Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
September 28, 2010October 25, 2012

Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, theIn February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV).
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006 ...............................................................................2
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................4
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................................6
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040..........................................................7
Oversight Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................8
Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal.............................................................................................8
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ..............................................................................9
Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................................9
Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships................................................................................. 11
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 11
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)..................................................... 11
House ........................................................................................................................... 11
Senate........................................................................................................................... 17
FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)........................................................................ 20
Senate........................................................................................................................... 20
National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035) ......................................................... 21
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs....................... 21

Tables
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001 ...........................................................2
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ...................................................4
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................6
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan......................................................7
Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................... 10
Table B-1. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan............................................. 25
Table C-1. Comparison of 1993 BUR Report, 313-Ship Plan, and Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR ...................................................................................................... 29
Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ................................................... 32
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015.................................... 33

Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Proposed 313-Ship Force Level .................. 23
Appendix B. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan ......................................... 25
Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR........................................................ 27
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate....................................................... 31

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 33

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). 1
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year.2 Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. 3 The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”4

1

The proposed FY2011 budget also requests funding for the procurement of an oceanographic ship that does not count
against the 313-ship goal.
2
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
3
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table 2
(page 9).
4
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, p. vii.

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Background
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet and compares it to previous
Navy ship force structure proposals.
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001

Ship type

February 2006 Navy
proposal for 313ship fleet

Early-2005 Navy
proposal for fleet of
260-325 ships
260-ships

325-ships

2002-2004 Navy
proposal for 375ship Navya

2001 QDR
plan for 310ship Navy

14

Ballistic missile
submarines
(SSBNs)

14

14

14

14

Cruise missile
submarines
(SSGNs)

4

4

4

4

Attack submarines
(SSNs)

48

37

41

55

55

Aircraft carriers

11c

10

11

12

12

Cruisers,
destroyers,
frigates

88

67

92

104

116

Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs)

55

63

82

56

0

Amphibious ships

31

17

24

37

36

12d

14d

20d

0d

0d

Combat logistics
(resupply) ships

30

24

26

42

34

Dedicated mine
warfare ships

0

0

0

26e

16

Otherf

20

10

11

25

25

313

260

325

375

310 or 312

MPF(F)

shipsd

Total battle
force ships

2 or 4b

Sources: U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review.
a.

Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.

b.

The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.

c.

For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.

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d.

Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contribute to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by
supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted by the Navy as battle force
ships.

e.

The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.

f.

Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.

Although the 313-ship goal remains in place as a Navy goal, some elements of Navy ship force
planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. For
example:
•

The Navy is planning to replace its 14 existing ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.5

•

The planned composition of the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force has changed
considerably since 2006 due to the truncation of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
destroyer program to three ships, the restart of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer procurement, and the Navy’s proposed cancellation of the CG(X)
cruiser program. 6 The Navy’s new mission of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations in Europe may also put upward pressure on the cruiser-destroyer
force-level goal.7

•

The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the
assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.8

•

Within the category of support ships, the original 313-ship plan included 3 Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a
force of about 23 JHSVs.9

•

Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of nextgeneration Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships; they now
call for building six new maritime prepositioning ships—three Lewis and Clark
(TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships (which have already been funded) and three
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that are to augment the three existing
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.

5

For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7
For further discussion, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, March
17, 2010.

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The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a
forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).10 Such an assessment could produce a replacement
for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for
the 313-ship plan might be issued.

Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal)
Ship type

FY11

FY12

Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier

FY13

FY14

FY15

Total

1

1

Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine

2

2

2

2

2

10

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer

2

1

2

1

2

8

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

2

3

4

4

4

17

San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship
Large-deck amphibious assault ship (LHA[R])

1

1

1

1

Fleet tug (TATF)
1

1

1

1

3

Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship

1

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)

1

1

2

2

2

8

TOTAL

9

8

12

9

12

50

Source: FY2011 Navy budget submission.
Note: The FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in
FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal.

Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•

The plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per
year.11 This is an increase from the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that
have been funded each year since FY1993. Shipbuilding supporters for some
time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more ships per year. A
rate of 10 ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of
313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year (see Appendix D).

10

U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, pp. 14, 19, 25.
11
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.

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•

Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 25% of the 313-ship requirement,
they account for 50% of the ships in the five-year plan. In this sense, these
relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding
plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship requirement, making it easier to
procure an average of 10 ships per year within available resources. Starting a few
years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer
overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of
next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an
average of 10 ships per year will become a considerably more expensive
proposition. In this sense, the FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding program’s average
of 10 ships per year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the
challenge it faces concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.

•

The FY2010 budget shifted the procurement of the next aircraft carrier from
FY2012 to FY2013.

•

The planned procurement rate of Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines is
consistent with Navy planning since the submission of the FY2009 budget to
increase the procurement rate of these ships to two per year starting in FY2011.
Virginia-class submarines were procured in FY2010 and previous years at a rate
of about one per year.12

•

The planned procurement rate for DDG-51 class destroyers reflects the Navy’s
proposal, approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, to stop procurement of DDG-1000 class destroyers and restart
procurement of DDG-51s.

•

The planned procurement rate of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) does not rise
above four per year. Previous Navy plans called for building as many as six LCSs
per year. The new planned maximum rate of four ships per year reflects a new
acquisition strategy for LCSs announced by the Navy in September 2009.13

•

The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 would be
the 11th ship in the class. The 33-ship goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD17s.

•

The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2015.
This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build
amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s (NGSB’s) Gulf Coast
yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at
Pascagoula, MS). (On July 13, 2010, Northrop announced that it intends to wind
down shipbuilding operations at Avondale in 2013 and consolidate its Gulf Coast
shipbuilding operations at the Ingalls yard.)

•

The three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships in the plan reflect the Navy’s
decision to cancel the planned MPF(F) squadron and instead build six new ships,

12

For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
13
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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including three MLPs, to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime
prepositioning ships.

30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The plan
includes a total of 276 ships.
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

CVN

1

1

1

1

1

1

LSC

SSC

SSN

2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

SSBN

AWS

CLF

1
1

1

1
1

1

1

1

2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1

1
1

Supt

Total

2
1
3
2
4
2
3
3
3
4
2
3
3
2
1

9
8
12
9
12
9
12
9
13
9
11
10
11
8
8
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
11
8
10
7
10
9
10
7

1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support
ships.

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Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040 that would result from
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan
FY

CVN

LSC

SSC

SSN

SSGN

SSBN

AWS

CLF

Supt

Total

Goal in 313-ship
plan

11

88

55

48

4

14

31

30

20

313a

11

11

84

42

53

4

14

29

29

18

284

12

11

84

41

54

4

14

30

29

20

287

13

10

85

37

55

4

14

30

29

23

287

14

10

86

32

55

4

14

30

30

24

285

15

11

88

28

54

4

14

31

30

25

285

16

11

90

32

51

4

14

33

30

27

292

17

11

91

33

51

4

14

33

30

31

298

18

11

93

37

50

4

14

33

30

33

305

19

11

94

37

51

4

14

33

30

37

311

20

12

96

39

49

4

14

33

30

38

315

21

12

96

39

49

4

14

34

31

39

318

22

12

95

41

48

4

14

34

29

41

318

23

11

94

39

48

4

14

35

29

45

319

24

11

94

40

46

4

14

36

28

47

320

25

12

92

41

45

4

14

35

28

46

317

26

12

89

43

44

4

14

36

28

45

313

27

12

87

45

43

2

13

35

26

46

308

28

11

85

46

41

1

13

36

26

46

304

29

11

81

48

40

0

13

34

25

44

296

30

12

77

49

39

0

12

33

25

44

291

31

12

73

51

41

0

12

33

24

44

290

32

11

71

52

41

0

12

32

25

44

288

33

11

69

53

42

0

12

31

26

44

288

34

11

67

54

43

0

12

33

26

44

290

35

12

68

55

44

0

12

30

25

44

290

36

11

70

56

45

0

12

30

26

44

294

37

11

72

56

46

0

12

29

27

44

297

38

11

74

56

45

0

12

29

27

44

298

39

11

76

56

45

0

12

29

28

44

301

40

11

76

55

45

0

12

30

28

44

301

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Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
a.

The 313-ship plan also includes a 12-ship Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron. The
Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan does not contemplate building a 12-ship MPF(F) squadron.

Observations that can be made about the above force-level projections include the following:
•

The Navy projects that implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan would result
in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a
peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288
ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040.

•

The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48
boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below
48 boats through 2040. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops
below the required level of 88 ships in 2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in
FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040.

•

The Navy projects a force of more than 40 support ships in FY2022 and beyond,
compared to a goal of 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan. The 20 support ships
in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now plans to build and
maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.

Oversight Issues for Congress
Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the status of the Navy’s 313-ship goal.
Potential questions for Congress include the following:

14

•

Does the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) endorse the Navy’s 313-ship
goal? The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) final report on the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the levels of Navy and other forces
that are expected to be in place for the years FY2011-FY2015, but does not
explicitly establish force-level requirements for Navy or other forces for either
FY2011-FY2015 or subsequent years.14

•

What is the Navy’s schedule for performing the new force structure assessment
(FSA) mentioned in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan? Will this
FSA result in a new force-level goal to replace the 313-ship plan? If so, when
does the Navy intend to issue the replacement plan? Why has the Navy decided
to retain, the for time being at least, the 313-ship plan, when certain elements of

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 20o1, pp. 45-47.

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Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from
that plan?
•

Given the Administration’s September 2009 announcement of its new plan for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which includes a significant use of
BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and
destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate?

The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR
shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the
2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommends a Navy of
346 ships (about 10% more than the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet), including 11 aircraft carriers
(the same number as in the Navy’s 313-ship plan) and 55 attack submarines (compared to 48 in
the Navy’s 313-ship plan).15 For additional discussion of the independent panel’s report, see
Appendix C.

Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A second potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support
all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run. The Navy projects that implementing the 30year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020,
reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships
in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that
the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in
the latter years of the 30-year plan.

Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A third potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the affordability and executability of the
30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan
would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the
plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If the
Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over
the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able
to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”

15
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.

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Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2010 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2011-FY2020)

Next 10 years
(FY2021-2030)

Final 10- years
(FY2031-FY2040)

Entire 30 years
(FY2011-FY2040)

Navy estimate

14.5

17.9

15.3

15.9

CBO estimate

15.2

20.4

21.4

19.0

% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates

5%

14%

40%

19%

Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table
2 (page 9). The CBO report calculates the percent difference between the Navy and CBO estimates for the
entire 30-year period as 20% rather than 19%. $19.0 billion is 19.497% greater than $15.9 billion.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding
plan with a total of 50 ships, or an average of 10 per year, within available resources in part
because half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from
now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan,
and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines
begins, procuring an average of 10 ships per year will become a considerably more expensive
proposition.
The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of
each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7 billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to almost onehalf of the Navy’s budget each year for procuring new ships. The May 2010 CBO report
estimates that a class of 12 SSBN(X)s would have an average unit procurement cost of $8.2
billion in constant FY2010 dollars.16 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other
shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding funding profile in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan
includes a “hump” of approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the
years (FY2019-FY2033) when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the 30year plan, however, contains little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in
shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no
real growth in coming years, as some observers, including some Navy leaders,17 expect. If the $2billion-per-year hump is not realized, the total number of ships of various kinds procured in
FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the 30-year plan. Attack submarines and
destroyers planned for those years could be among the ships that would not be procured. If so, the
shortfalls for these two categories of ships could be even deeper than the projections shown in
Table 4.

16

For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17
For example, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus reportedly told a group of defense reporters on April 21, 2010, that
“We [in the Navy] are looking at a [sic] no substantial growth and realistically no growth at all, in terms of the amount
of money we are allocated to spend.” As quoted in Geoff Fein, “Diminishing Budgets Forcing Navy To Closely
Examine Contracts, Navy Secretary Says,” Defense Daily, April 22, 1010: 4-5.

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Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships
A fourth oversight issue for Congress concerns current Navy plans for retiring certain older ships,
including several frigates and two amphibious assault ships, over the next few years. Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in deferring the retirements of at least some of
these ships, so as to increase the total number of Navy ships over the next few years. The Navy
has resisted proposals for deferring the retirements of the older ships, arguing that they Navy can
perform its expected missions with acceptable risk without these ships, and that the operation and
support costs of keeping these ships in service beyond their currently scheduled retirement dates
would reduce funding available for procuring new platforms and equipment, including new ships.

Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (pages 73-74).
The report states: “Demonstrating the committee’s commitment to reverse the decline in the size
of the Navy fleet, the committee authorizes 9 new ships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2
DDG 51 destroyers, and 2 Littoral Combat Ships.” (Page 20)
Section 121 of the bill as reported by the committee would broaden the Navy’s authority for
using incremental funding for procuring Navy ships.18
Section 123 would require the Navy to submit a report on, among other things, required numbers
of cruisers and destroyers, particularly in light of demands for these ships for ballistic missile
defense operations. 19
Section 1021 would amend the current law (10 U.S.C. 231) that requires DOD to annually submit
a 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Section 1022 states that the Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any battle force vessel
of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the congressional defense
committees written notification of such decommissioning in accordance with established
procedures.

18

For more on incremental funding, particularly in the procurement of Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke,
and CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
19
For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Section 1023 states that until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of the Navy reaches
313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in FY2011 or any subsequent
fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated for commissioning into the battle
force fleet for that fiscal year.
Section 1024 states that the Secretary of the Navy shall retain the amphibious assault ships
Nassau (LHA-4) and Peleliu (LHA-5) in a commissioned and operational status until the delivery
to the Navy of the new amphibious assault ships America (LHA-6) and LHA-7, respectively.
The text of Section 121 is as follows:
SEC. 121. INCREMENTAL FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF LARGE NAVAL
VESSELS.
(a) Incremental Funding of Large Naval Vessels- Except as provided in subsection (b), the
Secretary of the Navy may use incremental funding for the procurement of a large naval
vessel over a period not to exceed the number of years equal to three-fourths of the total
period of planned ship construction of such vessel.
(b) LPD 26- With respect to the vessel designated LPD 26, the Secretary may use
incremental funding for the procurement of such vessel through fiscal year 2012 if the
Secretary determines that such incremental funding—
(1) is in the best interest of the overall shipbuilding efforts of the Navy;
(2) is needed to provide the Secretary with the ability to facilitate changes to the shipbuilding
industrial base of the Navy; and
(3) will provide the Secretary with the ability to award a contract for construction of the
vessel that provides the best value to the United States.
(c) Condition for Out-year Contract Payments- A contract entered into under subsection (a)
or (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the
contract for a fiscal year after the fiscal year the vessel was authorized is subject to the
availability of appropriations for that purpose for that later fiscal year.
(d) Definitions- In this section:
(1) The term `large naval vessel’ means a vessel—
(A) that is—
(i) an aircraft carrier designated a CVN;
(ii) an amphibious assault ship designated LPD, LHA, LHD, or LSD; or
(iii) an auxiliary vessel; and
(B) that has a light ship displacement of 17,000 tons or more.
(2) The term `total period of planned ship construction’ means the period of years beginning
on the date of the first authorization of funding (not including funding requested for advance
procurement) and ending on the date that is projected on the date of the first authorization of
funding to be the delivery date of the vessel to the Navy.

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The text of Section 123 is as follows:
SEC. 123. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Report- Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to missile defense.
(b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be
accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by
procuring additional combatant surface vessels.
(2) Whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of
combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313ship fleet plan of the Navy.
(3) The number of Aegis ships needed by each combatant commander to fulfill ballistic
missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to
ballistic missile defense in Europe.
(4) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of
the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set.
(5) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a
balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States.
(6) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological
advancements in the sea-based missile defense program.
(7) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile ships
within the context of the fleet response plan.

