Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
January 21March 14, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32109
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The FY2010 budget that the Navy submitted to Congress in 2009 proposed ending procurement
of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers at three ships and resuming procurementProcurement of Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, supported this proposal: the FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51 (the
first to be procured since FY2005), provided advance procurement funding for two DDG-51s the
Navy wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000
(which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for
procuring additional DDG-1000s.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission called for procuring two DDG-51s in FY2011 and six
more in FY2012-FY2015. The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received
$577.2 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget
requested another $2,922.2 million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete
their estimated combined procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011
budget also requested $48.0 million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the
Navy wants to procure in FY2012, and $186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000
program-completion costs.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget also proposed terminating the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser
program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy
had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51,
called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current
version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by
procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Navy plans call for procuring 24 Flight
III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller version of
the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG(X). The
Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested $228.4 million in research and development funding
for the AMDR. Detailed design work on the Flight III DDG-51 reportedly is to begin in FY2012
or FY2013.
FY2012 issues for Congress include the following:
•
the potential impact of the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface
Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322)—sometimes called the
FY2011 continuing resolution—on the Navy’s ability to execute the planned
Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers resumed in FY2010 after a fouryear hiatus. Congress funded the procurement of one DDG-51 in FY2010, and the Navy
requested funding for the procurement of two more DDG-51s in FY2011. The Navy’s FY2012
budget submission calls for procuring one DDG-51 in FY2012, and seven more in FY2013FY2016.
DDG-51s to be procured through FY2015 are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy
wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design,
starting in FY2016. The Flight III design is to feature, among other design changes, a new and
more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy plans to begin
preliminary design work on the Flight III DDG-51 in FY2012, and wants to use a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured from FY2013 through FY2016 or
FY2017.
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $1,980.7 million in procurement funding for the
DDG-51 planned for procurement in FY2012. This funding, together with $48.0 million in
advance procurement funding that the Navy requested for the ship in its proposed FY2011
budget, would complete the ship’s total estimated procurement cost of $2,028.7 million. The
Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget also requests $100.7 million in advance procurement funding
for two DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2013, $453.7 million in procurement funding to
help complete procurement costs for the three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers that were
procured in FY2007 and FY2009, and $166.6 million in research and development funding for
the AMDR.
FY2012 issues for Congress include the following:
•
the potential impact of a year-long continuing resolution (CR) on the Navy’s
ability to execute its planned procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011;
•
the contract status of the second and third ships in the DDG-1000 program;
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight
III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016;
•
whether it would be appropriate for the Navy to use a to use multiyear procurement (MYP) for procuring Flight IIA DDG-51s;
(MYP) contract beginning in FY2013 to procure one or more Flight III DDG51s;
•
whether actions—such as adding DDG-51s to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan
and/or extending the lives of existing Flight I/II DDG-51s beyond current Navy
plans—should be taken to mitigate a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers that is
projected to begin in the 2020s; and
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2011 and FY2012 funding
funding requests for
procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s, for completing DDG-1000 procurement
costs, DDG-1000 program-completion costs,
and for research and development work on the AMDR.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
Navy Destroyer and Cruiser Acquisition Programs 1
DDG-51 Program................................................................2
DDG-51 Program..................................................1
General ..........................................................2
DDG-1000 Program.................................................................1
Resumption of Flight IIA DDG-51 Procurement in FY2010 .......................................4
CG(X) Program.....3
Procurement of Flight III DDG-51 Planned For FY2016 .................................................3
Plan for Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Starting in FY2013 .............................................................5
FY2010 Navy Proposal to End DDG-1000 Procurement and Resume DDG-51
Procurement4
DDG-1000 Program..............................................................................................................4
Projected Shortfalls in Cruisers and Destroyers .................................................6
FY2011 Navy Proposal to Terminate CG(X) in Favor of Flight III DDG-51 ....................75
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base ...................................................................87
Shipyards........................................................................................................................87
Combat System Manufacturers........................................................................................87
Supplier Firms ................................................................................................................87
FY2011 Funding Request......................................................................................................97
FY2012 Funding Request......................................................................................................98
Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................9
8
Near-Term Issue: Potential Impact of FY2011Year-Long Continuing Resolution................................8
Lack of Authorization for Quantity Increase .........................................................9...........9
Lack of Flexibility for Realigning Procurement Funds.....................................................9
Terms of Agreement Regarding the Two FY2011 DDG-51s.............................................9
Potential Provisions for Mitigating the Potential Impact of a Year-Long CR .................. 10
Contract Status of Second and Third DDG-1000s ................................................................ 10
Navy Proposal to Develop and Procure Flight III DDG-51s................................................. 1011
Analytical Basis ............................................................................................................ 11
AAW and BMD Capability ........................................................................................... 1213
Growth Margin ............................................................................................................. 13
Life-Cycle Ownership Costs ......................................................................................... 14
Alternative of New-Design Destroyer............................................................................ 1415
Industrial-Base.............................................................................................................. 16
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) forProcuring Flight IIA DDG-51s III DDG-51s in Under MYP Starting in FY2013 ....................................... 16
Mitigating Projected Cruiser-Destroyer Shortfall............................... 16
Legislative Activity for FY2012 ................................................. 17
Adding DDG-51s to Shipbuilding Plan............................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. DDG-51 Flight IIA Destroyer ........................... 18
Extending Service Lives of Flight I/II DDG-51s............................................................ 18
Legislative Activity for FY2012 ..............................3
Tables
Table 1. Flight III DDG-51 Compared to Potential New-Design Destroyer ........................................... 16
Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011........................ 18
Figures
Figure 1. DDG-51 Flight IIA Destroyer ..................................................... 18
Appendix B. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program.................................. 22
Appendix C. Additional Information on Navy Proposal to Terminate CG(X) in Favor of
Flight III DDG-51 2
Tables
Table 1. Projected Cruiser-Destroyer Shortfall..............................................................................6
Table 2. FY2010 and FY2011 DDG-51 Procurement and AP Funding .................................... 32
.....9
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Contact InformationTable 3. Flight III DDG-51 Compared to Potential New-Design Destroyer ................................ 16
Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011............................................................................ 19
Appendix B. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program................................. 23
Appendix C. Additional Background Information on CG(X) Cruiser Program ........................... 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 36
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. Decisions
that Congress makes concerning these programs could substantially affect Navy capabilities and
funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
DDG-51 Program
General
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.1 The DDG-51 is a multi-mission destroyer
with an emphasis on air defense (which the Navy refers as anti-air warfare, or AAW) and bluewater (mid-ocean) operations. DDG-51s, like the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers,2
are equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated ship combat system named for the
mythological shield that defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often referred to
as Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The Aegis
system has been updated several times over the years. All DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) are
being modified to receive an additional capability for ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations.3
The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985. A total of 63 have been procured through FY2010,
including 62 in FY1985-FY2005, none during the four-year period FY2006-FY2009, and a 63rd
in FY2010. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 59 were in service as of the
end of FY2010. Of the 63 DDG-51s procured through FY2010, General Dynamics Bath Iron
Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, is the builder of 34, and the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS,
which is currently owned by Northrop Grumman, is the builder of 29. The Navy estimates the
procurement cost of the DDG-51 procured in FY2010 at $2,234.4 million; the ship is to be built
at the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, that is currently owned by Northrop Grumman..
The DDG-51 design has been modified over time. The first 28 DDG-51s (i.e., DDGs 51 through
78) are called Flight I/II DDG-51s. Subsequent ships in the class (i.e., DDGs 79 and higher) are
referred to as Flight IIA DDG-51s. The Flight IIA design, first procured in FY1994, implemented
a significant design change that included, among other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar.
1
The program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers.
2
A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between
1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too
expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
3
The modification for BMD operations includes, among other things, the addition of a new software program for the
Aegis combat system and the arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is
designed for BMD operations. For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
The Flight IIA design has a full load displacement of about 9,500 tons, which is similar to that of
the CG-47.
DDG-51s were originally built with 35-year expected service lives. The Navy’s February 2010
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan stated that the Navy intends to
extend the service lives of Flight IIA DDG-51s to 40 years.4 The Navy is implementing a program
for modernizing all DDG-51s (and CG-47s) so as maintain their mission and cost effectiveness
out to the end of their projected service lives.5
Older CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51
program. 6
Figure 1. DDG-51 Flight IIA Destroyer
Source: U.S. Navy file photo accessed by CRS on January 13, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/management/
photodb/photos/110110-N-7981E-938.jpg.
4
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February
2010, p. 21.
5
For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
6
See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author), and CRS Report 80-205, The Navy’s
Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With An Equal-Cost
Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21, 1984; out of
print and available directly from the author).
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Resumption of Flight IIA DDG-51 Procurement in FY2010
The Navy in July 2008 announced that it wanted to end procurement of DDG-100 destroyers (see
“DDG-1000 Program” below) and resume procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s. The
announcement represented a major change in Navy planning: prior to the announcement, the
Navy for years had strongly supported ending DDG-51 procurement permanently in FY2005 and
proceeding with procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers.7 The Navy’s FY2010 budget, submitted
in May 2009, reflected the Navy’s July 2008 change in plans: the budget proposed truncating
DDG-1000 procurement to the three ships that had been procured in FY2007 and FY2009, and
resuming procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010
defense budget, supported the proposal.8
Procurement of Flight III DDG-51 Planned For FY2016
The Navy’s FY2011 budget, submitted in February 2010, proposed another major change in Navy
plans—terminating a planned cruiser called the CG(X) in favor of procuring an improved version
of the DDG-51 called the Flight III version. 9 The Flight III design is to feature, among other
design changes, a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar
(AMDR). Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy had previously
envisaged, the Navy stated that it wanted to begin procuring Flight III DDG-51s in FY2016.
Navy plans thus call for procuring the Flight IIA DDG-51s through FY2015, followed by
procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Navy plans call for procuring 24 Flight
III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031.10
The Flight III DDG-51 is to carry a version of the AMDR that is smaller and less powerful than
the one that was envisaged for the CG(X). The Flight III DDG-51’s AMDR is to have a diameter
of about 14 feet, while the AMDR envisaged for the CG(X) might have had a diameter of about
22 feet.11 In addition to improving the DDG-51’s AAW and BMD capability through the
7
The Navy announced this change in its plans at a July 31, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. In explaining their proposed change in plans, Navy
officials cited a reassessment of threats that Navy forces are likely to face in coming years. As a result of this
reassessment, Navy officials stated, the service decided that destroyer procurement over the next several years should
emphasize three mission capabilities—area-defense AAW, BMD, and open-ocean ASW. Navy officials also stated that
they want to maximize the number of destroyers that can be procured over the next several years within budget
constraints. Navy officials stated that DDG-51s can provide the area-defense AAW, BMD, and open-ocean ASW
capabilities that the Navy wants to emphasize, and that while the DDG-1000 design could also be configured to provide
these capabilities, the Navy could procure more DDG-51s than reconfigured DDG-1000s over the next several years
for the same total amount of funding. In addition, the Navy by 2008-2009 no longer appeared committed to the idea of
reusing the DDG-1000 hull as the basis for the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser. If the Navy had remained committed to
that idea, it might have served as a reason for continuing DDG-1000 procurement.
8
The FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51, provided advance procurement funding for two DDG51s the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000 (which was
authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for procuring additional DDG-1000s.
9
The Navy stated that its desire to terminate the CG(X) program was “driven by affordability considerations.”
(Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010,
p. 5-7.) For more on the CG(X) program and its termination in favor of procuring Flight III DDG-51s, see Appendix
C.
10
Source: Supplementary data on 30-year shipbuilding plan provided to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) by the Navy on February 18, 2010.
11
Sources for 14-foot and 22-foot figures: Zachary M. Peterson, “DDG-51 With Enhanced Radar in FY-16, Design
Work To Begin Soon,” Inside the Navy, February 8, 2010; Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,”
(continued...)
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
installation of the AMDR, the Navy is also studying options for modifying the DDG-51 design in
other ways for purposes of reducing crew size, achieving energy efficiency and improved power
generation, improving effectiveness in warfare areas other than AAW and BMD, and reducing
total ownership cost.12 The Navy plans to begin preliminary design work on the Flight III DDG51 in FY2012.
Plan for Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Starting in FY2013
The Navy wants to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured
starting in FY2013.
DDG-1000 Program
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.13 The DDG-1000 is a multi-mission
destroyer with an emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e.,
near-shore) waters. The DDG-1000 was intended in part to replace, in a technologically more
modern form, the large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its
Iowa-class battleships in the early 1990s.14 The DDG-1000 was also intended to improve the
Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral waters, to introduce several new
technologies that would be available for use on future Navy ships, and to serve as the basis for the
Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser.
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 142 sailors (compared to roughly 300 on the
Navy’s Aegis destroyers and cruisers) so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The
ship incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive
propulsion system15 and automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,482 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 63%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
(...continued)
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2010: 1-2; “[Interview With] Vice Adm. Barry McCullough,”
Defense News, November 9, 2009: 38.
