Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
January 3, 2012March 10, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22942
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as
a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
that have been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV
Technology Development (TD) Phase, which is scheduled to conclude in the June 2011
timeframe to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and
General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing
wasis completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was
expected expected
to be conducted in the late summer, 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Development
(EMD) Phase and the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two
contracts for the
EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months.
In February 2011, it was announced that the award of the EMD contract would be delayed until
January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV. DOD had
planned to award
two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but
instead proposed a 48-month-long EMD. There will be two JLTV variants—a Combat Tactical
now plans for a 48month-long EMD. In addition, the Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too
heavy to meet the required transportability weight. Now there will be two variants—a Combat
Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support
Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.
The FY2012 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of
$243.9 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee recommended
terminating the JLTV program, noting “excessive cost growth, constantly changing requirements,
and existing alternatives.” In response, Army and Marine leadership seemingly put aside past
differences by relaxing transportability requirements and setting a goal for a lower per-unit cost
of $225,000 per vehicle. In addition, the EMD phase would be cut by 16 months—now 32
months as opposed to the previous 48 months.
The FY2012 National Authorization Act (H.R. 1540) decreased the Army’s JLTV budget request
by $64.8 million and the Marine’s request by $24.9 million due to the delay of the awarding for
the EMD contract. The FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2055, P.L. 11274) provides $87.3 million for Army JLTV RDT&E and $46.7 million for the Marines in
recognition that the Services have made changes to the program to simplify the JLTV design, ease
requirements, and decrease per-vehicle costs.
Potential issues for Congress include affordability of the JLTV in relation to HMMWV and
MRAP and in the overall context of an anticipated “challenging economic environment.” Another
concern is even though the Army and Marines have dropped some requirements to lower pervehicle costs, that requirements might be added in the future, driving up the program cost. The
Army and Marines have both noted that, despite emphasis on recapitalizing HMMWVs and
MRAPs in lieu of developing JLTVs, there are limitations concerning the degree to which these
vehicles can be upgraded and still be operationally effective. Another possible issue for
consideration is the new lower JLTV per-vehicle cost target might be close to that of recapitalized
HMMWVs, bringing into question if it is better and more cost effective to procure “new” JLTVs
versus “old” recapitalized HMMWVs .
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
JLTV Program.................................................................................................................................. 1
What Is the JLTV?..................................................................................................................... 1
Program Structure...................................................................................................................... 1
Program History............................................................................................................................... 2
Technology Development Contracts Awarded .......................................................................... 2
JLTV Contracts Protested .......................................................................................................... 2
JLTV Phase of Development ..................................................................................................... 3
Program Developmental Issues ....................................................................................................... 3
Change in Requirements, Program Schedule, and Variants....................................................... 3
Performance Issues During the Technology Development Phase ............................................. 4
Marines’ Concerns with the JLTV Program .............................................................................. 4
Northrop Grumman Added to BAE/NAVISTAR JLTV Team................................................... 4
Army Releases Request for Information (RFI) for JLTV “Off the Shelf” Alternatives ............ 5
Recent Program Activities ............................................................................................................... 5
Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee Recommends JLTV
Termination ............................................................................................................................ 5
The Army and Marines’ Response to Recommended Program Termination............................. 5
Draft Engineering and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposal........................ 6
Army and Marines Revising Draft EMD RFP .................................................................... 6
Marines Might Defer JLTV Acquisition Until Late 2020s.................................................. 6
Foreign Participants ......................................................................................................................... 7
United States and Australia Agree on Joint JLTV Development ............................................... 7
Ramifications If the JLTV Is Terminated ............................................................................ 7
Additional Foreign Participants................................................................................................. 7
Possible Acquisition Targets ............................................................................................................ 8
Army.......................................................................................................................................... 8
Marines...................................................................................................................................... 8
Navy .......................................................................................................................................... 8
Air Force and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ..................................................... 8
Budgetary Issues.............................................................................................................................. 8
Program Cost and Funding........................................................................................................ 8
FY2012 JLTV Budget Request.................................................................................................. 9
Legislative Activity.......................................................................................................................... 9
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540) Conference Report
(H.Rept. 112-329)................................................................................................................... 9
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, FY2012 (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74),
Conference Report (H.Rept. 112-331) ................................................................................... 9
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 10
JLTV Affordability .................................................................................................................. 10
Changing Requirements .......................................................................................................... 10
Limitations on Upgrading HMMWVs and MRAPs................................................................ 11
The Cost of a Recapitalized HMMWV vs. a New JLTV ........................................................ 11
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 12
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background1
The JLTV is an Army-led, multi-service initiative to develop a family of future light tactical
vehicles to replace many of the HMMWVs used by the armed services today. HMMWVs, which
first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold War when improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were not a major factor in military
planning. The HMMWV’s demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the difficulties and costs
experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the inventory have led to renewed emphasis
on vehicle survivability. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace
HMMWVs “one for one.”2
JLTV Program
What Is the JLTV?3
The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce both vehicles and
associated trailers. Originally, there were three variants, but now there are two planned JLTV
variants: a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support
Vehicle (CSV). As planned, JLTVs would be more mechanically reliable, maintainable (with onboard diagnostics), all-terrain mobile, and equipped to link into current and future tactical data
nets. Survivability and strategic and operational transportability by ship and aircraft are also key
JLTV design requirements.
