U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
February 16July 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41349
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Summary
In recent years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result
of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime
assistance package for Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007.
With the enactment of the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) in July 2010,
Congress has provided almost $1.8 billion for the Mérida Initiative. Congress provided $248
million of that funding to Central America and included an additional $42 million for Caribbean
countries. However, Congress dedicated the vast majority of the funds—roughly $1.5 billion—to
support programs in Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican military
and police forces engaged in counterdrug efforts. Escalating drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico has focused congressional attention on the efficacy of U.S-Mexican efforts. Reducing
violence associated with organized crime (including drug trafficking), which, by Mexican
government estimates, has resulted in more than 34,500 deaths since President Felipe Calderón
took office in December 2006, has remained a focus of the Mérida InitiativeThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Summary
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is
threatening citizen security and governance in Mexico. According to Mexican government data,
organized crime-related violence claimed more than 34,500 lives in Mexico between January
2007 and December 2010. That toll may now exceed 40,000. Escalating violence has increased
U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the
possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations
dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are now considered the greatest organized crime threat
facing the United States.
In recent years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result
of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime
assistance package for Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007.
Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in
Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican security forces engaged in
counterdrug efforts. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to
intensify its efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged
to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
With funding for the original Mérida Initiative technically ending in FY2010 and new initiatives
underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the
Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation.
That strategy, outlined in the FY2011 budget requestadopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized
criminal groups; (2)
institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4)
building strong and
resilient communities. The first two pillars largely build upon existing efforts,
whereas pillars
three and four broaden the scope of Mérida Initiative programs to include new
efforts to facilitate “secure
flows” through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in
violence-prone border cities. The Administration’s FY2011 budget request included $310 million
for Mérida programs in Mexico. In the absence of FY2011 appropriations legislation, the 111th
Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242 as amended) to fund government
programs at the FY2010-enacted level, with the latest extension set to expire on March 4, 2011.
On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2012 budget request to
Congress. The request includes roughly $289.8 million in Mérida-related assistance violence-prone border cities.
While the Obama Administration asked for $310 million in Mérida Initiative funding for FY2011,
the allocation for Mexico that was included in P.L. 112-10 is not yet available. The
Administration also requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012. As of July 1, 2011,
a total of $465.0 million worth of assistance (training and equipment) had been provided to
Mexico. For 2011, the total value of deliveries to Mexico is expected to exceed $500 million.
The 112th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative, as well as
examining the degree to which the U.S. and Mexican governments are fulfilling their pledges to
tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region. Congress may also
also examine the degree to which the Administration’s new strategy for the Mérida Initiative
complements other counterdrug and border security efforts. Given current budget constraints,
Congress may also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative
programs. A July 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended
that the State Department develop better performance measures to track progress under Mérida.
as outlined in the 2011 National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. In August 2010, Congress approved $600 million in
supplemental funds for border security (P.L. 111-230). Given current budget constraints,
Congress may also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative
programs. Another congressional interest is likely to focus on whether human rights conditions
placed on
Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient.
For related information, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel; CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S.
Relations: Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R41075, Southwest
Border Violence: Issues in
Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin
M. Finklea.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: theThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Concerns About Drug Trafficking-Related Violence ....................................................................23
Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Mexico’s Antidrug Efforts .Security Strategy ..................................................23
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States................................................................56
Development and Implementation of the Mérida Initiative ..........................................................67
Evolution of U.S.- Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation...........................................................67
Implementation .....................................................................................................................9 11
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative................................................................ 1012
Drug Demand ............................................................................................................... 1012
Firearms Trafficking ..................................................................................................... 13
Money Laundering/Bulk Cash Smuggling ..................................................................... 1216
Beyond Mérida: the New Bilateral Security Strategy ................................................................. 1318
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime................................... 1419
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico..................................................... 1520
Reforming the Police .................................................................................................... 1620
Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems..................................................................... 1722
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border”..................................................................... 1924
Northbound and Southbound Inspections ...................................................................... 2126
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption................................................................... 2126
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities...................................................... 2227
Issues........................................................................................................................................ 2429
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative.................................................................... 2429
Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico ........................................................... 2632
Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative Funding ................................ 2733
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico ............................................................ 3035
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest Border Initiatives ................... 3137
Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere ............................................ 3238
The Way Forward...................................................................................................................... 39
Figures
Figure 1. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by State in 2010 ........................35
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States ............................................ 2631
Tables
Table 1. FY2008–FY2012 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure...........................................................................................................8 10
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2012 ......................................... 3441
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico .................................................................................... 34
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
41
Appendix B. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law Enforcement Partnerships....................................... 3542
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 3744
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Introduction
Escalating drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico, which conservative sources say resulted in
close to 11,600 deaths in 2010, has focused congressional attention on the efficacy of U.SMexican counterdrug efforts and related domestic initiatives.1 U.S. concerns about the violence in
Mexico have been heightened since the March 13, 2010, killing of three individuals, including
two U.S. citizens, connected to the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. On February 15,
2011, two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were shot, one fatally, while
driving from Mexico City to Monterrey, raising concerns about the safety of U.S. officials
working in Mexico. 2 Congressional apprehension about the possibility of violence in Mexico
“spilling over” into the United States has intensified since an Arizona rancher was killed on his
own property by an individual allegedly linked to Mexican drug traffickers in March 2010.
Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative3 programs in
Mexico, with the bulk of that funding dedicated to training and equipping Mexican military and
police forces engaged in counterdrug efforts (see Table 1). As of December 2010, roughly $361.8
million worth of training and equipment had been delivered to Mexico. 4 With funding for the
Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, technically ending with the FY2010 budget
cycle and new initiatives underway for Central America and the Caribbean5, the Obama
Administration worked closely with the Calderón government to develop a new strategy for U.S.Mexican security cooperation. An outline of the new strategy appeared in the Administration’s
FY2011 budget request, which included $310 million for Mérida programs in Mexico.
Shortly after a cabinet-level meeting in Mexico on March 23, 2010, the U.S. State Department
released a joint statement from Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia
Espinosa expressing both countries’ commitment to the continuation of U.S.-Mexican security
cooperation. 6 The four pillars of the new “Beyond Mérida” strategy they outlined focus on (1)
disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st
century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. While the first two pillars
1
Many experts use data from the national Mexican newspaper Reforma to tabulate deaths that have occurred as a result
of drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. Reforma is generally more cautious about classifying a death as drugtrafficking related than are official sources and other media outlets. In January 2011, the Mexican government reported
that more than 15,200 people had died in 2010 has a result of violence related to organized crime (including drug
trafficking). For a discussion of the government and media figures, see: CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug
Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
2
“Slain ICE Agent Identified; Another Agent Wounded in Mexico,” CNN, February 16, 2011.
3
This total includes $175 million for justice sector programs included in the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act
(H.R. 4899/P.L. 111-212), signed into law on July 29, 2010. For historical information on the Mérida Initiative, see
CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues.
4
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative—Significant Activities,” December 31, 2010; Phone interview with
State Department official, January 31, 2011.
5
In FY2008 and FY2009, Central America received $165 million in funding through the Mérida Initiative. In the
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress provided $83 million for combating gangs and
drug trafficking under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), splitting Central America from the
Mérida Initiative. P.L. 111-117 also included $37 million for a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) that was
first proposed by the Obama Administration in April 2009. See: CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the
Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
6
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Mérida Initiative High Level Consultative
Group on Bilateral Cooperation against Transnational Organized Crime,” March 23, 2010.
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largely build upon efforts that began under the George W. Bush Administration, pillars three and
four broaden the scope of bilateral cooperation under Mérida. Pillar three includes efforts to
facilitate “secure flows” of people and goods through the U.S.-Mexico border, while pillar four
aims to promote social and economic development in violence-prone communities. During
President Calderón’s state visit to Washington, DC, on May 19-20, 2010, Presidents Obama and
Calderón reaffirmed their commitment to the strategy and pledged to work together to combat the
organized criminal groups that traffic drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash
into Mexico. The State Department has indicated that it intends to continue Mérida assistance
beyond 2012 (when President Calderón leaves office) and to provide assistance to Mexican states
and municipalities. 7 It has asked for $289.8 million in Mérida-related assistance for FY2012.
The 112th Congress is likely to continue overseeing how Mérida and related funds have been
used, any planned adjustments in the uses of funds appropriated during the FY2008-FY2010
budget cycles, and the degree to which the Obama Administration’s new strategy for Mexico
complements other U.S. counterdrug and border security efforts. On August 12, 2010, President
Obama signed legislation (P.L. 111-230) that provides $600 million in supplemental funding to
strengthen U.S. border security efforts.8 Congress is likely to continue debating what types and
amounts of funding to provide for U.S.-Mexican security efforts in FY2011 and FY2012.9
Congress may also consider legislation that would define what role U.S. National Guard troops
should play in supporting law enforcement efforts along the Southwest border, which could have
implications for U.S.-Mexican law enforcement efforts.10The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Introduction
Organized crime poses a serious challenge to governance in Mexico, a country with which the
United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and close to $400 billion in annual trade. Drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) are fighting for control of lucrative smuggling routes into the
United States and resisting the Mexican government’s campaign against them. According to
Mexican government estimates, this violence resulted in more than 34,500 deaths in Mexico
between January 2007 and December 2010. That figure, which was released in January 2011 and
has not yet been updated, is higher than those that have been reported by Mexican media outlets.1
One media source, Grupo Reforma, recorded more than 6,400 drug-trafficking related killings in
the first half of 2011. Targets of the violence have often included rival criminal organizations or
affiliated gang members, but have also included Mexican security forces and public officials;
journalists; and civilians, including Americans.2 An example of this occurred in August 2010,
when 72 Central and South American migrants passing through Mexico were found massacred in
Tamaulipas. According to a survivor, the Zetas—one of the newest and most violent DTOs—
attempted to recruit the migrants to assist in moving drugs and killed them when they refused. In
another example, on February 15, 2011, two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agents were shot, one fatally, while driving to Mexico City. This incident marked the first death of
a U.S. law enforcement agent in Mexico since 1985.3
Drug-trafficking related violence and criminality have created regions in Mexico where the
government appears to be struggling to assert its authority4 leaving significant numbers of
Mexicans to question their government’s security strategy.5 The violence has also led to some
internal displacement within Mexico and refugees seeking asylum in the United States. DTOs
have corrupted and undermined police (particularly at the local level) and criminal justice
institutions. With impunity rates hovering around 98%,6 many Mexicans also doubt their
government’s ability to bring criminals to justice. J.P. Morgan’s chief economist for Mexico
estimated that drug trafficking-related violence cost the country some $4 billion in foreign direct
investment in 2010.7 The expanding techniques used by the DTOs, which has included the use of
car bombs and grenades, have led some scholars and U.S. officials to liken DTOs’ tactics to those
1
Mexican government data is available here: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/. In the
absence of updated government data, many analysts use data from Reforma, a Mexico-city based newspaper, to track
and analyze drug trafficking-related killings in Mexico. For a discussion of the different tallies of the casualties
reported by the Mexican media and those of the Mexican government, see Viridiana Ríos and David Shirk, Drug
Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010, Trans-Border Institute (TBI), University of San Diego, January
2011, http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence4.pdf.
2
That total includes two U.S. citizens connected to the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico that were killed on
March 13, 2010. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: Mexico, April 22, 2011.
3
In 1985, Drug Enforcement Administration agent, Enrique (Kiki) Camarena was kidnapped and killed in Mexico. For
more information, see http://www.justice.gov/dea/ongoing/red_ribbon/redribbon_history.html.
4
Adriana Gomez Licon and Katherine Corcoran, “Mexico Massacre Question: How did it Happen Twice?” Miami
Herald, Apr. 16, 2011.
5
According to a May 2011 survey, nearly 60% of those polled thought the Calderón government was losing its struggle
against organized crime. “58% Cree Que el Crimen va Ganando Lucha: Encuesta,” El Universal, June 1, 2011.
6
In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. See Guillermo Zepeda, Índice de
Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, Center of Research for Development (CIDAC), Mexico City, August 2009.
7
Nicholas Casey and James R. Hagerty, “Companies Shun Violent Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
of armed insurgencies.8 Criminality often associated with the illegal drug trade has also increased
the prevalence of related crimes, including kidnapping, robbery, and extortion.
Escalating violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover violence along the Southwest
border have focused congressional concern on the efficacy of the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic efforts in both countries. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion
for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico. Over roughly the same period, Mexico invested some
$26.0 billion of its own resources on security and public safety. 9
Whereas U.S. assistance under the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping
Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak judicial and
law enforcement institutions and the underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug
trade to flourish in Mexico. The “Beyond Mérida” strategy announced by both governments in
March 2010 focuses on four pillars: (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2)
institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón reaffirmed their
commitment to the strategy during Calderón’s state visit in May 2010 and after a White House
meeting on March 3, 2011. The Obama Administration asked for $310 million in Mérida
Initiative funding for FY2011, but allocation amounts are not yet available. The Administration
also requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012.
The 112th Congress is likely to continue overseeing how Mérida and related funds have been used
and the degree to which the Obama Administration’s strategy for Mexico complements other U.S.
counterdrug and border security efforts. Congress is likely to continue debating what types and
amounts of funding to provide for U.S.-Mexican security efforts and related domestic programs
for FY2012. Congress is likely to continue close scrutiny of U.S. efforts to reduce firearms
trafficking to Mexico in the wake of recent allegations that Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) officials allowed suspected straw purchasers to amass large quantities of
firearms, some of which were subsequently smuggled across the Southwest border (see “Firearms
Trafficking” below.10 Congress may also consider legislation that would define what role, if any,
U.S. National Guard troops should continue to play in supporting law enforcement efforts along
the Southwest border, which could have implications for U.S.-Mexican law enforcement efforts.11
This report provides a framework for examining the current status and future prospects for U.S.Mexican security cooperation. It begins with a brief discussion of the scope of the threat that drug
trafficking and related crime and violence now pose to Mexico and the United States, followed by
an analysis of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative. It then analyzes key
aspects of the new U.S.-Mexican security strategy. The report concludes by raising some policy
issues that may affect U.S.-Mexican security cooperation.
Concerns About Drug Trafficking-Related Violence
Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Mexico’s Antidrug Efforts11
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for more than 90% of the cocaine sold in the United
States (see “Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico”). A small number of Mexican
7
U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Mérida and Post-Mérida, June 11, 2010.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Passage of the Southwest Border
Security Bill,” press release, August 12, 2010.
9
Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242 as amended) to fund government programs, with
the latest extension set to expire on March 4, 2011. The Continuing Resolution, as amended, continues funding most
foreign aid programs at the FY2010-enacted level, with some exceptions.
10
For background, see CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. Chuck
Mason.
11
For background, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
8
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drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often referred to as drug “cartels,”12 control the most
significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest border. U.S. government reports have
characterized Mexican drug trafficking organizations as representing the “greatest organized
crime threat” to the United States today.13 Mexican DTOs have expanded their U.S. presence by
increasing their transportation and distribution networks, as well as displacing other Latin
American traffickers, primarily Colombians.14 In the past few years, the violence and brutality of
the Mexican DTOs have escalated as they have battled for control of lucrative drug trafficking
routes into the United States (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by State in 2010
Source: Crime Indicator Database at the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego, adapted
by CRS. The data represented are from Reforma newspaper.
12
8
See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Interview With Denise Maerker of Televisa, Interview, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Secretary of State, Guanajuato, Mexico, January 24, 2011.
9
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011.
10
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
11
The Obama Administration deployed 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border in July 2010 to support
counternarcotics enforcement pending Customs and Border Protection (CBP) staff increases. The National Guard
deployment was scheduled to end in June 2011, but has been extended until September 2011.
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Concerns About Drug Trafficking-Related Violence
Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Mexico’s Security Strategy12
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for more than 95% of the cocaine sold in the United
States (see “Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico”).13 Mexico is also increasingly
becoming a consumer of illicit drugs, particularly in northern states where criminal organizations
have been paying their workers in product rather than in cash. Consumption of marijuana,
cocaine, and methamphetamine in Mexico increased from 2002 to 2008.14 Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, often referred to as drug “cartels,”15 control the most significant drug
distribution operations along the Southwest border. The most dominant DTOs include the
Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana), Beltran Leyva Organization, the Zetas, Sinaloa (La
Federación), Carillo Fuentes Organization (Juárez), Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. U.S.
government reports have characterized Mexican drug trafficking organizations as representing the
“greatest organized crime threat” to the United States today. 16 Mexican DTOs have expanded
their U.S. presence by increasing their transportation and distribution networks, as well as
displacing other Latin American traffickers, primarily Colombians.17
In the past few years, the violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs have escalated as they have
battled for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United States and local drug
distribution networks in Mexico. U.S. and Mexican officials now often refer to the DTOs as
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)18 due to the fact that they have increasingly branched
out into other criminal activities, including alien smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion.
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has focused on combating drug
trafficking and organized crime by, in part, increasing Mexico’s annual budget for security and
public safety from $7.3 billion in 2007 to $10.9 billion in 2011.19 Government enforcement
efforts, many of which have been led by Mexican military forces, have successfully taken down
some of the leaders of the major DTOs, either through arrests or deaths during operations to
detain them. The pace of these takedowns has accelerated since late 2009, partly due to increased
12
For background, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
13
U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2011,
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/.
14
Marijuana use increased from 3.48 percent of the population in 2002 to 4.4 percent in 2008, cocaine from 1.23
percent to 2.5 percent, and methamphetamine from 0.08 percent to 0.5 percent. Ibid.
15
The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug cartels are setting illicit drug prices.
1316
U.S. Department of Justice’s, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment,
December 2008.
14
NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf
17
NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/
index.htm.
18
See for example, Miguel R. Salazar and Eric L. Olson, A Profile of Mexico’s Major Organized Crime Groups,
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.
19
These budget figures include funding for the Ministry of Defense, the Navy, the National Security and Investigation
Center, the Federal Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and parts of the Ministries of Government and the
Presidency. Government of Mexico, June 2011, op. cit.
