Honduran-U.S. Relations
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
July 14, 2011April 25, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34027
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Summary
On January 27, 2010, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo SosaPorfirio Lobo was inaugurated president of Honduras,
in January 2010, assuming power after
seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that
had resulted from the June 28, 2009,
June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. While the strength of
Lobo’s National Party in the
legislature has enabled thehis administration to pass much of its policy
agenda, Lobo has made only limited progress in addressing the challenges inherited as a result of
the political crisis. Several efforts to foster political reconciliationhad limited
success in resolving the many challenges facing Honduras. Efforts to foster political
reconciliation, for example, have helped Honduras secure
international recognition but have done little to lessen domestic polarization. Likewise, human
rights abuses—which increased significantly in the aftermath of Zelaya’s ouster—have continued,
and the citizen security situation has deteriorated. In June 2011, 45% of Hondurans approved of
Lobo’s performance in office.
In addition to the political problems inherited as a result of the 2009 ouster, Lobo has had to
contend with a weak economy. Honduras suffered an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009 as
the global financial crisis, together with the domestic political crisis, led to significant declines in
tourism, remittances, export earnings, and foreign investment. Lobo has pushed a number of
reforms through Congress designed to restore macroeconomic stability, strengthen public
finances, and encourage sustained economic growth. Although these reforms have generated
considerable opposition from some sectors of Honduran society, they have the support of the
international financial institutions, which are now providing Honduras with access to much
needed development financing. The economy began to recover in 2010, with estimated growth of
2.8%, and is expected to grow by 3.8% in 2011. Nonetheless, significant development challenges
remain. Approximately 60% of Honduras’ 8 million citizens live below the poverty line and the
country performs poorly on a number of social indicatorsonly
partially diminished domestic polarization. Lobo is relatively unpopular halfway through his fouryear term, as 68% of Hondurans believe he has done little to resolve the public’s demands.
The poor security and human rights situation in Honduras has continued to deteriorate under
President Lobo. Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and common crime
remains widespread. Moreover, human rights abuses—which increased significantly in the
aftermath of Zelaya’s ouster—have persisted. A number of inter-related factors have likely
contributed to this situation, including the increasing presence of organized crime, weak
government institutions, and widespread corruption. Although the government has adopted a
number of policy reforms designed to address these challenges, conditions have yet to improve.
Lobo also inherited a weak economy with high levels of poverty and inequality. Honduras
suffered an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009 as a result of the combined impact of the
global financial crisis and domestic political crisis. Since taking office, Lobo has secured much
needed support from the international financial institutions, and has pushed a number of structural
reforms through Congress designed to restore macroeconomic stability and strengthen public
finances. Despite the government’s tight fiscal policies, the economy grew by 3.8% in 2011 and is
expected to grow 4% in 2012. In an attempt to improve social conditions, Lobo has begun
implementing a new conditional cash transfer program. Considerable development challenges
remain, however, as over two-thirds of Honduras’ 8.1 million citizens live in poverty.
Although relations were strained during the political crisis, the United States has traditionally had
a close relationship with Honduras. Broad U.S. policy goals in the country include a strengthened
democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of
law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved
living conditions. In addition to providing Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign
assistance ($50.2 million in FY2010) and maintaining significant military and economic ties, the
United States cooperates with Honduras on transnational issues such as migration, crime,
narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.
The 111th Congress expressed considerable interest in Honduras as a result of the 2009 political
crisis and its aftermath. Several resolutions were introduced and multiple hearings were held.
Issues such as human rights abuses, the state of democracy, security challenges, and the treatment
of U.S. businesses have continued to be of interest to the 112th Congress. On June 15, 2011, a bill
(H.R. 2200) was introduced in the House to limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President
certifies that the Government of Honduras has settled all outstanding expropriation claims
brought by U.S. companies.
This report examines current political and economic conditions in Honduras as well as issues in
Honduran-U.S. relations. For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see
CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2010.
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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Contents
Recent DevelopmentsTo advance these policy objectives, the United States provides Honduras with
foreign assistance, maintains significant security and commercial ties, and engages on
transnational issues such as migration and human trafficking.
The 112th Congress has expressed considerable interest in Honduras, particularly with regards to
the state of democracy, human rights abuses, security challenges, and the treatment of U.S.
businesses. In December 2011, Congress adopted the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012
(P.L. 112-74), which contains a provision requiring the State Department to withhold 20% of
assistance appropriated for the Honduran military and police forces until certain human rights
conditions are met. Additional legislation (H.R. 2200), introduced in June 2011, would limit U.S.
assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government of Honduras has settled
all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
This report examines current conditions in Honduras as well as issues in U.S-Honduran relations.
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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Contents
Political Situation...........................................................................................................................1
Political Situation.. 1
Background........................................................................................................................2
Background ................ 1
Political Crisis ..................................................................................................................2
Political Crisis.... 3
2009 Election ......................................................................................................................3
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya 4
Lobo Administration (2010-Present) ..................................................................................3
Micheletti Government .............. 6
Political Reconciliation ............................................................................................4
November 2009 Elections ...................... 6
International Recognition....................................................................................5
Lobo Administration ................ 9
2013 Election.............................................................................................7
Political Reconciliation ................................ 9
Security and Human Rights Conditions...................................................................7
Truth Commission........................... 10
Criminal Threats, Weak Institutions, and Corruption.............................................................. 12
Public Security Policies........................7
Constitutional Reform...............................................................................................9
Return of Zelaya .. 14
Economic and Social Conditions................................................................................................... 10
Human Rights 16
Crises and Recovery ................................................................................................................ 11
Press Freedom and the Killing of Journalists ............16
Social Indicators ............................................... 11
International Recognition .............................................................................................. 12
Economic and Social Conditions 17
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations ................................................................................................ 13
Background .....18
Foreign Assistance................................................................................................................... 13
Crises and Recovery.19
Bilateral Assistance ........................................................................................................... 14
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations ..............19
Additional U.S. Assistance.............................................................................. 16
Foreign Assistance ..................... 20
Human Rights Conditions on Aid ......................................................................................... 17
Military Cooperation........ 22
Security Cooperation ................................................................................................... 18
Trade and Investment ........................ 22
Counternarcotics Cooperation.............................................................................................. 19
Migration Issues............................................................................. 23
Military Ties ..................................... 20
Temporary Protected Status........................................................................................... 20
Remittances 23
Port Security....................................................................................................................... 21
Deportations ... 24
Trade and Investment .............................................................................................................. 21
Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking.......24
Migration Issues ......................................................................... 22
Honduran Security Efforts............................................................................................. 23
U.S. Cooperation.. 26
Temporary Protected Status............................................................................................... 26
Deportations .................... 24
Human Trafficking.............................................................................................................. 24
Port Security ......... 27
Trafficking in Persons.............................................................................................................. 2527
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Honduras .............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress..................................6
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2012 ............... 5
Figure 3. Honduran Homicide Rate, 2000-2010................................ 17
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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................... 11
Tables
Table 1. Bilateral U.S. Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2013.................................................. 26
Acknowledgments ......... 20
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2628
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Recent Developments
On July 7, 2011, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed by President Lobo to
investigate the June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya issued its report. (For more
information, see “Truth Commission.”)
On June 26, 2011, an assembly of the leftist National Popular Resistance Front (FNRP) approved
the creation of a political party—the Broad Front of Popular Resistance (FARP)—to contest the
November 2013 Honduran elections.
On June 14, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a
hearing on U.S. policy toward Honduras titled, “Holding Honduras Hostage: Revoked Visas and
U.S. Policy.”
On June 1, 2011, the member-states of the Organization of American States (OAS) voted 32-1 to
lift Honduras’ suspension from the organization. (For more information, see “International
Recognition.”)
On May 31, 2011, 87 U.S. Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Clinton that
expressed concern about the protection of human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule of
law in Honduras, and called for the suspension of U.S. police and military assistance to the
country “due to the lack of mechanisms in place to ensure security forces are held accountable for
abuses.”
On May 28, 2011, nearly two years after he was first forced into exile, former President Zelaya
returned to Honduras. (For more information, see “Return of Zelaya.”)
On May 22, 2011, President Lobo and former President Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance.
On May 2, 2011, the Honduran Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to annul criminal charges against
former President Zelaya.
On March 9, 2011, Honduran police discovered a Mexican-run cocaine lab, the first ever found in
the country. (For more information, see “Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking.”)
On February 17, 2011, the Honduran National Congress approved a measure that makes it easier
for citizens to call plebiscites and referendums, and allows such citizen initiatives to address
“issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially including constitutional changes.
(For more information, see “Constitutional Reform.”)
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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Figure 1. Map of Honduras
Source: CRS.
Political Situation
Background
A Central American nation of 8 million people, Honduras enjoyed 27 years of uninterrupted
democratic, constitutional governance prior to the forced removal of President Manuel Zelaya
from office in June 2009. The Liberal (PL) and National (PN) Parties have been Honduras’ two
dominant political parties since the military relinquished political control in 1982. Both have
traditionally been based around patron-client networks and there appear to be few ideological
differences between them. Both parties have generally been considered to be ideologically centerright; however, the PL is heterogeneous and includes some center-left factions. 1
1
Honduras: A Country Study, ed. Tim L. Merrill, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
Division, 1995).
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Political Situation
Background
Honduras, a Central American nation of 8.1 million people, has suffered from political instability
and authoritarian governance for much of its history. The military has traditionally played a large
role in domestic politics, and essentially controlled the national government from 1963 until
1971, and again from 1972 until 1982. Hondurans elected a national constituent assembly to draft
a new constitution in 1980, and the country returned to civilian rule in 1982 following
presidential and legislative elections. Nevertheless, the military continued to operate as an
autonomous institution. While Honduras did not experience a civil conflict like those in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the Honduran military pursued hard-line anticommunist
security policies and was responsible for human rights abuses in the 1980s. According to the
National Commissioner for Human Rights, the Honduran security forces systematically engaged
in arbitrary detentions, torture, and extrajudicial executions, disappearing at least 179 people
between 1980 and 1992.1 During the 1990s, successive Honduran administrations took steps to
reduce the power of the military. Mandatory military service was abolished, the police and several
state-owned enterprises were removed from military control, and—after the ratification of
constitutional reforms in 1999—the military was subordinated to a civilian-appointed defense
minister.
The Liberal (Partido Liberal, PL) and National (Partido Nacional, PN) Parties have dominated
Honduran politics since the military relinquished political control in 1982. Both political parties
are considered to be ideologically center-right; however, the PL includes a small center-left wing.
The parties are oriented around personalist factions and are largely viewed as vehicles for
patronage.2 According to a number of analysts, “the objective of political competition between
the two parties has not been a competition for policies or programs, but rather a competition for
personal gain in which the public sector is turned into private benefit.”3 The PL has traditionally
had the broadest political base in the country, winning five of the eight presidential elections held
since 1982. Three smaller parties—the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata
Cristiano, DC), the Innovation and Unity Party (Partido Inovación y Unidad, PINU), and the
Democratic Unification party (Unificación Democrática, UD)—also participate in elections and
hold a few seats in the National Congress.
1
Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CONADEH), Los Hechos Hablan por Sí Mismos: Informe
Preliminar sobre los Desaparecidos en Honduras, 1980-1993, Second Edition, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, May 2002. An
English language translation is available at http://www.cja.org/downloads/Honduras_Report_%22The_Facts_Speak_for_Themselves%22.pdf.
2
J. Mark Ruhl, "Honduras Unravels," Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2010).
3
Honduras: A Country Study, ed. Tim L. Merrill, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
Division, 1995), p.174. Several more recent studies of the Honduran party system offer similar analysis. See, for
example, Ramón Romero, "Los Partidos Políticos y el Estado Hondureño: Evidencias de la Miopía Partidaria," in
Golpe de Estado: Partidos, Instituciones, y Cultura Política (Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras,
2010), pp. 23-54; and Leticia Salomón, "Honduras: Golpe de Estado, Sistema de Partidos y Recomposición
Democrática," in Honduras: Retos y Desafíos de la Reconstrucción Democrática (Tegucigalpa: Centro de
Documentación de Honduras, 2011), pp. 1-22.
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Figure 1. Map of Honduras
Source: CRS.
Manuel Zelaya of the PL was elected president in November 2005, narrowly defeating the PN’s
Porfirio Lobo. As a wealthy landowner who founded a center-left faction within the PL, Zelaya
was regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a four-year term in January 2006.24 As his
term progressed, however, Zelaya advanced a number of populist policies, including a 60%
increase in the minimum wage in December 2008.35 Zelaya also forged closer relations with
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, joining initiatives such as PetroCaribe, which provides oil at
preferential discounted rates, and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa
Bolivariana para las Américas, ALBA), a socially -oriented trade block. 46 Although Zelaya’s
populist policies helped him maintain support among certain sectors of Honduran society, they
alienated many within the traditional economic and political elite. Likewise, his administration’s
inability to achieve concrete results on a number of issues of importance—such as poverty and
violent crime—significantly weakened his public standing.5
Political Crisis6
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya
4
“Manuel Zelaya to Head Honduras and Redefine His Party,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, December 15, 2005;
“Country Profile: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 14, 2006.
5
“Elevan a L.5500 el Salario Mínimo en Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 24, 2008.
6
It should be noted that the National Congress ratified Honduras’ entrance into both PetroCaribe and ALBA.
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Political Crisis7
On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Zelaya and flew him to forced exile
in Costa Rica. The ouster followed several months of political polarization between Honduran
governmental institutions resulting from Zelaya’s intention to hold a non-binding referendum and
eventually amend the constitution. While Zelaya insisted that the non-binding referendum was
nothing more
than an opinion poll to consult the Honduran populace on the possibility of voting
to convene a
constituent assembly,78 others in Honduras viewed it asmaintained that it was an unconstitutional attempt to
perpetuate himself in power.8 In the aftermath of Zelaya’s expulsion, the Honduran Supreme
Court9 produced documents asserting that an arrest warrant for President Zelaya had been issued
in secrecy on June 26, 2009, as a result of his noncompliance with judicial rulings suspending all
activities related to the non-binding referendum. 10 Likewise, the Honduran National Congress
ratified the ouster by accepting an alleged letter of resignation, which Zelaya declared
2
“People Profile: Manuel ‘Mel’ Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, November 15, 2005; “Manuel Zelaya to Head Honduras
and Redefine His Party,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, December 15, 2005; “Country Profile: Honduras,”
Economist Intelligence Unit, November 14, 2006.
3
“Elevan a L.5,500 el Salario Mínimo en Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 24, 2008.
4
It should be noted that the National Congress ratified Honduras’ entrance into both PetroCaribe and ALBA.
“Honduras: Congress Signs Up to PetroCaribe” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, March 2008;
“Honduras: Congress Approves Alba, With Caveats,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, October
2008.
5
Mica Rosenberg, “Protests Erupt, Gunshots Heard After Honduras Coup,” Reuters, June 28, 2009.
6
For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis,
June 2009-January 2010.
7
The non-binding referendum would have asked Hondurans, “Do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a
fourth ballot box should be installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent
Assembly?” “Llegó el Día de Verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
8
“Honduras: Fiscalía Dice Zelaya No Puede Llamar a Consulta Popular,” Associated Press, March 25, 2009.
9
The U.S. State Department’s 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices states that “although the constitution
and the law provide for an independent judiciary,” the Honduran judicial system is “subject to patronage, corruption,
and political influence.”
10
Poder Judicial de Honduras, Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
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fraudulent,11 and
ouster by accepting an alleged letter of resignation, which Zelaya declared fraudulent, and
passing a decree that disapproved of Zelaya’s conduct, removed him from
office, and named the
head of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, as the president of Honduras for the
remainder of Zelaya’s
term. 1211
The legality of Zelaya’s removal has been heavily debated; however, most legal and political
analysts—including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed to investigate the
ouster—have declared Zelaya’s removal a “coup d’état.”1312 They assert that although Zelaya
disobeyed judicial rulings by attempting to carry out the non-binding referendum, the Honduran
military denied the president due process by expelling him from the country. Additionally, they
maintain that the Honduran National Congress did not have any legal authority to remove Zelaya
from office, and the interim government of Roberto Micheletti was therefore unconstitutional.
Micheletti Government
Contrary to the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Roberto Micheletti has
Nevertheless, Micheletti and his supporters have insisted that he took office through a
“constitutional succession.”14 While in power, Micheletti
and13
After assuming office in late June 2009, Micheletti remained in power for nearly seven months.