Program Structure4
The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.5 The Army bears the overall
responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office within the Army’s Tank,
Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. Marine participation is centered
1
Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” National Defense, April 25,
2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 2008.
2
Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008. Headquarters,
Department of the Army, “Army Truck Program (Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Acquisition Strategy) Report to the
Congress,” June 2010, p. 5.
3
Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website,
http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmJLTV.html, last visited March 2, 2011, and Marine Corps PEO Land Systems Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle website, http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandssystems/jltv.aspx, last visited March 2,
2011, and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,”
InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2011.
4
CRS Report RL34026, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the
Process, by Moshe Schwartz, provides an extensive discussion of the defense acquisition process.
5
The 12th Edition of the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as “a
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19
billion (FY2000 constant dollars).”
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Support Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.
The Marines have expressed reservations with the JLTV because, at its current estimated weight,
it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The Marines do not rule out
removing themselves from the program and modifying HMMWVs if developers cannot address
their specific requirements. The Army is said to be “moving ahead” with the JLTV program,
appearing less concerned than the Marines about transportability requirements. Some describe the
Army and Marines as “striking out on a separate path” with the Army more concerned with
survivability and the Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the
Navy’s amphibious ships.
DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too
early in the development process. Some analysts suggest that the JLTV program will cost well
over $10 billion and possibly as much as $30 billion to $70 billion, depending on the final cost of
the vehicles and the number procured. Currently, the per unit cost is estimated at about $320,000
per vehicle—a figure that the Marines believe is too high.
The FY2011 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of
$243.9 million.
Concerns have been expressed that DOD’s Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) effort will clash with the JLTV. There are also concerns about overall
JLTV program affordability and the Marine’s concerns with its weight and transportability. The
Army’s decision to change JLTV survivability requirements has resulted in the delay of awarding
EMD contracts and the doubling of the EMD phase to 48 months which could increase the
program’s overall cost.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................1
JLTV Program.............................................................................................................................1
What Is the JLTV? ................................................................................................................1
Program Structure .................................................................................................................2
Program History....................................................................................................................2
Technology Development Contracts Awarded........................................................................2
JLTV Contracts Protested......................................................................................................3
JLTV Phase of Development .................................................................................................3
Recent Program Activities...........................................................................................................3
Change in Requirements, Program Schedule, and Variants.....................................................3
Performance Issues During the Technology Development Phase............................................4
Possible Acquisition Targets and Costs ..................................................................................4
Army ..............................................................................................................................4
Marines...........................................................................................................................4
Navy...............................................................................................................................4
Air Force and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) .............................................5
Estimated Cost ................................................................................................................5
Marines’ Concerns with the JLTV Program ...........................................................................5
Foreign Participants ....................................................................................................................6
United States and Australia Agree on Joint JLTV Development .............................................6
Additional Foreign Participants .............................................................................................6
Budgetary Issues .........................................................................................................................6
Program Cost and Funding....................................................................................................6
FY2012 JLTV Budget Request ..............................................................................................7
Potential Issues for Congress.......................................................................................................7
JLTV Affordability................................................................................................................7
Marine Corps Concerns with JLTV Affordability, Weight, and Transportability .....................7
JLTV and M-ATV Redundancies...........................................................................................8
Changing Requirements ........................................................................................................8
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................8
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background1
The JLTV is an Army-led, multi-service initiative to develop a family of future light tactical
vehicles to replace many of the 160,000 HMMWVs used by the armed services today.
HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold War when
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were not a major
factor in military planning. The HMMWV’s demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the
difficulties and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the inventory have led
to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. With more than 50% of the Army’s total tactical
wheeled vehicle fleet nearing the end of its useful life, and with the need of the services to repair
equipment, the JLTV, with its scalable armor protection, is intended to replace a large portion of
the HMMWV fleet. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace
HMMWVs “one for one.”2 The Army plans to divest its older HMMWVs and through means of
recapitalization, intends to have approximately 85,000 HMMWVs still in service as of 2025 and
to fill other light tactical vehicle requirements with a not-yet-final number of JLTVs.3
JLTV Program4
What Is the JLTV?
The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce three categories
of vehicles and associated trailers. Category A JLTVs are intended for general purpose mobility
and would carry a 3,500 pound payload. Category Bs are intended to serve as infantry carriers,
command and control and reconnaissance vehicles, and weapons carriers and would
accommodate a 4,000 to 4,500 pound payload. Category Cs are intended to serve as shelter
carriers, prime movers, and ambulances and would carry a 5,100 pound payload. JLTVs are to be
designed with scalable armor, enhanced suspension, and drive train capability to accommodate
future load carrying capacity. In February 2011, the Category B variant was eliminated because it
proved to be too heavy to meet required transportability weights. There are now two planned
JLTV variants, a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat
Support Vehicle (CSV). As planned, JLTVs would be more mechanically reliable, maintainable
(with on-board diagnostics), all-terrain mobile, and equipped to link into current and future
tactical data nets. Survivability and strategic and operational transportability by ship and aircraft
are also key JLTV design requirements.
1
Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” National Defense, April 25,
2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 2008.
2
Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
3
Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Truck Program (Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Acquisition Strategy)
Report to the Congress,” June 2010, p. 5.