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Drug trafficking-related violence resulted in more than 5,100 lives lost in 2008 and 6,500 deaths
in 2009. According to conservative estimates, drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico in 2010
totaled almost 11,600, a more than 70% increase over 2009. 15 As in 2009, a large percentage of
the violence occurred in the states of Chihuahua (along the U.S.-Mexico border), Sinaloa,
Guerrero, and Durango. However, a split between the Gulf DTO and Los Zetas has sparked
violence in new areas of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León (also border states), feuding for control
over the Beltrán Leyva organization has increased violence in Morelos, and turf battles have
invaded Nayarit and Jalisco as well.16 Victims of the violence have increasingly included police,
soldiers, politicians (including 14 mayors and a gubernatorial candidate killed in 2010),
journalists, and other civilians. Kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and migrant smuggling have also
increased significantly, as DTOs have branched out into other criminal enterprises. In August
2010, drug traffickers executed 72 U.S.-bound migrants from Central and South America in
Tamaulipas for apparently refusing to participate in their organized criminal activities.17
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating DTOs a top
priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico a threat to the Mexican state and has sent thousands of soldiers and police to drug
trafficking “hot-spots” in states throughout Mexico. Joint deployments of federal military and
police officials are just one part of the Calderón government’s strategy against the DTOs. That
strategy involves (1) deploying the military to restore law and order, (2) expanding law
enforcement operations, (3) initiating institutional reform and anti-corruption initiatives, (4)
recovering social cohesion and trust, and (5) building up international partnerships against drugs
and crime (like the Mérida Initiative).18 President Calderón has secured legislative approval of a
number of constitutional reforms and laws related to national security, including, most recently,
an anti-kidnapping law. Other initiatives that he has proposed, including a reform of the national
security law and a law to reorganize municipal police forces, remain pending. The Calderón
government has also used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers, extraditing 107
individuals in 2009 and 94 individuals in 2010.19 Increased collaboration and intelligence-sharing
with U.S. law enforcement agencies have resulted in significant government victories against the
DTOs, which have accelerated since the December 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva.20
Despite these successes, the persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the drug
traffickers, which has occurred partially in response to government pressure, has led to increasing
15
TBI, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009, January 2010, citing Reforma data; “Mexico
Admits 15,273 killed in 2010,” LatinNews Daily, January 13, 2011.
16
TBI, Justice in Mexico: December 2010 News Report, December 2010.
17
See, for example, Dudley Althaus, "7 Arrested in Slayings of Migrants in Northern Mexico," Houston Chronicle,
September 8, 2010.
18
Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” June 2009, p. ii. President Calderón further expounded on this strategy in an editorial
published in Mexican newspapers on June 13, 2010. It is available in Spanish at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/
prensa/lucha_seguridad_publica/index.html.
19
U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2010, March 1, 2010; Email
from U.S. Department of Justice, January 4, 2011. For an illustration of trends in extraditions, see Figure 2.
20
Recent high-profile results have included: the July 2010 killing of Ignacio Coronel Villarreal (Sinaloa DTO), the
August 2010 arrest of Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal (Beltrán Leyva) and the November 2010 killing of Antonio
“Tony Tormenta” Ezequiél Cárdenas Guillén (Gulf DTO). See: Stratfor, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date,
December 20, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
criticism of Calderón’s military-led strategy. 21 The apparent inability of Mexican military forces
and/or federal police to curb the violent crimes committed by drug traffickers and their allied
gangs has also raised concerns that Calderón’s strategy, which for some has exposed the military
to corruption and resulted in human rights abuses, may need to be revised. 22 Many experts assert
that, in order to regain popular support for its security policies, the Calderón government will
have to show success in dismantling the DTOs, while also reducing drug trafficking-related
violence. Some have urged President Calderón to press governors and other officials to accelerate
efforts to implement much-needed judicial and police reforms, while others have urged the
government to concentrate its crime control efforts in the country’s most violent municipalities.23
President Calderón and his top advisers began consulting with local and state officials to revise
the government’s military-led strategy for Ciudad Juárez after the massacre of 15 civilians, many
of them teenagers, at a private home there in January 2010. The new strategy that the Calderón
government has developed, “We Are All Juárez” (discussed later in this report) involves
significant federal government investments in education, job training, and community
development programs to help address some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the
violence. The strategy for Juárez also involved an April 2010 shift from military to federal police
control over security efforts in the city, a strategy shift which has yielded mixed results.24
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States25intelligence-sharing between the U.S. and Mexican governments.20 In 2009, the Mexican
government identified the country’s 37 most wanted criminals and by the end of 2010 at least 20
of those alleged criminals had been captured or killed. 21 At the same time, the government’s focus
on dismantling the leadership of the major criminal organizations appears to have contributed to
brutal succession struggles, shifting alliances among the DTOs, and the replacement of existing
leaders and criminal groups with others that are even more violent.22
Even by conservative estimates, drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico resulted in more than
2,200 killings in 2007, 5,100 killings in 2008, 6,500 killings in 2009, and 11,500 killings in
2010—a more than 70% increase over the prior year).23 In 2010, a large percentage of the
violence occurred in the states of Chihuahua (along the U.S.-Mexico border), Sinaloa, Guerrero,
and Durango (see Figure 1). However, a split between the Gulf DTO and the Zetas (their former
enforcers) sparked violence in new areas of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León (also border states).
Feuding for control over the Beltrán Leyva organization increased violence in Morelos, and turf
battles invaded Nayarit and Jalisco as well.
Thus far in 2011, the incidence of violence in Mexico has spiraled higher and the geographic area
affected by the violence has spread. According to data from Reforma, the total number of drug
trafficking-related killings in Mexico this year may exceed last year’s total by 15% or more. 24
While violence in border states like Baja California and Chihuahua has declined, the locus of
border violence has now shifted to Tamaulipas and Nuevo León. Monterrey, a major industrial
and financial hub, has been particularly hard hit by the struggle between the Gulf and Zetas
DTOs. Violence has remained high in Sinaloa and increased in the Pacific states of Nayarit,
Guerrero and Jalisco, as well as in the interior states of Durango and San Luís Potosí. The recent
discoveries of mass grave sites in Durango and Tamaulipas have added to the drug traffickingrelated death tolls in those states.
20
STRATFOR, Mexico’s Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date, December 20, 2010.
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Actions and Achievements,” February 2011.
22
Patrick Corcoran, “A Survey of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations,” In Sight Organized Crime in the
Americas, June 27, 2011.
23
Ríos and Shirk, op. cit.
24
TBI, Justice in Mexico: June 2011 News Report, June 2011.
21
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Figure 1. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by State in 2010
Source: Crime Indicator Database at the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego, adapted by
CRS. The data represented are from Reforma newspaper.
Many experts assert that, in order to regain popular support for its security policies, the Calderón
government will have to show success in dismantling the DTOs while also reducing drug
trafficking-related violence. President Calderón and his top advisers have responded to mounting
criticism of the government’s security policies by stressing the holistic nature of its public
security strategy. They describe the strategy as focused on: (1) carrying out joint police-military
operations to support local authorities and citizens; (2) increasing the operational and
technological capacities of the state (such as the Federal Police25); (3) initiating legal and
institutional reforms; (4) strengthening crime prevention and social programs; and, (5)
strengthening international cooperation (such as the Mérida Initiative). 26 As part of that strategy,
President Calderón has secured legislative approval of a number of constitutional reforms and
laws related to national security, including judicial reform (passed in 2008) and, more recently, an
anti-kidnapping law. The Calderón government has also used extradition as a major tool to
25
The size of the Federal Police has increased from 6,500 officers in 2006 to roughly 35,500 officers (including 7,000
college graduates) in 2010.
26
Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
combat drug traffickers, extraditing 107 individuals to the United States in 2009 and another 94
individuals in 2010.
While some have urged the Calderón government to continue its current strategy with slight
modifications, others have suggested that the strategy be completely revised. Calderón
Administration officials consulted with local and state officials to change the government’s
military-led strategy for Ciudad Juarez after the massacre of 15 civilians, many of them teenagers,
at a private home there in late January 2010. The new strategy that the Calderón government has
implemented, “We Are All Juárez,” involves significant federal government investments in
education, job training, and community development programs to help address some of the
underlying factors that have contributed to violence in the city. It also involved an April 2010
shift from military to federal police control over security efforts in the city, a strategy shift which
appears to have yielded some results.27
Since August 2010, President Calderón has conducted a series of consultations with academics,
policy makers, and civil society leaders on the direction that Mexico’s broader public security
policy should take. Their recommendations include suggestions like focusing enforcement efforts
on the most violent criminal organizations, pressing governors to accelerate much-needed judicial
and police reforms, and concentrating crime control efforts and social programs in the country’s
most violent municipalities. 28 Other, more dramatic policy suggestions have also been put forth.
Among them: removing the military from the streets, creating one national police force, and
urging the United States to decriminalize drugs, beginning with marijuana, so as to cut into the
DTOs’ profits.29
On June 23, 2011, President Calderón met with peace activists led by Javier Sicilia, a prominent
Mexican poet whose son was killed by drug gangs earlier this year. The activists urged President
Calderón to abandon his military-led strategy, which they say has caused violence and human
rights abuses by security forces. They urged him to consider a new approach focused on
combating the poverty, inequality, and unemployment that are contributing to violence. 30
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States31
The prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the DTOs in Mexico—
and particularly in those areas of Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has generated concern
among U.S. policy makers that this violence might spill over into the United States. In particular,
an increase in violence in Mexican cities such as Juárez and Nuevo Laredo has sparked fears that
the violence may spill into the neighboring U.S. “sister cities” of El Paso and Laredo. For
instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a safety alert to law enforcement
officers in the El Paso area warning that DTOs and associated gangs may target U.S. law
enforcement.26 This alert comes at a time when reports indicate that the Mexican DTOs have
begun to direct more of their violence at Mexican authorities and to use new forms of weaponry,
21
Jorge C. Castañeda, “What’s Spanish for Quagmire?” Foreign Policy, January/February 2010; Mathieu von Rohr,
“The Mexican Drug War - A Nation Descends into Violence,” Spiegel Online International, December 23, 2010.
According to a November 2010 survey by Milenio, a Mexico City newspaper, just 21% of those polled thought the
Calderón government was winning its struggle against organized crime.
22
Ginger Thompson, “Killings Fuel Concerns Over Mexico’s Drug Offensive,” New York Times, March 16, 2010.
23
Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Mexico’s Forever War,” 27
Alejandor Martinez-Cabrera, “Mexican President Calderón Highlights Successes in Juárez,” El Paso Times, May 21,
2011.
28
Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La Ráiz de la Violencia,” Nexos en Línea, June 1, 2011; Alfredo Corchado, “Arrest
Signals Targeting of Zetas,” Dallas Morning News, July 5, 2011; Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Mexico’s Forever War,”
ForeignPolicy.com, December 22, 2010; Eduardo Guerrero
Gutiérrez, “Como Reducir la Violencia en México,” Nexos en Línea, November 3, 2010.
24
Katherine Corcoran,” Mexico Program to Clean up Violence-Plagued Border City Ciudad Juárez has Long Way to
go,” Associated Press, January 3, 2011.
25
en Línea, November 3, 2010.
29
See, for example, “Jorge Castañeda, “The Way Forward,” Time, June 30, 2011.
30
Candace Vallantin, “Mexicans Campaign to End Drug War; Renowned Poet Puts Down his Pen to Focus on a
Caravan For Peace,” Toronto Star, June 7, 2011.
31
For background, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover
Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea.
26
“Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Mexican Assassin Teams Targeting U.S. Law Enforcement,” Homeland
Security Newswire, April 6, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
including grenades and car bombs. 27 These expanding techniques have led some scholars and
U.S. officials to liken DTOs’ tactics to insurgents’ tactics.28
Currently,
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a safety alert to law enforcement
officers in the El Paso area warning that DTOs and associated gangs may target U.S. law
enforcement.32 This alert came at a time when the Mexican DTOs had begun to direct more of
their violence at Mexican authorities and to use new forms of weaponry, including sniper rifles,
grenades, and car bombs.33
U.S. federal officials deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico has
resulted in a significant spillover of violence into the United States, but recognize that
incidents incidents
of violence have occurred and that the potential for increased violence does exist.29 On
34 On May 25,
2010, in response to rising state and local concerns about border security, President
Obama Obama
authorized sending up to 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border. The
National Guard troops troops
began the deployment process on August 1, 2010, and are scheduled to
serve for a period of one year, during which they will servenow serving in law enforcement
support roles in
high-crime areas along the Southwest border.
As a result, through September 2011.
Congress faces several policy questions related to potential or actual spillover
violence. The first
question involves whether the increasing violence between the drug trafficking
organizations in
Mexico affects either the level or nature of drug trafficking-related violence in
the United States.
Of note, violent drug trafficking-related crimes have previously existed and
continue to exist
throughout the United States. However, data currently available on these crimes
does not allow
analysts to determine whether or how these existing levels of drug traffickingrelatedtrafficking-related violence in
the United States have been affected by the surge of violence in Mexico.
If there were evidence of such spillover violence, Congress may be confronted with the issue of
whether altering current drug or crime policies may aid in reducing drug trafficking-related
violence in the United States. If there were not significant spillover violence, policy makers may
debate best practices to prevent the possibility of future spillover violence. As such, another
question involves whether U.S. support to Mexico via the extension of the Mérida Initiative—as
proposed by the State Department—Mérida Initiative will be effective not
only in reducing drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico but in preventing this violence from
reaching the United States.
Development and Implementation of the Mérida
Mérida Initiative
Evolution of U.S.- Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation
The United States began providing Mexico with equipment and training to eradicate marijuana
and opium poppy fields in the 1970s, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after Enrique
Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, was assassinated in Mexico in
1985. From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled due to U.S.
mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and concerns about the Mexican government’s
27
See, for example, “Mexico: Cartels Changing Tactics in Turf War: Official Says After More Than 22,000 Killed in
Gangland Violence, Drug Rivals Now Shifting Attacks to Police,” CBS News, April 26, 2010; William Booth, “Ciudad
Juárez Car Bomb Shows New Sophistication in Mexican Drug Cartels’ Tactics,” Washington Post, July 22, 2010.
28
See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Interview With Denise Maerker of Televisa, Interview, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Secretary of State, Teatro Juarez, Guanajuato, Mexico, January 24, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/155254.htm.
29
See for example, DHS, "Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Border Security Conference," press release, August
11, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1250028863008.shtm.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the32
“Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Mexican Assassin Teams Targeting U.S. Law Enforcement,” Homeland
Security Newswire, April 6, 2010.
33
INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
34
See for example, Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Border Security at the
University of Texas at El Paso,” press release, January 31, 2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
tendency to accommodate drug leaders.3035 At the same time, the Mexican government was
reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its opposition to U.S. drug certification
procedures31procedures36 and to concerns about sovereignty. The Mexican government also expressed
opposition to the DEA and other U.S. agencies carrying out operations against drug trafficking
organizations in Mexican territory without authorization. Mexican military officials proved
particularly reticent to cooperate with their U.S. counterparts due to deeply held concerns about
past U.S. interventions in Mexico.3237
U.S.-Mexican cooperation began to improve and U.S. assistance to Mexico increased after the
two countries signed a Binational Drug Control Strategy in 1998. U.S. assistance to Mexico,
which totaled some $397 million from FY2000-FY2006, supported programs aimed at
interdicting cocaine; combating production and trafficking of marijuana, opium poppy, and
methamphetamine; strengthening the rule of law; and countering money-laundering. In 2007, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while U.S. programs had helped improve
Mexico’s counterdrug efforts, seizures in Mexico remained relatively low, and corruption
continued to hinder bilateral efforts.3338
As previously stated, upon taking office in December 2006, Mexican President Calderón made
combating drug trafficking and organized crime a top priority of his administration. In response to
the Calderón government’s request for increased U.S. cooperation, in October 2007 the United
States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a new package of U.S. assistance for Mexico
and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. The Mérida
Initiative, as it was originally conceived, sought to (1) break the power and impunity of criminal
organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of
justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand.
Congress appropriated roughly $1.35 billion to support the Mérida Initiative in P.L. 110-252, P.L.
111-8, P.L. 111-32, and P.L. 111-117 (see Table 1). Congress has also approved $175 million in
funds for justice sector programs in Mexico in the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act
(P.L. 111-212). Each of these actsP.L. 111-117, P.L. 111-212, and, most recently, in P.L. 112-10 (see Table 1).
Each of these Acts contained human rights conditions on 15% of certain law
enforcement and
military assistance provided (see “Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on
Mérida Mérida
Initiative Funding” below). U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping military
and law enforcement officials engaged in counterdrug efforts, improving border security, and, to a
lesser extent,
reforming Mexico’s police and judicial institutions. (For overall U.S. assistance to
Mexico, see
Table A-1 in Appendix A).
30
While U.S. and Mexican officials have described the Mérida Initiative as a “new paradigm” for
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, some observers have challenged that description, preferring
35
Under this system, arrests and eradication took place, but due to the effects of widespread corruption, the system was
“characterized by a working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug lords” through the 1990s. Francisco E.
González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
3136
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug producing and drug transit
countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico usually was criticized for its efforts, which in turn led
to increased Mexican government criticism of the U.S assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process
enacted in September 2002 (P.L. 107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead
required the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably” to make
substantial counternarcotics efforts.
3237
Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface,” Strategic Forum, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2009.
3338
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but
the Flow of Illicit Narcotics into the United States Remains High, 08215T, October 2007.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 1. FY2008–FY2012 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
Account
ESF
FY2008 Supp.
(P.L. 110-252)
FY2009
Bridge (P.L.
110-252)
FY2009 (P.L.
111-8)
FY2009 Supp.
(P.L. 111-32)
FY2010 (P.L.
111-117)
FY2010 Supp.
(P.L. 111-212)
Account
Totals
FY2011
Request
FY2012
Request
20.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
15.0a
0.0
50.0
10.0
33.3
INCLE
215.5
48.0
246.0
160.0
190.0
175.0
1,034.5
292.0
248.5
FMF
116.5
0.0
39.0
260.0
5.3
0.0
420.8
8.0
8.0
Total
352.0
48.0
300.0
420.0
210.3
175.0
1,505.3
310.0
2898
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
to describe the Mérida Initiative as a gradual expansion of existing bilateral efforts.39 Regardless
of whether it has resulted in a paradigm shift in U.S.-Mexican relations, the Mérida Initiative
signaled a major diplomatic step forward for U.S.-Mexican counterdrug cooperation, which in the
1990s had been at a low point. The Mérida Initiative has resulted in increased bilateral
communication and cooperation, from law enforcement officials engaging in joint operations on
the U.S-Mexico border to cabinet-level officials meeting regularly to discuss bilateral security
efforts. Bilateral coordination has been further advanced by the establishment of a Bilateral
Implementation Office in Mexico City where U.S. and Mexican personnel work together to plan
and implement joint activities and projects under the Merida Initiative. Perhaps most importantly
for Mexico, as part of the Mérida Initiative, both countries accepted a shared responsibility to
tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region, including U.S.
drug demand. Some Mexican analysts have concurred with these observations, while others assert
that the United States continues to largely dictate the bilateral agenda and that the Mérida
Initiative is not that different from previous counterdrug programs like Plan Colombia.40
39
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation,”
October 22, 2007. For debates about whether or not the Mérida Initiative is a “new paradigm” for U.S.-Mexican
security relations, see Laura K. Stephens and José de Arimateia da Cruz, “The Mérida Initiative: Bilateral Cooperation
or U.S. National Security Hegemony, International Journal of Restorative Justice, 2008, vol. 4, no. 2.; Rafael
Velázquez Flores and Juan Pablo Prado Lallande eds. La Iniciativa Mérida: ¿Una Nueva Paradigma de Cooperación
Entre México y Estados Unidos en Seguridad? Mexico City : National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2009.
