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Promoting Global Internet Freedom: Policy
and Technology
Patricia Moloney Figliola
Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy
May 26, 2011January 17, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41837
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
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Promoting Global Internet Freedom: Policy and Technology
Summary
Modern communication tools such as the Internet provide a relatively inexpensive, accessible,
easy-entry means of sharing ideas, information, and pictures around the world. In a political and
human rights context, in closed societies when the more established, formal news media is denied
access to or does not report on specified news events, the Internet has become an alternative
source of media, and sometimes a means to organize politically.
The openness and the freedom of expression allowed through social networking sites, as well as
the blogs, video sharing sites, and other tools of today’s communications technology, have proven
to be an unprecedented and often disruptive force in some closed societies. Governments that
seek to maintain their authority and control the ideas and information their citizens receive are
often caught in a dilemma: they feel that they need access to the Internet to participate in
commerce in the global market and for economic growth and technological development, but fear
that allowing open access to the Internet potentially weakens their control over their citizens.
Current legislation under consideration by the 112th Congress would mandate that U.S. companies
selling Internet technologies and services to repressive countries take actions to combat
censorship and protect personally identifiable information. Some believe, however, that
technology can offer a complementary and, in some cases, better and more easily implemented
solution to some of those issues. They argue that hardware and Internet services, in and of
themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are implemented by various
countries that is repressive. Also, Internet services are often tailored for deployment to specific
countries; however, such tailoring is done to bring the company in line with the laws of that
country, not with the intention of allowing the country to repress and censor its citizenry. In many
cases, that tailoring would not raise many questions about free speech and political repression.
This report provides information about federal and private sector efforts to promote and support
global Internet freedom, a description of Internet freedom legislation from the 112th Congress,
and suggestions for further reading on this topic. Two appendixes describe censorship and
circumvention technologies.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Doing Business with Repressive Regimes: U.S. Industry Dilemma ............................................... 1
U.S. State Department: Promoting Internet Freedom ...................................................................... 2
The NetFreedom Task Force .................................................................................................3
Funding .......... 3
The State Department’s International Strategy for Cyberspace.......................................................................................................................... 4
U.S. Industry Activity Promoting Internet Freedom: The Global Network Initiative .....................4 5
GNI Report: Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age .......................................................6. 7
Legislative Activity in the 112th Congress .......................................................................................7 8
For Further Reading ......................................................................................................................8... 9
Appendixes
Appendix A. Methods/Technologies Used to Monitor and Censor Websites and WebBased Communications ........................................................................................................... 10... 11
Appendix B. Technologies Used to Circumvent Censorship......................................................... 13 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................... 1314
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 14 13
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Introduction
Around the world, over 2 billion people have access to the Internet. Most use this access to
conduct activities related to their day-to-day lives—such as accessing government services,
banking and paying bills, communicating with friends and relatives, researching health
information, and, in some cases, participating in their counties’ political processes. In most
countries, those who use the Internet to participate in their countries’ political processes take for
granted that they may use the Internet to engage openly in political discussions and to organize
politically-oriented activities.
However, the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly—including both political speech and
organizing conducted via the Internet—are not available to citizens in every country. In some
countries activists are in danger any time they access or even attempt to access a prohibited
website or service or promote political dissent. Political activity is monitored and tracked (see
Appendix A for a description of methods). Despite such hurdles, political activists have
embraced the Internet, using it to share information and organize dissent. To protect themselves,
they have purchased and deployed circumvention technologies to skirt government censors (see
Appendix B).
The restriction of Internet freedom by foreign governments creates a tension between U.S.
policymakers and industry. One of the most fundamental of these tensions is between the
commercial needs of U.S. industry, which faces competitive and legal pressures in international
markets, and the political interests of the United States, which faces other pressures (e.g., national
security, global politics). This tension is complicated by the fact that many of the technologies in
question may be used both for and against Internet freedom, in some cases simultaneously.
This report provides information about federal and private sector efforts to promote and support
global Internet freedom, a description of Internet freedom legislation from the 112th Congress,
and suggestions for further reading on this topic. Two appendixes describe censorship and
circumvention technologies.
Doing Business with Repressive Regimes: U.S.
Industry Dilemma
Governments everywhere need the Internet for economic growth and technological development.