12
Source: Memorandum dated February 2, 2010, from Director, Surface Warfare Division (N86) to Commander, Naval
Sea Systems Command (SEA 05) on the subject “Technical Study In Support Of DDG 51 Class Resource Planning
And Requirements Analysis,” posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required) February 19, 2009. See also
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy To Launch Technical Study And Cost Analysis For New DDG-51s,” Inside the Navy,
February 19, 2010.)
13
The program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st Century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
14
The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
15
For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2012 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $7,856.3 million. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2012 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $3,452.5 million. All three ships are to be built at GD/BIW, with some
portions of each ship being built by the Ingalls shipyard for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the
prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related
software, displays, and weapon launchers).
Construction of the first DDG-1000 is well underway. Some early construction activities have
taken place on the second DDG-1000. Although the Navy has issued limited bridging contracts to
support early construction activities on the second DDG-1000, the Navy as of mid-March 2011
had not yet signed overall construction contracts for the second or third ships in the program.
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program—including developments in
2010 relating to the program’s Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach and subsequent restructuring
and milestone recertification—see Appendix B.
Projected Shortfalls in Cruisers and Destroyers
As discussed in another CRS report, the Navy’s planned fleet of more than 300 ships includes,
among other things, a requirement for a maintaining a force of 88 cruisers and destroyers.16 The
30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan submitted by the Navy in February 2010, in
conjunction with the FY2011 budget, does not contain enough destroyers to maintain a force of
88 cruisers and destroyers consistently over the long run. As shown in Table 1, the Navy projects
that implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would result in a cruiser-destroyer force that
drops below 88 ships in FY2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships (i.e., 21 ships, or about 24%,
below the required figure of 88 ships) in FY2034, and remains 12 or more ships below the 88ship figure through the end of the 30-year period. The projected cruiser-destroyer shortfall is, by
some measurements, the largest projected shortfall of any ship category in the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
16
CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 1. Projected Cruiser-Destroyer Shortfall
As shown in Navy’s FY2011-FY2040 30-year Shipbuilding Plan
Shortfall relative to 88ship goal (percent of 88ship goal, rounded to
nearest percent, shown
as a negative)
Fiscal year
Projected number of
cruisers and destroyers
Shortfall relative to 88ship goal (number of
ships, shown as a
negative)
11
84
-4
-5%
12
84
-4
-5%
13
85
-3
-3%
14
86
-2
-2%
15
88
16
90
17
91
18
93
19
94
20
96
21
96
22
95
23
94
24
94
25
92
26
89
27
87
-1
-1%
28
85
-3
-3%
29
81
-7
-8%
30
77
-11
-13%
31
73
-15
-17%
32
71
-17
-19%
33
69
-19
-22%
34
67
-21
-24%
35
68
-20
-23%
36
70
-18
-20%
37
72
-16
-18%
38
74
-14
-16%
39
76
-12
-14%
40
76
-12
-14%
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2011-FY2040 30-year shipbuilding plan.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
Shipyards
All cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at General
Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) shipyard of Bath, ME, and the Ingalls shipyard in
Pascagoula, MS, that is currently owned by Northrop Grumman. Both yards have long histories
of building larger surface combatants. Construction of Navy surface combatants in recent years
has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-construction work and for a significant share of
Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (The Ingalls shipyard also builds amphibious ships for the Navy.)
Navy surface combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, Ingalls, other
private-sector U.S. shipyards, and government-operated naval shipyards (NSYs).
Combat System Manufacturers
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Northrop Grumman is a third potential maker of
Navy surface combatant radars. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51 combat system
(the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000 combat system, the
core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (TSCE-I). Lockheed
has a share of the DDG-100 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of the DDG-51 combat
system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop are competing to be the maker of the AMDR to be
carried by the Flight III DDG-51.
Supplier Firms
The surface combatant industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that supply
materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has been a
matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for what
they make for Navy surface combatants.
FY2011 Funding Request
The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received $577.2 million in FY2010
advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested another $2,922.2
million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete their estimated combined
procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requested $48.0
million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the Navy wants to procure in
FY2012, $186.3 million in procurement funding to help complete DDG-1000 procurement costs,
and $228.4 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. The funding request for
the AMDR is contained in the Navy’s research and development account in Project 3186 (“Air
and Missile Defense Radar”) of Program Element (PE) 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water
Sensors”).
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
FY2012 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $1,980.7 million in procurement funding for the
DDG-51 planned for procurement in FY2012. This funding, together with $48.0 million in
advance procurement funding that the Navy requested for the ship in its proposed FY2011
budget, would complete the ship’s total estimated procurement cost of $2,028.7 million. The
Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget also requests $100.7 million in advance procurement funding
for two DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2013, $453.7 million in procurement funding to
help complete DDG-1000 procurement costs, and $166.6 million in research and development
funding for the AMDR. The funding request for the AMDR is contained in the Navy’s research
and development account in Project 3186 (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”) of Program Element
(PE) 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water Sensors”).
Issues for Congress
FY2012 issues for Congress include the following:
•
the potential impact of a year-long continuing resolution (CR) on the Navy’s
ability to execute its planned procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011;
•
the contract status of the second and third ships in the DDG-1000 program;
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight
III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016;
•
whether it would be appropriate for the Navy to use a multiyear procurement
(MYP) contract beginning in FY2013 to procure one or more Flight III DDG51s;
•
whether actions—such as adding DDG-51s to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan
and/or extending the lives of existing Flight I/II DDG-51s beyond current Navy
plans—should be taken to mitigate a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers that is
projected to begin in the 2020s; and
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2011 and FY2012 funding
requests for procurement of DDG-51s, for completing DDG-1000 procurement
costs, and for research and development work on the AMDR.
The first five of these issues are discussed below.
Near-Term Issue: Potential Impact of Year-Long Continuing
Resolution
A near-term issue for Congress is the potential impact of a year-long continuing resolution (CR)
on the Navy’s ability to execute its planned procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011. The issue has
three main elements: lack of authorization for an FY2011 quantity increase, lack of flexibility for
realigning procurement funds at the line-item level, and the terms of agreement regarding the two
FY2011 DDG-51s.
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Lack of Authorization for Quantity Increase
The FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51; the FY2011 budget requested funds
for the procurement of two DDG-51s. Notwithstanding the enactment of the FY2011 defense
authorization act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011), which authorizes the Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account at the requested FY2011 funding level, the Navy does not
believe it has authorization for executing proposed FY2011 quantity increases in shipbuilding
programs, including the DDG-51 program. 17
Lack of Flexibility for Realigning Procurement Funds
Unlike other Department of Defense procurement accounts, whose funds are appropriated at the
full-account level, funding for the procurement of Navy ships in the SCN appropriation account is
appropriated at the line-item level (including separate line items for advance procurement [AP]
funding), and is therefore managed by the Navy at the line-item level. This significantly reduces
the Navy’s flexibility in using the FY2010 SCN funding level to execute FY2011 SCN-funded
Navy shipbuilding programs.
As can be seen in Table 2, under a year-long CR at FY2010 funding levels, the Navy would face
a shortfall in the DDG-51 program of about $1.0 billion in procurement funding. This shortfall—
and the Navy’s belief that it lacks authorization for a quantity increase in FY2011—would likely
prevent the Navy from procuring a second DDG-51 in FY2011.
Table 2. FY2010 and FY2011 DDG-51 Procurement and AP Funding
Figures in millions, rounded to nearest million, figures may not add due to rounding
FY2010
funding level
FY2011 funding
level (requested)
Difference (with
FY2011 funding
shortfall shown
as a negative)
1,906
2,922
-1,016
577
48
529
Procurement
Advance procurement (AP)
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and used here with HASC
permission.
Terms of Agreement Regarding the Two FY2011 DDG-51s
Under the terms of a 2009 agreement between the Navy, General Dynamics, and Northrop
regarding the allocation of DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyer contracts between GD/BIW and
Ingalls, if the Navy is unable to award a contract for the second FY2011 DDG-51, it cannot award
a contract for the first FY2011 DDG-51.18 The scenario of a year-long CR thus jeopardizes the
Navy’s ability to award contracts for both of the DDG-51s requested for FY2011.
17
Source: Navy email to CRS on March 1, 2011.
18
Under the agreement, the second DDG-1000 was shifted from Ingalls to BIW, Ingalls would receive the DDG-51
procured in FY2010 and the first of the two DDG-51s to be procured in FY2011, and BIW would receive the second of
the two DDG-51s to be procured in FY2011. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2009 said he would support
construction of three DDG-1000s only if all three ships were built in the same shipyard. Shifting the second DDG-1000
(continued...)
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Potential Provisions for Mitigating the Potential Impact of a Year-Long CR
The potential impact of a year-long CR on the Navy’s ability to execute its planned procurement
of two DDG-51s FY2011 could be mitigated by including in that CR (or in some other legislative
vehicle) the following two provisions:
•
a provision granting the Navy the authority to execute an FY2011 quantity
increase for the DDG-51 program (or a more general authority to execute an
FY2011 quantity increase for any Navy procurement program scheduled for a
quantity increase in FY2011); and
•
a provision providing the Navy the flexibility to allocate an FY2010-level of
SCN funding so as to best meet the FY2011 funding needs of specific SCNfunded shipbuilding programs.
Contract Status of Second and Third DDG-1000s
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the contract status of the second and third ships in
the DDG-1000 program. As mentioned earlier (see “DDG-1000 Program” in “Background”),
although the Navy has issued limited bridging contracts to support early construction activities on
the second DDG-1000, the Navy as of mid-March 2011 had not yet signed overall construction
contracts for the second or third ships in the DDG-1000 program.
The signing of contracts for these two ships was delayed during 2010 by the need for the DDG1000 program to go back through the DOD acquisition milestone certification process following
the determination that the program had experienced a critical cost breach under the NunnMcCurdy provision. 19 That milestone certification process was completed late last year. It is
possible that the scenario of a year-long CR for FY2011 is contributing to the continued delay in
the awarding of these contracts because BIW, not knowing whether or when it will be awarded
the second of the two DDG-51s requested for FY2011, is facing uncertainty about its future
business base, making it difficult for BIW to commit to a certain price for the second and third
DDG-1000s. The longer the delay in the awarding of these two DDG-1000 construction
contracts, the greater the risk might be that the delay itself will cause an increase in the ships’
construction cost.20
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
•
When does the Navy anticipate being able to sign overall construction contracts
for the second and third ships?
•
Is the uncertainty over the Navy’s FY2011 funding contributing to this delay?
(...continued)
from Ingalls to BIW fulfilled this condition, and Ingalls was compensated for this through the promise of receiving the
FY2010 DDG-51 and the first of the two FY2011 DDG-51s.
19
For more on this, see Appendix B to this CRS report, and also and CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act:
Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress , by Moshe Schwartz.
20
For additional discussion, see Cid Standifer, “DDG-1001 And DDG-1002 Contract Awards Dragging Due To Price,
Spin-Off,” Inside the Navy, February 28, 2011.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The FY2010 budget that the Navy submitted to Congress in 2009 proposed ending procurement
of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers at three ships and resuming procurement of Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, supported this proposal: the FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51 (the
first to be procured since FY2005), provided advance procurement funding for two DDG-51s the
Navy wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000
(which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for
procuring additional DDG-1000s.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission called for procuring two DDG-51s in FY2011 and six
more in FY2012-FY2015. The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received
$577.2 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget
requested another $2,922.2 million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete
their estimated combined procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011
budget also requested $48.0 million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the
Navy wants to procure in FY2012, and $186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000
program-completion costs.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget also proposed terminating the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser
program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy
had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51,
called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current
version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by
procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Navy plans call for procuring 24 Flight
III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller version of
the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG(X). The
Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested $228.4 million in research and development funding
for the AMDR. Detailed design work on the Flight III DDG-51 reportedly is to begin in FY2012
or FY2013.1
FY2012 issues for Congress include the following:
•
the potential impact of the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface
Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322)—sometimes called the
FY2011 continuing resolution—on the Navy’s ability to execute the planned
procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011;
•
the contract status of the second and third ships in the DDG-1000 program;
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight
III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016;
•
whether to use multiyear procurement (MYP) for procuring Flight IIA DDG-51s;
and
1
Zachary M. Peterson, “DDG-51 With Enhanced Radar in FY-16, Design Work To Begin Soon,” Inside the Navy,
February 8, 2010.
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•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s funding requests for
procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s, for DDG-1000 program-completion costs,
and for research and development on the AMDR.
Congress’s decisions on these issues could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and
the shipbuilding industrial base. The question of whether to develop Flight III DDG-51 or pursue
an alternative path, such as developing a new-design destroyer, could have substantial and longlasting effects on the Navy.
