk factors contributing directly to
increased violence and enable both governments to identify successful models for replication.
Experiences in U.S. and Latin American cities have shown the importance that municipal-based
crime prevention programs play in efforts to reduce violence. USAID has supported local
prevention programs in Central America since the mid-2000s, and lessons learned can be drawn
from that experience. Some may argue that similar programs in Mexico should be scaled up,
while others may assert that Mexico, a middle-income country, has the capacity to pay for its own
prevention programs. As a result, the U.S. government’s pillar four programs were designed as
pilots for future replication in other areas of Mexico with similar characteristics and
vulnerabilities. Mexican participation and ultimate ownership and responsibility of these
programs, as well as local civil society participation and oversight, will be crucial to sustaining
these investments. Pillar four appears to be a top priority for the Peña Nieto government and
future bilateral efforts will likely seek to complement Mexico’s National Crime and Violence
Prevention Program.
87
The State Department reprogrammed $8.5 million in FY2010 funding and $14 million in FY2011 funding to support
pillar four projects. To date (FYs 2010, 2010 supplemental, 2011, 2012 and 2013), USAID has dedicated $35.9 million
in Economic Support Fund monies to pillar four.
88
U.S. programs under the first objective may help refine the Mexican government’s national crime prevention plan
and support federal entities engaged in developing, monitoring, and evaluating municipal crime prevention efforts.
Under the second objective, USAID may support the development and implementation of municipal crime prevention
plans. Programs under the third objective may include helping communities build networks of resources for at-risk
youth. See USAID-Mexico, “Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities,”
http://www.usaid.gov/mx/pillariveng.html.
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Issues
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative
With little publicly available information on what specific metrics the U.S. and Mexican
governments are using to measure the impact of the Mérida Initiative, analysts have debated how
bilateral efforts should be evaluated.89 How one evaluates the Mérida Initiative largely depends
on how one has defined the goals of the program. While the U.S. and Mexican governments’
long-term goals for the Mérida Initiative may be similar, their short-term goals and priorities may
be different. For example, both countries may strive to ultimately reduce the overarching threat
posed by the DTOs—a national security threat to Mexico and an organized crime threat to the
United States. However, their short-term goals may differ; Mexico may focus more on reducing
drug trafficking-related crime and violence, while the United States may place more emphasis on
aggressively capturing DTO leaders and seizing illicit drugs. More information on the State
Department’s metrics for evaluating Mérida may eventually be made public now that it has
opened a monitoring and evaluation office in Mexico City.
One basic measure by which Congress has evaluated the Mérida Initiative has been the pace of
equipment deliveries and training opportunities. A December 2009 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report identified several factors that had slowed the pace of Mérida
implementation.90 It is unclear, though, whether more expeditious equipment deliveries to Mexico
have resulted in a more positive evaluation of Mérida. Moreover, if equipment is not adequately
maintained, its long-term impact could be reduced. Measures of the volume of training programs
administered, including the number of individuals completing each course, have also been used to
measure Mérida success. This measure is imperfect, however, as it does not capture the impact
that a particular training course had on an individuals’ performance. U.S. agencies are generally
not currently measuring retention rates for those whom they have trained; some agencies have
identified high turnover rates within the agencies as a major obstacle for the sustainability of
Mérida-funded training programs.91
U.S.-funded antidrug programs in source and transit countries (of which Mexico is both) have
also traditionally been evaluated by examining the number of DTO leaders arrested and the
amount of drugs and other illicit items seized, along with the price and purity of drugs in the
United States. The State Department has attributed increased arrests and certain drug seizures
(i.e., cocaine and methamphetamine) to success of the Mérida Initiative.92 U.S. officials have also
highlighted the downward trend (since 2006) of cocaine availability and purity in the United
States as evidence of the success of Mérida and other U.S.-funded antidrug efforts.93
89
See, for example, Andrew Selee, Success or Failure? Evaluating U.S.-Mexico Efforts to Address Organized Crime
and Violence, Center for Hemispheric Policy- Perspectives on the Americas Series, December 20, 2010.
90
Government Accountability Office, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009.
91
U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice Studies Center of the Americas, and Coordination Council for
the Implementation of the Criminal Justice System and its Technical Secretariat (SETEC); Executive Summary of the
General Report: Monitoring the Implementation of the Criminal Justice Reform in Chihuahua, the State of Mexico,
Morelos, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas: 2007-2011, November 2012.
92
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Achievements,” press release, May 2011,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/16may/Law%20Enforcement%20May%202011%20Final.pdf.
93
ONDCP, 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, July 11, 2011.
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However, a principal challenge in assessing the success of Mérida is separating the results of
those efforts funded via Mérida from those efforts funded through other border security and
bilateral cooperation initiatives. The data available do not allow U.S. officials or analysts to
determine the success that can be directly attributed to Mérida. Changes in seizure data and drug
prices may not be directly related to U.S.-Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. It is equally
difficult to parcel out the reasons for periodic fluctuations in drug purity in the United States.