Some also seek to restrict the Internet in order to maintain social, political, or economic control.
Such regimes often require the assistance of foreign Internet companies operating in their
countries. These global technology companies find themselves in a dilemma. They must either
follow the laws and requests of the host country, or refuse to do so and risk the loss of business
licenses or the ability to sell services in that country.
However, the global technology industry also risks raising the concern of U.S. lawmakers by
appearing to be complicit with a repressive regime if they cooperate. For example, the Global
Online Freedom Act of 2011 (GOFA) (H.R. 1389), introduced by Representative Christopher
Smith, would mandate that companies selling Internet technologies and services to repressive
countries take actions to combat censorship and protect personally identifiable information. That
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legislation mirrors opinions of some who believe that the U.S. technology industry should be
doing more to ensure that its products are not used for repressive purposes.
Others believe that technology can offer a complementary (and, in some cases, better) solution to
prevent government censorship than mandates imposed on companies. Hardware, software, and
Internet services, in and of themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are
implemented by various countries that makes them “repressive.” For example, software is needed
by Internet service providers (ISPs) to provide that service. However, software features intended
for day-to-day Internet traffic management, such as filtering programs that catch spam or viruses,
can be misused. Repressive governments use such programs to censor and monitor Internet
traffic—sometimes using them to identify specific individuals for persecution. Further, U.S.
technology representatives note that it is not currently feasible to completely remove these
programs, even when sold to countries that use those features to repress political speech, without
risking significant network disruptions.1
On the other hand, widely used Internet services, such as search engines, are often tailored for
specific countries. Such tailoring is done to bring the company’s products and services in line
with the laws of that country, and not with the end goal of allowing the country to repress and
censor its citizenry. In many cases, tailoring does not raise many questions about free speech and
political repression because the country is not considered to be a repressive regime. Under
Canadian human rights law, for example, it is illegal to promote violence against protected
groups; therefore, when reported, Google.ca will remove such links from search results.2
U.S. State Department: Promoting Internet Freedom
The State Department works to advance Internet freedom as an aspect of the universal rights of
freedom of expression and the free flow of information. On February 15, 2011, Secretary Clinton
reconfirmed the U.S. commitment to “protect and defend a free and open Internet.”3 Secretary
Clinton has outlined the following key initiatives to advance Internet freedom as an objective of
U.S. foreign policy:4
•
Continue the work of the State Department’s NetFreedom Task Force (previously
called the Global Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT)). The Task Force oversees
U.S. efforts in more than 40 countries to help individuals circumvent politically
motivated censorship by developing new tools and providing the training needed
to safely access the Internet;
•
Make Internet freedom an issue at the United Nations and the U.N. Human
Rights Council in order to enlist world opinion and support for Internet Freedom;
1
Testimony of Mark Chandler, Cisco Systems, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Human
Rights and the Law, May 2, 2008.
2
Testimony of Nicole Wong, Google, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights
and the Law, May 2, 2008.
3
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked
World,” February 15, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.
4
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/
01/135519.htm.
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•
Work with new partners in industry, academia, and non-governmental
organizations to establish a standing effort to advance the power of “connection
technologies” that will empower citizens and leverage U.S. traditional
diplomacy;
•
Provide new, competitive grants for ideas and applications that help break down
communications barriers, overcome illiteracy, and connect people to servers and
information they need;
•
Urge and work with U.S. media companies to take a proactive role in challenging
foreign governments’ demands for censorship and surveillance; and
•
Encourage the voluntary work of the communications-oriented, private sector-led
Global Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI brings technology companies,
nongovernmental organizations, academic experts, and social investment funds
together to develop responses and mechanisms to government requests for
censorship.
