Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
JuneNovember 21, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33546
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian
relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its
cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the
Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the
Jordanian regime (particularly in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other
countries in the region), the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the possibility of
U.S.-Jordanian nuclear energy cooperation, and U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence
cooperation.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small
size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and
friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel,
Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful
neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its
relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however, relations improved
throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and
distanced itself from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2011 amounted to approximately $12.47 billion. Levels
of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during
periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid funding. On September 22, 2008, the
U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to
provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. For
FY2012, the Administration is requesting $663.7 million for Jordan in total military and
economic aid.
S. 1601, the Senate’s Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2012, would provide $360 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)
assistance to Jordan and $300 million in Foreign Military Financing, meeting the President’s full
request for FY2012. In addition, Section 7039(b) of the bill would authorize up to $60 million in
ESF appropriated by the bill to establish and operate one or more enterprise funds in Jordan.
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Contents
Recent Developments..............Overview: Jordan and Arab Regional Unrest ....................................................................................................1
Unrest in Jordan 1
National Dialogue Committee Recommendations .................................................................... 1
Constitutional Amendments ......................................................2
Dissent from within the King’s Tribal Base ...........................................................................2
Youth-Driven Protests and Islamists ...... 2
Opposition Reaction to Reform Proposals ................................................................................4
The King’s Dilemma ............................................ 3
Where Is the Protest Movement in Jordan Heading? .................................................................5 3
Country Overview .......................................................................................................................6.... 4
Domestic Politics and the Economy ................................................................................................ 57
The Hashemite Royal Family ...................................................................................................8. 6
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections ..Political Parties, and Judiciary...............................................................................8
The 1993 Election Law .............................................. 7
The Economy.....................................................9
2010 Parliamentary Elections ..........................................................................................9
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood ........... 8
Foreign Relations......................................................................... 11
The Military and Security Establishment ............................................................................. 12
The Economy...................................................................................................................... 12
Water Shortages ............................................................................................................ 12
Civilian Nuclear Energy Program.................................................................................. 13
Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations ................................................................................ 16
Promoting Peace in the Middle East ..................................................... 9
Jordan’s Relationship with Israel............................................................................................... 9
The King’s Recent Statements on Israel and Peace Process ............................................. 10
Jordan and Hamas ................................................................................... 16
Opposition to Normalization ......................................................................................... 17
Reviving the Arab-Israeli Peace Process............................ 10
Jordan and Syria ...................................................................... 17
Jordan-Hamas Relations................................................................................................ 17
Terrorism ...... 11
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation...................................................................................................................... 18
Allegations of Torture .... 12
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ............................................................................................... 20
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation............................... 12
The Five-Year Aid Deal.................................................. 21
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ................................................... 12
Economic Assistance...................................... 21
The Five-Year Aid Deal ....................................................................... 12
Food Aid......................... 21
Economic Assistance..................................................................................................... 22 13
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)............................................................................ 13 22
Military Assistance............................................................................................................ 13 23
Trade ..................................................................................................................................... 23... 14
Free Trade Agreement ................................................................................................... 23
Qualifying Industrial Zones........................................................................................... 24
Sweat Shop Allegations....................... 14
Qualifying Industrial Zones ............................................................................................... 24 14
Military Cooperation ............................................................................................................. 25.. 15
Military Sales ................................................................................................................. 25... 15
Joint Exercises and Training .......................................................................................... 25... 15
Other Activities ................................................................................................................. 16 26
Jordan’s Role in Libya ...................................................................................................... 26. 17
Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan......................................................................................... 27.... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Jordan and Its Neighbors ..............................................................................................7
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Tables
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan .......................................................................... 2515
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis .................................................... 18
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................... 29.. 19
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Recent Developments
•
King Abdullah Proposes New Reforms. In a nationally televised speech on
June 12, 2011, King Abdullah II proposed that in the future, parliamentary
majorities would be able to form governments rather than the king himself.1 He
offered no specific timetable for this change, but suggested that the process of
reform could take between two to three years. Some opposition groups and
figures asserted that the king had previously discussed similar proposals and that
this latest proposal lacks detail.
•
Protests in Tafila, King’s Convoy Attacked? According to various media
reports, both during and after a recent visit to the town of Tafila (109 miles south
of Amman), a crowd of young rioters clashed with local police and reportedly
threw stones at the king’s motorcade. Soon thereafter, there were reports that the
Amman office of Agence France Presse, the news agency that initially broke the
story of possible violence against the king’s convoy, was raided and vandalized.
King Abdullah II recently announced the creation of a Tafila Development Fund,
valued at $21 million, to create jobs for residents, among other development
projects.
•
King Abdullah II Interview on Peace Process In a recent interview with the
Washington Post, King Abdullah II stated that “2011 will be, I think, a very bad
year for peace.” He added that “Although we will continue to try to bring both
sides to the table, I am the most pessimistic I have been in 11 years.... If it’s not a
two-state solution, then it’s a one-state solution.... And then, is it going to be
apartheid, or is it going to be democracy?”2
•
National Dialogue Committee Recommendations. In June 2011, the National
Dialogue Committee recommended that the size of parliament be increased from
120 to 130 seats and that future elections be overseen by an independent panel of
judges rather than the Interior Ministry.3 The committee also proposed that the
government should ease requirements for the formation of political parties by
lowering the number of people required to found a party from 500 to 250, of
whom at least 25 would have to be women.4 The committee also recommended
that the electoral system be altered to designate seats both at the governorate
level (115 total) and the national level (15). 5 Islamists in the opposition have
criticized the proposed electoral law changes, claiming that 15 seats allotted for a
national list is insufficient, and that voting patterns along tribal and familial lines
will continue to the benefit of the monarchy and its allies.
1
Article 35 of Jordan’s Constitution states that “The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept
his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation, upon the
recommendation of the Prime Minister.”
2
"Jordanian King's Mideast Outlook Dims," Washington Post, June 16, 2011.
3
The committee recommends an election oversight panel consisting of 13 notable members, including seven retired
judges appointed by a royal decree.
4
The committee also increased seats allocated for women from 12 to 15.
5
According to the proposal, voters would be able to vote for one list at the governorate level and one list at national
level, both open lists where voters can choose three candidates.
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•
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council Aid Jordan. In June 2011,
Saudi Arabia provided Jordan with a $400 million cash grant in order to stabilize
Jordan’s finances. A month earlier, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
welcomed Jordan to apply for membership to the regional organization which, if
approved, could further boost the kingdom’s finances at a time when it is facing
significant budget deficits. The GCC twice rejected Jordan’s application for GCC
membership—once in the 1980s, and once in 1996.
•
Ministers Resign in Fallout from Corruption Scandal. In May 2011, the
ministers of justice and health resigned after news broke that a convicted
businessman serving a three-year sentence for bribery and corruption who was
permitted to leave Jordan for medical treatment had disappeared. Khaled
Shaheen had been incarcerated for his role in a bribery scandal over the
upgrading of a state refinery. He had been permitted in February to leave for the
United States for medical treatment but was then spotted in April 2011 at a
London restaurant. He has subsequently disappeared and become a symbol of
corruption in Jordan.
Unrest in Jordan
Dissent from within the King’s Tribal Base
The deeply rooted political and economic frustration that has fueled revolution and widespread
unrest across the Arab world since December 2010 has manifested itself in Jordan, shaking the
legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy on a scale unseen in several decades. Though mass
protests have yet to occur and there have been few instances of violent confrontation between
protestors and the government, nevertheless public criticism of King Abdullah II, Queen Rania,
and even the institution of monarchy has been unprecedented and has come from all sides,
including from members of the kingdom’s foundational support base—the tribal/military elite
with roots around the East Bank of the Jordan River. Although some foreign observers watching
unrest spread across the Arab world have been quick to argue that Arab kingdoms inherently are
more stable than republics, it has been evident that no country in the Arab Middle East has been
spared some form of domestic instability. Clearly, what are initially perceived as small incidents
have the potential to ignite public anger, and although this has yet to occur in Jordan, most
experts would not discount the potential for more unrest there. In Jordan, like other countries in
the Arab world, youth unemployment and underemployment are high, corruption is rampant, and
socioeconomic mobility is limited.6
Protests emanating from the more rural, tribal areas of Jordan, traditionally considered
government/military strongholds, have unnerved the monarchy. Even before the revolutions in
Tunisia and Egypt, experts had warned that, particularly in 2010, tribal dissatisfaction was
6
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that official unemployment in 2010 reached 13.4%; according to the
Agency, the “unofficial rate is approximately 30%.” In December 2010, the IMF reported that “Jordan’s economic
recovery remains on track, on the back of slowly rising domestic activity. Fiscal prudence and credible monetary
management, reinforced by strong supervision and regulation of the financial sector, provide a solid platform for a
more robust upturn in 2011.” International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Jordan— Aide-Mémoire for the 2010 Staff Visit
Discussions,” December 20, 2010.
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growing due to a lack of government investment in rural areas and anger against perceived
corruption from within the inner circle of the royal family and its business allies.7 In May 2010, a
group reportedly representing thousands of East Bank retired soldiers known as the National
Committee for Military Veterans (or National Committee of Military Retirees) issued a bold
petition demanding that the king reverse liberal economic policies, curb corruption, and, most
notably, disenfranchise Jordanian citizens who are of Palestinian origin.8 In early January 2011,
riots broke out in the southern town of Ma’an after an inter-tribal dispute over government
employment became a larger protest against government neglect. In February 2011, tribal elites
again criticized the monarchy when 36 prominent tribesmen issued a letter to the king, directly
accusing Queen Rania of enriching her family and interfering in politics by promoting Palestinian
allies. The letter demanded that farmlands rumored to have been sold to members of the queen’s
family be returned. It also criticized the queen for throwing herself a 40th birthday party in the
famous desert preserve of Wadi Rum. The letter stated that “We reject outrageous birthdays that
come at the expense of the poor and the treasury.”9 Also in February 2011, several tribes blocked
a highway east of the capital, demanding the use of “tribal lands” which are government-owned
but granted to the tribes for centuries. After receiving reassurances from the palace that their
needs would be addressed, Faysal al Fayaz, head of the House of Representatives and a
prominent member of the Bani Sakhar tribes, said, “We have never been forced to pledge
allegiance or loyalty to the Hashemites because their actions have always been one step ahead of
our aspirations.”10
In Jordan, tribes of East Bank descent, the country’s original inhabitants, make up the core of the
military and the state bureaucracy. They are largely dependent on government patronage, which
has been shrinking in recent years due to government efforts to rein in deficit spending.
Tribesmen have vociferously protested against the privatization of state companies, accusing the
royal family of not only selling off state lands but of undervaluing the sale of state potash and
phosphate companies in deals with foreign corporations. According to one retired general who
was a signatory to the 2010 petition from retired soldiers, “In one year, one [former state
company] profited three times the sales price. This is not just corruption, it is audacious
corruption.”11
King Abdullah II has responded to tribal demands by increasing government patronage and
spending and by appointing tribal loyalists to his administration. In a response to public anger,
King Abdullah II directed his cabinet to cancel a sales tax imposed on fuel and reduced overall
gas taxes. Subsidies for sugar and rice also were increased and public salaries have been raised.