President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to reduce drug trafficking-related violence. Should a
decrease in drug trafficking-related deaths be used as an indicator of success for the Mérida
Initiative, or is an imminent decline in the violence unrealistic given other countries’ experiences
combating entrenched organized criminal groups? If violence reduction is used as a measure of
success, how should it be weighed against other measures?
In addition to a decline in drug trafficking-related violence, analysts have suggested that success
in pillars two and four would be evidenced by, among other things, increases in popular trust in
the police and courts. Measuring citizens’ perceptions on crime and violence, on the one hand, as
well as governmental effectiveness, on the other, could also prove useful.
Still others, including U.S. officials, have maintained that the success of the Mérida Initiative may
be measured by a broad range of indicators that show increased bilateral cooperation. For
instance, the State Department has cited the arrests and killings of high-profile DTO leaders that
have been made since late 2009 as examples of the results of increased bilateral law enforcement
cooperation. Another example of Mérida success—in the form of bilateral cooperation—cited by
the State Department is the high number of extraditions from Mexico to the United States.
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States
1995–2011
Number of Extraditions
120
107
95
100
94 93
83
80
63
60
40
20
4
13 13 12 14 12
17
25
31 34
41
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
19
96
19
95
0
Source: 1995—2006 data from U.S. Embassy of Mexico, U.S. - Mexico at a Glance: Law Enforcement at a Glance,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/eataglance_law.html. Data for 2007—2008 from the Trans-Border
Institute, Justice in Mexico, News Report January 2009, January 2009, Data for 2009 from the U.S. Department of
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State, “United States - Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” press release, May 19, 2010. 2010 and
2011 figures from the U.S. Department of Justice.
As illustrated in Figure 2, however, these extraditions may have been more a reflection of the
Calderón government’s commitment to combating the DTOs than of Mérida successes.
Extraditions began to increase before the Mérida Initiative was authorized in October 2007 and
before the first funds obligated for equipment and training were realized in Mexico.
Dealing with Drug Production in Mexico
Drug eradication and alternative development programs have not been a focus of the Mérida
Initiative even though Mexico is a major producer of cannabis (marijuana), opium poppy (used to
produce heroin), and methamphetamine. According to U.S. government estimates, marijuana and
opium poppy cultivation in rural Mexico expanded significantly in 2009-2010, before declining
in 2011 due to drought conditions in crop-growing regions and slight increases in eradication. At
the same time, despite Mexican government import restrictions on precursor chemicals and
efforts to seize precursor chemicals and dismantle clandestine labs, the production of
methamphetamine appears to have continued at high levels.
The Mexican government has engaged its military in drug crop eradication efforts since the
1930s, but personnel constraints have inhibited recent eradication efforts. Indeed, increases in
drug production have occurred as the government assigned more military forces to public security
functions, including anti-DTO operations, than to drug crop eradication efforts. Should Mexicans
become increasingly wary of the government’s strategy of using the military to perform police
functions, there may be calls for the troops to return to more traditional antidrug functions.
Similarly, if drug production in Mexico further expands, particularly production of the potent and
dangerous “black tar” variety of heroin, U.S. policy makers may decide to direct some Mérida
assistance to support eradication efforts in Mexico.
The Mexican government has not traditionally provided support for alternative development even
though many drug-producing regions of the country are impoverished rural areas where few licit
employment opportunities exist. Alternative development programs have traditionally sought to
provide positive incentives for farmers to abandon drug crop cultivation in lieu of farming other
crops, but may be designed more broadly to assist any individuals who collaborate with DTOs out
of economic necessity. In Colombia, studies have found that the combination of jointly
implemented eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the
independent application of any one of these three strategies.94 Despite those findings, alternative
development often takes years to show results and requires a long-term commitment to promoting
rural development, two factors which may lessen its appeal as a policy tool for Mexico.
94
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Joel M. Jutkowitz, Sergio Rivas, et al. Assessment of the Implementation of the United States
Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, report produced for review by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), April 17, 2009.
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Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida
Initiative Funding
There have been ongoing concerns about the human rights records of Mexico’s military and
police. For the past several years, State Department’s human rights reports covering Mexico have
cited credible reports of police involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and
torture.95 There has also been increasing concern that the Mexican military, which is less
accountable to civilian authorities than the police, is committing more human rights abuses since
it is has been tasked with carrying out public security functions. A November 2011 Human Rights
Watch (HRW) report maintains that cases of torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial
killings have increased significantly in states where federal authorities (police and military) have
been deployed to fight organized crime.96 According to Mexico’s Human Rights Commission
(Commisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos or CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by
Mexico’s Department of Defense (SEDENA) increased from 182 in 2006 to a peak of 1,800 in
2009 before falling to 1,626 in 2011.97 Complaints of abuses against the Secretariat of the Navy
(SEMAR) increased by 150% from 2010 to 2011 as its forces became more heavily involved in
anti-DTO efforts.98 While troubling, only a small percentage of those allegations have resulted in
the CNDH issuing recommendations for corrective action to SEDENA and SEMAR, which those
agencies say they have largely accepted and acted upon.99
In addition to expressing concerns about current abuses, Mexican and international human rights
groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and police officials
accountable for past abuses. They fault the government for not taking further steps to comply
with rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and decisions by Mexico’s
Supreme Court affirming that cases of military abuses against civilians should be tried in civilian
courts. The Calderón government transferred a few dozen cases to civilian jurisdiction; the Peña
Nieto government has pledged to transfer all such cases to the civilian justice system.100
In 2008, Congress debated whether human rights conditions should be placed on Mérida
assistance beyond the requirements in Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.