4
Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website,
http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmJLTV.html, last visited March 2, 2011, and Marine Corps PEO Land Systems Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle website, http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandssystems/jltv.aspx, last visited March 2,
2011 and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,”
InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2011.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Program Structure5
The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.6 The Army bears the overall
responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office within the Army’s Tank,
Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. Marine participation is centered
on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO
LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA.
Program History
In November 2006, the Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC)
approved the JLTV program. On December 22, 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase
into the Technology Development (TD) Phase of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The
Army and Marines had intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology
Development Phase as early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical
maturity, and shifting requirements, the Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young,
disapproved the issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to “go back to the
drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase.”67 On February 5, 2008, an
RFP for Technology Development Phase was issued to industry.78 The RFP stated that the
government desired to award three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development Phase. The
RFP stipulated that proposals would be due April 7, 2008, and the TDP would last 27 months.
Contractors would build four test sub-configurations during the first 15 months, followed by 12
months of testing.
Technology Development Contracts Awarded8Awarded9
On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV TD Phase for a total of $166 million.
The three industry teams were (1) BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems
Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL; (2) General Tactical
Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint venture
between General Dynamics Land Systems and
AM General; and (3) Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa
Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA.
JLTV Contracts Protested
On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) against the TD contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh team and the
Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging that there were “unintended discrepancies” in how the
government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity, logistics, and costs.9 As a result
6
Integration, Oswego, NY.
5
CRS Report RL34026, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the
Process, by Moshe Schwartz, provides an extensive discussion of the defense acquisition process.
6
The 12th Edition of the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as “a
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19
billion (FY2000 constant dollars).”
7
Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy,” InsideDefense.com, September 24,
2007.
78
JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer, “JLTV Solicitation Calls
for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible,” InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2008.
89
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from TACOM’s JLTV Program website,
http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/MAJORSYS/JLTV/jltv.htm,, accessed March 2, 2011, and the Marine Corps PEO
Land Systems JLTV website, https://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandsystems/jltv.aspx, accessed March 2, 2011.
9
Marjorie Censer, “Following Northrop’s Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest,” InsideDefense.com,
November 12, 2008 and Ann Roosevelt, “Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards,” Defense Daily, November 13,
2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 25, 2009, p. 12 .
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JLTV Contracts Protested
On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) against the TD contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh team and the
Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging that there were “unintended discrepancies” in how the
government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity, logistics, and costs.10 As a
result of this protest, work on the JLTV program by the three winning teams was suspended. On
February 17, 2009, GAO rejected the JLTV protests and the stop work orders were lifted.
JLTV Phase of Development
The JLTV Program is currently in the Technology Development (TD) Phase10Phase11 of acquisition
which was originally scheduled to conclude in the June 2011 timeframe.1112 Prototypes from BAE
Systems,
and the teams of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and AM General and
General General
Dynamics Land Systems for each of the three JLTV categories are being tested at
Aberdeen Test
Center in Maryland and the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Once testing was
completed and
technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to
be conducted
in the late summer of 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase.12 Changing requirements, as detailed in the next section, resulted in the delay of
concluding the TD phase until January 2012.
Program Developmental Issues (EMD) Phase.13
Recent Program Activities
Change in Requirements, Program Schedule, and Variants13Variants14
In February 2011, the JLTV Program Office announced that the award of the EMD contract
would be delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the
JLTV to
have the same level of under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
All-Terrain AllTerrain Vehicle (M-ATV). DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase,
which which
was scheduled to last 24 months14 but instead optedmonths15 but now plans for a 48 month-long EMD phase
before before
awarding Production and Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016. In
addition, the
Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too heavy to meet the
required weight of approximately 15,639 pounds to make it transportable by Army CH-47F and
Marine Corps CH-53K helicopters. Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle
(CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support Vehicle
(CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.
10
required weight
10
Marjorie Censer, “Following Northrop’s Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest,” InsideDefense.com,
November 12, 2008 and Ann Roosevelt, “Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards,” Defense Daily, November 13,
2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 25, 2009, p. 12 .
11
From the November 2009 Defense Acquisition University Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, the
Technology Development (TD) Phase is the second phase of the Defense Acquisition Management System and the
purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated
into the full system.
1112
Matthew Cox, “Prototypes for JLTV to Undergo Testing Over Next 12 Months,” Marine Corps Times, June 21,
2010, p. 32 and Ann Roosevelt, “JLTV TD Phase Deliveries Continue, Army Fleshing Out JLTV EMD,” Defense
Daily, July 23, 2010.
1213
The EMD phase for the JLTV program will focus on reducing program risk, ensuring operational supportability,
designing for producibility, maximizing affordability, ensuring critical program information protection, and
demonstrating system integration, interoperability, transportability, fuel efficiency, reliability, and utility.
1314
Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat
Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011 and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV
Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,” InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2011.
1415
DOD Briefing: “JLTV EMD Industry Day,” April 26, 2010.
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of approximately 15,639 pounds to make it transportable by Army CH-47F and Marine Corps
CH-53K helicopters. Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can
transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) that can
transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.