Background
Navy Destroyer and Cruiser Acquisition Programs
DDG-51 Program
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.2 The DDG-51 is a multi-mission surface
combatant with an emphasis on air defense (which the Navy refers as anti-air warfare, or AAW)
and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations. DDG-51s, like the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class
cruisers, are equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated ship combat system named for
the mythological shield that defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often
referred to as Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The
Aegis system has been updated several times over the years. All DDG-51s (and also some CG47s) are being modified to receive an additional capability for ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations.3
The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985. A total of 63 have been procured through FY2010,
including 62 in FY1985-FY2005 and a 63rd in FY2010. The first ship entered service in 1991, and
a total of 59 were in service as of the end of FY2010. Of the 63 DDG-51s procured through
FY2010, General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, is the builder of 34, and
the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding
(NGSB), is the builder of 29.4 The Navy estimates the cost of the DDG-51 procured in FY2010 at
$2,234.5 million; the ship is being built at the Ingalls shipyard of NGSB.
2
The program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers.
3
The modification for BMD operations includes, among other things, the addition of a new software program for the
Aegis combat system and the arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is
designed for BMD operations. For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4
In the earlier years of the DDG-51 program, when as many as four or five DDG-51s per year were being procured,
Bath Iron Works (BIW) of Bath, ME (now a part of General Dynamics), and Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS
(now a part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding), competed on an annual basis for contracts to build DDG-51s. In
FY1994, when the annual DDG-51 procurement rate dropped to about three ships per year, the Navy ended annual
competition between the firms for the purpose of allocating DDG-51 construction contracts and began to allocate
DDG-51s between them. Two years later, in FY1996, the Navy began using Profit Related to Offer (PRO) bidding,
which granted a higher profit rate to the shipyard that submitted the lower-cost bid for its work. PRO bidding permits
the Navy to employ a degree of competition in the acquisition of DDG-51s even though DDG-51s are allocated rather
than competitively awarded to the two shipyards.
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The DDG-51 design has been modified over time. The first 28 DDG-51s (i.e., DDGs 51 through
78) are called Flight I/II DDG-51s. Subsequent ships in the class (i.e., DDGs 79 and higher) are
referred to as Flight IIA DDG-51s. The Flight IIA design, first procured in FY1994, implemented
a significant design change that included, among other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar.
The Flight IIA design has a full load displacement of about 9,500 tons, which is similar to that of
the CG-47.
Figure 1. DDG-51 Flight IIA Destroyer
Source: U.S. Navy file photo accessed by CRS on January 13, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/management/
photodb/photos/110110-N-7981E-938.jpg.
DDG-51s were originally built with 35-year expected service lives. The Navy’s February 2010
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan stated that the Navy intends to
extend the service lives of Flight IIA DDG-51s to 40 years.5 The Navy is implementing a program
for modernizing all DDG-51s so as maintain their mission and cost effectiveness out to the end of
their projected service lives. 6
5
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February
2010, p. 21.
6
For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Older CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51
program. 7
DDG-1000 Program
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.8 The DDG-1000 is a multi-mission
destroyer with an emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e.,
near-shore) waters. The DDG-1000 was intended in part to replace, in a technologically more
modern form, the large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its
Iowa-class battleships in the early 1990s.9 The DDG-1000 was also intended to improve the
Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral waters, to introduce several new
technologies that would be available for use on future Navy ships, and to serve as the basis for the
Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser.
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 142 sailors (compared to roughly 300 on the
Navy’s Aegis destroyers and cruisers) so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The
ship incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive
propulsion system10 and automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 14,987 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 55%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2011 budget submission estimated their
combined procurement cost at $6,324.6 million. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2011 budget submission estimated its
procurement cost at $2,723.0 million. All three ships are to be built at GD/BIW, with some
portions of each ship being built by NGSB for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime
contractor for the DDG-1000’s combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related
software, displays, and weapon launchers).
Construction of the first DDG-1000 is well underway. Some early construction activities have
taken place on the second DDG-1000. Although the Navy has issued limited bridging contracts to
7
See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. [April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author], and CRS Report 80-205, The Navy’s
Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With An Equal-Cost
Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke. [November 21, 1984; out of
print and available directly from the author]
8
The program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st Century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
9
The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
10
For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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support early construction activities on the second DDG-1000, the Navy as of mid-January 2011
had not yet signed overall construction contracts for the second or third ships in the program. 11
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program—including developments in
2010 relating to the program’s Nunn-McCurdy cost breach and subsequent restructuring and
milestone recertification—see Appendix B.
CG(X) Program
The CG(X) cruiser program was announced by the Navy on November 1, 2001.12 The Navy
wanted to procure as many as 19 CG(X)s as replacements for its 22 CG-47s, which are projected
to reach the end of their 35-year service lives between 2021 and 2029.13 The CG-47s are multimission ships with an emphasis on AAW and (for some CG-47s) BMD, and the Navy similarly
wanted the CG(X) to be a multi-mission ship with an emphasis on AAW and BMD. The CG(X)
was to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), a new radar that was to be considerably
larger and more powerful than the SPY-1 radar carried on the Navy’s Aegis ships. Some press
11
A June 14, 2010, press report stated:
Defense Department officials are launching compliance reviews of Northrop Grumman Ship
Systems in Pascagoula, MS, and General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard in Maine after
determining both contractors have multiple problems heeding key DOD management rules.
In a June 1 report to Congress, Defense Department acquisition chief Ashton Carter said two of
three prime contractors in the Navy’s Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 destroyer program were not
properly using earned value management….
The other major contractor in the program, Raytheon in Tewksbury, MA, met the requirements of
the agency’s earned value management review.
(Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Scrutinizes Two Shipbuilders For Ignoring Key Management
Rules,” Inside the Navy, June 14, 2010.)
12
The Navy on that date announced that that it was launching a Future Surface Combatant Program aimed at acquiring
a family of next-generation surface combatants. This new family of surface combatants, the Navy stated, would include
three new classes of ships:
•
a destroyer called the DD(X)—later redesignated DDG-1000—for the precision long-range strike and naval
gunfire mission,
•
a cruiser called the CG(X) for the AAW and BMD mission, and
•
a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft,
and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.
The Future Surface Combatant Program replaced an earlier Navy surface combatant acquisition effort, begun in the
mid-1990s, called the Surface Combatant for the 21st Century (SC-21) program. The SC-21 program encompassed a
planned destroyer called DD-21 and a planned cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface
Combatant Program in 2001, development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, but the start of
development work on the CG-21 was still years in the future. The DD(X) program, now called the DDG-1000 or
Zumwalt-class program, is essentially a restructured continuation of the DD-21 program. The CG(X) might be
considered the successor, in planning terms, of the CG-21. After November 1, 2001, the acronym SC-21 continued for
a time to be used in the Navy’s research and development account to designate a line item (i.e., program element) that
funded development work on the DDG-1000 and CG(X).
13
A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between
1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too
expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005. The Navy is currently modernizing the
remaining 22 to maintain their mission effectiveness to age 35; for more information, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy
Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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reports suggested that a nuclear-powered version of the CG(X) might have had a full load
displacement of more than 20,000 tons and a unit procurement cost of $5 billion or more.14
The Navy’s FY2009 budget called for procuring the first CG(X) in FY2011. Beginning in late
2008, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to defer the procurement of the first
CG(X) by several years, to about FY2017.15 Consistent with these press reports, on April 6, 2009,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced—as part of a series of recommendations for the
then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget—a recommendation to “delay the CG-X next
generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy” for the
program. 16 The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget deferred procurement of the first CG(X) beyond
FY2015. The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposed terminating the CG(X) program as unaffordable
(see “FY2011 Navy Proposal to Terminate CG(X) in Favor of Flight III DDG-51” below).
FY2010 Navy Proposal to End DDG-1000 Procurement and Resume DDG-51
Procurement
At a July 31, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee, the Navy announced that it wanted to end DDG-1000
procurement and resume DDG-51 procurement. The announcement represented a major change
in Navy planning: prior to July 31, 2008, the Navy for years had strongly supported ending DDG51 procurement in FY2005 and proceeding with DDG-1000 procurement.
In explaining their proposed change in plans, Navy officials cited a reassessment of threats that
Navy forces are likely to face in coming years. As a result of this reassessment, Navy officials
stated, the service decided that destroyer procurement over the next several years should
emphasize three mission capabilities—area-defense AAW,17 BMD, and open-ocean ASW. Navy
officials also stated that they want to maximize the number of destroyers that can be procured
over the next several years within budget constraints. Navy officials stated that DDG-51s can
14
For a discussion of nuclear power for Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy
Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
15
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Awards Technology Company $128 Million Contract For CG(X) Work,” Inside the
Navy, October 27, 2008. Another press report (Katherine McIntire Peters, “Navy’s Top Officer Sees Lessons in
Shipbuilding Program Failures,” GovernmentExecutive.com, September 24, 2008) quoted Admiral Gary Roughead, the
Chief of Naval Operations, as saying: “What we will be able to do is take the technology from the DDG-1000, the
capability and capacity that [will be achieved] as we build more DDG-51s, and [bring those] together around 2017 in a
replacement ship for our cruisers.” (Material in brackets in the press report.) Another press report (Zachary M.
Peterson, “Part One of Overdue CG(X) AOA Sent to OSD, Second Part Coming Soon,” Inside the Navy, September 29,
2008) quoted Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, as saying that the Navy did not budget for a CG(X) hull in its proposal for the Navy’s budget under the
FY2010-FY2015 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to be submitted to Congress in early 2009.
An earlier report (Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Destroyer Program Facing Major Cuts,” DefenseNews.com, July
14, 2008) stated that the CG(X) would be delayed until FY2015 or later. See also Geoff Fein, “Navy Likely To Change
CG(X)’s Procurement Schedule, Official Says,” Defense Daily, June 24, 2008; Rebekah Gordon, “Navy Agrees CG(X)
By FY-11 Won’t Happen But Reveals Little Else,” Inside the Navy, June 30, 2008.
16
Source: Opening remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at an April 6, 2009, news conference on DOD
recommendations for the then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget.
17
A ship with a point-defense AAW system can defend itself. A ship with an area-defense AAW system can defend
both itself and other ships in the area. An area-defense AAW system employs an interceptor missile with a range
sufficient to hit a crossing target (i.e., a target that is heading toward another ship). Navy ships equipped with the SM-2
missile can conduct area-defense AAW operations.
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provide the area-defense AAW, BMD, and open-ocean ASW capabilities that the Navy wants to
emphasize, and that while the DDG-1000 design could also be configured to provide these
capabilities, the Navy could procure more DDG-51s than reconfigured DDG-1000s over the next
several years for the same total amount of funding. In addition, the Navy by 2008-2009 no longer
appeared committed to the idea of reusing the DDG-1000 hull as the basis for the Navy’s planned
CG(X) cruiser. If the Navy had remained committed to that idea, it might have served as a reason
for continuing DDG-1000 procurement.
The Navy’s FY2010 budget proposed ending DDG-1000 procurement at three ships and resuming
DDG-51 procurement. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense budget, supported
the proposal: The FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51 (the first to be
procured since FY2005), provided advance procurement funding for two DDG-51s the Navy
wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000 (which
was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for procuring
additional DDG-1000s.
FY2011 Navy Proposal to Terminate CG(X) in Favor of Flight III DDG-51
The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposed another major change in Navy plans—terminating the
CG(X) cruiser program and instead procuring an improved version of the DDG-51 called the
Flight III version. 18 The Navy stated that its desire to terminate the CG(X) program was “driven
by affordability considerations.”19 Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the
Navy had previously envisaged, the Navy stated that it wants to begin procuring Flight III DDG51s in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2010-FY2015,
followed by procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016.20 Navy plans call for
procuring 24 Flight III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031.21
The Flight III DDG-51 is to carry a version of the AMDR that is smaller and less powerful than
the one envisaged for the CG(X). The Flight III DDG-51’s AMDR is to have a diameter of about
14 feet, while the AMDR intended for the CG(X) might have had a diameter of about 22 feet.22 In
addition to improving the DDG-51’s AAW and BMD capability through the installation of the
AMDR, the Navy is also studying options for modifying the DDG-51 design in other ways for
18
It is a source of potential confusion that this is not the first time that the Navy has used the Flight III designation: The
Navy in 1988 studied design options for a Flight III version of the DDG-51 design. The Chief of Naval Operations
gave initial approval to a Flight III design concept, and the design was intended to begin procurement in FY1994.
(Source: Donald Ewing, Randall Fortune, Brian Rochon, and Robert Scott, DDG 51 Flight III Design Development,
Presented at the Meeting of the Chesapeake Section of The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers,
December 12, 1989.) The Flight III design was canceled in late-1990/early-1991. Subsequent studies led to the current
Flight IIA design, which began procurement in FY1994. The Flight III DDG-51 that the Navy now wants to begin
procuring in FY2016 is not the same as the Flight III design of 1988-1991.
19
Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February
2010, p. 5-7.
20
See, for example, Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy To Launch Technical Study And Cost Analysis For New DDG-51s,”
Inside the Navy, February 19, 2010.
21
Source: Supplementary data on 30-year shipbuilding plan provided to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) by the Navy on February 18, 2010.
22
Sources for 14-foot and 22-foot figures: Zachary M. Peterson, “DDG-51 With Enhanced Radar in FY-16, Design
Work To Begin Soon,” Inside the Navy, February 8, 2010; Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2010: 1-2; “[Interview With] Vice Adm. Barry McCullough,”
Defense News, November 9, 2009: 38.