The text of Section 1021 is as follows:
SEC. 1021. REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels
`(a) Quadrennial Naval Vessel Construction Plan- At the same time that the budget of the
President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 during each year in which the
Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction of
combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force structure
recommendations of the quadrennial defense review.
`(b) Matters Included- The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following:

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`(1) A detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the ten-year period beginning on
the date on which the plan is submitted, including a certification by the Secretary that the
budget for the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted and the budget for the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title are sufficient for funding such
schedule.
`(2) A probable construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 10
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(3) A notional construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 20
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(4) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the construction schedules
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
`(5) For the construction schedules under paragraphs (1) and (2)—
`(A) a determination by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the level
of funding necessary to execute such schedules; and
`(B) an evaluation by the Director of the potential risk associated with such schedules,
including detailed effects on operational plans, missions, deployment schedules, and
fulfillment of the requirements of the combatant commanders.
`(c) Naval Composition- In submitting the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
ensure that such plan—
`(1) is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title; and
`(2) phases the construction of new aircraft carriers during the periods covered by such plan
in a manner that minimizes the total cost for procurement for such vessels.
`(d) Assessment When Budget Is Insufficient- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for
funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is less than the level determined
necessary by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection
(b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the budget,
including the risk associated with a reduced force structure that may result from funding
naval vessel construction at such a level.
`(e) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a), the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the
construction schedules and the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with
respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the futureyears defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(f) Changes to the Construction Plan- In any year in which a quadrennial defense review is
not submitted, the Secretary of the Navy may not modify the construction schedules
submitted in the plan under subsection (a) unless—
`(1) the modification is an increase in planned ship construction;

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`(2) the modification is a realignment of less than one year of construction start dates in the
future-years defense plan submitted under section 221 of this title and the Secretary submits
to the congressional defense committees a report on such modification, including—
`(A) the reasons for realignment;
`(B) any increased cost that will be incurred by the Navy because of the realignment; and
`(C) an assessment of the effects that the realignment will have on the shipbuilding industrial
base, including the secondary supply base; or
`(3) the modification is a decrease in the number or type of combatant and support vessels of
the Navy and the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such
modification, including—
`(A) an addendum to the most recent quadrennial defense review that fully explains and
justifies the decrease with respect to the national security strategy of the United States as set
forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a); and
`(B) a description of the additional reviews and analyses considered by the Secretary after
the previous quadrennial defense review was submitted that justify the decrease.
`(g) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels.’.

In summarizing Section 1021, the committee’s report states:
This section would amend section 231 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels with
each submission of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The long-range plan would be
required to have 3 distinct sections each spanning a period of 10 years. The first section
would be a detailed construction plan for the first 10 years, the second a probable
construction plan for the second 10 years, and the third a notional construction plan for the
last 10 years. This section would require that during the intervening years between
submissions of the QDR, the plan may not be modified unless the change is accompanied by
an addendum to the QDR which explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the
national security of the United States. This section would further require that the plan fully
comply with section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a minimum of 11

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operational aircraft carriers and to phase the construction of such carriers as to minimize the
total cost of procurement. (Page 363)

The text of Section 1022 is as follows:
SEC. 1022. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Notice of Decommissioning- The Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any
battle force vessel of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the
congressional defense committees written notification of such decommissioning in
accordance with established procedures.
(b) Content of Notification- Any notification provided under subsection (a) shall include
each of the following:
(1) The reasons for the proposed decommissioning of the vessel.
(2) An analysis of the effect the decommissioning would be likely to have on the deployment
schedules of other vessels in the same class as the vessel proposed to be decommissioned.
(3) A certification from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decommissioning
of the vessel will not adversely affect the requirements of the combatant commanders to
fulfill missions critical to national security.
(4) Any budgetary implications associated with retaining the vessel in commission,
expressed for each applicable appropriation account.

The text of Section 1023 is as follows:
SEC. 1023. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIZE OF THE NAVY BATTLE FORCE FLEET.
(a) Limitation on Decommissioning- Until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of
the Navy reaches 313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in fiscal
year 2011 or any subsequent fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated
for commissioning into the battle force fleet for that fiscal year.
(b) Treatment of Submarines- For purposes of subsection (a), submarines of the battle force
fleet slated for decommissioning for any fiscal year shall not count against the number of
vessels the Secretary of the Navy is required to maintain for that fiscal year.

The text of Section 1024 is as follows:
SEC. 1024. RETENTION AND STATUS OF CERTAIN NAVAL VESSELS.
The Secretary of the Navy shall retain the vessels the U.S.S. Nassau (LHA 4) and the U.S.S.
Peleliu (LHA 5), in a commissioned and operational status, until the delivery to the Navy of
the vessels the U.S.S. America (LHA 6) and the vessel designated as LHA 7, respectively.

The committee’s report also states:
The committee notes that the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels,
known as the 30–year shipbuilding plan, submitted in accordance with section 231 of title
10, United States Code, proposes an average of 10 new vessels per year during the 5-year
period of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). While this is a positive step in shipbuilding

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procurement, the total number of battle force vessels remains essentially constant during the
FYDP due to the high rate of ship retirements planned during the period. Only after the
FYDP, do the battle force levels begin to increase in real terms and the stated goal of a 313ship Navy is not achieved until fiscal year 2018. The committee further notes that a short
term solution to the stagnant number of battle force ships through the FYDP is to delay
retirement of vessels with useful service life and that a planned approach to retire no more
ships in any one fiscal year than are being delivered to the Navy would accomplish this goal.
(Page 75)

The report also states:
U.S. shipbuilding industrial base
The committee has reservations as to the continued health of the shipbuilding industrial base
and its ability to remain viable in its current form. The shipbuilding industrial base currently
serving the needs of Navy and the nation is a legacy from the cold war when the size of the
Navy fleet, and the construction required to maintain that fleet, was significantly higher than
today. The committee is concerned that the relatively low orders for new ships as proposed
in the 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient to maintain all shipyards currently
constructing naval vessels. This is a very difficult situation for the Navy since reducing the
number of shipyards constructing vessels could have the unintended consequence of driving
up cost due to limited or no competition for particular classes of ships, yet the current
industrial base adds increased costs due to the significant overhead rates that must be
charged to each vessel.
Perhaps even more significant than shipyard over-capacity for the current shipbuilding plan
is the reduction in vendors willing to provide equipment and materiel necessary for the
shipbuilding industry. Low orders coupled with significant government requirements for
testing, traceability, and financial controls have driven many former suppliers out of the
market altogether. The committee received testimony that the vendor supply base is currently
60 to 70 percent sole source. While this almost total lack of competition may be manageable
in terms of maintaining the ability to construct vessels, it is not a condition that is bringing
the best value to the taxpayer.
The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has embarked on a comprehensive
review of the industrial base, including the supply base. The committee requests the
Secretary of the Navy to inform the committee when the comprehensive review is complete
and to make available to the committee those officials who participated in the review to
testify before the committee at a hearing in open session aimed at oversight of this potential
threat to national security. (Page 78)

Senate
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (see pages
677-678 of the printed version of S. 3454).
Section 124 of the bill states:
SEC. 124. INCLUSION OF BASIC AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN IN ASSESSMENTS
REQUIRED PRIOR TO START OF CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SHIP OF A
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM.

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(a) Inclusion in Assessments- Subsection (b)(1) of section 124 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 28; 10 U.S.C. 7291 note) is
amended by inserting `(and in particular completion of basic and functional design)’ after
`completion of detail design’.
(b) Basic and Functional Design Defined- Subsection (d) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(5) BASIC AND FUNCTION DESIGN- The term `basic and functional design’, for a ship,
means design, whether in the form of two-dimensional drawings, three-dimensional models,
or computer-aided models, that fixes the hull structure of the ship, sets the hydrodynamics of
the ship, routes all major distributive systems (including electricity, water, and other utilities)
of the ship, and identifies the exact positioning of piping and other outfitting within each
block of the ship.’.

Regarding Section 124, the committee’s report states:
Inclusion of basic and functional design in assessments required prior to start of
construction of first ship of a shipbuilding program (sec. 124)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 124 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) to tighten the
requirements under which the Secretary of the Navy is required to certify that a new
shipbuilding program has achieved sufficient design maturity at the time the Navy begins
construction on the first ship of any major shipbuilding program.
The Government Accountability Office, in its May 2009 report, “Best Practices: High Levels
of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding
(GAO–09–322),” identified key steps that leading commercial shipbuilders and ship buyers
follow to ensure their vessels deliver on-time, within planned costs, and with a high degree
of innovation.
One critical step in this process is achieving design stability before start of fabrication.
Leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable once all basic and functional design
activities have been completed (usually in the form of a complete 3D product model).
Section 124 as currently written does not specifically require that the assessment of design
maturity directly address the completeness of the 3D modeling or completion of the activities
that make up basic and functional design. This provision would add that requirement. (Page
13)

The committee’s report also states:
Surface ship construction and industrial base issues
The committee recognizes that the Navy’s most recent Long-Range Plan for the Construction
of Naval Vessels continues the Navy’s long stated goal of a minimum fleet of 313 battle
force ships. The committee notes that this plan is based on a 2005 Force Structure
Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded
requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare
support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee
encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can
be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan.

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The committee continues to have significant concerns regarding the implications of the plan
for the non-nuclear surface ship industrial base. If the Navy and industry, working together,
are unable to control requirement driven cost growth and deliver the ships in the plan for the
projected costs, the inevitable reductions in quantity will likely impact the Navy’s ability to
reach the required fleet size and further jeopardize the industrial base. The committee notes
that the current shipbuilding plan includes the cost of the SSBN (X) program and the
committee encourages the Navy to closely scrutinize requirements for this program in order
to minimize its impact on the recapitalization of the Navy’s battle force.
Furthermore, the committee urges the Navy and the contractors to negotiate as expeditiously
as possible fair and reasonable construction contracts for ships previously authorized in order
to reduce uncertainty and maintain and foster affordability in the procurement of large
surface combatants and other naval vessels.
In reviewing the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels in conjunction with
recent program performance highlights, the committee notes the following observations and
expectations:
The stated requirement for amphibious ships is 38 vessels; however, the Long-Range Plan
projects accepting moderate risk by having 33 ships by 2016, but then declining to 29 or 30
ships after 2034. Although there have been improvements in recently delivered ships, cost
and quality issues have been all too common in the procurement of large and medium
amphibious ships, making an already constrained shipbuilding budget more difficult to
execute. A new dock landing ship class, LSD(X), is important to the recapitalization of the
amphibious force. The requirements for this ship must be closely validated to ensure
affordability. The committee notes the Navy’s plan to have a gap year following the lead
ship of the class and believes that this may help alleviate cost, schedule, and performance
issues. Overall, the committee remains concerned with the Navy’s management of the
amphibious ship accounts and expects continued close scrutiny of these programs by Navy
leadership.
In large surface combatants, the Navy’s last official report stated that the industrial base can
only be effectively sustained if naval ship yards were building the equivalent of three DDG–
51 destroyers per year, with additional work assumed at one of the yards. Even if the Navy
fully executes both of the large surface combatant programs of record in the near-term, the
President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and future-years defense program propose to buy
an average of 1.5 large surface combatants per year. Even at projected procurement rates, the
number of cruisers and destroyers falls below the required level of 88 ships in 2027 and
remains below that level for the following 13 years. At its worst, the number of large surface
combatants is 21 ships below the expected requirement in 2034.
The Navy has testified that continued demand for large surface combatants to meet forward
presence and strike operations requirements coupled with emerging ballistic missile defense
requirements drives the Navy to consider abandoning lesser priority missions for more
recent, higher priority ones. In light of the current pressure on the large surface combatant
force, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s projected rate of production is insufficient,
and anticipates that the Navy will closely assess future demand for large surface combatants,
and operational and additional risk to the industrial base of maintaining relatively low rates
of procurement for large surface combatants.
The committee remains concerned with the Navy’s ability to execute what it believes is an
overly optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants. The truncation of the
DDG–1000, the restart of the DDG–51 class and the proposed Flight III variant of the DDG–
51 inject a great deal of instability into the SCN accounts. The Navy’s testimony before
Congress has led this committee to identify six risk areas in the Navy’s plan for DDG–51s:

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(1) the availability of the Air and Missile Defense Radar; (2) the extent and cost of
modifications to the underlying ship’s design package to support proposed changes to the
ship; (3) increased limitation on service life margins of the early restart ships; (4) combat
system software integration; (5) the overall complexity of various separate programs that
need to converge for successful completion of the restart and Flight III programs; and (6)
cost and schedule growth for the Aegis Combat System Modernization. The committee
expects the Navy to keep it closely apprised of developments in these risk areas so that it can
monitor appropriate risk mitigation efforts.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has made progress during the past year and the
recent decision to move to a single design should improve affordability. The LCS fleet is
expected to comprise 55 vessels of the Navy’s 313–ship fleet force structure. Even modest
cost growth in this large component of the fleet magnifies the problem of achieving that
objective. The committee notes that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the LCS program
introduces competition for this class of ships and is therefore cautiously optimistic that this
program is making progress.
In summary, the committee considers the specialized shipbuilding industrial base for large
surface combatants, amphibious ships, Navy auxiliary ships, and littoral vessels as a critical
component of national security and expects the Department of Defense to appropriately
sustain this industrial base. The committee expects the Department of the Navy to include
these considerations as it incorporates the updated force structure assessment in the
upcoming Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels.
The committee understands that the Navy is conducting a comprehensive review of the
shipbuilding industrial base and calls upon the Navy to update the committee on the scope
and timeline for such a study. The committee understands the objective of the study is to
identify the challenges facing the Navy and the associated shipbuilding industrial base and
the strategies for mitigating the effects of those challenges. The committee expects that this
study will inform its deliberations in connection with the fiscal year 2012 budget. As a
general proposition, the committee expects that the Department of Defense will provide the
Navy with the support it needs to focus on the matters referred to above. (Pages 40-42)

FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-295 of September 16, 2010) on
S. 3800, recommends approval of the Navy’s FY2011 requests for procurement and advance
procurement funding for new ships, with two exceptions:
•

For the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the report recommends $615.5
million for the procurement of one LCS, a reduction of $615.5 million and one
ship from the Navy’s request (pages 7, 86, and 87). For the text of the report’s
discussion of the LCS, see the CRS report on the LCS program. 20

•

For the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) program, which is funded through the
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), the report recommends an increase of

20

CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.

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$100 million for advance procurement and advance construction activities (page
181).

National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035)
H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, and referred to the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2010,
would authorize $20 billion per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy
ships to meet the ship force structure requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year
shipbuilding plan. (It would also authorize $60 million per year for the period FY2011-FY2015
for loan guarantees for the construction of commercial ships.) The text of H.R. 5035 states:
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for the construction of vessels for the Navy and to authorize
appropriations for loan guarantees for commercial vessels.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act’.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Navy- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011
through 2015 for the construction of vessels for the Navy to meet the force requirements of
the Navy (as described in the annual naval vessel construction plan required by section 231
of title 10, United States Code) in the amount of $20,000,000,000.
(b) The Merchant Marine- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal
years 2011 through 2015 for loan guarantees and commitments authorized under chapter 537
of title 46, United States Code, for the construction of new vessels to replace and expand the
domestic fleet of commercial vessels (as that term is defined in that chapter) in the amount of
$60,000,000.

CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see the following CRS reports:
•

CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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•

CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Appendix A. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to
Proposed 313-Ship Force Level
One possible method for assessing the Navy’s proposed 313-ship force level is to compare it to
historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might
not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship
fleet, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to
be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-cold war peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,21 and as of July 16, 2010, had declined to a total of 289 battle force ships. The FY1987
fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering
Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the
September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements
centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of
potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In
addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009 fleet in areas such
as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships,
and sophistication of C4ISR systems.22
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities. 23 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 289-ship fleet of July 2010 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
21

Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
22
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
23
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a cold war set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.24

24

Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan

600-ship

Base Force

1993 BUR

1997 QDR

a

346
~305/310b
~600
~450/416
Total ships
c
45-55
50/55d
100
80/~55
Attack submarines
12
11+1f
11+1f
15e
Aircraft carriers
g
~150
~124
116
242/228
Surface combatants
51i
41i
36i
~75h
Amphibious ships
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.

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Appendix B. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s
313-Ship Plan
Table B-1 summarizes some alternatives to the Navy’s 313-ship plan that have been proposed by
various study groups. These proposals reflect differing views about factors such as U.S. interests
and potential threats to those interests, potential future levels of defense spending, the kinds of
missions that the Navy will be required to perform in the future, and the relative cost
effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.
Table B-1. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan

Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a

Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)

Sustainable
Defense Task
Force
(June 2010)

Heritage
Foundation
(January 2009)

Center for a New
American
Security (CNAS)
(November 2008)

Center for
Strategic and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b

SSBN

6

14

7

n/a

14

12

SSGN

0

4

4

n/a

0

2

SSN

40

55

37

at least 60

40

41

CVN

8

11

9

13

8

11

CVE

0

0

0

n/a

0

4

Cruiser

22

n/a

14

65

n/a

100

18

Destroyer

85

56

73

Frigate

14

n/a

0

n/a

0

9c

LCS

4

n/a

25

20

48

55

SSC

0

n/a

0

n/a

40

0d

Ship type
Submarines

Aircraft carriers

Surface combatants

Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious
ships

23

n/a

27

n/a

36

33

MPF(F) ships

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

0

3e

LSD station
ships

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

7f

Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW

11

0

CLF ships

21

n/a

Support
ships

27

n/a

36

n/a

40

31

TOTAL
ships

241

346

230

n/a

300

326g

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0

0

0

n/a

0
31

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman
and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010
(Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by email on
September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, cochairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final
Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For
Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable
Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For Heritage Foundation: Baker Spring and Mackenzie M.
Eaglen, Quadrennial Defense Review: Building Blocks for National Defense. Washington, Heritage Foundation, January
28, 2009. (Backgrounder, revised and updated February 9, 2009) p. 15. For CNAS: Frank Hoffman, From
Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington, Center for a New
American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US Navy[:] Charting a
Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008. p. 81 (Figure 5).
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a.

Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.

b.

Figures shown are for the year 2028.

c.

Maritime Security Frigates.

d.

Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.

e.

Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.

f.

T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.

g.

The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 313-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.

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Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR
shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the
2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommends a Navy of
346 ships (about 10% more than the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet), including 11 aircraft carriers
(the same number as in the Navy’s 313-ship plan) and 55 attack submarines (compared to 48 in
the Navy’s 313-ship plan).25 The report states the following, among other things:
•

“The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)

•

“In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)

•

“The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)

•

“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)

•

“Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability

25
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.

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that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The
United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
•

“To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)

In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table C-1 compares the 346-ship Navy
recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in subsequent Navy testimony and
publications), the Navy’s 313-ship plan, and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.

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Table C-1. Comparison of 1993 BUR Report, 313-Ship Plan, and Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR

Ship Type

Bottom-Up Review (BUR)
(1993)

Navy’s 313-Ship Plan
(2006)

Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR
(July 2010)

18

14

14

4

4

48

55

11 active + 1 operational/reserve

11 active

11 active

124

143

n/a

SSBNs

(SSBN force was later reduced to
14 as a result of the 1994 Nuclear
Posture Review)
SSGNs

0
(SSGN program did not yet exist)

SSNs

45 to 55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term goal
of about 45)

Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants

(114 active + 10 frigates in Naval
Reserve Force; a total of 110-116
active ships was also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers

n/a

88

n/a

Frigates

n/a

0

n/a

(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs

0

55

n/a

41

31

n/a

(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)

(33 needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)

0

12

n/a

26

0

n/a

(LCS program did not exist)

(to be replaced by LCSs)

CLF ships

43

30

n/a

Support ships

22

20

n/a

346

313

346

(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
MPF(F) ships

(MPF(F) program did not exist)
Dedicated mine warfare ships

TOTAL ships

(numbers above add to 331341; Navy testified in 1994
that the planned number was
adjusted from 346 to 330 to
reflect reductions in numbers
of tenders and early
retirements of some older
amphibious ships)
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval

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Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with
the Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s
(BUR’s) fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of
the then-planned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
323 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.26

26

Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.

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Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table D-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-cold war
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.27 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of September 30, 2009.
As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy
ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the
total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of
change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and
average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily
mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission
requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship
capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing
quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.

27
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as
of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this
case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential
statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a
single counting method.

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Table D-1.Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa

Number

FYa

Number

FYa

Number

1948

737

1969

926

1990

547

1949

690

1970

769

1991

526

1950

634

1971

702

1992

466

1951

980

1972

654

1993

435

1952

1,097

1973

584

1994

391

1953

1,122

1974

512

1995

373

1954

1,113

1975

496

1996

356

1955

1,030

1976

476

1997

354

1956

973

1977

464

1998

333

1957

967

1978

468

1999

317

1958

890

1979

471

2000

318

1959

860

1980

477

2001

316

1960

812

1981

490

2002

313

1961

897

1982

513

2003

297

1962

959

1983

514

2004

291

1963

916

1984

524

2005

282

1964

917

1985

541

2006

281

1965

936

1986

556

2007

279

1966

947

1987

568

2008

282

1967

973

1988

565

2009

285

1968

976

1989

566

2010

Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.

Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.

Shipbuilding Rate
Table D-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2010) and requested (FY2011-FY2015) rates of Navy ship
procurement.

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Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015
(Procured FY1982-FY2010; requested FY2011-FY2015)
82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

17

14

16

19

20

17

15

19

15

11

11

7

4

4

5

4

5

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

5

6

6

6

5

7

8

4a

5a

3a

8

7

9

8

12

9

12

Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a.

The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the
cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in
FY2008.

Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610

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313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department
of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force
structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310316 ship plan.
The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class
Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).
These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
The FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships—14 ships, or about
25%, less than the 55 ships in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan, and 16
ships, or about 28%, less than the 57 ships that were planned for FY2013-FY2017 under the
FY2012 budget. Of the 16 ships no longer planned for FY2013-FY2017, 9 were eliminated from
the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and 7 were deferred to years beyond FY2017. The nine ships that
were eliminated were eight Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and one TAGOS ocean
surveillance ship. The seven ships deferred beyond FY2017 were one Virginia-class attack
submarine, two LCSs, one LSD(X) amphibious ship, and three TAO(X) oilers. The Navy’s
proposed FY2013 budget also proposes the early retirement of seven Aegis cruisers and the
placement into Reduced Operating Status (ROS) of two LSD-type amphibious ships.
The Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan, which was submitted to
Congress on March 28, 2012 (more than a month after the submission of the FY2013 budget on
February 13, 2012), does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s
310-316 ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the fleet would remain below 310
ships during the entire 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at various points in ballistic
missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The projected
cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls are smaller than they were projected to be under
the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, due in part to a reduction in the
cruiser-destroyer force-level goal and the insertion of additional destroyers and attack submarines
into the FY2013 30-year plan.
In its July 2012 report on the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the plan would cost an average of $20.0 billion per year in
constant FY2012 dollars to implement, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s
estimate is about 11% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about
13% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 33% higher
than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. Some of the difference between CBO’s
estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference
between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding.

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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal ............................................................................................. 1
March 2012 Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships ........................................................... 1
Goal of About 310-316 Ships Is an Interim Target That May Be Refined .......................... 1
Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals ................................... 2
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ................................................................... 3
Five-Year (FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................ 3
30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................... 6
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan............. 8
Oversight Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 11
Potential Impact of Sequestration on Shipbuilding and Size of Navy..................................... 11
Potential Impact of Six-Month Continuing Resolution (CR) on Shipbuilding
Programs............................................................................................................................... 12
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and Budgetary Changes .................. 15
Sufficiency of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................. 19
Affordability of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan .............................................................. 20
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs ................................................................................... 20
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels ................................................................................. 21
Near-Term Options for Adding Ships and Reducing Ship Unit Procurement Costs ............... 21
Adding a Second Virginia Class Boat in FY2014—10 Boats in MYP ............................. 22
Adding a 10th DDG-51 to the DDG-51 MYP.................................................................... 24
Block Buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80 ................................................................................ 25
Legislative Activity for FY2013 .................................................................................................... 30
FY2013 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 30
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/S. 3254) ........................................ 30
House................................................................................................................................. 30
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 35
FY2013 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5856) ....................................................................... 39
House................................................................................................................................. 39
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 41
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 46

Tables
Table 1. Current 310-316 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals........................... 2
Table 2. Navy FY2013 Five-Year (FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 4
Table 3. Navy FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 7
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................................................................... 9
Table 5. FY2013 Shipbuilding Quantities Compared to FY2012 Quantities ................................ 13
Table 6. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 16

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Table 7. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................................................................... 21
Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 310-316 ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and
Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel ................................................................................. 55
Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ..................................................... 58
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2017 ..................................... 59

Appendixes
Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests........... 47
Appendix B. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels ............................. 51
Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR .......................................................... 53
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate ......................................................... 57

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 59

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Introduction
This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress
concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the
Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the
past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.

Background
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal
March 2012 Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships
The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of
313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department
of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. In its report on the FY2013 30year shipbuilding plan, the Navy refers to this new goal as a goal for a Navy of about 300 ships—
perhaps in recognition of the ongoing naval force structure assessment discussed below—but the
numbers presented in the report add to a target fleet of about 310-316 ships.1

Goal of About 310-316 Ships Is an Interim Target That May Be Refined
The goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships is an interim target that may be further refined in
coming months. DOD states that
In response to the new strategic priorities and guidance found in [the January 2012 document
entitled] Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,2 the
Department of Defense is now reviewing and updating the requirements for naval presence
and forces and its operational plans for a variety of potential regional contingencies. When
these efforts are complete, the DoN [Department of the Navy] will revisit and reassess the
force structure judgments and decisions in a supporting Naval Force Structure Assessment
(FSA)....
This battle force [totaling about 310-316 ships] is fully capable of meeting the strategic
guidance found in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,
and adequately sustains the national shipbuilding and naval combat systems design and
industrial base.

1

Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, pp. 4 and 10.
2
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by
Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.

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However the battle force inventory above should be considered an interim planning target
pending the outcome of a formal Force Struture Assessment (FSA) and the ongoing
Department of Defense review of its operational plans for potential regional contingencies.
The final FSA-derived inventory targets will remain valid as long as there are no further
changes to defense strategic guidance, the global force management allocation plan, or to
Department fiscal guidance. Should changes to any of these three things occur, a further
review and assessment of battle force requirements will be necessary.3

Goal for Fleet of About 310-316 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals
Table 1 compares the 310-316 ship goal to earlier Navy ship force structure plans.
Table 1. Current 310-316 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals
Early-2005 Navy
plan for fleet of 260325 ships

Ship type

Current
goal: 310316 ship
plan of
March 2012

Revised
313-ship
plan of
September
2011

Changes to
February
2006 313ship plan
announced
through
mid-2011

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)

12-14b

12b

12b

14

Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)

0-4c

4c

0c

Attack submarines (SSNs)

~48

48

11

11e

~90

325ships

20022004
Navy
plan for
375-ship
Navya

2001 QDR
plan for
310-ship
Navy

14

14

14

14

4

4

4

4

2 or 4d

48

48

37

41

55

55

11e

11f

10

11

12

12

94

94g

88

67

92

104

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

~55

55

55

55

63

82

56

0

~32

33

33h

31

17

24

37

36

0

0j

0j

12i

14i

20i

0i

0i

~29

30

30

30

24

26

42

34

0

0

0

0

0

0

26k

16

Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)

10l

10l

21l

3

0

0

0

0

Otherm

~23

16

24n

17

10

11

25

25

~310-316

313

328

313

260

325

375

310 or 312

Aircraft carriers
Cruisers and destroyers
Frigates
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
Amphibious ships
MPF(F)

shipsi

Combat logistics (resupply) ships
Dedicated mine warfare ships

Total battle force ships

February
2006
Navy plan
for 313ship fleet

260-ships

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately and signals that the number
in question may be refined as a result of the Naval Force Structure Assessment currently in progress.
a.

Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.

3

Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, pp. 8 and 10.

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b.

The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

c.

Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire,

d.

The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into
SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a
plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.

e.

With congressional approval, the goal will temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers for the period between
the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and entry into service of the carrier
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently scheduled for September 2015.

f.

For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.

g.

The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.

h.

The Navy acknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

i.

Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for example,
by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron were
counted by the Navy as battle force ships.

j.

The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure six ships that were previously planned for the MPF(F) squadron—three modified TAKE-1 class
cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships. These six ships were included in the total
shown for “Other” ships.

k.

The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships included 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.

l.

Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.

m.

This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.

n.

The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal included the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.

Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Five-Year (FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2013 five-year (FY2013-FY2017) shipbuilding plan.

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Table 2. Navy FY2013 Five-Year (FY2013-FY2017) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 310-316 ship goal)
Ship type

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

Total

Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier

1

1

Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine

2

1

2

2

2

9

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer

2

1

2

2

2

9

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

4

4

4

2

2

16

1

1

LHA(R) amphibious assault ship
Fleet tug (TATF)

2

Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB)
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)

1

1

1

1

TAO(X) oiler
TOTAL

2

1
10

7

8

9

1
7

41

Source: FY2013 Navy budget submission.
Notes: The MLP/AFSB is a variant of the MLP with additional features permitting it to serve in the role of an
AFSB.

Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2013-FY2017)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•

Total of 41 ships—16 ships, or 28% less than planned last year. The FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships—14 ships, or
about 25%, less than the 55 ships in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016)
shipbuilding plan, and 16 ships less, or about 28%, less than the 57 ships that
were planned for FY2013-FY2017 under the FY2012 budget.

•

The 16 ships eliminated or deferred. Of the 16 ships that are no longer planned
for FY2013-FY2017, 9 were eliminated from the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and 7
were deferred to years beyond FY2017. The nine ships that were eliminated were
eight Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship.
The seven ships that were deferred beyond FY2017 were one Virginia-class
attack submarine, two LCSs, one LSD(X) amphibious ship, and three TAO(X)
oilers.

•

Average of 8.2 ships per year. The FY2013-FY2017 plan includes an average of
8.2 battle force ships per year. The previous two five-year shipbuilding plans
included an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year. Given the singledigit numbers of battle force ships that were procured from FY1993 through
FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to increase the
shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. The steady-state
replacement rate for a fleet of 310-316 ships with an average service life of 35
years is about 8.9-9.0 ships per year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993
has been substantially below 8.9-9.0 ships per year (see Appendix D).

•

Five percent reduction in large combat ships. Although the FY2013-FY2017
five-year shipbuilding plan contains about 28% fewer ships than were planned
for FY2013-FY2017 under the FY02012 budget, the percentage reduction in

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large combat ships (defined here as aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and
amphibious ships) was much smaller. The total number of large combat ships
planned for FY2013-FY2017 dropped from 21 in the FY2012 budget to 20 in the
FY2013 budget—a reduction of about 5%.
•

Two-year stretch-out in aircraft carrier construction. Although the FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan retains FY2013 as the year of procurement
for the aircraft carrier CVN-79, the FY2013-F23017 plan defers the scheduled
delivery date of this ship by two years, to 2022, which is a delivery date that in
the past might have been expected for a carrier procured in FY2015. Although it
does not show in Table 2, the FY2013 budget also retains FY2018 as the year of
procurement for CVN-80, the next carrier after CVN-79. As with CVN-79, the
FY2013 budget defers the scheduled delivery date of CVN-80 by two years, to
2027, which is a delivery date that in the past might have been expected for a
carrier procured in FY2020.