Performance Issues During the Technology Development Phase15Phase16
According to the JLTV Program Office, the testing of the three manufacturers technology
demonstrators wasis described as “generally meeting requirements with exceptions” and that “current
force protection requirements appear achievable.” The Program Office further noted that the
technology demonstrator vehicles were “several hundred to a thousand pounds overweight, that
even though the technology demonstrator vehicles had not been tested; they appeared to be very
close to the maximum envelopes for aircraft transportability; and that there were problems meeting
both
meeting both the reliability and mobility requirements. The technology demonstrator vehicles
also exhibited
limited space to accommodate both mission essential equipment and payloads.
Marines’ Concerns with the JLTV Program16
The Marines have expressed reservations with the JLTV program because it did not lend itself to
Marine Corps expeditionary operations. Marine leadership was concerned industry prototypes
were too heavy to be transported by helicopters and faulted industry for failing to stay “apace of
the vision” for the JLTV. The Marines did not rule out removing themselves from the program
and modifying HMMWVs if developers could not address their specific requirements. The Army
appeared less concerned than the Marines that final JLTV versions might not be CH-47 and CH53 helicopter and C-130 cargo aircraft transportable. Some described the Army and Marines as
“striking out on a separate path” with the Army more concerned with survivability and the
Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the Navy’s amphibious
ships.17
After the release of the FY2012 Budget Request, Marine leadership reportedly suggested the
future of the JLTV was “up in the air” largely due to continuing concerns about cost and weight,
as well as the delay in the EMD contract.18 Marine leadership maintained unless the price of the
JLTV came down from around $300,000 the Marines would focus on upgrading their 22,000
HMMWVs. Another possibility discussed to bring down the JLTV price was to eliminate some of
the vehicle’s requirements such as the number of vehicles needing classified communications
systems or those that could generate external power.
Northrop Grumman Added to BAE/NAVISTAR JLTV Team19
Northrop Grumman has reportedly been added to the BAE/NAVISTAR JLTV team competing for
one of two EMD contracts expected to be awarded in January or February 2012. Northrop
15
Information in this section is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011.
16
Marjorie Censer, “Citing Weight, Commandant Says Marines May Have to Depart JLTV Program,”
InsideDense.com, April 29, 2009 and Dan Lamothe, “Weight Issues Aside, Army Sticks With JLTV,” Army Times,
May 18, 2009.
17
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Kate Brannen, “Mobility Vs. Survivability: JLTV
Could Suffer as U.S. Army, Marines Diverge,” Defense News, June 7, 2010.
18
Cid Standifer, “Marines: JLTV Faces Uncertain Future,” InsideDefense.com, February 16, 2011 and “JLTV
Requirements Could Be Trimmed to Bring Down Price Tag,” InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2010.
19
Tony Bertuca, “BAE, Navistar Add Northrop Grumman to Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Team,” InsideDefense.com,
April 29, 2011.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Grumman has been designated as the team’s command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) lead, responsible for integrating command
and control systems and software, computers, and sensors to gather intelligence and protect the
vehicle occupants.
Army Releases Request for Information (RFI) for JLTV “Off the
Shelf” Alternatives20
On May 4, 2011, the Army issued a request for information (RFI) for “off the shelf”
commercially available vehicles that could compete with JLTV prototypes already being
developed by three industry teams. The Army characterized this as a part of market research that
will support a potential Milestone B decision and will permit the Army to “see if there are any
other ‘off-the-shelf’ vehicle solution(s) that we may not have already explored to ensure that we
understand the ‘art of the possible’ that industry has to offer.”21
Recent Program Activities
Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee
Recommends JLTV Termination22
On September 13, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee recommended the
termination of JLTV program, noting “excessive cost growth and constantly changing
requirements” suggesting that “alternatives exist today to meet the Army and Marine Corps’
requirements to recapitalize and competitively upgrade the HMMWV fleet.” The subcommittee
expressed concern that early program cost growth and projected acquisition costs will make the
program unaffordable in a challenging economic environment.
The Army and Marines’ Response to Recommended Program
Termination23
In what has been characterized as a response to the Senate Appropriation’s Committee
recommendation to terminate the JLTV, the Army and Marines apparently put aside past
differences and developed a new acquisition strategy that relaxes transportability requirements
and sets a goal for a lower per-unit cost of $225,000. The Army notes this lower price tag is a
result of requirement trade-offs but crew survivability remains of paramount importance.
20
Tony Bertuca, “Army Releases RFI for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle “Off The-Shelf” Solutions,” InsideDefense.com,
May 6, 2011.
21
Ibid.
22
Report 112-77, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2012 (H.R. 2219), September 15, 2011, p. 162 and
Michael Hoffman, “JLTV Loses More Support on Capitol Hill,” Defense News, September 19, 2011.
23
Information in this section is taken from Tony Bertuca, “Army Digs in on JLTV, Touts New Acquisition Strategy
and Price Tag,” InsideDefense.com, September 23, 2011 and “Army and Marines Agree on Requirement Changes for
Embattled JLTV,” InsideDefense.com, September 30, 2011 and Michael Hoffman, “U.S.: JLTV to Beat Cost
Prediction,” Defense News, October 3, 2011.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Draft Engineering and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposal24
On October 3, 2011, the Army issued a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Key provisions include
•
a $230,000 to $270,000 per vehicle cost target;
•
an additional add-on armor kit (called a B kit) can cost no more than $50,000;
•
EMD phase cut by 16 months—will now be 32 versus 48 months; and
•
Army intends to procure at least 20,000 JLTVs with options to procure more.