40
Ibid; see the chapters by Mario Cruz Cruz, Juan Pablo Prado Lallande, Jorge Rebolledo, and Alberto Lozano.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Table 1. FY2008–FY2012 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2008 Supp.
(P.L.
Account
ESF
110252)
FY2009
Bridge (P.L.
110-252)
FY2009 (P.L.
111-8)
FY2009 Supp.
(P.L. 111-32)
20.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
INCLE
215.5
48.0
246.0
160.0
FMF
116.5
0.0
39.0
Total
352.0
48.0
300.0
FY2010 (P.L.
111-117)
15.0b
FY2010 Supp.
(P.L. 111-212)
Account
Totals
FY2011
Requesta
FY2012
Request
0.0
50.0
10.0
33.3
190.0
175.0
1,034.5
292.0
248.5
260.0
5.3
0.0
420.8
8.0
420.0
210.3
175.0
1,505.3
310.0
Not applicablec
281.8
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, FY2009 Appropriations Spending Plan, FY2009 Supplemental Spending Plan, FY2010
Spending Plan, and FY2010 Supplemental Spending Plan. U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011; U.S. Department of State,
Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs FY2012.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.
a.
CRS-8
$6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
While U.S. and Mexican officials have described the Mérida Initiative as a “new paradigm” for
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, some observers have challenged that description, preferring
to describe the Mérida Initiative as a gradual expansion of existing bilateral efforts.34 Regardless
of whether it has resulted in a paradigm shift in U.S.-Mexican relations, the Mérida Initiative
signaled a major diplomatic step forward for U.S.-Mexican counterdrug cooperation, which in the
1990s had been at a low point. The Mérida Initiative has resulted in increased bilateral
communication and cooperation, from law enforcement officials engaging in joint operations on
the U.S-Mexico border to cabinet-level officials meeting regularly to discuss bilateral security
efforts. Perhaps most importantly for Mexico, as part of the Mérida Initiative, both countries
accepted a shared responsibility to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and
crime in the region, including U.S. drug demand. Many Mexican analysts have concurred with
these observations, while some have argued that the United States continues to largely dictate the
bilateral agenda and that the Mérida Initiative is not that different from previous U.S.-funded
counterdrug programs like Plan Colombia.35On April 14, 2011, Congress passed legislation to fund government programs for the remainder of FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). While the legislation reduced most foreign
aid accounts from FY2010 enacted levels, final funding by country and program has not been established.
b.
$6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
c.
Beginning in the FY2012 request, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
CRS-10
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Implementation
There has been concern in Congress about the slow delivery of Mérida assistance. On December
3, 2009, the GAO issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida
Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAOThe report found that $753 million of the $1.1 billion in
Mérida funds appropriated for
Mexico as of that timeSeptember 2009 had been obligated by the State
Department, but only $24 million
of the funds had actually been spent.36 41 The GAO report
attributedattributed initial delays in Mérida
implementation to “(1) statutory conditions on the funds, (2)
challenges in fulfilling
administrative procedures [required for obligation and expenditure of the
funds] , and (3) the need
to enhance institutional capacity on the part of both recipient countries
and the United States to
implement the assistance.”37
Progress has been made in Mérida implementation since the release of the December 2009 GAO
report. According to a follow-up report by the GAO that was released on July
21, 2010,
approximately $790.9 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico as of
that time had been obligated ($669.7 billion) or expended ($121.2 billion) by March 31, 2010.38
That total includes approximately $14 million in new obligations for Mérida programs in Mexico
and $97 million in new expenditures.
Rather than tracking obligations and expenditures, State Department officials have preferred to
report on progress in Mérida implementation by compiling the value of equipment deliveries that
34
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation,”
October 22, 2007. For debates about whether or not the Mérida Initiative is a “new paradigm” for U.S.-Mexican
security relations, see Laura K. Stephens and José de Arimateia da Cruz, “The Mérida Initiative: Bilateral Cooperation
or U.S. National Security Hegemony, International Journal of Restorative Justice, 2008, vol. 4, no. 2.; Rafael
Velázquez Flores and Juan Pablo Prado Lallande eds. La Iniciativa Mérida: ¿Una Nueva Paradigma de Cooperación
Entre México y Estados Unidos en Seguridad? Mexico City : National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2009.
35
Ibid; see the chapters by Mario Cruz Cruz, Juan Pablo Prado Lallande, Jorge Rebolledo, and Alberto Lozano.
36
GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10253r.pdf.
37
Ibid.
38
GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better
Performance Measures, 10-837R, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
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have been made and the value of capacity-building programs that have been provided. According
to a recent State Department report, a total of $276.7 million worth of equipment had been
delivered and $85.1 million worth of training had been provided to Mexico by December 2010.39
The equipment that has been provided thus far has included seven Bell helicopters valued at $88
million for the Mexican Army and three UH-60 helicopters valued at $76.5 million for the
Secretariat for Public Security (SSP or Federal Police). Among Mérida-funded training programs,
police professionalization programs appear to have advanced the furthest, with more than 6,700
Mexican federal police officers having completed U.S.-funded courses. U.S. support for judicial
sector training has been slower to get off the ground. By late 2010, however, more than 3,000
prosecutors and justice sector personnel had received U.S. training. 40 Another $500 million worth
of equipment and training are to be provided in 2011.41 Despite this progress approximately $790.9 million in Mérida funding had been obligated by March 2010, of
which $121.2 million had been expended.42
Rather than tracking obligations and expenditures, State Department officials have preferred to
report on progress in Mérida implementation by compiling the value of equipment deliveries that
have been made and the value of capacity-building programs that have been provided. As of July
1, 2011, a total of $465.0 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico, including
$336.0 million in equipment and $129.2 million worth of training and technical assistance.
Significant equipment deliveries thus far have included three UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters,
eight Bell 412 helicopters, a case management system for the Attorney General’s Office, and nonintrusive inspection equipment for scanning containers.43 For 2011, the State Department has
committed to delivering $500 million in assistance (equipment and training) to Mexico.
Scheduled equipment deliveries this year should include four UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, a
CASA 235 maritime surveillance aircraft, and a $13 million secure communications system for
use by law enforcement in sister cities along the U.S.-Mexico border. 44
U.S. assistance provided under the Merida Initiative has shifted away from providing expensive
equipment, like aircraft and IT equipment, toward a focus on institution-building through training
and technical assistance. As of July 1, 2011, more than 65,000 Mexican participants have been
reached through direct training, conferences, seminars, or other events. Some 6,885 federal police
investigators, 2,014 penitentiary staff, and 4,312 judicial sector personnel have completed U.S.funded courses. 45 U.S. assistance is supporting training courses offered in new academies that are
either currently in operation or are being established for customs personnel, corrections staff,
canine teams, and police (federal, state, and local). Some of that training is designed according to
a “train the trainer” model in which the academies train instructors who in turn are able to train
their own personnel. Mérida assistance is also supporting curriculum and training programs
offered by Mexican institutions like the National Public Security System (SNSP), which sets
police standards and provides grants to states and municipalities for police training, and the
41
GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10253r.pdf.
42
GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better
Performance Measures, 10-837R, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
43
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative at a Glance,” July 1, 2011.
44
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “The Mérida Initiative- What’s Coming in 2011,” May 2011, http://photos.state.gov/
libraries/mexico/310329/12may/2011_Major_Deliveries_FINAL.pdf.
45
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative at a Glance,” July 1, 2011.
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National Institute of Criminal Sciences (INACIPE), which provides training to judicial sector
personnel. Despite progress in accelerating the delivery of Merida assistance, Congress may
retain a particular interest in ensuring that Mérida Initiative equipment and training programs are
delivered in a timely manner.
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative
In the 2007 U.S.-Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government
pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demandrelated portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico.”4246
Although not funded through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government has made efforts to
address each of these issues, as discussed below. When debating future support for the Mérida
Initiative, Congress
may consider whether to simultaneously provide additional funding for these
or other domestic
activities that would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges.
Drug Demand
Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. In 2009, about 21.8
million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users, representing 9% of individuals
aged 12 and older. 4347 High-ranking Administration officials and experts alike have acknowledged
that U.S. domestic demand for illegal drugs is a significant factor driving the global drug trade,
including the drug trafficking-related crime and violence that is occurring in Mexico and other
source and transit countries.44 The Obama Administration released its 2010 National Drug
39
U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative—Significant Activities,” December 31, 2010; Phone interview with
State Department official, January 31, 2011.
40
“U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” Remarks by Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, at the Brookings Institution, January 6, 2011.
41
U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa,” January 24, 2011.
42
48 The Obama Administration released its 2010 National Drug
Control Strategy report on May 11, 2010, which includes an increased focus on reducing U.S.
drug demand, particularly among youth.49 Drug policy experts have praised the Administration’s
focus on reducing consumption, but criticized the Administration for requesting relatively modest
budget increases in funding for treatment programs.50 Some have questioned whether the federal
government allocates enough of the drug budget to adequately address the demand side; the
FY2012 drug budget proposes to continue to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction
programs including drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law
46
U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
4347
See the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including
residents of households, non-institutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and is available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsP.pdf.
4448
See, for example, testimony of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Transnational Drug Enterprises (Part II): U.S. Government Perspectives on the Threat to Global Stability and
U.S. National Security, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 2010. See also “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton Remarks With Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” March 23, 2010.
49
The strategy is available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/strategy/. For more information on the National
Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), see CRS Report R41535,
Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Kristin M. Finklea.
50
See, for example, Testimony of John T. Carnevale, President, Carnevale Associates, before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommitee on Domestic Policy, April 14, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: theThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Control Strategy report on May 11, 2010, which includes an increased focus on reducing U.S.
drug demand, particularly among youth.45 Drug policy experts have praised the Administration’s
focus on reducing consumption, but criticized its budget request for including a relatively modest
3.7% increase in funding for treatment programs compared to FY2010.46 They further maintain
that while the request includes a 13.4% increase in funding for prevention efforts, the funds
requested are still less than what was spent in the early 2000s and 5.3% lower than what the Bush
Administration funded in FY2009.47 Some have questioned whether the federal government
allocates enough of the drug budget to adequately address the demand side; the FY2011 drug
budget proposes to continue to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction programs including
drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement efforts. It is
important to note, however, that many state, local, and non-profit agencies also channel funds
toward demand reduction.
Gun Trafficking48
Mexican DTOs have reportedly used “military-style” firearms, including assault weapons. While
a significant number of firearms seized by Mexican authorities, some arguably based on
“military” designs, have been traced back to the United States in the past few years, only a
handful of those firearms have been traced back to U.S. military inventories. Mexican DTOs
often obtain their weapons through “straw purchases,” whereby people who are legally qualified
to buy the weapons from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in U.S. border states sell them to
smugglers who take them across the border. Illicit firearms are used in conflicts between rival
DTOs as well as between the DTOs and the Mexican government, military, and police.
The United States has taken various measures to reduce the illegal flow of weapons into Mexico.
One such initiative is Project Gunrunner,49 led by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF). It aims to disrupt the illegal flow of guns from the United States to Mexico,
enhance U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination, and train U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement officials to identify firearms traffickers. As of March 2010, Project Gunrunner had
led to the arrest of 1,397 defendants—850 of which had been convicted—and the seizure of over
6,688 firearms.50 Project Gunrunner has recently been criticized, in part, for not systematically
and consistently sharing information with Mexican and U.S. partners as well as for focusing
45
For more information on the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, see
CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Kristin
M. Finklea.
46
See, for example, Testimony of John T. Carnevale, President, Carnevale Associates, before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommitee on Domestic Policy, April 14, 2010. For an overview of the proposed FY2011
National Drug Control Budget, see Executive Office of the President of the United States, “National Drug Control
Budget: FY2011 Funding Highlights,” Feb. 2010, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/11budget/
fy11highlight.pdf.
47
Ibid.
48
For more information on gun trafficking along the Southwest border, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and
the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.
49
For more information on Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
50
Statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, before the
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 4, 2010.
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investigations on gun dealers and straw purchasers over high-level traffickers.51 In September,
2010, ATF released a new strategy, "Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy," that
reportedly addresses these issues.52 In addition, on December 17, 2010, the Department of Justice
and ATF published a “60-day emergency notice of information collection” in the Federal
Register,53 requesting that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review and clear a
proposed multiple rifle sales reporting requirement by January 5, 2011.54 However, this review is
still under way and, to date, ATF has not received OMB clearance to implement this reporting
requirement. 55
ATF also maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace
Submission System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement
authorities. By late 2009, ATF had deployed eTrace technology to an additional nine U.S.
consulates in Mexico. From calendar years 2007-2009, ATF traced more than 69,800 firearms for
Mexican authorities, the majority of which appear to have a nexus to the United States.56
During his address to the Joint Meeting of Congress on May 20, 2010, Mexican President
Calderón asked for increased U.S. cooperation in reducing the illegal flow of weapons across the
Southwest border. In particular, he asked Congress to ensure the enforcement of current gun laws
as well as to consider a reinstatement of an assault weapons ban.57 Some argue that reinstating a
ban on certain types of weapons may help curb the flow of these weapons into the hands of DTOs
and their affiliated gangs and may subsequently reduce the level or severity of violence currently
seen in Mexico. Others, however, argue that the DTOs will ultimately circumvent any such
measures in order to procure the weapons they desire from U.S. sources or obtain them from
other countries.
Money Laundering/Bulk Cash Smuggling
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each
year.58 Much of the money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is
51
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF's Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, pp. iii-v, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
52
Ibid., p. ix.
53
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, "60-Day Emergency Notice of
Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles," 76 Federal
Register 79021, December 17, 2010.
54
Under the multiple rifle sales reporting initiative, federal firearms licensees (FFLs) operating in Southwest border
states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) would be required to report to ATF whenever they make multiple
sales or other dispositions of more than one rifle within five consecutive business days to an unlicensed person. Such
reporting would be limited to firearms that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22
caliber, and (3) are capable of accepting a detachable magazine. See ATF, News Release, “Acting Director Announces
Demand Letters for Multiple Sales of Specific Long Guns in Four Border States,” December 20, 2010.
55
James V. Grimaldi, “White House Delays Gun Reporting Requirement Along Mexican Border,” Washington Post,
February 4, 2011.
56
Data is from ATF's Violent Crime Analysis Branch (VCAB), which is housed in its National Tracing Center.
57
Mexican President Felipe Calderon, “Joint Meeting to Hear an Address by His Excellence Felipe Calderon Hinojosa,
President of Mexico,” Congressional Record, May 20, 2010, p. H3663. For more information on the assault weapons
ban, see archived CRS Report RL32585, Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban, by William J. Krouse.
58
DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
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laundered to Mexico through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling (the most common
method), the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), wire transfers, and prepaid stored value
cards. Illicit funds are also placed in financial institutions, cash-intensive front businesses, or
money services businesses. The proceeds may then be used by DTOs and other criminal groups to
acquire weapons in the United States and to corrupt law enforcement and other public officials.
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation
Firewall has resulted in 999 arrests and 5,123 seizures totaling more than $494 million.59 U.S.
efforts against money laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the
federal level as well, as experts have recommended. 60 In December 2009, for example, ICE
opened a bulk cash smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies track and disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the GAO has identified several ways in
which CBP outbound inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash smuggling, particularly
those aimed at combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved. 61
The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A
recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX. 62enforcement efforts.51 It is important to note, however, that many state, local, and nonprofit
agencies also channel funds toward demand reduction.
Firearms Trafficking52
Many view illegal gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico as a significant factor in the
escalating drug trafficking-related violence in that country. To stem the flow of illegal guns, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has stepped up enforcement of
domestic gun control laws in the four Southwest border states under a program known as “Project
Gunrunner.” However, ATF’s efforts to reduce illegal gun trafficking have generated controversy
on two counts. First, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and ATF have obtained approval from
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for an information collection initiative under
which federally licensed gun dealers in Southwest border states would be required to submit
multiple sales reports on certain rifles, as a means of more readily identifying possible straw
purchasers and gun traffickers.53 Second, ATF is alleged to have allowed firearms to be
transferred to suspected straw purchasers.54 Then, either intentionally or unintentionally, ATF
allowed those suspected criminals or their associates to smuggle those firearms across the border,
in an effort to build more complex investigations designed to uncover and dismantle larger gun
trafficking conspiracies.55 Some of those firearms were implicated in the deaths of two U.S.
federal agents, and perhaps hundreds have been seized by authorities in Mexico. 56 If these
allegations should prove true, they have possibly serious international implications, for neither
DOJ nor ATF are reported to have informed their Mexican counterparts about these investigations
and the possibility that some of these firearms could be reaching their country.57
As the lead federal agency charged with regulating firearms, ATF administers and enforces laws
that are designed to prevent the illegal diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. While
the United States does not maintain a registry of firearms or firearm owners (except for
machineguns and destructive devices), ATF and federally licensed gun dealers maintain a
decentralized system of transaction records, through which ATF can sometimes trace a firearm
from its manufacturer or importer to its first private owner of record. Over the years, successful
firearm traces have generated leads in criminal investigations and have generated data that
illustrate wider trafficking trends and patterns.
To undergird Project Gunrunner, ATF developed and deployed a Spanish language version of its
eTrace program for Mexican authorities to submit trace requests electronically to the United
51
Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Budget - FY 2012 Funding Highlights,
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/12budget/fy12Highlight_Exec_Sum.pdf.
52
This section was drafted by William Krouse, Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy. For background
information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J.
Krouse.
53
U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for
Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines,” press release, July 11, 2011.
54
A “straw purchase” occurs when a person, who is otherwise eligible to purchase a firearm, purchases a firearm from
a federally licensed dealer for another person, who is either prohibited from possessing a firearm or does not want a
paper trail linking him to the purchased firearm.