That section was re-designated as Section 620M and amended by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74). It states that an individual or unit of a foreign country’s
security forces is prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible
evidence” that an individual or unit has committed “a gross violation of human rights.”
95
Country Report: Mexico, 2012.
Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on
Drugs,” November 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf.
Hereinafter HRW, November 2011.
97
The Trans-Border Institute found that the number of abuses by SEDENA forces that have been investigated and
documented by CNDH has also declined since 2008-2009, particularly in areas where large-scale deployments have
been scaled back. Catherine Daly, Kimberly Heinle, and David A. Shirk, Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military
Human Rights Abuses in Mexico, Trans-Border Institute, 2012, available at:
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf, P. 21.
98
Benito Jiménez, “Acumula Marina Quejas por Abusos,” Reforma, March 5, 2012.
99
In 2011, for example, the 1,695 complaints filed with CNDH against SEDENA resulted in 25 recommendations.
100
For background, see: Maureen Meyer, Recent Developments on the Use of Military Jurisdiction in Mexico, WOLA,
January 31, 2012. CRS interview with Mexican Embassy officials, June 4, 2013.
96
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of
Mérida funding, had less stringent human rights conditions than had been proposed earlier,
largely due to Mexico’s concerns that some of the conditions would violate its national
sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action
in four human rights areas:
1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Similar human rights conditions were included in FY2009-FY2011 appropriations measures that
funded the Mérida Initiative.101 However, the first two conditions are not included in the 15%
withholding requirement in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74). The
FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6) contained the same
withholding requirement as P.L. 112-74.
Thus far, the State Department has submitted three 15% progress reports on Mexico to
congressional appropriators (in August 2009, September 2010, and August 2012) that have met
the statutory requirements for FY2008-FY2013 Mérida funds that had been on hold to be
released. Nevertheless, the State Department has twice elected to hold back some funding
pending further progress in key areas of concern. In the September 2010 report, for example, the
State Department elected to hold back $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds as a matter of
policy until further progress was made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity.102
Those funds were not obligated until the fall of 2011.
101
In P.L. 110-252, the human rights conditions applied to 15% of the funding for INCLE and FMF, or approximately
$57 million dollars. In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the 15% conditions applied all of the
funding accounts but excluded amounts for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law
activities, which were earmarked at not less than $75 million. The total aid withheld was $33.4 million. In the FY2009
Supplemental (P.L. 111-32), the conditions effectively only applied to the $160 million in the INCLE account, or
roughly $24 million, because the $260 million in FMF funds was excluded from the 15% withholding requirement. In
the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), the 15% withholding applied to all of the accounts but
excluded assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law activities. The total aid
withheld was some $12 million. In the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212), the conditions
applied to 15% of the INCLE appropriated or roughly $26 million. The same conditions that were included in P.L. 111117 applied to assistance provided in the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act
(P.L. 112-10). According to the State Department, the FY2011 funds on hold totaled approximately $3.5 million. Email
from State Department official, January 24, 2012.
102
In the September 2010 15% report, the State Department urged the Mexican Congress to approve pending
(continued...)
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In the August 2012 report, the State Department again decided to hold back all of the FY2012
funding that would have been subject to the conditions (roughly $18 million) as a matter of policy
until it can work with Mexican authorities to determine steps to address key human rights
challenges. Those include improving the ability of Mexico’s civilian institutions to investigate
and prosecute cases of human rights abuses; enhancing enforcement of prohibitions against
torture and other mistreatment; and strengthening protection for human rights defenders.103
The State Department has established a high-level human rights dialogue with Mexico, provided
human rights training for Mexican security forces (at least eight hours for every course offered),
and implemented a number of human rights-related programs. For example, USAID has provided
$1.3 million to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to help civil society
groups monitor abuses by security forces and to improve how security agencies respond to those
abuses. In 2011, USAID launched a $5 million program being implemented by Freedom House to
improve protections for Mexican journalists and human rights defenders. Human rights groups
have acknowledged these discrete efforts, but have criticized the U.S. government more broadly
for failing to enforce Mérida’s human rights restrictions and for backing Mexico’s military-led
security strategy.
Congress may choose to augment Mérida Initiative funding for human rights programs, such as
ongoing human rights training programs for military and police, or newer efforts, such as support
for human rights organizations through ESF funds. Human rights conditions in Mexico, as well as
compliance with conditions on Mérida assistance, are also likely to continue to be important
oversight issues as well. Policy makers may closely follow how the Peña Nieto moves to punish
past human rights abuses and prevent new abuses from occurring.