Army and Marines Revising Draft EMD RFP25
Reportedly based on input from a number of potential industry bidders, the Army and Marines
will likely delay release on the EMD RFP until January-February 2012. These meetings with
industry, in addition to soliciting interest for the RFP bid, were intended to determine cost drivers
during production and what actions could be taken to speed up production and drive down cost.
Ford Motor company, the second largest automaker who left the military tactical vehicle business
in the early 1980s, is said to be interested in competing to build the JLTV. The possible entry of
Ford, along with other industry teams, could serve to further reduce vehicle costs. The high pervehicle cost has been a point of contention with DOD, Congress, and program critics. The draft
RFP states that a production phase contract solicitation is envisioned for FY2015 and would be
awarded as a single fixed-price contract for three years for low-rate initial production.
Marines Might Defer JLTV Acquisition Until Late 2020s26
Marine leaders reportedly testified to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air
and Land Forces on November 16, 2011, that if significant budget cuts are enacted due to
sequestration of the defense budget under the provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011, P.L.
112-25, the Marines would defer acquisition of the JLTV until the late 2020s. The Marines would
instead develop and procure the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) before acquiring any JLTVs.
Experts suggest that if the Marines defer until the late 2020s that the per vehicle cost for the
Army’s JLTVs—that it hopes to begin procuring in 2015—would increase and possibly endanger
the overall program.
24
Draft JLTV EMD Request for Proposal, October 3, 2011 and Michael Hoffman, “U.S.: JLTV to Beat Cost
Prediction,” Defense News, October 3, 2011.
25
Information in this section is taken from Tony Bertuca and Jason Sherman, “ Army, Marine Corps Reworking JLTV
Plans Based on Industry Input,” InsideDefense.com, December 2, 2011, and “Ford Eying Entry into JLTV Competition,
Influenced DOD Move to Lower Cost Target,” InsideDefense.com, December 9, 2011.
26
Information in this section is taken from Roxana Tiron and Brendan McGarry, “Marines May Delay Light Combat
Vehicles Program to Late 2020s,” Bloomberg.com, November 6, 2011, and Michael Hoffman, “Cuts Could Delay U.S.
Marines’ JLTV,” Defense News, November 21, 2011.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Foreign Participants
United States and Australia Agree on Joint JLTV Development27 limited space to accommodate both mission essential equipment and payloads.
Possible Acquisition Targets and Costs17
Army
The Army will have the greatest requirement for JLTVs but, despite having issued a
congressionally mandated Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, they have been unwilling to provide
a definitive procurement quantity, although the Program Office indicates that Army requirements
could be between 26,300 to 26,400 vehicles. This lack of a definitive procurement quantity calls
into question the Army’s understanding of its vehicle requirements and makes it difficult to
forecast future program costs and could make program oversight challenging.
Marines
The Marine’s procurement quantity is planned for 5,500 vehicle with 4,650 being CTVs and 850
CSVs. This procurement quantity is likely dependent upon reducing vehicle cost and weight.
Navy
The Navy has recently expressed a desire to participate in the JLTV program. If the Navy does
participate, it would require from 400 to 500 CTVs and from 150 to 200 CSVs.
16
Information in this section is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011.
17
Information in this section is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011 and the Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, undated but
obtained from the Army in September 2010.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Air Force and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
The Air Force and USSOCOM might also participate in the JLTV program but USSOCOM’s
participation might be limited as it has its own Family of Special Operations Vehicles Program to
develop a wide range of special operations-unique vehicles, including light tactical vehicles.
Estimated Cost
The TD phase estimated base vehicle cost is between $305,000 to $340,000 and program officials
suggest the cost could be closer to $320,000. While some consider this cost high, an uparmored
HMMWV with a fragmentation kit costs around $200,000, a MRAP costs between $430,000 to
$900,000 and the M-ATV, about $1.4 million with special equipment and vehicle transportation
costs are factored in.18
Marines’ Concerns with the JLTV Program19
The Marines continue to express reservations with the JLTV program because, at its current
estimated weight, it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. Marine
leadership is concerned that industry prototypes are too heavy to be transported by helicopters
and faults industry for failing to stay “apace of the vision” for the JLTV. The Marines do not rule
out removing themselves from the program and modifying HMMWVs if developers cannot
address their specific requirements. The Army is said to be “moving ahead” with the JLTV
program, appearing less concerned than the Marines that final JLTV versions might not be CH-47
and CH-53 helicopter and C-130 cargo aircraft transportable. Some describe the Army and
Marines as “striking out on a separate path” with the Army more concerned with survivability and
the Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the Navy’s
amphibious ships.20 Concerned about weight, the Marines are reportedly testing Textron’s Small
Combat Tactical Vehicle Capsule (SCTVC), a bolt-on capsule that fits onto the chassis of existing
HMMWVs, as an alternative to the JLTV.21
After the release of the FY 2012 Budget Request, Marine leadership reportedly suggested that the
future of the JLTV was “up in the air” largely due to continuing concerns about cost and weight,
as well as the delay in the EMD contract.22 Marine leadership has maintained that unless the price
of the JLTV comes down from around $300,000 that the Marines will focus instead on upgrading
their existing 22,000 HMMWVs. Another possibility to bring down the JLTV price could be to
eliminate some of the vehicle’s requirements such as the number of vehicles needing classified
communications systems or those that can generate external power.