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purposes of reducing crew size, achieving energy efficiency and improved power generation,
improving effectiveness in warfare areas other than AAW and BMD, and reducing total
ownership cost.23 Detailed design work on the Flight III DDG-51 will reportedly begin in FY2012
or FY2013.24
For more on the Navy’s proposal in the FY2011 budget to terminate the CG(X) program in favor
of procuring Flight III DDG-51s, see Appendix C.
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
Shipyards
All cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at GD/BIW of Bath,
ME, and the Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, MS, that forms part of NGSB.25 Both yards have
long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of Navy surface combatants in
recent years has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-construction work and for a
significant share of Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (The Ingalls shipyard also builds amphibious
ships for the Navy.) Navy surface combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at
GD/BIW, NGSB, other private-sector U.S. shipyards, and government-operated naval shipyards
(NSYs).
Combat System Manufacturers
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Northrop Grumman is a third potential maker of
Navy surface combatant radars. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51 combat system
(the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000 combat system, the
core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (TSCE-I). Lockheed
has a share of the DDG-100 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of the DDG-51 combat
system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop are potential makers of the AMDR to be carried by
the Flight III DDG-51.
Supplier Firms
The surface combatant industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that supply
materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has been a
matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for what
they make for Navy surface combatants.
23
Source: Memorandum dated February 2, 2010, from Director, Surface Warfare Division (N86) to Commander, Naval
Sea Systems Command (SEA 05) on the subject “Technical Study In Support Of DDG 51 Class Resource Planning
And Requirements Analysis,” posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required) February 19, 2009. See also
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy To Launch Technical Study And Cost Analysis For New DDG-51s,” Inside the Navy,
February 19, 2010.)
24
Zachary M. Peterson, “DDG-51 With Enhanced Radar in FY-16, Design Work To Begin Soon,” Inside the Navy,
February 8, 2010.
25
NGSB also includes the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, Newport News Shipbuilding of Newport News, VA,
and a fourth facility, used for manufacturing ship components and structures made from composites, at Gulfport, MS.
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FY2011 Funding Request
The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received $577.2 million in FY2010
advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested another $2,922.2
million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete their estimated combined
procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requested $48.0
million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the Navy wants to procure in
FY2012, $186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000 program-completion costs, and
$228.4 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. The funding request for the
AMDR was contained in the Navy’s research and development account in Project 3186 (“Air and
Missile Defense Radar”) of Program Element (PE) 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water
Sensors”).
FY2012 Funding Request
The Administration is expected to submit its proposed FY2012 defense budget to Congress on or
about February 14, 2011.
Issues for Congress
FY2012 issues for Congress include the following:
•
the potential impact of the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface
Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322)—sometimes called the
FY2011 continuing resolution—on the Navy’s ability to execute the planned
procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011;
•
the contract status of the second and third ships in the DDG-1000 program;
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight
III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016;
•
whether to use multiyear procurement (MYP) for procuring Flight IIA DDG-51s;
and
•
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s funding requests for
procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s, for DDG-1000 program-completion costs,
and for research and development on the AMDR.
The first four of these issues are discussed below.
Potential Impact of FY2011 Continuing Resolution
One potential issue for Congress is whether the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface
Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322), also known as the FY2011 continuing
resolution, will affect the Navy’s ability to execute the planned procurement of two DDG-51s in
FY2011. H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322 generally funds defense programs, including the DDG-51
program, at FY2010 funding levels through March 4, 2011. Since the FY2010 budget included
funding for the procurement of one DDG-51, while the FY2011 budget requested funding for the
procurement of two DDG-51s, Congress may wish to inquire about the Navy’s ability under H.R.
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3082/P.L. 111-322 to obligate in a timely manner all the funding required to execute a two-ship
procurement in FY2011.
It is possible that the Navy might seek to use DDG-51 program funding that is made available
under H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322 to support, as much as possible, activities consistent with the
procurement of two DDG-51s in FY2011, while awaiting further congressional action on funding
for the remainder of FY2011. Section 102(a)(3) of the FY2011 defense authorization act (H.R.
6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011) might be interpreted as providing at least implicit
authorization for the procurement of two DDG-51s in FY2011. 26
Contract Status of Second and Third DDG-1000s
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the contract status of the second and third ships in
the DDG-1000 program. As mentioned earlier (see “DDG-1000 Program” in “Background”),
although the Navy has issued limited bridging contracts to support early construction activities on
the second DDG-1000, the Navy as of mid-January 2011 had not yet signed overall construction
contracts for the second or third ships in the DDG-1000 program. Potential oversight questions
for Congress include the following:
•
Given DOD’s decision on October 8, 2010, to reinstate the DDG-1000 program’s
Milestone B certification and authorize the Navy to continue production of the
first and second DDG-1000s and commence production of the third DDG-1000,
when does the Navy anticipate being able to sign overall construction contracts
for the second and third ships?
•
What impact, if any, might the delay in signing overall construction contracts for
the second and third ships have on the procurement costs of the ships?
Navy Proposal to Develop and Procure Flight III DDG-51s
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s proposal to develop and procure the
Flight III DDG-51. Although the first Flight III ship would not be procured under Navy plans
until FY2016, Navy activities in FY2012 will increasingly commit the Navy to this path. An
alternative to the Flight III DDG-51 that Congress may wish to consider would be a new-design
destroyer that would be more capable in certain respects than the Flight III DDG-51, but more
affordable than the CG(X). If development of a new-design destroyer were begun in FY2012, the
first ship might be ready for procurement as early as FY2018.
In considering whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop and procure
Flight III DDG-51s, potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:
•
Is there an adequate analytical basis for procuring Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of
CG(X)s? Should an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or the equivalent of an AOA
26
For press reports discussing the potential impact of the FY2011 continuing resolution on FY2011 Navy programs,
including shipbuilding programs, see Cid Standifer, “Stackley: Continuing Resolution Throws Sand In Navy, DOD
Budget Gears,” Inside the Navy, January 10, 2011; Cid Standifer and Dan Taylor, “Navy Looks At Reprogramming
Options Under Continuing Resolution,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2011.
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be performed before committing to the development and procurement of Flight
III DDG-51s?
•
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficient AAW and BMD capability to perform
projected AAW and BMD missions?
•
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or
40-year service life?
•
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficiently low life-cycle ownership costs?
•
How would a new-design destroyer compare to a Flight III DDG-51 in terms of
capabilities, costs, and risks?
•
What would be the potential industrial-base consequences of developing and
procuring a new-design destroyer instead of the Flight III DDG-51?
Each of these questions is discussed below.
Analytical Basis
Is there an adequate analytical basis for procuring Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of CG(X)s? Should
an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or the equivalent of an AOA be performed before committing to
the development and procurement of Flight III DDG-51s?27
Those who believe there is an adequate analytical basis for canceling the CG(X) and instead
procuring Flight III DDG-51s could argue the following:
•
Shifting to procurement of Flight III DDG-51s in FY2016, like shifting to
procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY1994, would simply extend the DDG51 production effort, and therefore would not amount to the initiation of a new
shipbuilding program that would require an AOA or the equivalent of an AOA.
•
The Navy’s proposal to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG51s reflects substantial analytical work in the form of the CG(X) AOA, additional
27
21
21
The issue of whether there is an adequate analytical basis for canceling the CG(X) and instead procuring Flight III
DDG-51s is somewhat similar to an issue raised by CRS several years ago as to whether there was an adequate
analytical basis for the Navy’s decision that a ship like the LCS—a small, fast ship with modular payload packages—
would be the best or most cost-effective way to fill gaps the Navy had identified in its capabilities for countering
submarines, small surface attack craft, and mines in heavily contested littoral areas. (See, for example, the September 5,
2002, update of CRS Report RS21305, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O’Rourke, or the October 28, 2004, and the October 28, 2004, update of CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51
and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.)
The Navy eventually acknowledged that, on the question of what would be the best approach to fill these capability
gaps, “the more rigorous analysis occurred after the decision to move to LCS.” (Spoken testimony of Vice Admiral
John Nathman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare Requirements and Programs), at an April 3, 2003, hearing
on Navy programs before the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At this
hearing, the chairman of the subcommittee, Representative Roscoe Bartlett, asked the Navy witnesses about the Navy’s
analytical basis for the LCS program. The witnesses defended the analytical basis of the LCS program but
acknowledged that “The more rigorous analysis occurred after the decision to move to LCS.” (See U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Hearing on National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004—H.R. 1588, and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs. 108th Cong., 1st
sess., Mar. 27, and Apr. 3, 2003, (Washington: GPO, 2003), p. 126. For an article discussing the exchange, see Jason
Ma, “Admiral: Most LCS Requirement Analysis Done After Decision To Build,” Inside the Navy, Apr. 14, 2003.)
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The Navy eventually acknowledged that, on the question of what would be the best approach to fill these capability
(continued...)
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Those who believe there is an adequate analytical basis for canceling the CG(X) and instead
procuring Flight III DDG-51s could argue the following:
•
Shifting to procurement of Flight III DDG-51s in FY2016, like shifting to
procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY1994, would simply extend the DDG51 production effort, and therefore would not amount to the initiation of a new
shipbuilding program that would require an AOA or the equivalent of an AOA.
•
The Navy’s proposal to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG51s reflects substantial analytical work in the form of the CG(X) AOA, additional
Navy studies that were done to support the 2008-2009 proposal to end DDG1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement, and the 2009 Navy
destroyer hull/radar study that examined options for improving the AAW and
BMD capabilities of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyer designs through the
installation of an improved radar and combat system modifications.
Those who question whether there is an adequate analytical basis for canceling the CG(X) and
instead procuring Flight III DDG-51s could argue the following:
•
Procuring Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016 represents a significant change
from the previous plan to procure CG(X)s starting around FY2017. Given the
scope of the design modifications incorporated into the Flight III DDG-51 and
the number of years that the design would be procured, the Navy’s plan amounts
to the equivalent of a new shipbuilding program whose initiation would require
an AOA or the equivalent of an AOA.
•
The CG(X) AOA focused mainly on examining radar and hull-design options for
a cruiser with a large and powerful version of the AMDR, rather than radar- and
hull-design options for a smaller destroyer with a smaller and less powerful
version of the AMDR. The Navy’s 2009 destroyer hull/radar study was focused
on answering a somewhat narrowly defined question: what would be the lowestcost option for improving the AAW and BMD performance of a DDG-51 or
DDG-1000 by a certain amount through the installation of an improved radar and
an associated modified combat system? An adequate analytical basis for a
proposed program change of this magnitude would require an AOA or equivalent
study that rigorously examined a broader question: given projected Navy roles
and missions, and projected Navy and DOD capabilities to be provided by other
programs, what characteristics of all kinds (not just AAW and BMD capability)
are needed in surface combatants in coming years, and what is the most costeffective acquisition strategy to provide such ships?
(...continued)
gaps, “the more rigorous analysis occurred after the decision to move to LCS.” (Spoken testimony of Vice Admiral
John Nathman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare Requirements and Programs), at an April 3, 2003, hearing
on Navy programs before the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At this
hearing, the chairman of the subcommittee, Representative Roscoe Bartlett, asked the Navy witnesses about the Navy’s
analytical basis for the LCS program. The witnesses defended the analytical basis of the LCS program but
acknowledged that “The more rigorous analysis occurred after the decision to move to LCS.” (See U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Hearing on National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004—H.R. 1588, and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs. 108th Cong., 1st
sess., Mar. 27, and Apr. 3, 2003, (Washington: GPO, 2003), p. 126. For an article discussing the exchange, see Jason
Ma, “Admiral: Most LCS Requirement Analysis Done After Decision To Build,” Inside the Navy, Apr. 14, 2003.)
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AAW and BMD Capability
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficient AAW and BMD capability to perform projected AAW
and BMD missions?
The Flight III DDG-51 would have more AAW and BMD capability than the current DDG-51
design, but less AAW and BMD capability than was envisioned for the CG(X), in large part
because the Flight III DDG-51 would be equipped with a roughly 14-foot-diameter version of the
AMDR that would have more sensitivity than the SPY-1 radar on Flight IIA DDG-51s, but less
sensitivity than the roughly 22-foot-diameter version of the AMDR that was envisioned for the
CG(X). The CG(X) also may have had more missile-launch tubes than the Flight III DDG-51.
Supporters of the Navy’s proposal to procure Flight III DDG-51s could argue that a roughly 14foot-diameter version of the AMDR would provide the DDG-51 with sufficient AAW and BMD
capability to perform projected AAW and BMD missions because this radar would be
substantially more capable than the SPY-1 radar currently on DDG-51s, and because Flight III
DDG-51s (and other Navy ships) would also benefit from data collected by other sensors,
including space-based sensors.