•

Virginia-class submarine deferred from FY2014 to FY2018. The FY2013FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers one Virginia-class submarine from
FY2014 to FY2018. Navy leaders in testimony this year have expressed an
interest in finding a way to restore a second Virginia-class submarine to FY014.
The Navy this year is also seeking congressional approval for a multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangement4 for the nine Virginia-class boats currently
scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2018. Adding a second Virginia-class
boat to FY2014 would increase to 10 the number of boats that would be procured
under the proposed FY2014-FY2018 MYP arrangement.

•

Start of Ohio-replacement procurement deferred to FY2021. Although it does
not show in Table 2, the FY2013 budget defers the scheduled procurement of the
first Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two years, from
FY2019 to FY2021.

•

DDG-51 destroyer deferred from FY2014 to FY2016. The FY2013-FY2017
five-year shipbuilding plan defers the scheduled procurement of one DDG-51
destroyer from FY2014 to FY2016. The Navy this year is seeking congressional
approval for an MYP arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for
procurement in FY2013-FY2017.

•

LCS procurement reduced in FY2016-FY2017. The FY2013-FY2017 fiveyear shipbuilding plan reduces the LCS procurement rate in FY2016 and FY2017
from three ships per year to two ships per year. The Navy still plans on procuring
a total of 55 LCSs, so the two LCSs that are no longer planned for FY2016 and
FY2017 have been deferred beyond FY2017.

•

LHA(R) amphibious assault ship deferred from FY2016 to FY2017. The
FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers the scheduled procurement
of the next LHA(R) amphibious assault ship by one year, from FY2016 to
FY2017.

4

For an explanation of MYP, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in
Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.

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•

Start of LSD(X) amphibious ship procurement deferred to FY2018. The
FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers from FY2017 to FY2018 the
scheduled procurement of the first LSD(X) amphibious ship. LSD(X)s are to
replace aging LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships. The Navy testified last year
that an FY2017 start for LSD(X) procurement would have been ahead of need
(i.e., earlier than needed) for replacing the first retiring LSD-41/49 class ship.
The implication was that the FY2017 start date for the LSD(X) under last year’s
budget reflected industrial-base considerations, and that the Navy no longer feels
that adequately supporting the industrial base over the next few years requires an
FY2017 start date.

•

AFSB added in FY2014. The FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan adds
an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ship in FY2014. This ship will be a
variant of the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship. The Navy is also proposing
to build the third MLP, which was funded in FY2012, to the modified AFSB
design, producing an eventual force of two regular MLPs and two AFSBs. The
Navy has canceled the retirement of an existing LPD-type amphibious ship and is
now modifying that ship to serve as an interim AFSB, pending the delivery of the
two new-built AFSBs.

•

Start of TAO(X) oiler procurement deferred from FY2014 to FY2016. The
FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan defers the start of TAO(X) oiler
procurement two years, from FY2014 to FY2016. The addition of the AFSB in
FY2014 is intended in part to mitigate the industrial-base impact of deferring the
start of TAO(X) procurement.

•

Eight JHSVs eliminated. The elimination of the eight JHSVs from the FY2013FY2017 shipbuilding plan reflects a reduction in the Navy’s JHSV force-level
goal from 21 ships down to 10 ships. A total of nine JHSVs have been procured
through FY2012; the JHSV requested for FY2013 is to be the 10th and final ship.

•

Early retirements for seven Aegis cruisers; ROS for two LSD-type
amphibious ships. The FY2013 budget also proposes the early retirement of
seven Aegis cruisers and the placement into Reduced Operating Status (ROS) of
two LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2014. The seven cruisers
would await foreign sale or disposal.

30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan, which
was submitted to Congress on March 28, 2012, more than a month after the submission of the
FY2013 budget on February 13, 2012,5 and which includes a total of 268 ships.

5
10 U.S.C. 231, as most recently amended by Section 1011 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
1540/ P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011), states that “The Secretary of Defense shall include [the 30-year shipbuilding
plan] with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year....”

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Table 3. Navy FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CVN
1

1

1

1

1

1

LSC
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

SSC
4
4
4
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1
1
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
2

SSN
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2

SSBN

AWS

1
1
1
1
1
1

2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
1
1
1
2

CLF

Supt
1
1

1

2

1

1
1
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

2
1

2
3
2
1

1
1
2
2
3
2
2

Total
10
7
8
9
7
11
8
12
9
12
13
12
10
9
6
9
8
9
8
11
8
8
5
7
7
10
8
11
8
8

Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.

In devising a 30-year shipbuilding plan to move the Navy toward its ship force-structure goal, key
assumptions and planning factors include but are not limited to the following:
•

ship service lives;

•

estimated ship procurement costs;

•

projected shipbuilding funding levels; and

•

industrial-base considerations.

The Navy’s report on the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan states that
This 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on several key assumptions:

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•

The battle force inventory target that forms the basis for the accompanying 30-year
shipbuilding report will not change substantially with the Navy Force Structure
Assessment or the ongoing Department of Defense review of its operational plans for a
variety of potential regional contingencies. Individual ship targets may vary slightly
based on a detailed analysis of Combatant Commander requirements in light of the new
defense strategy.

•

Yearly spending on Navy shipbuilding must increase starting in the second FYDP of the
near-term period [FY2013-FY2022], and remain at higher levels throughout the midterm planning period [FY2023-FY2032] before falling down to annual shipbuilding
levels nearer to historical averages. During the 2020s and early 2030s, a large number
of surface ships and submarines built during the Cold War build-up in the 1980s and
early 1990s—particularly the OHIO-class SSBNs—will reach the end of their service
lives. This will inevitably cause the annual shipbuilding expenditures from FY2020
through FY2032 to be higher than those seen from the mid-1990s through 2020.

•

All battle force ships—particularly Large Surface Combatants [i.e., cruisers and
destroyers]—will serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives. In this
fiscal environment, the DoN [Department of the Navy] can ill-afford to inflate future
shipbuilding requirements by retiring ships earlier than planned.

•

The Department of the Navy will be able to maintain cost control over its major
shipbuilding acquisition programs, especially once individual ship classes shift to serial
production. The Department will need to focus on limiting overruns for first ships-ofclass.

•

The Department of the Navy must still be able to cover the Manpower, Operations and
Maintenance (MPN/O&MN), Weapons Procurement navy (WPN), and Other
Procurement Navy (OPN) costs associated with this plan. DoN leaders are committed to
avoiding a “hollow force.”6

Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2013-FY2042 that would result from
implementing the FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.

6

Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY2013, April 2012, p. 19. Italics as in original.

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Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
CVN

LSC

SSC

SSN

SSGN

SSBN

AWS

CLF

Supt

Total

310-316 ship plan

11

~90

~55

~48

0-4

12-14

~32

~29

~33

~310-316

FY13

10

80

35

55

4

14

31

32

24

285

FY14

10

78

30

55

4

14

29

32

27

279

FY15

11

78

26

54

4

14

28

31

30

276

FY16

11

80

30

53

4

14

29

31

32

284

FY17

11

82

32

50

4

14

30

29

33

285

FY18

11

84

35

51

4

14

31

29

33

292

FY19

11

86

39

51

4

14

31

29

35

300

FY20

11

87

37

48

4

14

31

29

34

295

FY21

11

88

38

48

4

14

31

29

33

296

FY22

12

87

40

47

4

14

32

29

33

298

FY23

11

89

39

47

4

14

32

29

35

300

FY24

11

89

41

46

4

14

34

29

35

303

FY25

11

88

43

45

4

14

34

29

33

301

FY26

11

89

46

45

2

14

34

29

32

302

FY27

12

90

49

44

1

13

33

29

33

304

FY28

11

89

52

43

0

12

34

29

33

303

FY29

11

87

55

43

0

11

33

29

33

302

FY30

11

85

55

43

0

11

33

29

33

300

FY31

11

81

55

45

0

11

32

29

33

297

FY32

11

80

55

45

0

10

32

29

33

295

FY33

11

79

55

46

0

10

33

29

33

296

FY34

11

78

55

47

0

10

34

29

33

297

FY35

11

80

55

48

0

10

33

29

33

299

FY36

11

82

55

49

0

10

33

29

33

302

FY37

11

84

55

50

0

10

33

29

33

305

FY38

11

86

55

48

0

10

32

29

34

305

FY39

11

88

55

49

0

10

32

29

33

307

FY40

10

88

55

49

0

10

31

29

33

305

FY41

10

89

55

48

0

11

32

29

33

307

FY42

10

88

55

49

0

12

31

29

33

307

Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan.
Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the
Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.

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Observations that can be made about the Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan and resulting projected force levels include the following:
•

Total of 268 ships; average of about 8.9 per year. The plan includes a total of
268 ships to be procured, compared to 276 ships in the FY2012 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. The total of 268 ships equates to an
average of about 8.9 ships per year, which is the approximate average
procurement rate (sometimes called the steady-state replacement rate) that would
be needed over the long run to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 310-316
ships, assuming an average life of 35 years for Navy ships.

•

Projected fleet remains below 310 ships. Although the FY2013 30-year plan
includes an average of about 8.9 ships per year, the FY2013 30-year plan, like
previous 30-year plans, results in a fleet that does not fully support all elements
of the Navy’s ship force structure goal. The distribution of the 268 ships over the
30-year period, combined with the ages of the Navy’s existing ships, results in a
projected fleet that would remain below 310 ships during the entire 30-year
period and experience shortfalls in ballistic missile submarines, cruisersdestroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships.

•

New projected shortfall in ballistic missile submarines. As a result of the
decision in the FY2013 budget to defer the scheduled procurement of the first
Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two years, from
FY2019 to FY2021, the ballistic missile submarine force is projected to drop to a
total of 10 or 11 boats—one or two boats below the 12-boat SSBN force-level
goal—during the period FY2029-FY2041.

•

Smaller projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines.
The cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls under the FY2013 30-year
plan are smaller than they were projected to be under the FY2012 30-year plan,
due in part to the reduction in the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal to about 90
ships (compared to the previous goal of 94 ships) and the insertion of additional
destroyers and attack submarines into the FY2013 30-year plan.
•

18 more destroyers and 2 more attack submarines in plan. The FY2013
30-year shipbuilding plan includes 70 destroyers and 46 attack submarines,
compared to 52 destroyers and 44 attack submarines in the FY2012 30-year
plan. Fifteen of the 18 additional destroyers in the FY2013 plan were added
during the final 20 years of the 30-year plan.

•

Cruiser-destroyer force now projected to bottom out at 78 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the cruiser-destroyer force is projected to bottom
out in FY2014-FY2015 and FY2034 at 78 ships—12 ships, or 13.3%, less
than the goal of about 90 ships. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the cruiserdestroyer force was projected to bottom out in FY2034 at 68 ships—26 ships,
or 27.7%, less than the goal under that plan of 94 ships.

•

Attack submarine force now projected to bottom out at 43 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the attack submarine force is projected to bottom
out in FY2028-FY2030 at 43 ships—5 ships, or 10.4%, less than the goal of
about 48 boats. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the attack submarine force
was projected to bottom out in FY2030 at 39 boats—9 boats, or 18.8%, less
than the goal of 48 boats.

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•

Shortfall in amphibious ships. The Navy projects that there will be a shortfall
of one to four amphibious ships (i.e., 3.1% to 12.5% of the goal of about 32
ships) during the first nine years (FY2013-FY2021) of the 30-year period.

Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of Sequestration on Shipbuilding and Size of
Navy
One potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on FY2013 Navy shipbuilding
programs that would result from a sequestration on FY2013 funding implemented under the
Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011), and the potential
impact on the size of the Navy that would result over the course of several years from
implementing the lower budget caps established in the BCA for FY2013 through FY2021.7
At an August 1, 2012, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on sequestration
options and the effects on national defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified
that a sequester
introduces senseless chaos into the management of more than 2,500 defense investment
programs, waste into defense spending at the very time we need to be careful with the
taxpayer’s dollar, inefficiency into the defense industry that supports us, and causes lasting
disruptions even if it only extends for one year. Sequester in FY 2013 would seriously
disrupt our forces and programs. Over the longer term, the lower caps in FY 2014 through
FY 2021 would require that we substantially modify and scale back the new defense strategy
that the DoD leadership, working under the guidance of the President, so carefully developed
just a few months ago....
While sequestration and lowering of the discretionary caps could have important effects for
each of the next nine years, I will focus today mostly on the effects in FY 2013....
DoD estimates that the percentage reductions under sequester could range from 8 percent for
all DoD accounts (if military personnel funding is fully sequestered) to 10 percent for
accounts other than military personnel (if “milpers” funding is fully exempt from
sequestration). These estimates assume that Congress provides funds for FY 2013 equal to
the President’s request and reflects DoD’s best estimate of unobligated balances from prior
years....
For the investment portions of the [DOD] budget [i.e., the research and development,
procurement, and military construction accounts], the dollar cuts must be allocated
proportionally at a lower level of detail identified as “program, project, and activity (PPA)”.
More than 2,500 programs or projects are separately identified and must be reduced by the
same percentage. Absent a reprogramming action, the inflexible nature of the sequester law

7

For more on the Budget Control Act of 2011 and sequestration, see CRS Report R42506, The Budget Control Act of
2011: The Effects on Spending and the Budget Deficit When the Automatic Spending Cuts Are Implemented, by Mindy
R. Levit and Marc Labonte. See also CRS Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011, by Bill Heniff Jr.,
Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan.

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means that DoD would have no authority to vary the amount of the reduction. Within a PPA,
however, managers can decide how best to allocate the reductions....
Under current rules that govern the sequester process, every one of our more than 2,500
procurement programs, research projects, and military construction projects would each be
indiscriminately reduced. Those who manage these programs would be forced to join many
other acquisition managers in non-defense agencies as they seek to accommodate the
reduced funding for FY 2013, three months after the fiscal year starts.
Some military managers would be forced to buy fewer weapons.... Reductions in buy sizes
will cause unit costs of weapons to rise, which will in turn demand further cuts in buy sizes.
In cases where we cannot feasibly reduce the quantity of items bought – ships come
immediately to mind – we would have to delay projects. There could be a delay of
several months in the new CVN-78 carrier along with delays in the Littoral Combat
Ship program and DDG-51 destroyer procurement.8

On October 22, 2012, Admiral Mark Ferguson, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated, “If
you project out 10 years—remember that the budget control act talks about 10 years of [funding]
reductions—now you start talking about a fleet reduced to about 230-235 ships.”9

Potential Impact of Six-Month Continuing Resolution (CR) on
Shipbuilding Programs
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on Navy shipbuilding
programs of the decision to fund the federal government for the initial months of FY2013 through
a six-month continuing resolution, or CR (H.J.Res. 117/P.L. 112-175 of September 28, 2012), that
is based on FY2012 appropriations.10 DOD spending under this CR is based on the FY2012 DOD
appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011).
Due to the structure of the annual DOD appropriations act, H.J.Res. 117/P.L. 112-175 might cause
program-execution challenges for Navy shipbuilding that are more particular than those that
might occur for other areas of defense procurement: The paragraph in the annual DOD
appropriations act that provides funding for most Navy shipbuilding programs (that is, the
paragraph for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, appropriation account), unlike the
paragraphs for other DOD procurement accounts, not only states the total amount of funding for
the account—it also explicitly delineates funding for individual shipbuilding programs within the
account. (The language, in fact, not only delineates funding for individual shipbuilding
programs—it also divides some of those programs further, into separate line items covering
procurement funding for the program and advance procurement [AP] funding for that program.)
As a result, a CR that is based on the previous year’s DOD appropriations act can lead to a
program-level misalignment in funding for executing current-year Navy shipbuilding programs.