The full impact these measures will have on Jordan’s public finances is uncertain. A draft 2011
7
According to one report, “Electoral law reforms introduced in May 2010 have exacerbated tension between tribes in
Jordan and led to widespread-but-contained tribal violence after the November parliamentary elections. The level of
tribe-against-tribe violence in recent months, which occurred against a backdrop of rising tribal tension during the past
few years, was unprecedented…. Smaller tribes feared that under the new electoral law, they would win fewer seats in
parliament, limiting their ability to obtain pork barrel spending and state jobs.” See, “Jordan: Potential for Tribal
Violence Growing,” Open Source Works, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, January 5, 2011.
8
“The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 16, 2010.
9
“Tribesmen in Jordan Issue Urgent Call for Political Reform,” New York Times, February 7, 2011.
10
Open Source Center, "Al-Jazirah: Tribes in Jordan Stage Protests, Demand Tribal Land," Doha Al-Jazirah Satellite
Channel Television in Arabic, February 17, 2011, GMP20110217631001.
11
“In Jordan, King Abdullah II Getting Earful from Tribal Leaders,” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2011.
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budget had projected slowing public wage growth and still projected a deficit of over 5% of
GDP.12
On February 1, 2011, King Abdullah II dismissed his government just several months after its
formation, replacing Prime Minister Samir Rifai with Marouf al Bakhit, a former prime minister
(2005 to 2007), general, and ambassador to Israel and Turkey.13 Governments in Jordan typically
last no more than 15 months (over the past 90 years, Amman has seen 72 different
governments14), and the king may have acted to stem further criticism from his tribal base, as
Bakhit is well regarded among various tribal leaders. In March 2011, the king also appointed as
new chief to the royal court Khalid Karaki, a former royal court adviser and expert on tribal
politics.
Youth-Driven Protests and Islamists
Criticism from the king’s tribal base has quieted somewhat after youth protestors expanded their
activism in March 2011. On Friday, March 24, several thousand Jordanian protestors (comprised
of youth organizations, Islamists, leftists, and professional associations15) who were camped in
central Amman clashed with government loyalists and police, leading to the death of 55-year-old
Khairi Saad, who was killed after being beaten by security forces, though the government claims
he died of a heart attack. In response to heightened protest, King Abdullah II has attempted to
promote national unity and has engaged most but not all political forces in a national dialogue
(the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has refused to participate).16 He has also moved to amend the
Public Gatherings Law17 (requires preapproval for public demonstrations) and approved the
formation of a Teachers Union.
Since March 24, an eponymous group calling itself the March 24 youth have held sit-ins and
smaller protests outside state security, intelligence, and other government buildings. March 24
youth protestors have criticized the government’s response to demonstrations, and one youth
leader said that “We believe these changes are only cosmetic and don’t address the core issues
that need to be implemented right away — and that includes a Parliament and a government that
represents the people…. We will continue our protests … we will not be intimidated and we will
continue to demand that reforms be implemented on the ground.”18 Young Jordanian protestors
have been witnessed holding placards saying that “I am no longer a sheep,” but no other largescale, violent incidents have been reported. In order to prevent violence, the government has
12
The December 2010 IMF report stated: “Further fiscal consolidation will be critical over the medium term to bring
fiscal and external balances to a more comfortable level.”
13
The King also appointed independent Islamist Abdelrahim Akur as head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and
Awqaf (endowments).
14
See,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateI05.php?&newActiveSubNav=PolicyWatch/PeaceWatch&activeSub
NavLink=templateI05.php%3F&newActiveNav=analysis
15
An array of youth-led protest groups have emerged in recent months, including Jayin (We are Coming) and April 15
youth. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also has joined youth protestors, though some observers suggest that certain
youth-led groups may not be comfortable in associating themselves with the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood.
16
The National Dialogue Committee is expected to release its reform recommendations in June 2011. It is expected to
address laws on the formation of political parties and elections, but few experts expect it to propose other constitutional
amendments that would limit the King’s power in any meaningful way.
17
The amendment has passed the Lower Assembly of parliament but not the royally-appointed Senate.
18
"Uneasy Balancing Act in Jordan," New York Times, April 13, 2011.
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designated specific areas for protest. On April 6, 2011, 200 public figures signed a statement
condemning the violence used against protestors on March 24. The document was signed by a
former prime minister as well as many other former ministers, union members, and tribal leaders.
In mid-April 2011, 77 members of the “Youth of March 24” were tried before a military court for
“public order offences” resulting from the violence of March 24, 2011.
In Amman, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political action wing, the Islamic Action
Front (IAF), have been part of these protests and have demanded the dissolution of the
government, the dissolution of parliament, the holding of new elections under a revised electoral
law, and the amending of the constitution to allow for the direct election of the prime minister.
However, Islamists are not calling for the overthrow of the monarchy. According to IAF
Secretary-General Hamzah Mansur, “There is no comparison between Egypt and Jordan. The
people there demand a regime change, but here we ask for political reforms and an elected
government.”
On Friday, April 15, ultra-conservative Islamists in the city of Zarqa carried out a demonstration
calling for the release of other Islamist prisoners. The government claims that the demonstrators
then attacked police with swords, daggers, and clubs, resulting in several injuries and the
detainment of 70 Islamists. Among the detained was Ayman al Balawi, the brother of Humam
Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi, who killed eight CIA employees in Afghanistan in December 2009
(see footnote 66).
The King’s Dilemma
Since the founding of the kingdom in 1946, successive Jordanian monarchs have had to balance
the competing needs of their domestic constituents and foreign alliances, and the broad political
change sweeping across the Arab world has strained this delicate process. King Abdullah II needs
to satisfy his tribal East Bank base, which seeks state patronage and fears that a democratic
Jordan would become a state dominated by Arabs of Palestinian origin. At the same time, the king
must promote national unity, champion Jordan’s “progressive” image abroad, and manage an
economy that currently is unable to generate enough private sector jobs, thereby leading to
unsustainable budget deficits as the state attempts to fill the void. 19 In the past, King Abdullah II
tried to remain above the fray and place blame on his cabinet subordinates or Jordan’s weak
parliament for the lack of reform and economic development. However, regional developments
have negated this strategy, and the king may be forced to implement real reforms in order to stave
off greater unrest. To date, this has not happened in any meaningful way.
On the other hand, many experts believe that Jordanians themselves, while unhappy with the
status quo, are unwilling to completely change the political system due to fear of unleashing
societal tensions that are kept at bay by the very monarchy many protestors have decried.
According to Nathan J. Brown, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace,
In a society in which citizens cannot choose a soccer team to support without betraying their
origin (East Bank Jordanians versus Palestinians) and all too often coming to blows, any
19
Over 80 percent of the government’s budget is allocated for civil service salaries and military pensions. For 2011,
Jordan’s budget deficit is projected to be $1.7 billion. Total Jordanian domestic ($9.3 billion) and foreign debt ($6.3
billion) is $15.6 billion or 57.8% of annual GDP. Jordan’s public debt law sets the debt ceiling at 60 percent of GDP.
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political change is evaluated on Jordanian-Palestinian lines. A common platform of political
reform is difficult to develop in such a context. While Egyptians shouted “Leave!” and “Get
out!” to their president, Jordanians are far more likely to fear what would come next if their
king abdicated. An Islamist firebrand told me directly that he is now pulling his rhetorical
punches because he does not want to create another Lebanon.20
Country Overview
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
Overview: Jordan and Arab Regional Unrest
Throughout the so-called Arab uprising of 2010-2011, Jordan has remained stable, though there
have been numerous small-scale demonstrations in the capital of Amman and in smaller towns
usually considered strongholds of the Hashemite royal family. Popular discontent is widespread
in Jordan over the moribund economy, unemployment, corruption, and inequality—the same
grievances that sparked revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Yet, to date, as with the
monarchy in Morocco, the royal palace in Jordan has outmaneuvered a divided opposition by
steering the reform agenda toward its own preference for controlled liberalization that gives an
appearance of democratization without substantively compromising the power of the monarchy.
Earlier in 2011, two palace-appointed committees (see below) recommended possible reforms to
the Constitution, electoral laws, and political parties laws, among other things. The parliament
then approved 42 constitutional amendments in late September, thereby enacting them. Many
observers consider these amendments to be modest in scope.
The opposition, consisting of the Muslim Brotherhood, leftists, and youth activists, has not
offered unified suggestions for reforms; nor has it succeeded in organizing demonstrations larger
than a few thousand people. According to one poll conducted by the International Republican
Institute, “Youth movements inside the country have not impressed the majority of Jordanians
who said they are not in favor of street protests. Only one in five of those aware of youth
movements were in favor of taking to the streets. Half of respondents could not recall the names
of any of the youth movements.”1 Security forces have at times resorted to force to break up
demonstrations, but generally have refrained from responding to incidents in a way that might
generate a larger public outcry. During the most violent protest on March 24, one man (55-yearold Khairi Saad) was killed. His family claims he died in clashes with police, while the
government asserts that he died of heart failure.2
The United States continues to balance its policy of support for the monarchy with the need to
encourage reform. The Obama Administration is seeking $675 million in total aid to Jordan for
FY2012. Saudi Arabia, which is attempting to shape events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Egypt, has
provided Jordan $1.4 billion in grants in 2011 to stabilize the budget and prevent deficit spending.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also has discussed the possibility of membership to Jordan
and Morocco, which, should it occur, would open up the Gulf labor markets even more to
Jordanian workers and ease the unemployment crisis among Jordanian youth. It may also increase
Gulf investment and tourism to Jordan. On September 11, 2011, the GCC announced its intention
to fund a five-year development aid program for Morocco and Jordan, with exact aid amounts to
be set in December.
National Dialogue Committee Recommendations
In June 2011, the National Dialogue Committee (a 65-member, palace-appointed committee
consisting of political party members, non-governmental organization (NGO) activists, and
professional association members) recommended that the size of the Chamber of Deputies (lower
1
International Republican Institute, IRI Poll: More Than Half of Jordanians Believe Country is Heading in Right
Direction, October 12, 2011.
2
"Hundreds Gather to Mourn Jordanian Protester," Voice of America News, March 27, 2011.
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house of parliament) be increased from 120 to 130 seats and that future elections be overseen by
an independent panel of judges rather than the Interior Ministry. The committee also proposed
that the government should ease requirements for the formation of political parties by lowering
the number of people required to found a party from 500 to 250, of whom at least 25 would have
to be women. The committee also recommended that the electoral system be altered to designate
seats both at the governorate/provincial level (115 total) and the national level (15).
Islamists in the opposition have criticized the proposed electoral law changes, claiming that 15
seats allotted for a national list is insufficient, and that voting patterns along tribal and familial
lines will continue to be to the benefit of the monarchy and its allies. The Muslim Brotherhood
boycotted the last parliamentary election and is barely represented in the current parliament.