55
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
56
Ibid.
57
Kim Murphy, “AK-47s At Death Scene Were Part of ATF Probe,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2011.
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States. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, from FY2007 through FY2010, ATF
processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities.58 A large, but unknown, percentage of
these trace requests involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the
United States for civilian markets.59 It should be underscored, however, that not all firearms
seized by Mexican authorities are traced, and such trace submissions are more likely made for
firearms believed to have originated in the United States, such as those with a U.S. manufacturing
or import stamp. Moreover, problems persist with regard to the quality, quantity, and timeliness of
firearms trace requests made by Mexican authorities and resultant data.60 Data on some firearms,
for example, were submitted several times. If previous tracing trends hold true, moreover, about a
quarter of trace requests failed because the firearm make, model, or serial numbers were
erroneously entered into the system. 61 It is also probable that ATF was only able to identify the
first private firearm owner of record or other possible source in the United States in about a
quarter of these trace requests.
In November 2010, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released an evaluation of
Project Gunrunner.62 While the OIG was somewhat critical of ATF’s eTrace program for yielding
few “usable investigative leads,”63 the OIG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to develop a
reporting requirement for multiple long gun sales because Mexican DTOs have demonstrated a
marked preference for rifles capable of accepting high-capacity magazines.64 In the past,
published ATF trace data have shown that many of these rifles were semiautomatic versions of
the AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles that were produced for civilian markets in the United States. In
addition, the OIG recommended that ATF focus its investigative efforts on more complex
criminal conspiracies involving high-level traffickers rather than on low-level straw purchasers.
In December 2010, DOJ and ATF requested that OMB approve a “60-day emergency notice of
information collection” by January 5, 2011 under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. §
3507).65 Under this proposed initiative, ATF would require federally licensed gun dealers to report
whenever they make multiple disposals of one or more rifles within five consecutive business
days to an unlicensed person. Such reporting would be limited to firearms that are (1)
semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22 caliber, and (3) capable of
accepting a detachable magazine. Several Members of Congress strongly opposed the proposal. 66
58
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking,” April 2011.
It is highly probably that most of these firearms were illegally smuggled into Mexico, because the Mexican
government only authorizes a relatively small number of firearms to be legally imported for civilian markets.
60
Colby Goodman, Update on U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Mexico Institute, April 2011, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/
Goodman%20Update%20on%20US%20Firearms%20to%20Mexico.pdf
61
Ibid.
62
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
63
Ibid, p. 73.
64
Ibid, p. 38.
65
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of
Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 75 Federal
Register 79021, December 17, 2010.
66
Congressional Documents and Publications, “Rehberg Leads Bipartisan Letter to ATF Questioning New Firearm
Dealer Regulations,” Representative Denny Rehberg (R-MT) News Release, December 23, 2010. On February 19,
2011, the House adopted an amendment to the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) that would
have prohibited ATF from implementing that requirement. While the House passed H.R. 1, the Senate rejected this bill
on March 9, 2011, for budgetary considerations that went well beyond concerns about this policy rider. Meanwhile, the
(continued...)
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They maintain that if Congress authorized multiple handgun sales reporting in statute in 1986,
then it is incumbent upon ATF to request similar statutory authority from Congress for multiple
rifles sales reporting. While OMB initially denied ATF emergency approval, it approved this
information collection request on July 11, 2011.67 In addition, instead of the of the one-year
“pilot” period originally requested by ATF, OMB approved the information collection request for
a three-year period (through July 31, 2014).68 Opponents of this initiative quickly responded. On
July 12, 2011, Representative Denny Rehberg successfully amended the FY2012 Commerce,
Justice, Science Appropriations bill in full committee markup to prohibit ATF from implementing
its information collection initiative by a vote of 25 to 16.
In February 2011, ATF and Project Gunrunner came under renewed congressional scrutiny for a
Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious. ATF whistleblowers have
alleged to Members of Congress that suspected straw purchasers were allowed to amass relatively
large quantities of firearms as part of long-term gun trafficking investigations.69 As a
consequence, some of these firearms are alleged to have “walked,” meaning that they were
trafficked to gunrunners and other criminals before ATF moved to arrest the suspects and seize all
of their contraband firearms.70 Two of these firearms—AK-47 style rifles—were reportedly found
at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian
Terry was shot to death.71 Questions, moreover, have been raised about whether a firearm—an
AK-47 style handgun—that was reportedly used to murder U.S. ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata
and wound Special Agent Victor Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by
a subject of a Houston, TX-based ATF Project Gunrunner investigation.72 Legislators in both the
United States and Mexico have voiced their concern about these allegations. 73 U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder has called upon the DOJ Inspector General to conduct a third evaluation of
Project Gunrunner.74
On June 14, 2011, Representative Darrell E. Issa and Senator Charles E. Grassley issued a joint
staff report on Operation Fast and Furious,75 in which it is chronicled that ATF line supervisors
(...continued)
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10) does not include
a similar rider.
67
U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for
Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines,” press release, July 11, 2011; Evan Perez, “U.S.
News: New Rules on Border Gun Sales,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2011.
68
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last 30
Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control
Number: 1140-0100, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain;jsessionid=9f8e89cb30d6399089b4c8ac4da993b6c0e60ddbeff2.e34ObxiKbN0Sci0SbhaSa3aLchr0n6jAmlj
Gr5XDqQLvpAe.
69
James v. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post, February 2, 2011.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Dennis Wagner, “Gun Shop Told ATF Sting Was Perilous,” Arizona Republic, April 15, 2011, p. A1.
74
Jerry Seper, “ATF Knew Risks in Border Operation; Instructed Arizona Gun Dealer To Engage in ‘Suspicious Sales’
Despite Concerns,” Washington Times, April 15, 2011, p. 5.
75
U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents,
prepared for Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform & Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2011, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Reports/ATF_Report.pdf.
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became increasingly concerned when they witnessed hundreds of firearms being illegally
transferred during surveillance operations, but were reportedly directed not to arrest the suspects
and interdict those firearms. Those agents contend that this was a questionable departure from
past investigative practices. On June 15, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held a hearing on these matters. Representative Issa, Chairman of that
committee, expressed his concern that DOJ had not been entirely cooperative with his
committee’s efforts to investigate how some of those firearms found their way to crime scenes in
Mexico and on the Southwest border. Following the hearing, on June 29, 2011, Representative
Elijah E. Cummings, the committee’s ranking minority member, issued a report and held a forum,
during which the minority explored issues raised by some of those same ATF line supervisors,
who had suggested during the House hearing that the penalties for firearm straw purchases under
current law are arguably not stringent enough. The minority also discussed other gun control
proposals related to gun shows, semiautomatic assault weapons, sniper rifles, and additional
penalties for gun trafficking offenses. 76
Money Laundering/Bulk Cash Smuggling
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each
year.77 Much of the money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is
laundered to Mexico through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling. While bulk cash
smuggling has been a prominent means by which criminals move illegal profits from the United
States into Mexico, they have increasingly turned to stored value cards to move money. With
these cards, criminals are able to avoid the reporting requirement under which they would have to
declare any amount over $10,000 in cash moving across the border. Current federal regulations
regarding international transportation only apply to monetary instruments as defined under the
Bank Secrecy Act.78 Of note, stored value cards are not considered monetary instruments under
current law.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, intending to define “stored value” as “prepaid access”
and to implement regulations regarding the recordkeeping and suspicious activity reporting
requirements for prepaid access products and services. 79 The proposed rule would not, however,
76
U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Minority Staff Report, Outgunned: Law
Enforcement Agents Warn Congress They Lack Adequate Tools to Counter Illegal Firearms Trafficking, 112th Cong.,
1st sess., June 30, 2011, available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
OUTGUNNED%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf. On July 15, 2011, Representative Carolyn
B. Maloney introduced the Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 2554). Original
cosponsors included Representative Cummings and Representative Carolyn McCarthy.
77
DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
78
31 U.S.C. § 5312 defines a monetary instrument as “(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments,
bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and
(C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331 , checks, drafts,
notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not
in bearer form.”
79
U.S. Department of the Treasury, FinCEN, “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank
Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” 75 Federal Register, pp.
36589-36608, June 28, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-15194.pdf.
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directly address whether stored value or prepaid access cards would be subject to current
regulations regarding the international transportation of monetary instruments. Even if FinCEN
were to implement regulations requiring individuals leaving the United States to declare stored
value, GAO has identified several challenges that would remain.80 These challenges relate to law
enforcement’s ability to detect the actual cards and to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate
stored value on cards; travelers’ abilities to remember the amount of stored value on any given
card; and law enforcement’s ability to determine where illegitimate stored value is physically held
and subsequently freeze and seize the assets.
Aside from bulk cash smuggling and stored-value cards, Mexican traffickers move and launder
money by using digital currency accounts, e-businesses that facilitate money transfers via the
Internet, online role-playing games or virtual worlds that enable the exchange of game-based
currencies for real currency, and mobile banking wherein traffickers have remote access—via cell
phones—to bank and credit card accounts as well as prepaid cards.81 The proceeds may then be
used by DTOs and other criminal groups to acquire weapons in the United States and to corrupt
law enforcement and other public officials.
Countering financial crimes—including money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—is one
effort outlined by the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBCS).82 To curb
the southbound flow of money from the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, the SWBCS
includes several goals: stemming the flow of southbound bulk cash smuggling, prosecuting the
illegal use of MSBs and electronic payment devices, increasing targeted financial sanctions,
enhancing multilateral/bi-national collaboration, and empirically assessing the money laundering
threat.83
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This operation was reinitiated in January 2010, and between January 2010 and April 2011, Operation Firewall resulted
in eight arrests and the seizure of $6 million in U.S. currency.84 U.S. efforts against money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the federal level as well, as
experts have recommended. 85 In December 2009, for example, ICE opened a bulk cash
smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies track and
disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the GAO has identified several ways in which CBP outbound
inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash smuggling, particularly those aimed at
combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved. 86
80
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, October 2010, pp. 48 – 49.
81
Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, p.
161, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Farah.pdf.
82
ONDCP, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11/
swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pdf. Herein after, SWBCS, 2011. The SWBCS is implemented by the Director of
National Drug Control Policy, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement as well as the DOJ
Office of the Deputy Attorney General.
83
Ibid., pp. 31 – 36.
84
U.S. Embassy, “Fact Sheet: Combating Money Laundering,” April 2011.
85
Farah, op. cit.
86
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
(continued...)
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The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A
recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX.87 Information provided from studies such as these may
help inform policy makers and federal law enforcement personnel and assist in their decisions
regarding where to direct future efforts against money laundering.
Beyond Mérida: the New Bilateral Security Strategy
One of the most prominent criticisms of the Mérida Initiative has been its focus on technology
transfers, as some believe the plan has thus far neglected to provide adequate attention to capacity
building efforts and institutional reforms within Mexico. Experts have argued that a post-Mérida
strategy must seek to better address the weak civilian judicial and law enforcement institutions in
Mexico while also addressing underlying societal problems, such as poverty and widespread
corruption, that have allowed the drug trade to flourish. As such, the development of the new
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation strategy has focused heavily on judicial reform and
community building efforts.
With the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual in August 2009 and as88
As part of the FY2011
budget preparation process, U.S. and Mexican officials began to revise the
strategic framework
underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. After several months of
consultations, the
Obama and Calderón governments agreed to a new strategy, which has been
called “Beyond
Mérida,” that broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on institutionbuilding
institution-building than on technology and equipment transfers. The Obama Administration outlined the
59
Email from DHS official, February 7, 2011.
Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010.
61
GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010.
62
DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010, p. 4-2.
60
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strategy in its FY2011 budget request, which included $310 million for Mérida-related programs
in Mexico. 63 The Administration did not formally announce the new strategy until the Mérida
High-Level Consultative Group meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The State
Department has since indicated that it intends to extend Mérida assistance beyond 2012, when
President Calderón leaves office, and to increase U.S. support for Mexican state and local
governments.64 The four pillars of the strategy are discussed below.
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized
outlined the strategy in its FY2011 budget request, which included $310 million for Méridarelated programs in Mexico. The Administration did not formally announce the new strategy until
the Mérida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The State
Department has since indicated that it intends to extend Mérida assistance beyond 2012, when
President Calderón leaves office, and to increase support for Mexican states and municipalities.89
The U.S. and Mexican governments have remained committed to the Mérida Initiative under its
new strategy despite recent tensions that have emerged in the bilateral relationship. President
Obama welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a two-day state visit on May 19,
2010, during which the leaders pledged to continue working together to combat the organized
criminal groups that traffic drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash into Mexico.
After a March 3, 2011 meeting at the White House, President Obama and President Calderón
again vowed to bolster bilateral security cooperation. This public display of unity occurred even
as bilateral relations were being tested by several recent events. U.S.-Mexican relations have
reportedly been strained by the aforementioned shooting of two U.S. ICE agents working in
(...continued)
Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73.
87
DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010.
88
David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011.
Shirk maintains that the $200 million per year that the United States has provided in economic assistance to Colombia
has been crucial to consolidating the security improvements that have been made in that country. He recommends
increasing U.S. development assistance to Mexico.
89
U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Mérida and Post-Mérida, June 11, 2010.
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Mexico, one of whom was killed; the March 2011 resignation of the U.S. Ambassador Carlos
Pascual;90 and by the aforementioned “Fast and Furious” gunrunning scandal. 91
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of
Organized Crime
The Calderón government has, until recently, focused most of its efforts on dismantling the power
of drug trafficking organizations. To that end, the government has conducted joint police-military
operations to arrest DTO leaders, investigated and indicted public officials suspected of collusion,
and begun to go after the DTOs’ illicit assets.6592 A significant percentage of U.S. assistance
appropriated during the first phase of the Mérida Initiative has been obligated to purchase
equipment to support those efforts, including $590.5 million worth of aircraft and helicopters.
The Mexican government has increasingly begun to conceptualize the DTOs as for-profit
corporations. Consequently, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has begun to focus more
attention on disrupting the criminal proceeds used to finance DTOs’ operations. These efforts, as
well as increased intelligence-sharing and cross-border law enforcement operations and
investigations (such as those that have occurred in areas around Nogales, Arizona66AZ93) have been
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation.
One question that may arise for policy makers as they review the Administration’s proposal for
continued fundingcurrent and
future budget requests for the Mérida Initiative is whether proposed funding would be used to expand
expand existing bilateral partnerships or whether it would be used to establish new partnerships. The
The answer to this question may depend on the effectiveness of current partnerships, as well as
whether new partnerships are needed to address emerging law enforcement challenges. For
example, Mexico recently began conducting southbound inspections of commercial and noncommercial vehicles entering the country, deploying more canine detection teams, and employing
risk analysis techniques to improve its ability to detect and seize illicit goods.67 Under pillar three
of the new strategy (discussed below), the Mexican government may seek increased training from
CBP and ICE, as well as equipment to build a simulated/model port atfor the new customs training
academy that it is constructing in Querétaro. Should the DTOs begin to employ new weapons,
63
There is a steep decline in “counternarcotics” assistance in the FY2011 budget request. The President’s budget
requests $78 million for counternarcotics programs in Mexico under INCLE in FY2011, which is a $115.5 million
decrease below the FY2010 estimated allocation by the State Department.
64
U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Mérida and Post-Mérida, June 11, 2010.
65
in Querétaro. Should the Mexican Congress enact proposed legislation to create a border police
unit within the SSP, that unit could seek increased U.S. support as well. If the DTOs continue to
employ new weapons, such as grenades and car bombs, specific training to combat those new
threats could be needed.
Also, as the DTOs increasingly evolve into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a partial result
of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts have also urged both
90
Prior to his resignation, Ambassador Pascual was criticized by Presidentg Calderón for the comments he made about
deficiencies in Mexico’s antidrug efforts in confidential diplomatic cables that were leaked to the press. Denise
Dresser, “U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ousted ‘For Doing his Job,” Miami Herald, April 18, 2011.
91
“Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” Investor’s Business Daily, May 9, 2011, p. A16.
92
The Mexican Congress has recently enacted an asset forfeiture law. The Mexican government has also imposed
limits on the amount of U.S. dollars that individuals can exchange or deposit each month. “Mexico Targets Dirty
Dollars,” BBC News, June 15, 2010.
6693
CBP and the Mexican Federal Police within the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) have been conducting parallel
patrols along the Arizona border since September 2009. On February 18, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano signed an
agreement to expand that type of cooperation with the SSP. In addition, ICE, CBP, and the Mexican Attorney General’s
Office (PGR) have had an agreement in place that has enabled the PGR to prosecute drug smuggling cases that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Arizona declines to prosecute. That program is now being extended to El Paso.
67
CRS telephone briefing with Mexican Customs Official, June 17, 2010.
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such as grenades or car bombs (as occurred in Ciudad Juárez on July 15, 2010), specific training
to combat those new threats could be needed.
Also, as the DTOs increasingly evolve into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a partial result
of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts have also urged both
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
governments to focus more on combating other types of organized crime, such as human
kidnapping,
human trafficking and alien smuggling.6894 Some may therefore question whether the funding provided
provided under the Mérida Initiative will be used to address all forms of transnational organized
crime.
Examples of current U.S.-Mexico law enforcement partnerships are discussed in
Appendix B.
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico
Many security experts maintain that the Mexican government needs to focus more on addressing
the country’s weak law enforcement and judicial institutions. Federal police reform is well
underway, but serious questions remain as to when and how the federal police will take over the
anti-drug functions currently being carried out by the Mexican military.69 President Calderón has
indicated that the military will remain engaged in public security functions through the end of his
term in 2012. Another major challenged will be to expand police reform efforts to the state and
municipal level, possibly through the establishment of state level unified police commands. Some
Mérida funding is being used to extend U.S.-funded police training and prison reform efforts to
states and municipalities, beginning with Ciudad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua.
With impunity rates hovering around 98%,7095 experts maintain that it is crucial for Mexico to
implement the judicial reforms passed in the summer of 2008 and to focus on fighting corruption
at all levels of government. In order for Mexico to transition its criminal justice system to an
accusatorial system with oral trials by 2016, some argue that U.S.-funded judicial training
programs, some of which are just getting started, may have to be significantly expanded. 7196 Others
also maintain that the country’s
overcrowded federal and state prisons, whose inmate populations
have grown partially as a result
of increasing drug-related arrests and more frequentthe use of pretrial detentions, merit increased attention.72
68
Edgardo Buscaglia, a Mexican expert in organized crime, has estimated that between 52 and 55% of the illicit profits
earned by Mexican organized criminal groups now come from illicit activities other than drug trafficking. Dolia
Estévez, “Juárez: El Futúro de México?” Poder 360, March 12, 2010.