Commentators have expressed concerns that there could be serious negative consequences for
U.S. and foreign companies, and U.S. or foreign nationals working or living in countries with
repressive regimes, if they follow the expanded U.S. policy supporting Internet freedom. These
commentators point out that repressive governments could punish or make an example of an
individual or company for not following the dictates of that country. This could include
harassment, lifting of business licenses, confiscation of assets, or imprisonment. Observers also
question what powers the United States may have to respond to such actions, beyond expressing
displeasure through official demarches and public statements or through negotiations.5
The NetFreedom Task Force
The Task Force is the State Department’s policy-coordinating and outreach body for Internet
freedom. The members address Internet freedom issues by drawing on the Department'’s
multidisciplinary expertise in international communications policy, human rights,
democratization, business advocacy, corporate social responsibility, and relevant countries and
regions. The Task Force is co-chaired by the Under Secretaries of State for Democracy and
Global Affairs and for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs and draws on the State
Department’s multidisciplinary expertise in its regional and functional bureaus to work on issues
such as international communications, human rights, democratization, business advocacy and
corporate social responsibility, and country specific concerns. The Task Force supports Internet
freedom by6
•
monitoring Internet freedom and reporting in its annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices the quality of Internet freedom in each country around
the world;
5
Questions following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Remarks on Internet Freedom, January 21, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm, and questions following Assistant Secretary of State Michael
Posner’s “Briefing on Internet Freedom and 21st Century Statecraft,” January 22, 2010, http://it.tmcnet.com/news/2010/
01/26/4590599.htm.
6
The GIFT Strategy is available online at http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/78340.htm.
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•
responding in both bilateral and international fora to support Internet freedom;
and
•
expanding access to the Internet with greater technical and financial support for
increasing availability of the Internet in the developing world.
Funding
The U.S. Congress appropriated $15 million in FY2008, $5 million in FY2009, and $20 million
in FY2010 for State Department programs that support Internet freedom. Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner describes these programs as “not just
circumvention…. [I]t’s a lot about training people…. It’s some about technology. It’s some about
encouraging groups that are in danger. It’s a lot about diplomacy, too, for us getting out there and
being sure that when groups are in trouble, we provide a lifeline.”7 Program areas include
censorship circumvention, Internet and mobile communications security, media training and
advocacy, and public policy.
The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors’ International Broadcasting Bureau also supports
counter-censorship technologies and has committed approximately $2 million per year to help
enable Internet users in repressive regimes to have access to the VOA and other U.S.
governmental and non-governmental websites and to receive VOA e-mail newslettersThe State Department’s International Strategy for Cyberspace
In May 2011, the State Department released, “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity,
Security, and Openness in a Networked World.”7 This report contains a section called “Internet
Freedom: Fundamental Freedoms and Privacy,” which sets out a four-pronged strategy to help
secure fundamental freedoms and privacy in cyberspace.
Support civil society actors in achieving reliable, secure, and safe platforms for freedoms of
expression and association
The State Department supports individual use of digital media to express opinions, share
information, monitor elections, expose corruption, and organize social and political movements,
and denounce those who harass, unfairly arrest, threaten, or commit violent acts against the
people who use these technologies. The department believes that the same protections must apply
to ISPs and other providers of connectivity, “who too often fall victim to legal regimes of
intermediary liability that pass the role of censoring legitimate speech down to companies.”
Collaborate with civil society and nongovernment organizations to establish safeguards
protecting their Internet activity from unlawful digital intrusions
The State Department will promote cybersecurity among civil society and nongovernmental
organizations to help ensure that freedoms of speech and association are more widely enjoyed in
the digital age.
Cybersecurity is particularly important for activists, advocates, and journalists on the front
lines who may express unpopular ideas and opinions, and who are frequently the victims of
disruptions and intrusions into their email accounts, websites, mobile phones, and data
systems The United States supports efforts to empower these users to protect themselves, to
help ensure their ability to exercise their free expression and association rights on the new
technologies of the 21st century.
Encourage international cooperation for effective commercial data privacy protections
The State Department believes that protecting individual privacy is essential to maintaining the
trust that sustains economic and social uses of the Internet.
The United States has a robust record of enforcement of its privacy laws, as well as
encouraging multi-stakeholder policy development We are continuing to strengthen the U.S.
commercial data privacy framework to keep pace with the rapid changes presented by
networked technologies We recognize the role of applying general privacy principles in the
commercial context while maintaining the flexibility necessary for innovation The United
7
U.S. State Department, “International Strategy for Cyberspace, Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked
World,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
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States will work toward building mutual recognition of laws that achieve the same objectives
and enforcement cooperation to protect privacy and promote innovation.
Ensure the end-to-end interoperability of an Internet accessible to all
The final prong of the strategy is that users should have confidence that the information they send
over the Internet will be received as it was intended, anywhere in the world, and that under
normal circumstances, data will flow across borders without regard for its national origin or
destination.