8
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, Prepared Testimony [to the] House Armed Services Committee,
Wednesday, August 1, 2012, pp. 1-5. (emphasis added)
9
David Smalley, “Leaner Navy Looking at Future Technology, Fleet Size and Sequestration,” Navy News Service,
October 23, 2012, accessed October 25, 2012 at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=70311.
10
Under H.J.Res. 117/P.L. 112-175, FY2012 appropriations are adjusted upward by 0.612% so as to match the total
FY2013 federal discretionary spending limit of $1.047 trillion established the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L.
112-25 of August 2, 2011).

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In general, the longer into the fiscal year that the government operates under such a CR, the
greater the program-execution challenges resulting from this misalignment can be.
Particular program-execution challenges can arise in Navy shipbuilding when the current year
budget for a shipbuilding program requests a larger quantity for a shipbuilding program than was
funded in the previous fiscal year’s budget, because the Navy under the CR may lack authority to
execute a year-to-year increase in quantity for a shipbuilding program. Table 5 compares FY2013
requested quantities for a Navy shipbuilding programs to FY2012 quantities for those programs.
As suggested by the table, a CR based on FY2012 funding could create execution challenges in
the DDG-51 destroyer program and the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program. Challenges in executing
the second DDG-51 that is requested for FY2013 could affect the multiyear procurement (MYP)
arrangement that that Navy is requesting for FY2013-FY2017. The aircraft carrier requested for
FY2013 (CVN-79) is being incrementally funded, but the increase in quantity from FY2012 to
FY2013 might complicate the Navy’s schedule for awarding a full-ship construction contract for
the ship.
Table 5. FY2013 Shipbuilding Quantities Compared to FY2012 Quantities
FY2012
actual
quantity

FY2013
requested
quantity

Difference

Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier

0

1

+1

Virginia (SSN-774) class attack
submarine

2

2

—

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer

1

2

+1

FY2013 is to be first year of FY2013-FY2017
multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

4

4

—

Ships are being procured under two block buy
contracts covering FY2010-FY2015

San Antonio (LPD-17) class
amphibious ship

1

0

-1

Navy states that CR has led to an issue concerning
the completion of LPD-25, which was procured in
FY2008. (The FY2012 ship is LPD-27.)

LHA(R) amphibious assault ship

0

0

—

Navy states CR has led to an issue concerning the
completion of LHA-6, which was procured in
FY2007. (The FY2011 LHA(R) ship—LHA-7—is
being incrementally funded with $1,999.2 million in
FY2012 funding

Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/
Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)

1

0

-1

These ships are funded through National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF), not SCN

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)

2

1

-1

FY2013 ship is intended by Navy to be final ship in
program

Air-Cushioned Landing Craft (LCAC)
Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP)

4

2

-2

Oceanographic Ships

1

0

-1

Program

Comment

New Construction Ships
FY2013 ship (CVN-79) is being incrementally funded

Other Programs

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These ships are funded in SCN, but are used by
NOAA

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FY2012
actual
quantity

FY2013
requested
quantity

Difference

Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)

0

1

+1

The SSC is the next-generation replacement for the
Navy’s LCACs. FY2013 SSC is second of two lead
ships in program (the first was funded in FY2011).
Both of the lead SSCs are being funded through the
Navy’s research and development account, not the
SCN account.

Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft carrier
mid-life refueling complex overhaul
(RCOH)

0

1

+1

Navy stated that CR led to an urgent programexecution issue with CVNs 71 and 72. The issue was
addressed through a reprogramming of FY2012
funding that was approved in late September.

Program

Comment

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2013 budget submission.

In programs where there is no difference in FY2013 and FY2013 quantities, differences between
FY2012-enacted funding and FY2013-requested funding could create either FY2013 execution
challenges (if the FY2013 requested amount is higher) or situations where the amount of funding
available in FY2013 is excess to FY2013 need (if the FY2012 funding is higher). Programs where
the FY2012-enacted quantity is higher than the requested FY2013 could similarly create
situations of where the amount of funding available in FY2013 is excess to FY2013 need.
At a September 11, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding issues before the Oversight and
Investigations subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that the
CR had led to an urgent execution challenge in the program for performing mid-life refueling
complex overhauls (RCOHs) on the Nimitz-class carriers CVN-71 and CVN-72, and that this
issue was the Navy’s top priority in seeking an anomaly (i.e., a special provision providing relief)
in the CR.11 No such anomaly was included in the CR, but the issue was resolved (or at least
mitigated) through a reprogramming of FY2012 Navy funds that the congressional defense
committees approved in late September.12
In addition to the RCOH program, a Navy point paper dated September 14, 2012, identified the
completion of the amphibious ships LPD-25 (procured in FY2008) and LHA-6 (procured in
FY2007) as additional program-execution issues resulting from the CR. The point paper stated
that the Navy might need to request a special transfer authority to provide the additional funds
needed address the issue with LPD-25, and that no additional funds would be needed to address
the issue with LHA-6, provided that a final FY2013 appropriation is enacted by April 1, 2013.
The point paper did not mention any program-execution issues relating to the DDG-51 or CVN78 programs, perhaps because the timing of FY2013 events for these programs permits the Navy
to avoid significant program execution problems, provided that a final FY2013 appropriation is
enacted by about April 1, 2013. An October 1, 2012, press report, however, stated that the CR
11

Transcript of Spoken testimony of Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, before the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee hearing
on Navy shipbuilding and its impact on the defense industrial base in a time of fiscal uncertainty, September 11, 2012.
See also Christopher P. Cavas, “Carriers at Risk From Continuing Resolution,” DefenseNews.com, September 17,
2012.
12
See, for example, Jason Sherman and Dan Taylor, “Congress Allows Navy To Spend Personnel Funding On Carrier
Refuelings,” Inside the Navy, October 1, 2012; and Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy: 4 Missile Cruisers to Remain in
Service,” DefenseNews.com, September 26, 2012 (section subtitled “Carrier Work Continues”).

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will cause the Navy to lose at least some of the savings it would have gained from a
multiyear procurement contract for nine DDG-51 destroyers, and other programs will
experience problems as well, according to a service spokeswoman....
The Navy had planned to save about $1.5 billion on the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer program by entering into a multiyear deal with the shipbuilders, but at least a
portion of those savings will now be lost because of the CR, Lt. Courtney Hillson, a Navy
spokeswoman, said Sept. 28.13

If funding levels established by the six-month CR were reduced through sequestration (see
previous section), Navy shipbuilding programs (particularly those where the amount of funding
available in FY2013 is not excess to FY2013 need) could experience additional or intensified
program-execution challenges.

Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and
Budgetary Changes
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the planned size and structure of the
Navy. Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the
appropriate future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the
Navy. Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the
growth of China’s military capabilities.14 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on
reductions in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011
(S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011).
On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a
stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region.15 Since the Asia-Pacific region is to a significant degree
a maritime and aerospace theater for the United States, this shift in strategic focus is expected by
many observers to result in a shift in the allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air
Force.
The Navy’s current goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships reflects a number of assumptions and
planning factors, including but not limited to the following:
•

current and projected Navy missions in support of U.S. military strategy,
including both wartime operations and day-to-day forward-deployed operations;

13

Dan Taylor, “Navy: CR Will Cause Savings To Be Lost On DDG-51, Other Programs,” Inside the Navy, October 1,
2012.
14
For more on the growth in China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required
U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
15
Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine
Dale and Pat Towell.

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•

current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries, including their antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities;

•

regional combatant commander (COCOM) requests for Navy forces;

•

the individual and networked capabilities of current and future Navy ships and
aircraft;

•

basing arrangements for Navy ships, including numbers and locations of ships
homeported in foreign countries;

•

maintenance and deployment cycles for Navy ships; and

•

fiscal constraints.

With regard to the third point above, Navy officials testified at least three times in 2012 that a
Navy of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet COCOM requests for Navy forces
(see Appendix A). The difference between a fleet of more than 500 ships and the current goal for
a fleet of about 310-316 ships can be viewed as one measure of the operational risk associated
with the goal of a fleet of about 310-316 ships. A goal for a fleet of more than 500 ships might be
viewed as a fiscally unconstrained goal.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 6 shows
some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 6 also shows the Navy’s 310-316
ship goal of March 2012.
Table 6. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure

Sustainable
Defense
Task Force
(June 2010)

Center for a
New
American
Security
(CNAS)
(November
2008)

Center for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b

Navy’s 310316 ship
goal of
March 2012

Heritage
Foundation
(April
2011)

Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a

Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)

SSBN

12-14

14c

6

14

7

14

12

SSGN

0-4

4

0

4

4

0

2

SSN

~48

55

40

55

37

40

41

CVN

11

11

8

11

9

8

11

CVE

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

~90

88

22

n/a

18

14

65

n/a

56

73

14

n/a

0

0

9e

4

n/a

25

48

55

0

n/a

0

40

0f

Ship type
Submarines

Aircraft carriers

Surface combatants
Cruiser
Destroyer
Frigate

0

LCS

~55

SSC

0

28d
0

85

Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships

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Sustainable
Defense
Task Force
(June 2010)

Center for a
New
American
Security
(CNAS)
(November
2008)

Center for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)b

Navy’s 310316 ship
goal of
March 2012

Heritage
Foundation
(April
2011)

Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a

Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)

~32

37

23

n/a

27

36

33

MPF(F) ships

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

0

3g

LSD station ships

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

7h

0

0

0

36

40

230

300

Ship type
Amphibious ships

Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
0

14

11

0

CLF ships

~29

33

21

n/a

Support ships

~33

25

27

n/a

~310-316

309

241

346

MIW

TOTAL battle
force ships

31
31
326i

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National
Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 2526. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,
Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional
information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel
Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and
Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS:
Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington,
Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US
Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2008. p. 81 (Figure 5).
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a.

Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.

b.

Figures shown are for the year 2028.

c.

The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20
SLBM tubes.

d.

The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface
combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—as a way of collectively
referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS
report are separate from and smaller than the LCS.

e.

Maritime Security Frigates.

f.

Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.

g.

Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing

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prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
h.

T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.

i.

The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 310-316 ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the
early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.

A potential key question for Congress concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be
large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world. Some
observers are concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budgetdriven reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence
and demoralize U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby make it harder for the United
States to defend its interests in the region.16 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
•

Under the Administration’s plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the
world?

•

What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?

•

Are the proposed early retirements of nine Aegis cruisers and the placing of two
LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships into Reduced Operating Status (ROS)
consistent with the stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region in DOD’s new
strategic guidance? What are the potential operational implications of these early
retirements? What steps, if any are being taken to preserve a potential for
reactivating these nine ships, should circumstances warrant their reactivation?

•

If the Navy is reduced in size and priority is given to maintaining Navy forces in
the Pacific, what will be the impact on Navy force levels in other parts of the
world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea,
and consequently on the Navy’s ability to adequately perform its missions in
those parts of the world?

•

To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship
numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., “Sea Swap”)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?

16
See, for example, Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com),
October 26, 2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean
Cheng, Sea Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576,
July 11, 2011, p. 10.

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•

Particularly in a situation of constrained DOD resources, if enough funding is
allocated to the Navy to permit the Navy in coming years to maintain a fleet of
about 310-316 ships including 11 aircraft carriers, how much would other DOD
programs need to be reduced, and what would be the operational implications of
those program reductions in terms of DOD’s overall ability to counter improved
Chinese military forces and perform other missions?17

Sufficiency of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2013 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As discussed earlier (see “Navy’s Projected Force Levels
Under 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan”), the plan does not include enough ships to
fully support all elements of the 310-316 ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the
fleet would remain below 310 ships during the entire 30-year period and experience shortfalls at
various points in ballistic missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships.
Although the projected cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls are smaller under the
FY2013 30-year plan than they were under the FY2012 30-year plan, the shortfalls in ballistic
missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships projected under
the FY2013 30-year plan could make it difficult for the Navy to fully perform its projected
missions in certain years. In light of these projected shortfalls, policymakers may wish to consider
various options, including but not limited to the following:
•

keeping in active service some or all of the seven Aegis cruisers that the Navy’s
FY2013 budget proposes for early retirement, and/or the two LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships that the Navy’s FY2013 budget proposes shifting to Reduced
Operating Status (ROS);

•

increasing planned procurement quantities of destroyers and attack submarines,
perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement; and

•

extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling a
small number of older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40
or more years.

The Navy estimates that keeping in service the seven Aegis cruisers proposed for early retirement
would cost a total of a little more than $4 billion over the period FY2013-FY2017. This figure
includes costs for conducting maintenance and modernization work on the ships during those
years; for operating the ships during those years (including crew costs); and for procuring,
crewing, and operating during those years helicopters that would be embarked on the ships.18
Regarding the third option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the first
28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack
17
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
18
Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Vice Admiral William Burke, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet
Readiness and Logistics, before the Readiness subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22,
2012.

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submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines.
Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear.
Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine
pressure hull life.
Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their
maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the
ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life
extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently
programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently
planned service lives.
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship service lives. The Navy in past years has, for various reasons,
retired numerous ships, including surface combatants and attack submarines, well before the ends
of their expected service lives. Many of these retirements were due the decision to reduce the size
of the Navy following the end of the Cold War. Other instances were due to the material condition
of the ships or the projected costs of keeping them mission-effective through the ends of their
service lives. If ship service lives in some cases turn out to be shorter than assumed under the 30year plan, then Navy ship force levels will be smaller in certain years than shown in Table 4.

Affordability of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the
FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan. In assessing the prospective affordability
of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, key factors that Congress may consider include
estimated ship procurement costs and future shipbuilding funding levels.

Estimated Ship Procurement Costs
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship procurement costs. If one or more Navy ship designs turn out to
be more expensive to build than the Navy estimates, then the projected funding levels shown in
the 30-year shipbuilding plan will not be sufficient to procure all the ships shown in the plan.
Ship designs that can be viewed as posing a risk of being more expensive to build than the Navy
estimates include Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers (a program currently
experiencing cost growth), Ohio-replacement (SSBNX) class ballistic missile submarines, the
Flight III version of the DDG-51 destroyer, and the LSD(X) amphibious ship.
In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that certain Navy ships
would be more expensive to procure than the Navy estimates, and consequently that the Navy’s
30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated. In its July
2012 report on the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, CBO estimates that the plan
would cost an average of $20.0 billion per year in constant FY2012 dollars to implement, or
about 19% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 11% higher than the Navy’s
estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 13% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the
second 10 years of the plan, and about 33% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years

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of the plan.19 Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate,
particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in
how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 7 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of
the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the July 2012 CBO report.
Table 7. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2012 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2013-FY2022)

Next 10 years
(FY2023-2032)

Final 10 years
(FY2033-FY2042)

Entire 30 years
(FY2013-FY2042)

Navy estimate

15.1

19.5

15.9

16.8

CBO estimate

16.8

22.0

21.2

20.0

% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates

11%

13%

33%

19%

Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Table
2 (Page 11).

Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about future shipbuilding funding levels. It has been known for some time
that funding requirements for the Ohio-replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine
program will put considerable pressure on the shipbuilding budget during the middle years of the
30-year plan. Although the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan reduces procurement of other types
of ships in the middle years of the plan to help accommodate the SSBN(X) program, the Navy
still projects that the shipbuilding budget would need to be substantially higher during the middle
10 years of the plan than during the first or last 10 years of the plan.
If the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle 10 years of the 30-year plan is not
achieved, numerous ships shown for procurement during the middle 10 years of the plan might
not be procured. A potential oversight question for Congress is whether the Navy has received a
commitment or assurance of some kind from DOD leaders that the Navy will be able to budget
for the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan without
reducing funding for other Navy program priorities.