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Skeptics could argue that Flight III DDG-51s might not have sufficient AAW and BMD capability
because a roughly 14-foot-diameter AMDR would be substantially less capable than the roughly
22-foot-diameter AMDR that the Navy previously believed would be needed to adequately
perform projected AAW and BMD missions, and because the off-board sensors and datacommunications links on which the Flight
III DDG-51 would rely for part of its sensor data that
could might turn out to be less capable as the
Navy assumed in 2008 that they would be, and because the off-board sensors and their related
data-communication links could in any event be vulnerable to enemy attack.
Growth Margin
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service
life?
A ship’s growth margin refers to its capacity for being fitted over time with either additional
equipment or newer equipment that is larger, heavier, or more power-intensive than the older
equipment it is replacing, so as to preserve the ship’s mission effectiveness. Elements of a ship’s
growth margin include interior space, weight-carrying capacity, electrical power, cooling capacity
(to cool equipment), and ability to accept increases in the ship’s vertical center of gravity. Navy
ship classes are typically designed so that the first ships in the class will be built with a certain
amount of growth margin. Over time, some or all of the growth margin in a ship class may be
used up by backfitting additional or newer systems onto existing ships in the class, or by building
later ships in the class to a modified design that includes additional or newer systems.
Modifying the DDG-51 design over time has used up some of the design’s growth margin. The
Flight III DDG-51 would have less of a growth margin than what the Navy would aim to include
in a new destroyer design of about the same size.
Supporters of the Navy’s proposal to procure Flight III DDG-51s could argue that the ship’s
growth margin would be adequate because the increase in capability achieved with the Flight III
configuration reduces the likelihood that the ship will need much subsequent modification to
retain its mission effectiveness over its projected service life. They could also that, given
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technology advances, new systems added to the ship years from now might require no more (and
possibly less) space, weight, electrical power, or cooling capacity than the older systems they
replace.
Skeptics could argue that there are uncertainties involved in projecting what types of capabilities
ships might need to have to remain mission effective over a 35- or 40-year life, and that building
expensive new warships with relatively modest growth margins consequently would be
imprudent. The Flight III DDG-51’s growth margin, they could argue, could make it more likely
that the ships would need to be removed from service well before the end of their projected
service lives due to an inability to accept modifications needed to preserve their mission
effectiveness. Skeptics could argue that it might not be possible to fit the Flight III DDG-51 in the
future with a high-power laseran electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG) or a high-power (200 kW to 300 kW) solid state
laser (SSL), because the ship would lack the electrical power or cooling
capacity required for
such a weapon. Skeptics could argue that EMRGs and/or high-power lasersSSLs could be critical
to the
Navy’s ability years from now to affordably counter large numbers of enemy anti-ship
cruise cruise
missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) that might be fielded by a
wealthy wealthy
and determined adversary,28 and. Skeptics could argue that procuring Flight III DDG-51s could delay the point
28
The cost for an adversary to build and field an additional land-based ASCM or ASBM might be much less than the
cost for the Navy to build and field an additional sea-based missile-launch tube and procure an additional interceptor
(continued...)
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at which
the point at which EMRGs or high-power lasersSSLs could be introduced into the cruiser-destroyer
force, and reduce for
many years the portion of the cruiser-destroyer force that could ultimately
be backfitted with
high-power lasers these weapons. This, skeptics could argue, might result in an approach to AAW
and BMD on
cruisers and destroyers that might ultimately be unaffordable for the Navy to sustain
in a
competition against a wealthy and determined adversary.22
Life-Cycle Ownership Costs
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficiently low life-cycle ownership costs?
Supporters of the Navy’s proposal to procure Flight III DDG-51s could argue that the annual
operating & support (O&S) cost of the Flight IIA DDG-51 design is not onerous, and that the
annual O&S cost of a Flight III DDG-51 would not be markedly different. They could also argue
that the Navy is studying options for modifying the DDG-51 design to reduce crew size and
otherwise reduce total ownership cost.2923 Skeptics could argue that the crew size and other
elements of the Flight III DDG-51’s life-cycle ownership cost could be reduced only so much,
given certain unchangeable features of the basic DDG-51 design, and that building significant
numbers of Flight III DDG-51s—rather than ships designed from scratch to achieve significant
reductions in crew size and other life-cycle ownership costs—would produce a surface combatant
fleet with relatively high life-cycle ownership costs.
Alternative of New-Design Destroyer
How would a new-design destroyer compare to a Flight III DDG-51 in terms of capabilities,
costs, and risks?
As an alternative to the Flight III DDG-51, a new-design destroyer could be designed with the
following characteristics:
•
a version of the AMDR that is larger than the roughly 14-foot-diameter version
envisioned for the Flight III DDG-51, but smaller than the roughly 22-footdiameter version that was envisioned for the CG(X);
•
enough electrical power to permit the ship to be backfitted in the future with a
high-power DEW, such as a laser, for AAW and/or BMD operations;
•
more growth margin than on the Flight III DDG-51;
(...continued)
missile to place in that tube. If so, then it might become unaffordable for the Navy at some point in the future to match
each additional ASCM and ASBM that a wealthy and determined adversary might field with an additional launch tube
and interceptor missile. DEWs, if successfully developed, promise to reverse this unfavorable cost equation by
lowering the marginal cost per shot for intercepting ASCMs and ASBMs to a level well below what it costs an enemy
to build an additional ASCM or ASBM.
2922
For more on potential shipboard lasers, see CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
23
Source: Memorandum dated February 2, 2010, from Director, Surface Warfare Division (N86) to Commander, Naval
Sea Systems Command (SEA 05) on the subject “Technical Study In Support Of DDG 51 Class Resource Planning
And Requirements Analysis,” posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required) February 19, 2009. See also
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy To Launch Technical Study And Cost Analysis For New DDG-51s,” Inside the Navy,
February 19, 2010.)
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Alternative of New-Design Destroyer
How would a new-design destroyer compare to a Flight III DDG-51 in terms of capabilities,
costs, and risks?
As an alternative to the Flight III DDG-51, a new-design destroyer could be designed with the
following characteristics:
•
a version of the AMDR that is larger than the roughly 14-foot-diameter version
envisioned for the Flight III DDG-51, but smaller than the roughly 22-footdiameter version that was envisioned for the CG(X);
•
enough electrical power to permit the ship to be backfitted in the future with an
EMRG or high-power SSL;
•
more growth margin than on the Flight III DDG-51;
•
producibility features for reducing construction cost per ton that are more
extensive than those on the DDG-51 design;
•
automation features permitting a crew that is smaller than what can be achieved
on a Flight III DDG-51, so as to reduce crew-related life-cycle ownership costs;
•
physical open-architecture features that are more extensive than those on the
Flight III DDG-51, so as to reduce modernization-related life-cycle ownership
costs;
•
no technologies not already on, or being developed for, other Navy ships, with
the possible exception of technologies that would enable an integrated electric
drive system that is more compact than the one used on the DDG-1000; and
•
DDG-51-like characteristics in other areas, such as survivability, maximum
speed, cruising range, and weapons payload.
Such a ship might have a full load displacement of roughly 11,000 to 12,000 tons, compared to
about 10,000 tons for the Flight III DDG-51, about 15,000 tons for an AAW/BMD version of the
DDG-1000, and perhaps 15,000 to 23,000 tons for a CG(X).
The cost and technical risk of developing the new destroyer’s hull design could be minimized by
leveraging, where possible, existing surface combatant hull designs. The cost and technical risk of
developing its combat system could be minimized by using a modified version of the DDG-51 or
DDG-1000 combat system. Other development costs and risks for the new destroyer would be
minimized by using no technologies not already on, or being developed for, other Navy ships
(with the possible exception of some integrated electric drive technologies). Even with such steps,
however, the cost and technical risk of developing the new destroyer would be greater than those
of the Flight III DDG-51. The development cost of the new destroyer would likely be equivalent
to the procurement cost of at least one destroyer, and possibly two destroyers.
The procurement cost of the new destroyer would be minimized by incorporating producibility
features for reducing construction cost per ton that are more extensive than those on the Flight III
DDG-51. Even with such features, the new destroyer would be more expensive to procure than
the Flight III DDG-51, in part because the Flight III DDG-51 would leverage many years of prior
production of DDG-51s. In addition, the new destroyer, as a new ship design, would pose more
risk of procurement cost growth than would the Flight III DDG-51. The procurement cost of the
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new destroyer would nevertheless be much less than that of the CG(X), and might, after the
production of the first few units, be fairly close to that of the Flight III DDG-51.
Although the new destroyer would use a reduced-size crew and physical open architecture
features to reduce life-cycle ownership costs, it is unclear how the life-cycle ownership costs of
the new destroyer would compare with those of the Flight III DDG-51.
Table 13 summarizes potential relative merits of the Flight III DDG-51 and the potential new
destroyer considered here. The Flight III DDG-51 offers near-term benefits of lower development
cost and risk and lower procurement cost and risk, while the new destroyer would offer longerterm benefits of greater AAW and BMD capability and greater growth margin.
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Table 13. Flight III DDG-51 Compared to Potential New-Design Destroyer
(X indicates the design that would likely have greater capability or growth margin, or lower cost or risk)
Flight III DDG-51
New-design destroyer
Capability of AMDR for
AAW/BMD operations
X
Electrical power to support future
high-power DEW for AAW/BMD
operations electromagnetic
rail gun (EMRG) or high-power (200 kW to 300
kW) solid state laser (SSL)
X
Growth margin
X
Development cost
X
Development risk
X
Procurement cost
X
Procurement cost growth risk
X
Life-cycle ownership cost
unclear which design would have lower cost
Source: Prepared by CRS.
Industrial-Base
What would be the potential industrial-base consequences of developing and procuring a newdesign destroyer instead of the Flight III DDG-51?
Developing and procuring a new-design destroyer would provide an opportunity for the Navy to
conduct a competition between Lockheed and Raytheon (and perhaps other firms) to be the lead
contractor on the ship’s combat system. Procuring Flight III DDG-51s would mean that Lockheed
would likely continue its current status as the lead contractor of Navy cruiser and destroyer
combat systems. Developing and procuring either ship would provide the Navy with an
opportunity to conduct a competition between Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop to build the
AMDR. The supplier firms for a new-design destroyer could be different in some cases from the
supplier firms for a Flight III DDG-51.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) for Flight IIA DDG-51s
Multiyear procurement (MYP), also known as multiyear contracting, is a special contracting
authority that Congress permits DOD to use for a small number of procurement programs. MYP
permits the service in question to use a single contract to contract for multiple copies of an item
that are scheduled to be procured over a period of up to five years. MYP reduces the cost of the
items being procured by giving the production plant the confidence in future business that it
needs to make labor force and capital plant investments that can reduce the production cost of the
item being procured, and because MYP also permits certain long lead-time components of the
items to be procured up front, in the first year or two of the MYP arrangement, permitting the
manufacturers of these components to make them more economically. The authority to order long
lead-time components up front, in batch form, is called economic order quantity (EOQ). Although
the savings realized from using MYP arrangements varies from program to program, a typical
savings is roughly 10% of the total cost of the items being procured, of which roughly half might
be due to labor force and capital plant investments at the production plant, and roughly half to
EOQ procurement of long lead-time components.
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The statute governing MYP contracts is located at 10 U.S.C. 2603b. Under 10 U.S.C. 2306b,
programs being considered for MYP must meet certain criteria.
MYP contracts were used to procure 13 Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY1998-FY2001, and to procure
11 more Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2002-FY2005. Some observers are interested in the option of
using a third MYP contract to procure Flight IIA DDG-51s.
At a May 6, 2010, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower Subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred between Senator Susan
Collins and Sean Stackley, the Navy’s acquisition executive (i.e., the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy [Research, Development and Acquisition]):
SENATOR COLLINS:
Mr. Stackley, in Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates’ speech on Monday [May 3, 2010], he
talked about the need for the Navy and the industry to find ways to build the ships more
economically. One way to do that is for the Navy to make greater use of multiyear
procurement contracts.
As the Navy looks at the restart of the DDG 51 line, are you giving consideration to the use
of multiyear procurement contracts?
STACKLEY:
Absolutely, we are. We've used two multiyears in the past with the DDG 51 program that
provided great benefit. We are not ready yet, the initiation of the restart, to go right into a
multiyear.
We do owe Congress an acquisition strategy [for the Flight IIA DDG-51s to be procured
through FY2015]. And in formulating that acquisition strategy, we'll be addressing an
approach that considers multiyear, perhaps in 2013.30
Legislative Activity for FY2012
The Administration is expected to submit its proposed FY2012 defense budget to Congress on or
about February 14, 2011.
30
Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Another potential issue for Congress is whether it would be appropriate for the Navy to use a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract beginning in FY2013 to procure one or more Flight III
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DDG-51s.24 An MYP contract starting in FY2013 would be the third use of MYP contracting in
the DDG-51 program: an MYP contract was used to procure 13 Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY1998FY2001, and another was used procure 10 more Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2002-FY2005.