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico
In contrast to Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative does not include an active U.S. military
presence in Mexico, largely due to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty stemming from
past conflicts with the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not play a primary
role in designing the Mérida Initiative and is not providing assistance through Mérida aid
accounts. However, DOD administers assistance provided through the FMF account, which was
part of Mérida until FY2012. As an implementing agency, DOD’s role largely involved
overseeing the procurement and delivery of Mérida equipment for Mexican security forces.
(...continued)
legislation that would strengthen the power of the CNDH and the Calderón government to submit legislation to reform
the Military Justice Code so that military officials accused of human rights crimes against civilians would be tried in
civilian courts. The Mexican Congress approved a series of reforms that elevate human rights conditions in
international treaties signed by Mexico to the level of the constitution and strengthen the power of the CNDH and statelevel human rights commissions. The reforms were promulgated in June 2011. A reform of Article 57 of the military
justice code was submitted by President Calderón in October 2010 mandating that at least certain human rights
violations be investigated and prosecuted in civilian courts. A more comprehensive proposal that required that all cases
of alleged military human rights violations be transferred to the civilian justice system was approved by the Mexican
Senate’s Justice Commission in April 2012; however, the bill was subsequently blocked from coming to a vote. In
September 2012, another proposal to reform Article 57 was presented in the Mexican Senate as it began its first period
of sessions with its new members.
103
U.S. Department of State, Mexico- Merida Initiative Report (“15 Percent”Report), August 30, 2012.
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Despite its limited role in the Mérida Initiative, DOD assistance to Mexico has been increasing,
as has military cooperation between the two countries and Mexican participation in DOD training
programs in the United States. These trends that have accelerated since then-President Calderón
deployed the military to confront the DTOs.104 For example, according to press reports, in
response to a request from the Mexican government, DOD has begun sending unmanned aerial
vehicles into Mexico to gather intelligence on criminal organizations.105 In December 2011, DOD
and DHS announced that the mission for National Guard troops on the U.S.-Mexico border would
shift from serving in law enforcement support roles to providing aerial surveillance support for
the Border Patrol. That mission is continuing in 2013.106
Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own legislative authorities to provide certain
counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are overseen by the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), which is located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. DOD can provide
counterdrug assistance under guidelines outlined in Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510, as amended
through FY2014, and can provide additional assistance to certain countries as provided for in
Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended through FY2013. DOD counternarcotics support to
Mexico totaled roughly $34.2 million in FY2009, $89.7 million in FY2010, and $84.7 million in
FY2011. DOD is using some $50 million in FY2011 per Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 funds to
improve security along the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border. Total DOD support to Mexico in
stood at $83.5 million in FY2012, but may decline to $57.3 million this fiscal year.107
While DOD is unlikely to provide Mexico with the same amount of funds it has provided to
Colombia, the same variety of programs may be funded. Future training programs may focus on
how to work with police forces to conduct intelligence-driven operations and investigations. The
future of the U.S.-Mexican defense relationship may depend on what role President Peña Nieto
envisions for the armed forces to play in Mexico’s future counterdrug and anticrime efforts.
Since DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is not
required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, obtaining recent data
on DOD programs and plans for Mexico may be difficult. Regardless, policy makers may want to
receive periodic briefings on those efforts in order to guarantee that current and future DOD
programs are being adequately coordinated with Mérida Initiative efforts. They may also want to
ensure that DOD-funded programs are not inadvertently reinforcing the militarization of public
security in Mexico. Experts have urged the United States “not to focus too much on military
104
Roderic Ai Camp, Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges, Woodrow Wilson
Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010; Richard D. Downie, “Critical
Decisions in Mexico: the Future of U.S./Mexican Defense Relations,” Strategic Issues in U.S.-Latin American
Relations, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 2011).
105
Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
106
DHS, "DHS and DOD Announce Continued Partnership in Strengthening Southwest Border Security," press
release, December 20, 2011. “Guard Troops' Border Mission Extended,” Arizona Star, December 6, 2012.
107
FY2009-FY2010 figures are from a DOD response to CRS request, March 21, 2011. FY2011 figures are from a
DOD response to CRS request, February 17, 2012. FY2012-FY2013 figures are from a DOD response to a CRS
request, June 6, 2013.These data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD counternarcotics support provided or
efforts in these nations/regions; DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs by regions/countries, but by program.
These figures reflect both “direct” support to those countries (e.g., training, equipment, information sharing,
infrastructure and other categories) and “indirect” support via DOD and other U.S. Government counterdrug operations
with regard to those countries (e.g., transportation, communications, intelligence analysis, radar, air and maritime
patrol, liaison personnel, and other categories).