Near-Term Options for Adding Ships and Reducing Ship Unit
Procurement Costs
Congressional review to date of the Navy’s FY2013 5-year and 30-year shipbuilding plans has
included, among other things, discussion of near-term options for adding ships to the plan and
reducing ship unit procurement costs. These options include the following:

19

Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Table 2
(page 11).

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•

adding a second Virginia-class attack submarine to FY2014 and, as a
consequence, increasing to 10 the number of Virginia-class submarines procured
under the proposed FY2014-FY2018 multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement
for the Virginia-class program;

•

adding a 10th DDG-51 destroyer to the proposed FY2013-FY2017 MYP
arrangement for the DDG-51 program; and

•

procuring the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80 under a block buy
arrangement.

The first two options could mitigate operational risks associated with the projected cruiserdestroyer and attack submarine shortfalls. The third option could reduce the cost of implementing
the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

Adding a Second Virginia Class Boat in FY2014—10 Boats in MYP
Another issue for Congress for FY2013 is whether to restore procurement of a second Virginiaclass boat in FY2014. Navy officials have testified this year that the second Virginia-class boat
that had been programmed for FY2014 was deferred to FY2018 in this year’s budget submission
for fiscal reasons—because FY2014 has become a tight budget year for the Navy—and that the
Navy is interested in finding a way, if possible, to restore the procurement of a second Virginiaclass boat to FY2014.20

Advance Procurement Funding in FY2013
The question of whether to procure a second boat in FY2014 is an issue for FY2013 because
procuring a second boat in FY2014 could involve adding advance procurement funding for that
boat in FY2013. The Navy testified on April 19, 2012, that procuring a second boat in FY2014
using a normal funding profile would require adding about $777 million in Virginia-class
program advance procurement funding in FY2013, and more than $1.2 billion in Virginia-class
program procurement funding in FY2014.21

Option of Incremental Funding
Finding a way to procure a second Virginia-class boat in FY2014 could involve the use of
incremental funding (as opposed to full funding) in the Virginia-class program, at least for the
20
See, for example, the spoke testimony of Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to the House Armed Services Committee
on February 16, 2012.
21
Spoken testimony of Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition
(i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive) before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services committee, at
an April 19, 2012, hearing on the Navy’s proposed FY2013 shipbuilding programs, as reflected in the transcript of the
hearing.
Providing advance procurement funding for the boat in FY2013 would permit the boat to be constructed on a schedule
that is more-or-less consistent with what one might expect for a boat procured in FY2014. Adding advance
procurement funding in FY2013, however, is not absolutely required to procure a second boat in FY2014—the boat can
be procured in FY2014 without any advance procurement funding in FY2013. Doing so might result in the boat being
built on a schedule closer to what one might expect for a boat procured in FY2015, but the boat would still enter
service years earlier than it would if it is procured in FY2018.

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second boat in FY2014, if not also for one or more other Virginia-class boats. Incrementally
funding a second boat in FY2014 would involve providing some of the boat’s procurement cost in
FY2014 and deferring the remainder to one or more subsequent years. Incrementally funding
additional Virginia-class boats could involve similarly spreading out their procurement costs over
multiple years. Incrementally funding multiple Virginia-class boats over the next few years could
minimize the amount of additional Virginia-class program procurement funding that would be
required over the next few years to fund a second boat in FY2014, though that additional funding
would eventually need to be provided.
Incremental funding is normally used only for procuring aircraft carriers and LHD/LHA-type
amphibious assault ships,22 but there have been rare cases when individual ships of other types
have, for various reasons, been procured with incremental funding. Examples include the third
and final Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarine, whose procurement was reinstated in
FY1996, each of the three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers that were procured in FY2007FY2009,23 and ships procured through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), including
Navy auxiliary ships and DOD sealift ships, which are often executed by the Navy with
incremental funding, even though they are nominally funded by Congress with full funding.24

Navy Estimate of Cost of Adding a Second Boat in FY2014
The Navy in March 2012 estimated that adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and
increasing to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement would reduce the total
cost of the other 9 boats in the arrangement by roughly $700 million.25 The reduction in cost
would come from production learning-curve benefits at both the two shipyards (GD/EB and
NNS) and component vendors, from increased spreading of fixed overhead costs at the shipyards,
and from reduced costs for components procured from suppliers in batches of 10 rather than
batches of 9. Since the figure of roughly $700 million is equivalent to about 27% of the cost of a
Virginia-class submarine, the Navy, in effect, was estimating in March that adding a second
Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP
arrangement would be roughly 27% self-financing.
The Navy subsequently revised this estimate, using more up-to-date cost data for the Virginiaclass program, and now estimates that adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and
increasing to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement reduce the total cost of
the other 9 boats in the arrangement by roughly $900 million, which would make adding a second

22
Incremental funding is allowed for procuring aircraft carriers and LHD/LHA-type amphibious assault ships because
using full funding to procure these ships—which are very expensive and which are procured once every several
years—can cause a one-year “spike” in Navy shipbuilding funding requirements that can be disruptive to other
acquisition programs.
23
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year incremental
funding) in FY2007-FY2008. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009 and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010.
24
The full funding provision does not apply to ships funded in the NDSF—a DOD fund that is outside the procurement
title of the annual DOD appropriations act—the same way that it applies to ships, aircraft, vehicles, and other end items
that are procured through the procurement title of the annual appropriations act. For a discussion, see CRS Report
RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding
Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
25
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), March 16, 2012.

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Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP
arrangement roughly 35% self-financing.26
The Navy further estimates that if the calculation is extended to include cost effects on all
Virginia-class boats procured through FY2020 (including boats procured prior to FY2014, the
first year of the proposed MYP arrangement), then adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014
and increasing to 10 the number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement would reduce
Virginia-class procurement costs for boats procured through FY2020 by roughly $1,400 million,
which would make adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the
number of boats in the proposed MYP arrangement roughly 54% self-financing.27

Arguments of Supporters and Skeptics
Supporters of adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the number of
boats in the proposed MYP arrangement could argue that the Navy estimates that it would be
roughly 35% to 54% self-financing due to the effect it would have on reducing costs for the other
Virginia-class boats, that it would further mitigate the projected SSN shortfall, and that Congress
in the past has on occasion used incremental funding for procuring ships other than aircraft
carriers and LHD/LHA-type amphibious assault ships.
Skeptics of adding a second Virginia-class boat to FY2014 and increasing to 10 the number of
boats in the proposed MYP arrangement could argue that the Navy’s estimate that it would be
roughly 35% to 54% self-financing has not been independently verified, that finding funding for
the other 46% to 65% of the boat’s cost could require offsetting near-term reductions in other
defense programs that would create their own problems, and that the use of incremental funding
should be avoided for the procurement of ships other than aircraft carriers and LHD/LHA-type
amphibious assault ships.

Adding a 10th DDG-51 to the DDG-51 MYP
Regarding the possibility of adding a 10th DDG-51 to the proposed FY2013-FY2017 MYP
arrangement for the DDG-51 program, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition executive), stated the
following at a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and
Projection Forces subcommittee, in response to a question about the FY2013 budget’s deferral to
FY2016 of a second DDG-51 that was previously programmed for FY2014:
I’d like to address the question regarding the second destroyer in 2014. A couple of
important facts: First, the—we restarted DDG-51 construction in—in [FY]2010 and we’ve
got four ships under contract, and a result of the four ships that we’ve placed under contract
is we have prior year savings in this program that are—work in our favor when we consider
future procurement for the [DDG-]51s.
We also have a unique situation where we’ve got competition on this program—two builders
building the 51s, and the competition has been healthy with both builders. We also have a
very significant cost associated with government-furnished equipment, so not only did we
26
27

Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), May 9, 2012.
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), May 9, 2012.

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restart construction at the shipyards, we also restarted manufacturing lines at our weapon
systems providers.
So in this process we were able to restart 51s virtually without skipping a beat, and we’re
seeing the continued learning curve that we left off on back with the [FY]2005 procurement.
So when we march into this third multiyear for the 51s we’re looking to capitalize on the
same types of savings that we saw prior, and our top line, again, allowed for nine ships to be
budgeted, but when we go out with this procurement we’re going to go out with a
procurement that enables the procurement of 10 ships, where that 10th ship would be the
second—potentially the second ship in [FY]2014 if we’re able to achieve the savings that
we’re targeting across this multiyear between the shipbuilders in competition as well as the
combat systems providers as well as all of the other support and engineering associated with
this program.
So we want to leverage the strong learning, we want to leverage the strong industrial base,
we want to leverage the competition to get to what we need in terms of both affordability and
force structure, and I think we have a pretty good shot at it.28

Block Buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80
The Navy currently plans to procure the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80 separately, as oneship procurements. Procuring the two ships together in a block buy could reduce their combined
procurement cost. Procuring two aircraft carriers together in a two-ship block buy has been done
on two previous occasions. The Navy procured two Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft carriers
(CVN-72 and CVN-73) together in a block buy in FY1983, and procured another two Nimitzclass aircraft carriers (CVN-74 and CVN-75) together in a block buy in FY1988. The Navy
proposed these block buys in the FY1983 and FY1988 budget submissions.29
When the FY1983 block buy was proposed, the Navy estimated that the block buy would reduce
the combined cost CVN-72 and CVN-73 by 5.6% in real terms.30 When the FY1988 block buy
was proposed, the Navy estimated that the block buy would reduce the combined cost of CVN-74
and CVN-75 by a considerably larger percentage. GAO stated that the savings would be
considerably less than the Navy estimated, but agreed that a two-ship acquisition strategy is less
expensive than a single-ship acquisition strategy, and that some savings would occur in a twoship strategy for CVN-74 and CVN-75.31
28
Source: Transcript of hearing. See also Megan Eckstein, “Navy Looking Into Feasibility Of Procuring 10th DDG In
Multiyear Contract,” Inside the Navy, April 2, 2012.
29
It can also be noted that the Air Force is procuring two Advanced EHF (AEHF) satellites under a two-satellite block
buy that the Air Force proposed and Congress approved in FY2012.
30
See General Accounting Office, Request to Fully Fund Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in Fiscal Year 1983,
MASAD-82-87 (B-206847), March 26, 1982, 10 pp. The figure of 5.6% was derived by dividing $450 million in noninflation cost avoidance shown on page 5 by the combined estimated cost of the two ships (absent a block buy) of
$8,024 million shown on page 4.
31
See General Accounting Office, Procurement Strategy For Acquiring Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers, Statement of
Frank Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the
Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense Subcommittee and Projection Forces and Regional Defense Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 1987, T-NSIAD-87-28, 5 pp. The testimony states on page 2 that “A
single ship acquisition strategy is more expensive because materials are bought separately for each ship rather than
being combined into economic order quantity buys under a multi-ship procurement.” The report discounted the Navy’s
estimated savings of $1,100 million based on this effect on the grounds that if CVN-74 and CVN-75 were not procured
in the proposed two-ship block buy, with CVN-74 procured in FY1990 and CVN-75 procured FY1993, it was likely
(continued...)

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The FY1983 and FY1988 block buys each involved procuring two aircraft carriers in a single
year. Procuring two carriers in the same year, however, is not mandatory for a two-ship aircraft
carrier block buy. The Navy, for example, proposed the block buy for CVN-74 and CVN-75 in
the FY1988 budget submission as something that would involve procuring CVN-74 in FY1990
and CVN-75 in FY1993. (Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to not only approve
the two-ship block buy, but also accelerate the procurement of both CVN-74 and CVN-75 to
FY1988.)32 A block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 could leave intact the FY2013 procurement
date for CVN-79 and the FY2018 procurement date for CVN-80. This would permit the funding
for the two ships to be spread out over the same fiscal years as currently planned, although the
amounts of funding in individual years would likely change.
It is too late to implement a complete block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80, because some of CVN79, particularly its propulsion plant, has already been purchased. Consequently, the option would
be to implement a partial block buy that would include the remaining part of CVN-79 and all of
CVN-80.
To illustrate the notional scale of the savings that might result from using a block buy strategy on
CVN-79 and CVN-80, it can be noted that if such a block buy were to achieve one-third as much
percentage cost reduction as the FY1983 block buy—that is, if it were to reduce the combined
procurement cost of CVN 79 and 80 by about 1.9%—that would equate to a savings of roughly
$470 million on the currently estimated combined procurement cost of CVN-79 and CVN-80.
More refined estimates might be higher or lower than this notional figure of $470 million.
At a March 19, 2012, briefing for CRS and CBO on the CVN-78 program, CRS asked the Navy
whether it was considering the possibility of a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80. The Navy
stated that it had looked into a narrower option of doing joint purchases of some materials for the
two ships.
Implementing a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 would require committing to the
procurement of CVN-80. Whether Congress would want to commit to the procurement of CVN80, particularly in light of current uncertainty over future levels of defense spending, is a factor
(...continued)
that CVN-74 and CVN-75 would subsequently be procured in a two-ship block buy, with CVN-74 procured in FY1994
and CVN-75 procured in FY1996. For the discussion here, however, the comparison is between the Navy’s current plan
to procure CVN-79 and CVN-80 separately and the potential alternative of procuring them together in a block buy.
The GAO report commented on an additional $700 million in savings that the Navy estimated would be derived from
improving production continuity between CVN-73, CVN-74, and CVN-75 by stating on page 3 that “It is logical to
assume that savings are possible through production continuity but the precise magnitude of such savings is difficult to
calculate because of the many variables that affect the outcome.” It is not clear how significant savings from production
continuity might be in a two-ship block buy for CVN-79 and CVN-80 if the procurement dates for the two ships
(FY2013 and FY2018, respectively) are not changed.
The GAO report noted that the Navy estimated $500 million in additional savings from avoided configuration changes
on CVN-74 and CVN-75 if the ships were procured in FY1990 and FY1993 rather than FY1994 and FY1996. It is not
clear how significant the savings from avoided configuration changes might be for a two-ship block buy for CVN-79
and CVN-80.
See also CRS Issue Brief IB87043, Aircraft Carriers (Weapons Facts), 13 pp., updated February 10, 1988 and archived
March 24, 1988, by Ronald O’Rourke. The report includes a discussion of the above GAO report. The report is out of
print and available directly from the author.
32
See CRS Issue Brief IB87043, Aircraft Carriers (Weapons Facts), 13 pp., updated February 10, 1988 and archived
March 24, 1988, by Ronald O’Rourke. The report is out of print and available directly from the author.

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that Congress may consider in assessing the option of doing a block buy. If budgetary
circumstances were to lead to a decision to end procurement of Ford-class carriers after CVN-79,
then much or all of the funding spent procuring materials for CVN-80 could go to waste.
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Sean Stackley, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acquisition
executive), stated the following when asked by Representative Robert Wittman about the
possibility of a two-ship block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80:
Yes, sir. Let me focus on affordability of the CVN-78 class. We are right now about 40
percent complete construction of the CVN-78 and we’re running into some very difficult
cost growth issues across the full span—design, material procurement, and production—
material procurement on both contractor and government side.
So our first focus right now is to stabilize the lead ship. Let’s get cost under control so we
can complete this ship as close to schedule at the lowest cost possible.
But in parallel, the Navy is working very closely with the shipbuilder to take a step back and
say, one, what are all the lessons we just learned on CVN-78? Two, CVN-78 is a very
different ship from the Nimitz [CVN-68]; we cannot expect to build the [CVN-]78 the way
we build the [CVN-]68 and—and get to an affordable ship construction plan. So we’re
pressing on the way the carrier is built—the build plan for the carrier—to arrive at a more
affordable CVN-79.
Now, in the process of doing that we’ll take a hard look at what opportunity there is across
[CVN-]79 and [CVN-]80, recognizing that we’re going to be limited, again, by [budget] top
line. But there are going to be some opportunities that jump out at us. We don’t want to have
to replan each carrier. We have a vendor base that is stretched out with the carrier build cycle
that for some components that are carrier-unique, that vendor base is—is just struggling to
hold on between the five-year gaps.
So we have to take a hard look at where does it make sense after we’ve gotten to what I’m
calling an optimal build plan for CVN-79 and then be able to come back and—and say, OK,
here—on CVN-79 here are some opportunities that if we could, in fact, reach out to CVN-80
we can either avoid a gap in a production line or avoid unnecessary cost growth on that
follow ship.33

Later in the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE RICK LARSEN:
Finally, we had some discussion about this question with regard to CVNs and trying to find a
way to squeeze some costs out, and one of the ideas was to do some—do block buy of
certain components of—of—of CVN components. And have you considered that, and what’s
your thought on that on block buy on components from [CVN-]79 to [CVN-]80, or whatever,
[CVN-]79, [CVN-]79 to [CVN-]80, and so on?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SEAN STACKLEY:

33

Source: transcript of hearing.