69
On April 8, 2010, Mexican military forces began to withdraw from Ciudad Juarez, leaving primary security
responsibilities to 5,000 federal police. The Federal Police opened a new Federal Police Command Center in Ciudad
Juárez to coordinate interagency security efforts in the city and share intelligence with the Federal Police Intelligence
Center in Mexico City. If this transition from military to federal police control goes smoothly, it could serve as a model
for other cities and states to replicate. Embassy of Mexico in Washington, DC, “Fact Sheet: Federal Police Takes
Control of Security in Ciudad Juárez,” April 2010.
70pre-trial detentions, merit increased attention. 97
Reforming the Police
Police corruption has presented additional challenges to the campaign against DTOs in Mexico.
In October 2008, an elite unit within the Attorney General’s Office for Special Investigations of
Organized Crime (SIEDO) was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive
information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 officials fired or arrested.98 In November
2008, the former head of SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a DTO. The
former investigative agency within the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), the Federal Agency of
Investigations (AFI), which was created in 2001, was, by 2005, widely criticized for corruption,
94
Edgardo Buscaglia, a Mexican expert in organized crime, has estimated that between 52 and 55% of the illicit profits
earned by Mexican organized criminal groups now come from illicit activities other than drug trafficking. Dolia
Estévez, “Juárez: El Futúro de México?” Poder 360, March 12, 2010.
95
In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. This figure is widely cited, see, for
example, Guillermo Zepeda, Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, Center of Research for Development
(CIDAC), Mexico City, August 2009, p. 9.
7196
Eric L. Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May
2010.
7297
Federal police reform in Mexico began in 2008. Between FY2008 and FY2010, some $14 million in Mérida
assistance has been set aside for providing “technical assistance in prison management.”
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Reforming the Police
Police corruption has presented additional challenges to the campaign against DTOs in Mexico.
In October 2008, an elite unit within the PGR’s Office for Special Investigations of Organized
Crime (SIEDO) was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive information about
antidrug activities, with at least 35 officials fired or arrested.73 In November 2008, the former
head of SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a DTO. The former
investigative agency within the PGR, the Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI), which was
created in 2001, was, by 2005, widely criticized for corruption, and largely disbanded in June
2009.74were set aside for providing “technical assistance in prison management.”
98
Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
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and largely disbanded in June 2009.99 Corruption has also plagued federal, state, and municipal
police forces.
President Calderón has taken steps to reform Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal police forces
by enhancing police training at the federal level, creating a national database through which
police can share information and intelligence, and accelerating implementation of a national
police registry.75100 Calderón initially proposed the creation of one unified federal police force under
under the SSP, but two laws passed in 2009 created a Federal Police (FP) force under the SSP and a
a Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) force under the PGR to replace the discredited AFI, both with
some investigative functions. 76101 It took the Mexican government another year to issue regulations
delineating the roles and responsibilities of these two new police entities.
Whereas initiatives to recruit, train, and equip the FP under the SSPSecretariat for Public Security
(SSP) have rapidly advanced (with
support from the Mérida Initiative), efforts to build the PGR’s
police forces (the PFM) have
lagged behind. According to the State Department, Mérida funding
will support specialized
training courses to improve federal police investigations, intelligence
collection and analysis, and
anti-money laundering capacity, as well as the construction of
regional command and control
centers.77102 The Calderón government has also sought U.S.
technical assistance in developing inservicein-service evaluations and internal investigative units to
prevent and punish police corruption and
human rights abuses. Mérida assistance has recently
begun to support the PFM as well as the FP,
but the success of U.S.-funded efforts could be
hindered without a clear division of labor between
the two entities and guidance on how they will
collaborate in investigating and developing cases
with prosecutors from the PGR.
Thus far, state and local police reform has lagged behind federal police reform efforts. In
September 2009 October
2010, the Calderón government put forthsubmitted a proposal to reform article 115 of the
Mexican Mexican
Constitution in order to have the country’s roughly 2,022 municipal police forces
absorbed by
state-level police agencies that would then coordinate their efforts with the SSP.78
73
Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
103 Mexico’s 2011
budget includes funding for its implementation, which is moving forward in some states, but the
proposal has encountered significant opposition in the Mexican Congress.104 Proponents of the
reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the SSP and bring efficiency,
standardization, and better trained and equipped police to municipalities. Skeptics argue that
police corruption has been a major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system,
99
Robert E. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds., Police and Public Security in Mexico, San Diego, CA: University
Readers, 2010, p. 228.
75100
A State Department report submitted to congressional appropriators on April 2, 2010, as required by the Joint
Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, described Mexico’s national police registry, which was started in 2001, as now
being “fully functional,” but stated that “not all [Mexican] states and municipalities have permanent, real-time
connectivity to the system.” The State Department plans to devote up to $8.8 million in Mérida funding to enhance the
registry and make it available across the country. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Mexican Federal Registry of
Police Personnel, April 2, 1010.
76101
Daniel Sabet, Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010.
77, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Sabet.pdf
102
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Mérida Initiative Spending Plan for Mexico, June 10, 2010.
78
103
In order to take effect, the measure would have to be approved by the Mexican Congress and then a majority of the
(continued...)
74
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Mexico’s National Security Council has approved the proposal and the 2011 budget includes
funding for its implementation, but the proposal has encountered significant opposition in the
Mexican Congress.79 Proponents of the reform maintain that it would improve coordination with
the SSP and bring efficiency, standardization, and better trained and equipped police to
municipalities. Skeptics argue that police corruption has been a major problem at all levels of the
Mexican policing system, state legislatures, a process which could take several months to a year or more.
104
Melissa Pitts, Mexico Update: Addressing Police Reform and Climate Changes, Council of the Americas, December
2, 2010.
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including the state and federal police, and argue that there is a role for
municipal police who are
trained to deal with local issues. They urge the Mexican government to
Regardless of whether the aforementioned proposal moves forward, many analysts have urged the
Mexican government to implement the vetting and certification procedures for state and local
police that were codified in
the January 2009 public security law; strengtheningstrengthen the National System of Public Security,
which is overseesPublic
Security System (SNSP), which is overseeing state and local police reform efforts; and continue
rewarding state and
municipal units whose officers meet certain standards with federal subsidies.
The SNSP recently reported that just 9.2% of Mexican police have met the professional standards
established in the 2009 law and only one third of Mexican states were on track to ensure that their
police forces meet the law’s standards by January 2013.105
The outcome of the aforementioned reform effort could have implications for U.S. intensionsinitiatives to
expand Mérida assistance to state and municipal police forces, which is already planned foroccurring in the
state of Chihuahua.80 Some have urged the106 The U.S. and Mexican governments to consider expanding
are expanding the training programs
developed for the SSP training institute at San Luis Potosi to support a
number of new regional police academies.81 new national police
academy that is now under construction in Puebla. Roughly $4 million in Mérida funds is
supporting the creation that police academy. Training courses offered to state and local police
might have a slightly different emphasis than those given to federal forces, with more emphasis
on, for example, community-oriented policing and dealing with street crime.
In order to complement these efforts, analysts have maintained that it is important to provide
assistance to civil society and human rights-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Mexico in order to strengthen their ability to monitor police conduct and provide input on
policing policies. Combined with internal control mechanisms and stringent punishments for
police misconduct, some maintain that citizen participation councils can have a positive impact
on police performance and police-community relations.
Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate, and an inability to secure
convictions. Recent pressPress reports citing data provided by the PGR maintain Attorney General’s Office (PGR) maintain
that the vast majority
of drug trafficking-related deaths that have occurred since President
Calderón took office have
not been prosecuted. 82107 At the same time, increasing arrests have
caused the prison population to
expand by approximately 8% in the past three years, with inmates
housed in facilities that are, on
average, 30% over capacity.83108 Many inmates (perhaps 40%84109) are awaiting their trials. Those
(...continued)
state legislatures, a process which could take several months to a year or more.
79
Melissa Pitts, Mexico Update: Addressing Police Reform and Climate Changes, Council of the Americas, December
2, 2010.
80
awaiting their trials. Those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by the
105
“Mexico Struggling to Reform Police Forces,” EFE, June 10, 2011; Antonio Baranda, “Avanzan 9 Estados en
Evaluación Policial,” Reforma, May 8, 2011.
106
The U.S. government plans to help Mexico develop a standard curriculum for state and municipal police officers; to
provide equipment, training, and advisors to state and municipal forces; and to help create a major crimes task force
comprised of federal and state police.
81
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Common Enemy, Common Struggle: Progress in U.S.Mexican Efforts to Defeat Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 18, 2010.
82107
“Cárteles Perturban al Sistema Carcelario,” El Universal, June 18, 2010.
83108
Silvia Otero, “No Investigan 95% de Muertes en ‘Guerra,’” El Universal, June 21, 2010.
84109
Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2010, available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010.
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suspected of involvement in organized criminal activity can be held by the authorities for 40 days
without access to legal council, with a possible extension of another 40
days.85110
In June 2008, President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of
Congress and Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform,
Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a
closed-door process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are
expected to adopt additional means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make it
more flexible and efficient thereby relieving some of the pressure on the country’s prison system.
Implementing these judicial reforms has brought with it major challenges, including the need to
revise revise
federal and state criminal procedure codes (CPCs), build new courtrooms, retrain current
legal legal
professionals, update law school curricula, and improve forensic technology.
Two and a half years into the reform process, implementation has advanced further in many states
than at the federal level.Implementation of judicial reform has advanced in many states, but experts maintain that “the
lack of any serious movement [to implement judicial reforms] at the federal level sends an
unfortunate signal that reform is not a priority.”111 The Mexican Congress has yet to approve a
new federal CPC, a key
element needed to guide both federal and state reform efforts. Prior to
2008, six states had already
adopted judicial reforms, many with assistance from USAID, while
three others had approved but
not yet implemented state-level reforms. 86112 In January 2011, the
federal commission tasked with
monitoring implementation of judicial reforms at the state and
federal level reported that eight
states have implemented the reforms and three more states are
scheduled to do so in 2011. The
commission’s goal is for all 32 states to have approved the
minimum legal changes necessary to
comply with the reforms before President Calderón leaves
office. Its ability to spur reform efforts
have has reportedly been hindered, however, by budget
constraints and a limited ability to exert
pressure on other government entities such as the courts
and the PGR. 87113
From the beginning, many analysts had predicted that progress in advancing judicial reform in
Mexico was “likely to be very slow as capacity constraints and entrenched interests in the judicial
system delay any changes.”88114 Others expressed concerns that the Calderón government appeared
to be devoting more funding and political will towards modernizing the police than strengthening
the justice system (including the courts and the PGR).89 Some analysts questioned whether it
would be feasible to revamp the judicial system at a time when the government was under
pressure to get tough on organized crime since accountability and due process within the judicial
system are sometimes portrayed as impediments to law enforcement efforts.
85115 Some analysts questioned whether it
110
This practice, known as “arraigo” (pre-charge detention) first came into existence in the 1980s, and was formally
incorporated into the Mexican Constitution through a constitutional amendment passed in 2008 as a legal instrument to
fight organized crime. Its use has been criticized by several United Nations bodies, the Inter-American Commission for
Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and international and Mexican human rights organizations. For
more, see Janice Deaton, Arraigo and Legal Reform in Mexico, University of San Diego, June 2010.
86111
Andrew Selee and Eric L. Olson, Steady Advances, Slow Results: U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation After Two
Years of the Obama Administration, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2011.
112
Chihuahua, Mexico State, Morelos, Oaxaca, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas adopted reforms prior to 2008. As of that
time, Baja California, Durango, and Hidalgo had adopted but not yet implemented state-level reforms. Matthew
Ingraham, State-Level Judicial Reform in Mexico: The Local Progress of Criminal Justice Reforms, TBI Working
Paper, May 2010.
87113
David Shirk, Justice Reform in Mexico: Changes and Challenges in the Judicial Sector, Woodrow Wilson Center,
Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, April 2010.
88, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/
Shirk.pdf.
114
“Mexico Risk: Legal and Regulatory Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit-Risk Briefing, January 8, 2010.
89115
Eric L. Olson, Police Reform and Modernization in Mexico, 2009. Woodrow Wilson Center, September 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Brief%20on%20Police%20Reform%20and%20Modernization.pdf.
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would be feasible to revamp the judicial system at a time when the government was under
pressure to get tough on organized crime since accountability and due process within the judicial
system are sometimes portrayed as impediments to law enforcement efforts.
Despite these challenges, many analysts are hopeful that Mexico will be able to follow the
examples of countries like Chile and Colombia that have successfully transformed their judicial
systems. In order for that transformation to take place, Mexico would likely benefit from
increased training and technical assistance from the United States and other Latin American
countries. USAID has been supporting code reform, judicial exchanges, alternative dispute
resolution, and Citizen’s Participation Councils, as well as training justice sector operators in five
Mexican states since 2004. Using roughly $19 million of the Economic Support Funds (ESF)
appropriated thus far for the Mérida Initiative, USAID is now working comprehensively in seven
of Mexico’s 32 states. With $11.5 million in FY2010 supplemental funds, USAID will continue
and expand its justice sector reform at the state level.90116 However, at a time when Mexico is
supporting the reforms through significant in-kind financial investments, demand appears to be
outpacing USAID resources. Additional funding would enable USAID to deepen assistance to
target states and further expand into others committed to advancing the reforms. 91117 For its part,
DOJ is administering at least $19 million in State Department and USAID funding in the areas of
(1) prosecutorial capacity building; (2) strengthening the internal control systems of the SSP and
the PGR; (3) extradition training; (4) asset forfeiture; (5) forensics; and (6) witness protection.92118
Since no one, including the Mexican government, has published an estimate of how much it is
likely to cost to implement the 2008 reforms, the adequacy of Mexican and U.S. investments is
difficult to measure.
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border”
Policy makers have questioned not only what it means to have a 21st century border, but
specifically how this will enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat the drug trafficking
organizations and reduce the related violence. In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a
border is necessarily more complex than a physical line between two sovereign nations.
Consequently, the proposed 21st century border is based on (1) enhancing public safety via
increased information sharing, screenings, and prosecutions; (2) securing the cross-border flow of
goods and people; (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in
personnel, technology, and infrastructure; (4) engaging border communities in cross-border trade;
and (5) setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.93
Policy makers may question whether this combination of efforts aimed at creating a 21st century
border will simultaneously enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat organized crime and
prevent drug trafficking-related violence from spilling over into the United States.
90119
116
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mérida Initiative/Mexico,
November 9, 2010.
91117
USAID officials estimate that it would require $21 million in additional funding to establish a permanent presence in
in the seven states where it has already been working and $35 million to deal with the pending requests it has received.
USAID will receive $11.5 million in FY2010 supplemental funding to support judicial sector programs, including
prosecutorial training at the state level. Email from USAID official, December 16, 2010.
92118
U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and
Training (OPDAT), “OPDAT Mexico Mérida Initiative Resident Legal Advisor Program,” press release, April 2010.
That figure does not include funds from the FY2010 supplemental appropriations measure.
93119
U.S. Department of State, “United States - Mexico Partnership: A New Border Vision,” press release, March 23,
2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138926.htm.
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Policy makers may question whether this combination of efforts aimed at creating a 21st century
border will simultaneously enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat organized crime and
prevent drug trafficking-related violence from spilling over into the United States.
On May 19, 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing
the U.S.-Mexican border. 94120 To head this initiative, they have established a Twenty-First Century
Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC). On December 15, 2010, the ESC held its
inaugural meeting in Mexico City during which it adopted a bi-national action plan. The plan is
focused on: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment
programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo pre-clearance, and improving information sharing
among law enforcement agencies.95121 The ESC also issued a joint declaration on preventing border
violence, including the use of lethal force by either U.S. or Mexican law enforcement officers.96122
As part of the binational effort to modernize the border, three new ports of entry opened in 2010.
Both the United States and Mexico spend significant funds—outside of Mérida—related to border
security. Because border policies and practices have been different along the U.S. side of the
Southwest border and the Mexican side, each country’s goals in further developing the border
may necessarily differ as well. A related issue is whether funds appropriated under the revised
Mérida Initiative should be divided equally or equitably between border initiatives on the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border.
While policy makers may generally question what constitutes a “21st century border,” they may
more specifically question which aspects of this border will be mutually beneficial to both U.S.
and Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. Although a key goal of the Mérida Initiative is to
combat the DTOs and their criminal activities, the U.S. border strategy does not discriminate
between combating drug trafficking-related illicit activities and other illegal behaviors along the
border. The current U.S. border strategy strives to secure and manage the U.S. border through
obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying
and disrupting transnational criminal organizations. 97123 As such, it remains to be seen whether
enhancements to the border will specifically support the Mérida Initiative’s goal of combating the
DTOs or whether the funds put toward border development will result in a general strengthening
of the security of the border—and, as a byproduct, aid in disrupting drug trafficking-related
activities.
94
120
The White House, “Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The Government Of The
United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/declaration-government-united-states-america-and-government-unitedmexican-states-c. As . As
mentioned, U.S. - Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida
Initiative. This ESC is
one of the most recent developments in the bilateral cooperation.
95121
A draft version of the binational plan is available at: http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/plan-eng.pdf.
96122
“Mexico-US Joint Statement on the Prevention of Violence in the Border Region,” press release,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/fronteriza-eng.pdf.
97123
For more information on the U.S. border strategy, see CRS Report R41237, People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of
of U.S. Border Protection Policies, by Chad C. HaddalAlison Siskin. CRS was unable to locate an official Mexican border strategy for
comparison with the U.S. border strategy. For information on the roles of various U.S. agencies in border security, see
CRS Report RS21899, Border Security: Key Agencies and Their Missions, by Chad C. Haddal. For information on the
U.S. Border Patrol, see CRS Report RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Chad C.
Haddal.
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Northbound and Southbound Inspections98Inspections124
One element of concern regarding enhanced bilateral border security efforts is that of southbound
inspections of people, goods, vehicles, and cargo. In particular, both countries have
acknowledged a shared responsibility in fueling and combating the illicit drug trade. Policy
makers may question who is responsible for performing northbound and southbound inspections
in order to prevent illegal drugs from leaving Mexico and entering the United States and to
prevent dangerous weapons and the monetary proceeds of drug sales from leaving the United
States and entering Mexico. Further, if this is a joint responsibility, it is still unclear how U.S. and
Mexican border officials will divide the responsibility of inspections to maximize the possibility
of stopping the illegal flow of goods while simultaneously minimizing the burden on the
legitimate flow of goods and preventing the duplication of efforts.