As of mid-November, the committee’s recommendations have yet to be approved or even
considered by parliament. Instead, the recommendations were sent to the government, which will
draft them into legislative language (an electoral law and a political parties law) and later submit
them to parliament. The king most likely preferred that the mostly pro-government parliament
first review and approve new amendments to the Constitution (see below) before the government
changes the electoral law. If the electoral law were somewhat liberalized, and elections were held
soon thereafter, a new parliament could have attempted to alter the king’s constitutional
proposals.
Constitutional Amendments
In April 2011, King Abdullah II appointed a 10-member panel of elder statesmen (Jordan's Royal
Committee on Constitutional Review) to draft amendments to the revised 1952 Constitution.3 In a
nationally televised speech on June 12, 2011, the king previewed possible amendments by
suggesting that they would include provisions for allowing parliamentary majorities to form
governments rather than the king himself. Then in August, the Royal Committee presented 42
suggested constitutional amendments. By late September, both the Lower House (with 98
representatives voting in favor, 1 voting against, and 21 absent) and the Senate approved most of
the amendments with only minor changes. Most analysts consider the new amendments to be a
3
Throughout the political upheaval of 2011, some Jordanian activists have been demanding that the legal system be
reformed and that Jordan’s revised 1952 constitution be restored to its original form before it be amended further.
Jordan’s 1952 constitution has been amended multiple times (29 total amendments passed in the years 1954, 1958,
1960, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1984). After it was first approved, some Jordanians viewed it as a far more democratic
document than its 1947 predecessor, perhaps reflecting both the liberal sensibilities of the then King of Jordan Talal Ibn
Abdullah and the statesmen guiding the country in the interregnum between the late King Abdullah I and his grandson
King Hussein (See, Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition, Oxford U. Press; 1st edition
1994). The 1952 constitution declared that the Jordanian nation is the source of all powers. It placed some limited
checks and balances on the monarch and the cabinet, such as enabling the lower house of parliament to issue a vote of
no confidence in the government if approved by a two-thirds majority. The parliament also was given the right to
approve, reject, or amend legislation proposed by the cabinet. It can override the king’s veto of legislation if approved
by two-thirds majorities in both houses. Under the constitution, the judiciary is independent. The constitution bars
discrimination on the basis of race or religion; bans compulsory labor; and requires due process to be followed in the
case of arrest, imprisonment, or confiscation of property. However, the king has the power to appoint a prime minister
and is not legally obligated to appoint one from either the majority party or from among members of parliament
(though in 1956, the late King Hussein asked the head of the majority party in parliament, Sulayman al Nabulsi, to
serve as prime minister). Most of the amendments since 1952 were passed in periods of national “crisis,” following
Jordan’s loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967 when King Hussein declared martial law (which lasted until 1989).
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modest step toward advancing political reform in the kingdom. Notable provisions among the
amendments include:
•
The establishment of a constitutional court (Article 58).4
•
The establishment of an independent electoral commission to supervise
parliamentary elections (Article 67).
•
The limitation of the king’s power to issue temporary laws unless the parliament
is dissolved or a natural disaster, war, or other emergency occurs (Article 94).
•
The prohibition of Jordanians who have dual nationality from holding
ministerial, senatorial, and parliamentary posts (Articles 42 and 75).
•
The explicit prohibition of torture (Article 8).
Opposition Reaction to Reform Proposals
The king’s critics charge that the National Dialogue Committee proposals and the draft
constitutional amendments fall short of protestor demands and are designed, like previous reform
efforts, to create the illusion of reform without implementing substantive change. Among these
critics, the Muslim Brotherhood had sought the direct election of the prime minister. In late
October, the king suggested that in 2012, members of parliament might be able to elect a prime
minister whose election the king can either veto or approve. The king also has stressed that direct,
popular election of the prime minister will take time—perhaps two to three years—in order to
allow for Jordan’s multitude of small political parties to coalesce into two or three broader
coalitions. According to King Abdullah II, “We haven’t shut any doors on relinquishing power.
My mission is as quickly as possible to get Jordan to have a prime minister elected from a
political party…. We need to create new political parties based on programs.”5
Opposition activists also have criticized the National Dialogue Committee’s proposal to reform
the electoral law. For years, activists have sought an electoral law governed by a proportional
representation system for at least half the seats in parliament. Although 15 seats allocated for a
national list (per the committee’s recommendations) would likely produce a somewhat more
representative parliament in future elections, most analysts believe that the law would continue to
produce solid pro-government majorities immune from serious opposition. Furthermore, some
Jordanians are disappointed that the revised electoral law is to be approved by an overwhelmingly
pro-palace parliament rather than by public referendum, as was done in Morocco earlier in 2011.
Where Is the Protest Movement in Jordan Heading?
It is difficult to predict how the revolution and ongoing political transition in Egypt, unrest in
neighboring Syria, and even efforts by the Palestinians to attain statehood in the West Bank and
Gaza will affect Jordan in the months ahead. It also is difficult to gauge if and how long King
Abdullah II can forestall wholesale changes to the political system without a popular majority
4
According to the amendments, “It will be an independent and separate judicial body, and shall consist of a minimum
of nine members, including the president, appointed by the King. The term of membership in the Constitutional Court
is six years and nonrenewable. The members of the Court shall not be dismissed during their membership.”
5
"Jordan’s King Abdullah on Egypt, Syria and Israel," Washington Post, October 24, 2011.
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demanding it from the street. The king and his family are nationally respected—not reviled like
ruling families in Arab countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Despite the
goodwill toward the royal family, however, public discontent is palpable, particularly outside
Amman, largely because smaller cities and towns have not experienced the economic growth seen
in the capital over the past few years. The king has stated that while political reform is critical,
economic growth is paramount. According to King Abdullah II:
The Arab Spring didn’t start because of politics; it started because of economics — poverty
and unemployment.... What keeps me up at night is not political reform because I am clear
on where we are going. What keeps me up at night is the economic situation because if
people are going to get back on the streets, it is because of economic challenges, not
political.6
In order to address the perception of rising injustice, the government has tried to crack down on
corruption, and several high-profile cases have been covered by the media, but only a handful of
former ministers and businessmen have actually been indicted. In late October, the king dismissed
Prime Minister Marouf al Bakhit, who had been accused of illegally authorizing a casino
construction project during his first stint as prime minister in 2007.7 He was replaced by 61-yearold Awn Khasawneh, a former judge at the International Court of Justice.8 The king also
appointed a new head of the General Intelligence Directorate (Major General Faisal al Shobaki),
which is arguably, after the king himself, the second-most-powerful post in the kingdom.
Perhaps the single most startling effect the so-called Arab Spring has wrought in Jordan has been
the recent prevalence of public criticism of the king and his family. Such criticism was once
considered taboo and is still banned by law. Moreover, Arabs of Bedouin descent from tribal
strongholds have in recent times been among the king’s most vocal critics, in contrast to longstanding tribal tradition of staunchly backing the monarchy. In the much poorer southern half of
the country, protests have occurred in Tafilah, Karak, and Ma’an. In June, according to various
media reports, both during and after the king’s visit to the town of Tafilah (109 miles south of
Amman), a crowd of young rioters clashed with local police and reportedly threw stones at the
king's motorcade. Despite the government’s apparent attempts at times to sow divisions between
East Bankers (who generally comprise the ruling elite and the monarchy’s primary base of
support) and citizens of Palestinian origin or descent, some analysts believe that young
demonstrators are not as susceptible to these older cleavages. According to one observer, “The
majority of the youth activists that organized the March 24 Shabab movement were not
Palestinian, and many share strong ties with the very southern areas now chafing under the false
promise of development.”
Country Overview
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
6
Op.cit., Washington Post, October 24, 2011
“Jordan's PM Approved Controversial Casino,” Al Jazeera.net, September 13, 2011.
8
Most experts suggest that the king’s dismissal of the prime minister was a symbolic gesture designed to create the
impression of government resolve to promote reform. According to one unnamed Western diplomat, “In Jordan, prime
ministers are there to be sacked.... They’re a buffer, a shock absorber—between the people and the king.” See, “Caught
in the Middle as Usual,” The Economist, October 22, 2011.
7
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and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has
also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990,
Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the
United States and the Persian Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as
Jordan played an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.
20
Nathan J. Brown, Jordan: Not on the Brink but in Crisis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 22,
2011.
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Figure 1. Jordan and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS Graphics.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which
subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River. known as the West
Bank.9 The original “East
Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the
9
Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
(continued...)
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remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of
support for the Jordanian
monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55%
to 70% of the population
and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their
exclusion from certain public
sector and military positions.21
21
Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is
unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to
discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations sector and military positions.10
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
King Abdullah II has ruled the country since
1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon
the death of his father, the late King Hussein,
after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in
Britain and the United States, King Abdullah
II had earlier pursued a military career,
ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s
Special Operations Forces with the rank of
Major General. The king’s 1517-year-old son
Prince Hussein is the designated crown
prince. 2211
King Abdullah II (age 49) has won approval
for his energetic and hands-on style of
governing; however, some Jordanians, notably
Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists, are
opposed to his policies of cooperating with the
United States on issues such as Iraq and the
Arab-Israeli peace process.
Jordan in Brief
Population:
6,407,085 (July 2010 est.)
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
slightly smaller than Indiana)
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
Armenians 1%
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
small Muslim sects 2% (2001
est.)
Literacy:
89% (male 95%, female 84%)
(2003 est.)
GDP:
Per Capita $5,300 (2010 est.)
Inflation:
4.4% (2010 CIA est.) 5.5%
(December 2010 IMF est.)
Unemployment:
13.5% (official estimate); ca. 30%
according to some unofficial
estimates (2009 est.)
External Debt:
$5.52 billion (December 2010
est.)
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State; CIA World Factbook;
Central Bank of Jordan; International Monetary Fund,
other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;
The Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
The king appoints a prime minister to head the
government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet). Typically, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. This is done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials and to
dispense patronage to various elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the
armed forces.
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections
Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of a mostly elected 120-member lower house and an
appointed 55-member upper house. 23 Building on his father’s legacy, King Abdullah II has
supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing dissent when it
threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations with Israel. Overall, parliament has
limited power. In theory, it can override the veto authority of the king with a two-thirds majority
in both the upper and lower houses. A two-thirds majority of the lower house can also dissolve the
cabinet with a “no confidence” vote. However, since both houses almost always have solid progovernment majorities, such actions are rarely attempted (once in April 1963). The constitution
enables the king to dissolve parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.24 The
22
In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his (...continued)
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
10
Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is
unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to
discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
11
In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his then 15-year-old son, Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah, as crown prince. The
position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
23
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the parliament was suspended and legislative powers reverted to the
government.
24
The king also is allowed to declare martial law and suspend the provisions of the constitution. See United Nations
(continued...)