An MYP contract beginning in FY2013 could extend through FY2016 or FY2017. Such a
contract would include, in addition to several Flight IIA DDG-51s, at least one Flight III DDG-51
(the one planned for FY2016). The statute covering MYP contracts—10 U.S.C. 2306b—states
that an MYP contract can be used for a DOD procurement program when the Secretary of
Defense finds, among other things, “that there is a stable design for the property to be acquired
and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive.” For Navy
shipbuilding programs, demonstrating the existence of a stable design traditionally has involved
building at least one ship to that design and confirming, through that ship’s construction, that the
design does not need to be significantly changed. This is a principal reason why MYP contracts
have not been used for procuring the lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs.
Skeptics of using an MYP contract to procure the first Flight III DDG-51 could argue that the
extent of design changes in the Flight III design—including the change in the ship’s radar and
associated changes in the ship’s power-generation and cooling systems—make the ship different
enough from the Flight IIA design that a stable design for the Flight III design has not yet been
demonstrated. They can also note that the previous two DDG-51 contracts did not encompass a
shift in DDG-51 flights, and that the first of these two MYP contracts began in FY1998, four
years after the first Flight IIA DDG-51 was procured.
Supporters of using an MYP contract to procure the first Flight III DDG-51 could argue that in
spite of the design changes in the Flight III design, the vast majority of the DDG-51 design will
remain unchanged, and that the stability of the basic DDG-51 design has been demonstrated
through many years of production.
Mitigating Projected Cruiser-Destroyer Shortfall
Another issue for Congress is whether actions should be taken to mitigate the projected shortfall
in cruisers and destroyers shown in Table 1. Options for mitigating this projected shortfall
include the following:
•
adding DDG-51s to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and
•
extending the lives Flight I/II DDG-51s to about 45 years (i.e., about 10 years
beyond their currently planned 35-year service lives).
24
Multiyear procurement (MYP), also known as multiyear contracting, is a special contracting authority that Congress
permits DOD to use for a small number of procurement programs. MYP permits the service in question to use a single
contract to contract for multiple copies of an item that are scheduled to be procured over a period of up to five years.
MYP reduces the cost of the items being procured by giving the production plant the confidence in future business that
it needs to make labor force and capital plant investments that can reduce the production cost of the item being
procured, and because MYP also permits certain long lead-time components of the items to be procured up front, in the
first year or two of the MYP arrangement, permitting the manufacturers of these components to make them more
economically. The authority to order long lead-time components up front, in batch form, is called economic order
quantity (EOQ) authority. Although the savings realized from using MYP arrangements varies from program to
program, a typical savings is roughly 10% of the total cost of the items being procured. The statute governing MYP
contracts is located at 10 U.S.C. 2603b.
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Adding DDG-51s to Shipbuilding Plan
Substantially mitigating the projected cruiser-destroyer shortfall primarily through the first of
these two options could involve adding at least 10, and possibly closer to 20, additional DDG-51s
to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. The Navy’s FY2011 five-year shipbuilding plan included one
DDG-51 in FY2014; the Navy’s new FY2012 five-year shipbuilding plan includes two. The
second DDG-51 now planned for FY2014 could be considered the first such additional DDG-51.
Given funding pressures that could be placed on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget during the period
FY2019-FY2033 by the Navy’s program to procure 12 new SSBN(X) ballistic missile
submarines,25 one option would be to add at least some, if not most or all of these additional
DDG-51s to the shipbuilding plan in fiscal years that are prior to FY2019. This could make the
question of whether to add DDG-51s to the shipbuilding plan a potentially near-term issue for
policymakers.
Extending Service Lives of Flight I/II DDG-51s
A second potential option for substantially mitigating the project cruiser-destroyer would be to
extend the lives of most or all of the Navy’s 28 Flight I/II DDG-51s to about 45 years (i.e., about
10 years beyond their currently planned 35-year service lives). If feasible, this option could be
much less expensive on a per-hull basis than adding DDG-51s to the shipbuilding plan. The lifeextended Flight I/II DDG-51s, however, might be less capable than new DDG-51s added to the
shipbuilding plan, making the calculation of the relative cost effectiveness of these two options
more complex.
Extending the service lives of Flight I/II DDG-51s could require increasing, perhaps soon,
funding levels for the maintenance of these ships, to help ensure they will remain in good enough
shape to eventually have their lives extended for another 10 years. This additional maintenance
funding would be on top of funding that the Navy has already programmed to help ensure that
these ships can remain in service to the end of their currently planned 35-year lives. The potential
need to increase maintenance funding soon could make the question of whether to extend the
lives of these ships a potentially near-term issue for policymakers.
The options of adding DDG-51s to the shipbuilding plan and extending the lives of Flight I/II
DDG-51s are not mutually exclusive; a combination of both options could be employed to
mitigate the projected cruiser-destroyer shortfall.
Legislative Activity for FY2012
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget was submitted in February 2011. For details on the Navy’s
FY2012 funding request for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see “FY2012 Funding
Request” in “Background.”
25
For more on this program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010. The two
DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received $577.2 million in FY2010 advance
procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested another $2,922.2 million in
procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete their estimated combined procurement
cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requested $48.0 million in
advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012,
$186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000 program-completion costs, and $228.4
million in research and development funding for the AMDR. The funding request for the AMDR
was contained in the Navy’s research and development account in Project 3186 (“Air and Missile
Defense Radar”) of Program Element (PE) 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water Sensors”).
FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation
Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322)
H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322 of December 22, 2010, generally funds government programs through
March 4, 2011, at FY2010 funding levels. The FY2010 budget included funding for the
procurement of one DDG-51, while the FY2011 budget requested funding for the procurement of
two DDG-51s.
FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-295 of September 16, 2010) on
S. 3800, recommended approval of the Navy’s requests for FY2011 procurement and advance
procurement funding for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs (page 86), and for FY2011
research and development funding for the AMDR (page 151, line 106).3126
FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
House (H.R. 5136)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommended approval of the Navy’s requests for
FY2011 procurement and advance procurement funding for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000
31
The report recommends a $3 million increase to the Navy’s funding request for PE 0604501N (“Advanced Above
Water Sensors”), which includes, among other things, Project 3186 (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”). The increase is
for an electronic periscope detection radar, an item that does not appear related to AMDR.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
programs (page 73), and for FY2011 research and development funding for the AMDR (page
150).3227 The report stated:
DDG 51 class destroyer
The committee is pleased with the effort by the Navy to undertake a comprehensive analysis
of the radar and hull alternatives needed for a future sea-based ballistic missile defense
(BMD) platform. The analysis has determined that the proposed Air and Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR) system matched to a DDG 51 class destroyer hull is the most cost-effective
26
The report recommends a $3 million increase to the Navy’s funding request for PE 0604501N (“Advanced Above
Water Sensors”), which includes, among other things, Project 3186 (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”). The increase is
for an electronic periscope detection radar, an item that does not appear related to AMDR.
27
The report recommends approval of the Navy’s funding request for PE 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water
Sensors”), which includes, among other things, Project 3186 (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”).
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
method of fielding a new generation of sea-based BMD. The committee notes that this new
radar development program will leverage existing technologies of both the DDG 1000 class
destroyer program and the DDG 51 class destroyer program. The committee understands that
the AMDR system is not likely to reach full development for a number of years and that a
funding authorization request for the first ship will not occur until fiscal year 2016. In the
meantime, the committee understands that the Navy’s plan is to continue the restart of the
DDG 51 production line begun last year using a procurement strategy of three ships every
two years in a ‘‘2–1–2–1’’ build plan. The committee has significant concerns whether such
an acquisition strategy can sustain a competitive relationship between the two current surface
warfare construction yards.
DDG 1000 class destroyer
The committee is concerned with the Nunn-McCurdy cost breach incurred by the DDG 1000
destroyer program. The committee understands that the current cost breach was caused by
costs associated with research and development efforts charged against only three vessels
vice the original seven.
The committee notes that this cost threshold breach was known by the Navy far in advance
of the receipt of notification required by law. The committee was informed that official
notification of the cost breach was not technically required until after submission of the
budget request for fiscal year 2011, as the budget request was the official truncation of the
class to three vessels. This argument is disingenuous in that both the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of the Navy made public statements and transmitted official
correspondence to the committee that the program would be truncated to three vessels as
early as mid–2008.
However, regardless of how the Navy has arrived at this juncture, the fact remains that one
vessel is currently under construction and significant materiel orders have been made for the
second. The committee is also keenly aware of the industrial base consequences of a decision
by the Secretary of Defense to terminate the program. (Pages 75-76)
The report also stated:
Composite deckhouse design for DDG 51 flight III class ships
The budget request contained $17.9 million in PE 63563N for ship concept advanced design,
but contained no funds for development of a composite deckhouse for flight III of the DDG
51 class destroyer.
32
The report recommends approval of the Navy’s funding request for PE 0604501N (“Advanced Above Water
Sensors”), which includes, among other things, Project 3186 (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”).
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The committee supports the Navy decision to re-start the DDG 51 class destroyer acquisition
program and to work toward a flight III version of the vessel by fiscal year 2016. To support
the goal of that flight of ships of advanced radar and ship control systems, the Navy must
make significant design changes to the class, in order to upgrade power and cooling
capability. The committee realizes that those design changes have the potential to add
significant weight to the vessel which could limit operational effectiveness. The committee
supports an effort, aimed at reducing overall lifecycle costs of the class, to develop a
composite deckhouse for the flight III ships that would significantly reduce the weight to
center of buoyancy ratio and increase operational effectiveness of the vessel. The committee
notes that the technological advancements for the composite deckhouse of the DDG 1000
program can significantly aid this effort.
The committee recommends an increase of $10.0 million in PE 63563N for development of a
composite deckhouse for potential use on flight III DDG 51 class destroyers. (Page 157)
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Senate (H.R. 3454)
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454), as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010), recommended approval of the Navy’s request for
FY2011 procurement and advance procurement funding for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000
programs (see page 677 of the printed bill). The bill as reported recommended a $22.5-million
reduction to the Navy’s request for FY2011 research and development funding for the AMDR
(page 735, line 106). The committee’s report stated:
Air and missile defense radar
The budget request included $274.4 million in PE 64501N for advanced above water
sensors, including $228.4 million for the air and missile defense radar (AMDR) program.
The Navy’s AMDR program is intended to produce a next-generation radar system designed
to provide ballistic missile defense, air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. The fiscal
year 2010 budget includes $113.6 million for AMDR technology development contracts and
the fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $145.3 million for AMDR technology
development contracts.
In December 2009, the Navy released a request for proposals for AMDR technology
development. The Navy intends to award these technology development contracts after
completion of Milestone A, which has been delayed. The Navy had planned to have a
Milestone A decision in the third quarter of fiscal year 2010, but the Navy now expects that
decision in August, after the Navy completes key analyses.
Based on this delayed decision, the Government Accountability Office has estimated that
$22.5 million of the fiscal year 2010 funds are not needed to fund fiscal year 2010 activities
and could be applied to fiscal year 2011 requirements.
Therefore, the committee believes the Navy should use 2010 resources available for AMDR
instead of reprogramming them, which obviate the need for $22.5 million of the funds
requested in fiscal year 2011. (Page 66)
The committee’s report also states:
The committee continues to have significant concerns regarding the implications of the plan
for the non-nuclear surface ship industrial base. If the Navy and industry, working together,
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are unable to control requirement driven cost growth and deliver the ships in the plan for the
projected costs, the inevitable reductions in quantity will likely impact the Navy’s ability to
reach the required fleet size and further jeopardize the industrial base. The committee notes
that the current shipbuilding plan includes the cost of the SSBN (X) program and the
committee encourages the Navy to closely scrutinize requirements for this program in order
to minimize its impact on the recapitalization of the Navy’s battle force.
Furthermore, the committee urges the Navy and the contractors to negotiate as expeditiously
as possible fair and reasonable construction contracts for ships previously authorized in order
to reduce uncertainty and maintain and foster affordability in the procurement of large
surface combatants and other naval vessels….
In large surface combatants, the Navy’s last official report stated that the industrial base can
only be effectively sustained if naval ship yards were building the equivalent of three DDG–
51 destroyers per year, with additional work assumed at one of the yards. Even if the Navy
fully executes both of the large surface combatant programs of record in the near-term, the
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President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and future-years defense program propose to buy
an average of 1.5 large surface combatants per year. Even at projected procurement rates, the
number of cruisers and destroyers falls below the required level of 88 ships in 2027 and
remains below that level for the following 13 years. At its worst, the number of large surface
combatants is 21 ships below the expected requirement in 2034.
The Navy has testified that continued demand for large surface combatants to meet forward
presence and strike operations requirements coupled with emerging ballistic missile defense
requirements drives the Navy to consider abandoning lesser priority missions for more
recent, higher priority ones. In light of the current pressure on the large surface combatant
force, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s projected rate of production is insufficient,
and anticipates that the Navy will closely assess future demand for large surface combatants,
and operational and additional risk to the industrial base of maintaining relatively low rates
of procurement for large surface combatants.