He worked with the Honduran National Congress passed a 2009to pass a budget that severely reduced government
government expenditures, and enacted measures that annulled more than a dozen decrees and reforms
approved under Zelaya, including Honduras’ accession to ALBA. 15
Micheletti also maintained tight control of Honduran society, severely restricting the political
opposition. On the day of Zelaya’s ouster, security forces patrolled the streets, a curfew was put in
place, and a number of local and international television and radio stations were shut down or
intimidated.16 Over the next several months, the Micheletti government periodically implemented
curfews—often with little or no prior notification—and issued decrees restricting civil liberties. 17
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous body of the
Organization of American States (OAS), asserts that during the Micheletti government, serious
violations of human rights occurred, including “deaths, an arbitrary declaration of a state of
emergency, suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force,
criminalization of public protest, arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of detention, militarization of Honduran
territory, a surge in incidents of racial discrimination, violations of women’s rights, serious and
11
“Zelaya Ofrece Conferencia en Costa Rica,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
“El Decreto de la Separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
13
reforms approved under Zelaya.14 Micheletti also maintained tight control of Honduran society.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous body of the
7
For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis,
June 2009-January 2010.
8
The non-binding referendum would have asked Hondurans, “Do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a
fourth ballot box should be installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent
Assembly?” “Llegó el Día de Verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
9
It should be noted that although the Honduran judicial system is nominally independent, in practice, it is “subject to
patronage, corruption, and political influence” according to the U.S. State Department’s 2010 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices.
10
Poder Judicial de Honduras, Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales, July 2009.
11
“El Decreto de la Separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
12
See, for example, Edmundo Orellana, “El 28 de Junio y la Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), August 1, 2009;
Tim Johnson, “All Parties Broke Law in Honduras Coup, Envoy Wrote,” McClatchy Newspapers, November 28, 2010;
and Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la la
Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/paraque-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
1413
Roberto Micheletti, “Moving Forward in Honduras,” Washington Post, September 22, 2009; Testimony of Roberto
Micheletti, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 14, 2011.
15.
14
“Honduras: Micheletti Prepares to Leave on High Note,” Latin News Weekly Report, January 21, 2010.
12
16
“Honduras: Decretan Toque de Queda por 48 Horas,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Honduras: Media
Blackout, Protests Reported,” STRATFOR, June 29, 2009.
17
“Honduras Suspende Derechos Constitucionales Durante Toque Queda,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; Amnesty
International, “Honduras: Human Rights Crisis Threatens as Repression Increases,” August 2009.
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arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, and grave violations of political
rights.”18
Although some sectors of Honduran society strongly supported Micheletti, a December 2010 poll
found that 64% of Hondurans considered Zelaya’s expulsion a coup d’état, and nearly 59%
thought Micheletti should be put on trial.19
November 2009 Elections
On November 29, 2009, Honduras held general elections
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Organization of American States (OAS), asserts that serious violations of human rights occurred
during the Micheletti government, including “deaths; an arbitrary declaration of a state of
emergency; suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force;
criminalization of public protest; arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons; cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of detention; militarization of Honduran
territory; a surge in incidents of racial discrimination; violations of women’s rights; serious and
arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of expression; and grave violations of political
rights.”15 Although some sectors of Honduran society strongly supported Micheletti and the
ouster of Zelaya, polling suggests that the majority of Hondurans did not.16
2009 Election
On November 29, 2009, Honduras held a general election to fill nearly 3,000 posts nationwide,
including the presidency and all 128 seats in the unicameral National Congress.20 Former
President President
of Congress and 2005 National Party (PN)PN presidential nominee Porfirio Lobo easily
defeated his closest rival,
former Vice President Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party (PL)PL, 56.6% to
38.1%. Three minor party candidates won
a combined 5.3% of the presidential vote. 2117 Lobo’s PN
also won an absolute majority in the
unicameral National Congress, with 71 of the 128 seats.
The election was a major defeat for the PL, which has traditionally had the broadest base of
support in Honduras. On top of its poor presidential showing, it won just 45 seats in Congress,
down from 62 in 2005 (see Figure 2 below for the change in the legislative balance of power).22
According to some analysts, many).18 Some analysts assert that Hondurans held the PL
responsible for the country’s political
crisis as a result of Zelaya and Micheletti both belonging to
the party. Likewise, traditional PL
supporters were divided over the ousterpolitical crisis, leading many some
from the Zelaya-allied faction to stay home
on election day.23
There has been considerable debate—both in Honduras and the international community—
concerning the legitimacy of the November 2009 elections as a result of them being held under
the Micheletti government. Supporters of the elections note that the electoral process was
initiated, and the members of the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were chosen,
prior to Zelaya’s ouster. They also note that the candidates were selected in internationally
observed primary elections in November 2008,24 and that election day was largely25 free of
18
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, Organization of
American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, December 30, 2009.
19
Universidad on election day.19
15
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, December
30, 2009, http://cidh.org/countryrep/Honduras09eng/Toc.htm.
16
See, for example, Orlando J. Pérez, José René Argueta, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Cultura Política de la Democracia
en Honduras, 2010, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, October 2010,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/honduras/2010-Cultura_politica_Honduras_smaller3.pdf; and Universidad
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP), Los
Hondureños y
Hondureñas Opinan Sobre la Situación Política y Evalúan el Primer Año de Gestión de Porfirio Lobo,
Boletín de
Prensa, Año XXV, No.1, San Salvador, January 19, 2011.
20
“Elecciones, Incierto Antídoto Contra la Crisis Socio Política,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 31, 2009.
21,
http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/Web/2010/boletinHonduras.pdf.
17
“TSE Confirma el Triunfo de ‘Pepe’ en las Elecciones,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 21, 2009.
2218
“Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
2319
Noé Leiva, “El Partido Liberal de Zelaya, el Gran Perdedor de los Comicios Hondureños,” Agence France Presse,
November 30, 2009; “Partido Liberal Sacrificó el Poder para Salvar Democracia,” La Tribuna (Honduras), December
3, 2009.
24
Former Vice President Elvin Santos, although originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, became
the PL presidential nominee following a series of events that included congressional passage of a special decree and a
52%-32% primary victory by his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio Villeda, over then President of Congress, Roberto
Micheletti. “Honduras’ Vice President Regains the Right to Run; Elvin Santos is Partido Liberal Presidential
Candidate,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, March 5, 2009.
25
A demonstration in San Pedro Sula by those opposed to the government of Roberto Micheletti was forcefully
dispersed on election day. “Police Fire Tear Gas on Honduras Poll Protesters,” Agence France Presse, November 29,
2009.
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political violence.26 Nonetheless, some Hondurans and international observers have argued that
the
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Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress
(2005 and 2009 Election Results)
Source: CRS.
There has been considerable debate—both in Honduras and the international community—
concerning the legitimacy of the November 2009 election as a result of it being held under the
Micheletti government. Supporters of the election note that the electoral process was initiated,
and the members of the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were chosen, prior to
Zelaya’s ouster. They also note that the candidates were selected in internationally observed
primary elections in November 2008,20 and that election day was largely21 free of political
violence.22 Nonetheless, some Hondurans and international observers have argued that the
Micheletti government’s suppression of opposition media and demonstrators prevented a fair
electoral campaign from taking place. This led to election boycotts and a number of left-leaning
candidates for a variety of offices withdrawing from the elections.27election.23 It also led organizations that
traditionally observe elections in the hemisphere, such as the OAS, the European Union, (EU),
and the
Carter Center, to cancel their electoral observation missions.28 Critics of the elections also
election also assert that
the electoral turnout, which was just under 50% (five points lower than 2005),
demonstrated a
rejection of the electionselection by the Honduran people. Supporters of the elections
election counter this assertion
by arguing that Lobo won more absolute votes in 2009 than Zelaya did in
2005, and that the electoral rolls are artificially inflated—distorting the turnout rate—as a result
of Honduras not purging the rolls of those who have died or migrated abroad.29
Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress
(2005 and 2009 Election Results)
Source: CRS.
26 2005, and that the
20
Former Vice President Elvin Santos was originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, but became the
PL presidential nominee after his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio Villeda, won the PL primary and Congress passed a
special decree to allow his candidacy.
21
A demonstration in San Pedro Sula by those opposed to the government of Roberto Micheletti was forcefully
dispersed on election day.
22
José Saúl Escobar Andrade, Enrique Ortez Sequeira, and David Andrés Matamoros Batso, “Honduran Elections,”
Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, October 22, 2009; International Republican Institute,
“Hondurans Turn Out to Polls in Credible Elections: IRI’s Preliminary Statement on Honduras’ 2009 National
Elections,” November 30, 2009.
2723
“Seguidores de Zelaya No Particparán en Elecciones Aunque Haya Restitución,” EFE News Service, November 8,
2009; “Renuncian Importantes Dirigentes del Liberalismo,” El Tiempo (Honduras), November 22, 2009.
28
Gustavo Palencia, “Honduras Busca Convencer Observadores para Cuestionada Elección,” Reuters, November 12,
2009; “La CE Dice que No Hay Tiempo para una Misión Electoral y Envía Dos Expertos,” EFE News Service,
November 11, 2009.
29
“Honduras: Tug of War Between Opposition and De Facto Regime Regarding Flow of Voters,” Latin America Data
Base, NotiCen, December 3, 2009; “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
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Lobo Administration
A year and a half after his inauguration to a four-year term, President Lobo continues to face
daunting challenges stemming from Honduras’ seven-month political crisis. Efforts to foster
political reconciliation, including the creation of a truth commission, the passage of a political
reform measure, and an agreement to allow former President Zelaya to return to the country have
produced mixed results. Although these reconciliation efforts have won support from the
international community, they have done little to reduce domestic polarization. Moreover, there
has been little improvement in the country’s poor human rights situation. Murders of journalists,
political activists, and human rights defenders have continued and law enforcement officials have
proven unwilling or unable to bring those responsible to justice.
Lobo’s popularity has also suffered as a result of the public’s perception that the government has
made little progress in addressing issues of importance such as unemployment and the
deteriorating security situation. While the strength of Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has
enabled the government to secure passage of several policies designed to address these issues,
Hondurans have seen few improvements thus far (see “Economic and Social Conditions” and
“Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking” below). In June 2011, Hondurans were split in their
opinions of President Lobo with 45% approving and 44% disapproving of his performance in
office.30
Political Reconciliation
President Lobo has taken a number of steps to ease political polarization in Honduras, but still
faces significant challenges. Upon taking office in late January 2010, Lobo arranged safe passage
out of the country for former President Zelaya31 and immediately signed a bill providing political
amnesty to Zelaya and those who removed him from office. The amnesty covers political and
common crimes committed prior to and after the removal of Zelaya, but does not include acts of
corruption or violations of human rights.32 President Lobo also appointed a national unity cabinet
with representatives of each of the five official political parties, and pledged to engage in
dialogue with all sectors of Honduran society. Since then, Lobo has established a truth
commission to investigate the events surrounding the 2009 ouster, passed a constitutional reform
to grant greater power to citizen initiatives, and forged an agreement with former President
Zelaya to facilitate his return to Honduras.
Truth Commission
In April 2010, President Lobo established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, CVR) to investigate the events surrounding the ouster of President
Zelaya and to make recommendations to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.33
The creation of a truth commission had previously been agreed to by Zelaya and Micheletti as
30
“8 de 10 Creen que País Va por Rumbo Equivocado,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2011.
Zelaya had clandestinely returned to Honduras in September 2009, but was unable to leave the Brazilian Embassy
where he had taken refuge.
32
“Lobo Secures Exit from Honduras for Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, January 21, 2010; “Congreso Aprueba Amnistía
para Delitos Políticos Comunes Conexos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 27, 2010.
33
Honduras, Presidencia de la República, Decreto Ejecutivo Número PCM-011-2010.
31
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part of the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord, which they signed in late October 2009 in a failed
attempt to end the political crisis. Although the accord fell apart almost immediately, Lobo has
implemented several of its provisions since taking office as part of his efforts to facilitate political
reconciliation. The five-member CVR was led by former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo
Stein, and included two Hondurans and two additional international representatives. 34 It officially
began its work in May 2010.
Reflecting the political polarization in Honduras, the CVR was immediately criticized by both the
right and the left. Critics on the right feared that the CVR could be used as a means to promote
the constitutional reforms that former President Zelaya proposed in the lead up to the country’s
political crisis. In June 2010, President Lobo even suggested that some extremist elements on the
right were plotting to overthrow him as a result of his reconciliation efforts.35 Human rights
groups criticized President Lobo for establishing the CVR on his own without consultation with
civil society groups. Likewise, the leftist National Popular Resistance Front 36 (Frente Nacional de
Resistencia Popular, FNRP)—an umbrella group of those who were opposed to Zelaya’s
removal—viewed the CVR as an attempt to “whitewash” the ouster. As a result, Zelaya called on
officials from his government not to cooperate with the CVR and the FNRP established an
alternative truth commission. 37
On July 7, 2011, the CVR issued its final report. Among other findings, the report asserts (1)
Zelaya refused to recognize or obey orders from the judicial branch and other governmental
institutions to halt activities related to the proposed non-binding referendum; (2) the Honduran
military partially acted on a judicial order in detaining Zelaya but the high command’s decision to
force the president into exile violated due process and thus amounted to a coup d’état; (3) the
Honduran National Congress had no power to remove President Zelaya or name a substitute and
therefore the government of Roberto Micheletti was illegal; (4) there is no reliable evidence that
President Zelaya intended to dissolve Congress, remain in office, or directly install a national
constituent assembly after holding the non-binding referendum; (5) the November 2009 elections
were legitimate; and (6) members of the Honduran military and police killed at least 12 citizens
as a result of the disproportionate use of force to suppress political demonstrations during the
Micheletti government. The CVR’s report also provides a wide variety of recommendations to
avoid similar crises in the future. These include reforming the constitution to establish clear
impeachment procedures and investigating, processing, and punishing those responsible for the
human rights abuses that took place in the aftermath of the ouster.38
34
The other members of the CVR were Canadian diplomat Michael Kergin; former Peruvian judicial official María
Amadilia Zavala Valladares; Julieta Castellas, the rector of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH);
and Jorge Omar Casco, the former rector of UNAH.
35
Germán Reyes, “Lobo Pide No Temer a Comisión de Verdad y Avala Consulta para Constituyente,” Agencia EFE,
May 4, 2010; “Presidente Hondureño Insinúa que se está Gestando Otro Golpe de Estado,” Agence France Presse, June
8, 2010.
36
The FNRP initially was formed after Zelaya’s ouster as the National Resistance Front Against the Coup d’état.
Zelaya serves as the General Coordinator of the FNRP, which also includes an executive committee representative of
the movement’s composite parts: labor unions, worker and campesino organizations, human rights advocates, the
Zelaya-allied faction of the Liberal Party, and other civil society groups.
37
“Zelaya Calls on Former Officials Not to Collaborate with Truth Commission,” ACAN-EFE, June 8, 2010;
“Honduran Resistance Sets Up Alternative Commission,” Latin News Weekly Report, July 1, 2010.
38
Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/paraque-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
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Constitutional Reform
As noted above, President Zelaya was advocating constitutional reform at the time of his ouster.
Zelaya, the FNRP, and others maintain that the current constitution, which was written in 1982 by
a constituent assembly elected under the military government, reinforces political and economic
exclusion of the majority of the Honduran population. They believe the only way to overcome
this exclusion is to convene a democratic and inclusive constituent assembly to draft a new
constitution. 39 The FNRP claims to have gathered over 1.3 million signatures in support of such
an assembly, which—if verified—would surpass the number of votes received by Lobo in
November 2009.40
President Lobo, who never ruled out the idea of abstract constitutional changes as a candidate,
called for a national dialogue to discuss potential political, economic, and social reforms in
October 2010. After consulting with each of the political parties and various sectors of Honduran
society, Lobo proposed a measure that would grant greater power to citizen initiatives. The
proposal, which was approved by the Honduran National Congress in February 2011, amended
the constitutional provisions governing referendums and plebiscites to allow such citizen
initiatives to address “issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially including
changes to the currently unalterable portions of the constitution. 41 Lobo held another dialogue in
July 2011, in which he invited representatives from the five officially recognized political parties
and seven parties in the process of formation to suggest constitutional reforms. After holding
similar discussions with unions, business federations, and other civil society organizations, Lobo
intends to suggest potential reforms to the National Congress. 42
Much like the truth commission, Lobo’s efforts around the issue of constitutional reform have
largely failed to reduce polarization. The FNRP and others think the changes made thus far are
insufficient. They note that any reforms suggested through citizen initiatives or Lobo’s national
dialogue would need to be approved by the National Congress, an institution they believe
represents entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo. Consequently, they have
continued to push for a constituent assembly capable of drafting a new constitution.43 On the
other hand, conservative elements within the traditional parties and civil society have reacted to
Lobo’s efforts with suspicion. While conceding that abstract changes may be necessary, they are
opposed to the idea of convoking a constituent assembly or any attempt to change the unalterable
portions of the constitution. They also have accused Lobo of seeking reelection and catering to
small radical groups instead of addressing real issues of national importance.44
39
“Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011.