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king also can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional
legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved. 25 The
king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Overall, political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the moderately fundamentalist Islamic
Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
There are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan, consisting of an estimated 4,100 total
members.26
The 1993 Election Law
The opposition in Jordan routinely criticizes the law governing national elections. After Islamists
made gains in the 1989 parliamentary elections, the government changed27 the rules to a “one
man, one vote” system that gives citizens one vote regardless of how many parliamentary seats
represent their district. 28 When forced to choose just one representative, voters have typically
chosen candidates based on familial or tribal ties—not on ideology. Reformers would like to see a
mixed election system that provides for some proportional representation and allows parties to
field lists of candidates. In addition, many reformers have called for changes to Jordan’s electoral
map, asserting that the government gerrymandered voting districts to favor candidates from rural
tribal strongholds over urban areas where Islamists typically have more support.29
2010 Parliamentary Elections
In late 2009, King Abdullah II dissolved parliament two years before scheduled parliamentary
elections. A month later, he appointed 43-year-old Samir al Rifai as prime minister. Shortly
thereafter, Al Rifai formed a new cabinet, and the king instructed Rifai to implement economic
reforms, hold new parliamentary elections in 2010 under a new election law, and clamp down on
corruption.
(...continued)
Development Program (UNDP), Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), Historical Background of
Jordan’s Constitution, available online at http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=7.
25
According to one expert, “When parliament was out of session between 2001 and 2003, over 200 provisional laws
were passed, many of them containing controversial economic reform provisions. Similarly, since November 2009,
when the parliament was dismissed a second time, the Samir Rifai government has ushered through more than thirty
provisional laws dealing with contentious issues like pensions, taxes, utilities pricing, and -- of course -- electoral
reform.” See, “Jordan: Just What Exactly Are We Promoting?” ForeignPolicy.Com, October 12, 2010.
26
CRS interview with Jordanian lawmakers, May 2006.
27
The 1993 law was adopted during a period when parliament was suspended. It has never received the formal
approval of parliament, raising questions over its constitutional legitimacy.
28
Under Jordan’s system, electoral districts return several members to parliament, but a voter may vote for only one
candidate. Seats are then awarded to as many of the highest-polling individual candidates as there are seats allocated to
that district.
29
According to one study of Jordan’s election law, “It is no coincidence that under-represented urban governorates
have a large population of Palestinian origin, and that over-represented largely rural governorates are considered
mainstays of support for the regime.” See, David M. DeBartolo, “Jordan: Attention Turns to Electoral Law,” Arab
Reform Bulletin, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Volume 5, Issue 3, April 2007. In
Amman, each legislator represents about 95,000 people. In certain rural provinces, a legislator represents as few as
2,000 individuals.
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In May 2010, the king passed by royal decree (with cabinet approval) a new temporary electoral
law to govern parliamentary elections set for November 9, 2010. The law makes minor
modifications to the 1993 electoral law without addressing the fundamental grievances of
opposition critics, who charge that the old and new laws both favor rural, pro-royal constituencies
over urban, Islamist-leaning areas. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, the
Islamic Action Front (IAF), threatened to boycott the elections.
The new law raises the number of lower house seats from 110 to 120. Of the 10 new seats, 6 are
allocated for women under the existing quota system (raising the number of quota seats from 6 to
12), and the remaining 4 are distributed to districts representing the cities of Amman, Zarqa, and
Irbid. The government claims that by adding seats to underrepresented urban areas, it is
responding to calls for reform. The government also claims that the new law stiffens penalties for
election-related violations, such as using money to influence voting.
The new electoral law preserves the “one-man, one-vote system.” It also creates 45 electoral
zones, which in turn contain a total of 108 sub-districts, with each sub-district sitting one member
of parliament. The remaining 12 seats are set aside for the women’s quota. Voters are registered in
the larger electoral zone and may vote for only one candidate in the given sub-district of their
choice. Candidates must choose to run in one sub-district.
According to one analysis of the new law, “with smaller sub-districts, candidates will now rely
more on their tribal affiliations and campaign among a smaller pool of core familial voters than
before.”30 Another expert asserts that “The new system also opens the possibility that a loser in
one sub-district may have won more votes than the winner in another sub-district. This oddity of
Jordan’s new system means that a given electoral district might be represented in Parliament by
one or more politicians who were not among the top vote-getters in the district.”31
Most foreign observers of Jordanian domestic politics believe that internal fissures over what
constitutes Jordan’s national identity are the main factor inhibiting democracy there. In this
context, the ruling Hashemite family and its allies of East Bank tribal elites are unwilling to cede
power to Jordanians of Palestinian origin, some of whom fill the ranks of the Muslim
Brotherhood. At the same time, fears of Palestinians in the West Bank being pushed into Jordan
as the result of a failed peace process drive the government’s inability to open up the political
system. According to Jordan expert Professor Curtis Ryan:
The 2010 elections will be contested in a way that, despite the minor reforms, should
minimize the development of political parties and encourage localized rather than national
voting. It should also ensure a parliament that is once again largely elected based on tribal
linkages, far outweighing whatever strength the democratic opposition is able to muster….
The battle over the new election law, like so much in Jordanian politics, is permeated by the
demographic and political battles over the role of its citizens of Palestinian origin and the
prospects of an eventual Palestinian state.32
The November 2010 election transpired as expected. The IAF boycotted the election and only 17
opposition members were elected, leaving the government with an overwhelming majority in
30
See, Dima Toukan Tabbaa, “Jordan’s New Electoral Law Disappoints Reformers,” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 22,
2010.
31
Jillian Schwedler, "Jordan’s Risky Business As Usual," Middle East Report Online, June 30, 2010.
32
“Jordan’s New Electoral Law and Its Implications,” ForeignPolicy.com, May 24, 2010.
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parliament. Some violent incidents occurred, though foreign observers praised the conduct of
authorities. According to the U.S. State Department,
We were pleased to review the preliminary reports released on November 10 by the
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in which
IRI deemed the Jordanian elections as “credible” and “a significant improvement for the
Middle East” and NDI found that “the conduct of voting on election day compared favorably
to accepted international practices” and the process showed a “clear improvement over the
election process in 2007.”….In line with the full scope of their missions, both NDI and IRI
identified a number of areas for improvement that, if addressed, would further increase
citizen confidence in the electoral process. While there were sporadic incidents of violence
on election day, as well as reports of a number of irregularities in the administration of the
election, IRI noted that the balloting process was generally calm and orderly.33
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has long been integrated into the political mainstream due to
its acceptance of the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, although relations between the
Brotherhood and the palace have fluctuated over the years. The Brotherhood presence in Jordan
dates back to the 1930s, as it has been tacitly recognized first as a charitable organization and
later as a quasi-political organization, which has openly fielded candidates in parliamentary
elections albeit under a different name (Islamic Action Front, IAF). The relationship between the
Brotherhood and the palace has been mutually beneficial over the years. Successive Jordanian
monarchs have found that the Brotherhood has been more useful politically as an ally than as an
opponent (as opposed to the Brotherhood in Egypt), as it secured Islamist support in countering
Arab nationalist interference during the 1950s and 1960s and secular Palestinian nationalism in
the 1970s. The Brotherhood’s educational, social, and health services have grown so extensive
over the years that some experts believe that the Brotherhood’s budget for services rivals that of
the Jordanian government.
Like other Islamist parties in the region, the Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s
political wing, operates in a tight political space, wedged between a government which seeks to
limit its influence and a disillusioned constituency impatient for reform. In Jordan’s poorer
neighborhoods, the Brotherhood uses its social services to attract support, though it must compete
with the growing allure of militant Islam, emanating both from within Jordan and from
neighboring Iraq. The IAF markets itself as beyond the culture of corruption found in Jordanian
politics, and while this message may resonate with the average supporter, it is unclear what the
party’s platform is aside from its slogan of “Islam is the solution.”
With the government seeking to limit its activities and having performed poorly in the 2007
parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood reorganized in 2008 and internally elected Dr. Hamam
Said (alternate spellings: Himman Said/Hammam Sa’id /Hamam Sa’id/Hammam Saaed) as the
movement’s new general guide. Press reports have described the leader as a “hawk,” stressing his
Palestinian origins and possible ties to Hamas.
33
See, Press Statement, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, November 10, 2010.
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The Military and Security Establishment
Many tribal East Bank Jordanians or their descendants form the backbone of Jordan’s armed
forces and internal security establishment. Most observers agree that with the possible exception
of Syria, Jordan faces few conventional threats from its neighbors and that the greatest threats to
its security are internal and asymmetrical. In general, counter-terrorism and homeland security
policies are carried out by a number of institutions, most notably the security services under direct
palace control, the military, and the Interior Ministry. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
reports directly to King Abdullah II and is responsible for both covert operations abroad and
internal security. The military’s elite special forces units also are directly involved in countering
threats to internal security and were reportedly used to thwart a chemical weapons plot in April
2004. The Interior Ministry controls all civilian police forces and civil defense units through a
branch agency known as the Public Security Directorate (PSD).
The Economy
With few natural resources34 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, 35 and the service
sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (15%-30%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 13% but thought by many
analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.36 Corruption37 is particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of
intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta” (connections), is widespread, and many young
Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic mobility that corruption
engenders. Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and
opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a “brain drain” of its most talented
workers, and the government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly
skilled workers close to home. The government is by far the largest employer with between onethird and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll.
Water Shortages
Jordan is one of the 10 most water-deprived countries in the world and is in constant search of
new water resources. Most of the country’s drinking water is secured from underground wells,
and excessive pumping over decades has led water levels to drop precipitously. The agricultural
sector uses an estimated 60% to 70% of all water resources, but only accounts for about 3% of
34
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Parliament, Constitution, Political Parties, and Judiciary
Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of a mostly elected 120-member lower house and an
appointed 55-member upper house.12 Building on his father’s legacy, King Abdullah II has
supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing dissent when it
threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations with Israel. Overall, parliament has
limited power. In theory, it can override the veto authority of the king with a two-thirds majority
in both the upper and lower houses. A two-thirds majority of the lower house can also dissolve the
cabinet with a “no confidence” vote. However, since both houses almost always have solid progovernment majorities, such actions are rarely attempted (once in April 1963).
The Jordanian constitution empowers the king with broad powers. According to Article 35, “The
King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the
Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the
Prime Minister.” The constitution also enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and
postpone lower house elections for two years.13 The king also can circumvent parliament through
a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when
parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.14 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are
not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits
insulting the dignity of the king (lese-majeste) with criminal penalties of one to three years in
prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action
Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
There are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan, consisting of an estimated 4,100 total
members.15
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are the military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketing, and “security offenses.”
Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palaceappointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.
12
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the parliament was suspended and legislative powers reverted to the
government.
13
The king also is allowed to declare martial law and suspend the provisions of the constitution. See United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), Historical Background of
Jordan’s Constitution, available online at http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=7.
14
New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws. See, “Constitutional Amendments”
15
CRS interview with Jordanian lawmakers, May 2006.
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The Economy
With few natural resources16 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,17 and the service
sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (15%-30%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 13% but thought by many
analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.18 Youth unemployment is more than 30%. Corruption19 is
particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”
(connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of
social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.20 Each year, thousands of Jordanians go
abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a
“brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop
incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by
far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s
payroll. Some estimates suggest that 80% of all government spending is allocated toward civil
service expenses.