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assistance and neglect other, more effective forms of aid … [such as assistance for] the
development, training, and professionalization of Mexico’s law enforcement officers.”108
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest
Border Initiatives
The Mérida Initiative was designed to complement domestic efforts to combat drug demand, drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. These domestic counter-drug initiatives
are funded through regular and supplemental appropriations for a variety of U.S. domestic
agencies. As the strategy underpinning the Mérida Initiative has expanded to include efforts to
build a more modern border (pillar three) and to strengthen border communities (pillar four),
policy makers may consider how best to balance the amount of funding provided to Mexico with
support for related domestic initiatives.109
Regarding support for law enforcement efforts, some would argue that there needs to be more
federal support for states and localities on the U.S. side of the border that are dealing with crime
and violence originating in Mexico. Of those who endorse that point of view, some are
encouraged that the Obama Administration has increased manpower and technology along the
border, whereas others maintain that the Administration’s efforts have been insufficient to secure
the border.110 In contrast, some maintain that it is impossible to combat transnational criminal
enterprises by solely focused on the U.S. side of the border, and that domestic programs must be
accompanied by continued efforts to build the capacity of Mexican law enforcement officials.
They maintain that if recent U.S. efforts are perceived as an attempt to “militarize” the border,
they may damage U.S.-Mexican relations and hinder bilateral security cooperation efforts.
Mexican officials from across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the
construction of border fencing and the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths.111
With respect to pillar four of the updated strategy, as previously mentioned, Mexico and the
United States are supporting programs to strengthen communities in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey,
and Tijuana. In targeting those communities most affected by the violence, greater efforts will
necessarily be placed on community-building in Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana than on their sister
cities in the United States. However, if the U.S. government provides aid to these communities in
Mexico, some may argue that there should also be federal support for the adjacent U.S. border
cities. For example, initiatives aimed at providing youth with education, employment, and social
outlets might reduce the allure of joining a DTO or local gang. Some may contend that increasing
these services on the U.S. side of the border as well as the Mexican side could be beneficial.
108
Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 4 (July/August 2010).
109
The SWBCS, 2011 includes a new chapter on U.S. efforts to promote strong communities by, in part, increasing
crime prevention efforts and drug prevention and treatment programs in U.S. border communities.
110
For a fuller discussion of U.S. border enforcement efforts, see: CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum.
111
See, for example, Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: the U.S.-Mexico
Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011.
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Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere
U.S. State Department-funded counterdrug assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere are
currently in transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean region is in decline
after record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia in FY2000 and
peaked in the mid-2000s. Antidrug aid to Mexico increased dramatically in FY2008-FY2010 as a
result of the Mérida Initiative, but is also now gradually being reduced. Conversely, funding for
Central America is increasing as a result of the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) 112 and support for the Caribbean increased in FY2010 and has remained relatively
stable due to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
The Obama Administration has taken steps to coordinate the aforementioned country and regional
antidrug programs and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the efforts of partner
governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State
Department (the Principal Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs)
to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned security assistance packages.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council conduct
annual reviews of counterdrug efforts in the Americas. ONDCP and the State Department use a
high-level committee process to oversee programming and planning. The Administration is
encouraging countries that have received U.S. assistance in the past—particularly Colombia—to
share technical expertise with other countries in the region, a strategy that analysts have
recommended. One area in which closer cooperation between the United States, partner
governments, and other donors will likely be necessary is in efforts to better secure the porous
Mexico-Guatemala and Mexico-Belize borders.
Outlook
Mexico has experienced a transition from a PAN Administration focused on combating organized
crime to a PRI government focused on bolstering competitiveness by enacting structural reforms.
As a result, security issues may take a back seat to economic issues on the bilateral agenda for the
first time since September 2001. On May 2, 2013, President Obama traveled to Mexico for a trip
focused on enhancing economic cooperation and expanding educational exchanges between the
two countries.113 When asked about changes in Mexico’s security strategy, President Obama said
“it is up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how [they will engage]
with other nations, including the United States.”114 He reiterated his Administration’s support for
Mexico’s efforts to reduce violence and criminality, including continued U.S. assistance.
When examining the future of the Mérida Initiative, Congress may first consider defining the
desired end state of the Mérida Initiative. Congress may then seek to ensure that those who are
implementing the Initiative have developed adequate metrics to measure progress, and that those
metrics are shared with Congress for review and oversight. Given the level of progress that has
112
CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by
Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
113
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “White House Fact Sheet on U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” Press
Release, May 2, 2013.
114
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Peña Nieto of Mexico
in a Joint Press Conference,” Press Release, May 2, 2013.
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been made thus far, the current Mérida strategy may be deemed sufficient or insufficient. If it is
judged insufficient, Congress may consider how it might be improved. When considering future
assistance for the Mérida Initiative, Congress may compare how much funding programs in
Mexico, an upper middle income country, are receiving from the Peña Nieto government, and
whether U.S. funding is complementing or duplicating Mexican efforts.
As President Peña Nieto implements his security strategy, the 113th Congress may wish to
examine how the Mexican government’s priorities align with U.S. interests. Congressional
approval will be needed should the State Department seek to shift funding to better align with
Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S. priorities,
Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. If the Peña Nieto
Administration no longer has the same goals as the United States or Congress sees a significant
change in Mexican cooperation, Congress may consider reevaluating some types of Mérida
Initiative funding.
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Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2014
(U.S. $ millions)
Account
FY2007
FY2008a
FY2009b
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
(req.)
