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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

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. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs May 2October 19, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32665 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress c11173008 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. Since then, the Navy has The Navy in subsequent years changed its desired quantities for some of those ship types, and the Navy’s goals now add up to a desired fleet of 328 shipscertain ship types, and by mid-2011 the Navy’s desired fleet appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships. In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a new 313-ship plan that incorporates some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the 313-ship plan of September 2011 reduces the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21. Press reports in September and October 2011 state that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, is examining options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned procurements. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 328313-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2012FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget, includes a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the 55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. The Navy’s FY2011FY2012 30-year (FY2011-FY2040FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in February 2010 in conjunction with its proposed FY2011 budget late May 2011, includes 276 ships. The FY2011 FY2012 30-year plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s de facto 328313-ship goal over the long run. Among other things, the Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine forces would drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. The Navy last year estimated that executing the FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimated. Issues for Congress include the sufficiency of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan for achieving and maintaining the Navy’s 328-ship goal, the affordability of the FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, and proposals that some study groups have made for Navy ship force structure. Congressional Research Service Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Contents Introduction the 30-year plan. A June 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Issues for Congress include the appropriate future size and structure of the Navy in light of changes in strategic and budget circumstances, the sufficiency of the Navy’s FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan for achieving and maintaining the Navy’s 313-ship goal, and the affordability of the FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan. Congressional Research Service . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................1 Background ... 1 Background...................................................................................................................................... 1 Navy’s De Facto 328313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011 ....................................................................1 Navy’s 5-Year, 10-Year, 1 Navy’s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans .......................................................3 FY2012 3 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................ 3 303 FY2012 10-Year (FY2012-FY2021FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................... 5 Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under5 FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan....................................................6 Navy’s Projected Force Levels 7 Press Reports of Navy Examining Options for Force Structure and Procurement Reductions .............................................................................................................................. 8 Oversight Issues for Congress ................................................................................................7 Projected Force Levels Under FY2012 10-Year Plan....... 12 Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary Circumstances .......................................................7 Projected Force Levels Under FY2011 30-Year Plan ............................................................... 12 Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective................................................... 15 Sufficiency of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................8 Oversight Issues for Congress .................................. 15 Affordability of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ........................................................ 16 Efficacy of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan..................................................................... 10 Official Replacement for 313-Ship Plan of 2006............... 18 Legislative Activity for FY2012 ................................................................................................. 10 Sufficiency of FY2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan... 18 FY2012 Funding Request.......................................................................................... 10 Affordability of FY2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ............................................................ 11 Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ............................................. 12 Legislative Activity for FY2012 .............. 18 FY2012 National Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1540/S. 1253)........................................ 18 House (Committee Report) ............................................................................................... 18 House (Floor Consideration)............................................................................................. 21 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 21 FY2012 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219) ...................................................................... 23 House....................................................................................................................... 14 FY2012 Funding Request.......... 23 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 1424 CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 1525 Tables Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001 ..................................................................... 2 Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 3 Table 3. Navy FY2012 1030-Year (FY2012-FY2021FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 6 Table 4. Navy FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan .........................................7 Table 5. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 10-Year Plan .........................................8 Table 6. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2011 30-Year Plan..........................................9 7 Table 7. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 14 Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan ............................................................................. 12 Table 8. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure.......................................... 1317 Table B-1. Comparison of Navy’s 328313-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel ........................................................................................... 3230 Table DC-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ................................................... 37... 33 Table DC-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016 .................................... 38 Appendixes Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011............................................................................ 16. 34 Congressional Research Service . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendixes Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels ............................. 26 Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR............ ............................................ 30 Congressional Research Service Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix C. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to 328-ship goal.............................................. 34.............. 28 Appendix DC. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate......................................................... 32 36 Contacts Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................... 3834 Congressional Research Service . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Introduction This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. Background Navy’s De Facto 328313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011 The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. Since then, the Navy has The Navy in subsequent years changed its desired quantities for some of thosecertain ship types, and the Navy’s goals now add up to a desired fleet of 328 ships. Although the 313-ship plan of 2006 is no longer a fully accurate representation of current Navy ship force-structure goals, the Navy has not presented to Congress an official replacement for the 313-ship plan. Many observers continue to refer to the Navy’s planned fleet as a 313-ship fleet. by mid-2011 the Navy’s desired fleet appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships. In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a new 313-ship plan that incorporates some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the 313-ship plan of September 2011 reduces the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21. Navy officials sometimes refer to the figure of 313 ships as a “floor.” This CRS report treats the Navy’s desire for a fleet of 328 ships as the service’s de facto ship force structure plan. Table 1 compares the current 328-ship goal to the 313-ship plan of 2006 and earlier Navy ship force structure plans. Congressional Research Service 1 ,” meaning a minimum required number. The Navy states that the new 313-ship plan of 2011 “will provide the capability and capacity to meet projected future missions with acceptable risk.”1 Table 1 compares the new 313-ship goal of September 2011 to earlier Navy ship force structure plans. 1 Source: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on October 7, 2011. Congressional Research Service 1 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001 2006 Navy plan for 313ship fleet 260-ships 325ships Ship type De facto 328-ship goal reflecting changes since 2006 to the 313ship planShip type New 313ship plan of September 2011 Changes to February 2006 313ship plan announced through mid-2011 February 2006 Navy plan for 313ship fleet Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 12b 14 1412b Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) 0c 44 0c Attack submarines (SSNs) 48 Aircraft carriers 11e Cruisers and destroyers Early-2005 Navy plan for fleet of 260325 ships 260-ships 325ships 20022004 Navy plan for 375-ship Navya 2001 QDR plan for 310-ship Navy14 14 14 14 14 4 4 4 4 2 or 4d 48 48 37 41 55 55 11e 11f 10 11 12 12 94 94g 88 67 92 104 Frigates 0 0 0 0 0 0 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) 55 55 55 63 82 56 0 Amphibious ships 33 33h 31 17 24 37 36 MPF(F) shipsi 0j 0j 12i 14i 20i 0i 0i Combat logistics (resupply) ships 30 30 30 24 26 42 34 30 30 24 26 42 34 16 shipsi MPF(F) Combat logistics (resupply) ships Dedicated mine warfare ships 1160 0 0 0 0 26k 16 Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) 10l 21l 3 0 0 0 0 Otherm 16 24n 17 10 11 25 25 Total battle force ships313 328 313 260 325 375 310 or 312 Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy dataTotal battle force ships 2001 QDR plan for 310-ship Navy 116 Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. Source for new 313-ship plan of September 2011: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on October 7, 2011. Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified. b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs. For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(XOhio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late 2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire, and the 328-ship presentation reflected the post-2020s force level of zero SSGNs. d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs. e. With congressional approval, the goal will temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers during 33-month period between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and the scheduled entry into service of the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) in September 2015. f. For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers. g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure and missile defense. h. The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31. For further the 31 ships Congressional Research Service 2 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 2 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress i. Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contributehave contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. j. The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to procure six ships that were previously planned for the MPF(F) squadron—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships. These six ships are now included in the 46-ship total total shown for “Other” ships. k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness status. l. The 21 JHSVs include 16 ships dedicated to Navy missions andTotals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships. n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the apparent 328-ship goal includes the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron. Navy’s 5-Year, 10-Year,FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan. Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan (Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 328313-ship goal) Ship type FY12 Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 1 Total 1 Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine 2 2 2 2 2 10 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer 1 2 2 2 1 8 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 4 4 4 4 3 19 San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship 1 1 LHA(R) amphibious assault ship 1 Fleet tug (TATF) 1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship 1 1 Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 1 2 TAO(X) oiler TAGOS ocean surveillance ship TOTAL 1 2 2 2 1 8 1 1 1 3 1 10 13 1 1 11 12 9 55 Source: FY2012 Navy budget submission. Congressional Research Service 3 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Notes: The FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan also includes, in FY2012, an oceanographic ship that does not count against the 328313-ship goal. JHSVs are being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army is procuring a second JHSV in FY2012; this ship is included in the Army’s budget. Congressional Research Service 3 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan include the following: • The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes a total of 55 battle force ships, or 5 more than the FY2011-FY2015 plan. The net increase of five ships includes the addition of six ships and the subtraction of one previously planned ship. The six added ships include a second DDG-51 in FY2014, a fourth Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in FY2012, three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016, and a TAGOS ocean surveillance ship in FY2013. The ship that was subtracted was a second JHSV that was previously planned for FY2016. • The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes an average of 11 battle force ships per year, making this the second year in a row that the Navy has presented a five-year shipbuilding plan showing an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year. Given the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that have beenwere procured each year since FY1993from FY1993 through FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. A rate of 10 battle force ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of 328313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 9.28.9 ships per year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below 9.28.9 ships per year (see Appendix DC). • Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 2421% of the ships in the Navy’s planned force structure (7865 of 328313 ships), they account 49% of the ships in the FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan (27 of 55 ships). In this sense, these relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding plan relative to their portion of the 328313-ship goal, making it easier to procure an average of 11 ships per year within available resources. Starting a few years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a considerably more expensive proposition. In this sense, the FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding program’s average of 11 ships per year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans. • The addition of the fourth LCS in FY2012 brings planned annual LCS procurement quantities into line with those called for in the dual-award acquisition strategy that Congress approved in December 2010 for the LCS program. 12 • The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 is to be the 11th and final ship in the class. The 33-ship force-structure goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD-17s.2 • The first of three planned Mobile Landing Platform ships (MLPs) was requested in the Navy’s FY2011 budget. The FY2011-FY2015 plan scheduled the second 13 2 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 23 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.(continued...) Congressional Research Service 4 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress • The FY2011-FY2015 plan requested the first of three planned Mobile Landing Platform ships (MLPs) in FY2011, and the second and third MLPs in FY2012 and FY2013. As part of its action on the FY2011 defense budget, Congress funded the procurement of two MLPs in FY2011 (i.e., one more than requested). Congress completed its action on the FY2011 budget after the Navy submitted its proposed FY2012 budget, and the FY2012 budget submission does not account for the funding of a second MLP in FY2011. The Navy states that since two MLPs were funded in FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in FY2013. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress and third ships for FY2013 and FY2015. The FY2012-FY2016 plan accelerates the second and third ships to FY2012 and FY2013. The procurement profile for the three MLPs has thus been changed from 1-0-1-0-1 to 1-1-1. Last year, some supporters of the MLP program proposed making this change (or, at a minimum, accelerating the third MLP from FY2015 to FY2014), on the grounds that it would permit a more efficient production profile for the three ships. The Navy last year was presumably aware of the potential production-line advantages of procuring the ships in consecutive years, but may have nevertheless stretched out the procurement profile to 1-0-1-0-1 to help bridge the builder of these ships— National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego—to the planned start of the TAO(X) oiler and LSD(X) amphibious ship programs in FY2017. As noted in the next point below, the planned start of the TAO(X) program has now been accelerated from FY2017 to FY2014. The Navy plans to compete the TAO(X) program; NASSCO is generally considered to be a likely competitor for the program. • The addition of the three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016 reflects an acceleration of the start of this program from FY2017 to FY2014. This acceleration was one of a series of measures that the Navy announced on September 17, 2010, for sustaining the shipbuilding capability in Louisiana. 3 As mentioned above, the 4 The Navy plans to compete the TAO(X), so it is not certain that the program will be awarded to a shipyard in Louisiana, such as the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans that forms part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), which until recently was part of Northrop Grumman. FY2012 10-Year (FY2012-FY2021) Shipbuilding Plan Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2012 10-year (FY2012-FY2021) shipbuilding plan. The first five years of this plan include the same ships as those in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012FY2016) shipbuilding plan shown in the previous section. 3 For the text of the Navy’s announcement, see http://www.wwltv.com/news/Sec-of-Navy-remarks-on-shipyard-inAvondale-103150169.html. Congressional Research Service 5 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 3. Navy FY2012 10-Year (FY2012-FY2021) Shipbuilding Plan (Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 328-ship goal) Ship type FY12 Aircraft carriers FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 1 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 1 Large surface combatants (i.e., destroyers) 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 Small surface combatant (i.e., LCSs) 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 Attack submarines 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Ballistic missile submarines Amphibious ships 1 1 Combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships Support ships TOTAL 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 3 1 3 3 2 2 10 13 11 12 9 12 10 12 8 1 9 Source: FY2012 Navy budget submission. Notes: Tables does not include ships, such as oceanographic ships, that do not count against the 328-ship goal. FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan The Navy did not submit an FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. 4 Table 4 shows the FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan that the Navy submitted to Congress in February 2010, in conjunction with its proposed FY2011 budget. Because this 30year plan reflects the Navy’s FY2011 budget submission rather than the Navy’s FY2012 budget submission, the figures it shows for FY2012-FY2021 do not match those in the FY2012 5-year (FY2012-FY2016) and FY2012 10-year (FY2012-FY2021) shipbuilding plans shown in the previous two sections. The FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) plan includes a total of 276 ships. 4 . National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, is generally considered to be a likely competitor for the program. 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan The Navy did not submit an FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in February 2011, in conjunction with the proposed FY2012 budget.5 At the request of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in late May 2011.6 Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. The first five years of this plan include the same ships as those in the FY2012 (...continued) and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 4 For the text of the Navy’s announcement, see http://www.wwltv.com/news/Sec-of-Navy-remarks-on-shipyard-inAvondale-103150169.html. 5 Section 1023 of the FY2011 defense authorization act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011) amended the law (10 U.S.C. 231) that had required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year. As amended by Section 1023, 10 U.S.C. 231 now requires DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Regarding the three years between each QDR, the joint explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R. 6523 stated: The committees expect that, following the submission of the President’s budget materials for a fiscal year, the Secretary of the Navy, at the written request of one of the congressional defense committees, will promptly deliver the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan used to develop the President’s budget request for that fiscal year, as well as a certification from the Secretary of the Navy that both the President’s budget request for that fiscal year and the budget for the future-years defense program is sufficient to fund the construction schedule provided in that plan. The committees expect that such a plan would include the quantity of each class of ship to be constructed in that fiscal year and the nine following fiscal years. 6 The Navy’s cover letter for the plan is dated May 23, 2011. CRS received the plan on May 24, 2011. The Navy’s cover letter states that the plan was submitted in response to a letter dated February 15, 2011, from Representative Todd Akin, the chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, requesting a 30-year plan. Congressional Research Service 5 . Congressional Research Service 6 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 4. Navy FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan FY 11 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 2. The FY2012 30-year (FY20122041) plan includes a total of 276 ships.7 Table 3. Navy FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan FY 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 CVN 1 1 1 1 1 1 LSC SSC SSN 2 1 2 12 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 34 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 SSBN AWS CLF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Supt Total 2 1 3 2 4 2 3 1 3 3 2 2 10 13 113 3 4 2 3 3 2 1 9 8 12 9 12 9 12 9 13 9 11 1010 12 8 9 9 11 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 11 8 10 7 10 9 10 7 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Source: Navy FY2011 budget submission10 8 8 9 10 7 9 8 11 9 8 7 8 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships. Navy’s Projected Force Levels Projected Force Levels Under FY2012 10-Year Plan Table 5 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2012-FY2021 that would result from implementing the FY2012 10-year (FY2012-FY2021) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3. This table, unlike Table 6, includes five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. Congressional Research Service 7 Supt = support ships. 7 The total of 276 ships includes a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship in FY2013. The Navy says that, as a result of Congress funding two MLPs in FY2011, or one more than the Navy requested for FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in FY2013. Subtracting this MLP from the plan would leave a total of 275 ships. Congressional Research Service 6 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 5. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 10-Year Plan CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total Goal in 328-ship plan 11 94 55 48 0 12 33 30 45 328 FY12 11 84 41 54 4 14 30 31 21 290 FY13 10 84 35 55 4 14 30 30 25 287 FY14 10 85 30 55 4 14 30 30 28 286 FY15 11 86 26 54 4 14 30 30 31 286 FY16 11 90 31 52 4 14 31 30 34 297 FY17 11 91 32 50 4 14 33 29 37 301 FY18 11 93 36 50 4 14 33 30 40 311 FY19 11 95 36 51 4 14 33 30 42 316 FY20 12 97 40 49 4 14 33 30 43 322 FY21 12 97 40 49 4 14 34 30 44 324 Source: Navy FY2012 budget submission. Note: Unlike Table 6, figures in this table include, in the category for support ships, five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships. Projected Force Levels Under FY2011 30-Year Plan Table 6Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040FY2012-FY2041 that would result from implementing the FY2011FY2012 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 4. This table, unlike Table 5, does not include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. Congressional Research Service 8 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 6FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3. Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2011 30-Year FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total Goal in 328313-ship plan 11 94 55 48 0 12 33 30 45 328 FY11 11 84 42 53 4 14 29 29 18 2844 12 33 30 26 313 FY12 11 84 41 54 4 14 30 29 20 28731 21 290 FY13 10 85 3784 35 55 4 14 30 29 2330 25 287 FY14 10 86 3285 30 55 4 14 30 30 24 28528 286 FY15 11 88 2886 26 54 4 14 3130 30 25 28531 286 FY16 11 90 32 5131 52 4 14 3331 30 27 29234 297 FY17 11 91 33 5132 50 4 14 33 30 31 29829 37 301 FY18 11 93 3736 50 4 14 33 30 33 30540 311 FY19 11 94 3795 36 51 4 14 33 30 37 31142 316 FY20 12 96 3997 40 49 4 14 33 30 38 31543 322 FY21 12 96 3997 40 49 4 14 34 31 39 31830 44 324 FY22 12 95 4196 42 48 4 14 34 29 41 31830 45 325 FY23 11 94 3995 40 48 4 14 35 29 45 31936 30 47 325 FY24 11 94 4095 41 46 4 14 36 2830 47 320324 FY25 12 92 4193 42 45 4 14 35 28 46 31736 30 45 321 FY26 12 89 4390 44 44 42 14 36 28 45 31330 44 316 FY27 12 87 4588 46 43 2 13 35 26 46 3081 13 36 30 45 314 FY28 11 85 4686 47 41 10 13 36 26 46 30430 45 309 FY29 11 81 4882 49 40 0 13 34 25 44 29635 30 45 305 FY30 12 77 4978 50 39 0 12 33 25 44 29130 45 299 FY31 12 73 5174 52 41 0 12 33 24 44 29034 30 45 300 FY32 11 71 5272 53 41 0 12 32 25 44 28830 45 296 FY33 11 69 5370 54 42 0 12 31 26 44 28832 30 45 296 FY34 11 6768 54 43 0 12 33 26 44 29030 45 296 FY35 12 6869 55 44 0 12 30 25 44 29031 30 45 298 FY36 11 70 5671 55 45 0 12 30 26 44 29430 45 299 FY37 11 72 5673 55 46 0 12 29 27 44 29730 30 45 302 FY38 11 74 5675 57 45 0 12 29 27 44 29830 45 304 FY39 11 76 56 45 0 12 29 28 44 301 FY40 11 76 55 45 0 12 30 28 44 301 Source: Navy FY2011 budget submission. Note: Unlike Table 5, figures in this table do not include, in the category for support ships, five JHSVs 77 58 45 0 12 30 30 43 306 FY40 11 77 58 45 0 12 30 30 43 306 FY41 11 78 56 45 0 12 30 30 43 305 Congressional Research Service 7 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011. Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships. Congressional Research Service 9 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Oversight Issues for Congress Official Replacement for 313-Ship Plan of 2006 As mentioned earlier, although the 313-ship plan of 2006 is no longer a fully accurate representation of current Navy ship force-structure goals, the Navy has not presented to Congress an official replacement for the 313-ship plan. Consequently, a potential oversight issue for Congress is whether and when the Navy plans to present to Congress an official replacement for the 313-ship plan of 2006. Such a replacement presumably would take into account the changes that have led to the 328-ship total shown in the first data column of Table 1, plus any other changes the Navy might wish to announce. The Navy’s February 2010 report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan stated that the Navy was undertaking a force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could lead to a new plan to replace the 313-ship plan of 2006, but the Navy’s report did not say when the FSA might be completed, or when the Navy might present a new official ship force structure plan to Congress. The Navy testified in March 2011 that we in fact during the past year have done a force structure assessment. And what we are currently doing is working through the leadership both on the Department of the Navy side and the Department of Defense side. And I expect that we should be delivering that [assessment] in the near future as soon as we go through the wickets with the leadership.5 Sufficiency of FY2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 6, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 328-ship goal over the long run: • The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level of 94 ships in 2025, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040. The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through 2040. • There would also be shortfalls in certain years in amphibious ships, combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships, and support ships. The projected shortfalls in cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other ships could make it difficult or impossible for the Navy to fully perform its projected missions during the latter years of the 30-year plan. In light of the projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines, policymakers may wish to consider two options: 5 Spoken remarks of Vice Admiral John Blake, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, at a March 9, 2011, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, as shown in the transcript of the hearing. Congressional Research Service 10 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress • increasing planned procurement rates of destroyers and attack submarines, perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement, and • extending the service lives of older cruisers and destroyers to 45 years, and refueling older attack submarines an extending their service lives to 40 or more years. Regarding the second option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the Navy’s 22 Aegis cruisers, the first 28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN21) class attack submarines—a total of 76 ships. Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear. Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine pressure hull life. Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently planned service lives. Affordability of FY2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the affordability of the FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The Navy estimated that executing the FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for new-construction ships. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for new-construction ships, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report stated: “If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”6 Table 7 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates, as presented in the CBO report. 6 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 201, p. vii. Congressional Research Service 11 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 7. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2011 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2010 dollars First 10 years (FY2011-FY2020) Next 10 years (FY2021-2030) Final 10- years (FY2031-FY2040) Entire 30 years (FY2011-FY2040) Navy estimate 14.5 17.9 15.3 15.9 CBO estimate 15.2 20.4 21.4 19.0 % difference between Navy and CBO estimates 5% 14% 40% 19% Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table 2 (page 9). The CBO report calculates the percent difference between the Navy and CBO estimates for the entire 30-year period as 20% rather than 19%. $19.0 billion is 19.497% greater than $15.9 billion. As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan with a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year, within available resources in part because almost half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a considerably more expensive proposition. The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and is working to reduce the estimated unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.7 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding funding profile in the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan includes a “hump” of approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the years (FY2019-FY2033) when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the FY2011 30-year plan, however, contains little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no real growth in coming years. If the $2billion-per-year hump is not realized, the total number of ships of various kinds procured in FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the FY2011 30-year plan. If so, the shortfalls projected for cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other categories of ships could be larger than those shown in Table 6. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure Some study groups have recently made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 8 shows some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 8 also shows the Navy’s current 328-ship goal. In assessing proposals for Navy ship force structures, Congress may consider various factors, such as potential future defense spending levels in the context of the federal budget and debt situation, U.S. interests and potential threats to those interests, the value 7 For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 12 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress of naval forces in defending those interests, and the relative cost-effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.8 Table 8. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure Sustainable Defense Task Force (June 2010) Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (November 2008) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (2008)b Navy’s current 328-ship goal Heritage Foundation (April 2011) Cato Institute (September 2010)a Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR (July 2010) SSBN 12 14c 6 14 7 14 12 SSGN 0Supt = support ships. Press Reports of Navy Examining Options for Force Structure and Procurement Reductions Press reports in September and October 2011 state that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, is examining options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned procurements. A September 1, 2011, press report stated that the Navy is considering the following options, among others: • reducing the Navy to a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240ship fleet that includes 8 aircraft carriers (a fleet with 9 carriers is another option); • retiring (rather than performing a nuclear-refueling overhaul on) the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73), which would be one measure for reducing the size of the carrier force; • delaying the procurement of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) by two years, to FY2015 (an option that was first reported in July 20118); • eliminating six aircraft squadrons; • retiring at least some of the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers; • reducing the planned number of next-generation Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBN[X]s) by two boats, from 12 to 10, and consequently delaying the procurement of the first SSBN(X), perhaps by two years; and • maintaining funding for procurement of two Virginia-class submarines per year, and for Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).9 An October 6, 2011, press report similarly stated that the Navy is examining the option of retiring the rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN73).10 8 See Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. May Delay Next Carrier,” Defense News, July 11, 2011: 1. Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon, September 1, 2011. 10 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” DefenseNews.com, October 6, 2011. 9 Congressional Research Service 8 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress An October 14, 2011, press report stated that the Navy is considering retiring four Aegis cruisers in FY2013, another five Aegis cruisers in FY2014, and three Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships in FY2014. The report also mentioned the option of retiring rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73), the option of delaying the procurement of the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to FY2015, and the option of shifting carrier procurement generally to seven-year intervals.11 A September 4, 2011, press report concerning proposals such as those discussed above stated: Pentagon leaders expect U.S. lawmakers to cleave up to $30 billion from the 2012 defense budget request. “We were originally thinking we would start at $553 billion in ‘12 and then go up, but we’ll start potentially as much as $30 billion below that,” Navy Undersecretary Robert Work said Sept. 1. That’s just part of the uncertainty that has planners looking at hundreds of “what if” scenarios, gearing up to move nimbly as new guidance comes in. For one thing, the Obama administration’s goal for cutting defense spending over the next decade recently took a big jump—to at least $464 billion, according to one knowledgeable source. In April, the president set the savings goal at $400 billion over 12 years. In an interview in his Pentagon office, Work acknowledged that the number had risen “When you add it all up, it’s more than $450 billion over a 10-year period,” he said. Moreover, planners have been instructed to base their 2013 spending plans on the 2012 budget, which Congress will take up after lawmakers return from summer recess on Sept. 6. And yet more guidance will arrive in the form of DoD’s ongoing “comprehensive review,” which is taking longer than expected and may not be completed for several months, the knowledgeable source said. That will leave little time before the 2013 budget proposal is due to Congress in February…. For now, Work said, worrying about the so-called Sword of Damocles cuts will have to wait. Planners have enough to do preparing for the near term. “It’s up to Congress to decide where those cuts will be taken” in the 2012 budget, Work said. The need to know the 2012 numbers is crucial. “Anything Congress does in ‘12 will have cascading effects that we will have to consider in the fall,” Work said. 11 Carlo Munoz, “Navy Delays Carrier, Cuts Cruisers, Amphibs In Draft Budget,” AOL Defense (http://defense.aol.com), October 14, 2011. A blog entry identified the four cruisers that would be retired in FY2013 as Normandy (CG-60), Anzio (CG-CG-68), Vicksburg (CG-69), and Cape St. George (CG-71), the five cruisers that would be retired in FY2014 as Princeton (CG-59), Cowpens (CG-63), Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), and the four amphibious ships that would be retired in FY2014 as Whidbey Island (LSD-41), Fort McHenry (LSD-43), and Tortuga (LSD-46). (“ALT POM Early Decommission Plans,” Information Dissemination (www.information diseemination.net), October 17, 2011.) Congressional Research Service 9 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress “But now, in September, we’re trying to adjust to what-if numbers, and we’re waiting for the final numbers” for the budget years from 2014 to 2017 from the Office of Management and Budget in the White House, he said. Those numbers, which will also apportion cuts for the various departments within the Pentagon, “could come soon or they could come late in the game, like they generally do,” he said. The Navy department—like the other military service departments—has been examining hundreds, perhaps thousands, of scenarios to understand the impact of a vast array of potential decisions. “We’re doing what-if drills on ships, aircraft, munitions, force structure, people, every single program in the department,” Work said. Some scenarios could actually come true; others are being studied simply to inform potential moves. That the Navy is looking at particular scenarios does not necessarily indicate the move is being considered, Work said. “If we weren't doing what-if drills, they would accuse us of being idiots,” he said…. Press leaks of the discussions are expected, Work said, but he cautioned against quick assumptions. “I tell people all the time, when they see these leaks, they shouldn't get too excited,” Work said. “Everything’s on the table, everything’s being discussed. There are all sorts of scenarios. We’re looking at every aviation program, every shipbuilding program. We’re trying to wring out cost wherever and whenever we can find it. “Everybody is focused,” he said, “on maintaining the highest number of ships possible, the highest number of aircraft, the highest number of sailors and Marines.” That approach “is uniformly held, across the services.” Work said leaders are striving to avoid mistakes of previous generations. “We would much rather have a smaller force than a larger, hollow force. So what everybody’s doing in these what-if drills is how we keep the best capability for the least amount of money,” he said. One program that received recent media attention is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The Pentagon’s most expensive weapon program is working to field Air Force F-35A, Marine Corps F-35B and Navy F-35C versions. In a July 7 memo, Work directed his planners to run what-if studies on various JSF scenarios, including canceling one or more variants. “People read the thing and said, ‘This is an attack against the F-35 program,’” Work said of the memo. “But it’s nothing more than one of these long series of what-if drills.” He acknowledged an easy way to save money would be to cancel the JSF program. “That would save a lot of money, but nobody is arguing that,” Work said. “We need a fifthgeneration strike fighter. The question is not, ‘Are we going to buy the JSF?’ It’s ‘How many are we going to buy?’” The Pentagon looked at buying only one JSF model, and the Navy Congressional Research Service 10 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Department looked at buying only the carrier-based Navy version or the Marine Corps version, he said. “You’d get all sorts of efficiencies on the learning curve and have one variant that everybody flies. But the Department of the Navy isn't arguing that,” he said. The whole effort, he said, was designed to “get the really smart aviators in the department— Naval Air Systems Command, chief of naval air forces, the Marines’ deputy commandant for aviation, the N88 requirements office, the guys who live and breathe aviation—to tell me the best mix of F-35Bs, F-35Cs and F/A-18 Es, Fs, and Gs. What is the best capability we can buy for the least amount of money?” Rather than buying fewer types of aircraft, Work said, “the answer that kept coming back is that a mix of Bs, Cs, Es, Fs and Gs is the right way to go. “The question is, ‘How many can you afford to buy? What’s the best mix?’ We’re still in the process of trying to figure that out, and we'll continue to work this through the fall.” The effort is not unique to strike aircraft, he said. “This type of memo is being played out in the number of cruisers and destroyers we want to buy. How many submarines. The number of air wings. How many V-22s, MH-60Rs and Ss? How many P-8s? “Every single thing is being looked at. That’s why I say that people should not get too upset [when they hear] that we're looking at every single thing.” Media reports also have surfaced that the Navy may change its carrier force structure or build rate. “I can't talk to you about any specific shipbuilding program right now,” Work said. “But carriers cost a lot of money, and they’re being looked at just like JSF. Submarines cost a lot of money too.” Consideration for the industrial base is a key element in the decisions, he said. “We’re trying to meet the requirement at the minimum cost and with the minimum impact on our industrial base. And it’s a hard juggling act. This is going to be tough.”