“Hondureños Reclaman en las Calles una Constituyente en el Día del Trabajdor,” Agence France Presse, May 1,
2010; Frente Nacional De Resistencia Popular, “Comunicado No.74: Avanzamos Seguros Hacia la Constituyente,”
September 17, 2010.
41
“Honduras Congress Approves Referendums,” Latin News Daily, February 18, 2011.
40
42
Pedro Membreño, “Reformas Políticas Deben Proponerse este Año,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 5, 2011; Francisco
Rodriguez, “Dirigentes Políticos Coinciden en Reformas Constitucionales,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 9, 2011.
43
“Honduras: Constitutional Change Tests Opposition Unity,” Oxford Analytica, February 14, 2011; “Rafael Alegría:
Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011; Frente Amplio de Resistencia
Popular, “Posicionamiento Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,” July 9, 2011.
44
Unión Cívica Democrática, “Posición de la Unión Cívica Democrática Relacionada con la Reforma del Articulo 5 de
la Constitución de la República,” November 11, 2010; “Anduray Postula Movimiento para Defender Constitución,” La
Tribuna (Honduras), June 13, 2011; “‘Lobo y Hernández Gastan 2,000 Millones en Política’,” La Prensa (Honduras),
July 11, 2011.
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Return of Zelaya
Following Lobo’s inauguration, domestic groups like the FNRP and a number of countries called
on the president to create the conditions necessary to allow former President Zelaya to return to
Honduras. Lobo encouraged Zelaya to return from exile but insisted that the former president
would have to stand trial for the charges that were brought against him following his ouster,
including fraud, falsification of public documents, and embezzlement of $2.95 million from the
presidency and the Honduran Fund for Social Investment. Zelaya insisted that the charges were
politically motivated and refused to return until they were dropped. On May 2, 2011, the
Honduran court of appeals voted 2-1 to annul the criminal charges against Zelaya due to
procedural irregularities.45
With criminal charges out of the way, former President Zelaya entered into a dialogue with
President Lobo that was mediated by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and President Manuel
Santos of Colombia. On May 22, 2011, Lobo and Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the Accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance. 46
Former President Zelaya returned to Honduras on May 28, 2011, and immediately reentered
politics. The FNRP, which had previously named Zelaya its general coordinator, voted to create a
political party—the Broad Front of Popular Resistance (Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,
FARP)—to contest the 2013 elections. Zelaya hopes to unite members of the FNRP, his
supporters in the PL, and others who opposed his ouster under the FARP banner. 47 It remains
unclear how much popular support the new political party will be able to attract. While the
majority of the delegates at the FNRP assembly supported the creation of the FARP, some sectors
are opposed to pursuing electoral politics.48 At the same time, many of the top PL officials that
previously supported Zelaya and/or opposed his ouster have decided not to follow him into the
FARP.49 On the other hand, over 80% of Hondurans have little or no faith in the existing political
parties, 50 and Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, the former president’s wife and a potential candidate for
the presidency in 2013, has the second-highest favorability ratings in the country among public
figures. 51
45
“Zelaya Free to Roam,” Latin News Daily, May 3, 2011; “Honduras: Zelaya Ruling Removes Final Hurdle – Or
Does It?” Latin American Weekly Report, May 5, 2011
46
“Acuerdo para la Reconciliación Nacional y la Consolidación del Sistema Democrático en la República de
Honduras,” La Tribuna (Honduras), May 23, 2011.
47
Noé Leiva, “Zelayistas Forman ‘Frente Amplio’ para Elecciones de 2013,” Agence France Presse, June 26, 2011.
48
Todd Gordon and Jeffrey R. Webber, “The Different Logics within the Honduran Resistance: An Interview with
Bertha Cáceres,” Upside Down World, June 27, 2011.
49
“Liberales en Resistencia se Quedan en el PL,” La Tribuna (Honduras), June 28, 2011; “Honduras: Liberales en
Resistencia Prefieren PL,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 29, 2011.
50
Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP), Los
Hondureños y Hondureñas Opinan Sobre la Situación Política y Evalúan el Primer Año de Gestión de Porfirio Lobo,
Boletín de Prensa, Año XXV, No.1, San Salvador, January 19, 2011.
51
“Empatados a 35% Nacionalistas y Liberales,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2011.
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Human Rights
Another key challenge for the Lobo government is curtailing the increase in human rights
violations that has occurred since the forced expulsion of President Zelaya. In March 2010, the
U.S. State Department released its 2009 human rights report on Honduras. The report details
numerous human rights violations that occurred in the aftermath of the ouster, including
“unlawful killings by members of the police and government agents,” “arbitrary and summary
killings committed by vigilantes and former members of the security forces,” and “arbitrary
detention and disproportionate use of force by security forces.”52
Similar human rights abuses appear to have continued since President Lobo’s January 2010
inauguration. Following a May 2010 visit to Honduras, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) expressed deep concern over murders of, and threats against, journalists,
political activists, and human rights defenders, as well as the absence of effective investigations
into these crimes. The IACHR also expressed concerns that the dismissal of judges opposed to
Zelaya’s ouster was politicizing the justice system, and that Lobo’s appointment of several highranking military officers accused of participating in Zelaya’s removal to positions in the
government was remilitarizing society.53 Although the Lobo Administration has taken some steps
to improve the human rights situation—such as providing the Human Rights Unit in the Attorney
General’s Office an independent budget for the first time and creating a new Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights—Honduran and international human rights organizations assert that the
Honduran government has made little progress, especially with regard to bringing human rights
violators to justice. 54 According to a December 2010 Human Rights Watch report, at least 18
journalists, political activists, and human rights defenders were killed in Honduras in 2010.55
Press Freedom and the Killing of Journalists
International human rights observers have been particularly concerned about declining press
freedom in Honduras as media outlets and journalists have been the subjects of attacks. In the
aftermath of Zelaya’s forced removal in June 2009, human rights organizations strongly criticized
the Micheletti government for its attacks on press freedom, including government intimidation of
journalists and media outlets and the temporary shutdown and interruptions of radio and
television broadcasts. Press rights groups maintain that media workers were often targeted and
foreign journalists were expelled. The IACHR issued a report in December 2009 asserting that
there were serious violations of freedom of expression under Micheletti. The report maintained
that the media became extremely polarized during the year, with those journalists and media
supportive of the new Micheletti government subject to attacks by those who opposed Zelaya’s
ouster, and those perceived as encouraging support for resistance to the government subject to
severe restrictions by state actions and attacks by private citizens.
Threats to press freedom have continued under the Lobo Administration. As noted above, the
IACHR reported in May 2010 that it received information about threats and attacks directed
52
53
See the full text of the report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136117.htm.
IACHR “IACHR Publishes Observations on Follow-up Visit to Honduras,” Press Release No. 59/10, June 7, 2010.
54
Thelma Mejía, “Latin America: Honduras has Much to Explain in Human Rights Exam,” Inter Press Service,
November 3, 2010.
55
Human Rights Watch, After the Coup: Ongoing Violence, Intimidation, and Impunity in Honduras, New York,
December 2010.
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against journalists to intimidate and impede their journalistic work. 56 In 2010, at least 10
journalists were murdered in Honduras, making the country among the most dangerous in the
world for the media.57 According to a July 2010 report by the independent, nonprofit Committee
to Protect Journalists, there is no evidence to “confirm a political conspiracy or coordinated effort
behind the killings.” Nonetheless, the report asserts that “the murders occurred in a politically
charged atmosphere of violence and lawlessness” and “the government’s ongoing failure to
successfully investigate crimes against journalists and other social critics—whether by intention,
impotence, or incompetence—has created a climate of pervasive impunity.”58
Press rights groups have repeatedly urged President Lobo to combat the crime wave against
journalists. The IACHR and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have
called on the Honduran government to take all necessary measures to prevent these murders,
protect at-risk journalists, and make progress in investigating the crimes.59 The Inter American
Press Association recommended that the Lobo Administration request international technical
assistance, establish special prosecutors’ offices, and adopt a number of legal, judicial, and penal
reforms.60 Honduran officials have asserted that there is nothing to indicate that journalists are
being attacked because of their work, and that the murdered journalists were most likely the
victims of the widespread, random crime that has plagued Honduras in recent years.61
Nevertheless, the Honduran government has requested assistance from the United States, Spain,
and Colombia in investigating alleged human rights violations, including the killing of
journalists.62 The United States has sent advisors from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and U.S. officials have indicated they are open to providing additional assistance if needed. 63
International Recognition
Following the ouster of President Zelaya, Honduras was diplomatically isolated by the
international community. Although trade continued with the exception of a 48-hour blockade by
some Central American countries, the Micheletti government was not recognized by a single
nation. On July 4, 2009, in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
the member states of the OAS unanimously voted to suspend Honduras from the organization for
an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.64 Honduras also lost the support of the
international financial institutions, which withheld access to loans and other transfers.
56
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, Organization of
American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, December 30, 2009; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
“IACHR Concerned About Human Rights Violations in Honduras,” Press Release, No. 54/10, May 19, 2010.
57
“Honduras: HRN Radio Reporter Killed,” EFE News Service, December 28, 2010.
58
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalist Murders Spotlight Honduran Government Failures,” July 27, 2010.
59
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern Over New
Attacks Against Journalists and Media in Honduras,” September 20, 2010.
60
Inter American Press Association, “IAPA Makes Recommendations to President Porfirio Lobo to Combat Violence
Against Journalists,” Press Release, April 27, 2010.
61
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalist Murders Spotlight Honduran Government Failures,” July 27, 2010.
62
“Honduras Pide Ayuda a Colombia, España, y EEUU en Investigación Sobre DDHH,” Agence France Presse,
January 27, 2011.
63
“EEUU Prestará Toda la Ayuda Necesaria a Honduras en DDHH (Funcionaria),” Agence France Presse, June 5,
2011.
64
Organization of American States, Resolution on the Suspension of the Right of Honduras to Participate in the OAS,
OEA/Ser.P, AG/Res/2 (XXXVII-E/09), Washington, DC, July 4, 2009.
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As a result of the November 2009 election and Lobo’s reconciliation attempts upon taking office,
much of the international community—including the United States, the European Union, most
Central American nations, and the international financial institutions—quickly recognized the
Lobo Administration. Many South American nations, however, expressed concerns that restoring
formal relations with Honduras would set a dangerous precedent in the region since Zelaya was
never returned to office. They excluded Honduras from regional gatherings and refused to lift the
country’s suspension from the OAS.65 Moreover, they indicated that recognition would be
dependent on conditions on the ground, including the ability of former President Zelaya to return
home peacefully. 66
On June 1, 2011, four days after Zelaya returned from exile, Honduras was finally able to rejoin
the OAS. Noting the importance of the “Accord for National Reconciliation and the
Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras” negotiated between Lobo and Zelaya, the
OAS member states voted 32-1 to lift the suspension. 67 Nearly all of the countries that had
previously refused to do so also began to restore official ties with Honduras. Ecuador, which was
the only country to vote against lifting the suspension, refuses to restore diplomatic relations “so
long as those serving in the Honduran government participated in the coup outright and remain in
complete impunity.”68
Economic and Social Conditions
Background
The Honduran economy has experienced significant changes since the 1990s. Traditional
agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important, but nontraditional sectors, such as
shrimp farming and the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly. In
1998, Honduras was devastated by Hurricane Mitch, which killed more than 5,000 people and
caused billions of dollars in damage. The gross domestic product declined by 1.4% in 1999, and
the country felt the effects of the storm for several years, with roads and bridges washed out, the
agricultural sector hard hit, and scores of orphaned children, many of whom joined criminal
gangs. Spurred on by substantial U.S. foreign assistance, however, the economy rebounded.
Between 2000 and 2008, the country experienced average growth of over 5%.69 Honduras is now
classified by the World Bank as a lower middle income developing economy, with a per capita
income of $1,800 (2009).70
65
“Honduras: Honduras Cleaves Latin America,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
May 2010.
66
“Insulza Dice que Reintegro de Honduras a OEA está Atado a Exilio de Zelaya,” Agence France Presse, February
11, 2011.
67
Organization of American States, Participation of Honduras in the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.P,
AG/Res.1 (XLI-E/11), Washington, DC, June 1, 2011.
68
“Ecuador President Won’t Restore Ties with Honduras,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2011.
69
“Honduras: Country Data,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2011.
70
World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” February 2010, available at http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators.
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Over the past decade, Honduras has benefited from several debt-reduction programs. In 2005,
Honduras signed a three-year poverty reduction and growth facility agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), making the country eligible for about $1 billion in debt relief
under the IMF and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 71 The
agreement imposed fiscal and monetary targets on the government, and required Honduras to
maintain firm macroeconomic discipline and develop a comprehensive poverty reduction
strategy. In 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) implemented a debt forgiveness
program for its poorest members. Honduras benefitted from a reduction of $1.4 billion in foreign
debt, freeing government resources to finance poverty alleviation. 72 Largely as a result of these
programs, Honduras’ net public debt declined from nearly 46% of gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2005 to about 19.1% in 2007.73 Honduran debt has been climbing again in recent years,
however, as increased domestic spending and decreased government revenue have contributed to
growing fiscal deficits.
Despite experiencing relatively strong growth and benefitting from debt reduction programs,
Honduras continues to face significant development challenges. The country remains one of the
most impoverished nations in Latin America. According to the most recent household census
conducted by the Honduran National Statistics Institute, 60% of Honduras’ 8 million citizens live
under the poverty line—defined as being unable to acquire the basic basket of household goods. 74
Likewise, Honduras has an infant mortality rate of 27 per 1,000; chronic malnutrition for one out
of four children under five years of age; and a significant HIV/AIDS crisis, with an adult
infection rate of 1.5% of the population. The Garifuna community (descendants of freed black
slaves and indigenous Caribs from St. Vincent) concentrated in northern coastal areas has been
especially hard hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The World Bank maintains that development
indicators have improved over the past decade because of increased public spending on health
and education, but further progress is uncertain. It notes that the country remains vulnerable to
external shocks, including declines in prices for agricultural exports and natural disasters such as
hurricanes and droughts.75
Crises and Recovery
The global financial crisis and domestic political crisis took a significant toll on the Honduran
economy. Honduras was already experiencing significant declines in remittances, tourism, and
export earnings as a result of the financial crisis prior to President Zelaya’s expulsion from the
country.76 The ouster exacerbated these economic problems, as the international community,
71
For more information on the HIPC Initiative, see CRS Report RL33073, Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries: Issues for Congress, by Martin A. Weiss.
72
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007; Nestor Ikeda, “Inter-American Development
Bank Forgives Debt of 5 Nations,” Associated Press, March 17, 2007.
73
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2010.
74
“Honduras: Poverty Drives Lobo’s Calls for Constitutional Change,” Latin American Economy & Business, October
2010.
75
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Social Panorama of Latin America,” 2009;
World Bank, “Honduras Country Brief,” April 22, 2010; World Food Programme, “Country Programme – Honduras,”
2008. Also see CRS Report RL32713, Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U.S. Policy, by Clare
Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.
76
“Honduras: Struggling,” Latin American Economy & Business, October 2009; “Honduras Economy: Political Crisis
Takes its Toll,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 27, 2009.