FY2014
(req.)
INCLE
36.7
242.1
454.0c
365.0d
117.0
248.5
199.0
148.1
ESF
11.4
34.7
15.0
15.0
18.0
33.3
35.0
35.0
299.0e
5.3
8.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
FMF
0.0
116.5
IMET
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.4
NADR
1.3
1.4
3.9
3.9
5.7
5.4
4.0
3.9
GHCSf
3.7
2.7
2.9
3.5
3.5
1.0
0.0
0.0
DA
12.3
8.2
11.2
10.0
25.0
33.4
23.0
10.0
TOTAL
65.4
405.9
786.8
403.7
178.2
329.6
269.5
205.4
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2014.
Notes: GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
Funds are accounted for in the fiscal year for which they were appropriated as noted below:
a.
FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b.
FY2009 assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
110-252) and funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).
c.
$94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
d.
$175 million provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212) and counted here as FY2010 funding was
considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2011
request.
e.
$260 million provided under a FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was
considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
request.
f.
Prior to FY2008, the Global Health and Child Survival account was known as Child Survival and Health.
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Appendix B. U.S. Domestic Efforts to Complement
the Mérida Initiative
Drug Demand
Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. In 2011, about 22.5
million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users, representing 8.7% of individuals
aged 12 and older.115 Administration officials and experts alike have acknowledged that U.S.
domestic demand for illegal drugs is a significant factor driving the global drug trade, including
the drug trafficking-related crime and violence that is occurring in Mexico and other source and
transit countries.116
In April 2013, the Administration released its 2013 National Drug Control Strategy, which
continues to emphasize the need to reduce U.S. drug demand. The Strategy furthers the goal of
cutting drug use among youth by 15% by 2015.117 Drug policy experts have praised the
Administration’s focus on reducing consumption, but criticized the Administration for requesting
relatively modest budget increases in funding for treatment programs.118 Some have questioned
whether the federal government allocates enough of the drug budget to adequately address the
demand side; the FY2013 drug budget continues to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction
programs including drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law
enforcement efforts.119 In addition to federal efforts, however, many state, local, and nonprofit
agencies also channel funds toward demand reduction.
Firearms Trafficking120
Illegal firearms trafficking from the United States has been cited as a significant factor in the drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico. To address this issue, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws in the four
Southwest border states under an agency-wide program known as “Project Gunrunner.” ATF has
115
See the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including
residents of households, non-institutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and is available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k11Results/NSDUHresults2011.htm.
116
See, for example, testimony of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Transnational Drug Enterprises (Part II): U.S. Government Perspectives on the Threat to Global
Stability and U.S. National Security, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 2010.
117
That strategy is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/2013-national-drug-control-strategy . For more
information on the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), see CRS
Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Lisa N. Sacco
and Kristin Finklea.
118
See, for example, Testimony of John T. Carnevale, President, Carnevale Associates, before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommitee on Domestic Policy, April 14, 2010.
119
Office of National Drug Control Policy, FY2013 Budget and Performance Summary, April 2012.
120
For background, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse as well as CRS Report RL32842, Gun Control Legislation, by William J. Krouse.
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also trained Mexican law enforcement officials to use its electronic tracing (eTrace) program,
through which investigators are sometimes able to trace the commercial trail and origin of
recovered firearms. In the past, ATF has periodically released data on firearms traces performed
for Mexican authorities. Although substantive methodological limitations preclude using trace
data as a proxy for the larger population of “crime guns” in Mexico or the United States, trace
data have proven to be a useful indicator of trafficking trends and patterns. In June 2009, GAO
recommended to the Attorney General that he should direct ATF to update regularly its reporting
on aggregate firearms trace data and trends.121 For the last two years, however, ATF has only
released limited and arguably selected amounts of trace data.
In February 2011, ATF came under intense congressional scrutiny for a Phoenix, AZ-based
Project Gunrunner investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious, when ATF whistleblowers
reported that suspected straw purchasers122 had been allowed to acquire relatively large quantities
of firearms as part of long-term gun trafficking investigations.123 Some of these firearms are
alleged to have “walked,” or been trafficked to gunrunners and other criminals, before ATF
moved to arrest the suspects and seize all of their contraband firearms. Two of those firearms
were reportedly found at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. Border
Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot to death.124 Questions have also been raised about whether a
firearm that was reportedly used to murder ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata and wound Special
Agent Victor Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by a subject of a
Houston, TX-based Project Gunrunner investigation.125 While it remains an open question
whether ATF or other federal agents were in a position to interdict the firearms used in these
deadly attacks before they were smuggled into Mexico,126 neither DOJ nor ATF informed their
Mexican counterparts about these investigations and the possibility that some of these firearms
could be reaching Mexico.127
Legislators in both the United States and Mexico have voiced ongoing concerns about Operation
Fast and Furious.128 Repeated congressional inquiries prompted U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder to direct his Inspector General to conduct a third evaluation of Project Gunrunner, which
was delivered to Congress in September 2012.129 In addition, in July 2011, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) approved an ATF multiple rifle sales reporting requirement for a
121
GAO, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination
Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 59.