… Unlike the Air Force and Army, the Navy is not considering shrinking its civilian workforce any further. The service already is working to freeze the number of civilians at 2010 levels. “Right now, that is the focus of our effort,” Work said. “Re-adjusting our civilian workforce, because we had planned on higher levels of growth in our civilian workforce.” And while the service is actively looking for ways to consolidate commands and operations—“Some of these things can add up to hundreds of millions” over five or six years—no consideration is being given to base closures. Work said the Navy was “really aggressive” in the last round of base closures. “We had approximately 150 bases and we have about 70 now. The Marine Corps already has an extremely lean infrastructure,” he said. Savings from base closures often take years to take effect, he noted, and may show up beyond the planning period. “We’re really chasing a 10-year [savings] target,” he said…. Congressional Research Service 11 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Taking a step back, Work noted that the severely compressed pace at which major decisions are about to be made is a rare opening. “Opportunities like this only happen only once every 20 years or so,” he said. “If you’re going to be in government, this is the time to be in. The decisions we make over the next six to eight months are going to have an enormous impact on the way the Department of Defense looks over the next 10, 15, 20 years. “It really is an exciting time,” he said. “A time for our best and brightest to come up with good ideas, because we sure need them.”12 Oversight Issues for Congress Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary Circumstances Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the appropriate future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the Navy. Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the growth of China’s military capabilities.13 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on reductions in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011). The winding down of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the growth of China’s military capabilities have led some observers to anticipate or argue in favor of a shift in U.S. defense strategy toward a reduced emphasis on planning for operations the Persian Gulf and Central Asia and an increased emphasis on planning for operations in the Western Pacific. Since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have involved substantial numbers of ground forces, while the Western Pacific is, for the United States, more of a maritime and aerospace theater, some of these observers argue that such a shift in U.S. defense strategy would lead to a reduced emphasis on ground forces and an increased emphasis on the Navy and Air Force. Other observers, however, disagree that such a shift in U.S. defense strategy will or should occur, given continued concerns over Iran and the Persian Gulf region generally, as well as past difficulties in predicting the location of future U.S. combat operations. As mentioned earlier (see Press Reports of Navy Examining Options for Force Structure and ), the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, reportedly is discussing options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships, such as a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240-ship fleet that includes 8 aircraft carriers. 12 Christopher P. Cavas, “DOD Braces for $30B Cut in ’12,” DefenseNews.com, September 4, 2011. Material in brackets as in original. 13 For more on the growth in China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke Congressional Research Service 12 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress In addition to these reported Navy options, some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 5 shows some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy’s 313-ship goal of September 2011. In assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, Congress may consider various factors, such as potential future defense spending levels, U.S. interests and potential threats to those interests, the value of naval forces in defending those interests, and the relative cost-effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.14 14 Another possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. As discussed in Appendix A, however, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. Congressional Research Service 13 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure Sustainable Defense Task Force (June 2010) Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (November 2008) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (2008)b Navy’s 313ship goal of September 2011 Heritage Foundation (April 2011) Cato Institute (September 2010)a Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR (July 2010) SSBN 12 14c 6 14 7 14 12 SSGN 4 4 0 4 4 0 2 SSN 48 55 40 55 37 40 41 CVN 11 11 8 11 9 8 11 CVE 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 94 88 22 n/a 18 14 65 n/a 56 73 14 n/a 0 0 9e 4 n/a 25 48 55 0 n/a 0 40 0f Ship type Submarines Aircraft carriers Surface combatants Cruiser Destroyer Frigate 0 LCS 55 SSC 0 28d 0 85 Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships Amphibious ships 33 37 23 n/a 27 36 33 MPF(F) ships 0 0 0 n/a n/a 0 3g LSD station ships 0 0 0 n/a n/a n/a 7h 0 0 0 36 40 230 300 Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships MIW 0 14 11 0 CLF ships 30 33 21 n/a Support ships 4526 25 27 n/a 328313 309 241 346 TOTAL battle force ships 31 31 326i Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 2526. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 8 For more on this larger debate, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by Stephen Daggett. Congressional Research Service 13 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS: Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington, Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008. p. 81 (Figure 5). Congressional Research Service 14 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship. a. Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be considered. b. Figures shown are for the year 2028. c. The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20 SLBM tubes. d. The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding planas a way of collectively referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS CNAS report are separate from and smaller than the LCS. e. Maritime Security Frigates. f. Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments and seven riverine squadrons. g. Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F) squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift ships. h. T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew. i. The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count toward the 328313-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments, and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime forces that includes units such as these in the total count. Legislative Activity for FY2012 FY2012 Funding Request The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 328-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2012FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy’s proposed Congressional Research Service 14 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress FY2012 budget, includes a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the 55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization programs, see the following CRS reports: • CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 15 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011 This appendix presents legislative activity on the Navy’s proposed FY2011 shipbuilding budget. FY2011 DOD and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473/P.L. 112-10) According to line-item funding tables posted by the House Rules Committee,9 the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473/P.L. 112-10 of April 15, 2011) provides funding for the procurement of 10 new-construction battle force ships, or one more than was requested in the FY2011 budget. The nine new-construction ships that were requested in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account and the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) were two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 destroyers, two LCSs, one LHA-6 amphibious assault ship (which is to be split-funded between FY2011 and FY2012), one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), and (in the NDSF) one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship. The funding tables show that H.R. 1473/P.L. 112-10 provides full or close-to-full funding for all nine ships. (A substantial reduction to the requested funding level for the two LCSs reflects a reduction in the Navy’s estimated procurement cost for these ships following the implementation of a new LCS acquisition strategy.) In addition, the funding tables for H.R. 1473 show an increase of $500 million in the NDSF for an additional MLP. FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800) Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-295 of September 16, 2010) on S. 3800 of the 111th Congress, recommends approval of the Navy’s FY2011 requests for procurement and advance procurement funding for new ships, with two exceptions: • For the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the report recommends $615.5 million for the procurement of one LCS, a reduction of $615.5 million and one ship from the Navy’s request (pages 7, 86, and 87). For the text of the report’s discussion of the LCS, see the CRS report on the LCS program. 10 • For the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) program, which is funded through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), the report recommends an increase of $100 million for advance procurement and advance construction activities (page 181). 9 The funding tables were posted at http://rules.house.gov/Legislation/legislationDetails.aspx?NewsID=244. CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 10 Congressional Research Service 16 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383) House (H.R. 5136) The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy’s request for procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (pages 73-74). The report states: “Demonstrating the committee’s commitment to reverse the decline in the size of the Navy fleet, the committee authorizes 9 new ships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2 DDG 51 destroyers, and 2 Littoral Combat Ships.” (Page 20) Section 121 of the bill as reported by the committee would broaden the Navy’s authority for using incremental funding for procuring Navy ships.11 Section 123 would require the Navy to submit a report on, among other things, required numbers of cruisers and destroyers, particularly in light of demands for these ships for ballistic missile defense operations. 12 Section 1021 would amend the current law (10 U.S.C. 231) that requires DOD to annually submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan. Section 1022 states that the Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any battle force vessel of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the congressional defense committees written notification of such decommissioning in accordance with established procedures. Section 1023 states that until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of the Navy reaches 313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in FY2011 or any subsequent fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated for commissioning into the battle force fleet for that fiscal year. Section 1024 states that the Secretary of the Navy shall retain the amphibious assault ships Nassau (LHA-4) and Peleliu (LHA-5) in a commissioned and operational status until the delivery to the Navy of the new amphibious assault ships America (LHA-6) and LHA-7, respectively. The text of Section 121 is as follows: SEC. 121. INCREMENTAL FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF LARGE NAVAL VESSELS. (a) Incremental Funding of Large Naval Vessels- Except as provided in subsection (b), the Secretary of the Navy may use incremental funding for the procurement of a large naval 11 For more on incremental funding, particularly in the procurement of Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett. 12 For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 17 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress vessel over a period not to exceed the number of years equal to three-fourths of the total period of planned ship construction of such vessel. (b) LPD 26- With respect to the vessel designated LPD 26, the Secretary may use incremental funding for the procurement of such vessel through fiscal year 2012 if the Secretary determines that such incremental funding— (1) is in the best interest of the overall shipbuilding efforts of the Navy; (2) is needed to provide the Secretary with the ability to facilitate changes to the shipbuilding industrial base of the Navy; and (3) will provide the Secretary with the ability to award a contract for construction of the vessel that provides the best value to the United States. (c) Condition for Out-year Contract Payments- A contract entered into under subsection (a) or (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after the fiscal year the vessel was authorized is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose for that later fiscal year. (d) Definitions- In this section: (1) The term `large naval vessel’ means a vessel— (A) that is— (i) an aircraft carrier designated a CVN; (ii) an amphibious assault ship designated LPD, LHA, LHD, or LSD; or (iii) an auxiliary vessel; and (B) that has a light ship displacement of 17,000 tons or more. (2) The term `total period of planned ship construction’ means the period of years beginning on the date of the first authorization of funding (not including funding requested for advance procurement) and ending on the date that is projected on the date of the first authorization of funding to be the delivery date of the vessel to the Navy. The text of Section 123 is as follows: SEC. 123. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE. (a) Report- Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to missile defense. (b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following: (1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by procuring additional combatant surface vessels. Congressional Research Service 18 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (2) Whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313ship fleet plan of the Navy. (3) The number of Aegis ships needed by each combatant commander to fulfill ballistic missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to ballistic missile defense in Europe. (4) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set. (5) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States. (6) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological advancements in the sea-based missile defense program. (7) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile ships within the context of the fleet response plan. The text of Section 1021 is as follows: SEC. 1021. REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS. (a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: `Sec. 