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Yes, sir. At this point in time the Navy and the shipbuilder are sitting side by side putting
together a build plan for CVN-79. We’re 40 percent complete construction of the [CVN-]78;
we’ve got a lot that we’ve got to, I’ll say, do different on the [CVN-]79 and follow from the
lead ship. It’s a very different ship class [compared to the Nimitz class].
So we’re taking a hard look at the build plan [for CVN-78]. We need to get that locked
down. And associated with that is the complete bill of materials for the Ford class.
At that point in time we'll be able to take a look at...
LARSEN:
On this, call it bill of materials, what does it make sense—what makes sense in terms of
looking long term, beyond the immediate ship?
STACKLEY:
Right.
LARSEN:
Are there areas of the industrial base that are stressed to the point that it does make sense to
look at coupling the CVN-79 and CVN-80 buy?
STACKLEY:
We’re not at that point yet. I described earlier that I think after we get through this build plan
review then we'll be able to come back in ‘14 [FY2014] and identify potential critical items
that warrant a block buy approach.34

Later in the hearing, Matthew Mulherin, president of NNS and corporate vice president of HII,
stated the following when asked by Representative Robert Wittman about the possibility of a twoship block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80:
Yes, sir. You know, historically you go back, you were exactly right, if you look at the
contracts that bought the CVN- 72 and [CVN-]73 there was huge savings that flowed to the
second ship, both in the ability to go buy materials, a block buy and get—get discounts there,
but also that you did the engineering up front the first time for both hulls so the second ship
you really just had the answer, problem, paper [sic] and some of those kind of things the—
the kind of the normal course of business to support the waterfront.
So I wouldn’t see any different. I think if we were able to do it both for material, for—for the
engineering to be able to go pump out drawings that had two-ship applicability—plus, I think
it brings the—the—the CVN—if we were to do a two-ship buy for [CVN-]79 and [CVN-]80
it would ensure CVN-80 was a copy of CVN-79, no change into the contract or very
minimal, you’re not having a—on the material side you get economic order savings, you
don’t have to deal with obsolescence.
So absolutely. I think there’s huge opportunity to go do that. You know, you talk to the—the
vendor base. They would love to see it. It gives them the ability to go look at—at what

34

Source: Transcript of hearing.

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investments they need, what work is out in front of them, and go invest in—in training and
tools to—to be able to go support that.35

At the March 19, 2012, briefing for CRS and CBO on the CVN-78 program, CRS asked the Navy
to examine the option of a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80, and inform CRS and CBO of the
Navy’s estimate of how much it might reduce the combined procurement cost of CVN-79 and
CVN-80. The Navy’s response, dated April 22, 2012, was sent to CRS on May 10, 2012 (i.e., just
after the House Armed Services Committee completed its markup of H.R. 4310, the FY2013
National Defense Authorization Act). The response stated:
There are several options for procuring aircraft carriers that differ from the current practice;
two ship buys and block buys. Navy experience with aircraft carrier two ship buys includes
procurement of the CVN 72 and CVN 73 (awarded in FY83), and the CVN 74 and CVN 75
(awarded in FY88). The actual cost returns for these procurements support significant
savings compared to other NIMITZ Class single ship buys. This conclusion is based on a
comparison of the NIMITZ Class two ship buys (CVN72, 73, 74 & 75) with single ship buys
(CVN71 and CVN76). The total ship man-hour comparison shows a 9% reduction. The total
ship material comparison in constant dollars shows an 8% reduction. The NIMITZ- Class
two ship buys took advantage of a single year of full funding for the combined procurement,
and less than three years between the deliveries of each ship. Having both ships fully funded
in one year enabled the Navy and shipbuilder to take advantage of two ship-set Economic
Order Quantity (EOQ) market savings for material items, and also allowed the shipbuilder to
optimize production trades management. The short time between deliveries also resulted in
design stability, minimized potential obsolescence, and greater opportunities for learning.
Given hard budget constraints in FY13 and FY14, CVN 79 and CVN 80 cannot benefit from
a multiyear construct, similar to those requested in PB13 for VIRGINIA Class Submarine
and ARLIEGH BURKE Class Destroyers. By the end of FY14, 75% of CVN 79 material
will be under contract with suppliers, leaving limited opportunities to implement material
savings with multiyear incremental funding. 75% of CVN 80 material would also be
incapable of achieving savings, as the material purchases would be placed after CVN 79.
CVN 80/81 would present the first opportunity to potentially consider this strategy.36

The Navy’s response states that “Having both ships fully funded in one year enabled the Navy
and shipbuilder to take advantage of two ship-set Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) market
savings for material items.” It can be noted that ships funded in separate years can also take
advantage of EOQ savings, provided that the authorizing legislation permits the use of EOQ, and
that the FY1988 block buy of CVN-74 and CVN-75 was originally proposed by the Navy as a
block buy in which CVN-74 would be procured in FY1990 and CVN-75 in FY1993.
The Navy’s response states that “given hard budget constraints in FY[20]13 and FY[20]14, CVN
79 and CVN 80 cannot benefit from a multiyear construct, similar to those requested in
PB[20]1337 for VIRGINIA Class Submarine and ARLIEGH BURKE Class Destroyers.” It can be
noted that a block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 would not necessarily be a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract, like those requested for the Virginia-class submarine program and
the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyer programs. It can also be noted that Congress may decide
35

Source: Transcript of hearing.
Navy information paper dated April 25, 2012, sent to CRS on May 10, 2012.
37
This is a reference to the president’s budget for FY2013—that is, the administration’s requested budget for FY2013.
36

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to work within budget constraints for FY2013 and FY2014 that might differ from those on which
DOD is basing its planning.
The Navy’s response states that “by the end of FY14, 75% of CVN 79 material will be under
contract with suppliers, leaving limited opportunities to implement material savings with
multiyear incremental funding. 75% of CVN 80 material would also be incapable of achieving
savings, as the material purchases would be placed after CVN 79.” CRS on May 10, 2012, asked
the Navy what percent of the material for CVN-79 would be under contract by the end of
FY2012. The Navy’s response, dated May 22, 2012, was sent to CRS on May 25, 2012 (i.e., the
same day that the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5856, the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act). The response stated: “Approximately 47% of CVN 79 direct material will be
under contract by the end of FY[20]12.”38
The Navy’s response states that “CVN 80/81 would present the first opportunity to potentially
consider this [block buy] strategy.” This statement appears to refer to a strategy of a complete
block buy involving 100% of the material for both carriers. Based on the Navy’s response dated
May 22, 2012, a partial block buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80 involving as much as 53% of the
material on CVN-79 might be possible, if the block buy were authorized and implemented as part
of the FY2013 defense budget.

Legislative Activity for FY2013
FY2013 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class
Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).
These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.

FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/S. 3254)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-479 of May 11, 2012) on H.R.
4310, recommended approving the Navy’s requests for procurement funding for all 10 new battle
force ships requested for procurement in FY2013. The committee also recommended an
additional $778 million in FY2013 advance procurement funding to support the procurement of
an additional Virginia-class attack submarine in FY2014, and an additional $115 million in
FY2013 advance procurement funding for the DDG-51 destroyer program. (Page 375)
Section 121 of H.R. 4310 as reported would prohibit the Navy from retiring or decommissioning
a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) if such retirement or decommissioning
would reduce the SSBN force to less than 12 boats. Section 122 would provide authority for
38

Navy information paper dated May 22, 2012, sent to CRS on May 25, 2012.

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using six-year incremental funding to procure the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80. Sections
125 and 126 would authorize new multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangements for the DDG-51
destroyer and Virginia-class attack submarine programs, respectively. Sections 128 and 129
require reports from the Navy and GAO, respectively, on the LCS program. The texts of these
provisions and report language associated with these provisions are presented in the CRS reports
on these individual programs (see “CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy
Shipbuilding Programs” below).
Section 130 of H.R. 4310 as reported states:
SEC. 130. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF ENGINEERING IN EARLY
STAGES OF SHIPBUILDING.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) placing a priority on engineering dollars in the early stages of shipbuilding programs is a
vital component of keeping cost down; and
(2) therefore, the Secretary of the Navy should take appropriate steps to prioritize early
engineering in large ship construction including amphibious class ships beginning with the
LHA-8.

Section 131 states:
SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND
PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States Marine Corps is a combat force which leverages maneuver from the sea
as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat
operations to humanitarian assistance;
(2) the United States Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon Naval vessels,
they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations,
operating `from the sea’ they require no third party host nation permission to conduct
military operations;
(3) the Department of the Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet
this full range of military operations;
(4) for budgetary reasons only that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels,
which adds military risk to future operations;
(5) the Department of the Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 33
operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to
the Congress which will reduce the force to 28 vessels; and
(6) experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly
reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.
(b) Next Generation of Amphibious Ships- In light of subsection (a), it is the sense of
Congress that—

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(1) the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next
generation of amphibious assault ships;
(2) the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection
level II in accordance with current Navy ship requirements;
(3) commonality in hull form design could be a desirable element to reduce acquisition and
life cycle cost; and
(4) maintaining a robust amphibious shipbuilding industrial base is vital for future national
security.

Section 354 states:
SEC. 354. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT OR
INACTIVATION OF TICONDEROGA CLASS CRUISERS OR DOCK LANDING SHIPS.
(a) Limitation- Except as provided by subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2013 for the Department
of Defense may be obligated or expended to retire, prepare to retire, inactivate, or place in
storage a cruiser or dock landing ship.
(b) Exception- Notwithstanding subsection (a), the U.S.S. Port Royal, CG 73, is authorized
for retirement.
(c) Maintained Levels- The Secretary of the Navy, in supporting the operational
requirements of the combatant commands, shall maintain the operational capability and
perform the necessary maintenance of each cruiser and dock landing ship belonging to the
Navy until the later of the following dates:
(1) The date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014.
(2) September 30, 2013.

Section 1021 states:
SEC. 1021. POLICY RELATING TO MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF THE
STRIKE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.
Section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181;
122 Stat. 303), as most recently amended by section 1015 of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417; 122 Stat. 4586), is amended
by striking `Secretary of Defense’ and all that follows through the period and inserting the
following: `Secretary the Navy notifies the congressional defense committees that, as a result
of a cost-benefit analysis, it would not be practical for the Navy to design the class of ships
with an integrated nuclear power system.’.39

Section 1022 states:
39

For additional background information on the issue addressed by this provision, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy
Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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SEC. 1022. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DELAYED ANNUAL
NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION PLAN.
(a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):
`(e)(1) If the Secretary of Defense does not include with the defense budget materials for a
fiscal year the plan and certification under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Navy may not
use more than 50 percent of the funds described in paragraph (2) during the fiscal year in
which such materials are submitted until the date on which such plan and certification are
submitted to the congressional defense committees.
`(2) The funds described in this paragraph are funds made available to the Secretary of the
Navy for operation and maintenance, Navy, for emergencies and extraordinary expenses.’.
(b) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304b(i) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
by striking `231(e)(2)’ and inserting `section 231(f)(2)’.

H.Rept. 112-479 states:
The committee acknowledges that hard choices will have to be made to prioritize capabilities
that allow our military to remain flexible, responsive, and decisive in any engagement.
However, the committee recommends changes to the President’s proposed force structure, in
order to preserve depth and capacity within the force. For example, the committee is
concerned with the Navy’s overall size of the fleet and sustained demand for naval forces,
particularly in light of the strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific. In fiscal year 2013, the budget
request proposed to retire four additional Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers well
before the end of their expected service life. The committee has reinstated the requisite
funding to operate and maintain, modernize and upgrade the U.S.S. Cowpens (CG 63),
U.S.S. Anzio (CG 68), and the U.S.S. Vicksburg (CG 69) in fiscal year 2013 and expects the
Navy to properly maintain these critical assets in the fleet in the future. The committee notes
that it is less costly to maintain existing assets and supports providing the correct naval
capabilities and fleet mix through a balance of new procurement and adequately maintaining
the existing force structure for the length of time for which assets were initially programmed.
In keeping with these concerns, the committee also authorizes a multi-year procurement for
up to 10 Virginia-class submarines and a multi-year procurement for up to 10 DDG–51
Arleigh Burke class destroyers. (Page 5)

The report also states:
Navy Shipbuilding Program
The committee is concerned with the Navy’s shipbuilding program. The budget request for
fiscal year 2013 Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) account contained $13.7 billion, which
is significantly lower than the $14.9 billion level appropriated for fiscal year 2012. In fiscal
year 2012, it was forecast that the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) would include the
start of construction of 57 ships. However, 16 of those ships have fallen out of the FYDP,
reducing new construction starts to 41 ships. The Navy has indicated that they will no longer
seek to build a 313 ship fleet. Additionally, the Navy has proposed retiring nine additional
ships during the FYDP before the end of their service lives. The committee believes the
following programs are crucial.