The continuing global economic slowdown, combined with regional unrest, has led to diminished
growth in Jordan.21 The government has responded by increasing salaries and public subsidies of
food and energy which earlier in the year led to a spiraling fiscal deficit. The 2011 budget
increased by nearly $1 billion in 2011, reaching a total of $10 billion.22 Since the country is
unable to generate enough annual revenue to cover its social spending, Jordan had been facing a
deficit of $1.4 billion in 2011. However, foreign donors have increased their direct budget aid to
Jordan, with Saudi Arabia providing nearly $1.2 billion in direct budgetary support. The United
States is providing $184 million in direct cash assistance. The European Union is providing an
estimated $120 million in direct budgetary support as well. In 2011, Jordanian officials estimate
that the country will have received $2.8 billion in total foreign aid in the form of cash grants,
funds for development projects, loan guarantees, and concessional loans.
16
Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been
discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country
contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves. In 2006, Shell signed an oil shale exploration agreement with the
Jordanian government. Estonia’s Eesti Energia AS also has signed agreements on oil shale projects. See, “Amman
Unlocks Energy Potential,” Middle East Economic Digest, August 7, 2009.
3517
It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.)
reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.
36
One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks.
37
Jordan was ranked 49 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
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GDP. A series of recent droughts has exacerbated existing shortages, and experts have warned that
the kingdom’s overall water situation is deteriorating.
In addition, the Dead Sea, which abuts both Jordan and Israel, is losing water at an estimated 3
feet per year, and some scientists suggest that without significant action it will be gone by 2050.
Jordan has been exploring new water development projects, including the feasibility of pumping
water from the Red Sea, desalinating it, and then transferring it north and down below sea level to
the Dead Sea. This project, referred to as the Red-Dead Canal, is being studied by the government
and international lenders. For more information on the project, see CRS Report RS22876, The
“Red-Dead” Canal: Israeli-Arab Efforts to Restore the Dead Sea, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Civilian Nuclear Energy Program
In order to address chronic water and energy shortages, Jordan would need energy-intensive
desalination plants and the electric power to fuel them. For the past three years, the kingdom has
moved ahead with plans to develop a domestic civilian nuclear energy program. In a January
2007 interview with an Israeli newspaper, King Abdullah II announced his country’s plans to
construct a nuclear-powered reactor for peaceful purposes. Most analysts believe that Jordan, like
other Arab countries, is using the specter of a looming Iranian nuclear threat to generate
international support for a nuclear program which, in Jordan’s case, would mainly alleviate
electricity and fuel shortages needed to power new desalination plants. Between 2017 and 2030,
the government aims to have between 20% and 30% of its annual electricity generated by nuclear
power. Nonetheless, financing a nuclear program may be cost prohibitive without significant
international support. In September 2007 at a nuclear energy summit in Vienna, Austria, the
United States and Jordan signed a memorandum of understanding outlining potential U.S.Jordanian cooperation on developing requirements for appropriate power reactors, fuel service
arrangements, civilian training, nuclear safety, and energy technology. In 2008, the United States
agreed to supply Jordan with radiation monitors at the kingdom's border crossings to foil any
illegal trafficking of nuclear materials.
To date, Jordan has made substantial progress in securing international private sector and
governmental support for its nuclear plans. In 2008, the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission
(JAEC) signed a uranium38 exploration agreement with the French company Areva for joint
exploration of uranium in central Jordan. Several months later, JAEC signed a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) covering exploration and mining of uranium and other ores with BritishAustralian mining company Rio Tinto. In 2009, Jordan signed a $173 million deal39 with the
state-run South Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute and Daewoo Engineering and
Construction Co. to construct a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at the Jordan University for Sciences
and Technology near the northern city of Irbid. The reactor facility is to be used to train Jordanian
staff. Also in 2009, Jordan signed another agreement with Areva granting the French company the
exclusive right to extract and mine uranium in central Jordan.
There are still a number of obstacles to clear before Jordan can begin construction on any largescale reactor, including determining its location, its cost, and what role, if any, the United States
may play in providing technical assistance. Jordan’s coastline may be too small for a reactor
38
Jordan accounts for 2% of the world's uranium reserves.
According to various Jordanian reports, Jordan will contribute $60 million toward the overall cost of the reactor with
the rest made up by a South Korean government loan.
39
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facility and any attempt to place it further inland may have to contend with the challenge of
piping and pumping water uphill to a power plant. Some Israeli officials are concerned that a
potential Jordanian nuclear power plant could be built too close to the Dead Sea Rift, an area
prone to earthquakes. Israeli officials assert that an earthquake could cause radioactive leaks that
could then damage the nearby Israeli city Eilat. They have asked the Jordanian government to
locate any reactor in a more geologically stable location, such as the cliffs above the coastal
southern city of Aqaba.40 Financing Jordan’s ambitious program also is a major obstacle, as
estimates run into the billions of dollars. To date, four companies are in competition to build the
main reactor. They include Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), the prime contractor for
the United Arab Emirates; Areva, the French company; Atomic Energy of Canada; and
AtomStroyExport of Russia.
Jordanian public opinion, like in many countries, has somewhat turned against the pursuit of
nuclear energy since the crisis unfolded at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan
beginning in March 2011. Small groups of protestors have rallied outside government buildings,
chanting “no to nuclear power” and Jordanian media reports indicate that activists are attempting
to obtain 100,000 signatures on a petition calling for the end of Jordan’s pursuit of nuclear power.
U.S.-Jordanian Nuclear Cooperation: Negotiations over a 123 Agreement
The United States is a major political and financial supporter of the Jordanian government, and
Jordan is intent on securing U.S. technical and financial backing of its nascent nuclear project.
However, both sides are currently at odds over Jordan’s desire to maintain its right to enrich its
own domestically mined uranium, one of the rare natural resources found in the kingdom. The
process of uranium ore enrichment for fuel also can be used to produce weapons-grade materials.
As such, the Obama Administration has continued the Bush Administration approach of seeking
to limit the adoption of uranium enrichment technology among other countries in order to limit
the potential spread of expertise or materials that could be used to build nuclear weapons. On the
other hand, the Jordanian government insists it has a right to enrich its own domestic uranium
resources and officials have pledged to send uranium-ore deposits abroad for processing into
nuclear fuels.
By law, all U.S. nuclear cooperation with foreign countries requires, under Section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Once an agreement is
signed, Jordan would be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear equipment, fuel, and expertise. However,
the U.S. government would like Jordan to sign a 123 agreement that closely resembles its 2009
agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that, among many other provisions, stated:
The UAE “shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise
engage in activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of
material, or for the alternation in form or content (except by irradiation or further irradiation
or, if agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high
enriched uranium, or irradiated source or special fissionable material.”41
40
Open Source Center, "Israeli Officials Fear Jordanian Nuclear Plant on Earthquake-Prone Dead Sea Rift," Yedi'ot
Aharonot (in Hebrew), October 1, 2009, Document ID# GMP20091001735011.
41
CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by
Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
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In April 2010, Chairman of the Jordanian Atomic Energy Commission Khalid Touqan said that
“Jordan upholds its right to enrich uranium under the accords of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”42 Jordan signed the NonProliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1998. According to one report, the Obama Administration is seeking
guarantees that Jordan won't enrich uranium domestically, fearing that the UAE, under the terms
of its deal, could demand a renegotiation if another Middle Eastern country secures an agreement
with the United States under more favorable terms. 43
For months, U.S.-Jordanian negotiations have remained at an impasse. In an interview with the
Wall Street Journal, King Abdullah II blamed Israel for lobbying against any U.S.-Jordanian
nuclear deal, saying that “there are countries, Israel in particular, that are more worried about us
being economically independent than the issue of nuclear energy, and have been voicing their
concerns…. There are many such reactors in the world and a lot more coming, so [the Israelis
must] go mind their own business.”44
However, in late 2010 Jordanian officials appeared more optimistic about a possible compromise
solution. During a one-day visit to Jordan in September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton held a press conference with Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh. During the proceedings, the
foreign minister hinted at a possible U.S.-Jordanian compromise when he remarked:
On bilateral relations, I would like to say that this strategic relationship between us gets
stronger by the day. We thank the United States for its support for Jordan on all levels. In my
most recent meeting with the Secretary in Washington a couple of weeks ago, or just under a
couple of weeks ago, we made serious headway on a range of issues. Particularly, I
mentioned the nuclear cooperation agreement which is under discussion and hopefully
nearing the end of that discussion, and we thank the United States for its strong and firm
support for Jordan on that front.45
In late September 2010, Jordanian officials publicly indicated that a possible compromise U.S.Jordanian nuclear deal was on the horizon. Reportedly, Jordan has agreed to mine uranium but
not enrich it. According to one Jordanian official, “We received a positive gesture from the U.S.
administration, and we are hoping to reach a compromise and sign the agreement by the end of
this year…. Our official strategic plan is not to enrich uranium now, but in the future this may
change, so we will not give up our right to do so.”46
42
Open Source Center, "Jordan Atomic Energy Official Cited on Nuclear Program; Fear of US 'Terms' Noted," Al
Jazirah.net, April 1, 2010, GMP20100402676001.
43
"Jordan and U.S. Move Closer to Nuclear Pact," Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2010.
44
"Jordan's Nuclear Ambitions Pose Quandary for the U.S. ," Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2010.
45
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, Marka Airbase, Amman, Jordan, September 16, 2010.
46
"Jordan Sees Nuclear Accord with U.S. by Year-End," Reuters, September 28, 2010.
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Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations
Promoting Peace in the Middle East18
One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry,
Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.
19
Jordan was ranked 49 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
20
In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken
on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing
project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance). However, some
21
For example, in 2011 foreign tourist visits to Jordan are down 18% from the previous year.
22
IHS Global Insight estimates that Jordan’s total defense budget for 2011 is approximately $2.7 billion. See, “Jane’s
Defence Budgets,” Jordan, April 14, 2011.
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Foreign Relations
Jordan’s Relationship with Israel
Finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the utmost priority of the
Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of
military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999)
ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s
conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national
movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and Jordan’s support for Saddam
Hussein in the first Gulf War, which isolated it from the West.4723 Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and
Israel signed a peace treaty, 4824 and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official
relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international
financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the continuation of conflict continues to be a major obstacle to Jordan’s
development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than
half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the pre-1967 borders of
area now comprising the
state of Israel. There are an estimated 1.9 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in
in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained
their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli
occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement. 4925 Furthermore, for King
Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and rely politically
on the support of East Bank tribal families, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a
matter of political survival since the government cannot afford to ignore an issue of critical
importance to a majority of its citizens. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently
reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the
“Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the political status quo in Jordan.
Like his father before him, King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that “Jordan is Jordan and
Palestine is Palestine.”
4723
In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan. See Section 502 of P.L. 10227, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and Pensions, and Urgent Needs
for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
4824
Jordan and Israel signed athe peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
4925
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan. UNRWA has 7,000 staff in Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates
174172 schools in Jordan (providing education through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government).
According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees
live outside of UNRWA camps.