Ensuring the integrity of information as it flows over the Internet gives users confidence in
the network and keeps the Internet open as a reliable platform for innovation that drives
growth in the global economy and encourages the exchange of ideas among people around
the world. The United States will continue to make clear the benefits of an Internet that is
global in nature, while opposing efforts to splinter this network into national intranets that
deprive individuals of content from abroad.
U.S. Industry Activity Promoting Internet Freedom:
The Global Network Initiative
The Global Network Initiative (GNI) was formed in October 2008 to respond to criticism of
Internet service providers and computer manufacturers who had sold technology or services to
Internet-restricting countries.8 The GNI was launched by a coalition of human rights
organizations, academics, investors and technology leaders. GNI adopts a self-regulatory
approach to protect and advance individuals’ rights to free expression and privacy on the Internet.
A set of principles and supporting mechanisms provide guidance to the information and
communications technology (ICT) industry and its stakeholders on how to protect and advance
freedom of expression and the right to privacy when faced with pressures from governments to
take actions that infringe upon these rights.
Governments are not members of the GNI, but are encouraged to support the principles and
encourage their adoption. U.S. companies participating in the GNI include Google Inc., Microsoft
Corp., and Yahoo! Inc. Each initial participating company committed $100,000 per year over the
two-year start-up period. Organizations not participating in the initiative but that were involved in
its development include Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders. Reporters
Without Borders remains skeptical about how much change GNI can effect.9 It has pushed for
standards that would require all government requests and takedown notices be made in writing.
7
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael H. Posner, “Briefing on Internet
Freedom and 21st Century Statecraft,” January 22, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2010/134306.htm.
8
See http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/.
9
Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Why Reporters Without Borders Is Not Endorsing the Global
(continued...)
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The GNI’s Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy (“the Principles”) are based on
internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
The GNI’s Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy (“the Principles”) are based on
internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
8
See http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/.
Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Why Reporters Without Borders Is Not Endorsing the Global
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy for ICT Companies Operating in Internet Restricting Countries,’’
October 28, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29117.
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The GNI acknowledges that the rights of privacy and freedom of expression should not be
restricted by governments, except in narrowly defined circumstances based on internationally
recognized laws or standards. The Implementation Guidelines (“The Guidelines”) of the GNI
provide guidance to ICT companies on how to implement the Principles, and describe the actions
that constitute compliance. With respect to government demands to remove or limit access to
content or restrict communications, participating companies commit to
•
require governments to follow local legal processes;
•
interpret the governmental authority’s jurisdiction to minimize the negative
effect; and
•
interpret government demands so as to minimize the negative effect, when
required to restrict communications or remove content.
Companies also commit to encourage governments to
•
be specific, transparent, and consistent in the demands issued to restrict freedom
of expression online; and
•
limit demands to those consistent with international laws and standards.
Companies that participate also commit to operate in a transparent manner when required to
remove content or restrict access, and must disclose to users the applicable laws and policies
requiring such action, the company’s policies for responding to government demands, and
provide timely notice to users when access to content has been locked or communications limited
due to government restrictions. With respect to privacy, participating companies commit to assess
the human rights risks associated with the collection, storage, and retention of personal
information and to develop mitigation strategies.
A system of independent third-party assessment of company compliance with the Principles and
Implementation Guidelines are to be phased in over three stages:
•
In Phase One (ended December 2010) each participating company establishesestablished
internal policies and procedures to implement the Principles, and the Board
approves independence and competence criteria for the selection of independent
assessors.
•
In Phase Two (2011) independent assessors plan to conductconducted process assessments
of of
each participating company to review and evaluate their internal systems for
implementing the Principles.
•
In Phase Three (January 2012 onwards) the Board plans towill accredit independent
assessors to review the internal systems of companies, and company responses to
(...continued)
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy for ICT Companies Operating in Internet Restricting Countries,’’
October 28, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29117.
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specific government demands implicating freedom of expression or privacy. Each
participating company is supposed to submit an annual report to the
Organization. The assessors are then supposed to prepare reports explaining each
company’s responses to government demands, evaluating the effectiveness of the
company’s responses. Each company is given the opportunity to respond to the
assessor’s draft and final report. The Board of the Organization plans to assess
whether the company is in compliance with the Principles and make its
determination public. The Board of the Organization plans to publish an annual
report assessing each participating company’s compliance with the Principles.