122
A “straw purchase” occurs when an individual poses as the actual transferee, but he is actually acquiring the firearm
for another person. In effect, he serves as an illegal middleman. Straw purchases can be prosecuted under two
provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(1)(A)).
123
James v. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post, February 2, 2011.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Operation Fast and Furious was launched in November 2009. It was approved as an Organized Crime and Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation in February 2010. As an OCDETF investigation, it was then directed
largely by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix. While ICE and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents were also part
of this investigation, so far their role in this operation has not generated public or congressional scrutiny.
127
Richard A. Serrano, “U.S. Embassy Kept in Dark as Guns Flooded Mexico,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 25, 2011.
128
Dennis Wagner, “Gun Shop Told ATF Sting Was Perilous,” Arizona Republic, April 15, 2011, p. A1.
129
United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Justice before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Concerning
Report by the Office of the Inspector General on the Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters,
September 20, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t1220.pdf.
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three-year period.130 Under this reporting requirement, federally licensed gun dealers in
Southwest border states are required to report to ATF whenever they make multiple sales or other
dispositions of more than one rifle within five consecutive business days to an unlicensed
person.131
Bulk Cash Smuggling/Money Laundering
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each
year.132 Much of the money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is
laundered to Mexico through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling. While bulk cash
smuggling has been a prominent means by which criminals move illegal profits from the United
States into Mexico, they have also turned to stored value cards to move money. With these cards,
criminals are able to avoid the reporting requirement under which they would have to declare any
amount over $10,000 in cash moving across the border. Current federal regulations regarding
international transportation only apply to monetary instruments as defined under the Bank
Secrecy Act.133 Of note, stored value cards are not considered monetary instruments under current
law.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)134 has issued a final rule, defining “stored
value” as “prepaid access” and implementing regulations regarding the recordkeeping and
suspicious activity reporting requirements for prepaid access products and services.135 This rule
does not, however, directly address whether stored value or prepaid access cards would be subject
to current regulations regarding the international transportation of monetary instruments. A
separate proposed rule would amend the definition of “monetary instrument,” for the purposes of
BSA international monetary transport regulations, to include prepaid access devices.136 Even if
FinCEN were to issue a final rule and implement regulations requiring individuals leaving the
United States to declare stored value, the GAO has identified several challenges that would
130
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last
30 Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control
Number: 1140-0100.
131
This reporting requirement is limited to firearms that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of
greater than .22 caliber, and (3) capable of accepting a detachable magazine.
132
DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
133
31 U.S.C. §5312 defines a monetary instrument as “(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments,
bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and
(C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331 , checks, drafts,
notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not
in bearer form.”
134
FinCEN, under the Department of the Treasury, administers the BSA and the nation’s financial intelligence unit.
FinCEN also supports law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies by analyzing and sharing financial
intelligence information. For more information, see http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/strategic.html.
135
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions
and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” 76, No. 146 Federal Register 45403-45420, July 29, 2011.
136
Department of the Treasury, "Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Definition of “Monetary Instrument," 76 Federal
Register 64049, October 17, 2011. Entities such as the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control have urged the
Administration to finalize this rule. See, for instance, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops
Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices, April 2013.
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remain.137 These challenges relate to law enforcement’s ability to detect the actual cards and to
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate stored value on cards; travelers’ abilities to remember
the amount of stored value on any given card; and law enforcement’s ability to determine where
illegitimate stored value is physically held and subsequently freeze and seize the assets.
Aside from bulk cash smuggling and stored-value cards, Mexican traffickers move and launder
money by using digital currency accounts, e-businesses that facilitate money transfers via the
Internet, online role-playing games or virtual worlds that enable the exchange of game-based
currencies for real currency, and mobile banking wherein traffickers have remote access—via cell
phones—to bank and credit card accounts as well as prepaid cards.138 The proceeds may then be
used by DTOs and other criminal groups to acquire weapons in the United States and to corrupt
law enforcement and other public officials.
Countering financial crimes—including money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—is one
effort outlined by the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBCS).139 To curb
the southbound flow of money from the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, the SWBCS
includes several goals: stemming the flow of southbound bulk cash smuggling, prosecuting the
illegal use of MSBs and electronic payment devices, increasing targeted financial sanctions,
enhancing multilateral/bi-national collaboration, and empirically assessing the money laundering
threat.140
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This operation was reinitiated in January 2010, and between January 2010 and April 2011, Operation Firewall resulted
in eight arrests and the seizure of $6 million in U.S. currency.141 U.S. efforts against money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the federal level as well, as
experts have recommended.142 In December 2009, for example, ICE opened a bulk cash
smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies track and
disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the GAO has identified several ways in which CBP outbound
inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash smuggling, particularly those aimed at
combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved.143
The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A
137
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, October 2010, pp. 48–49.
138
Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, p. 161,
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Farah.pdf.