The committee remains concerned with the Navy’s ability to execute what it believes is an
overly optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants. The truncation of the
DDG–1000, the restart of the DDG–51 class and the proposed Flight III variant of the DDG–
51 inject a great deal of instability into the SCN accounts. The Navy’s testimony before
Congress has led this committee to identify six risk areas in the Navy’s plan for DDG–51s:
(1) the availability of the Air and Missile Defense Radar; (2) the extent and cost of
modifications to the underlying ship’s design package to support proposed changes to the
ship; (3) increased limitation on service life margins of the early restart ships; (4) combat
system software integration; (5) the overall complexity of various separate programs that
need to converge for successful completion of the restart and Flight III programs; and (6)
cost and schedule growth for the Aegis Combat System Modernization. The committee
expects the Navy to keep it closely apprised of developments in these risk areas so that it can
monitor appropriate risk mitigation efforts. (Pages 40-41)
Final Version (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
Section 102(a)(3) of H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011, authorizes FY2011 funding for
the Navy’s entire shipbuilding account at the requested amount. The bill contains no provisions
relating specifically to procurement of DDG-51 or DDG-1000 destroyers. The joint explanatory
statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R. 6523 does not discuss
procurement of DDG-51 or DDG-1000 destroyers.
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Appendix B. Additional Background Information
on DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort called the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:3328
•
a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission,
•
a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission, and
•
a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, small surface attack craft (also called “swarm boats”) and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.3429
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, is to be named the Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of
Naval operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made
by the Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was still called the DD-21
program. 3530
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wavepiercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability, 3631 a superstructure made partly of large
sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like) materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated
3328
The DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. The SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG21 was still years in the future. The current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. The acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG1000 and CG(X).
3429
For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3530
For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
3631
A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
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electric-drive propulsion system, 3732 a total-ship computing system for moving information about
the ship, automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar, a new kind
of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a 155mm gun
called the Advanced Gun System (AGS). The AGS is to fire a new rocket-assisted 155mm shell,
called the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), to ranges of more than 60 nautical miles.
The DDG-1000 can carry 600 LRLAP rounds (300 for each gun), and additional rounds can be
brought aboard the ship while the guns are firing, creating what Navy officials call an “infinite
magazine.”
Planned Quantity
When the DD-21 program was initiated, a total of 32 ships was envisaged. In subsequent years,
the planned total for the DD(X)/DDG-1000 program was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and
finally to 3.
Construction Shipyards
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by NGSB, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and
contracts for building the first six were to have been equally divided between NGSB and
GD/BIW.
In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-all competition between NGSB and GD/BIW to build all
DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to Navy’s proposal for a winner-take-all
competition. Congress included a provision (Section 1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-takeall competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by NGSB and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
3732
For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L, granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and NGSB for the
construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that the
Navy has with GD/BIW and NGSB for detailed design and construction of the two lead ships.
Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is treated as
a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that NGSB would be the final-assembly yard for the first DDG1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25, 2007,
the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the second
at NGSB.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, NGSB, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG1000s, in exchange for NGSB receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG51 procurement.3833
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with NGSB and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build all three ships.
NGSB will continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite deckhouses.
The agreement to have all three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010 defense
budget for his support for continuing with the construction of all three DDG-1000s (rather than
proposing the cancellation of the second and third).
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 billion, plus adjustments for inflation
and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
March 2009 GAO Report
A March 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing major DOD weapon
acquisition programs stated the following of the DDG-1000 program:
3833
Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
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Technology Maturity
Three of DDG 1000’s 12 critical technologies are mature, and an additional 8 have been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Practical limitations prevent the Navy from fully
demonstrating all technologies in a realistic environment prior to installation. The Navy
planned to fully demonstrate the integrated deckhouse prior to ship construction start in
February 2009, but land-based testing was delayed. Testing is now scheduled to complete by
March 2010—over a year after deckhouse construction began. The integrated power system
will not be tested with the control system until 2011—nearly 3 years later than planned. As a
result, the power system will not be demonstrated until after its installation on the first two
ships. The volume search radar has progressed in maturity and began testing with the
multifunction radar in January 2009. However, program officials report that the tests were
conducted without the volume search radar’s radome and at a lower voltage than required.
The lead ship’s volume search radar will be installed in April 2013—after the Navy has
taken custody of the ship. The total ship computing environment (phased over six releases
and one spiral) remains at a lower level of maturity and will not be completed until after the
lead ship’s systems are activated. Program officials report that problems identified in release
4 have been resolved in release 5, which is currently undergoing integration testing.
However, the Defense Contract Management Agency expects that problems discovered in
releases 4 and 5 will cause release 6 to have higher defect rates than planned, and additional
cost and schedule delays.
Design Maturity
The design of the DDG 1000 appears stable, although the continuing maturation of critical
technologies could result in design changes. The design was 88 percent complete at the start
of lead ship construction, and 100 percent complete shortly thereafter.
Production Maturity
Lead ship construction began in February 2009 and 68 percent of the units that make up the
ship are now in fabrication. The Navy reported that it contractually requires the shipbuilders
to specify detailed structural attributes to be monitored during unit fabrication and
integration in order to reduce the risk of rework. According to program officials, this
contractual requirement is a first for large Navy shipbuilding programs. The program
initially experienced higher than expected rejection rates on the peripheral vertical launch
system, which program officials reported were resolved. The Navy anticipates awarding
construction contracts for the second and third ships by June 2010.
Other Program Issues
The Navy reduced the number of ships in the DDG 1000 program from 7 to 3 ships in fiscal
year 2008. Program officials stated that truncating the program will likely cause an increase
in the cost per ship. Navy officials reported that this could result in a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold. In addition, some contractor costs that were
previously distributed over the planned 7-ship program will now be allocated to the 3-ship
program. In fiscal year 2010, the Navy requested $310 million to fund these costs. The Navy
anticipates requesting additional funds for this purpose during fiscal years 2011-2014.
The Navy is conducting a Future Surface Combatant study, which program officials say
includes a review of hull options for this new ship program. One option being considered is
the DDG 1000 hull form. The Navy expects to incorporate the final decision from this study
in the fiscal year 2011 budget.
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Program Office Comments
The Navy stated that three critical technologies are mature and that all technologies have
been demonstrated in at least a relevant environment, except for the total ship computing
environment which will increase in maturity on the completion of release 5. The Navy noted
that release 5 includes most combat systems-related functionality and release 6 focuses on
engineering control, which is mostly independent of combat systems. The Navy noted that
the software schedule has a margin available before software is needed for land-based and
ship testing. The Navy stated that the power system will be tested on land in 2011 using
components of the third ship before lead ship testing begins. The Navy noted that the volume
search radar prototype was built at a lower voltage to limit risk, and that prototype
integration tests are not dependent on the voltage or radome. The Navy stated that fullvoltage modules have been produced and tested, and that a lead-ship radar will be tested in
2012 with a radome.3934
2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
General
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.4035
The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.4136 Since
the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 billion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 billion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-10000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth42growth37—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
3934
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-10388SP, March 2010, p. 56.
4035
For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress , by Moshe Schwartz.
4136
Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
4237
PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. The other measure used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
(continued...)
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In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.4338 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
•
A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
•
A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.
•
A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 originally
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built Xband SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overall DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and thus
was removed from the current baseline design….
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is still
expected to perform local area air defense….
The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for the
three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a result of
the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR software
modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less than the
estimated procurement costs for the VSR.4439
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-1000],” and
(...continued)
program.
4338
Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
4439
Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
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“You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar] with
software modifications.”4540
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)
Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for all years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 will increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfall [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 billion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 billion in then-year dollars for all three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 billion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 billion in then-year dollars for all
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program will
exceed these cost estimates.
An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fall 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new
Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.4641
Potential Oversight Questions
Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s June 1, 2010, letter and attachment restructuring the
DDG-1000 program and DOD’s decision on October 8, 2010, to reinstate the DDG-1000
4540
Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted To CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010.
4641
Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion-Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
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program’s Milestone B certification (see Appendix B) raise the following potential oversight
questions for Congress:
•
Why did DOD decide, as part of its restructuring of the DDG-1000 program, to
change the primary radar on the DDG-1000?
•
What are the potential risks to the DDG-1000 program of changing its primary
radar at this stage in the program (i.e., with the first ship under construction, and
preliminary construction activities underway on the second ship)?
•
How will the upgraded MFR differ in cost, capabilities, and technical risks from
the baseline MFR included in the original DDG-1000 design?
•
What is the net impact on the capabilities of the DDG-1000 of the change to the
DDG-1000’s primary radar (i.e., of removing the VSR and upgrading the MFR)?
•
Given change to the DDG-1000’s primary radar and the May 2010 CAPE
estimates of the program’s program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) and average
program unit cost (APUC), is the DDG-1000 program still cost effective?
•
What impact on cost, schedule, or technical risk, if any, will the removal of the
VSR from the DDG-1000 design have on the Navy’s plan to install the dual-band
radar (DBR), including the VSR, on the Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers
CVN-78 and CVN-79?4742
A June 4, 2010, press report stated:
The Pentagon’s move to delete half the radar system for the U.S. Navy’s DDG 1000
Zumwalt-class destroyers could save more than $600 million and may eventually open the
door to giving the ships a ballistic missile defense capability, industry sources said….
One source said [the savings] would be at least $100 million per ship, while an industry
source said it would be “at least” $200 million for each of the three planned Zumwalts….
Sources said the decision to eliminate the VSR was “purely a budget decision” and not a
reflection of any decision to install BMD capability in the ships.
But an industry source insisted the move meant space, weight and power would be available
for the possible future installation of a BMD radar - which could be the Air Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR), currently in the early stages of development.…
“Given that the Navy is engaged in the AMDR competition for the future S-band radar, why
spend the money on a three- or four-of-a-kind approach to create these one-offs, when in
fact, in about the same schedule, you can have a fairly good match to whatever comes out of
the AMDR program?” the industry source said.
“You could do it,” a technical source said. “If Zumwalt were to stay around and take on a
BMD mission, it’s certainly an option.”…
Navy officials confirmed the DBR still is to be installed on the new aircraft carrier USS
Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), already under construction by Northrop Grumman, and on the as47as42
For more on these aircraft carriers, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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yet-unnamed CVN 79. No decision has been made on the radar for carriers beyond CVN
79….
The Navy has been testing both radars [the SPY-3 MFR and the SPY-4 VSR] for some time.
The SPY-3 MFR reportedly has exceeded technical expectations and will receive upgrades to
give it a better volume search capability.
The VSR encountered “no serious problems,” according to an industry source, although its
performance “was acceptable but somewhat below expectations.” Combined with dramatic
cost growth - the radar was originally forecast to come in at about $20 million per ship - “it
simply became a cost-benefit tradeoff.” The drop in the number of radars that would be built
also contributed to the radar’s cost growth, the industry source said.4843
At a May 6, 2010, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower Subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred between Senator Jack
Reed and Sean Stackley, the Navy’s acquisition executive (i.e., the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy [Research, Development and Acquisition]):
SENATOR REED:
Thank you. And let me ask one final question in this round before I recognize Senator
Wicker. And that is, with respect to the DDG 1000, Secretary Stackley, it has breached the
Nunn-McCurdy line, so there’s a technical review under way.
My understanding is the principal cause of that is the truncation of the program from seven
ships to three ships, and can you comment on that?
And second, what effect will this have on the program as it exists today, the truncated
program?
STACKLEY:
Yes, sir. Let me start with the baseline for the DDG 1000 program, was struck at Milestone
B, when it was, at that point in time, a 10-ship program.
And when you look at the criteria for determining the procurement acquisition unit costs,
you have both an R&D component as well as a procurement component.
So the program has a healthy R&D component stream that preceded procurement. And so
when you go from a 10-ship program to a seven and then ultimately to a three-ship program,
that R&D front end basically gets divided in the three ships and becomes a significant
burden on the average unit cost.
That became the mechanism that triggered the Nunn-McCurdy critical breach. And we're
going through the process right now to meet the criteria for certifying continuation of the
program, where we have five criteria that we need to certify.
We are more than midstream through that process; 4 June [2010] is our requirement to
certify or other [sic] back to the Hill. And as you indicated in your remarks, the driver for
4843
Christopher P. Cavas, “Axing DDG 1000 Radar May Save Cash, Enable BMD,” DefenseNews.com, June 4, 2010.
See also Zachary M. Peterson, “In Cost Saving Measure, Navy To Scrap DDG-1000 S-Band Radar,” Inside the Navy,
June 7, 2010.
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this particular program has to deal with the quantity—the quantity impact on the average unit
cost.4944
Later in the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Senator Susan Collins and
Stackley:
SENATOR COLLINS:
I recognize that the process to recertify the DDG 1000 in light of this [Nunn-McCurdy]
breach requires significant analysis. And you indicated to the chairman that you're about
halfway through that process.
I am concerned, however, that these delays are going to have an impact on program
schedule, on program cost and on the maintenance of the workforce, unless it comes to a
closure soon.
Could you give us some better understanding of how soon you think the process will be
completed and when the second and third DDG 1000 ships could be put under contract?