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Opposition to Normalization
King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within
Jordan, particularly among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community,
and influential trade and professional organizations. Among many mainstream Jordanians, there
is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to
them so far. Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts
with Israel, and activists among them have compiled “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and
companies that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists,
but courts have upheld their right to publish them. In addition, IAF parliamentarians periodically
propose legislation to prohibit cooperation with Israel in various sectors. The IAF also has
proposed legislation to abrogate Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
Reviving the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
For nearly9
Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
In November 2011, in an effort to reassure Jordan that the Israeli government is not attempting to
destabilize its neighbor, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said before the Knesset that “Talk
about Jordan as a Palestinian state damages Israel.”
The King’s Recent Statements on Israel and Peace Process
For over a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and
Congress to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. King
Abdullah II is a strong supporter of a Saudi initiative, dubbed the “Arab Peace Initiative,” which
calls for Israel’s full withdrawal from all occupied territories and the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for full normalization of relations
with all Arab states in the region. In a March 2007 address to a joint session of Congress, King
Abdullah II pleaded for U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the “core issue in
the Middle East.” He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a collective
peace treaty. Jordanian officials also have repeatedly condemned Israeli settlement activities in
the West Bank, especially in Jerusalem, claiming that they violate international law and heighten
tensions in the region.
In July 2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a surprise visit to Jordan for
meetings with King Abdullah II. Reportedly, Netanyahu sought Jordanian support for direct
Israeli-Palestinian talks, and both sides may have sought to improve relations in what has been a
notably tense period. Several months earlier, King Abdullah II had stated in a Wall Street Journal
article that “for the first time since my father made peace with Israel, our relationship with Israel
is at an all bottom low. It hasn't been as bad as it is today and as tense as it is today.”
In September 2010, King Abdullah II traveled to Washington, DC, for the launch of U.S.brokered peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. A month later, the king told
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “all unilateral actions that threaten peace, in
particular the construction of settlements, must cease.”
Jordan-Hamas Relations
For two decades, Jordan has had an on-again, off-again relationship with Hamas, the Palestinian
militant group and U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
Throughout the 1990s, the late King Hussein tolerated a Hamas presence in his kingdom.50 Upon
50
In 1997, Israeli agents disguised as Canadian tourists attempted to poison Khaled Meshaal, head of the Hamas
political bureau and one of its founding members. The agents were captured by Jordanian authorities, and Israel was
forced to release a number of high profile Hamas members in order to secure the return of their operatives. King
Hussein had reportedly threatened to abrogate the Israel-Jordan 1994 peace treaty if Israel failed to provide an antidote
(continued...)
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his accession to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II, perhaps realizing that Jordan’s relationship
with Hamas was a political liability, reversed his late father’s long-standing policy of tolerating
Hamas and closed its Jordan offices permanently.
Since then, Jordan has been a strong backer of Palestinian moderates (such as the Fatah party)
loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas and has been determined to bolster the capacity of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank in order to prevent Hamas from gaining strength
there. Jordan has provided training for several battalions of U.S.-screened Palestinian recruits to
serve in an overhauled Palestinian Authority National Security Force.51 The training is conducted
by Jordanian police at the Jordanian International Police Training Center near Amman.
Toward the end of 2008, perhaps in order to hedge against the prospect of yet another round of
failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, Jordan opened a dialogue with Hamas officials. Led
by General Muhammad Dahabi, Jordan reportedly discussed “political and security issues” with
their Hamas counterparts (Muhammad Nazzal). Most analysts interpreted this limited
engagement as a pragmatic Jordanian maneuver designed to open channels of communication
with an emboldened Hamas now in firm control of the Gaza Strip. Jordan may have sought a
pledge from Hamas not to interfere in Jordanian domestic politics. According to one observer,
“Hamas wants to talk with Jordan and Jordan wants to listen to what Hamas has to say. And it is
in Jordan’s interest today to communicate with all and sundry—north, south, east, and west,
without changing the underlying fundamentals of its policies, instead of concentrating on an
alliance with only two states, the United States and Israel.”52
Since the 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority legislative elections, the Jordanian
government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of its citizenry sympathizes with
Hamas, and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), reportedly maintains
close ties to Hamas. The IAF has been careful to downplay these ties and, in August 2009, three
high-ranking moderate Brotherhood figures resigned from the group’s leadership bureau in
protest over Hamas-Jordanian Brotherhood ties. According to one IAF statement, “Abbas is the
legitimate Palestinian president and Hamas’s battle should be with the Zionist enemy, not other
Palestinians, so we ask them to return to a policy of dialogue and to restore the institutions in
Gaza.”53 Some critics of King Abdullah II assert that the Hamas threat to Jordan is a specter used
by the royal family to consolidate its rule and repress potential opposition.
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its main intelligence
organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is considered one of the most effective
organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist networks.54 Jordanian intelligence reportedly
(...continued)
and release other Hamas prisoners.
51
“Palestinian Forces Enter Jordan for Training Under U.S. Program,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2008 and “500 Palestinian
Security Force Members Head to Jordan for U.S.-funded Training,” Ha’aretz, September 18, 2008. Jordan has helped
train 3,000 Palestinian cadets at the U.S.-funded Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC).
52
“Report on Jordan-Hamas Talks,” Al-Hayat (London), accessed via Open Source Center, Document ID#
GMP20080817837001, August 17, 2008.
53
“Egypt and Jordan Quietly Back Abbas, Too,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2007.
54
For years, some experts have speculated that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support to the GID has been
(continued...)
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played a role in assisting U.S. forces in killing Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian
terrorist mastermind who headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Zarqawi hailed from the industrial town of Zarqa, several miles northeast of Amman, which is
known as a source of Sunni militancy, as dozens of its young men have traveled to Iraq to die as
suicide bombers. According to one Islamist community leader in Zarqa, “Most of the young
people here in Zarqa are very religious.... And when they see the news and what is going on in the
Islamic countries, they themselves feel that they have to go to fight jihad. Today, you don’t need
anyone to tell the young men that they should go to jihad. They themselves want to be martyrs.”
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it vulnerable to terrorist
attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On November 9, 2005, near
simultaneous explosions at three Western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt,
and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist
organization Al Qaeda in Iraq, formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act.
Many Jordanians, even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East
policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and denounced
Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah II has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians, not
foreigners, noting that the hotels, though Western owned, were frequented by local citizens. On
November 15, 2005, Jordan’s minister of the interior announced new security regulations
designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for
Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners.
Other terrorist activity in Jordan includes the following:
•
On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) program in Jordan, was shot
and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was leaving for work from his
residence. A Jordanian military court convicted and sentenced to death eight
Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably involved in the Foley
murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant.
Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and
two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
•
In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by a terrorist cell
linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical attack in the Jordanian
capital of Amman. According to press reports, in January 2004, one of the wouldbe perpetrators visited Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had
collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled
by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of operations in
Amman.
(...continued)
substantial. One expert wrote that “the agency created a Jordanian intelligence service, which lives today as its liaison
to much of the Arab world.” See, Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, New York, Anchor Books, 2008. In addition, there is a
long history of U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, the GID collaborated
with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1980s to disrupt the Abu Nidal organization and in 1999 was
instrumental in foiling Al-Qaeda’s ‘millennium plot.’ It also may have been responsible for foiling planned bombings
of the US, Jordanian and British embassies in Beirut in 2001 as well as the US embassy in Amman in 2004. See,
“Jordanian-US intelligence co-operation: Iraq and beyond,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, November 9, 2007.
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•
On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S. amphibious warfare
ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed their targets, one
hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third rocket
struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier
was killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of
responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with Zarqawi.
•
On September 4, 2006, a lone gunman opened fire on a group of Western tourists
visiting the historic Roman amphitheater in downtown Amman, killing a British
man and wounding six others, including a Jordanian policeman. The assailant
was a 38-year-old Jordanian named Nabeel Jaoura, who claimed his attack was in
retaliation for the murder of his two brothers in 1982 at the hands of Israeli
soldiers during the war in southern Lebanon. According to the New York Times,
Jaoura had worked in Israel, where he was arrested two years ago for overstaying
his visa. Jordanian security officials believe his incarceration may have further
radicalized him. 55
•
In late 2006, Jordanian intelligence authorities thwarted a potential bomb attack
against foreign tourists traveling through Queen Alia Airport in Amman. Several
of the convicted conspirators were Iraqis, and one of the ringleaders of the plot
reportedly had sought to place a bomb in a sports bag using the explosive PE-4A,
which is used by insurgents in Iraq.
•
In September 2009, a Jordanian citizen who was living in the United States
illegally was arrested and charged with attempting to blow up a skyscraper in
Dallas, TX. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, age 19, was arrested after planting an
inert bomb at Fountain Place, a 60-story glass tower in downtown Dallas
following an undercover FBI operation. Smadi was sentenced to 24 years in
prison.
•
In January 2010, a roadside bomb exploded near an Israeli Embassy vehicle
travelling from Amman toward the border with Israel. There were no reports of
injuries.
•
In August 2010, several Chinese-made Grad-type rockets fired from Egypt’s
Sinai desert struck the Jordanian town of Aqaba, killing a taxi driver and
wounding four others. Israel, Egypt, and Jordan all have disagreed over the
attack’s perpetrators. Israel and Egypt claim that Hamas may have fired the
rocket intending to hit Israel, while Jordan claims that the attackers may have
been from a branch of Al Qaeda based in the Gaza Strip.
Allegations of Torture
As media scrutiny over the CIA’s alleged practice of transporting terrorism suspects to detention
facilities abroad has grown in recent years, Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) has
been accused of detaining and torturing CIA prisoners captured in other countries. According to a
Washington Post article on the GID, “its [GID’s] interrogators had a reputation for persuading
tight-lipped suspects to talk, even if that meant using abusive tactics that could violate U.S. or
55
“Typical of a New Terror Threat: Anger of a Gunman in Jordan,” New York Times, September 6, 2006.
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international law.”56 In July 2006, the human rights group Amnesty International accused the
Jordanian security establishment of torturing terrorist suspects on behalf of the United States
government. Amnesty International identified 10 suspected cases of men subjected to rendition
from U.S. custody to interrogation centers in Jordan. 57 A second report, released by Human
Rights Watch in September 2006, claimed that the GID carries out arbitrary arrests and abuses
suspects in its own detention facility. The report studied the cases of 16 men whom the GID had
arrested and found that in 14 of the 16 cases, detainees were tortured or ill-treated. In response,
the GID denied any wrongdoing. Finally, in a January 2007 report, Manfred Nowak, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, concluded that “the practice of torture persists in Jordan because of a lack of
awareness of the problem, and because of institutionalized impunity.” In April 2008, three
prisoners were killed and dozens of others injured during a riot at Muwaqqar prison. According to
the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), “mistreatment and beatings of inmates
by some policemen at the Muaqqar prison led to the rioting.”
Despite government denials or statements suggesting that reforms are underway, international
monitoring groups continue to charge that torture in the Jordanian prison system is widespread.