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GNI Report: Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age
In February 2011, the GNI released the report, “Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age.”10 In
the report, the authors explain the importance of understanding the ICT industry’s “freedom of
expression and privacy risk drivers” and characteristics that distinguish it from other industry
sectors. The report goes on to explain the characteristics that exist across five spheres and have
implications for how to best protect and advance human rights in the industry:
•
End user—plays a significant role in the human rights impact of ICT
•
Legal frameworks—can move more slowly than ICT product and service
development
•
Jurisdictional complexity—increasingly significant as information becomes
global and data flows across borders
•
Technological complexity—new products and services are continually
introduced, often with unpredictable consequences for human rights
•
B2B relationships with enterprise and government customers—with whom ICT
companies often co-design products and services.
The GNI provides direction and guidance to companies on how to respond to government
demands to remove, filter, or block content, and how to respond to law enforcement agency
demands to disclose personal information. These types of risk drivers will be relevant for
companies that hold significant amounts of personal information and/or act as gatekeepers to
content, primarily telecommunications services providers and internet services companies.
The report sets out the following “risk drivers” across eight segments of the ICT industry:
•
Telecommunications Services—risk drivers include requirements to assist law
enforcement agencies in investigations
•
Cell Phones and Mobile Devices—location-based services such as mapping or
advertising can present new sources of security and privacy risks
•
Internet Services—companies can receive demands to remove, block, or filter
content, or deactivate individual user accounts
10
Global Network Initiative, “Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age,” February 2011,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/1/BSR_ICT_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
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•
Enterprise Software, Data Storage, and IT Services—companies hosting data “in
the cloud” may increasingly be gatekeepers to law enforcement requests or
provide service to high-risk customers
•
Semiconductors and Chips—hardware can be configured to allow remote access,
which may present security and privacy risks
•
Network Equipment—where functionality necessarily allows content to be
restricted or data to be collected by network managers
•
Consumer Electronics—pressure may exist to pre-install certain types of
software to restrict access to content or allow for surveillance
10
Global Network Initiative, “Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age,” February 2011,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/1/BSR_ICT_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
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•
Security Software—risk drivers may include increasing pressure to offer simpler
means of unscrambling encrypted information.
The GNI report concludes by highlighting four key topics that any ongoing dialogue about the
technology industry should likely address: relationships with governments; designing future
networks; implementing due diligence; and engaging employees, users, and consultants.
Legislative Activity in the 112th Congress
Two bills and one resolution have been introduced in the 112th Congress related to global Internet
freedom.
H.R. 1389, Global Online Freedom Act of 2011. Introduced by Representative Christopher Smith.
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce on April 6, 2011; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights on May 13, 2001. This bill is identical to H.R. 2271
that was introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 1389 would:
•
Make it U.S. policy to (1) promote the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas through any media; (2) use all appropriate instruments of
U.S. influence to support the free flow of information without interference or
discrimination; and (3) deter U.S. businesses from cooperating with Internetrestricting countries in effecting online censorship.
•
Express the sense of Congress that (1) the President should seek international
agreements to protect Internet freedom; and (2) some U.S. businesses, in
assisting foreign governments to restrict online access to U.S.-supported websites
and government reports and to identify individual Internet users, are working
contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests.
•
Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require assessments of electronic
information freedom in each foreign country.
•
Establish in the Department of State the Office of Global Internet Freedom
(OGIF).
•
Direct the Secretary of State to annually designate Internet-restricting countries.
Prohibits, subject to waiver, U.S. businesses that provide to the public a
commercial Internet search engine, communications services, or hosting services
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from locating, in such countries, any personally identifiable information used to
establish or maintain an Internet services account.
•
Require U.S. businesses that collect or obtain personally identifiable information
through the Internet to notify the OGIF and the Attorney General before
responding to a disclosure request from an Internet-restricting country.
Authorizes the Attorney General to prohibit a business from complying with the
request, except for legitimate foreign law enforcement purposes.
•
Require U.S. businesses to report to the OGIF certain Internet censorship
information involving Internet-restricting countries.
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•
Prohibit U.S. businesses that maintain Internet content hosting services from
jamming U.S.-supported websites or U.S.-supported content in Internetrestricting countries.