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels `(a) Quadrennial Naval Vessel Construction Plan- At the same time that the budget of the President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 during each year in which the Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force structure recommendations of the quadrennial defense review. `(b) Matters Included- The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following: `(1) A detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the ten-year period beginning on the date on which the plan is submitted, including a certification by the Secretary that the budget for the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted and the budget for the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of this title are sufficient for funding such schedule. `(2) A probable construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date on which the plan is submitted. `(3) A notional construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 20 years after the date on which the plan is submitted. `(4) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the construction schedules under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). Congressional Research Service 19 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress `(5) For the construction schedules under paragraphs (1) and (2)— `(A) a determination by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the level of funding necessary to execute such schedules; and `(B) an evaluation by the Director of the potential risk associated with such schedules, including detailed effects on operational plans, missions, deployment schedules, and fulfillment of the requirements of the combatant commanders. `(c) Naval Composition- In submitting the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that such plan— `(1) is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title; and `(2) phases the construction of new aircraft carriers during the periods covered by such plan in a manner that minimizes the total cost for procurement for such vessels. `(d) Assessment When Budget Is Insufficient- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is less than the level determined necessary by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection (b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the budget, including the risk associated with a reduced force structure that may result from funding naval vessel construction at such a level. `(e) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a), the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the construction schedules and the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the futureyears defense program submitted under section 221 of this title. `(f) Changes to the Construction Plan- In any year in which a quadrennial defense review is not submitted, the Secretary of the Navy may not modify the construction schedules submitted in the plan under subsection (a) unless— `(1) the modification is an increase in planned ship construction; `(2) the modification is a realignment of less than one year of construction start dates in the future-years defense plan submitted under section 221 of this title and the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such modification, including— `(A) the reasons for realignment; `(B) any increased cost that will be incurred by the Navy because of the realignment; and `(C) an assessment of the effects that the realignment will have on the shipbuilding industrial base, including the secondary supply base; or `(3) the modification is a decrease in the number or type of combatant and support vessels of the Navy and the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such modification, including— Congressional Research Service 20 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress `(A) an addendum to the most recent quadrennial defense review that fully explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a); and `(B) a description of the additional reviews and analyses considered by the Secretary after the previous quadrennial defense review was submitted that justify the decrease. `(g) Definitions- In this section: `(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31. `(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal year. `(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this title.’. (b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item: `231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels.’. In summarizing Section 1021, the committee’s report states: This section would amend section 231 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels with each submission of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The long-range plan would be required to have 3 distinct sections each spanning a period of 10 years. The first section would be a detailed construction plan for the first 10 years, the second a probable construction plan for the second 10 years, and the third a notional construction plan for the last 10 years. This section would require that during the intervening years between submissions of the QDR, the plan may not be modified unless the change is accompanied by an addendum to the QDR which explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the national security of the United States. This section would further require that the plan fully comply with section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a minimum of 11 operational aircraft carriers and to phase the construction of such carriers as to minimize the total cost of procurement. (Page 363) The text of Section 1022 is as follows: SEC. 1022. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF NAVAL VESSELS. (a) Notice of Decommissioning- The Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any battle force vessel of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the congressional defense committees written notification of such decommissioning in accordance with established procedures. (b) Content of Notification- Any notification provided under subsection (a) shall include each of the following: Congressional Research Service 21 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (1) The reasons for the proposed decommissioning of the vessel. (2) An analysis of the effect the decommissioning would be likely to have on the deployment schedules of other vessels in the same class as the vessel proposed to be decommissioned. (3) A certification from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decommissioning of the vessel will not adversely affect the requirements of the combatant commanders to fulfill missions critical to national security. (4) Any budgetary implications associated with retaining the vessel in commission, expressed for each applicable appropriation account. The text of Section 1023 is as follows: SEC. 1023. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIZE OF THE NAVY BATTLE FORCE FLEET. (a) Limitation on Decommissioning- Until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of the Navy reaches 313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in fiscal year 2011 or any subsequent fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated for commissioning into the battle force fleet for that fiscal year. (b) Treatment of Submarines- For purposes of subsection (a), submarines of the battle force fleet slated for decommissioning for any fiscal year shall not count against the number of vessels the Secretary of the Navy is required to maintain for that fiscal year. The text of Section 1024 is as follows: SEC. 1024. RETENTION AND STATUS OF CERTAIN NAVAL VESSELS. The Secretary of the Navy shall retain the vessels the U.S.S. Nassau (LHA 4) and the U.S.S. Peleliu (LHA 5), in a commissioned and operational status, until the delivery to the Navy of the vessels the U.S.S. America (LHA 6) and the vessel designated as LHA 7, respectively. The committee’s report also states: The committee notes that the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels, known as the 30–year shipbuilding plan, submitted in accordance with section 231 of title 10, United States Code, proposes an average of 10 new vessels per year during the 5-year period of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). While this is a positive step in shipbuilding procurement, the total number of battle force vessels remains essentially constant during the FYDP due to the high rate of ship retirements planned during the period. Only after the FYDP, do the battle force levels begin to increase in real terms and the stated goal of a 313ship Navy is not achieved until fiscal year 2018. The committee further notes that a short term solution to the stagnant number of battle force ships through the FYDP is to delay retirement of vessels with useful service life and that a planned approach to retire no more ships in any one fiscal year than are being delivered to the Navy would accomplish this goal. (Page 75) The report also states: U.S. shipbuilding industrial base The committee has reservations as to the continued health of the shipbuilding industrial base and its ability to remain viable in its current form. The shipbuilding industrial base currently Congressional Research Service 22 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress serving the needs of Navy and the nation is a legacy from the cold war when the size of the Navy fleet, and the construction required to maintain that fleet, was significantly higher than today. The committee is concerned that the relatively low orders for new ships as proposed in the 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient to maintain all shipyards currently constructing naval vessels. This is a very difficult situation for the Navy since reducing the number of shipyards constructing vessels could have the unintended consequence of driving up cost due to limited or no competition for particular classes of ships, yet the current industrial base adds increased costs due to the significant overhead rates that must be charged to each vessel. Perhaps even more significant than shipyard over-capacity for the current shipbuilding plan is the reduction in vendors willing to provide equipment and materiel necessary for the shipbuilding industry. Low orders coupled with significant government requirements for testing, traceability, and financial controls have driven many former suppliers out of the market altogether. The committee received testimony that the vendor supply base is currently 60 to 70 percent sole source. While this almost total lack of competition may be manageable in terms of maintaining the ability to construct vessels, it is not a condition that is bringing the best value to the taxpayer. The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has embarked on a comprehensive review of the industrial base, including the supply base. The committee requests the Secretary of the Navy to inform the committee when the comprehensive review is complete and to make available to the committee those officials who participated in the review to testify before the committee at a hearing in open session aimed at oversight of this potential threat to national security. (Page 78) Senate (S. 3454) The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) recommends approval of the Navy’s request for procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (see pages 677-678 of the printed version of S. 3454). Section 124 of the bill states: SEC. 124. INCLUSION OF BASIC AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN IN ASSESSMENTS REQUIRED PRIOR TO START OF CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SHIP OF A SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM. (a) Inclusion in Assessments- Subsection (b)(1) of section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 28; 10 U.S.C. 7291 note) is amended by inserting `(and in particular completion of basic and functional design)’ after `completion of detail design’. (b) Basic and Functional Design Defined- Subsection (d) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: `(5) BASIC AND FUNCTION DESIGN- The term `basic and functional design’, for a ship, means design, whether in the form of two-dimensional drawings, three-dimensional models, or computer-aided models, that fixes the hull structure of the ship, sets the hydrodynamics of the ship, routes all major distributive systems (including electricity, water, and other utilities) of the ship, and identifies the exact positioning of piping and other outfitting within each block of the ship.’. Congressional Research Service 23 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Regarding Section 124, the committee’s report states: Inclusion of basic and functional design in assessments required prior to start of construction of first ship of a shipbuilding program (sec. 124) The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) to tighten the requirements under which the Secretary of the Navy is required to certify that a new shipbuilding program has achieved sufficient design maturity at the time the Navy begins construction on the first ship of any major shipbuilding program. The Government Accountability Office, in its May 2009 report, “Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding (GAO–09–322),” identified key steps that leading commercial shipbuilders and ship buyers follow to ensure their vessels deliver on-time, within planned costs, and with a high degree of innovation. One critical step in this process is achieving design stability before start of fabrication. Leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable once all basic and functional design activities have been completed (usually in the form of a complete 3D product model). Section 124 as currently written does not specifically require that the assessment of design maturity directly address the completeness of the 3D modeling or completion of the activities that make up basic and functional design. This provision would add that requirement. (Page 13) The committee’s report also states: Surface ship construction and industrial base issues The committee recognizes that the Navy’s most recent Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels continues the Navy’s long stated goal of a minimum fleet of 313 battle force ships. The committee notes that this plan is based on a 2005 Force Structure Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan. The committee continues to have significant concerns regarding the implications of the plan for the non-nuclear surface ship industrial base. If the Navy and industry, working together, are unable to control requirement driven cost growth and deliver the ships in the plan for the projected costs, the inevitable reductions in quantity will likely impact the Navy’s ability to reach the required fleet size and further jeopardize the industrial base. The committee notes that the current shipbuilding plan includes the cost of the SSBN (X) program and the committee encourages the Navy to closely scrutinize requirements for this program in order to minimize its impact on the recapitalization of the Navy’s battle force. Furthermore, the committee urges the Navy and the contractors to negotiate as expeditiously as possible fair and reasonable construction contracts for ships previously authorized in order to reduce uncertainty and maintain and foster affordability in the procurement of large surface combatants and other naval vessels. Congressional Research Service 24 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress In reviewing the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels in conjunction with recent program performance highlights, the committee notes the following observations and expectations: The stated requirement for amphibious ships is 38 vessels; however, the Long-Range Plan projects accepting moderate risk by having 33 ships by 2016, but then declining to 29 or 30 ships after 2034. Although there have been improvements in recently delivered ships, cost and quality issues have been all too common in the procurement of large