An October 2008 Human Rights Watch report alleged that despite an amendment to the penal
code to make torture a crime, Jordan’s measures have been insufficient and the practice continues.
According to Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, “Torture in
Jordan’s prison system is widespread even two years after King Abdullah II called for reforms to
stop it once and for all.... The mechanisms for preventing torture by holding torturers accountable
are simply not working.”58
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2011 amounted to approximately $12.47 billion. Jordan
has received large allocations in subsequent supplemental appropriations acts (a total of $2.186
billion since FY2002). In addition to funds specifically earmarked for Jordan, emergency
supplemental bills also have contained funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key
cooperation states for Congress
to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. For the past
two years, amid a stalled peace process and now regional political upheaval, King Abdullah II has
reiterated his support for his country’s peaceful relationship with Israel while chiding the Israeli
government for not only failing to restart negotiations but also for obstructing the peace process
by continuing to build settlements. He has called both publicly and privately for the United States
to pressure Israel into returning to the negotiating table. The king has used the Western and U.S.
media as a platform not only to advocate for peace but to warn of the dire regional consequences
if war breaks out. He also has repeatedly cautioned that the lack of a resolution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict undermines U.S. credibility in the Arab world and only increases Israel’s
isolation. Recent statements include:
•
In September 2011, the king remarked that “Everything we've seen on the ground
has been completely the opposite.... [There's] increasing frustration, because
they're [Israeli officials] sticking their heads in the sand and pretending there isn't
a problem.”26
•
In May 2011, the king stated that “It's always easy to find an excuse why not to
do the right thing.... And if we continue along those lines, then we will never
solve this problem. So we need leaders with courage to take the tough decisions
and solve this once and for all.”27
•
In April 2010, the king said that “I met Benjamin Netanyahu ... this time last
year. I was extremely optimistic by the vision he had for peace between the
Israelis and the Palestinians and the Israelis and the Arabs.... However, I have to
say, that over the past 12 months, everything I've seen on the ground has made
me extremely skeptical.... And, I believe I'm one of the more optimistic people
you'll find in this part of the world.”28
•
In May 2009, the king said that “If we delay our peace negotiations, then there is
going to be another conflict between Arabs or Muslims and Israel in the next 1218 months....Just because there is a right-wing [Israeli] government in Israel does
not mean that we should chuck in the towel.”29
Jordan and Hamas
For two decades, Jordan has had an on-again, off-again relationship with Hamas, the Palestinian
militant group and U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
26
"Jordan's King Says Israel Blocks Peace," Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2011.
"King Abdullah II warns of fresh Mideast conflict," Agence France Presse, May 22, 2011.
28
"Jordan's king issues rebuke to Israel ," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2010.
29
"King Abdullah warns of Mideast war if no deal," Agence France Presse, May 11, 2009.
27
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Throughout the 1990s, the late King Hussein tolerated a Hamas presence in his kingdom.30 Upon
his accession to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II, perhaps realizing that Jordan’s relationship
with Hamas was a political liability, reversed his late father’s long-standing policy of tolerating
Hamas and closed its Jordan offices permanently.31
Under King Abdullah II, Jordan has periodically engaged Hamas in a limited dialogue, mostly as
a pragmatic maneuver designed to open channels of communication. Jordan also has sought
assurances that Hamas officials will not interfere in Jordanian domestic politics by encouraging
Islamists groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to be more confrontational in opposing the
kingdom’s peaceful relationship with Israel.
In late 2011, new reports of Jordanian-Hamas contacts surfaced. In September, Jordan permitted
Khaled Meshaal, chief of Hamas’s political bureau, to visit Jordan to see his sick mother.32 Some
analysts have speculated that due to ongoing unrest in Syria, Hamas members are looking to
hedge their bets by seeking a new host country as a base for their international operations. In
November 2011, Jordanian authorities and Meshaal held official meetings in Jordan to “tackle
issues of mutual concern, including major regional files.” Jordanian officials also said that the
kingdom will not host Hamas, though the new Prime Minister Awn Khasawneh did remark that
Jordan’s closure of Hamas’ offices in 1999 was a “constitutional and political mistake.”33 The
Jordanian goverment may be interested in engaging Hamas due to reports that Fatah and Hamas
have agreed to hold elections in 2012 and are due to agree upon a caretaker Palestinian
government for the interim period before elections.
Jordan and Syria
On November 14, following an Arab League decision to suspend Syria’s membership due to the
ongoing regime crackdown against protestors there, King Abdullah II stated in an interview that
President Asad of Syria should resign, saying that “I believe, if I were in his shoes, I would step
down and make sure whoever comes behind me has the ability to change the status quo that we're
seeing.” The king’s remarks were the first time an Arab leader had publicly called for Asad’s
resignation, though subsequent Jordanian press coverage has emphasized that the king’s statement
was not a direct call for Asad to stand down, but rather a response to a hypothetical question.
30
In 1997, Israeli agents disguised as Canadian tourists attempted to assassinate Khaled Meshaal, head of the Hamas
political bureau and one of its founding members, by poisoning him. The agents were captured by Jordanian
authorities, and Israel was forced to release a number of high profile Hamas members in order to secure the return of
their operatives. King Hussein had reportedly threatened to abrogate the Israel-Jordan 1994 peace treaty if Israel failed
to provide an antidote and release other Hamas prisoners.
31
In 1999, the Jordanian Government closed Hamas’ offices and expelled four officials over alleged smuggling of arms
through Jordan and Hamas interference in the country's internal politics through connections with the Islamic Action
Front (IAF).
32
In 2009, Jordan permitted Meshaal to visit the country to see his sick father.
33
"Hamas' return to Amman 'not on agenda'," McClatchy - Tribune Business News, November 13, 2011.
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U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2011 amounted to approximately $12.47 billion. Jordan
has received large allocations in supplemental appropriations acts (a total of $2.186 billion since
FY2002). In addition to funds specifically earmarked for Jordan, emergency supplemental bills
also have contained funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating states for
logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations.
The Five-Year Aid Deal
On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the
United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a
five-year period (FY2010-FY2014). Under the terms of their non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future
congressional appropriation and availability of funds, to providing $360 million per year in
56
“Jordan’s Spy Agency: Holding Cell for the CIA,” Washington Post, December 1, 2007.
“Group: Jordan Tortures Suspects for U.S.,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006.
58
“Jordan: Torture in Prisons Routine and Widespread,” Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2008.
57
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Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).5934 According to the Jordanian government, the agreement “reaffirms the strategic
partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” AtComing at a time when the overall
budget for
foreign aid has beenwas constrained by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deal iswas a
testament to strong U.S.-Jordanian relations.
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.6035
Approximately 4553% of Jordan’s ESF allotment each year goes toward the cash transfer. USAID
programs in
Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water
preservation, and education
education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S.
assistance supports capacity building
programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian
Judicial Council, Judicial Institute,
and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican
Institute and the National Democratic
Institute also receive U.S. grants to train, among other
groups, some Jordanian political parties
and members of parliament. USAID provided $26
million in FY2010 to support political development in Jordan. In the water sector, the bulk of
U.S. economic assistance is devoted
to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most waterdeprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and
water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Aqaba, and Irbid.
The United States government also periodically assists Jordan with other forms of indirect
economic aid. For example, in July 2008 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation signed a
$250 million loan deal with three Jordanian banks to help them extend long-term mortgage
lending to low-income citizens. These loans were in support of the king’s plan to construct
100,000 houses over the next five years to help cash-strapped Jordanians
34
Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
35
When providing cash transfer assistance, the United States, though USAID, requires the Jordanian government to
meet certain mutually-agreed upon benchmarks. According to USAID, these benchmarks include, among others, the
Government of Jordan approving an Insolvency and Bankruptcy draft law, streamlining the consultation process
required for registering property, approving a Medical Liability draft law, approving the Anti-Money Laundering Unit
(AMLU) By-Laws, amending the Judicial Independence Law to allow for the formation of a Judges Association, and
allowing Iraqis returning home to exit the Kingdom without paying overstay fees or incurring a bar to reentry. CRS
Correspondence with USAID, March 3, 2011.
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Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing
several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq,
Aqaba, and Irbid.
In order to address many of the economic grievances expressed by Arab protestors throughout the
so-called Arab Spring of 2011, USAID has reprogrammed $45 million in previously-appropriated
ESF to the establishment of a small-to-medium enterprise (SME) loan guarantee financing
facility. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) plans to provide $250 million in
loan guarantees for new and expanding SMEs, and USAID funding will support administration of
the fund.
Food Aid
Jordan periodically receives U.S. food aid administered by the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) under Title I of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480), under the Section 416(b) program
permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949, and under the Food for Progress Act of
1985 as a grant. Between FY1999 to FY2006, Jordan received approximately $238.52 million in
food aid to purchase wheat. Jordan received no food assistance between FY2007 to FY2010. In
FY2011, the United States provided Jordan with $19 million aid to purchase 50,000 metric tons
of wheat.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold
country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of
directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. Even prior to
the selection, the possible choice of Jordan had come under severe criticism. Freedom House, the
organization whose annual Index of Freedom is drawn upon for two of the “Ruling Justly”
indicators, urged the MCC board to bypass countries that had low scores on political rights and
civil liberties. It argued that countries like Jordan that fall below 4 out of a possible 7 on its index
should be automatically disqualified. Jordan, however, did well on three3 of the six6 other
indicators in this category. Several development analysts further argued that Jordan should not be
59
Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
60
When providing cash transfer assistance, the United States, though USAID, requires the Jordanian government to
meet certain mutually-agreed upon benchmarks. According to USAID, these benchmarks include, among others, the
Government of Jordan approving an Insolvency and Bankruptcy draft law, streamlining the consultation process
required for registering property, approving a Medical Liability draft law, approving the Anti-Money Laundering Unit
(AMLU) By-Laws, amending the Judicial Independence Law to allow for the formation of a Judges Association, and
allowing Iraqis returning home to exit the Kingdom without paying overstay fees or incurring a bar to reentry. CRS
Correspondence with USAID, March 3, 2011.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
eligible,
this category. Several development analysts further argued that Jordan should not be eligible,
asserting that it is already one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, has access to private
sector sector
capital, and is not a democracy. In selecting Jordan, the MCC board appears not to have
been been
swayed by these arguments.
In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million
compact with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to increase the supply of water available to
households and businesses in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also will help improve
the efficiency of water delivery, wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates
hold true, the clean drinking water generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to
supply almost 1 million Jordanian citizens with freshwater.
Military Assistance
U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward upgrading Jordan’s air force, as recent
purchases include upgrades to U.S.-made F-16 fighters, air-to-air missiles, and radar systems.
FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order
to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror capability. Jordan is currently the single
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largest provider of civilian police personnel and fifth-largest provider of military personnel to
U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. In addition to large-scale military aid grants for
conventional weapons purchases, Jordan also receives small grants of U.S. antiterrorism
assistance assistance
from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account
(NADR).61 (NADR).