•
Authorize the President to waive provisions of this act: (1) to further the purposes
of this act; (2) if a country ceases restrictive activity; or (3) if it is the national
interest of the United States.
S. 879 and H.R. 1714, Iran Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Act of 2011. Introduced by
Representative Robert Dold and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as
the House Committees on Financial Services, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means. Among other
purposes, H.R. 1714These bills
were both introduced on May 4, 2011, by Senator Mark Steven Kirk in the Senate and by
Representative Robert Dold in the House. The bills were referred to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.11 Among other purposes, these
bills would require the President to submit to Congress a comprehensive strategy
to promote
Internet freedom and access to information in Iran.
H.Res. 29, Calling for Internet freedom in Vietnam. Introduced by Representative Loretta
Sanchez on January 7, 2011, and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Health, and Human Rights. on March 1, 2011.
This resolution would:
•
Support the right of the citizens of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to access
websites of their choosing and to have the freedom to share and publish
information over the Internet.
•
Call on Vietnam to: (1) repeal Circular 07, Article 88, and similar statutes that
restrict the Internet, so as to be in line with the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, to which Vietnam is a signatory; and (2) become a
responsible member state of the international community by respecting
individuals'’ freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of political
association.
For Further Reading
“Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumvention Tools,”
Freedom House
April 2011
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=97
Report
“Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media”
Freedom House
April 2011
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fotn/2011/FOTN2011.pdf
Report
11
H.R. 1714 was also referred to the House Committees on Financial Services, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means.
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http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fotn/2011/FOTN2011.pdf
Report
“Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age”
Global Network Initiative
February 2011
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/1/BSR_ICT_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
Report
“The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change”
Foreign Affairs (Journal of the Council on Foreign Relations), by Clay Shirky
January/February 2011
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media
*Full article not available online.
Article
Related:
“Social Media and Revolution”
The Brian Lehrer Show
January 2011
http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/2011/jan/19/wikileaks-revolution/
Audio Transcript
“Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked World”
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
February 2011
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm
Speech
“Remarks on Internet Freedom”
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
January 2010
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm
Speech
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Appendix A. Methods/Technologies Used to
Monitor and Censor Websites and Web-Based
Communications11Communications12
There are four different types of targets that are censored:
•
Services, e.g., email, the web, peer-to-peer, social networking service
•
Content, e.g., hate speech, child pornography, gambling, human-rights
organizations, independent news sites, political opposition sites
•
Activities, e.g., illegal music downloads, spam, political organizing by opposition
groups in repressive regimes.
These targets can be censored using the methods listed below.
Key-Word List Blocking
This is a simple type of filtration where a government drops any Internet packets featuring certain
keywords, such as “protest” or “proxy.”
Domain Name System (DNS) Poisoning
DNS poisoning intentionally introduces errors into the Internet’s directory service to misdirect the
original request to another IP address.
IP Blocking
IP Blocking is one of the most basic methods that governments use for censorship, as it simply
prevents all packets going to or from targeted IP addresses. This is an easy technology to
implement, but it does not address the problem of individual communications between users. This
method is used to block banned websites, including news sites and proxy servers that would allow
access to banned content, from being viewed.
Bandwidth Throttling
Bandwidth throttling simply limits the amount of traffic that can be sent over the Internet.
Keeping data volume low facilitates other methods of monitoring and filtering by limiting the
amount of data present.
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Adapted from “Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumvention Tools,” Freedom House, April
2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=97 ;“The State of Iranian Communication:
Manipulation and Circumvention,” Morgan Sennhauser, Nedanet, July 2009, http://iranarchive.openmsl.net/SoIC1.21.pdf; and “Five Technologies Iran is Using to Censor the Web,” Brad Reed, Network World, July 2009,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/072009-iran-censorship-tools.html.
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Traffic Classification
This is a much more sophisticated method of blocking traffic than IP blocking, as governments
can halt any file sent through a certain type of protocol, such as FTP. Because FTP transfers are
most often sent through a specific communications port, a government can simply limit the
bandwidth available on that port and throttle transfers. This type of traffic-shaping practice is the
most common one used by repressive governments today. It is not resource intensive and it is
fairly easy to implement.