In addition to its inbound/northbound inspections, the United States has undertaken steps to
enhance its outbound/southbound screening procedures. Currently, DHS is screening 100% of
southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, cash, and drugs. Also, as previously mentioned,
CBP scans license plates along the Southwest border with the use of automated license plate
readers (LPRs). As of April 2010, CBP operated 52 outbound LPR lanes at 16 Southwest border
crossings, and DHS officials indicate that this number will continue to increase. 99 In FY2010,
CBP is expected to deploy additional LPR equipment to more than 42 locations
along the Southwest border by the end of FY2011.125 In FY2010, Congress provided $20 million
for CBP to acquire Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) to
aid in southbound inspection
and processing of travelers and shipments. As of April 2010, CBP
had 117 large-scale NIIE systems at Southwest border ports of entry.1002011, Mérida funding had enabled 30 ion
scanner vapor tracers, 23 ZBV Backscatter Vans, 10 mobile X-Ray Minivans, and 2 Railroad
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems. 126
Historically, Mexican Customs had not served the role of performing southbound (or inbound)
inspections. As part of the revised Mérida Initiative, CBP is helping to establish a Mexican
Customs training academy to support professionalization and promote the Mexican Customs’ new
role of performing inbound inspections. Additionally, CBP is assisting Mexican Customs in
developing an investigator training program and, as of September 2010, had established 42 new
canine teamsApril 2011, had trained 58 canines and 44
handlers to assist with the inspections.101127
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption
Another point that policy makers may question regarding the strengthening of the Southwest
border is how to prevent the corruption of U.S. and Mexican border officials who are charged
with securing the border. On March 11, 2010, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration held a hearing on the corruption of U.S. border officials by Mexican DTOs. According
to testimony from the hearing, in FY2009, the DHS Inspector General opened 839 investigations
98of DHS employees. Of the 839 investigations, 576 were of CBP employees, 164 were of ICE
employees, 64 were of Citizen and Immigration Services (CIS) employees, and 35 were of
124
There is a dearth of open-source data that currently measures the extent of inbound and outbound inspections
performed by both the United States and Mexico along the Southwest border. Rather, existing data tends to address
seizures of drugs, guns, and money as well as apprehensions of suspects. Therefore, this section addresses current U.S.
and additional initiatives to bolster cross-border inspections.
99
Department of Homeland Security, “Testimony by Secretary Janet Napolitano, before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, on Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” press release, April 27, 2010,
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1272383936754.shtm.
100
Ibid.
101
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, CBP Canine Program Aids Government of Mexico, September 8, 2010,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/highlights/canine_graduation.xml.125
SWBCS, 2011, p. 77.
126
Embassy of Mexico, Fact Sheet: A 21st Century Border Vision, April 2011.
127
Ibid.
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of DHS employees. Of the 839 investigations, 576 were of CBP employees, 164 were of ICE
employees, 64 were of Citizen and Immigration Services (CIS) employees, and 35 were of
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees.102128 It is unknown, however, how many
of these cases involve alleged corruption by Mexican DTOs or how many involve suspected
corruption of DHS employees working along the Southwest border.
To date, the Administration’s proposal for a 21st century border has not directly addressed this
issue of corruption. Congress may consider whether preventing, detecting, and prosecuting public
corruption of border enforcement personnel should be a component of the border initiatives
funded by the Mérida Initiative. If the corruption is as pervasive as officials say,103129 resources
provided for new technologies and initiatives along the border may be diminished or negated by
corrupt border personnel. For instance, at the end of 2009, CBP was able to polygraph between 10
and 15% of applicants applying for border patrol positions, and of those who were polygraphed,
about 60% were found unsuitable for service. 104130 If this pattern holds true and 85%-90% of current
new hires were not subjected to a polygraph, anywhere between 51% and 54% of all CBP newhires may not be found suitable for service. Further, between October 1, 2004, and March 11,
2010, 103 CBP officers were arrested or indicted on “mission-critical corruption charges
including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering and conspiracy.”131 Congress may
Congress may decide to increase funding—as part of
or separately from Mérida funding—for the vetting of new
and current border enforcement
personnel.
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities
This pillar is a relatively new focus for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the overall goal of which is to build
strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence.
Programs will consist primarily of targeted efforts to 1) improve strategic planning and
communication to reduce risk factors to reduce risk factors that lead to crime/violence; 2)
improve the ability of subnational governments to collaboratively address community needs; and
3) prepare youth to be responsible members of their communities. Funding and implementation of
pillar four is primarily the responsibility of the Mexican government, with some support from
multilateral institutions like the World Bank. The Mexican government began its efforts under
pillar four in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, but has started to expand some social programs to other
cities. U.S.- Mexican efforts are focusing on pilot projects in Ciudad Juárez, but, with additional
funds, could potentially be expanded to other cities.
For the past few years, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, a city across the border from El Paso, Texas,
has been at the epicenter of Mexico’s drug trafficking-related violence and is now among the
world’s most violent cities. Violence has escalated as the Juárez and Sinaloa DTOs have battled
for control over the El Paso drug smuggling route or “plaza,” youth gangs have fought over local
102
build strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. It
includes existing programs in support of school-based “culture of lawfulness”132 courses, as well
as new “cultural of lawfulness” courses that are being taught to Federal Police and state police in
five northern border states. Pillar Four also includes ongoing Mérida-funded programs in the area
of demand reduction. Those programs are helping to create a network to connect Mexico’s 334
prevention and treatment centers, to develop curricula for drug counselors and volunteers at the
centers, and to help certify Mexican drug counselors.
128
See testimony by Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
103
129
See testimony by Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
104130
See testimony by James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
131
Ibid.
132
A “culture of lawfulness” may be defined as a culture in which the overwhelming majority of the population is
convinced that the rule of law offers the best long term chance of securing their rights and attaining their goals. Culture
of Lawfulness (CoL) programs aim to combine “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to educate all sectors of
society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Key sectors that CoL programs seek to involve include law
enforcement, security forces, and other public officials; the media; schools; and religious and cultural institutions.
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New programs under this pillar will consist primarily of targeted efforts to (1) improve strategic
planning and communication to reduce risk factors that lead to crime/violence; (2) help
subnational governments to collaboratively address community needs; and (3) prepare youth to be
responsible members of their communities. Funding and implementation of pillar four is
primarily the responsibility of the Mexican government, with some support from multilateral
institutions like the World Bank. The Mexican government began its efforts under pillar four in
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, but has started to expand some social programs to other cities. U.S.funded efforts are focusing on pilot projects in Ciudad Juárez, but, with additional funds, could
potentially be expanded to other cities.
For the past few years, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, a city across the border from El Paso, TX, has
been at the epicenter of Mexico’s drug trafficking-related violence and is now among the world’s
most violent cities. Violence has escalated as the Juárez and Sinaloa DTOs have battled for
control over the El Paso drug smuggling route or “plaza,” youth gangs have fought over local
drug distribution networks, and criminal groups have struggled against Mexican law enforcement
and military forces. The violence captured international attention after the massacre of 15
civilians, many of them teenagers, by armed gunmen at a private home in late January 2010, an
event which also sparked strong criticism in Mexico of President Calderón’s military-led drug
strategy. Mistrust between the citizens of Ciudad Juárez and government officials, as well as
amongst officials from different agencies and levels of the Mexican government had reportedly
reached an untenable level that was hindering law enforcement efforts.105133
In an attempt to heal those rifts and counter the escalating violence, President Calderón and his
top advisers began consulting with state and local officials to revise the government’s military-led
strategy for Ciudad Juárez. After those consultations, the Calderón government launched a new
“We Are All Juárez” strategy in mid-February, 2010, that includes significant federal government
investments in education, job training, and community development programs to help address
some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the violence. 106134 Critics argued that the
hastily conceived strategy concentrated too much on amplifying existing programs rather than
developing new ones to meet the particular needs of the Juárez community. More broadly, some
observers maintain that any social programs are likely to fail in Ciudad Juárez unless the security
situation and rampant corruption now plaguing the city are brought under control.107135 Possibly in
response to those concerns, efforts are being made to concentrate federal efforts in certain “safe
zones” that will enable the Juárez government to demonstrate to citizens the benefits that come
with successful government control over neighborhoods.
U.S. efforts in Ciudad Juárez have involved the expansion of some existing Mérida-funded
initiatives, such as school-based "“culture of lawfulness"” programs and demand reduction and
treatment services, as well as supporting some new initiatives. USAID has reprogrammed
existing funding, both Mérida and bilateral, to support an urban mapping project (Mérida) and an
at-risk youth program (non-Mérida) administered by international organizations with experience
working in the city. Some of USAID’s Mérida funding has also been dedicated to supporting
133
Eric L. Olson, Shattered Dreams and Restoring Hope: Organized Crime and Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Woodrow Wilson Center, February 22, 2010.
134
The Mexican government plans to implement 160 concrete policy actions that will involve government investments
of more than $3.4 billion pesos (roughly $274.0 million dollars). A progress report on how implementation of the
strategy is advancing is available in Spanish at http://www.todossomosjuarez.gob.mx/estrategia/avances.html.
135
Katherine Corcoran,” Mexico Program to Clean up Violence-Plagued Border City Ciudad Juárez has Long Way to
go,” Associated Press, January 3, 2011.
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social development projects in Ciudad Juárez. In April 2010, USAID launched a program by
which civic organizations in Ciudad Juárez could submit proposals to receive grants of up to
$100,000 to support community development projects. By October 2010, roughly 17 grants worth
roughly close to $1 million had been approved.108
USAID will also receive some136
USAID is receiving $14 million in FY2010 supplemental funding to implement pillar
four four
activities in Ciudad Juárez. Those activities may include: grant funding for crime prevention
programs; support for human rights NGOs; assistance to help civic organizations influence local
and state politics; municipal exchanges to share best practices in reducing violence; and, support
for the development of community crime prevention strategies. 109
105
Eric L. Olson, Shattered Dreams and Restoring Hope: Organized Crime and Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Woodrow Wilson Center, February 22, 2010.
106
The Mexican government plans to implement 160 concrete policy actions that will involve government investments
of more than $3.4 billion pesos (roughly $274.0 million dollars). A progress report on how implementation of the
strategy is advancing is available in Spanish at: http://www.todossomosjuarez.gob.mx/estrategia/avances.html.
107
Katherine Corcoran,” Mexico Program to Clean up Violence-Plagued Border City Ciudad Juárez has Long Way to
go,” Associated Press, January 3, 2011.
108
Email from USAID official, January 18, 2011.
109
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mérida Initiative/Mexico,
November 9, 2010.
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According to the Obama Administration’s FY2012 budget request, some of the $33.3 million in
ESF funds requested would be used to support pillar four activities in targeted areas.110
Issues
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative
Policy makers and analysts have debated how to measure the success of the Mérida Initiative. 111137
According to the Obama Administration’s FY2012 budget request, some of the $33.3 million in
ESF funds requested would be used to support pillar four activities in targeted areas.138
Issues
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative
Policy makers and analysts have debated how to measure the success of the Mérida Initiative. 139
How one evaluates the Mérida Initiative largely depends on how one has defined the goals of the
program. While the U.S. and Mexican governments’ long-term goals for the Mérida Initiative
may be similar, their short-term goals and priorities may be different. For example, both countries
may strive to ultimately reduce the overarching threat posed by the DTOs—a national security
threat to Mexico and an organized crime threat to the United States. However, as the 2012
elections approach, U.S. and Mexican goals may differ. Mexico may focus more on reducing drug
trafficking-related crime and violence, while the United States may place more emphasis on
aggressively capturing DTO leaders and seizing illicit drugs.
One basic measure by which Congress has evaluated the Mérida Initiative has been the pace at
which equipment has been delivered and trainings have been carried out. As previously
mentioned, a December 2009 GAO report identified several factors that had slowed the pace of
Mérida implementation. 112140 It is unclear whether more expeditious equipment deliveries to Mexico
may result in a more positive evaluation of Mérida because this is one of many metrics that may
be used for measuring success. Another means by which Mérida success may be measured is
through the impact of training programs—, such as the number of individuals completing each
course. If, for example, the speed of equipment deliveries or the number of Mexican officials
trained are used as benchmarks for success, it is unclear whether the Mérida Initiative may still be
considered a success if equipment is delivered and training programs are carried out, but the
136
Email from USAID official, January 18, 2011.
137
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mérida Initiative/Mexico,
November 9, 2010.
138
U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs FY2012.
139
See, for example, Andrew Selee, Success or Failure? Evaluating U.S.-Mexico Efforts to Address Organized Crime
and Violence, Center for Hemispheric Policy- Perspectives on the Americas Series, December 20, 2010.
140
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009.
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Mexican government is still unable to make significant inroads against drug trafficking
organizations and organized criminal groups.
U.S.-funded antidrug programs in source and transit countries (of which Mexico is both) have
also traditionally been evaluated by examining the number of DTO leaders arrested and the
amount of drugs and other illicit items seized, along with the price and purity of drugs in the
United States. The State Department included a list of similar performance measures for each
portion of the Mérida Initiative in its FY2008 supplemental spending plan.113141 As noted in the July
2010 GAO report that was previously discussed, the State Department has yet to update those
measures to reflect the new four-pillar strategy for Mérida.114142 In the Joint Explanatory Statement
to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress directed the State
Department to submit a report to congressional appropriators on progress that has been made thus
far in implementing the Mérida Initiative. The report, which was submitted on June 11, 2010,
continues to document progress in terms of the amount of equipment that has been delivered and
training courses that have been carried out, but does not include information on any other
performance indicators.
Nevertheless, State Department fact sheets and remarks have shown that, with respect to arrests
and seizures of some drugs (i.e., cocaine and methamphetamine), the Mérida Initiative may have
had some success. Arrests and seizures on both sides of the border have increased.115 U.S.
110
U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs FY2012.
111
See, for example, Andrew Selee, Success or Failure? Evaluating U.S.-Mexico Efforts to Address Organized Crime
and Violence, Center for Hemispheric Policy- Perspectives on the Americas Series, December 20, 2010.
112
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009.
113
For a complete list of those indicators, see U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008, pp. 16-39.
114
GAO 10-837.
115
U.S. Department of State, “United States-Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” press release, May 19,
(continued...)
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143 U.S.
officials have also highlighted the fact that cocaine availability and purity in United States has
been on a downward trend since 2006 as evidence of the success of Mérida and other U.S.-funded
antidrug efforts.116144
However, a principal challenge in assessing the success of Mérida is separating the results of
those efforts funded via Mérida from those efforts funded through other border security and
bilateral cooperation initiatives. The data available does not allow U.S. officials or analysts to
determine the success that can be directly attributed to Mérida. It is also important to note that
changesChanges in seizure data and drug prices may not be directly related to U.S.-Mexican efforts to
combat the DTOs. For instance, a decrease in drug seizures may be linked to a decrease in drug
production and transshipment across the Southwest border, a decrease in the number of border
enforcement officers available to search vehicles and people crossing the border, a shift in the
smuggling routes used by the DTOs, a diversification of DTO activities to rely upon other illegal
activities to generate income, or a success by the United States and Mexico in combating the drug
smuggling activities of
prices may not be directly related to U.S.-Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. It is equally
difficult to parcel out the reasons for periodic
fluctuations in drug prices and purity in the United States.
Many experts have argued that Mexican President Calderón needs to reduce drug traffickingrelated violence in order to recover popular support for his anti-drug efforts. Should a decrease in
drug trafficking-related deaths be used as an indicator of success for the Mérida Initiative, or is an
imminent decline in the violence unrealistic given other countries’ experiences combating
entrenched organized criminal groups? Studies have shown that violence tends to escalate after a
government launches a major law enforcement initiative against a DTO or other organized
criminal group. 117145 In addition to a decline in drug trafficking-related violence, others have
suggested that success would be evidenced by, among other things, increases in popular trust in
the police and courts
141
For a complete list of those indicators, see U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008, pp. 16-39.
142
GAO 10-837.
143
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Achievements,” press release, May 2011,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/16may/Law%20Enforcement%20May%202011%20Final.pdf.
144
ONDCP, 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, July 11, 2011.
145
International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence:
Evidence from a Scientific Review, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
the police and courts, and the return of a free press, particularly in parts of Mexico where attacks
on journalists have led to virtual self-censorship.118146
Still others, including U.S. officials, have maintained that the success of the Mérida Initiative may
be measured by a general increase in bilateral cooperation. Some officials have stated that the
increasing ability of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement to work collaboratively may be a
byproduct of enhanced cooperation fostered in part by Mérida.119147 For instance, the State
Department has cited the arrests and killings of nearly two-dozen high-profile DTO leaders that
have been made
since late 2009 as examples of the results of increased bilateral law enforcement
cooperation. 120 Another example of Mérida success—in the form of bilateral cooperation—cited
(...continued)
2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142019.htm.
116
NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010.
117
International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence:
Evidence from a Scientific Review, 2010.
118
Diana Villers Negroponte, Measuring Success in the Drug War: Criteria to Determine Progress in Mexico’s Efforts
to Defeat Narco-traffickers, The Brookings Institution, May 25, 2010.
119
Testimony by Roberta S. Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27,
2010.
120
U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa,” January 24, 2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
by the State
Another example of Mérida success—in the form of bilateral cooperation—cited by the State
Department is the high number of extraditions from Mexico to the United States: 107
in 2009 and
94 in 2010. As illustrated in Figure 2, however, these extraditions may be more a
reflection of
President Calderón’s commitment to combating the DTOs than of Mérida successes.
Extraditions Extraditions
began to increase before the Mérida Initiative was authorized in October 2007 and
before the first
funds obligated for equipment and training were realized in Mexico.
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States
1995–2010
Source: 1995—2006 data from U.S. Embassy of Mexico, U.S. - Mexico at a Glance: Law Enforcement at a Glance,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/eataglance_law.html. Data for 2007—2008 from the Trans-Border
Institute, Justice in Mexico, News Report January 2009, January 2009, http://www.justiceinmexico.org/news/pdf/
justiceinmexico-january2009news-report021709.pdf. Data for 2009 from the U.S. Department of State, “United
146
Diana Villers Negroponte, Measuring Success in the Drug War: Criteria to Determine Progress in Mexico’s Efforts
to Defeat Narco-traffickers, The Brookings Institution, May 25, 2010.
147
Testimony by Roberta S. Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
States - Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” press release, May 19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142019.htm. 2010 figures from electronic communication with U.S. Department of Justice.