18
Lance M. Bacon, “Buys of Tactical Vehicles Cut by 15%,” Army Times, February 7, 2011.
Marjorie Censer, “Citing Weight, Commandant Says Marines May Have to Depart JLTV Program,”
InsideDense.com, April 29, 2009 and Dan Lamothe, “Weight Issues Aside, Army Sticks With JLTV,” Army Times,
May 18, 2009.
20
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Kate Brannen, “Mobility Vs. Survivability: JLTV
Could Suffer as U.S. Army, Marines Diverge,” Defense News, June 7, 2010.
21
Ibid.
22
Cid Standifer, “Marines: JLTV Faces Uncertain Future,” InsideDefense.com, February 16, 2011 and “JLTV
Requirements Could Be Trimmed to Bring Down Price Tag,” InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2010.
19
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Foreign Participants
United States and Australia Agree on Joint JLTV Development23
In February 2009, the Pentagon and the Australian Department of Defense signed an agreement to
coordinate the technology development for the JLTV. Under this agreement, 30 JLTV prototypes
will be developed, with the United States funding the development of 21 prototypes and Australia
funding nine. Australia reportedly has a need for about 1,300 to 1,400 vehicles with requirements
similar to the JLTV, although Australian defense officials note that Australia’s participation in
JLTV technology development does not automatically mean that they will eventually procure
JLTVs. At February 2011 conference, Australian defense officials noted that their current planned
procurement quantity for right-hand drive JLTVs was 1,300 with about 900 for general purposes
and 400 for utility missions.28
Ramifications If the JLTV Is Terminated29
The Australian press reports that if the JLTV program is terminated, Australia will lose $40
million that it has contributed to the JLTV program. Australian defense officials suggested that
even if the JLTV program is terminated, they would benefit from knowledge gained through
research and testing conducted to date. 24
Additional Foreign Participants30Participants25
According to the JLTV Program Office, in addition to Australia, Israel, Great Britain, and Canada
are participating in various extents in the TD phase. The Program Office has established working
groups with Israel, Great Britain, and Canada, although the extent of the participation as well as
the number of JLTVs that they might consider procuring was not made public.
27
Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. and Australia to Join Forces on JLTV Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2009,
p. 12 and Marjorie Censer, “DOD Inks Formal JLTV Agreement with Australia; More Partnerships Planned,”
InsideDefense.com, February 26, 2009.
28
Information is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011.
29
Brendan Nicholson, “Canberra Loses $40 M on U.S. Army Project, “ The Australian, September 16, 2011.
30
Ibid.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Possible Acquisition Targets31
Army
The new draft EMD RFP calls for at least 20,000 JLTVs for the Army with the option to procure
additional vehicles.
Marines
The Marines’ procurement quantity is planned for 5,500 vehicles, with 4,650 being CTVs and
850 CSVs. This procurement quantity is likely dependent upon reducing vehicle cost and weight.
Navy
The Navy has recently expressed a desire to participate in the JLTV program. If the Navy does
participate, it would require from 400 to 500 CTVs and from 150 to 200 CSVs.
Air Force and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
The Air Force and USSOCOM might also participate in the JLTV program, but USSOCOM’s
participation might be limited as it has its own Family of Special Operations Vehicles Program to
develop a wide range of special operations-unique vehicles, including light tactical vehicles.
Budgetary Issues
Program Cost and Funding32Budgetary Issues
Program Cost and Funding26
DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too
early in the development process to determine an accurate cost estimate. Some defense and trade
analysts suggest that the JLTV program will cost well over $10 billion and possibly as much as
$30 billion to $70 billion, depending on the final cost of the vehicles chosen and the number of
vehicles procured.33 27 The Army originally estimated that each fully equipped JLTV will cost
$418,000, almost 70% higher than the target cost of $250,000 per vehicle that would have
enabled the Army to replace all of its HMMWV’s with JLTVs. The Army’s current draft EMD
RFP calls for a per-vehicle cost between $230,000 to $270,000.
31
Information in this section is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011 and the Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, undated but
obtained from the Army in September 2010 and Michael Hoffman, “U.S.: JLTV to Beat Cost Prediction,” Defense
News, October 3, 2011.
32One estimate by the Center for
Army Analysis suggests that it would require about $6.7 billion per year to outfit all Army
brigades over 15 years with JLTVs.
23
Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. and Australia to Join Forces on JLTV Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2009,
p. 12 and Marjorie Censer, “DOD Inks Formal JLTV Agreement with Australia; More Partnerships Planned,”
InsideDefnse.com, February 26, 2009.
24
Information is from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011.
25
Ibid.
26
Jason Sherman and Daniel G. Dupont, “JLTV Price Tag Drives New Three Step Tactical Vehicle Plan for the
Army,” InsideDefense.com, August 8, 2008 and Michael Hoffman, “U.S.: JLTV to Beat Cost Prediction,” Defense
News, October 3, 2011.
33.
27
Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Companies Jockey for Huge U.S. Military Truck Program,” Reuters, November 12, 2007.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
FY2012 JLTV Budget Request34
The FY2012Request28
The FY2011 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of
$243.9 million. The significant increase from the FY2011 Budget Request of $84.7 million
reflects the anticipated award of the EMD contracts in January or February 2012.