STACKLEY:
Yes, ma'am. Let me start with the schedule: 4 June [2010] is the hard and fast date that we
need to meet for certification. And it's—it’s a pretty well understood date for all the number
(inaudible), frankly, and we're driving to that date, now, and we will have all the issues
addressed to support that schedule.
With regards to construction contracts, in fact, Bath Iron Works has construction contracts
for both DDG 1000 and DDG 1001. So since the original program had production split over
two shipyards, BIW had a piece of 1001 when that ship was contracted with Northrop
Grumman. As the contract has moved north [to BIW], they still have a core piece of their
workshare on 1001.
We have a proposal in hand for the balance of the ship under a fixed price proposal, and we
are negotiating those details so that, when we come out of the Nunn-McCurdy process, we
can quickly conclude the contract actions that are necessary.
In the interim, we have existing material procurement contracts so that we can keep material
orders on schedule without causing disruption to those ships’ construction schedules to
keep—as I was saying—to keep the costs contained.50
49
5045
44
45
Source: Transcript of hearing.
Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Appendix C. Additional Information on Navy
Proposal to Terminate CG(X) in Favor of Flight III
DDG-51
The Navy’s desire to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG-51s apparently took
shape during 2009: at a June 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that it was conducting a study on destroyer
procurement options for FY2012 and beyond that was examining design options based on either
the DDG-51 or DDG-1000 hull form. 51 A January 2009 memorandum from the Department of
Defense acquisition executive had called for such a study.52 In September and November 2009, it
was reported that the Navy’s study was examining how future requirements for AAW and BMD
operations might be met by a DDG-51 or DDG-1000 hull equipped with a new radar.53 On
December 7, 2009, it was reported that the Navy wanted to cancel its planned CG(X) cruiser and
instead procure an improved version of the DDG-51.54 In addition to being concerned about the
projected high cost and immature technologies of the CG(X),55Background Information
on CG(X) Cruiser Program
Background Information on CG(X) Program
The CG(X) cruiser program was announced by the Navy on November 1, 2001.46 The Navy
wanted to procure as many as 19 CG(X)s as replacements for its 22 CG-47s, which are projected
to reach the end of their 35-year service lives between 2021 and 2029. The CG-47s are multimission ships with an emphasis on AAW and (for some CG-47s) BMD, and the Navy similarly
wanted the CG(X) to be a multi-mission ship with an emphasis on AAW and BMD. The CG(X)
was to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), a new radar that was to be considerably
larger and more powerful than the SPY-1 radar carried on the Navy’s Aegis ships. Some press
reports suggested that a nuclear-powered version of the CG(X) might have had a full load
displacement of more than 20,000 tons and a unit procurement cost of $5 billion or more.47
The Navy’s FY2009 budget called for procuring the first CG(X) in FY2011. Beginning in late
2008, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to defer the procurement of the first
CG(X) by several years, to about FY2017.48 Consistent with these press reports, on April 6, 2009,
46
The Navy on that date announced that that it was launching a Future Surface Combatant Program aimed at acquiring
a family of next-generation surface combatants. This new family of surface combatants, the Navy stated, would include
three new classes of ships:
•
a destroyer called the DD(X)—later redesignated DDG-1000—for the precision long-range strike and naval
gunfire mission,
•
a cruiser called the CG(X) for the AAW and BMD mission, and
•
a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft,
and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.
The Future Surface Combatant Program replaced an earlier Navy surface combatant acquisition effort, begun in the
mid-1990s, called the Surface Combatant for the 21st Century (SC-21) program. The SC-21 program encompassed a
planned destroyer called DD-21 and a planned cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface
Combatant Program in 2001, development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, but the start of
development work on the CG-21 was still years in the future. The DD(X) program, now called the DDG-1000 or
Zumwalt-class program, is essentially a restructured continuation of the DD-21 program. The CG(X) might be
considered the successor, in planning terms, of the CG-21. After November 1, 2001, the acronym SC-21 continued for
a time to be used in the Navy’s research and development account to designate a line item (i.e., program element) that
funded development work on the DDG-1000 and CG(X).
47
For a discussion of nuclear power for Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy
Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
48
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Awards Technology Company $128 Million Contract For CG(X) Work,” Inside the
Navy, October 27, 2008. Another press report (Katherine McIntire Peters, “Navy’s Top Officer Sees Lessons in
Shipbuilding Program Failures,” GovernmentExecutive.com, September 24, 2008) quoted Admiral Gary Roughead, the
Chief of Naval Operations, as saying: “What we will be able to do is take the technology from the DDG-1000, the
capability and capacity that [will be achieved] as we build more DDG-51s, and [bring those] together around 2017 in a
replacement ship for our cruisers.” (Material in brackets in the press report.) Another press report (Zachary M.
Peterson, “Part One of Overdue CG(X) AOA Sent to OSD, Second Part Coming Soon,” Inside the Navy, September 29,
2008) quoted Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, as saying that the Navy did not budget for a CG(X) hull in its proposal for the Navy’s budget under the
FY2010-FY2015 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to be submitted to Congress in early 2009.
An earlier report (Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Destroyer Program Facing Major Cuts,” DefenseNews.com, July
14, 2008) stated that the CG(X) would be delayed until FY2015 or later. See also Geoff Fein, “Navy Likely To Change
(continued...)
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Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced—as part of a series of recommendations for the
then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget—a recommendation to “delay the CG-X next
generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy” for the
program. 49 The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget deferred procurement of the first CG(X) beyond
FY2015.
Cancellation of CG(X) Program
The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposed terminating the CG(X) program as unaffordable. The
Navy’s desire to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG-51s apparently took shape
during 2009: at a June 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the Navy testified that it was conducting a study on destroyer procurement
options for FY2012 and beyond that was examining design options based on either the DDG-51
or DDG-1000 hull form. 50 A January 2009 memorandum from the Department of Defense
acquisition executive had called for such a study.51 In September and November 2009, it was
reported that the Navy’s study was examining how future requirements for AAW and BMD
operations might be met by a DDG-51 or DDG-1000 hull equipped with a new radar.52 On
December 7, 2009, it was reported that the Navy wanted to cancel its planned CG(X) cruiser and
instead procure an improved version of the DDG-51.53 In addition to being concerned about the
projected high cost and immature technologies of the CG(X),54 the Navy reportedly had
concluded that it does not need a surface combatant with a version of the AMDR as large and
capable as the one envisaged for the CG(X) to adequately perform projected AAW and BMD
missions, because the Navy will be able to augment data collected by surface combatant radars
with data collected by space-based sensors. The Navy reportedly concluded that using data
collected by other sensors would permit projected AAW and BMD missions to be performed
adequately with a radar smaller enough to be fitted onto the DDG-51. 56 Reports suggested that the
new smaller radar would be a scaled-down version of the AMDR originally intended for the
CG(X).57
51
(...continued)
CG(X)’s Procurement Schedule, Official Says,” Defense Daily, June 24, 2008; Rebekah Gordon, “Navy Agrees CG(X)
By FY-11 Won’t Happen But Reveals Little Else,” Inside the Navy, June 30, 2008.
49
Source: Opening remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at an April 6, 2009, news conference on DOD
recommendations for the then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget.
50
Source: Transcript of spoken remarks of Vice Admiral Bernard McCullough at a June 16, 2009, hearing on Navy
force structure shipbuilding before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
5251
A January 26, 2009, memorandum for the record from John Young, the then-DOD acquisition executive, stated that
“The Navy proposed and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] agreed with modification to truncate the DDG1000 Program to three ships in the FY 2010 budget submission.” The memo proposed procuring one DDG-51 in
FY2010 and two more FY2011, followed by the procurement in FY2012-FY2015 (in annual quantities of 1, 2, 1, 2) of
a ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000
design. The memorandum stated that the FSC might be equipped with a new type of radar, but the memorandum did
not otherwise specify the FSC’s capabilities. The memorandum stated that further analysis would support a decision on
whether to base the FSC on the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 design. (Memorandum for the record dated January
26, 2009, from John Young, Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology and Logistics], entitled “DDG 1000
Program Way Ahead,” posted on InsideDefense.com [subscription required].)
5352
Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Slated To Wrap Up Future Destroyer Hull And Radar Study,” Inside the Navy,
September 7, 2009. Christopher P. Cavas, “Next-Generation U.S. Warship Could Be Taking Shape,” Defense News,
November 2, 2009: 18, 20.
5453
Christopher J. Castelli, “Draft Shipbuilding Report Reveals Navy Is Killing CG(X) Cruiser Program,” Inside the
Navy, December 7, 2009.
5554
Christopher J. Castelli, “Draft Shipbuilding Report Reveals Navy Is Killing CG(X) Cruiser Program,” Inside the
Navy, December 7, 2009.
56
Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2009: 1-2.
57
Cid Standifer, “NAVSEA Plans To Solicit Contracts For Air And Missile Defense Radar,” Inside the Navy,
December 28, 2009; “Navy Issues RFP For Phase II of Air And Missile Defense Radar Effort,” Defense Daily,
December 24, 2009: 4.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
adequately with a radar smaller enough to be fitted onto the DDG-51. 55 Reports suggested that the
new smaller radar would be a scaled-down version of the AMDR originally intended for the
CG(X).56
The Navy’s February 2010 report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan,
submitted to Congress in conjunction with the FY2011 budget, states that the 30-year plan:
Solidifies the DoN’s [Department of the Navy’s] long-term plans for Large Surface
Combatants by truncating the DDG 1000 program, restarting the DDG 51 production line,
and continuing the Advanced Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) development efforts. Over the
past year, the Navy has conducted a study that concludes a DDG 51 hull form with an
AMDR suite is the most cost-effective solution to fleet air and missile defense requirements
over the near to mid-term....
The Navy, in consultation with OSD, conducted a Radar/Hull Study for future destroyers.
The objective of the study was to provide a recommendation for the total ship system
solution required to provide Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (simultaneous
ballistic missile and anti-air warfare (AAW) defense) capability while balancing affordability
with capacity. As a result of the study, the Navy is proceeding with the Air and Missile
Defense Radar (AMDR) program....
As discussed above, the DDG 51 production line has been restarted. While all of these newstart guided missile destroyers will be delivered with some BMD capability, those procured
in FY 2016 and beyond will be purpose-built with BMD as a primary mission. While there is
work to be done in determining its final design, it is envisioned that this DDG 51 class
variant will have upgrades to radar and computing performance with the appropriate power
generation capacity and cooling required by these enhancements. These upgraded DDG 51
class ships will be modifications of the current guided missile destroyer design that combine
the best emerging technologies aimed at further increasing capabilities in the IAMD arena
and providing a more effective bridge between today’s capability and that originally planned
for the CG(X). The ships reflected in this program have been priced based on continuation of
the existing DDG 51 re-start program. Having recently completed the Hull and Radar Study,
the Department is embarking on the requirements definition process for these AMDR
destroyers and will adjust the pricing for these ships in future reports should that prove
necessary.5857
In testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on February 24 and 25, 2010,
respectively, Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) incorporates all aspects of air defense against
ballistic, anti-ship, and overland cruise missiles. IAMD is vital to the protection of our force,
and it is an integral part of our core capability to deter aggression through conventional
means....
55
Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2009: 1-2.
56
Cid Standifer, “NAVSEA Plans To Solicit Contracts For Air And Missile Defense Radar,” Inside the Navy,
December 28, 2009; “Navy Issues RFP For Phase II of Air And Missile Defense Radar Effort,” Defense Daily,
December 24, 2009: 4.
57
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, pp. 12, 13, 19. The first reprinted paragraph, taken from page 12, also occurs on page 3 as part of the
executive summary.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship missiles and deep-water
submarine threats, as well as increase the capacity of our multipurpose surface ships, we
restarted production of our DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers (Flight IIA series).
These ships will be the first constructed with IAMD, providing much-needed Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) capacity to the Fleet, and they will incorporate the hull, mechanical,
and electrical alterations associated with our mature DDG modernization program. We will
spiral DDG 51 production to incorporate future integrated air and missile defense
capabilities....
58
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, pp. 12, 13, 19. The first reprinted paragraph, taken from page 12, also occurs on page 3 as part of the
executive summary.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a
Radar/Hull
Study for future surface combatants that analyzed the total ship system solution
necessary to meet
our IAMD requirements while balancing affordability and capacity in our
surface Fleet. The
study concluded that Navy should integrate the Air and Missile Defense
Radar program S Band
radar (AMDR-S), SPY-3 (X Band radar), and Aegis Advanced
Capability Build (ACB) combat
system into a DDG 51 hull. While our Radar/Hull Study
indicated that both DDG 51 and DDG
1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems,
leveraging the DDG 51 hull was the most
affordable option. Accordingly, our FY 2011
budget cancels the next generation cruiser program
due to projected high cost and risk in
technology and design of this ship. I request your support as
we invest in spiraling the
capabilities of our DDG 51 Class from our Flight IIA Arleigh Burke
ships to Flight III ships,
which will be our future IAMD-capable surface combatant. We will
procure the first Flight
III ship in FY 2016.5958
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
5958
Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee on
24 February, 2010, pp. 10-11; and Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on 25 February 2010, pp. 10-11.
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