Dealing with Increasing Drug Production in Mexico
Mexico is not only a transit country for Andean cocaine bound for the United States, but also a
major producer of cannabis (marijuana), opium poppy— (used to produce heroin), and
methamphetamine. In recent years, U.S. government estimates indicate that marijuana and opium
poppy cultivation in rural Mexico has expanded significantly. In 2009, estimated marijuana
production in Mexico rose to 12,00017,400 hectares, a 3545% increase over 2008 and the highest level
recorded since 1992. Similarly, as of September 2009, opium production had risen to 15,000
rose to 19,000 hectares, a 5031% increase over
2008.148 At the same time, despite Mexican government import
restrictions on precursor
chemicals, the production of methamphetamine in clandestine labs also
appears to have increased
significantly.121 149 Despite these trends, neither drug eradication nor
alternative development
programs have been a focus of Mérida Initiative programs to date.
121
U.S. Department of State, INCSR, March 2010. Press reports maintain that NDIC’s 2010 National
(continued...)
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
The Mexican government has engaged its military in drug crop eradication efforts since the
1930s, but personnel constraints have inhibited recent eradication efforts. Indeed, increases in
drug production have occurred as President Calderón has assigned more military forces to public
security functions, including anti-DTO operations, than to drug crop eradication efforts.122 As
Mexicans become increasingly wary of President Calderón’s strategy of using the military to
perform police functions, there may be calls for the troops to return to more traditional antidrug
functions. Similarly, if drug production in Mexico continues to expand, particularly production of
the potent and dangerous “black tar” variety of heroin, U.S. policy makers may decide to direct
some Mérida assistance to support eradication efforts in Mexico.
The Mexican government has not traditionally provided support for alternative development even
though many drug-producing regions of the country are impoverished rural areas where few licit
employment opportunities exist. Alternative development programs have traditionally sought to
provide positive incentives for farmers to abandon drug crop cultivation in lieu of farming other
crops, but may be designed more broadly to assist any individuals who collaborate with DTOs out
of economic necessity. In Colombia, recent studies have found that the combination of jointly
implemented eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the
independent application of any one of these three strategies.123150 Despite those findings, alternative
development often takes years to show results and requires a long-term government and donor
commitment to promoting rural development, two factors which may lessen its appeal as a policy
tool for Mexico.
148
149
2010 figures are not yet available. U.S. Department of State, INCSR, March 2011.
Ibid.
150
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Joel M. Jutkowitz, Sergio Rivas, et al. Assessment of the Implementation of the United States
Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, report produced for review by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), April 17, 2009.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida
Initiative Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative
Funding
Both the Mexican police and military have poor human rights records. According to the State
Department’s human rights report covering 20092010, there have been credible reports of police
involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture.124151 There has also been
increasing concern that the Mexican military, which has had less human rights training and is less
accountable to civilian authorities than the police, is committing human rights abuses as it is
increasingly tasked with carrying out public security functions.125152 According to Mexico’s Human
Rights Commission (CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by the Mexico’s Department of
Defense increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,791 in 2009 before falling to 1,415 in 2010. The CNDH
also reported that 111 civilians were killed during federal police or army operations in 2010. 126
(...continued)
Methamphetamine Threat Assessment, which has yet to be released, contains evidence that methamphetamine is
increasingly available in the United States because of expanding production in Mexico. Charlie Savage and Michael R.
Gordon, “Administration Puts Off Release of a Drug Report,” New York Times, June 9, 2010.
122
INCSR, March 2010.
123
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Joel M. Jutkowitz, Sergio Rivas, et al. Assessment of the Implementation of the United States
Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, report produced for review by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), April 17, 2009.
124
U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, March 11, 2010.
125
See, for example, Jorge Rocha Quintero, “Public Security and Human Rights,” in Police and Public Security in
Mexico, edited by Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk. San Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010; Maureen Meyer,
Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez, Washington Office of Latin America/Centro Prodh, September 2010.
126
Statistics are available in annual reports of Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (CNDH), available at
(continued...)
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
153
In addition to expressing concerns about current human rights abuses, Mexican and international
human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and
police officials accountable for past abuses. On July 13, 2009, Human Rights Watch issued a
statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single member of the
military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”127 In November 2009, Mexican
Interior Minister Fernando Gomez Mont reported that, as of that time, one soldier had been
convicted of abuses during the Calderón Administration.128154 The Mexican army has since
created a
unit to handle citizen complaints about human rights abuses and announced that, as of late July
2010, a chief, an officer, and five soldiers have been convicted of abuse in military courts.129developed a website to
track cases of human rights abuses that are being handled in military courts. As of December
2010, one officer and seven soldiers had been convicted of abuses.155
Given these concerns, in 2008, Congress debated what type of human rights conditions should be
placed on Mérida assistance beyond the requirements in Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance
Act (FAA) of 1961. Section 620J of the FAA states that units of a foreign country’s security
forces are prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible
evidence” that such units have committed “gross violations of human rights.” In the end, the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of
Mérida funding, had softer human rights conditions than earlier House and Senate versions, in
large part because of Mexico’s objections that some of the conditions would violate its national
sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action
in four human rights areas:
1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Similar human rights conditions have been included in subsequent appropriations measures that
have funded the Mérida Initiative. In P.L. 110-252, the human rights conditions applied to 15% of
the funding for INCLE and FMF, or approximately $57 million dollars. In the FY2009 Omnibus
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the 15% conditions applied to all of the funding accounts but
(...continued)151
U.S. Department of State, 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011.
See, for example, Jorge Rocha Quintero, “Public Security and Human Rights,” in Police and Public Security in
Mexico, edited by Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk. San Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010; Maureen Meyer,
Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez, Washington Office of Latin America/Centro Prodh, September 2010.
153
Statistics are available in annual reports of Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (CNDH), available at
http://www.cndh.org.mx; “Ciento Once Civiles Ajenos a Guerra Contra Crimen Murieron en 2010 en México,” EFE,
January 27, 2011.
127154
Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/13/mexico-us-should-withhold-military-aid.
128
U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 11, 2010.
129.
155
Ignacio Alzaga. “Sedena se Abre al Escrutinio Público; Sube Quejas a Web.” Milenio. July 28, 2010.; U.S.
Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: Mexico, April 2011.
152
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
excluded amounts for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law
activities, which were earmarked at not less than $75 million, or roughly $33.75 million. In the
FY2009 Supplemental (P.L. 111-32), the conditions effectively only applied to the $160 million
in the INCLE account, or $24 million, because the $260 million in FMF funds designated for
aircraft for the Mexican navy was excluded from the scope of the 15% withholding requirement.
In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), the 15% withholding applies to
all of the accounts but it excludes assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anticorruption and rule of law activities. 130 Finally, in the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act
(P.L. 111-212), the conditions applied to 15% of the INCLE appropriated or roughly $26 million.
Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion of these human rights conditions in
Mérida Initiative appropriations legislation, although some thought they could have been more
tightly worded.
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted itsThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Similar human rights conditions have been included in subsequent appropriations measures that
have funded the Mérida Initiative. 156 Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion
of these human rights conditions in Mérida Initiative appropriations legislation, although some
thought they could have been more tightly worded.
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted a human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remained, the report outlined steps that the Mexican government had taken to comply with the
human rights conditions. It acknowledged, however, that human rights complaints against the
Mexican military had “increased almost six-fold” since the beginning of the Calderón
government. It also stated that “the opaqueness of the [Mexican] military court system makes it
difficult to analyze the nature and type of complaints filed, the status of cases against members of
the military alleged to have violated human rights, or the results of the military prosecution.”131
Human rights groups criticized the State Department report and the release of Mérida funds that
were on hold. They have urged the State Department not to issue another favorable human rights
progress report to Congress until measurable improvements have been made. 132remain, the report outlined steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police
transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture.157 Human rights groups criticized the State
Department report, and the release of Mérida funds that were on hold. They urged the State
Department not to issue another favorable human rights progress report to Congress until
measurable improvements have been made.158
On September 2, 2010, the State Department submitted a second human rights progress report on
Mexico to Congress. 133159 According to that report, the Mexican government had demonstrated
enough progress since the August 2009 report was issued to enable $36 million in FY2009 and
FY2010 regular funds that had been on
hold to be released. The report credited the Calderón
government with initiating legislation to strengthen the authority of the CNDH, carrying out
human rights training for military and police officials, and formalizing a bilateral dialogue on
human rights issues with the United States. It said that further progress had to be made in the
areas of transparency and impunity, however, in order for roughly $26 million in FY2010
supplemental funds that are on hold to be released. The State Department specifically urged the
Mexican Chamber of Deputies to approve human rights legislation that had passed the Senate in
April 2010 and the Calderón government to submit legislation that would reform the Military
Justice Code to have military officials accused of human rights crimes against civilians tried in
civilian courts. In October 2010, President Calderón submitted legislation to the Mexican
Congress that would establish civilian jurisdiction in cases where soldiers are accused of forced
130
Congress did not specify a certain amount for these areas, so the total amount that is subject to the condition will
depend on how the State Department allocates funds to particular programs.
131
U.S. Department of State, Mexico- Mérida Initiative Report, August 2009.
132
156
In P.L. 110-252, the human rights conditions applied to 15% of the funding for INCLE and FMF, or approximately
$57 million dollars. In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the 15% conditions applied to all of the
funding accounts but excluded amounts for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law
activities, which were earmarked at not less than $75 million, or roughly $33.75 million. In the FY2009 Supplemental
(P.L. 111-32), the conditions effectively only applied to the $160 million in the INCLE account, or $24 million,
because the $260 million in FMF funds designated for aircraft for the Mexican navy was excluded from the scope of
the 15% withholding requirement. In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), the 15%
withholding applies to all of the accounts but it excludes assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anticorruption and rule of law activities.156 In the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212), the conditions
applied to 15% of the INCLE appropriated or roughly $26 million. The same conditions that were included in P.L. 111117 will apply to assistance provided in the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act (P.L. 112-10).
157
U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
158
Fundar et al., “Obama Administration’s Alleged Release of Mérida Funds: A Violation of U.S. Law That Will
Encourage Serious Human Rights Violations in Mexico,” August 2009; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
et al., “Joint Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Human Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of
State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico,” May 27, 2010.
133159
U.S. Department of State, Mexico-Mérida Initiative Report, September 2, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
disappearance, rape, and torture. Both the aforementioned human rights legislation and
Calderón’s proposed reform of the Military Justice Code are still being debatedThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
strengthen the authority of the CNDH, carrying out human rights training for military and police
officials, and formalizing a bilateral dialogue on human rights issues with the United States.
While acknowledging the aforementioned progress, the State Department report stated that
further progress had to be made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity in order for
roughly $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds on hold to be released. The State Department
urged the Mexican Congress to approve pending legislation that would, among other measures,
strengthen the power of the CNDH and the Calderón government to submit legislation to reform
the Military Justice Code so that military officials accused of human rights crimes against
civilians would be tried in civilian courts. In October 2010, President Calderón submitted
legislation to the Mexican Congress that would reform the Military Justice Code to establish
civilian jurisdiction in cases where soldiers are accused of forced disappearance, rape, and
torture.160 That legislation is still pending. On July 12, 2011, the Mexican Supreme Court
rendered a decision that may imply that the current Military Justice Code should be reinterpreted
so that cases involving credible allegations of human rights abuses committed by military forces
against civilians are tried in civilian courts.161 In March 2011, the Mexican Congress approved a
series of reforms that elevate human rights conditions in international treaties signed by Mexico
to the level of the Constitution and strengthen the power of the CNDH and state-level human
rights commissions. 162 The reforms were promulgated in June 2011.
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico
In contrast to Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative does not include an active U.S. military
presence in Mexico, largely due to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty stemming from
past conflicts with the United States.134163 The Department of Defense (DOD) did not play a primary
role in designing the Mérida Initiative and is not providing assistance through Mérida aid
accounts. However, DOD is administering assistance provided through the FMF account. As an
implementing agency, DOD’s role has largely involved overseeing the procurement and delivery
of Mérida-funded equipment for Mexican security forces.
Despite its limited role in the Mérida Initiative, DOD assistance to Mexico has been increasing,
as has military cooperation between the two countries and Mexican participation in DOD training
programs in the United States.135164 Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own legislative
authorities to provide certain counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are overseen by
the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which is located at Peterson Air Force Base in
Colorado. DOD can provide counterdrug assistance under guidelines outlined in Sec. 1004 of
160
Some human rights groups and Member of Congress have criticized President Calderón’s proposal for exempting
many crimes, including extrajudicial killings, from civilian jurisdiction. Washington Office on Latin America,
“Members of U.S. Congress Urge Secretary Clinton to Raise Human Rights Concerns with Mexico,” press release,
March 3, 2011.
161
“Mexican Supreme Court Says Military Rights Violations Should be Reviewed by Civilian Courts,” Associated
Press, July 13, 2011.
162
Maureen Meyer, “Al Día: Historic Human Rights Reforms Passed in the Mexican Senate; now State Congresses
Should Follow Suit,” March 16, 2011.
163
See testimony of Roderic Ai Camp before the Congressional Policy Forum, “Role of Military to Military
Cooperation and the Implications and Potentials Risks to Civil-Military Relations,” May 9, 2008.
164
These trends preceded the Mérida Initiative. Roderic Ai Camp, Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and
Institutional Challenges, Woodrow Wilson Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May
2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
P.L. 101-510, as amended through FY2011, and can provide additional assistance to certain
countries as provided for in Sec. 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended through FY2011. DOD
counternarcotics support to Mexico totaled roughly $12.134.2 million in FY2008, $34.2FY2009, $89.7 million in
FY2009FY2010, and $86.171.7 million in FY2010.136FY2011. DOD is developing a plan to use some $50 million in
FY2011 per Sec.1033 of P.L. 105-85 funds to improve security along the Mexico-GuatemalaBelize border. Total DOD support to Mexico in FY2011FY2012 may exceed $69.675.5 million. 137
165
In March 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike
Mullen traveled to
Mexico along with Secretary Clinton in March 2010to participate in a Mérida High-Level
group meeting and to offer increased military assistance and
collaboration to their Mexican counterparts. In July
2010, Admiral James Winnefeld, the new NORTHCOM
Commander, recentlyCommander of NORTHCOM, said that he sees a saw a
“tremendous opportunity” to strengthen ties between the
U.S. and Mexican militaries through
training and intelligence-sharing. As an example, he said
that the Mexican government has asked
NORTHCOM to help it establish a joint intelligence
center. 138 DOD officials in Mexico City have predicted that while DOD is unlikely to provide
Mexico with the same amount of funds it has provided to Colombia, the same variety of programs
134
See testimony of Roderic Ai Camp before the Congressional Policy Forum, “Role of Military to Military
Cooperation and the Implications and Potentials Risks to Civil-Military Relations,” May 9, 2008.
135
These trends preceded the Mérida Initiative. Roderic Ai Camp, Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and
Institutional Challenges, Woodrow Wilson Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May
2010.
136
DOD response to CRS request, September 9, 2010. This data reflects center.166 Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen participated in another Mérida High-Level Group meeting held in late April 2011 to
review progress and plan future efforts. While DOD is unlikely to provide Mexico with the same
amount of funds it has provided to Colombia, the same variety of programs may be funded.
Future training programs may focus on how to work with police forces to conduct intelligencedriven operations and investigations. According to press reports, in response to a request from the
Mexican government, DOD has begun sending unmanned aerial vehicles into Mexico to gather
intelligence on criminal organizations.167
Since DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is not
required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, obtaining recent data
on DOD programs and plans for Mexico may be difficult. Regardless, policy makers may want to
receive periodic briefings on those efforts in order to guarantee that current and future DOD
programs are being adequately coordinated with Mérida Initiative efforts. They may also want to
ensure that DOD-funded programs are not inadvertently reinforcing the militarization of public
security in Mexico. Experts have urged the United States “not to focus too much on military
assistance and neglect other, more effective forms of aid … [such as assistance for] the
development, training, and professionalization of Mexico’s law enforcement officers.”168
165
DOD response to CRS request, March 21, 2011. These data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD
counternarcotics support provided or efforts in these nations/regions; DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs
by regions/countries, but by program. These figures reflect both “direct” support to those countries (e.g., training,
equipment, information sharing, infrastructure and other categories) and “indirect” support via DOD and other U.S.
Government counterdrug operations with regard to those countries (e.g., transportation, communications, intelligence
analysis, radar, air and maritime patrol, liaison personnel, and other categories).
137
Ibid.
138 as well as operation of Forward
Operating Locations.
166
“NORTHCOM Chief Cites Mexico Partnership as Top Priority,” U.S. Fed. News, June 2, 2010; Bill Gertz,
“NORTHCOM’s New Leader Boosts Focus on Mexico,” Washington Times, July 5, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
may be funded. Future training programs may focus on how to work with police forces, conduct
anti-drug operations and investigations, and pursue DTO leaders.139
Since DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is not
required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, obtaining recent data
on DOD programs and plans for Mexico may be difficult. Regardless, policy makers may want to
receive periodic briefings on those efforts in order to guarantee that current and future DOD
programs are being adequately coordinated with Mérida Initiative efforts. They may also want to
ensure that DOD-funded programs are not inadvertently reinforcing the militarization of public
security in Mexico. Experts have urged the United States “not to focus too much on military
assistance and neglect other, more effective forms of aid…[such as assistance for] the
development, training, and professionalization of Mexico’s law enforcement officers.”140
167
Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
168
Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 4 (July/August 2010).
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest Border
Initiatives141
Border Initiatives169
The Mérida Initiative was designed to complement domestic efforts to combat drug demand, drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. These domestic counter-drug initiatives
are funded through regular and supplemental appropriations for a variety of U.S. domestic
agencies. As the strategy underpinning the Mérida Initiative expands to include efforts to build a
more modern border (pillar three) and to strengthen border communities (pillar four), policy
makers may consider how best to balance the amount of funding provided to Mexico with support
for related domestic initiatives, particularly those focused on the U.S. side of the Southwest
border. 170
Regarding support for law enforcement efforts, some would argue that there needs to be more
federal support for states and localities on the U.S. side of the border that are dealing with crime
and violence originating in Mexico. Of those who endorse that point of view, some are
encouraged by President Obama’s decision to send about 1,200 National Guard troops to the
border, whereas others maintain that those steps are insufficient to secure the border. In contrast,
some maintain that it is impossible to combat transnational criminal enterprises by adopting a
“fortress-like” mentality solely focused on the U.S. side of the border, and that domestic
programs must be accompanied by continued efforts to build the capacity of Mexican law
enforcement officials. They warn that if recent U.S. efforts are perceived as an attempt to
“militarize” the border, they may damage U.S.-Mexican relations and hinder bilateral security
cooperation efforts. Further, Mexican officials from across the political spectrum have been
critical of Arizona’s recently enacted state law against illegal immigration (S.B. 1070) and have
expressed concerns about the treatment of Mexican migrants in the United States. The Mexican
government was particularly incensed after two Mexican youth were killed by U.S. Border Patrol
agents within a ten10-day span, including one youth shot on June 7, 2010, at the El Paso-Ciudad
Juárez border crossing. 142
139
CRS Interview with DOD official from the Office of Defense Coordination at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City,
December 8, 2009.