Jordan received $24.6 million in NADR funds in FY2010 and $12.5 million in FY2011 to support
local authorities in customs inspection and border patrol. Jordan also receives small sums of
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INLCE) aid to support police training in
forensic criminal investigation procedures to combat gender-based violence, anti-money
laundering, and enforcement of intellectual property rights laws (approximately $1.5 million in
FY2010 and $250,000 in FY2011).
Trade
Jordan ranked 78th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United States in 2010.
According to the United States Trade Commission, in 2010 Jordan exported $973.8 million in
goods and services to the United States, a large percentage of which consisted of apparel and
clothing accessories. In 2010, Jordanian imports from the United States reached $1.13 billion.
Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and
appliances, vehicles, and cereals. Two measures, in particular—the Free Trade Agreement and
Qualifying Industrial Zones—have helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create
more opportunities for U.S. investment in Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement
On October 24, 2000, then-President Clinton and King Abdullah II witnessed the signing of a
U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to
bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released
on September 26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S.
production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce
existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, thenPresident Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade
61
Since FY2002, Jordan has received an annual average of approximately $2 million in NADR appropriations from
Congress. NADR funds helps train civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in
police procedures that deal with terrorism.
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Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador
Marwan Muasher exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to
resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were
designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the possible use of
sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R.
2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King
Abdullah’s visit to Washington, DC, following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional
information, see CRS Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones
One outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying
Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and
Israeli input can enter the United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act
amended previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free
trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt.
QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding
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commercial ties between Jordan and Israel. Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.Jordanian trade, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 43,000 people (working eighthour days six days a week), 74% of whom are foreign workers from Southeast Asian nations
including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In general, foreign laborers are viewed as
more skilled and productive than local Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to
recruit local Jordanians since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant to separate
from their families, though in some areas local Jordanians are provided with free transportation to
the QIZs. According to one Jordanian labor leader, foreign workers are attractive to employers
because “they are like slaves. They work them day and night.”62 Labor rights activists also have
complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new minimum wage law.
Sweat Shop Allegations
On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC), a New York-based human rights
advocacy group, issued a report alleging sweatshop-like conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified
Industrial Zone (QIZ) plants in Jordan. The government subsequently acknowledged that it had
failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and has taken action since to close down
factories in violation of the law. The NLC has recognized the government’s recent actions, though
it has suggested that violations of worker rights may continue in smaller factories. Foreign
companies with operations inside QIZs must provide food and housing for workers. Conditions in
worker dormitories are reportedly inspected by retail garment buyers, and the government
provides medical clinics and security for the zones.
In 2008, the Jordanian government signed an agreement with the International Labor
Organization and International Finance Corporation to establish a voluntary monitoring program
to check conditions in close to 100 apparel factories operating in the QIZs. According to Charles
Kernaghan of the NLC, “a lot of people seem to be trying to get this thing straight, but in a
62
“Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
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country where you don’t have a vibrant civil society and unions are not dealing with workers, and
workers have virtually no voice, it is going to be problematic.” For additional information, see
CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt, by Mary Jane Bolle,
Jeremy M. Sharp, and Alfred B. Prados36 Labor rights activists also have
complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new minimum wage law.
Military Cooperation
Military Sales
The United States is helping Jordan to modernize its armed forces, which have been the
traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian military forces, though well trained and
disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of Jordan’s neighboring forces. In recent
years, Jordan has used U.S. military assistance grants to purchase Advanced Medium Range Airto-Air Missiles, upgrades for its fleet of F-16 fighters (approximately 70-80), and Black Hawk
helicopters. The United States also delivered three Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early
2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations in Iraq.
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime Contractor
FY2006
National Command & Control System
$450 million
Northrop Grumman Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million
BAE Company
FY2008
Border Security System
$390 million
DRS Technologies Corp
FY2009
AMRAAM Missiles
$131 million
Raytheon
FY2009
Artillery Rocket Systems
$220 million
Multiple Companies
FY2010
Repair of F-16 Engines
$75 million
Pratt & Whitney
FY2010
JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
$388 million
Javelin Joint Venture
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Joint Exercises and Training
A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. More than 300 Jordanian
military personnel study in the United States each year. In recent years, Jordan is among the top
three recipients of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. IMET
36
“Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
also funds the equipping of English language labs in Jordan. Combined training exercises by U.S.
and Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan (dubbed “Early Victor”), at least on
an annual basis and sometimes more often. The above-mentioned courses conducted by Jordan
for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the United States under a program
called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.6337 In addition, the United States has supported the
construction of the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations Training (KASOTC). The
center, which has been partially financed by the United States including with $99 million in
63
Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army—in Jordan,” Defense News, February 9, 2004, p. 8.
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appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13), serves as a regional
headquarters for counter-terrorism training. 6438 In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations
Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within
the military.
Other Activities
Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, thenPresident Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on
November 13, 1996. According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan
eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already
appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases, the
stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium munitions.”
According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military hospitals to
Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health care professionals to the
two facilities. Both facilities provide critical health care to numerous patients, including civilians.
The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more than 650 patients a day, having treated more than
500,000 since it was first deployed in December 2001. In Iraq, Jordan helped train 50,000
policemen, helped the United States reach out to Sunni tribes and politicians in order to facilitate
reconciliation, and still maintains a field hospital in Fallujah.
Jordan also regularly contributes peacekeeping forces to United Nations missions abroad.6539 In
November 2006, a Jordanian United Nations peacekeeping patrol in the Haitian capital, Port-auPrince, was killed while on patrol. Jordan has about 1,500 troops in the Brazilian-led U.N. force,
which includes more than 8,000 soldiers and police supported by some 1,000 civilian personnel.
Two other Jordanian soldiers were killed in January 2006. In 2009, five more Jordanian
peacekeepers were killed in a plane crash during border surveillance mission while serving in
Haiti. Three more Jordanian soldiers were killed during the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Jordan’s Role in Libya
In April 2011, an estimated six Jordanian Air Force fighter jets were deployed to the
Mediterranean to participate in Operation Odyssey Dawn in order to provide logistical support for
imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya and protect Jordanian military aircraft flying humanitarian
aid to the Libyan people. In early April, Jordanian aircraft landed at Benghazi Airport with
humanitarian supplies. Jordan has said it will not participate militarily in the NATO-led
enforcement mission in Libya, but is willing to provide humanitarian aid if asked.
6437
Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army—in Jordan,” Defense News, February 9, 2004, p. 8.
According to one description of the new U.S.-Jordanian facility, “If special forces have to conduct house-to-house
searches, KASOTC provides that infrastructure in a training environment.... If they have to rescue hostages on an
airplane, KASOTC provides the plane. If they have to rescue hostages from an embassy, KASOTC provides an
embassy structure.” See, Joan Kibler, “KASOTC,” Special Operations Technology Online Edition, volume 6, issue 2,
March 19, 2008.
6539
To date, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) have contributed 57,000 troops to 18 different United Nations
peacekeeping missions.
38
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Jordan’s Role in 16
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Jordan’s Role in Libya
In April 2011, an estimated six Jordanian Air Force fighter jets were deployed to the
Mediterranean to participate in Operation Unified Protector in order to provide logistical support
for imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya and protect Jordanian military aircraft flying
humanitarian aid to the Libyan people. In early April, Jordanian aircraft landed at Benghazi
Airport with humanitarian supplies. Jordan did not participate militarily in the NATO-led
enforcement mission in Libya.
Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan
Although the Jordanian government had publicly acknowledged a limited humanitarian presence
in Afghanistan since major NATO operations began there in 2001, the December 30, 2009,
terrorist attack against a CIA base in Khost, in which a Jordanian intelligence agent and royal
family member was killed, shed light on Jordan’s deeper cooperation against Al Qaeda and their
Taliban allies.6640 Officially, Jordan has not acknowledged its intelligence role in Afghanistan.
Numerous reports of joint CIA-GID cooperation have illustrated Jordan's long-standing, but
unacknowledged cooperation with U.S. global counterterrorism. According to one unnamed U.S.
source, “we have a close partnership with the Jordanians on counterterrorism matters…. Having
suffered serious losses from terrorist attacks on their own soil, they are keenly aware of the
significant threat posed by extremists.” Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al Rafa'i stated that
“Being part of this world, we have to coordinate with other countries and exchange information
about the location of terrorist groups…. We will be everywhere as long as this is necessary for
our national security.” Some Jordanian Islamists have expressed dismay at the degree of
Jordanian cooperation with the United States, and there is some concern that the 2009 incident
might temper future U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation.
In March 2010, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen officially requested that
Jordan play a role in training the Afghan Army. In response, Jordan has sent an unspecified
number of instructors from its armed forces and security service to Afghanistan. Reportedly,
Jordan has already trained 2,500 members of the Afghan special forces at the King Abdullah II
Special Operations Training Centre.6741 Jordan also is helping to promote religious toleration by
training Afghan imams.
In June 2011, a Jordanian Al Qaeda operative named Mahmoud Hamdan Nizal (aka Abu Dher al
Urduni) was killed in a clash with U.S. troops in eastern Afghanistan. Nizal was from the city of
Zarqa and was killed in a U.S. air or artillery strike.
6640
On December 30, 2009, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian terrorist who had been serving as an
informant for the Central Intelligence Agency and Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate, detonated a suicide vest
bomb killing eight people outside CIA Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan. His Jordanian
handler, Captain Sharif Ali bin Zeid, a member of the royal family, was killed as well. Al Balawi, a physician, held
virulent anti-American and anti-Israeli views expressed in various Jihadist online forums. Prior to his attack, he had
managed to convince U.S. and Jordanian intelligence officials that he knew the whereabouts of Ayman Al Zawahiri,
who is Al Qaeda's second-in-command. In a video filmed before his death, Al Balawi swore revenge for the August
2009 killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and appeared with Mehsud's cousin and successor
Hakimullah Mehsud. Months later, a second video emerged showing Al Balawi urging militants to target Jordan for
terrorist attacks.
6741
"Jordan Trained 2,500 Afghan Special Forces: Minister," Agence France Presse, May 12, 2010.
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Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
Totals
EconSpt
Food
Devel
0
0
1991
35.0a
0
0
1992
30.0b
20.0
1993c
5.0
1994d
Totals
PeaceCp
FMF
IMET
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1.6
223.00
1998f
150.0
0
0
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004
250.0
0
0
2.3
206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005
250.0
0
0
1.6
206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006
247.5
0
0
1.6
207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.30i
2008
361.4
0
0
0
298.3
2.9
662.60
2008 (Suppl.)
200.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
250.00
2009
263.5
0
0
0
235.0
3.1
501.60
(150.0 in FY2010
2009 (Suppl.)
150.0
0
0
0
Advanced funding)
0
150.00
2010
363.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.8
666.8
2010 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
150.0
2011 (Estimate)
360.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
663.7
FY2012 (Request)
360.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
663.7
Congressional Research Service
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts , food aid between 1999-2006, or amounts
for de-mining assistance
and counter-terrorism assistance.
a.
Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b.
Released in late July 1993.
c.
Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d.
FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e.
Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special
drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.
These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g.
For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h.
Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.
Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in
NADR funds.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
2919