139
ONDCP, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11/
swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pdf. Herein after, SWBCS, 2011. The SWBCS is implemented by the Director of
National Drug Control Policy, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement as well as the DOJ
Office of the Deputy Attorney General.
140
Ibid., pp. 31-36.
141
U.S. Embassy, “Fact Sheet: Combating Money Laundering,” April 2011.
142
Farah, op. cit.
143
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73.
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recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX.144 Information provided from studies such as these may
help inform policy makers and federal law enforcement personnel and assist in their decisions
regarding where to direct future efforts against money laundering.
144
DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010.
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Appendix C. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law
Enforcement Partnerships
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
The BEST Initiative is a multi-agency initiative, led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), wherein task forces seek to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security—both
along the Southwest border with Mexico as well as along the Northern border with Canada.145
Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Coast Guard; and U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices; as well as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) or federal police is a partner along
the Southwest border. There are currently 21 BEST teams around the country, 12 of which are
along the Southwest border and one in Mexico City. BEST is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms
Trafficking Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border Liaison Program.
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety
and Security (OASISS)
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at
enhancing both countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the
Southwest border.146 Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien
smugglers apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in August 2005
through May 2010, OASISS generated 2,031 cases.147 This program is supported by the Border
Patrol International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
Illegal Drug Program (IDP)
The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) is an agreement between ICE and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) wherein ICE can transfer cases of Mexican nationals smuggling drugs
145
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces, November 3, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
146
See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. - Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26,
2006.
147
Testimony by Allen Gina, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida
Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, 2010.
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into the United States to the PGR for prosecution.148 The program was initiated in Nogales, AZ, in
October 2009 and subsequently adopted in El Paso, TX. Under the IDP, the U.S. Attorneys’
Offices review the cases and then transfer them to the PGR rather than to local law enforcement
agencies, as was previously done. The PGR has agreed to accept any drug smuggling case
referred by the U.S. Attorneys, regardless of quality, quantity, or type of illegal drug seized.
Project Gunrunner149
Project Gunrunner is an initiative led by ATF in DOJ. Its goal is to disrupt the illegal flow of guns
from the United States to Mexico. In addition to its domestic objectives, Project Gunrunner also
aims to bolster U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination along the border in firearms and
violent crime cases as well as to train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify
firearms traffickers. Between FY2005 and FY2010, ATF investigations in those border states
have led to the seizure of over 8,700 guns and the indictment of 1,705 defendants, of whom 1,170
were convicted, in federal court.150 Project Gunrunner has recently been criticized, in part, for not
systematically and consistently sharing information with Mexican and U.S. partners as well as for
focusing investigations on gun dealers and straw purchasers over high-level traffickers.151 In
September, 2010, ATF released a new strategy, “Project Gunrunner—A Cartel Focused Strategy,”
that reportedly addresses these issues.152
Electronic Trace Submission System153
ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission
System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. In
January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine
U.S. consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).154 More recently, ATF has developed and deployed a
Spanish language version of its eTrace program that enables Mexican authorities to submit
firearm trace requests electronically to ATF officials in the United States. From FY2007 through
FY2010, ATF processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities.155 Most of those requests
148
For more information on the IDP, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE, Mexican authorities meet
and agree to prosecution plan for drug smugglers captured at the border: DHS, Government of Mexico announce new
agreement to help curb narcotics smuggling,” press release, April 15, 2010, http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1004/
100415elpaso.htm.
149
For more information on Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
150
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2012, February 2011, p. 5.
151
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, pp. iii-v, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
152
Ibid., p. ix.
153
For more information on the Electronic Trace Submission System, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
154
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to
Combat Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008.
155
U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking, April 2011.
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involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the United States for civilian
markets.156
Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training
(MALLET)
The FBI created Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training (MALLET) seminars
in 1988.157 These week-long seminars, hosted at least four times annually in the United States
throughout the four Southwest border states, train Mexican law enforcement officers on various
topics including law enforcement management and investigative techniques. The Mexican law
enforcement officials participating in these trainings come from all levels of government—
federal, state, and municipal. These seminars provide not only training, but opportunities for
building trusted partnerships on both sides of the border. The MALLET seminars are funded
through the FBI’s Office of International Operations.158
Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA)
The Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA) is a nonprofit organization that was established
in 1978 and has continued to enhance international law enforcement communication and train
officers in laws and procedures across borders.159 With nearly 500 representatives from various
levels of Mexican and U.S. government, PISA promotes training and mutual assistance to
extradite fugitives and solve crimes from auto thefts to homicides. For example, state and local
law enforcement from Arizona have been involved in providing tactical, SWAT, and money
laundering training to Mexican police.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov, 7-6259
156
It is highly probable that most of these firearms were illegally smuggled into Mexico, because the Mexican
government only authorizes a relatively small number of firearms to be imported for civilian markets.
157
For more information, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, On the Border: Training Our Mexican Colleagues, May
11, 2009, http://elpaso.fbi.gov/boader051109.htm.
158
From CRS communication with FBI representative, April 27, 2010.
159
For more information on PISA, see the website at http://www.azpisa.org/.
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