Legislative Activity
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540)
Conference Report (H.Rept. 112-329)35
The conference recommended reducing the Army’s $172.1 million budget request by $64.8
million due to “schedule slip” (delay of awarding the EMD contract) and reducing the Marines’
$71.8 million request by $24.9 million for the same reason.
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, FY2012 (H.R. 2055, P.L.
112-74), Conference Report (H.Rept. 112-331)36
The budget request includes $243,940,000 within Army and Marine Corps accounts for the
development of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV program has undergone
significant changes since its inception and the submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget
request. The principal reason for the changes is the discovery that the plan to acquire
multiple variants of a limited number of vehicles with demanding performance specifications
would result in an unaffordable program for both the Army and Marine Corps. As a result,
the program will now pursue a competitively-selected single vehicle with a less complex
design on a significantly accelerated timeline.
The conferees are encouraged to see the Army and Marine Corps taking definitive action to
change their approach in evaluating requirements, technology, key performance parameters,
and costs as they apply to this acquisition program. Continuing on the nine year path of
studies, development, and testing to field a lightweight tactical vehicle that will carry four
passengers and 3,500 pounds of cargo onto the battlefield was unacceptable.
Recognizing the renewed focus and approach, the conference agreement provides
$87,300,000 in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army and $46,700,000 in
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy for continued JLTV development, in
accordance with revised estimates for the program. The conferees strongly encourage the
Army and Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics), to examine the feasibility of accelerating a competition for
34
United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon
System, February 2011, p. 3-2.
35
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540) Conference Report, H.Rept. 112-329, December 12,
2011, p. 4 and p. 8.
36
Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, Conference Report to
Accompany H.R. 2055, December 15, 2011, pp. 688-689.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
production through more efficient testing and acquisition practices and by embracing off-theshelf technology demonstrated by industry so that improved vehicles are delivered to the
warfighter as soon as possible. Accordingly, the Army and Marine Corps are encouraged to
acquire, test, and evaluate, as necessary, available of the-shelf systems that meet the essential
program requirements.
Potential Issues for Congress
JLTV Affordability
It can be argued that the Army’s per unit cost target of between $230,000 to $270,000 under the
provisions of the draft EMD RFP are a “step in the right direction” in terms of addressing the
issue of JLTV affordability, but there are other factors that must also be considered. HMMWVs
and MRAPs—primarily M-ATVs—constitute competing programs that arguably have a degree of
political support for their continuation. Both House and Senate appropriators have acknowledged
the roles that MRAPs and recapitalized HMMWVs will be expected to play in the future and have
expressed doubts that the JLTV can meet affordability targets. Aside from congressional concern
is the notion of a “challenging economic environment” that will confront not only the JLTV
program, but also other current and future DOD weapon systems programs.
A number of think tanks and commissions—including the presidentially-appointed BowlesSimpson Fiscal Commission37—who are proposing ways to decrease DOD spending have
recommended the JLTV program be cancelled or deferred. Given this wide-ranging opposition to
the JLTV program on the basis of affordability, even a $230,000 per copy JLTV variant might
prove to be difficult to justify.
Changing Requirements
As previously discussed, the Army’s decision to change requirements for the JLTV to have the
same level of under body protection as M-ATVs resulted in delaying the award of the EMD
contract until January or February 2012 and will undoubtedly add to the program’s overall
duration and cost. Changing requirements during a system’s development cycle has often been
cited as one of the major reasons why defense programs take many more years than planned as
well as why they exceed their budgets. Even though the Army and Marines have reportedly
reduced a number of vehicle requirements to reach a $230,000 to $270,000 per vehicle target
cost, there is no guarantee that if funding is provided for FY2012 that requirements might be
added on in the future, thereby driving up the per vehicle cost. Given this possibility, Congress
might choose to closely monitor the Army and Marines during the rest of the TD phase and EMD
phase—if the program makes it to that phase—to ensure that the Services do not make significant
requirements changes/additions that could adversely affect the JLTV development timeline and
program cost.
37
The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform: $200 Billion in Illustrative Savings, November 12,
2010 (Draft Document), p. 24.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Limitations on Upgrading HMMWVs and MRAPs
The Army has countered the argument that upgrading HMMWVs and MRAPs is a viable
substitute for JLTVs by suggesting that these vehicles have reached the point where additional
upgrades (primarily additional armor) are no longer technically feasible and might negate
mobility benefits. In the case of HMMWVs, the Army contends that adding additional armor puts
significant stress on engine, suspension and transmission equipment, requiring extensive and
costly modification to these vehicles. While M-ATVs initially enjoyed success in Afghanistan,
reports suggest that insurgents have increased the size of IEDs, thereby negating much of the
protective value of M-ATVs resulting in increased U.S. casualties.38 In response to the enhanced
IED threat, two additional layers of Israeli-made armor plates are being installed to the M-ATV’s
underside and new padding and crew harnesses inside the vehicle which reportedly will enable
the M-ATVs to withstand explosions twice as large as their current classified capability.39 While
additional armor and interior improvements could improve M-ATV survivability up to a point,
there are concerns that additional armor might have an adverse impact on vehicle mobility, which
was the prime consideration for the development of the M-ATV. As Congress works with DOD to
find both an effective and affordable strategy to modernize and recapitalize the tactical wheeled
vehicle fleet, these considerations might merit additional examination.