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which had been expected to finance 20% of the country’s budget, imposed a series of economic
sanctions on Honduras.77 International financial institutions withheld access to some $485 million
in loans and other transfers, the European Union and United States terminated $126 million in
aid, and Venezuela—which provided 50% of Honduras’ petroleum imports in 2008—stopped
supplying the country with subsidized oil. 78 Domestic opponents of the ouster placed additional
pressure on the economy, engaging in strikes, transportation blockades, and other measures
designed to paralyze economic activity.79 Curfews implemented by the Micheletti government to
suppress demonstrations by the political opposition further inhibited economic activity as workers
were unable to reach their places of employment. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
estimates that the total economic cost of the political crisis was $1.09 billion.80 Overall, the
Honduran economy contracted by 2.1% in 2009.81
Since taking office, President Lobo has pushed for reforms designed to restore macroeconomic
stability, strengthen public finances, and encourage sustained economic growth. The Honduran
National Congress has approved several of Lobo’s proposals, including an energy reform
intended to better target subsidies to the poor, and a comprehensive tax reform expected to
generate additional revenue equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. The National Congress also approved a
measure de-indexing teachers’ wages from changes in the minimum wage in an effort to slow the
growth of expenditure on public sector salaries, which absorb 73% of all government revenue.82
To attract foreign direct investment, the Honduran National Congress has approved a law on
public-private partnerships, a temporary employment scheme, and the creation of special
development areas, or “charter cities.”83
Lobo’s fiscal reforms have been criticized by business groups and public sector workers,
however, they have been supported by the international financial institutions that are currently
providing Honduras with much needed development financing. In October and November 2010,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
World Bank approved a combined $322.5 million in financial support for Honduras. The funds
are to be used in support of the Lobo Administration’s efforts to improve the country’s long-term
fiscal balance and implement the reforms necessary to achieve the country’s poverty reduction
and growth objectives.84 The Honduran economy has begun to slowly recover from the 2009
77
Keny López de Carballo, “Honduras No Puede Prescindir de Créditos,” La Prensa Grafica (El Salvador), July 9,
2009.
78
Robin Emmott, “Aid Freeze in Post-Coup Honduras Hurting Poor,” Reuters, November 12, 2009; “Honduras Can’t
Touch IMF Resources—IMF” Reuters, September 9, 2009; “Unión Europea Suspende Ayuda Financiera a Honduras,”
Reuters, July 20, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009; “Venezuela Halts Oil Deliveries to Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 8,
2009; “Negociación Solo es para que Zelaya Enfrente la Justicia,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 7, 2009.
79
“Manifestantes Aseguran que Hoy Paralizan el País,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 23, 2009.
80
Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/paraque-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
81
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011.
82
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2010; International Monetary Fund,
Honduras: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, September 10, 2010.
83
“Country Watch: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, June 13, 2011.
84
“Tracking Trends: Honduras IMF Loan,” Latin News Weekly Report, October 14, 2010; “BID y BM Conceden
Préstamos por más de USD 120 Millones a Honduras,” Agence France Presse, November 10, 2010.
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financial and political crises. GDP grew by 2.8% in 2010 and is expected to grow by 3.8% in
2011.85 Unemployment remains a challenge, however, as over 16% of Hondurans lack formal
jobs.86
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years. The bilateral
relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and
became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country became a
staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by the Contra forces attempting to
overthrow the leftist Sandinista government. Economic linkages also intensified in the 1980s
after Honduras became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provided duty-free
importation of Honduran goods into the United States. Bilateral economic ties have further
expanded since the entrance into force of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006.
Relations between the United States and Honduras were strained in 2009 because of the country’s
political crisis. Following Zelaya’s ouster, the United States cut off almost all contact with the
Honduran government. It suspended some foreign assistance, minimized cooperation with the
Honduran military, and revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti
government, which assumed power following Zelaya’s removal. 87 Micheletti reacted angrily to
U.S. policy toward his government, declaring, “it isn’t possible for anyone, no matter how
powerful they are, to come over here and tell us what we have to do.”88
Relations have improved considerably since the inauguration of President Lobo, whose efforts to
foster national reconciliation and solidify democratic processes in Honduras led the United States
to restore foreign assistance and resume cooperation on other issues. Current U.S. policy
objectives in Honduras include (1) improving the human-rights climate, especially regarding
allegations that journalists and other individuals have been targeted for their political views; (2)
combating high levels of corruption, crime, and drug-trafficking; and (3) promoting and
implementing social and economic reforms to boost growth and reduce poverty and inequality
levels that are among the highest in the hemisphere. 89 To advance these policy objectives, the
United States provides Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign assistance, maintains
significant military and economic ties, and engages on transnational issues such as migration,
crime, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.
85
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2011.
“Honduras: President Lobo Wrestles with Intractables,” Latin American Economy & Business, June 2011.
87
“Senior Administration Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, June 28, 2009; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of
Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009; U.S. Department of
State, Office of the Spokesman, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” July 28, 2009.
88
Carlos Salinas, “Honduran De Facto Leader Vows to Cling to Power Over US Objections,” El País (Spain), August
5, 2009.
89
Testimony of Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, March 18, 2010.
86
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Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable amounts of foreign assistance to Honduras over the
past three decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and
military aid as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S.
assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign
assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the
United States provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the
1998 storm. As a result of the influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s
amounted to around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S.
foreign aid levels to Honduras again began to decline.
Recent foreign aid funding to Honduras amounted to $40.5 million in FY2008, $40.2 million in
FY2009, and $50.2 million in FY2010. The Obama Administration requested $67.9 million for
Honduras in FY2011; however, country-specific funding levels, as appropriated through the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) are not
yet available. For FY2012, the Obama Administration has requested nearly $68 million in foreign
aid for Honduras, including $55 million in Development Assistance (DA), $11 million in Global
Health and Child Survival assistance (GHCS), and $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). (See Table 1 below.) U.S. assistance supports a variety of projects designed to enhance
security, strengthen democracy, improve education and health systems, conserve the environment,
and build trade capacity. Most assistance to the country is managed by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the State Department.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2012
(U.S. $ in thousands)
Account
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011(req)a
FY2012(req)
Development Assistance (DA)
15,149
21,382
37,491
53,934
55,266
Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS)
(USAID)
12,035
11,750
11,000
11,000
10,000
Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS)
(State)
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
10,150
5,771
0
0
0
International Narcotics & Law Enforcement
(INCLE)
744
0
0
0
0
International Military Education and Training
(IMET)
936
329
700
700
700
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
496
0
0
1,300
1,000
40,510
40,232
50,191
67,934
67,966
Food for Peace Title II (P.L. 480)
Total
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012, April
11, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010, May
28, 2009.
Notes: Global Health and Child Survival (USAID) was formerly called “Child Survival and Health,” but was relabeled with the FY2010 budget request. Likewise, Global Health and Child Survival (State) was formerly called
“Global HIV/AIDS Initiative,” but was re-labeled with the FY2010 budget request.
a.
Although the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) was
signed into law on April 15, 2011, country-specific funding levels are not yet available.
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Honduras receives some foreign assistance beyond the bilateral funds listed above. The Peace
Corps, which has been active in the country since 1963, provides nearly 180 volunteers to work
on projects related to HIV/AIDS prevention and child survival; protected area management; water
and sanitation; and business, municipal and youth development. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) provided Honduras with $205 million90 for a five-year economic growth
compact that was completed in September 2010. The compact had two components: a rural
development project to provide farmers with skills to grow and market new crops, and a
transportation project to improve roads and highways to link farmers and other businesses to ports
and major production centers in Honduras.91 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) provides assistance in response to natural disasters. USAID/OFDA provided Honduras
with $150,000 to respond to flooding and other damage during the 2010 hurricane season.92
Honduras also receives assistance under the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI, formerly known as Mérida-Central America), a package of counternarcotics and
anticrime assistance for the region.93 From FY2008-FY2010, Congress appropriated $260 for
CARSI, a portion of which was intended for Honduras. For FY2012, the Obama Administration
has requested $100 million for CARSI.
Military Cooperation
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with
about 1,200 troops who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S.
counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch
in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort. Today,
U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian
assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras
and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty
and reserve components also provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops.
The June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya led some to reassess the state of U.S.Honduran military cooperation. As a result of the Honduran military’s role in Zelaya’s removal,
the United States suspended joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the
country.94 The events in Honduras also led some analysts to question the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign military training programs. They argued that such programs have not obtained their
desired outcomes given that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, who had received U.S. training,
led the effort to remove President Zelaya, and the Honduran military reportedly cut off contact
90
The compact was originally for $215 million, but the final $10 million was terminated as a result of the 2009 political
crisis.
91
Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Honduras Overview,” available at http://www.mcc.gov/countries/honduras/
index.php.
92
USAID, Latin America and the Caribbean—Hurricane Season and Floods, Fact Sheet #6, FY2011, November 9,
2010.
93
For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
94
John J. Kruzel, “U.S. Limits Contact with Honduran Military,” American Forces Press Service, July 2, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
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with the United States prior to the ouster. 95 Nevertheless, U.S.-Honduran military cooperation
resumed following the election of President Lobo, with the United States restoring aid and
training efforts.96 The United States also resumed funding the construction of a Honduran naval
base on the island of Guanaja, which—together with a naval base constructed in Caratasca in
2009—is designed to enhance Honduras’ capacity to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments.97
Trade and Investment
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased greatly since the early 1980s.
In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a
unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many goods
from the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing arrangements
with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States of certain apparel products
assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or export-assembly companies flourished,
most concentrated in the north coast region. The passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act in 2000, which provided Caribbean Basin nations with North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)-like preferential tariff treatment, further boosted the maquila sector. Trade
relations expanded most recently as a result of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has significantly liberalized trade in goods and
services since entering into force with Honduras in April 2006.98
Total trade between the United States and Honduras has increased 15% since the implementation
of CAFTA-DR, with U.S. exports to Honduras growing by 25% and U.S. imports from Honduras
growing by 6%. Total two-way trade amounted to $8.5 billion in 2010, $4.6 billion in U.S.
exports to Honduras and $3.9 billion in U.S. imports from Honduras. Similar to previous trade
arrangements, CAFTA-DR has provided substantial benefits to the maquila sector. Knit and
woven apparel (assembled products from the maquila sector) account for the greatest share of
U.S. imports from Honduras. Likewise, apparel inputs, such as yarns and fabrics, account for a
substantial portion of U.S. exports to Honduras. Other major U.S. exports to Honduras include oil
and machinery.99
U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras has also increased since the implementation of
CAFTA-DR. Total U.S. foreign direct investment amounted to $844 million in 2009, up 7% from
$787 million in 2006.100 The most significant U.S. investments are in the maquila, manufacturing,
tourism, agriculture, telecommunications, and energy sectors. According to the U.S. State
Department, relatively low labor costs, proximity to the U.S. market, and Central America’s
largest port (Puerto Cortés) make Honduras attractive to investors. On the other hand, high levels
of crime, a weak judicial system, corruption, low levels of educational attainment, and poor
95
See, for example, Adam Isacson, “When Your Aid Recipients Stop Taking Your Calls,” Center for International
Policy, June 28, 2008, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=949.
96
“Honduras: Ties with US Return to Normal,” Latin News Weekly Report, April 22, 2010.
97
“Central America: Behind the Growing Presence of the US,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, July 2010.
98
For more information on CAFTA-DR, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck.
99
U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, April 2011.
100
U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Tables,” Survey of Current Business, September
2010.
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infrastructure hamper investment. 101 Additionally, some observers have raised questions about the
investment climate in Honduras as a result of several cases where U.S.-owned companies have
been driven out of business as a result of anticompetitive practices or have been expropriated
without compensation.102 On June 15, 2011, a bill (H.R. 2200, Rohrabacher) was introduced to
limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government of Honduras
has settled all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
Despite the increases in trade and investment, some analysts have expressed concerns about the
implementation of CAFTA-DR. Labor rights provisions have been of particular concern to many
in the United States. According to the U.S. State Department, Honduran labor laws are generally
satisfactory, however, the government frequently fails to enforce them. In the past year, “union
leaders were subjected to violence and threats,” “employers commonly threatened to close
unionized factories and harassed or dismissed workers seeking to unionize,” and “factory
management in export-processing zones required compulsory overtime, with some factories
enforcing this requirement by locking workers inside.”103 Honduran officials, on the other hand,
have expressed concerns about the potential loss of agricultural jobs in the corn, rice, beef, pork,
and poultry sectors as the country further opens its market to U.S. agricultural products.104
Migration Issues
Temporary Protected Status
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided temporary protected
status (TPS) to eligible Hondurans who may otherwise have been deported from the United
States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS status has now been extended nine times. The
most recent TPS extension came on May 5, 2010, when the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced that the United States would continue to provide TPS for an additional 18 months,
expiring on January 5, 2012 (prior to this extension, TPS would have expired July 5, 2010).
According to a Federal Register notice on the most recent extension, the Secretary of Homeland
Security maintained that the extension was warranted because there continues to be a substantial,
but temporary, disruption of living conditions in Honduras resulting from Hurricane Mitch, and
the country remains temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals.105
Homeland Security estimates that TPS covers an estimated 66,000 Hondurans residing in the
United States.106
101
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement Honduras, March 2011.
102
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Next Steps for
Honduras, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 2010, Serial No. 111-94 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
103
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices – Honduras, April 8, 2011.
104
Kathleen Schalch, "Hondurans Brace for Pros, Cons of CAFTA," National Public Radio (NPR), May 19, 2005.
105
For more details, see 75 Federal Register 24734-24737, May 5, 2010.
106
“18-Month Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Honduras, Questions and Answers,” States News Service,
May 5, 2010. See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
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Remittances
Remittances from migrant workers abroad—87% of whom live in the United States—are the
largest single source of foreign exchange for Honduras. Between 2002 and 2008, remittances to
Honduras more than tripled to $2.7 billion, the equivalent of 20% of GDP. Although remittances
declined by over 8% in 2009, they partially recovered in 2010 to $2.53 billion. The recent decline
in remittances is at least partially due to the global financial crisis and U.S. recession, which have
left many Honduran immigrants in the United States unemployed. Most remittances from
Hondurans abroad are sent to immediate family members, such as parents and children, to
supplement their wages.107
In September 2010, Secretary of State Clinton signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
President Lobo regarding the Building Remittance Investment for Development Growth and
Entrepreneurship (BRIDGE) Initiative. Under the Initiative, the United States will work with
Honduras to develop and support partnerships with Honduran financial institutions in hopes of
maximizing the development impact of remittance flows. The identified financial institutions will
be able to leverage the remittances they receive to obtain lower-cost, longer-term financing in
international capital markets to fund investments in infrastructure, public works, and commercial
development.108
Deportations109
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. Approximately
25,600 Hondurans were deported from the United States in FY2010, making Honduras one of the
top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.110 Increasing deportations from the United States
have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit country for
Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are concerned
about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often difficult for
those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not speak Spanish,
who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support face additional
difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social problems, leaders are
concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of deportations continue. 111
Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. By the mid1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended and the United States began deporting
unauthorized immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region. Between 2000 and
107
“Honduras: Moderate Inflation,” Latin American Economy & Business, February 2011; “Honduras: Country
Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2010; “Roundtable Discussion: Outlook for Remittances to Latin
America in 2010,” Inter American Dialogue, April 12, 2010; “Latin America: Remittances Slide,” Economist
Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2009; “Country Profile: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008.
108
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. BRIDGE Initiative Commitments with El Salvador and
Honduras,” September 22, 2010.
109
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, contributed information to this section.
110
Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations.
111
Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington
Post, June 27, 2007.
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2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many of whom had spent
time in prisons in the United States for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Some observers
contend that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America, and
that they have recruited new members from among the local populations.112 Although a recent
United Nations study found little conclusive evidence to support their claims, the media and
many Central American officials have attributed a large proportion of the rise in violent crime in
the region to gangs, particularly gang-deportees from the United States.113
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide receiving countries with the
complete criminal records or gang affiliations of deportees, however, it may provide them with
some information regarding deportees’ criminal histories and gang affiliations when specifying
why the deportees were removed from the United States. Likewise, receiving countries may
contact the FBI to request criminal history checks on particular criminal deportees once they have
arrived. Over 40% of the Hondurans deported from the United States in FY2010 were removed
on criminal grounds. 114
Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking115
Honduras, along with neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, has become fertile ground for
gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Fueled by poverty, unemployment, leftover weapons
from the conflicts of the 1980s, and the U.S. deportation of criminals to the region, gangs such as
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang (M-18) have firmly established themselves in
the region. Although estimates of the number of gang members vary widely, the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has suggested that there are some 36,000 in Honduras.116 At the
same time, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have taken control of Central
American trafficking corridors to transport cocaine and other narcotics from the Andean region of
South America to the United States.