and medium amphibious ships, making an already constrained shipbuilding budget more difficult to execute. A new dock landing ship class, LSD(X), is important to the recapitalization of the amphibious force. The requirements for this ship must be closely validated to ensure affordability. The committee notes the Navy’s plan to have a gap year following the lead ship of the class and believes that this may help alleviate cost, schedule, and performance issues. Overall, the committee remains concerned with the Navy’s management of the amphibious ship accounts and expects continued close scrutiny of these programs by Navy leadership. In large surface combatants, the Navy’s last official report stated that the industrial base can only be effectively sustained if naval ship yards were building the equivalent of three DDG– 51 destroyers per year, with additional work assumed at one of the yards. Even if the Navy fully executes both of the large surface combatant programs of record in the near-term, the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and future-years defense program propose to buy an average of 1.5 large surface combatants per year. Even at projected procurement rates, the number of cruisers and destroyers falls below the required level of 88 ships in 2027 and remains below that level for the following 13 years. At its worst, the number of large surface combatants is 21 ships below the expected requirement in 2034. The Navy has testified that continued demand for large surface combatants to meet forward presence and strike operations requirements coupled with emerging ballistic missile defense requirements drives the Navy to consider abandoning lesser priority missions for more recent, higher priority ones. In light of the current pressure on the large surface combatant force, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s projected rate of production is insufficient, and anticipates that the Navy will closely assess future demand for large surface combatants, and operational and additional risk to the industrial base of maintaining relatively low rates of procurement for large surface combatants. The committee remains concerned with the Navy’s ability to execute what it believes is an overly optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants. The truncation of the DDG–1000, the restart of the DDG–51 class and the proposed Flight III variant of the DDG– 51 inject a great deal of instability into the SCN accounts. The Navy’s testimony before Congress has led this committee to identify six risk areas in the Navy’s plan for DDG–51s: (1) the availability of the Air and Missile Defense Radar; (2) the extent and cost of modifications to the underlying ship’s design package to support proposed changes to the ship; (3) increased limitation on service life margins of the early restart ships; (4) combat system software integration; (5) the overall complexity of various separate programs that need to converge for successful completion of the restart and Flight III programs; and (6) cost and schedule growth for the Aegis Combat System Modernization. The committee expects the Navy to keep it closely apprised of developments in these risk areas so that it can monitor appropriate risk mitigation efforts. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has made progress during the past year and the recent decision to move to a single design should improve affordability. The LCS fleet is expected to comprise 55 vessels of the Navy’s 313-ship fleet force structure. Even modest cost growth in this large component of the fleet magnifies the problem of achieving that objective. The committee notes that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the LCS program Congressional Research Service 25 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress introduces competition for this class of ships and is therefore cautiously optimistic that this program is making progress. In summary, the committee considers the specialized shipbuilding industrial base for large surface combatants, amphibious ships, Navy auxiliary ships, and littoral vessels as a critical component of national security and expects the Department of Defense to appropriately sustain this industrial base. The committee expects the Department of the Navy to include these considerations as it incorporates the updated force structure assessment in the upcoming Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels. The committee understands that the Navy is conducting a comprehensive review of the shipbuilding industrial base and calls upon the Navy to update the committee on the scope and timeline for such a study. The committee understands the objective of the study is to identify the challenges facing the Navy and the associated shipbuilding industrial base and the strategies for mitigating the effects of those challenges. The committee expects that this study will inform its deliberations in connection with the fiscal year 2012 budget. As a general proposition, the committee expects that the Department of Defense will provide the Navy with the support it needs to focus on the matters referred to above. (Pages 40-42) Final Version (H.R. 6523/P/L. 111-383) Section 1023 of H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011, amends the current law (10 U.S.C. 231) that requires DOD to annually submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan. The text of Section 1023 is as follows: SEC. 1023. REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS. (a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: `Sec. 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels `(a) Quadrennial Naval Vessel Construction Plan- At the same time that the budget of the President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 during each year in which the Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force structure recommendations of the quadrennial defense review. `(b) Matters Included- The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following: `(1) A detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the 10-year period beginning on the date on which the plan is submitted, including a certification by the Secretary that the budget for the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted and the budget for the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of this title are sufficient for funding such schedule. `(2) A probable construction schedule for the 10-year period beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date on which the plan is submitted. `(3) A notional construction schedule for the 10-year period beginning on the date that is 20 years after the date on which the plan is submitted. `(4) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the construction schedules under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). Congressional Research Service 26 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress `(5) For the construction schedules under paragraphs (1) and (2)— `(A) a determination by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the level of funding necessary to execute such schedules; and `(B) an evaluation by the Director of the potential risk associated with such schedules, including detailed effects on operational plans, missions, deployment schedules, and fulfillment of the requirements of the combatant commanders. `(c) Naval Composition- In submitting the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that such plan is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title. `(d) Assessment When Budget Is Insufficient- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is less than the level determined necessary by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection (b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the budget, including the risk associated with a reduced force structure that may result from funding naval vessel construction at such a level. `(e) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a), the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of this title. `(f) Changes to the Construction Plan- In any year in which a quadrennial defense review is not submitted and the budget of the President submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 decreases the number of vessels requested in the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of this title, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on such decrease including— `(1) an addendum to the most recent quadrennial defense review that fully explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a); and `(2) a description of the additional reviews and analyses considered by the Secretary after the previous quadrennial defense review was submitted that justify the decrease. `(g) Definitions- In this section: `(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31. `(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal year. `(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this title.’. Congressional Research Service 27 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item: `231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels.’. Regarding Section 1023, the joint explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R. 6523 stated: The committees expect that, following the submission of the President’s budget materials for a fiscal year, the Secretary of the Navy, at the written request of one of the congressional defense committees, will promptly deliver the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan used to develop the President’s budget request for that fiscal year, as well as a certification from the Secretary of the Navy that both the President’s budget request for that fiscal year and the budget for the future-years defense program is sufficient to fund the construction schedule provided in that plan. The committees expect that such a plan would include the quantity of each class of ship to be constructed in that fiscal year and the nine following fiscal years. Section 113 of H.R. 6523 requires a report on the force structure requirements of major combatant surface vessels (i.e., cruisers and destroyers) with respect to ballistic missile defense. The text of Section 113 is as follows: SEC. 113. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE. (a) Report- Not later than March 31, 2011, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the force structure requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to ballistic missile defense. (b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following: (1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by procuring additional combatant surface vessels. (2) A discussion of whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313-ship fleet plan of the Navy. (3) A discussion of the process for determining the number of Aegis ships needed by each commander of the combatant commands to fulfill ballistic missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to ballistic missile defense in Europe. (4) A discussion of the impact of Aegis Ashore missile defense deployments, as well as deployment of other elements of the ballistic missile defense system, on Aegis ballistic missile defense ship force structure requirements. (5) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set. (6) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States. Congressional Research Service 28 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (7) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological advancements in the sea-based missile defense program. (8) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile defense ships within the context of the fleet response plan. National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035) H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, and referred to the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2010, would authorize $20 billion per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy ships to meet the ship force structure requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan. (It would also authorize $60 million per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for loan guarantees for the construction of commercial ships.) The text of H.R. 5035 states: A BILL To authorize appropriations for the construction of vessels for the Navy and to authorize appropriations for loan guarantees for commercial vessels. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the `National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act’. SEC. 2. NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS. (a) Navy- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for the construction of vessels for the Navy to meet the force requirements of the Navy (as described in the annual naval vessel construction plan required by section 231 of title 10, United States Code) in the amount of $20,000,000,000. (b) The Merchant Marine- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for loan guarantees and commitments authorized under chapter 537 of title 46, United States Code, for the construction of new vessels to replace and expand the domestic fleet of commercial vessels (as that term is defined in that chapter) in the amount of $60,000,000. Congressional Research Service 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommends a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines. 13 The report statesIssues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective Sufficiency of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship goal over the long run: • The Navy projects that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented, the fleet would grow from 290 ships in FY2012 to a peak of 325 ships in FY2022-FY2023, decline to 296 ships in FY2032-FY2034, and then increase back to 305 ships by FY2041. • The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level of 94 ships in 2025, reaches a minimum of 68 ships in FY2034, and remains below 94 ships through FY2041. The projected number of attack submarines Congressional Research Service 15 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2024, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through 2041. • There would also be shortfalls in certain years in small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and LCSs) and amphibious ships. The projected shortfalls in cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other ships could make it difficult or impossible for the Navy to fully perform its projected missions, particularly during the latter years of the 30-year plan. In light of the projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines, policymakers may wish to consider two options: • increasing planned procurement rates of destroyers and attack submarines, perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement, and • extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40 or more years. Regarding the second option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the first 28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines. Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear. Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine pressure hull life. Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently planned service lives. Affordability of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. In assessing this issue, a key factor to consider is the estimated cost to implement the plan. In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated, and this is again the case for the Navy’s FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan. A June 2011 CBO report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.15 Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes 15 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (page 9). Congressional Research Service 16 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress the Navy and CBO estimates of the FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the June 2011 CBO report. Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2011 dollars First 10 years (FY2012-FY2021) Next 10 years (FY2022-2031) Final 10 years (FY2032-FY2041) Entire 30 years (FY2012-FY2041) Navy estimate 14.6 17.2 14.7 15.5 CBO estimate 15.7 19.0 19.2 18.0 % difference between Navy and CBO estimates 7% 10% 31% 16% Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (Page 9). The June 2011 CBO report also estimates the cost of a revised 30-year shipbuilding plan created by CBO that would fully meet the various force-level goals in the apparent 328-ship force-level objective of mid-2011. Compared to the Navy’s FY2012 30-year plan, this revised 30-year plan would include 24 additional destroyers, 5 additional attack submarines, and 2 additional largedeck (i.e., LHA-type) amphibious assault ships. CBO estimated the cost of implementing this revised plan at an average of $19.7 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars, including an average of $19.1 billion per year for the first 10 years of the plan, an average of $21.3 billion per year for the second 10 years of the plan, and an average of $18.6 billion per year for the final 10 years of the plan.16 As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan with a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year, within available resources in part because almost half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a considerably more expensive proposition. The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and is working to reduce the estimated unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.17 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding funding profile in the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan included a “hump” of approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the years (FY2019-FY2033) when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the FY2011 30-year plan, however, contained little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in shipbuilding funding would be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no real growth in 16 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (page 9). 17 For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke Congressional Research Service 17 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress coming years. If the $2-billion-per-year hump were not realized, the total number of ships of various kinds procured in FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the FY2011 30-year plan. If so, the shortfalls projected for cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other categories of ships could be larger than those shown in Table 4. Efficacy of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the efficacy of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. On June 1, 2011, the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the efficacy of the Department of Defense’s 30-year aviation and shipbuilding plans. Witnesses at the hearing included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, CBO, CRS, and the Heritage Foundation.18 Legislative Activity for FY2012 FY2012 Funding Request The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, except for the MLP, which is funded through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF). FY2012 National Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1540/S. 1253) House (Committee Report) Funding for Shipbuilding The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R. 1540, recommends approving, with two exceptions, the Navy’s requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See pages 345-346 and 460 of the report.) One exception concerns LHA-7, an amphibious assault ship that was authorized in FY2011 but is being partially funded in FY2012. The committee’s report recommends a net reduction of $50 million from the amount requested for LHA-7 for FY2012. The recommended net reduction of $50 million includes a $200 million reduction for “contract delay” and a $150 million increase for “program increase.” Section 1604 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee provides for the 18 Materials from the hearing are posted at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2011/6/the-efficacy-of-thedepartment-of-defense-s-thirty-year-aviation-and-shipbuilding-plans. Congressional Research Service 18 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress recommended $150 million increase. Section 121 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee would permit the final increment of procurement funding for LHA-7 to be provided in FY2013. Regarding LHA-7, the committee’s report states: The delivery of the first ship of the America-class, LHA-6, has been significantly delayed. According to the Department of Defense “Selected Acquisition Report” of December 31, 2010, the delays are “due to changing conditions in the shipyard portfolio which are driving labor demands in various trades”. These delays have had a cascading effect on LHA-7, which was scheduled to go on contract for detail design and construction in November 2010, but now the Navy estimates the contract will be delayed until the end of fiscal year 2011. Elsewhere in this title, the committee includes a provision that would authorize the Navy to conclude funding for LHA-7 in fiscal year 2013. (page 33) The second exception is that the committee’s report recommends an undistributed increase of $150 million in the SCN account for advance procurement and economic order quantity (EOQ) funding, and an offsetting undistributed reduction of $150 million in the SCN account for “program decrease.” The committee’s report also states: The committee is pleased that the Navy has turned around the downward spiral in battle force ship quantities, and the plan to achieve the floor of 313 ships appears to be achievable. To obtain the required capability and to provide the required stability to the fragile shipbuilding industrial base, the committee believes the following programs are crucial. (page 33) The report at this points goes on to discuss the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program, the Virginia class attack submarine program, the Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program, the DDG-51 destroyer program, and amphibious ships. 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Section 1021 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee would amend the provision in the code (10 U.S.C. 231) pertaining to the 30-year shipbuilding plan. The text of Section 1021 is as follows: SEC. 1021. BUDGETING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS. (a) Annual Plan- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: `Sec. 231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification `(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan and Certification- The Secretary of Defense shall include with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year— `(1) a plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy developed in accordance with this section; and `(2) a certification by the Secretary that both the budget for that fiscal year and the futureyears defense program submitted to Congress in relation to such budget under section 221 of this title provide for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is sufficient Congressional Research Service 19 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress for the procurement of the vessels provided for in the plan under paragraph (1) on the schedule provided in that plan. `(b) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- (1) The annual naval vessel construction plan developed for a fiscal year for purposes of subsection (a)(1) should be designed so that the naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a), except that, if at the time such plan is submitted with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year, a national security strategy report required under such section 108 has not been submitted to Congress as required by paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), if applicable, of subsection (a) of such section, then such annual plan should be designed so that the naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the ship force structure recommended in the report of the most recent quadrennial defense review. `(2) Each such naval vessel construction plan shall include the following: `(A) A detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy over the next 30 fiscal years. `(B) A description of the necessary naval vessel force structure to meet the requirements of the national security strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense review, whichever is applicable under paragraph (1). `(C) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the program, together with a discussion of the procurement strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funding are based. `(c) Assessment When Vessel Construction Budget Is Insufficient to Meet Applicable Requirements- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is not sufficient to sustain the naval vessel force structure specified in the naval vessel construction plan for that fiscal year under subsection (a), the Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the reduced force structure of naval vessels that will result from funding naval vessel construction at such level. Such assessment shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the combatant commands. `(d) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a)(1), the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of this title. `(e) Definitions- In this section: `(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31. `(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal year. Congressional Research Service 20 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress `(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this title.’. (b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item: `231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification’. Regarding Section 1021, the committee’s report states: This section would repeal an amendment made by section 1023 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383). This section would require that a 30-year shipbuilding plan be delivered to Congress periodically. The section that would be repealed changed the periodicity from an annual requirement to once every 4 years to be delivered with the Quadrennial Defense Review. The committee believes that returning to an annual submittal of the plan would promote stability and continuity in the planning process, both in the plan itself, and in the shipbuilding industrial base. One aspect of the section that would be retained is the requirement that the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, within 60 days of submittal of the plan, provide an assessment of the sufficiency of funds to execute the plan in the budget year and Future Years Defense Program to the congressional defense committees. (page 208) Number of Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) and CVW Headquarters Section 1094 of H.R. 1540 as reported states: SEC. 1094. NUMBER OF NAVY CARRIER AIR WINGS AND CARRIER AIR WING HEADQUARTERS. The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Navy maintains— (1) a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and (2) for each such carrier air wing, a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters. House (Floor Consideration) On May 26, 2011, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1540, the House rejected, 176-241, H.Amdt. 335, which would have deleted Section 1604, which provides for $150 million in procurement funding for LHA-7 (see “Funding for Shipbuilding” in “House (Committee Report)” above). Senate S. 1253 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommends approving the Navy’s requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See Sections 4101 and 4401 of the bill as reported by the committee. In the printed version of the bill as Congressional Research Service 21 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress reported by the committee, the relevant tables within these two sections appear on pages 606 and 647.) Section 1021 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states: SEC. 1021. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS. No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating status until the later of the following: (1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or component thereof, on reduced operating status. (2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense committees a report that— (A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and (B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in paragraph (1). (3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable. Regarding this section, the committee’s report states: Limitation on availability of funds for placing Maritime Prepositioning Ships squadrons on reduced operating status (sec. 1021) The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funding to place a maritime prepositioning ship squadron (MPSRON), or any component thereof, on reduced operating status until: the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) submits a report to Congress assessing the impact on military readiness for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating status; the Chief of Naval Operations describes the Navy’s plan and comments on the CMC’s report for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating status; and the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the risks to readiness of placing such MPSRON on reduced operating status are acceptable. (Page 175) Section 1022 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states: SEC. 1022. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY. Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in preparation for the transfer.’