The Cost of a Recapitalized HMMWV vs. a New JLTV40
With the proposed target cost for the JLTV in the $230,000-$270,000 range, some defense
officials suggest that the JLTV could reach cost parity with recapitalized HMMWVs. The Marine
Corps is reportedly not releasing a Request for Proposal (RFP) for HMMWV recapitalization
(recap) noting that:
When you start trying to bring those capabilities back into the [HMMWV] recap, your price
goes up to the $240,000 to $250,000 range, and now you’re at [the price of] a JLTV vehicle,
which has so much more payload and so much more capability.41
Army program officials contend that some recapitalized HMMWV versions could cost as much
as $500,000 per vehicle. Analysts also suggest that a new JLTV will have a much greater
operational life than a “used” recapitalized HMMWV. Given these considerations, Congress
might decide to further examine how the new proposed target cost for the JLTV in the $230,000$270,000 range affects current and future HMMWV recapitalization efforts.
38
Yochi J. Dreazen, “Desperate Measures,” National Journal, July 9, 2011.
Ibid.
40
Lee Hudson, “Marine Corps Will Not Release Humvee Recap Request for Proposal,” InsideDefense.com, October
14, 2011.
41
Ibid.
39
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
122012.
Potential Issues for Congress
JLTV Affordability
In testimony on DOD weapons programs, GAO asserted that total acquisition costs for the
FY2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs still in the SDD phase increased 26%
and development costs increased by 40% from first estimates.29 As previously noted, early in the
TD phase, the Army estimated that each JLTV would cost $418,000—almost 70% higher than the
target cost of $250,000 per vehicle. The Program Office now estimates that the JLTV will cost
around $320,000 per vehicle, but these costs could change if additional requirements are added,
the number of vehicles is reduced, or if the program slips further to the right. Another factor
affecting affordability is what is expected to be increasingly tight defense budgets for the
foreseeable future. Even if JLTV per vehicle costs can be decreased, the possibility of
significantly smaller procurement budgets might render the JLTV unaffordable. With possible
foreign involvement in JLTV development and acquisition, there might be potential cost savings
that could drive down the per unit cost of JLTVs destined for the U.S. military which could have
an impact on the overall program.
Marine Corps Concerns with JLTV Affordability, Weight, and
Transportability
Based on reports, there appears to be concerns that JLTV prototypes under development may
exceed air transportability requirements and that they might also pose a weight and size problem
on amphibious ships. Given the Marines’ stated concerns about industry losing sight of JLTV’s
expeditionary requirements, Congress might opt to review the current state of JLTV development
with DOD and industry to insure that JLTVs remain both “light” and expeditionary. A further
issue for review might also be the Army’s and Marines’ overall approach to the JLTV program, as
some have described their approaches as divergent, which could cause programmatic difficulties
in the future. In addition, the Marines affordability concerns might result in fewer JLTVs
procured, thereby having an overall programmatic impact.
28
United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon
System, February 2011, p. 3-2.
29
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony, Defense Acquisitions: Results of Annual
Assessment of DOD Weapon Programs, GAO-08-674T, April 29, 2008, p. 2.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress
JLTV and M-ATV Redundancies
Concerns have been raised that the JLTV and M-ATV share many common characteristics and
there might be significant program redundancies. In August 2009 briefings to the House Armed
Services Committee Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
Subcommittees, GAO noted that “the introduction of MRAP, M-ATV and eventually the JLTV
creates a potential risk of unplanned overlap in capabilities; a risk that needs to be managed.”30
Defense officials have been asked if there is a need for the MRAP/M-ATV and JLTV programs as
these programs share as many as 250 requirements. 31 While DOD leadership notes that there are
450 additional requirements that the MRAPs and M-ATVs can not meet, thereby justifying the
JLTV program,32 the Army’s intent to develop a fourth type of vehicle—the Ultra-Lite MRAP—
calls into question the need for all four programs. Despite calls from Congress for DOD and the
Services to develop comprehensive tactical wheeled vehicle strategies it appears that there are a
significant number of redundancies that will be examined in greater detail before the JLTV
program enters production and procurement.
Changing Requirements
As previously discussed, the Army’s decision to change requirements for the JLTV to have the
same level of under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle
(M-ATV) resulted in delaying the award of the EMD contract until January 2012 and will
undoubtedly add to the program’s overall duration and cost. Changing requirements during a
system’s development cycle has often been cited as one of the major reasons why defense
programs take many more years than planned as well as why they exceed their budgets. Given
this tendency, Congress might choose to closely monitor the Army and Marines during the rest of
the TD phase and EMD phase—if the program makes it to that phase—to insure that the Services
do not make significant requirements changes/additions that could adversely afffect the JLTV
development timeline and program cost.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
30
GAO Briefing to the House Armed Services Committee Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces Subcommittees, “Status of DOD Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy,” August 13, 2009, p. 3.
31
Cid Standifer, “ Taylor: JLTV Absolutely Needed, Regardless of MRAP and M-ATV,” Inside the Navy, November
9, 2009.
32
Ibid.
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