This confluence of gangs and DTOs has led to increasing rates of crime and violence. According
to Vanderbilt University’s 2010 Americas Barometer, 14% of Honduran citizens reported that
they had been the victim of a crime within the past year.117 The surge in violent crime has been
particularly worrisome. In December 2009, Honduras’ top counternarcotics official was
ambushed and killed in the capital by gunmen on motorcycles. In September 2010, 18 men
working in a shoe factory in San Pedro Sula were apparently massacred by members of a
Mexican DTO. And in January 2011, eight people were killed and three were injured when
gunmen opened fire on a public bus.118 Honduras’ murder rate was already among the highest in
112
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
114
Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations.
115
For more information see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
116
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
117
“65% Satisfecho con Democracia,” La Prensa (Honduras), November 23, 2010.
118
U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics
(continued...)
113
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the world in 2008 at 57.9 per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, it increased to 66.8 per 100,000
in 2009 and reportedly reached 77 per 100,000 in 2010.119 Many have assumed that gangs are
responsible for the increasing number of homicides; however, some recent studies have shown
that the highest murder rates are not in large cities—where gangs are primarily located—but in
more remote areas along strategic drug trafficking corridors. Although there have been some
indications that DTOs are using gangs as hired assassins in Honduras, connections between the
DTOs and gangs remain largely anecdotal and unsubstantiated.120
Honduran Security Efforts
Recent Honduran presidents have implemented varying anti-crime strategies; however, none of
them have achieved much success. During his term, President Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006)
increased the number of police officers and signed legislation that made maras (street gangs)
illegal and gang membership punishable with 12 years in prison. Although the crackdown won
popular support and initially reduced crime, its success was short-lived. Following his election,
President Zelaya (2006-2009) replaced the previous administration’s zero-tolerance policy with
dialogue and other outreach techniques designed to persuade gang members to reintegrate into
society.121 Failure to achieve concrete results, however, led the Zelaya Administration to shift its
emphasis toward more traditional anti-gang law enforcement operations. Zelaya increased the
number of police and military troops in the streets and conducted raids against suspected
criminals. Nonetheless, crime and violence in Honduras continued unabated (as reflected in the
statistics cited above). 122
President Lobo has pledged to crack down on crime and violence, and although he has backed
away from his 2005 proposal to reinstate the death penalty, he still favors a hard-line approach.
Since taking office, Lobo has deployed army troops into the streets to assist in policing and won
legislative approval for several criminal justice reforms. In November 2010, the Honduran
National Congress approved a new anti-terrorism law that is designed to strengthen control over
land, sea, and air borders, and allow authorities to better control cash flows into the country. 123
The Congress approved another legal reform in March 2011, which lengthened prison terms.124 In
June 2011, Lobo won congressional approval for a tax package designed to raise $79 million
(...continued)
Control Strategy Report,” March 2010; “Gang Massacre Appalls Honduras,” Latin News Daily, September 8, 2010,
“Bus Massacre in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, January 7, 2011.
119
This is four times the average homicide rate in Latin America of 18 per 100,000 inhabitants. “Honduras Report
Signals Rising Violence,” Latin News Daily, February 22, 2009; “Honduras has Highest Murder Rate in Central
America,” EFE News Service, March 30, 2010; “Honduras Posts Startling Homicide Rate,” Latin News Daily, January
18, 2011.
120
Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 2010.
121
“Honduran Government Reaches Out to Rehabilitate Gangs,” ACAN-EFE, January 30, 2006.
122
Marion Barbel, “Homicide Rate Confirms Honduras as One of Region’s Most Violent Nations,” Global Insight
Daily Analysis, September 11, 2008.
123
“Honduras Denounces Internal Armed Groups,” Latin News Daily, November 24, 2010.
124
Noé Leiva, “Gobierno de Honduras Ordena Desplegar a Militares para Combatir el Crimen,” Reuters, March 1,
2011.
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annually to fund security efforts, and a constitutional reform that will allow the government to
detain individuals for up to 48 hours without bringing them before a judge. 125
U.S. Cooperation
Although security cooperation was temporarily disrupted by the 2009 political crisis,
communication and coordination between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence entities and
Honduras military and police elements have improved since President Lobo took office. A highlevel task force, co-chaired by President Lobo and the U.S. Ambassador, convenes quarterly to
oversee and direct coordination on security sector efforts. Through the Central America Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI)126 and other efforts, the United States supports a variety of
anticorruption, anti-gang, police training, institution building, and maritime operations programs
intended to prevent crime and improve Honduras’ counternarcotics capabilities. In 2010, joint
counternarcotics operations led to an increase in seizures of bulk cash and most illegal drugs. 127
Likewise, a U.S.-vetted Honduran police unit seized a cocaine processing laboratory in March
2011, the first ever discovered in Central America.128
Despite these accomplishments, some analysts have raised serious concerns about criminal
infiltration of the Honduran government, which could impede future cooperation. A former
member of Honduras’ Council Against Drug Trafficking reportedly has estimated that 10% of the
Honduran National Congress is linked to drug traffickers.129 Recent reports also suggest that U.S.
arms sold to Honduras in the past have turned up in the hands of criminal groups in Colombia and
Mexico.130 According to the U.S. State Department, corruption continues to pose a challenge to
Honduras and institutional changes will need to be made in order for the country to successfully
expel traffickers from its territory. 131
Human Trafficking
According to the State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, Honduras is
primarily a source and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purpose of
commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Many victims are recruited from rural areas with
promises of employment and later subjected to forced prostitution in urban and tourist locales
such as Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the Bay Islands. Destination countries for trafficked
Honduran women and children include Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United
States. There are also foreign victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Honduras, most
125
“Honduras Approves New Tax to Boost Drug Fight,” Reuters, June 23, 2011; “Pese a Advertencia de Ministerio
DDHH: Reforman la Constitución para Detener a Ciudadanos por 48 Horas,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 23, 2011.
126
CARSI is a package of counternarcotics and anticrime assistance for Central America, for which Congress
appropriated $260 million from FY2008-2010. For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America
Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
127
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2011 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 3, 2011.
128
“Honduras Discovers First Mexican-Made Cocaine Lab,” Reuters, March 9, 2011.
129
Tim Johnson, “Drug Gangs Muscle Into New Territory: Central America,” McClatchy Newspapers, April 21, 2011.
130
Geoffrey Ramsey, “Cable: Honduran Military Supplied Weaponry to Cartels,” InSight: Organized Crime in the
Americas, April 25, 2011.
131
U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, March 3, 2011.
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having been trafficked from neighboring countries, including economic migrants en route to the
United States. According to a Honduran non-governmental organization, 10,000 children in
Honduras are victims of commercial sexual exploitation and some 500,000 are subject to child
labor.132
The State Department maintains that Honduras does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, however, it notes that the government is making
significant efforts to do so. As a result, Honduras is considered a so-called “Tier 2” country. The
2011 report recognized the Honduran government’s law enforcement actions against child sex
traffickers, the creation of a draft comprehensive anti-trafficking law, and the launch of an antitrafficking hotline. On the other hand, the report maintained that the Honduran government
provided minimal services for trafficking victims, that laws failed to prohibit trafficking for
forced labor, and that the number of trafficking-related convictions had decreased. The State
Department report provides a number of recommendations for Honduras. These include passing a
comprehensive anti-trafficking law that prohibits forced labor; increasing efforts to investigate
and prosecute trafficking offenses; ensuring that specialized services and shelter are available to
trafficking victims; and developing formal procedures for identifying and assisting victims. 133
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security. For the United
States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to
ensure the speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S.
investment in the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest
port in Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated
by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, and
uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are
identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. Honduras also participates in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which
supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear or radioactive materials, and the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable of scanning containers for
radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States.
Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the first phase of
the SFI.134
132
“Casa Alianza: En Honduras 10,000 Niños Sufren Explotación Sexual,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 11, 2011.
U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report, June
2011.
134
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative,” Press Release,
December 7, 2006, and “Secure Freight Initiative Becomes Fully Operational in United Kingdom, Pakistan, and
Honduras,” Press Release, October 12, 2007.
133
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Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
Acknowledgments
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, contributed to this report.
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electoral rolls are artificially inflated—distorting the turnout rate—as a result of Honduras not
purging the rolls of those who have died or migrated abroad.24
Lobo Administration (2010-Present)
Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated president of Honduras in January 2010, assuming power after
seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had resulted from the
June 2009 ouster of President Zelaya. Over half way through his four-year term, President Lobo
continues to face daunting challenges. His efforts to lead Honduras out of the country’s political
crisis have produced mixed results. While initiatives such as the creation of a truth commission,
the passage of a political reform measure, and an agreement to allow former President Zelaya to
return to the country have won support from the international community, they have only partially
reduced domestic polarization. Lobo’s popularity has also suffered as a result of the perception
that the government has made little progress in addressing the public’s most pressing concerns:
deteriorating security conditions and high levels of unemployment and poverty. Although the
strength of Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has enabled his administration to secure
passage of several policies designed to address these issues, Hondurans have seen few
improvements thus far (see “Security and Human Rights Conditions” and “Economic and Social
Conditions” below). Consequently, 68% of Hondurans believe Lobo has done little or nothing to
resolve the demands of the population.25
Political Reconciliation
President Lobo has taken a number of steps to ease political polarization in Honduras. After being
inaugurated in late January 2010, Lobo arranged safe passage out of the country for former
President Zelaya26 and immediately signed a bill providing political amnesty to Zelaya and those
who removed him from office. The amnesty covers political and common crimes committed prior
to and after the removal of Zelaya, but does not include acts of corruption or violations of human
rights.27 President Lobo also appointed a national unity cabinet with representatives of each of the
five political parties holding seats in the National Congress, and pledged to engage in dialogue
with all sectors of Honduran society. Additionally, Lobo established a truth commission that
investigated the events surrounding the 2009 ouster, passed a constitutional reform to grant
greater power to citizen initiatives, and forged an agreement with former President Zelaya that
facilitated his return to Honduras.
Truth Commission
In April 2010, President Lobo established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación) to investigate the events surrounding the ouster of President Zelaya
24
“Honduras: Tug of War Between Opposition and De Facto Regime Regarding Flow of Voters,” Latin America Data
Base, NotiCen, December 3, 2009; “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
25
Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) and Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación,
Compañía de Jesús (ERIC-SJ), Percepciones Sobre la Situación Hondureña en el Año 2011, January 2012,
http://www.enlaceacademico.org/uploads/media/BOLETIN_SONDEO_2011.pdf.
26
Zelaya had clandestinely returned to Honduras in September 2009, but was unable to leave the Brazilian Embassy
where he had taken refuge.
27
“Congreso Aprueba Amnistía para Delitos Políticos Comunes Conexos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 27, 2010.
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and to make recommendations to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.28 Reflecting
the political polarization in Honduras, the Truth Commission was criticized throughout its
operations by several sectors of Honduran society. Some conservatives feared it could be used as
a means to promote the constitutional reforms that Zelaya proposed in the lead up to the country’s
political crisis.29 At the other end of the ideological spectrum, the leftist National Popular
Resistance Front (Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular, FNRP)—an umbrella group of those
who were opposed to Zelaya’s removal—viewed the Truth Commission as an attempt to
“whitewash” the ouster. As a result, Zelaya called on officials from his government not to
cooperate with the Truth Commission and the FNRP established an alternative commission.30
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued its final report in July 2011. Among other
findings, the report asserts: (1) Zelaya refused to recognize or obey orders from the judicial
branch and other governmental institutions; (2) the Honduran military partially acted on a judicial
order in detaining Zelaya but the high command’s decision to force the president into exile
violated due process and thus amounted to a coup d’état; (3) the Honduran National Congress had
no power to remove President Zelaya or name a substitute and therefore the government of
Roberto Micheletti was illegal; (4) there is no reliable evidence that President Zelaya intended to
dissolve Congress, remain in office, or directly install a national constituent assembly after
holding the non-binding referendum; (5) the November 2009 elections were legitimate; and (6)
members of the Honduran military and police killed at least 12 citizens as a result of the
disproportionate use of force to suppress political demonstrations during the Micheletti
government. The report also provides a number of recommendations to avoid similar crises in the
future. These include reforming the constitution to establish clear impeachment procedures, and
investigating, processing, and punishing those responsible for the human rights abuses that took
place in the aftermath of the ouster.31
Constitutional Reform
Since his inauguration, Lobo has also engaged various sectors of Honduran society about
potential political and constitutional reforms. As noted above, President Zelaya was advocating
constitutional reform at the time of his ouster. Zelaya, the FNRP, and others assert that the current
constitution—adopted in 1982 by a constituent assembly elected under a military government—
reinforces the political and economic exclusion of the majority of the Honduran population. They
maintain the only way to overcome this exclusion is to convene a democratic and inclusive
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.32 Lobo, who never ruled out the idea of abstract
constitutional changes as a candidate, called for a national dialogue to discuss potential reforms in
October 2010. In February 2011, the Honduran National Congress approved a measure that
amended the constitutional provisions governing referendums and plebiscites to allow such
28
The creation of a truth commission had previously been agreed to by Zelaya and Micheletti as part of the
Tegucigalpa-San José Accord, which they signed in late October 2009 in a failed attempt to end the political crisis.
Although the accord fell apart almost immediately, Lobo has implemented several of its provisions since taking office.
29
Germán Reyes, “Lobo Pide No Temer a Comisión de Verdad y Avala Consulta para Constituyente,” Agencia EFE,
May 4, 2010.
30
“Zelaya Calls on Former Officials Not to Collaborate with Truth Commission,” ACAN-EFE, June 8, 2010;
“Honduran Resistance Sets Up Alternative Commission,” Latin News Weekly Report, July 1, 2010.
31
Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, 2011, op.cit.
32
“Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011.
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citizen initiatives to address “issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially
including changes to the currently unalterable portions of the constitution.33
Much like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Lobo’s efforts around the issue of
constitutional reform have largely failed to reduce polarization. The FNRP and others assert that
the changes made thus far are insufficient. They note that any reforms suggested through citizen
initiatives would need to be approved by the National Congress, an institution they maintain
represents entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo. Consequently, they have
continued to push for a constituent assembly capable of drafting a new constitution.34 Likewise,
conservative elements within the traditional parties and civil society have reacted to Lobo’s
efforts with suspicion. While conceding that abstract changes may be necessary, they are opposed
to the idea of convoking a constituent assembly or any attempt to change the unalterable portions
of the constitution. They also have accused Lobo of seeking reelection and catering to small
radical groups instead of addressing real issues of national importance.35
Return of Zelaya
Although Lobo ensured Zelaya’s safe passage out of the country shortly after taking office,
Zelaya was not able to freely return to Honduras until May 2011. Following Lobo’s inauguration,
a number of countries joined with domestic groups like the FNRP in calling on President Lobo to
create the conditions necessary to allow Zelaya to return to Honduras. Lobo encouraged Zelaya to
return from exile but insisted that the former president would have to stand trial for the charges
that were brought against him following his ouster, including fraud, falsification of public
documents, and embezzlement of $2.95 million from the presidency and the Honduran Fund for
Social Investment. Zelaya insisted that the charges were politically motivated and refused to
return until they were dropped. On May 2, 2011, a Honduran court of appeals voted 2-1 to annul
the criminal charges against Zelaya due to procedural irregularities.36
With criminal charges out of the way, former President Zelaya entered into a dialogue with
President Lobo that was mediated by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and President Juan
Manuel Santos of Colombia. On May 22, 2011, Lobo and Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance.37
33
“Honduras Congress Approves Referendums,” Latin News Daily, February 18, 2011.
“Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011; Frente
Amplio de Resistencia Popular, “Posicionamiento Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,” July 9, 2011.
35
“Anduray Postula Movimiento para Defender Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), June 13, 2011; “‘Lobo y
Hernández Gastan 2,000 Millones en Política’,” La Prensa (Honduras), July 11, 2011; Unión Cívica Democrática,
“Posición de la Unión Cívica Democrática Relacionada con la Reforma del Articulo 5 de la Constitución de la
República,” November 11, 2010.
36
“Zelaya Free to Roam,” Latin News Daily, May 3, 2011; “Honduras: Zelaya Ruling Removes Final Hurdle – Or
Does It?” Latin News Weekly Report, May 5, 2011
37
“Acuerdo para la Reconciliación Nacional y la Consolidación del Sistema Democrático en la República de
Honduras,” La Tribuna (Honduras), May 23, 2011.