Shallow Packet Inspection (SPI)
Shallow packet inspection is a less sophisticated version of the deep packet inspection (DPI)
technique (DPI is described below) that is used to block packets based on their content. Unlike
DPI, which intercepts packets and inspects their fingerprints (fingerprinting is described below),
headers, and payloads, SPI makes broad generalities about traffic based solely on evaluating the
packet header. Although shallow packet inspection can’t provide the same refined/detailed traffic
assessments as DPI, it is much better at handling volume than DPI.
SPI is much less refined than DPI, but it is capable of handling a greater volume of traffic much
more quickly. SPI is akin to judging a book by its cover. This method is prone to exploitation by
users because they can disguise their packets to look like a different kind of traffic.
Packet Fingerprinting
This is a slightly more refined method of throttling packets than shallow packet inspection, as it
looks not only at the packet header but at its length, frequency of transmission, and other
characteristics to make a rough determination of its content. In this manner, the government can
better classify packets and not throttle traffic sent out by key businesses.
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) / Packet Content Filtering
DPI is the most refined method that governments have for blocking Internet traffic. As mentioned
above, deep packet inspectors examine not only a packet’s header but also its payload. For
instance, certain keywords can be both monitored and the e-mail containing them can be kept
from reaching its intended destination.
This gives governments the ability to filter packets at a more surgical level than any of the other
techniques discussed so far. While providing the most targeted traffic monitoring and shaping
capabilities, DPI is also more complicated to run and is far more labor-intensive than other
traffic-shaping technologies.
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Appendix B. Technologies Used to Circumvent
Censorship12Censorship13
Each of the circumvention methods explained below can, in general, be considered an anonymous
“proxy server.” A proxy server is a computer system or an application program that acts as an
intermediary for requests from a user seeking resources from other servers, allowing the user to
block access to his or her identity and become anonymous.
Web-Based Circumvention Systems
Web-based circumvention systems are special web pages that allow users to submit a URL and
have the web-based circumventor retrieve the requested web page. There is no connection
between the user and the requested website as the circumventor transparently proxies the request
allowing the user to browse blocked websites seamlessly. Since the web addresses of public
circumventors are widely known, most Internet filtering applications already have these services
on their block lists, as do many countries that filter at the national level.
Examples: Proxify, StupidCensorhip, CGIProxy, psiphon, Peacefire/Circumventor.
Web and Application Tunneling Software
Tunneling encapsulates one form of traffic inside of other forms of traffic. Typically, insecure,
unencrypted traffic is tunneled within an encrypted connection. The normal services on the user’s
computer are available, but run through the tunnel to the non-filtered computer which forwards
the user’s requests and their responses transparently. Users with contacts in a non-filtered country
can set up private tunneling services while those without contacts can purchase commercial
tunneling services. “Web” tunneling software restricts the tunneling to web traffic so that web
browsers will function securely, but not other applications. “Application” tunneling software
allows the user to tunnel multiple Internet applications, such as e-mail and instant messenger
applications.
Examples: Web Tunneling: UltraReach, FreeGate, Anonymizer, Ghost Surf.
Examples: Application Tunneling: GPass, HTTP Tunnel, Relakks, Guardster/SSH.
Anonymous Communications Systems
Anonymous technologies conceal a user’s IP address from the server hosting the website visited
by the user. Some, but not all, anonymous technologies conceal the user’s IP address from the
anonymizing service itself and encrypt the traffic between the user and the service. Since users of
anonymous technologies make requests for web content through a proxy service, instead of to the
server hosting the content directly, anonymous technologies can be a useful way to bypass
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Adapted from Reporters Without Borders, “Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber-Dissidents,” September 2005,
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Bloggers_Handbook2.pdf; and The Citizen Lab, “Everyone’s Guide to By-Passing Internet
Censorship for Citizens Worldwide,” University of Toronto, September 2007, http://citizenlab.org/Circ_guide.pdf.
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Internet censorship. However, some anonymous technologies require users to download software
and can be easily blocked by authorities.
Examples: Tor, JAP ANON, I2P
Author Contact Information
Patricia Moloney Figliola
Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications
Policy
pfigliola@crs.loc.gov, 7-2508
Acknowledgments
Casy Addis, Thomas Lum, Kennon H. Nakamura, and Gina Stevens contributed to a previous version of
this report.
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