140
Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 4 (July/August 2010).
141
CRS Report R41237, People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection Policies, by Chad C. Haddal.
142
Christopher Sherman and Alexandra Olson, “Mexico Condemns Border Patrol Shooting of Teen; Some Demand
(continued...)
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171
With respect to pillar four of the updated strategy, Mexico and the United States have discussed
the possibility of launching pilot programs to strengthen communities in the Ciudad Juárez-El
Paso and possibly Tijuana-San Diego areas. In targeting those cities most affected by the
violence, greater efforts will necessarily be placed on community building in Ciudad Juárez and
Tijuana than on their sister cities in the United States. However, if the U.S. government provides
aid to these communities in Mexico, some may argue that there should also be federal support for
the adjacent U.S. border cities. Take, for example, initiatives directed at providing youth with
education, employment, and social outlets such that the allure of joining a DTO or local gang is
reduced. Some may contend that providing these services on the U.S. side of the border as well as
the Mexican side could prevent youth in the U.S. from becoming involved in a local gang with
ties to drug trafficking.
169
CRS Report R41237, People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection Policies, by Alison Siskin.
170
The SWBCS, 2011 includes a new chapter on U.S. efforts to promote strong communities by, in part, increasing
crime prevention efforts and drug prevention and treatment programs in U.S. border communities.
171
Christopher Sherman and Alexandra Olson, “Mexico Condemns Border Patrol Shooting of Teen; Some Demand
Agent’s Extradition to Mexico,” AP Newswire, June 10, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
In August 2010, the 111th Congress passed legislation (P.L. 111-230) that provides $600 million in
in supplemental funding to strengthen U.S. border security efforts. That total includes $394 million
million for DHS: $244 million to hire new CBP officers and Border Patrol agents, $84 million to
hire new
ICE agents, $32 million for two unmanned aerial detection systems, $6 million for bases for
for Border Patrol agents, $14 million for communications equipment, and $8 million to train new law
law enforcement personnel. The supplemental funds also include $196 million to support DOJ efforts
efforts on the Southwest border. Those funds will enable the creation of seven new ATF
Gunrunner units
and five FBI Hybrid Task Forces, as well as support additional DEA agents,
federal attorneys,
prosecutors, and immigration judges. The supplemental funds will also enable
the U.S.
government to provide increased technical assistance and training for Mexican law
enforcement.143
Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere144Hemisphere172
U.S. State Department-funded drug control assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere are
currently undergoing a period of transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean
region is in decline after record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia
in FY2000. Conversely, antidrug funding for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean has
increased as a result of the Mérida Initiative, which began in FY2008, and two related programs
that received initial funding in FY2010, the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(...continued)
Agent’s Extradition to Mexico,” AP Newswire, June 10, 2010.
143
Other bills were introduced in the 111th Congress that would have provided additional funds for law enforcement
and related efforts along the Southwest border. For example, the Southern Border Security Assistance Act (S. 3273),
which cited the need for domestic law enforcement initiatives to complement the funding provided to Mexican law
enforcement, would have authorized $300 million for DHS to provide grants to law enforcement agencies along the
Southwest border for activities combating drug trafficking, smuggling, and violence. It would also have directed the
President to appoint more district judges for the region. The Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2009 (H.R.
495, S. 205) would have authorized funding for the ATF to provide agents, equipment, and training to Mexican law
enforcement to combat firearms trafficking and criminal organizations; it would also have authorized additional
domestic funding for ATF to expand Project Gunrunner. Other bills such as the Southern Border Security Task Force
Act of 2009 (H.R. 1437), the Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act of 2009 (H.R. 1448), and the Border
Violence Prevention Act of 2009 (H.R. 1867) would have provided support for various domestic law enforcement
activities. These activities would have included enhancing infrastructure used by CBP agents, hiring additional law
enforcement agents, expanding resources for operations such as Project Gunrunner and Operation Armas Cruzadas, and
establishing border- specific task forces.
144
CARSI)173 and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The strategy undergirding the
Mérida Initiative has broadened from primarily providing equipment and training to Mexican
officials engaged in combating DTOs to place more of an emphasis on building democratic
institutions. It also includes a new focus on facilitating “secure flows” of people and goods
through the U.S.-Mexico border and promoting social and economic development in violenceprone communities. Similarly, CARSI and CBSI include some anti-drug components as part of
broader regional security packages that are also aimed at institutional strengthening and
community development.
The Obama Administration has recently taken steps to better coordinate the aforementioned
country and regional antidrug programs and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the
efforts of partner governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator
within the State Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned
regional security assistance packages. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is
also working with other federal agencies, as well as independent policy experts, to develop a
Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Strategy that is scheduled to be published later this year.
According to ONDCP, the strategy will emphasize “interdiction and disrupting transnational
criminal organizations, institutional strengthening, building strong and resilient communities, and
drug demand reduction."90 The Administration is encouraging countries that have received U.S.
assistance in the past—particularly Colombia—to share technical expertise with other countries
in the region, a strategy that analysts have recommended.91 One area in which closer cooperation
between the United States, partner governments, and other donors will likely be necessary is in
efforts to better secure the porous Mexico-Guatemala and Mexico-Belize borders.
172
This section is drawn from CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and
U.S. Counterdrug Programs , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
173
CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by
Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: theThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
(CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The strategy undergirding the
Mérida Initiative has broadened from primarily providing equipment and training to Mexican
officials engaged in combating DTOs to place more of an emphasis on building democratic
institutions. It also includes a new focus on facilitating "secure flows" of people and goods
through the U.S.-Mexico border and promoting social and economic development in violenceprone communities. Similarly, CARSI and CBSI include some anti-drug components as part of
broader regional security packages that are also aimed at institutional strengthening and
community development.
Some policy makers have raised questions regarding whether there is the need for a more
integrated approach to counternarcotics policies in the region. For instance, some have expressed
concern that the overall effectiveness of hemispheric counterdrug efforts has been hindered by
“fragmented management, unclear reporting chains, and duplicative and overlapping agendas”
among the many agencies charged with implementing aspects of antidrug programs in the
region. 145 Some have also argued that a more integrated effort might include having the State
Department develop a multi-year drug strategy for the region that would seek to avoid the socalled “balloon effect” in which successful efforts in one area drive drug-related activities to
another area. Others have urged the Administration to establish a coordinator within the State
Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the various counterdrug assistance
programs in Latin America.146 Some observers have praised these proposals, while others feel
they would be unnecessary given that there are already mechanisms in place by which the State
Department develops and coordinates its regional counterdrug programs and policies.
Regardless of whether the State Department develops a multi-year hemispheric drug policy or
designates a hemispheric drug policy coordinator, many analysts maintain that it is crucial for
U.S.-funded efforts in Mexico to complement other U.S. counterdrug efforts in the region. They
are encouraged by the fact that Colombian law enforcement and judicial officials who received
U.S. training through Plan Colombia are now sharing their expertise with counterparts in Mexico
and Central America.147 They are also supportive of efforts to coordinate hemispheric antidrug
initiatives through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of
American States and other, less formal mechanisms, like the Tuxtla dialogue involving leaders
from Mexico, Colombia, and the Central American nations.
145
Office of Senator Robert Menendez, “Press Release: Menendez-Kerry Bill to Strengthen Counternarcotics
Cooperation in the Americas,” March 26, 2010.
146
See, for example, the Opening Statement of Chairmen Eliot L. Engel at a Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
hearing on “Assessing U.S. Drug Policy in the Americas,” October 15, 2009; “Rep. Connie Mack: We Must Examine
U.S. Drug Policy in Latin America From All Angles,” U.S. Fed News, October 19, 2009.
147
Juan Forero, “Colombia Shares its Cartel-Fighting Expertise with Mexican Forces,” Washington Post, January 22,
2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2012
U.S. $ millions
FY2007
FY2008a
FY2009ab
FY2010
(est.)
INCLE
36.7
242.1
454.0e
365.0f
292.0
248.5
ESF
11.4
34.7
15.0
15.0
10.0
33.3
299.0d
5.3
8.0
8.0
1.7
Account
FY2011 req.
FY2012 req.
FMF
0.0
116.5
IMET
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.1
1.1
NADR
1.3
1.4
3.9
5.7
5.7
CSHcThe Way Forward
On April 29, 2011, Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa chaired
another meeting of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Group in Washington D.C. after which both
governments “ratified their shared commitment to achieving long-term solutions to challenges to
the rule of law posed by transnational organized crime.”174 Both governments pledged, among
other measures, to increase efforts to accelerate judicial reform in Mexico, expand Mexican
police reform to the state and local levels, and counter illicit financing and weapons trafficking.
This meeting signaled the commitment of both governments to advance bilateral efforts under the
Mérida Initiative despite recent tensions in the U.S.—Mexican relationship and upcoming
elections in both countries in 2012.
The Mérida Initiative was designed in response to the Calderón Administration’s request for
specific forms of U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance. Increased U.S. operational
support for Mexico’s struggle against organized crime has recently included, among other things,
the deployment of U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles to gather intelligence on DTO activities. This
support, however, has only occurred in accordance with requests by the Mexican government. 175
As such, while the Mérida Initiative’s broad four-pillar strategy is likely to remain in place, the
specific type of assistance and the depth of U.S. involvement, as requested by Mexico, may
change over time, particularly after the 2012 elections.176
Analysts have been weighing in about how the Calderón government and/or its successor might
adjust Mexico’s current security strategy. They have also debated how the U.S. will advance its
pledges of reducing drug demand, firearms trafficking, and bulk cash smuggling. Similarly,
experts have also suggested ways in which the Mérida Initiative might be adjusted in the future.
Those suggestions have included
•
Bolstering U.S. domestic efforts to combat drug demand, firearms trafficking,
and bulk cash smuggling;
•
Conceptualizing the DTOs as businesses and increasing U.S., Mexican, and
bilateral efforts against money laundering and bulk cash smuggling;
•
Expanding bi-national intelligence-sharing and U.S. operational support for
targeted operations against DTO leaders;
•
Focusing law enforcement efforts on combating all activities of organized crime,
including kidnapping, human trafficking and alien smuggling, as Mexican DTOs
are increasingly evolving into poly-crime organizations;
•
Concentrating Mexican crime control efforts on the country’s most violent cities
and paying increased attention to helping state and local police combat street
crimes, such as robbery and extortion, in those cities; and
174
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on U.S.- Mexico Merida High Level Consultative Group on Bilateral
Cooperation Against Transnational Criminal Organizations,” press release, April 29, 2011.
175
Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
176
Duncan Wood, Mexico’s 2012 Election and U.S.-Mexican Relations, Center for Strategic & International Studies,
May 2011; Richard Downie, Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico: the Future of US/Mexican Defense Relations,
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, Vol. 1, no. 1, July 6, 2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
•
Increasing development assistance to Mexico to help address the underlying
societal problems—poverty, inequality, unemployment, a large informal sector,
and a lack of opportunities for at-risk youth—that have enabled the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico.
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Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2012
(U.S. $ millions)
Account
FY2010
(est.)
FY2011c
req.
454.0f
365.0g
292.0
248.5
34.7
15.0
15.0
10.0
33.3
299.0e
5.3
8.0
8.0
1.7
FY2007
FY2008a
INCLE
36.7
242.1
ESF
11.4
FY2009ab
FY2012 req.
FMF
0.0
116.5
IMET
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.1
1.1
NADR
1.3
1.4
3.9
5.7
5.7
CSHd
3.7
2.7
2.9
3.5
0.0
3.7
DA
12.3
8.2
11.2
10.0
26.3
33.4
TOTAL
65.4
405.9
786.8
405.6
346.6
328.6
n/a
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2011,
FY2010 Supplemental Spending Plan; Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs FY2012.
Notes: CSH= Child Survival and Health; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
a.
FY2008 assistance includes110-252).
FY2009 assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252). FY2009
assistance includes FY2009 bridge
110-252).
b.
FY2009 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 20082009 (P.L. 110-252).
b.
FY2009 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 11-32).
c11-32).
c.
On April 14, 2011, Congress passed legislation to fund government programs for the remainder of FY2011
(P.L. 112-10). While the legislation reduced most foreign aid accounts from FY2010 enacted levels, final
funding by country and program has not been established.
d.
Beginning with the FY2010 request, the Child Survival and Health Account became known as Global Health
and Child Survival—USAID.
de.
$260 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding
funding was considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
FY2010 request.
ef.
$94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
fg.
$175 million of this funding provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212) and counted here as
FY2010 funding was considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in advance a
portion of the FY2011 request.
FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: theThe Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Appendix B. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law
Enforcement Partnerships
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
The BEST Initiative is a multi-agency initiative, led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), wherein task forces seek to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security—both
along the Southwest border with Mexico as well as along the Northern border with Canada.148177
Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),;
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF),; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),; U.S. Coast Guard,; and U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices,; as well as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) or federal police is a partner along
the Southwest border. There are currently 1721 BEST teams around the country, 1012 of which are
along the Southwest border and one in Mexico City. For FY2011, the Administration’s budget
request includes an additional $10 million for the BEST Initiative. 149 BEST is the umbrella for the
Vetted Arms
Trafficking Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border Liaison
Program.
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety
and Security (OASISS)
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at
enhancing both countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the
Southwest border. 150178 Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien
smugglers apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in August 2005
through May 2010, OASISS generated 2,031 cases.151179 This program is supported by the Border
Patrol International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
148
Illegal Drug Program (IDP)
The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) is an agreement between ICE and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) wherein ICE can transfer cases of Mexican nationals smuggling drugs
177
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces, November 3, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
149
Department of Homeland Security, Departmental Management and Operations, Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional
Justification, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_congressional_budget_justification_fy2011.pdf.
150178
See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. - Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26,
2006.
151179
Testimony by Allen Gina, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida
Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, 2010.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Illegal Drug Program (IDP)
The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) is an agreement between ICE and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) wherein ICE can transfer cases of Mexican nationals smuggling drugs
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
into the United States to the PGR for prosecution.152180 The program was initiated in Nogales, TX, in
October 2009 and subsequently adopted in El Paso, TX. Under the IDP, the U.S. Attorneys’
Offices review the cases and then transfer them to the PGR rather than to local law enforcement
agencies, as was previously done. The PGR has agreed to accept any drug smuggling case
referred by the U.S. Attorneys, regardless of quality, quantity, or type of illegal drug seized.
Project Gunrunner153Gunrunner181
Project Gunrunner is an initiative led by ATF in DOJ. Its goal is to disrupt the illegal flow of guns
from the United States to Mexico. In addition to its domestic objectives, Project Gunrunner also
aims to bolster U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination along the border in firearms and
violent crime cases as well as to train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify
firearms traffickers. As of March 2010, Project Gunrunner had led to the arrest of 1,397
defendants—850 of which had been convicted—and the seizure of over 6,688 firearms.154 Project
Between FY2005 and FY2010, ATF investigations in those border states
have led to the seizure of over 8,700 guns and the indictment of 1,705 defendants, of whom 1,170
were convicted, in federal court.182 Project Gunrunner has recently been criticized, in part, for not
systematically and consistently sharing
information with Mexican and U.S. partners as well as for
focusing investigations on gun dealers
and straw purchasers over high-level traffickers.155 In 183 In
September, 2010, ATF released a new
strategy, “Project Gunrunner – —A Cartel Focused Strategy,”
that reportedly addresses these
issues.156 184
Electronic Trace Submission System157System185
ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission
System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. In
January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine
U.S. consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).158 From calendar years 2007-2009, ATF traced more
than 69,800 firearms for Mexican authorities, the majority of which appear to have a nexus to the
152186 More recently, ATF has developed and deployed a
Spanish language version of its eTrace program that enables Mexican authorities to submit
firearm trace requests electronically to ATF officials in the United States. From FY2007 through
FY2010, ATF processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities. 187 Most of those requests
180
For more information on the IDP, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE, Mexican authorities meet
and agree to prosecution plan for drug smugglers captured at the border: DHS, Government of Mexico announce new
agreement to help curb narcotics smuggling,” press release, April 15, 2010, http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1004/
100415elpaso.htm.
153181
For more information on Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
154
Statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Deputy Director182
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, before
the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 4, 2010.
155
ATF Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2012, February 2011, p. 5.
183
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, pp. iii-v, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
156184
Ibid., p. ix.
157
185
For more information on the Electronic Trace Submission System, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
158186
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to
Combat Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008.
187
U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking, April 2011.
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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond
United States.159 By late 2009, ATF had deployed a Spanish language version of the eTrace
software to Mexico, a move which may eventually result in increased tracing requests.The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the United States for civilian
markets. 188
Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training
(MALLET)
The FBI created Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training (MALLET) seminars
in 1988.160189 These week-long seminars, hosted at least four times annually in the United States
throughout the four Southwest border states, train Mexican law enforcement officers on various
topics including law enforcement management and investigative techniques. The Mexican law
enforcement officials participating in these trainings come from all levels of government—
federal, state, and municipal. These seminars provide not only training, but opportunities for
building trusted partnerships on both sides of the border. The MALLET seminars are funded
through the FBI’s Office of International Operations.161190
Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA)
The Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA) is a non-profitnonprofit organization that was established
in 1978 and has continued to enhance international law enforcement communication and train
officers in laws and procedures across borders.162191 With nearly 500 representatives from various
levels of Mexican and U.S. government, PISA promotes training and mutual assistance to
extradite fugitives and solve crimes from auto thefts to homicides. For example, state and local
law enforcement from Arizona have been involved in providing tactical, SWAT, and money
laundering training to Mexican police.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov, 7-6259
159
Data is from ATF’s Violent Crime Analysis Branch (VCAB), which is housed in its National Tracing Center.188
It is highly probable that most of these firearms were illegally smuggled into Mexico, because the Mexican
government only authorizes a relatively small number of firearms to be imported for civilian markets.
189
For more information, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, On the Border: Training Our Mexican Colleagues, May
11, 2009, http://elpaso.fbi.gov/boader051109.htm.
161190
From CRS communication with FBI representative, April 27, 2010.
162191
For more information on PISA, see the website at http://www.azpisa.org/.
160
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