34
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International Recognition
Following the ouster of President Zelaya, Honduras was diplomatically isolated by the
international community. Although trade continued with the exception of a 48-hour blockade by
some Central American countries, the Micheletti government was not recognized by a single
nation. On July 4, 2009, the member states of the OAS invoked Article 21 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and unanimously voted to suspend Honduras from the organization for an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.38 Honduras also lost the support of the
international financial institutions, which withheld access to loans and other transfers.
As a result of the November 2009 election and Lobo’s reconciliation attempts upon taking office,
much of the international community—including the United States, the European Union, most
Central American nations, and the international financial institutions—quickly recognized the
Lobo Administration. Many South American nations, however, expressed concerns that restoring
formal relations with Honduras would set a dangerous precedent in the region since Zelaya was
never returned to office. They excluded Honduras from regional gatherings and refused to lift the
country’s suspension from the OAS. Moreover, they indicated that recognition would be
dependent on conditions on the ground, including the ability of former President Zelaya to return
home peacefully.39
On June 1, 2011, four days after Zelaya returned from exile, Honduras was finally able to rejoin
the OAS. Noting the importance of the “Accord for National Reconciliation and the
Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras” negotiated between Lobo and Zelaya, the
OAS member states voted 32-1 to lift the suspension.40 Nearly all of the countries that had
previously refused to do so also began to restore official ties with Honduras. Ecuador, which was
the only country to vote against lifting the suspension, refuses to restore diplomatic relations “so
long as those serving in the Honduran government participated in the coup outright and remain in
complete impunity.”41
2013 Election
Although over a year and a half remain in President Lobo’s term, attention in Honduras is
increasingly turning to what could be an extremely volatile election in 2013. Polls conducted over
the past year have consistently found high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in Honduras.
They have also found little or no confidence in almost every governmental and political
institution in the country. Political parties are among the least trusted, with several polls finding
nearly 60% of Hondurans have no confidence in them.42 As confidence in the parties has eroded,
38
Organization of American States, Resolution on the Suspension of the Right of Honduras to Participate in the OAS,
OEA/Ser.P, AG/Res/2 (XXXVII-E/09), Washington, DC, July 4, 2009.
39
“Insulza Dice que Reintegro de Honduras a OEA está Atado a Exilio de Zelaya,” Agence France Presse, February
11, 2011.
40
Organization of American States, Participation of Honduras in the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.P,
AG/Res.1 (XLI-E/11), Washington, DC, June 1, 2011.
41
“Ecuador President Won’t Restore Ties with Honduras,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2011.
42
See UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.; Centro de Estudios para la Democracia (CESPAD), Segunda Encuesta
de Opinion Ciudadana: La Continuada Crisis del Bipartidismo y la Creciente Insatisfacción Ciudadana con la
Democracia, September 2011,
http://cespad.org/documentos/encuestas/Segunda%20encuesta%20de%20opinion%20cespad.pdf; and Neil Nevitte,
Democracy in Honduras: Political Values and Civic Engagement in 2011, National Democratic Institute for
(continued...)
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so too has Hondurans’ family-based sense of party affiliation to the PL and PN.43 The majority of
Hondurans are now open to voting for different political parties. Moreover, public approval of
President Lobo and the PN-controlled National Congress is relatively low, and the PL remains
divided over the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya.44
Given these dynamics, the 2013 election could present an opportunity for third party political
forces or anti-system candidates beyond the country’s two dominant parties. Several new parties
have registered with the TSE over the past year. Former President Zelaya and the FNRP launched
the Liberty and Refoundation (Libertad y Refundación, LIBRE) party, under which they hope to
unite supporters of the FNRP and disillusioned former supporters of the PL. Salvador Nasralla, a
television personality and sports commentator, created the Anti-Corruption Party (Partido
Anticorrupción, PAC) as a platform for a presidential run. And retired General Romeo Vásquez
Velásquez, the commander of the Honduran armed forces when Zelaya was deposed, founded the
Honduran Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patriótica Hondureña, APH), a self-described civic-military
group. These new parties will face a number of challenges, such as a lack of clientelist networks
and political party machinery. The most difficult challenge to overcome, however, may be the
cynicism of Hondurans toward politics. Voter abstention has increased in each election since
1997, and those abstaining constituted a majority in 2009.45 The new parties will need to convince
the dissatisfied majority that electoral democracy is capable of producing real changes in
Honduras. In December 2011, almost 65% of Hondurans surveyed described the new political
parties as “more of the same.”46
Party primaries to select candidates for the 2013 election will be held in November 2012. Top PN
presidential candidates include President of Congress Juan Orlando Hernández, who is backed by
President Lobo, and Ricardo Alvarez, the mayor of Tegucigalpa. At least six candidates from
various internal factions are seeking the PL’s presidential nomination. These include Yani
Rosenthal, who served as Zelaya’s Minister of the Presidency; Edmundo Orellana, who served as
Zelaya’s Defense Minister; Mauricio Villeda, who served as one of Micheletti’s negotiators
during the 2009 political crisis; and Luis Alfonso Santos, a retired bishop who was one of the few
members of the Catholic hierarchy to oppose the ouster. Although LIBRE will hold primary
elections for most offices, its various internal factions have agreed to back Zelaya’s wife,
Xiomara Castro, for president.
Security and Human Rights Conditions
Honduras has long struggled to address high levels of crime and violence, but the deterioration in
security conditions has accelerated in recent years. Homicide rates have risen rapidly, from an
already high 51 murders per 100,000 residents in 2000 to a world-topping 82 per 100,000 in 2010
(...continued)
International Affairs (NDI) and Hagamos Democracia, July 2011, http://www.ndi.org/files/Democracy-in-Honduras2011.pdf.
43
Ruhl, April 2010, op.cit.
44
UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit; CESPAD, September 2011, op.cit; Nevitte, July 2011, op.cit.
45
NDI, 2009 Honduran General Elections: International Election Assessment Mission Final Report, Washington, DC,
January 27, 2010, p. 13,
http://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Honduras_Final_Report_International_Election_Assessment_Mission_%20English.pdf.
46
UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
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(see Figure 3 below).47 Preliminary statistics suggest that the homicide rate continued to climb in
2011, with murders increasing by 15%.48 Common crime is also widespread. In 2010, 16% of
Hondurans reported they had been the victim of a crime in the past year.49 The World Bank
estimates that crime and violence cost Honduras the equivalent of 10% of gross domestic product
(GDP) annually.50
Figure 3. Honduran Homicide Rate, 2000-2010
(Homicides per 100,000 Residents)
Source: CRS presentation of data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study
on Homicide, 2011.
Many observers have been particularly concerned by a surge in violence against journalists and
political and social activists. The frequency of such attacks increased in the aftermath of the June
2009 ouster of President Zelaya, and the attacks have continued under President Lobo. According
to the National Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 journalists have been killed in Honduras
since 2010.51 Many others have been threatened, harassed, or attacked, with those who report on
or criticize the 2009 ouster, government corruption, and human rights abuses being the most
frequent targets. Human rights organizations have also documented attacks against
environmentalists, indigenous activists, human rights defenders, land rights activists, political
organizers, unionists, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
47
United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide, 2011.
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.
48
Tatiana Paz, “Homicidios Aumentan un 15% en el 2011 en Honduras,” La Prensa (Honduras), December 30, 2011.
49
Mitchell A. Seligson and Amy Erica Smith, eds., Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation
in the Americas in Hard Times, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, December 2010,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/RegionalEng.pdf.
50
“World Bank: Crime, Violence Cost Honduras 10 Percent of GDP Annually,” Associated Press, March 28, 2012.
51
CONADEH, “Violaciones a la Libertad de Expresión,” Press Release, March 19, 2012.
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community.52 In the Bajo Aguan region of Honduras, for example, at least 50 people have been
killed over the past two years as violence has escalated in a long-running land dispute between
peasant farmers and large landowners.53 There are indications that members of the Honduran
security forces may have been involved in some of these threats and attacks against journalists
and activists; however, it is difficult to determine the extent of such involvement since most of the
cases have never been investigated.
Criminal Threats, Weak Institutions, and Corruption
A number of inter-related factors have likely contributed to the worsening security and human
rights situation. One aspect is the increasing presence of organized crime. An estimated 36,000
Honduran youth belong to street gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street
Gang (M-18).54 These organizations engage in a wide variety of criminal activities, including
kidnapping and extortion.55 Honduras also serves as a drug-trafficking corridor as a result of its
location between cocaine-producing countries of South America and the major consumer market
in the United States. U.S.-backed security efforts over the past two decades have weakened
Colombian cartels and restricted trafficking through the Caribbean, providing incentives for
Mexican cartels to move into Central America. Consequently, more sophisticated transnational
criminal organizations, such as the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas, have now established a presence
in Honduras.56 Given that two-thirds of Hondurans live below the poverty line,57 a large portion
of the population may be susceptible to recruitment by these and other criminal groups.
Institutional weaknesses and corruption in the Honduran government have also contributed to
deteriorating security and human rights conditions. In 2011, the Honduran National Police had
14,500 officers and a budget of $151 million (0.9% of GDP)58—a force strength and resources
that analysts maintain are “grossly insufficient for the efficient policing of a country the size of
Honduras.”59 The police force also suffers from widespread corruption, with analysts asserting
that some officers have moved beyond taking bribes or tipping off criminals to actually
participating in crimes and acting as enforcers for criminal interests.60 Some 67% of Hondurans
52
At least 75 such activists were reportedly murdered between June 2009 and March 2011. IACHR, Annual Report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011, April 9, 2012,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/TOC.asp.
53
CONADEH, “Informe Muerte Violenta de Personas en el Bajo Aguan,” Press Release, 2012.
54
UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Central-america-study-en.pdf.
55
For more information, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
56
Patrick Corcoran, “Mexican Cartels Expand into Honduras,” InSight Crime, April 14, 2011.
57
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin
America, 2011, November 2011, p.13, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/5/45175/2011-819_PSI-SummaryWEB.pdf.
58
Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), Índice de Seguridad Pública y Ciudadana en América
Latina : El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras, 2011.
59
“Country Risk Assessment: Honduras,” IHS Jane's Defense and Security Intelligence and Analysis, February 8,
2012.
60
Edward Fox, “Dynamics of Honduran Police Corruption Narrow Chance for Reform,” InSight Crime, January 31,
2012; Diego Jiménez, “‘El Incendio en Comayagua Evidencia el Colapso del Sistema,’” La Nación (Costa Rica),
February 26, 2012.
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believe that the police force is involved in crime.61 Moreover, recent press investigations suggest
that corruption may run to the very top of the organization.62
Partially as a result of the serious flaws in the police force, Honduran presidents have repeatedly
turned to the armed forces to provide internal security. The Honduran military, however, has its
own limitations. In 2010, Honduras had roughly 8,600 military personnel, and a defense budget
of $172 million (1.1% of GDP). The Honduran military is almost entirely dependent on
international donors for functioning equipment and technology since less than 1% of the defense
budget is invested in maintenance and procurement.63 Corruption is also a problem. The military
has been linked to drug trafficking in Honduras since the 1980s,64 and recent reports suggest
some sectors continue to engage in illicit activities.65 Although the military is more respected than
the police force, it enjoys the confidence of less than 36% of Hondurans.66
Other justice sector institutions are prone to similar problems. According to the National
Commissioner for Human Rights, 80% of crimes that are reported are never even investigated.67
This reportedly stems from the failure of public prosecutors, who are charged with coordinating
investigations, to work effectively with the police to carry them out.68 Although most criminals
are never brought to justice, the Honduran prison system is still overcrowded. While Honduras’
hard-line anti-gang laws make it relatively easy to detain suspected gang members, the judiciary
is incapable of dealing with the volume of cases.69 Consequently, Honduran prisons, which have
capacity for 8,000 inmates, currently hold 13,000 prisoners—60% of whom have not been
convicted.70
This lack of capacity and susceptibility to corruption goes well beyond the security forces and
justice sector. The patronage system, which allows the political parties to place their supporters in
government positions after each election, has prevented the development of a professional civil
service. As a result, Honduran officials often lack technical expertise and rarely engage in longterm strategic planning.71 Likewise, Honduras ranks near the bottom of the Western Hemisphere
in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, suggesting public-sector
corruption is relatively widespread.72 This apparently includes infiltration by organized crime.
61
UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
Frances Robles, “Graft, Greed, Mayhem Turn Honduras into Murder Capital of World,” Miami Herald, January 22,
2012; and Daniel Valencia Caravantes, “Así es la Policía del País Más Violento del Mundo,” El Faro (El Salvador),
March 19, 2012.
63
RESDAL, Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, 2010.
64
Mark B. Rosenberg, “Narcos and Politicos: Politics of Drug Trafficking in Honduras,” Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, (Summer-Autumn 1988).
65
Geoffrey Ramsey, “Cable: Honduran Military Supplied Weaponry to Cartels,” InSight Crime, April 25, 2011.
66
In comparison, 23.3% of Hondurans express confidence in the police force. UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
67
CONADEH, “Impunidad,” Press Release, April 2012.
68
“Policías y Fiscales son un ‘Desastre’ en la Investigación Criminal,” El Heraldo (Honduras), April 11, 2012; “La
Investigación es Problema de País, Admite Directora de Fiscalías en Honduras,” El Heraldo, (Honduras), April 15,
2012.
69
Hannah Stone, “Honduras Prison Fire Tells of Repressive Anti-Gang Policies,” InSight Crime, February 16, 2012.
70
“Honduras Crea Instituto para Atender Severa Crisis de las Cárceles,” Agence France Presse, April 11, 2012.
71
Romero, 2010, op.cit.
72
On a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Honduras receives a score of 2.6. Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, 2011, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/.
62
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According to Alfredo Landaverde—a well-respected anti-corruption advocate and former head of
the Anti-Narcotics Commission who was assassinated in December 201173—10% of the members
of the Honduran National Congress are involved in drug-trafficking.74
Public Security Policies
Recent Honduran presidents have implemented varying anti-crime strategies, but none of them
have achieved much success. During his term, President Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006) increased
the size of the police force, sent the military into the streets, and implemented hard-line anti-gang
policies that made membership illegal and punishable with 12 years in prison. Although the
crackdown won popular support and initially reduced crime, its success was short-lived. President
Zelaya (2006-2009) replaced the previous administration's zero-tolerance policy with dialogue
and other efforts to reintegrate gang members into society. Failure to achieve concrete results,
however, led the Zelaya Administration to shift its emphasis toward more traditional law
enforcement operations. The deterioration in security conditions accelerated in the aftermath of
Zelaya’s ouster, as Roberto Micheletti (2009-2010) reoriented the security forces away from
combating organized crime to controlling the population.75 Some analysts assert that the ouster
also exacerbated the situation by reinforcing the general sense of impunity in Honduras.76
Since taking office, President Lobo has undertaken a number of initiatives in an attempt to
improve security conditions in Honduras. Working with the National Congress, he has enacted
significant changes in the country’s legal framework. These include a law against terrorism
finance; a reform to allow 48-hour detentions; regulations to allow asset forfeiture and
wiretapping; and a constitutional amendment to allow the extradition of Honduran citizens in
cases of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Lobo and the National Congress also
increased taxes on the mining, telephone, and other industries to increase funding for security
efforts. The tax package was partially rolled back, however, as a result of fierce private sector
opposition.77 Many of these legal changes are still in the process of implementation.
In reaction to a series of scandals in which the police were implicated in murders and other
criminal activities, Honduran officials established two commissions to reform the police force
and other justice sector institutions. In December 2011, the National Congress created the
Directorate for the Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career. It will replace the former
Internal Affairs Unit of the police, which was reported to be rather ineffective.78 In January 2012,
the National Congress established a Public Security Reform Commission. It is empowered to
investigate the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary, and suggest reforms to
strengthen the institutions and reduce corruption.79 Both commissions have been slow to begin
73
Just days before he was assassinated, Landaverde appeared on a television program and stated that he had a list of
Honduran officials tied to organized crime and drug-trafficking.
74
Tim Johnson, “Drug Gangs Muscle into New Territory: Central America,” McClatchy Newspapers, April 21, 2011.
75
James Bosworth, Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, December 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf.
76
See, for example, Annie Murphy, “‘Who Rules in Honduras?’ Coup’s Legacy of Violence,” National Public Radio,
February 12, 2012.
77
“Honduras Cuts Security Tax After Angering Businesses,” Reuters, September 14, 2011.