. Congressional Research Service 22 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Regarding this section, the committee’s report states: Modification of conditions on status of retired aircraft carrier ex-John F. Kennedy (sec. 1022) The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1011 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364) to allow the Navy to dispose of the ex-John F. Kennedy. The provision would amend section 1011 to remove the requirement that the Navy ensure the ship is maintained in a status that would permit the Navy to return the ship to active service in event of a national emergency. (Page 176) FY2012 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219) House The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-110 of June 16, 2011) on H.R. 2219, supports the procurement of the new-construction ships requested by the Navy for FY2012, but recommends reductions to the Navy’s requested funding amounts for some of the ships. (Pages 153-154 and, for the MLP program, page 255). As detailed on page 276 of the report, Section 8040 of the bill as reported would rescind, among other funds, $110.351 million in FY2011 advance procurement funding for the LCS program. Section 8072 of the bill as reported details the use of $73.992 million in funding provided on page 153 of the committee’s report for the completion of prior-year shipbuilding programs. The report also states: SHIPBUILDING OVERSIGHT The Committee understands that a number of issues related to quality have recently been identified on Navy ships. Most recently, a failed weld joint caused structural damage to a mast mounted antenna on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Incorrect installation of key subsystems on several Virginia-class submarines required corrections to avoid jeopardizing the mission performance of the submarines. Faulty welds were identified on a number of ship classes, including at least four aircraft carriers. Additionally, several issues have arisen regarding the LPD–17 class of amphibious transport dock ships. These issues were severe enough to cause the USS San Antonio to miss a scheduled deployment. The Committee directs the Comptroller General to review the Navy’s process for quality assurance in shipbuilding. This review should identify the extent to which quality assurance processes identified known quality problems, including an examination of what analyses the Navy has performed and what actions have been taken to address identified problems. The review should also examine the extent to which the American Bureau of Shipbuilding plays a role in quality assurance in Navy shipbuilding and how this role complements or duplicates reviews conducted by Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Conversion personnel. As part of this analysis, a comparison should be made between the Navy, commercial shipbuilders, and commercial ship buyers’ approaches to quality assurance. The results of this review should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act. (Page 155) Congressional Research Service 23 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-77 of September 15, 2011) on H.R. 2219, recommends fully funding all of the Navy ships requested for procurement in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account (page 120), but recommends denying the request for $425.9 million in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) for the procurement of a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (page 221). Regarding the MLP, the committee’s report states: Mobile Landing Platform [MLP].—The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $425,865,000 to procure one Mobile Landing Platform [MLP]. The Navy has a requirement for three MLPs, and the Committee notes that in its previous budget submission, the Navy proposed procuring the three MLPs over the course of 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2012 budget submission proposes to condense this acquisition to 3 years, concluding in fiscal year 2013. However, the Committee notes that the fiscal year 2012 budget submission does not take into account that Congress adjusted the MLP acquisition profile in the Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations Act by accelerating the planned schedule by 2 years and procuring two MLPs in fiscal year 2011 instead of one. The Committee notes that this acceleration, coupled with procuring an additional MLP in fiscal year 2013, as the Navy has planned for the last two budget cycles, concludes the program’s acquisition in 3 years, as the Navy proposes in its fiscal year 2012 budget submission. The Committee believes that a further acceleration of the MLP acquisition schedule is unwarranted and high-risk and does not allow for sufficient learning to occur, nor cost efficiencies to be absorbed prior to initiating construction of the third and final ship of the class. The Committee notes that Navy has already procured long lead materials for the third ship to avoid shipyard production breaks prior to award of the fiscal year 2013 MLP. Therefore, the Committee recommends denying the proposed additional acceleration of the program and recommends that the Navy retain its original plan of procuring a MLP in fiscal year 2013. (Pages 221-222) The committee’s report also states: Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] Capable Ships.—The Committee notes that the Navy has established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large surface combatants (including ballistic missile defense [BMD] capability), but the Navy’s fiscal year 2012 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the Navy will achieve the 94-ship goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, with force levels declining thereafter. Specifically, the Navy projects that it will have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024 before declining to 65 in 2034. The Committee is concerned about this projected shortfall and believes that the Navy should begin to review and consider options to close this gap. The Navy has indicated that it intends to pursue a multiyear procurement contract for DDG–51 vessels in fiscal year 2013 that could result in significant cost savings. Historic production rates of three DDG–51s per fiscal year reflected substantial unit cost savings in the past and would likely be realized by procuring DDG–51 ships at a more economical procurement rate than currently planned. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report, at the same time as the President submits the budget request for fiscal year 2013, which provides options for closing this gap. (Page 121) Congressional Research Service 24 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization programs, see the following CRS reports: • CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. • CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 25 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels One possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,19 and as of October 13, 2011, had declined to a total of 284 battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the October 2011 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese military forces and non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the October 2011 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided airdelivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.20 In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles. The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; the 284-ship fleet of October 2011 may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing 19 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method. 20 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Congressional Research Service 26 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers. Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today.21 21 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s, the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below summarizes some key features of these plans. Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans Plan Total ships Attack submarines Aircraft carriers Surface combatants Amphibious ships 600-ship ~600 100 15e 242/228g ~75h Base Force ~450/416a 80/~55c 12 ~150 51i 1993 BUR 346 45-55 11+1f ~124 41i 1997 QDR ~305/310b 50/55d 11+1f 116 36i Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data. a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999. b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55 from 50. c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55. d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55. e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP). f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier. g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228. h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships. Congressional Research Service 27 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.22 The report stated the following, among other things: • “The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the 2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54) • “In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51) • “The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55) • “The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 66) • “Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The 1322 Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58. Congressional Research Service 30 28 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike. That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages 59-60) • “To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page 51; a similar passage appears on page 67) In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table B-1 compares the Navy’s 328313-ship goal of September 2011 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the independent panel report. Congressional Research Service 31 29 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table B-1. Comparison of Navy’s 328313-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel Ship Type Navy’s 328313-ship goal of September 2011 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) (1993) 2010 QDR Independent Review Panel (July 2010) 12 18 14 SSBNs (SSBN force was later reduced to 14 as a result of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review) SSGNs 04 0 4 (SSGN program did not yet exist) SSNs 48 45 to 55 55 (55 in FY99, with a long-term goal of about 45) Aircraft carriers Surface combatants 11 active 11 active + 1 operational/reserve 11 active 149 124 n/a (114 active + 10 frigates in Naval Reserve Force; a total of 110-116 active ships was also cited) Cruisers and destroyers Frigates destroyers 94 n/a n/a Frigates 0 n/a n/a 0 n/a (to be replaced by LCSs) LCSs 55 (LCS program did not exist) Amphibious ships 33 41 (33 needed to lift 2.0 MEBs) (Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs) 0 26 (to be replaced by LCSs) (LCS program did not exist) CLF ships 30 43 n/a Support ships 4526 22 n/a 328313 346 346 Dedicated mine warfare ships TOTAL ships n/a n/a (numbers above add to 331-341)a Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995 Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting Congressional Research Service 32 30 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade. a. The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships. In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part: I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the the Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s) fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the then-planned the thenplanned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to 321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics, mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements…. I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.14 14 Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter. Congressional Research Service 33 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix C. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to 328-ship goal One possible method for assessing the Navy’s 328-ship goal is to compare it to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s 328-ship goal, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,15 and as of May 2, 2011, had declined to a total of 288 battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the February 2011 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the May 2011 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.16 In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, for example, a greater emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities.17 In addition, the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles. The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; the 288-ship fleet of May 2011 may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An 15 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method. 16 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 17 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities— Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Congressional Research Service 34 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers. Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today.18 18 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s, the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below summarizes some key features of these plans. Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans Plan 600-ship Base Force 1993 BUR 1997 QDR a 346 ~305/310b ~600 ~450/416 Total ships c 45-55 50/55d 100 80/~55 Attack submarines 12 11+1f 11+1f 15e Aircraft carriers g ~150 ~124 116 242/228 Surface combatants 51i 41i 36i ~75h Amphibious ships Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data. a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999. b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55 from 50. c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55. d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55. e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP). f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier. g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228. h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships. Congressional Research Service 35 23 23 Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter. Congressional Research Service 31 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix DC. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate Size of the Navy Table DC-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.1924 The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships in August 2003 and included 288284 battle force ships as of May 2October 13, 2011. As discussed in Appendix CA, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s 328-ship goal, proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers. 1924 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an appleapples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method. Congressional Research Service 36 32 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table DC-1.Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 FYa Number FYa Number FYa Number 1948 737 1969 926 1990 547 1949 690 1970 769 1991 526 1950 634 1971 702 1992 466 1951 980 1972 654 1993 435 1952 1,097 1973 584 1994 391 1953 1,122 1974 512 1995 373 1954 1,113 1975 496 1996 356 1955 1,030 1976 476 1997 354 1956 973 1977 464 1998 333 1957 967 1978 468 1999 317 1958 890 1979 471 2000 318 1959 860 1980 477 2001 316 1960 812 1981 490 2002 313 1961 897 1982 513 2003 297 1962 959 1983 514 2004 291 1963 916 1984 524 2005 282 1964 917 1985 541 2006 281 1965 936 1986 556 2007 279 1966 947 1987 568 2008 282 1967 973 1988 565 2009 285 1968 976 1989 566 2010 2881970 769 1992 466 1949 690 1971 702 1993 435 1950 634 1972 654 1994 391 1951 980 1973 584 1995 373 1952 1,097 1974 512 1996 356 1953 1,122 1975 496 1997 354 1954 1,113 1976 476 1998 333 1955 1,030 1977 464 1999 317 1956 973 1978 468 2000 318 1957 967 1979 471 2001 316 1958 890 1980 477 2002 313 1959 860 1981 490 2003 297 1960 812 1982 513 2004 291 1961 897 1983 514 2005 282 1962 959 1984 524 2006 281 1963 916 1985 541 2007 279 1964 917 1986 556 2008 282 1965 936 1987 568 2009 285 1966 947 1988 565 2010 288 1967 973 1989 566 2011 284 1968 976 1990 547 2012 1969 926 1991 526 2013 Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. a. Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year. Shipbuilding Rate Table DC-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2011) and requested (FY2012-FY2016) rates of Navy ship procurement. Congressional Research Service 37 33 . Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Table DC-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016 (Procured FY1982-FY2011; requested FY2012-FY2015) 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11 7 4 4 5 4 5 5 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 6 6 6 5 7 8 4a 5a 3a 8 7 10 10 13 11 12 9 Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the 328313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). a. The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008. Author Contact Information Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610 Congressional Research Service 3834