78
“Cisma en la Policía Nacional: 60 Días de Escándalos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), December 22, 2011.
79
“Honduras: Lobo Makes Move to Purge Police,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 2, 2012.
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operations, however, leading some observers to question the Honduran government’s
commitment to security sector reform.80
Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Lobo has also ordered the armed forces into the
streets to carry out some internal security operations. He has deployed the military to carry out
joint operations with the police on several occasions, and in late November 2011, the Honduran
National Congress approved a decree to temporarily allow military personnel to carry out raids,
make arrests, disarm people, and act against police officers that are involved in criminal
activities. In March 2012, the emergency decree providing the military with broad policing
powers was extended for another 90 days. President Lobo also proposed amending the
constitution to make the military’s policing powers permanent. Lobo has previously suggested
merging the security and defense ministries to establish a single civilian ministry to coordinate
both the police and military.81
A number of analysts have raised concerns about this increasing reliance on the military for
domestic security. Some assert that the military has begun to carve out a larger role for itself in
internal affairs since playing a leading role in the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya, and argue that
this is a worrying trend since the military repeatedly took control of the country prior to 1982 and
was only subordinated to civilian control in the late 1990s.82 U.S. military officials argue that
utilizing the Honduran military for domestic security matters “is a necessary initial step to help
curb the rising tide of violence,” but maintain that such an approach “is unsustainable in the long
term.”83
Although some of these security policies—such as police reform—could improve human rights
conditions in Honduras, the Honduran government has offered few initiatives specifically
designed to do so. President Lobo has created a new Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, and
provided the Human Rights Unit in the Attorney General’s Office with an independent budget for
the first time. Lobo has also acknowledged that the Honduran government lacks investigatory
capacity, and has requested international assistance to resolve human rights cases.84 Human rights
organizations maintain that these efforts have been insufficient. They criticize the Lobo
Administration for repeatedly dismissing the possibility that attacks against journalists and
activists might be related to the victims’ professions or activism, and for failing to hold
accountable those responsible for such attacks.85
80
“Proceso de Depuración Policial en Honduras está Estancado,” La Prensa (Honduras), April 11, 2012; “‘Gobeirno
Siembra la Incertidumbre,’” La Prensa (Honduras), April 5, 2012.
81
“Honduras: Lobo Leans Towards a Permanent Military-Security Role,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean
& Central America, April 2012; “Lobo Forced to Clarify Security Reforms,” Latin News Daily, October 11, 2011.
82
See, for example, Thelma Mejía, “Honduras: Putting Defense in the Hands of Civilians,” Inter Press Service,
October 4, 2011; and Geoffrey Ramsey, “New Powers for Honduran Military Will Not Clean Up Law Enforcement,”
InSight Crime, November 30, 2011.
83
General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, Posture Statement Before the 112th Congress,
House Armed Services Committee, United States Southern Command, March 6, 2012, p. 24, http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Fraser%2003-13-12.pdf.
84
“Honduras Pide Ayuda a Colombia, España, y EEUU en Investigación Sobre DDHH,” Agence France Presse,
January 27, 2011.
85
Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-chapter-honduras;
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 2011, 2012,
http://www.cpj.org/attacks_on_the_press_2011.pdf.
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Economic and Social Conditions
With a gross national income (GNI) of $14.2
billion (2010) and a per capita income of $1,870,
Honduras is classified by the World Bank as a
lower-middle-income developing country.86 The
Honduran economy has historically been dependent
on agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas.
While these commodities remain important, the
Honduran economy has grown more diversified as
a result of significant growth in nontraditional
sectors such as shrimp farming and the
maquiladora, or export-processing industry. In
1998, Honduras was devastated by Hurricane
Mitch, which killed more than 5,000 people and
caused billions of dollars in damage. The economy
contracted by 1.4% in 1999, but rebounded with
average annual growth of 5% between 2000 and
2008.87 During the same time period, international
financial institutions provided Honduras with $2.4
billion in debt relief to free government resources
for poverty alleviation efforts. 88
Honduras in Brief
Approximate Size: Slightly larger than Virginia
Population (2011 est.): 8.14 million
Ethnic Groups: 90% Mestizo (mixed Amerindian
and European), 7% Amerindian, 2% black, 1% white
Religions: 65% Roman Catholic, 35% Protestant
Official Language: Spanish
GNI (Atlas Method, 2010): $14.2 billion
GNI per Capita (Atlas Method, 2010): $1,870
Poverty Rate (2010): 67.4%
Indigence Rate (2010): 42.8%
Adult Literacy Rate (2007): 84%
Life Expectancy (2009): 73 years
Infant Mortality (2010): 20 per 1,000 live births
Sources: U.S. State Department, World Bank,
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean.
Crises and Recovery
The global financial crisis and domestic political crisis took a significant toll on Honduras. As an
open economy that is closely tied to the United States, Honduras is sensitive to international
downturns. By early 2009, Honduras was experiencing significant declines in remittances,
tourism, and export earnings as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession.89 The
ouster of President Zelaya exacerbated these economic problems, as the international community,
which had been expected to finance 20% of the government’s budget,90 imposed a series of
economic sanctions on Honduras. International financial institutions withheld access to loans and
other transfers, the European Union and United States terminated some foreign aid, and
Venezuela stopped supplying the country with subsidized oil. Domestic opponents of the ouster
placed additional pressure on the economy, engaging in strikes, transportation blockades, and
other measures designed to paralyze economic activity. Curfews implemented by the Micheletti
government to suppress demonstrations by the political opposition further inhibited economic
86
World Bank, “Data: Honduras,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras.
“Honduras: Country Data,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2011.
88
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF and World Bank Support US$1 Billion in Debt Service Relief for
Honduras,” Press Release No. 05/76, April 5, 2005; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “IDB Governors
Approve $4.4 Billion in Debt Relief for Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua,” Press Release, March 16,
2007.
89
“Honduras: Country Report” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2009.
90
Robin Emmott, “Aid Freeze in Post-Coup Honduras Hurting Poor,” Reuters, November 12, 2009.
87
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activity as workers were unable to reach their places of employment. These external and internal
shocks contributed to an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009.91
Upon taking office in January 2010, President Lobo inherited a weak economy and a growing
budget deficit. He entered into negotiations with the international financial institutions, and
quickly secured an emergency stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
as well as much needed development financing from the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank. Under the agreements, Lobo committed to undertaking structural reforms
designed to restore macroeconomic stability and strengthen public finances. The Honduran
National Congress has approved several of the structural changes, including a tax reform
designed to increase revenue, an energy reform to more narrowly target subsidies, a reform of
public sector pension funds designed to make them more sustainable, and a measure de-indexing
teachers’ wages from changes in the minimum wage in an effort to slow the growth of
expenditure on public sector salaries.92 These changes, along with improving economic
conditions in the United States, have helped narrow the Honduran central government’s deficit
from 6.2% of GDP in 2009 to an estimated 3.5% of GDP in 2012. Despite these tight fiscal
policies, the economy grew by 3.8% in 2011 and is expected to grow by 4% in 2012. The
recovery remains fragile, however, and the government’s budget constraints leave little room for
counter-cyclical spending should the international economic situation worsen.93
Social Indicators
Honduras remains one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America. Nevertheless,
international debt relief and higher levels of economic growth over the past decade have allowed
the Honduran government to dedicate more resources to poverty alleviation efforts. Between
2002 and 2009, public social spending increased from 9.5% of GDP to 11.4% of GDP.94 During
the same time period, poverty fell from 77.3% to 65.7% and indigence fell from 54.4% to 41.8%.
Both poverty and indigence increased in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and domestic
political crisis, however, reaching 67.4% and 42.8%, respectively, in 2010.95 The reduction in the
poverty rate has not been accompanied by a reduction in income disparities. The top 10% of
Hondurans received 43% of all income in 2010, which is more than the bottom 80% combined
and a level virtually unchanged from 1999.96 Likewise, there continue to be significant barriers to
social mobility. According to a 2010 World Bank report, just 51% of the basic housing and
education services necessary to succeed in life are available and distributed equitably among
Honduran children.97
91
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2012.
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2010; IMF, Honduras: Letter of Intent,
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, September 10,
2010; IMF, “Statement by an IMF Mission at the Conclusion of its Visit to Honduras,” Press Release No.12/43,
February 9, 2012.
93
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2012.
94
ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2010, November 2010, p.156,
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/41801/PSI2010-Chapter-III-Social-Spending.pdf.
95
ECLAC, November 2011, op.cit.
96
ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011, December 2011, p. 68,
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/45608/LCG2513b.pdf.
97
José R. Molinas et al., Do Our Children Have a Chance? The 2010 Human Opportunity Report for Latin America
and the Caribbean, World Bank, Conference Edition, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 52,
(continued...)
92
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The Lobo Administration is currently implementing policy reforms designed to strengthen the
Honduran social protection system. When Lobo took office, Honduras had a number of social
assistance programs that offered varying levels of coverage and were not well coordinated. Lobo
has begun consolidating several of these programs under his Bono 10,000 initiative, which
provides an annual stipend of 10,000 Lempiras (about $525) to families in extreme poverty. In
exchange, the families agree to keep their children in school and attend regular preventative
health check-ups. The program currently reaches at least 229,000 households, and is expected to
incorporate 600,000 families by the end of 2014. The World Bank expects Bono 10,000 to have a
significant impact on household income, but is concerned that Honduras may not be able to
sustain the program once it reaches its full projected coverage.98
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years. The bilateral
relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and
became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country was a staging
area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by the Contra forces attempting to overthrow
the leftist Sandinista government. Economic linkages also intensified in the 1980s after Honduras
became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provided duty-free importation of
Honduran goods into the United States. Bilateral economic ties have further expanded since the
entrance into force of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006.
Relations between the United States and Honduras were strained in 2009 because of the country’s
political crisis. The Obama Administration quickly condemned the June 28 ouster, and, over the
course of the following months, leveled a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions designed
to pressure Honduran officials to restore Zelaya to power. The Administration limited contact
with the Honduran government, suspended some foreign assistance, minimized cooperation with
the Honduran military, and revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti
government. Micheletti reacted angrily to U.S. policy toward Honduras, declaring, “it isn’t
possible for anyone, no matter how powerful they are, to come over here and tell us what we have
to do.”99 In November 2009, the Administration shifted the emphasis of U.S. policy from
reversing Zelaya’s removal to ensuring the legitimacy of previously scheduled elections.
Although some analysts argued that the policy shift allowed those behind the ouster to
consolidate their hold on power, Administration officials maintained that elections had become
the only realistic way to bring an end to the political crisis.100
Relations have improved considerably since the inauguration of President Lobo, whose efforts to
foster national reconciliation and solidify democratic processes in Honduras led the United States
(...continued)
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPPOVANA/Resources/840442-1260809819258/66455531273515611898/Livro2010_final1.pdf.
98
World Bank, Project Information Document, Appraisal Stage: HN-Social Protection, Report No.AB5677, May 17,
2010; World Bank, Information Status & Results: Honduras Social Protection, Report No.ISR5625, July 12, 2011.
99
Carlos Salinas, “Honduran De Facto Leader Vows to Cling to Power Over US Objections,” El País (Spain), August
5, 2009.
100
Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Tries to Salvage Honduras Accord,” New York Times, November 10, 2009.
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to restore foreign assistance and resume cooperation on other issues. Current U.S. policy
objectives in Honduras include (1) improving the human-rights climate, especially regarding
allegations that journalists and other individuals have been targeted for their political views; (2)
combating high levels of corruption, crime, and drug-trafficking; and (3) promoting and
implementing social and economic reforms to boost growth and reduce poverty and inequality
levels that are among the highest in the hemisphere.101 To advance these policy objectives, the
United States provides Honduras with foreign assistance, maintains significant security and
commercial ties, and engages on transnational issues such as migration and human trafficking.
Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable amounts of foreign assistance to Honduras over the
past three decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $2.5 billion (constant 2010
dollars) in economic and military aid to Honduras as the country supported U.S. policy objectives
in the region. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts
subsided and competing foreign assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane
Mitch changed that trend as the United States provided significant amounts of aid to help the
country recover from the 1998 storm. As a result of the influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to
Honduras for the 1990s amounted to around $1.2 billion (constant 2010 dollars). With Hurricane
Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid levels to Honduras again began to
decline. From 2000 to 2009, total U.S. assistance to Honduras amounted to just over $900 million
(constant 2010 dollars).102
Bilateral Assistance
U.S. bilateral assistance to Honduras supports a variety of projects designed to strengthen
democracy and the rule of law, enhance citizen security, improve health systems, increase food
security, and conserve the environment. Recent bilateral U.S. assistance to Honduras amounted to
$50.3 million in FY2010, $56 million in FY2011, and is scheduled to total an estimated $57
million in FY2012. Honduras would receive $58.2 million under the Obama Administration’s
request for FY2013. This includes $49 million in Development Assistance, $5.5 million for
Global Health Programs, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $650,000 for International
Military Education and Training (see Table 1 below). Most assistance to the country is managed
by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State.
101
Testimony of Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, March 18, 2010.
102
These figures represent actual obligations, not appropriations. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2010, 2012.
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Table 1. Bilateral U.S. Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2013
(U.S. $ in thousands)
Account
FY2012
(Estimate)
FY2013
(Request)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
DA
15,149
21,382
37,491
42,266
46,266
49,000
GHP (USAID)
12,035
11,750
11,000
10,988
8,000
4,500
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
10,150
5,771
0
0
0
0
INCLE
744
0
0
0
0
0
IMET
936
329
777
765
700
650
FMF
496
0
0
998
1,000
3,000
40,510
40,232
50,268
56,017
56,966
58,150
GHP (State)
P.L. 480
Total
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2010,
2011, 2012, and 2013, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm.
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; GHP=Global Health Programs; P.L. 480=Food For Peace;
INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET=International Military Education and
Training; and FMF=Foreign Military Financing.
Additional U.S. Assistance
Honduras receives some U.S. aid beyond the bilateral assistance noted above. Additional sources
of U.S. assistance in recent years include the Central America Regional Security Initiative, the
Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps.
Central America Regional Security Initiative103
Honduras receives some assistance provided to Central America through the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI, formerly known as Mérida-Central America), which is
funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere Regional account. In addition to
providing the seven nations of Central America with equipment, training, and technical assistance
to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, CARSI is designed to
strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the
underlying conditions that contribute to them. Congress has appropriated $466.5 million for
CARSI since FY2008, and the Obama Administration has requested an additional $107.5 million
for CARSI in FY2013. It is unclear what percentage of that funding goes to Honduras since the
State Department has not provided a public breakdown of CARSI funding by country.
CARSI supports a wide variety of activities in Honduras. Some U.S. agencies are using CARSI
funds to establish and support specially-vetted units and task forces. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) vetted units and a U.S.Honduran joint Financial Crimes Task Force receive equipment and training in support of
complex investigations into drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms and bulk cash
103
For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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smuggling. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads a Transnational Anti-Gang unit
designed to interrupt criminal gang activity. A Special Victims Task Force—consisting of vetted
members of the Honduran National Police, the Public Ministry, and U.S. advisors—is looking
into high profile violent crime cases, such as the persecution of journalists and members of the
LGBT community. Other CARSI-funded efforts to strengthen Honduran institutions include
support for a joint Criminal Investigative School, and border and prison management reforms.
CARSI funds are also being utilized to support civil society and municipal government
prevention programs. At least 25 community outreach centers have been established to provide
vocational training, employment resources, and other opportunities for at-risk youth.104
Department of Defense
The U.S. Department of Defense provides Honduras with additional security assistance. Congress
has authorized the Department of Defense to provide certain types of support for foreign
counterdrug efforts, including training, equipment, infrastructure, transportation, reconnaissance,
and intelligence analysis.105 In recent years, this has included the construction of Honduran naval
bases in Caratasca and on the island of Guanaja, both of which are designed to enhance
Honduras’ capabilities to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments in high volume maritime
trafficking corridors.106 Estimated direct and indirect Department of Defense counternarcotics
support totaled $8.5 million in FY2011, and is expected to total $4.9 million in FY2012, and $4.4
million in FY2013.107
Millennium Challenge Corporation
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provided Honduras with a five-year, $205
million108 economic growth compact, which was completed in September 2010. The compact had
two components: a rural development project to provide farmers with skills to grow and market
new crops, and a transportation project to improve roads and highways to link farmers and other
businesses to ports and major production centers in Honduras.109 In January 2011, MCC
announced that it would not be renewing the compact. Although Honduras passes 16 of 20
indicators on the MCC scorecard, it performs below the median on corruption. Nevertheless,
MCC has declared Honduras eligible for a Threshold Program of up to $20 million in FY2012.
The Threshold Program will address policy barriers to a second MCC compact and economic
growth.110
104
U.S. Embassy in Honduras, “Current CARSI Projects in Honduras,” March 6, 2012.
For more information on Department of Defense counterdrug authorities, see CRS Report RL34543, International
Drug Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
106
“Central America: Behind the Growing Presence of the US,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, July
2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 DoD Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, April 4, 2011.
107
These are estimates as the Department of Defense budgets its counternarcotics assistance by program rather than by
country. U.S. Department of Defense, Counternarcotics (CN) Support for Foreign Countries, February 17, 2012.
108
The compact was originally for $215 million, but the final $10 million was terminated as a result of the 2009 ouster
of President Zelaya.
109
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Honduras Compact: Raising Incomes, Realizing Dreams” November
3, 2010.
110
MCC, “Report on Selection of Eligible Countries for Fiscal Year 2012,” December 2011.
105
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Peace Corps
The Peace Corps, which had been active in Honduras since 1963, pulled all 158 of its volunteers
out of Honduras in January 2012 as a result of security concerns.111 The volunteers worked on
projects related to HIV/AIDS prevention and child survival; protected area management; water
and sanitation; and business, municipal, and youth development. The Peace Corps conducted a
thorough assessment of the program and security conditions in Honduras in February 2012, and is
currently considering whether or not to return to the country. More than 5,500 Americans have
served in Honduras since the program was founded.112
Human Rights Conditions on Aid
Since the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya, Members of Congress have expressed serious concerns
about the human rights situation in Honduras. A provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2012 (P.L. 112-74) requires the State Department to withhold some assistance for the
Honduran security forces until certain human rights conditions are met. According to the
legislation, 20% of the funds appropriated for the Honduran military and police forces must be
withheld until the Secretary of State reports that: “the Government of Honduras is implementing
policies to protect freedom of expression and association, and due process of law; and is
investigating and prosecuting in the civilian justice system, in accordance with Honduran and
international law, military and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have violated human
rights, and the Honduran military and police are cooperating with civilian judicial authorities in
such cases.” The restriction does not apply to assistance designed to promote transparency, anticorruption, and the rule of law within the military and police forces. Nor does it apply to any of
the security support being provided by the U.S. Department of Defense.
In March 2012, a number of Members of Congress signed onto letters to Secretary of State
Clinton reiterating their concerns about human rights conditions in Honduras. A letter signed by
seven Senators highlighted a broad range of human rights concerns and requested detailed
information on the Honduran government’s compliance with the human rights provisions in the
FY2012 appropriations legislation.113 Another letter, which was signed by 94 Representatives,
primarily focused on the situation in Bajo Aguán. Among other actions, the letter called for the
suspension of U.S. assistance to Honduran security forces.114
Security Cooperation
U.S.-Honduran security cooperation goes well beyond the provision of foreign assistance. Among
other initiatives, the two countries work together on counternarcotics efforts, maintain close
military ties, and cooperate on port security issues.
111
“158 Peace Corps Volunteers Leave Honduras,” Associated Press, January 16, 2012.
Peace Corps, “Frequently Asked Questions: Peace Corps Operations in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,”
March 2012.
113
Letter from Barbara A. Mikulski, United States Senator, et al. to the Honorable Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State,
March 5, 2012.
114
Letter from Jan Schakowsky, United States Representative, et al. to the Honorable Hillary Clinton, Secretary of
State, March 9, 2012.
112
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Counternarcotics Cooperation
Honduras is a major transshipment point for illicit narcotics. Approximately 20% of the cocaine
trafficked to the United States is transported through the air,115 and 79% of cocaine smuggling
flights departing South America land in Honduras.116 Remote areas, such as the Mosquitia region
along Honduras’ northeastern coast, have been particularly vulnerable to such flights given the
lack of state presence. After the drug planes land in Honduras, the cocaine continues on toward
the United States on subsequent flights or through maritime corridors and overland routes.
Although counternarcotics cooperation was temporarily disrupted by the 2009 political crisis,
communication and coordination between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence entities and
Honduran military and police elements have improved since President Lobo took office. A highlevel task force, co-chaired by President Lobo and the U.S. Ambassador, convenes quarterly to
oversee and direct coordination on security sector efforts. As noted above, the United States
provides Honduras with extensive assistance to combat drug-trafficking and related security
problems through CARSI and other aid programs (see “Foreign Assistance”). Additional
counternarcotics support reportedly has been provided through the DEA’s Foreign-deployed
Advisory Support Team (FAST) program, which deploys detachments of military-trained special
agents to train, mentor, and work with specially vetted members of local security forces.117
U.S.-Honduran counternarcotics efforts have produced considerable results. In 2011, the
Honduran government (with U.S. support) interdicted over 22 metric tons of cocaine, which is
four times the amount of cocaine it interdicted in 2010. The Honduran government also seized 8
kilograms of heroin, 299,000 pseudoephedrine tablets, and the first cocaine processing laboratory
to be discovered in Central America in recent years.118 Despite these accomplishments, concerns
about criminal infiltration of the Honduran government and security forces could impede future
cooperation.119 The State Department asserts that corrections management and police reform will
be needed to sustain near-term successes.120
Military Ties
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. JTF Bravo was first established in
1983 with about 1,200 troops who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting
U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort.
Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and
humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and rescue operations that
benefit Honduras and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments
115
Information provided to CRS by Joint Interagency Task Force South, 2012.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 7, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/184100.htm#Honduras.
117
Charlie Savage, Randal C. Archibold, and Ginger Thompson, “D.E.A. Squads Extend Reach of Drug War,” New
York Times, November 7, 2011.
118
INCSR, 2012, op.cit.
119
See, for example, Ramsey, April 2011, op.cit.; Johnson, April 2011, op.cit.; and Robles, January 2012, op.cit.
120
INCSR, 2012, op.cit.
116
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involving active duty and reserve components also provide training opportunities for thousands of
U.S. troops.
The Honduran military’s role in the June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya led some to
reassess the state of U.S.-Honduran military cooperation. Some analysts questioned the
effectiveness of such cooperation, arguing that military-to-military contact does not appear to
have obtained its desired outcomes given that the Honduran military reportedly cut off contact
with the United States prior to the ouster.121 The events led the United States to temporarily
suspend joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the country.122 U.S.Honduran military cooperation resumed following the election of President Lobo, however, with
the United States restoring aid and training efforts.123
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have also cooperated on port security. For the United States, port
security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to ensure the
speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S. investment in
the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest port in
Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and uses a security regime to ensure that all containers
that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are
placed on vessels destined for the United States. Honduras also participates in the Department of
Energy's Megaports Initiative, which supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear
or radioactive materials, and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable
of scanning containers for radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart
for the United States. Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the
first phase of the SFI.
Trade and Investment
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased significantly since the early
1980s. In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), a unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many
goods from the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing
arrangements with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States of certain
apparel products assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or export-assembly
companies flourished, most concentrated in the north coast region. The passage of the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act in 2000, which provided Caribbean Basin nations with North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-like preferential tariff treatment, further boosted the
maquila sector. Trade relations expanded most recently as a result of the Dominican Republic-
121
See, for example, Adam Isacson, “When Your Aid Recipients Stop Taking Your Calls,” Center for International
Policy, June 28, 2008.
122
John J. Kruzel, “U.S. Limits Contact with Honduran Military,” American Forces Press Service, July 2, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
123
“Honduras: Ties with US Return to Normal,” Latin News Weekly Report, April 22, 2010.
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Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has significantly
liberalized trade in goods and services since entering into force with Honduras in April 2006.124
Total trade between the United States and Honduras has increased 44% since the implementation
of CAFTA-DR, with U.S. exports to Honduras growing by 67% and U.S. imports from Honduras
growing by 21%. Since a large portion of Honduran exports entered the United States duty free
prior to implementation of the agreement, analysts had predicted that CAFTA-DR would lead to a
relatively larger increase in U.S. exports. Total two-way trade amounted to $10.6 billion in 2011,
$6.1 billion in U.S. exports to Honduras and $4.5 billion in U.S. imports from Honduras. Similar
to previous trade arrangements, CAFTA-DR has provided substantial benefits to the Honduran
maquila sector. Textiles and apparel (assembled products from the maquila sector) account for
60% of U.S. imports from Honduras. Likewise, textile and apparel inputs, such as yarns and
fabrics, account for a substantial portion of U.S. exports to Honduras. Other major U.S. exports to
Honduras include oil and machinery.125
U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras has also increased since the implementation of
CAFTA-DR. Total U.S. foreign direct investment exceeded $1 billion in 2010, up 27% from $787
million in 2006.126 The most significant U.S. investments are in the maquila, manufacturing,
tourism, agriculture, telecommunications, and energy sectors. According to the U.S. State
Department, relatively low labor costs, proximity to the U.S. market, and Central America’s
largest port (Puerto Cortés) make Honduras attractive to investors. At the same time, high levels
of crime, a weak judicial system, corruption, low levels of educational attainment, and poor
infrastructure hamper investment.127 Some Members of Congress have raised questions about the
investment climate in Honduras as a result of several cases where U.S.-owned companies
allegedly have been driven out of business as a result of anticompetitive practices or have been
expropriated without compensation.128 On June 15, 2011, a bill (H.R. 2200, Rohrabacher) was
introduced to limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government
of Honduras has settled all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
Despite the increases in trade and investment, some analysts have expressed concerns about the
implementation of CAFTA-DR. Labor rights provisions have been of particular concern to many
in the United States and Honduras. According to the U.S. State Department, Honduran labor laws
are generally satisfactory, however, the government frequently fails to enforce them. In 2010,
“union leaders were subjected to violence and threats,” “employers commonly threatened to close
unionized factories and harassed or dismissed workers seeking to unionize,” and “factory
management in export-processing zones required compulsory overtime, with some factories
enforcing this requirement by locking workers inside.”129 In March 2012, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) joined with Honduran
124
For more information on CAFTA-DR, see CRS Report R42468, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA DR): Developments in Trade and Investment, by J. F. Hornbeck.
125
U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, April 2012.
126
U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Tables,” Survey of Current Business, September
2011.
127
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement Honduras, March 2011, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157290.htm.
128
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Next Steps for
Honduras, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 2010, Serial No. 111-94 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
129
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices – Honduras, April 8, 2011, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154510.htm.
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trade unions to file a petition with the U.S. Department of Labor. The petition alleges that the
government of Honduras has failed to effectively enforce its labor laws and comply with its
commitments under CAFTA-DR, and calls on the U.S. government to engage Honduras on these
issues to ensure future compliance.130
Migration Issues
Migration issues are central to the U.S.-Honduran relationship as more than 625,000 Hispanics of
Honduran origin—the equivalent of nearly 8% of the Honduran population—reside in the United
States. Some 428,000 (68%) of the Hondurans in the United States are foreign born, 79% of
whom have arrived since 1990.131 Immigration from Honduras to the United States is primarily
driven by high levels of poverty and unemployment. Given the persistence of those conditions,
nearly a third of Honduran citizens who still live in their home country would like to emigrate.132
In addition to relieving social pressure, emigration plays an important role in the Honduran
economy. Remittances from migrant workers abroad are the largest single source of foreign
exchange for Honduras. They more than tripled between 2002 and 2008 before declining in 2009
as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession, which left many Honduran immigrants
unemployed.133 Remittances have since recovered, however, growing by 13% in 2011 to reach
$2.9 billion (17% of GDP).134 The United States and Honduras have sought to maximize the
development impact of remittance flows under the Building Remittance Investment for
Development Growth and Entrepreneurship (BRIDGE) Initiative that was launched in September
2010. Under the initiative, the United States and Honduras partner with financial institutions to
leverage the remittances they receive to obtain lower-cost, longer-term financing in international
capital markets and fund investments in infrastructure, public works, and commercial
development.135
Temporary Protected Status
Since Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras in 1998, the U.S. government has provided temporary
protected status (TPS) to allow eligible Hondurans—who may otherwise be deported—to stay in
the United States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS has now been extended 10 times.
The most recent TPS extension came on November 4, 2011, when the Secretary of Homeland
Security announced that the United States would continue to provide TPS for an additional 18
months, expiring on July 5, 2013 (prior to this extension, TPS would have expired January 5,
2012). According to the Federal Register notice on the most recent extension, the Secretary of
130
AFL-CIO, “The AFL-CIO Joins Honduran Trade Unions in Filing a Petition with Department of Labor against
Honduran Government for Failing to Enforce Labor Laws under Trade Agreement,” Press Release, March 29, 2012.
131
Daniel Dockterman, Hispanics of Honduran Origin in the United States, Pew Hispanic Center, Statistical Profile,
Washington, DC, May 26, 2011.
132
UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
133
“Roundtable Discussion: Outlook for Remittances to Latin America in 2010,” Inter-American Dialogue, April 12,
2010; “Latin America: Remittances Slide,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2009.
134
Rene Maldonado, Natasha Bajuk, and Maria Luisa Hayem, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean:
Regaining Growth, Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund, Washington, DC, 2012,
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=36723460.
135
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. BRIDGE Initiative Commitments with El Salvador and
Honduras,” September 22, 2010.
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Homeland Security determined that the extension was warranted because there continues to be a
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in Honduras resulting from Hurricane
Mitch, and Honduras remains temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its
nationals.136 An estimated 66,000 Hondurans residing in the United States benefit from TPS.137
Deportations
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. Approximately
23,800 Hondurans were deported from the United States in FY2011, making Honduras one of the
top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.138 Increasing deportations from the United States
have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit country for
Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are concerned
about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often difficult for
those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not speak Spanish,
who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support face additional
difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social problems, leaders are
concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of deportations continue.139
Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. Between 2000
and 2004, an estimated 20,000 unauthorized immigrants with criminal convictions were sent back
to Central America, many of whom had spent time in prisons in the United States for drug and/or
gang-related offenses. Some observers contend that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los
Angeles gang culture to Central America, and that they have recruited new members from among
the local populations.140 ICE does not provide receiving countries with the complete criminal
records or gang affiliations of deportees, however, it may provide them with some information
regarding deportees’ criminal histories and gang affiliations when specifying why the deportees
were removed from the United States. Likewise, receiving countries may contact the FBI to
request criminal history checks on particular criminal deportees once they have arrived. Nearly
48% of the Hondurans deported from the United States in FY2011 were removed on criminal
grounds.141
Trafficking in Persons
According to the State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, Honduras is
primarily a source and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purpose of
136
Department of Homeland Security, “Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS Beneficiaries,” 76 Federal
Register 68488-68493, November 4, 2011.
137
For more information on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy
and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
138
Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations, October 31, 2011.
139
Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington
Post, June 27, 2007.
140
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
141
Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations, October 31, 2011.
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commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Many victims are recruited from rural areas with
promises of employment and later subjected to forced prostitution in urban and tourist locales
such as Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the Bay Islands. Destination countries for trafficked
Honduran women and children include Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United
States. There are also foreign victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Honduras, most
having been trafficked from neighboring countries, including economic migrants en route to the
United States. According to a Honduran non-governmental organization, 10,000 children in
Honduras are victims of commercial sexual exploitation and some 500,000 are subject to child
labor.142
The State Department maintains that Honduras does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, however, it notes that the government is making
significant efforts to do so. As a result, Honduras is considered a so-called “Tier 2” country. The
State Department’s 2011 report recognized the Honduran government’s law enforcement actions
against child sex traffickers, the creation of a draft comprehensive anti-trafficking law, and the
launch of an anti-trafficking hotline. Nevertheless, the report maintained that the Honduran
government provided minimal services for trafficking victims, that laws failed to prohibit
trafficking for forced labor, and that the number of trafficking-related convictions had decreased.
The State Department’s recommendations for Honduras include passing a comprehensive antitrafficking law that prohibits forced labor; increasing efforts to investigate and prosecute
trafficking offenses; ensuring that specialized services and shelter are available to trafficking
victims; and developing formal procedures for identifying and assisting victims.143
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
142
“Casa Alianza: En Honduras 10,000 Niños Sufren Explotación Sexual,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 11, 2011.
U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report, June
2011, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/index.htm.
143
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