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CVN–78 is the lead ship of the Ford class aircraft carrier. It incorporates improved
performance and cost saving technologies, decreases the crew size by 1,200 personnel, and
saves the Navy over $5.0 billion in total ownership costs for each ship. The Navy intends to
start construction of the first three ships of the Ford class on a 5-year basis. The committee
encourages the Navy to maintain this schedule with fiscal year 2013 as the first year of
incremental funding for CVN–79. Elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision
that would authorize an extension from the current 5-year period to 6 years for the
incremental funding of CVN–79 and CVN–80. The committee also believes it is essential to
keep the Nimitz class aircraft carriers on schedule for their mid-life Refueling and Complex
Overhauls to ensure these ships reach their planned service life.
The Virginia class submarine program continues to deliver on cost and well ahead of
contractual schedule. Having achieved a rate of two submarines a year starting in fiscal year
2011, the committee was concerned to see the rate decrease to one submarine in fiscal year
2014, and believes this would inject instability into a stable program. The committee
recommends an increase in fiscal year 2013 advance procurement funds to facilitate restoring
the second submarine in fiscal year 2014. To achieve that end, elsewhere in this Act, the
committee includes a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Navy to enter a
multiyear procurement for up to 10 submarines and authorizes the Secretary to incrementally
fund that multi-year contract.
The Marine Corps has a stated requirement of 38 amphibious ships but has made an
agreement with the Navy that 33 amphibious ships would be sufficient to provide the lift and
forcible entry capabilities they require. There are currently only 29 amphibious ships in the
fleet. Two large deck amphibious ships are under contract, LHA–6 and LHA–7. The fiscal
year 2013 budget request slid the construction start of the next large deck amphibious ship,
LHA–8, from 2016 to 2017. Prior to LHA–6, these ships had well decks, which would flood
to launch landing craft. LHA–6 and LHA–7 are designed without well decks, but a well deck
is going into LHA–8. The committee is concerned that the internal arrangements to
accommodate a well deck are going to change construction significantly, requiring many
drawing changes. The committee encourages the Navy to get an early start on LHA–8 design
with the contractor. It has been proven that the greater the percentage of a design that is
complete at the start of construction, the more successful the construction program. The
LPD–27 is the last LPD–17 San Antonio class small deck amphibious ship until the
replacement for the LSD starts. In the fiscal year 2013 plan, LSD construction has been
delayed until after the FYDP. The committee is concerned that this delay may negatively
affect the industrial base.
In the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the Department of the Navy has requested authority to
begin a multi-year program for nine DDG–51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Elsewhere in
this Act, the committee includes a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Navy
to award a contract for a multiyear procurement of up to 10 destroyers. In fiscal year 2016,
the Navy intends to start procuring Block III DDG–51 destroyers. This block will
incorporate the advanced Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), which is currently being
competitively evaluated. The committee views AMDR as essential to pacing the air and
missile threat. The Navy has stated that the DDG–51 hull is sufficient to accommodate the
increased power generation and cooling requirements that AMDR will need, yet the
committee still views this as an area of risk.
With the first two Littoral Combat ships (LCS) delivered to the fleet, each of a different
design, each has had various problems that are being addressed by the Navy. LCS–1 has had
some cracking and shaft seal problems and LCS–2 has had problems with galvanic corrosion
within the water jets. The committee is aware that the Navy intends to forward stage up to
four LCS to Singapore, and while supporting the budget request for four LCS in fiscal year

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2013, it encourages the Navy to ensure the problems discovered to date have technical
solutions and that these solutions are incorporated on forthcoming ships.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Navy shipbuilding plan is how it will be able to
afford the Ohio class replacement ballistic missile submarine and still have a viable program
for other ships. This will have to be addressed in coming years. The budget request delayed
the start of construction of the first submarine by 2 years until fiscal year 2021. This delay
means that the ballistic missile submarine force dips to 10 submarines for almost 10 years in
a couple of decades. To maintain a credible undersea nuclear deterrent, the committee
recommends restoring the research and development funding that was reduced in the fiscal
year 2013 budget request to allow the Department of Defense time to determine how to keep
the program on track. Elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would
prevent the Secretary of the Navy from having fewer than 12 ballistic missile submarines at a
time. (Pages 34-36)

Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-173 of June 4, 2012) on S.
3254, recommended approving the Navy’s requests for procurement funding for all 10 new battle
force ships requested for procurement in FY2013. The committee also recommended an
additional $777.7 million in FY2013 advance procurement funding to support the procurement of
an additional Virginia-class attack submarine in FY2014. (Page 325)
Section 122 of S. 3254 as reported would provide authority for using six-year incremental
funding to procure the aircraft carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80. Section 123 would limit the
obligation and expenditure of FY2013 procurement funding for the aircraft carrier CVN-79 until
the Navy submits a report describing program management and cost control measures that will be
employed in constructing the ship. Sections 124 and 125 would authorize new multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangements for the Virginia-class attack submarine and DDG-51 destroyer
programs, respectively. Section 127 would designate the effort to develop and produce LCS
mission modules as a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). The texts of these provisions
and report language associated with these provisions are presented in the CRS reports on these
individual programs (see “CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs” below).
Section 130 of S. 3254 as reported states:
SEC. 130. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND
PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States Marine Corps is a combat force which leverages maneuver from the
sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major
combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
(2) The United States Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon Naval vessels,
they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations,
operating `from the sea’ they require no third party host nation permission to conduct
military operations.

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(3) The Department of the Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet
this full range of military operations.
(4) Due to fiscal constraints only, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels,
which adds military risk to future operations.
(5) The Department of the Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30
operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to
Congress which will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
(6) Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly
reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure
necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
(2) the Department of the Navy carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current
and projected requirements;
(3) the Department of the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and
procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships, as a component of the
balanced battle force;
(4) the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
(5) operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a
common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and
acquisition cost; and
(6) maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the
national security of the United States.

Section 1021 states:
SEC. 1021. RETIREMENT OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Report Required- Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Chief of Naval Operations shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
sets forth a comprehensive description of the current requirements of the Navy for combatant
vessels of the Navy, including submarines.
(b) Additional Report Element if Less Than 313 Vessels Required- If the number of
combatant vessels for the Navy (including submarines) specified as being required in the
report under subsection (a) is less than 313 combatant vessels, the report shall include a
justification for the number of vessels specified as being so required and the rationale by
which the number of vessels is considered consistent with applicable strategic guidance
issued by the President and the Secretary of Defense in 2012.

Section 1022 states:
SEC. 1022. TERMINATION OF A MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRON.

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(a) Report Required(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall jointly submit to
the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the Marine
Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway and the capability of that program to address any
readiness gaps that will be created by the termination of Maritime Prepositioning Ship
Squadron One in the Mediterranean.
(2) ELEMENTS- The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the time required to transfer stockpiles onto Navy vessels for
use in contingency operations.
(B) A comparison of the response time of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
with the current response time of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One.
(C) A description of the equipment stored in the stockpiles of the Marine Corps
Prepositioning Program-Norway, and an assessment of the differences, if any, between that
equipment and the equipment of a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron.
(D) A description and assessment of the current age and state of maintenance of the
equipment of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Program-Norway.
(E) A plan to address the equipment shortages and modernization needs of the Marine Corps
Maritime Prepositioning Program-Norway.
(b) Limitation on Availability of Funds- Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may not be obligated or expended to terminate a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron
until the date of the submittal to the congressional defense committees of the report required
by subsection (a).

Section 1023 states:
SEC. 1023. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECAPITALIZATION FOR THE NAVY AND
COAST GUARD.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) More than 70 percent of the world’s surface is comprised of navigable oceans.
(2) More than 80 percent of the population of the world lives within 100 miles of an ocean.
(3) More than 90 percent of the world’s commerce traverses an oceans.
(4) The national security of the United States is inextricably linked to the maintenance of
global freedom of access for both the strategic and commercial interests of the United States.
(5) To maintain that freedom of access the sea services of the United States, composed of the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, must be sufficiently positioned as rotationally
globally deployable forces with the capability to decisively defend United States citizens,
homeland, and interests abroad from direct or asymmetric attack and must be comprised of
sufficient vessels to maintain global freedom of action.

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(6) To achieve appropriate capabilities to ensure national security the Government of the
United States must continue to recapitalize the fleets of the Navy and Coast Guard and must
continue to conduct vital maintenance and repair of existing vessels to ensure such vessels
meet service life goals.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the sea services of the United States should be funded and maintained to provide the
broad spectrum of capabilities required to protect the national security of the United States;
(2) such capabilities should include—
(A) the ability to project United States power rapidly anywhere on the globe without the
need for host nation basing permission or long and potentially vulnerable logistics supply
lines;
(B) the ability to land and recover maritime forces from the sea for direct combat action, to
evacuate United States citizens from hostile situations, and to provide humanitarian
assistance where needed;
(C) the ability to operate from the subsurface with overpowering conventional combat
power, as well as strategic deterrence; and
(D) the ability to operate in collaboration with United States maritime partners in the
common interest of preventing piracy at sea and maintaining the commercial sea lanes
available for global commerce;
(3) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, should maintain
the recapitalization plans for the Navy as a priority in all future force structure decisions; and
(4) the Secretary of Homeland Security should maintain the recapitalization plans for the
Coast Guard as a priority in all future force structure decisions.

Regarding Section 1021, S.Rept. 112-173 states:
Retirement of naval vessels (sec. 1021)
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Chief of Naval Operations to
produce a report that would set forth a comprehensive description of the current requirements
of the Navy for combatant vessels of the Navy, including submarines. The provision would
also require that, if the number of these vessels is less than 313 ships, the report would have
to include the justification of the Chief of Naval Operations for that smaller number, and an
explanation of how that smaller number is consistent with the recently revised strategic
guidance issued by the President and the Secretary of Defense in 2012.
Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111–84) conveyed the sense of Congress that “the Navy should meet its requirement for a
313-ship fleet until such time that modifications to the Navy’s ship fleet force structure are
warranted, and the Secretary of the Navy provides Congress with a justification of any
proposed modifications, supported by rigorous and sufficient warfighting analysis.” The
Chiefs of Naval Operations since 2006 have consistently stated that they need a fleet of 313
ships to do their jobs. Nevertheless, the Navy has not achieved this number of ships in the
fleet since falling below that level in the 1990s.

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In testimony before the congressional defense committees and other public remarks, senior
Navy leaders, including the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and the
Chief of Naval Operations, have noted that the Navy is conducting a new review of Navy
force structure review. Navy officials say that they have not completed the review, but that it
will probably reduce the goal for fleet size to approximately 300 ships.
The committee is concerned that the Navy or the Department of Defense (DOD) may
propose reductions in the Navy’s ship fleet force structure without sufficient justification.
The committee reminds the Navy and DOD that the statement of the sense of Congress
remains in effect, and that the committee expects that any proposed change in goal for the
size of the Navy’s fleet will be accompanied by rigorous and sufficient analysis that is
convincing.
The committee doubts that neither a strategy shifting DOD’s focus to the Pacific and Asia,
nor the demands of current operational requirements, nor increased investment by potential
adversaries in naval forces and anti-access and area-denial capabilities warrant a reduction in
the required Navy fleet size. (Pages 187-188)

FY2013 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5856)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-493 of May 25, 2012) on H.R.
5856, recommended approving, with some adjustments, the Navy’s requests for procurement
funding for all 10 new battle force ships requested for procurement in FY2013. The committee
recommended reducing by $29.9 million the funding request for the aircraft carrier CVN-79, and
reducing by $12.03 million the funding request for the two DDG-51 destroyers requested for
procurement in FY2013. The committee also recommended an additional $723 million in
FY2013 advance procurement funding to preserve the option of procuring an additional Virginiaclass attack submarine in FY2014, and an additional $1 billion in FY2013 procurement funding
to facilitate the procurement of an additional DDG-51 in FY2013.40 (Pages 156 and 157)
Section 8010 of the bill as reported would permit multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangements
for, among other things, DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyer and associated systems and SSN774 Virginia class submarine and government-furnished equipment.
The committee also recommended funding for keeping in service three of the four Aegis cruisers
that the Navy proposed for early retirement in FY2013; the funding is in the Military Personnel,
Navy (MPN) account (page 27, lines BA-1, BA-2, and BA-4), the Operation and Maintenance,
Navy (OMN) account (page 71, lines 1A1A, 1B1B, 1B4B, and 1B5B; see also line 2B2G), and
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account (page 167, line 16).
H.Rept. 112-493 states:
SHIPBUILDING

40
A table on page 156 of the committee’s report shows a transfer of $189.2 million from the LPD-17 amphibious ship
program to the JHSV program (identified in the table as “intratheater conector”), but this appears to be a typo, as the
Navy’s FY2013 budget requests the $189.2 million for the JHSV program.

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The Navy’s shipbuilding program is the centerpiece of the Navy’s budget request. The
Nation’s fleet creates our forward presence, projects power, and maintains open sea lanes.
The Committee is well aware that the sight of a U.S. Navy ship on the horizon makes a
powerful strategic statement in any theater. The Committee strongly supports all actions to
maintain the standing of the United States Navy as the world’s preeminent sea power and a
global good neighbor when humanitarian relief is required. The Committee is therefore
puzzled by the Navy’s priorities in its shipbuilding plan.
As part of its new strategy, the Department of Defense has rebalanced toward the AsiaPacific and Middle East regions of the world. Despite these regions having a significantly
larger area of the world’s oceans, the Navy plans to accelerate the decommissioning of seven
guided missile cruisers, has reduced the shipbuilding budget by nearly eleven percent relative
to the fiscal year 2012 appropriated level, and is reducing the total number of ships required
to fulfill its requirements under this new strategy. The required fleet size has been reduced
from 313 ships to approximately 300 ships in the long term, but the Navy will maintain 285
ships in the near term. The Navy has also deferred the procurement of an attack submarine
and a guided missile destroyer, the backbone of the Navy’s combatant fleet, from fiscal year
2014 to future years and, in their place has inserted a vessel known as the Afloat Forward
Staging Base. This vessel would fill a very long standing (but never fulfilled) mission need.
The Committee applauds the Navy for finally fulfilling such a long standing need but is
confused by the timing of this action in an era of decreasing budgets and also by the fact that
a submarine and destroyer are not being procured in fiscal year 2014 in part to make funding
available for this new vessel.
The decision to defer the procurement of a submarine and a destroyer is both confusing and
concerning, especially the submarine. Since its inception in 1998, the Virginia Class
Submarine program always intended to build two submarines per year. Although the second
submarine repeatedly appeared in outyear budget projections, it was continually deferred by
the Navy. The program finally reached a rate of two submarines per year in fiscal year 2011,
largely due to the efforts of this Committee. Now, after only three years at this rate (2011
through 2013), the Navy is again reducing the production rate. The Committee believes this
decision will increase the cost of the submarines, result in production inefficiencies, and
exacerbate the Navy’s own predicted attack submarine shortfall. Additionally, with the
impending addition of the SSBN replacement submarine to the shipbuilding budget, an event
which will “suck the air out of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget” according to a former
Secretary of Defense, funding in the outyears will not be any easier to come by.
The Committee believes the Navy recognizes the need to fund another destroyer and
submarine in fiscal year 2014 since the Navy has approached the Committee with various
plans and schemes to attempt to restore these ships to fiscal year 2014. One of these plans
revolves around the incremental funding concept despite the fact that the Department’s own
financial management regulations and policies prohibit incremental funding of large end
items such as ships, except under certain circumstances, none of which apply in this case.
The Committee strongly supports these regulations and policies because fully funded end
items do not commit future Congresses to obligations they may or may not agree with and
also because they provide the ability to conduct much more complete, transparent, and
rigorous program oversight. Incremental funding is certainly comparable to buying items on
credit by deferring payments to the outyears.
The Committee understands the constraints of the fiscal year 2014 budget, but to give up two
highly prized combatants, and fund instead a vessel for a mission that can be (and has been)
satisfied with existing ships, then attempt to restore those combatants through funding
gimmicks in violation of the Department’s own financial regulations is deeply troubling. The
Committee firmly believes that a strong Navy shipbuilding program is absolutely essential
for the Nation’s security but will not mortgage the Nation’s future to accomplish it.

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Accordingly, the recommendation provides an additional $1,000,000,000 above the request
for the procurement of an additional DDG–51 guided missile destroyer. The Secretary of the
Navy is directed to use this funding as part of the DDG–51 multiyear procurement planned
for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 in order to achieve a lower cost and provide a more stable
production base for the duration of the DDG–51 multiyear procurement. Finally, the
recommendation provides an additional $723,000,000 above the request for advance
procurement for the Virginia Class Submarine program. The Secretary of the Navy is
directed to fully fund an additional submarine in fiscal year 2014 to achieve a lower cost and
stable production base through the course of the program’s planned multiyear procurement.
(Pages 158-159)

The report also states:
AFLOAT FORWARD STAGING BASE
The request includes $38,000,000 for the advance procurement of items for the Afloat
Forward Staging Base (AFSB). The AFSB is envisioned by the Navy to act as a mobile atsea platform that will provide flexible mission support and sustainment. This platform will
fulfill a very longstanding (at least 20 years) but never fulfilled mission need for sea-based
support for a variety of missions. In the past, this mission need has been filled by a variety of
ad-hoc methods to include the use of available surface combatants or amphibious ships. The
closest dedicated platform to fulfilling a similar mission need was the conversion of the
Navy’s amphibious assault ship, USS Inchon, to a mine countermeasure command and
support ship in 1995. This was done at a time when the Navy was shifting the fleet from an
organic mine warfare capability embedded on surface combatants to a more dedicated mine
warfare capability of mine hunting ships and aircraft. Similarly, the Navy plans to fill this
mission need in the very near term with the conversion of the USS Ponce in fiscal year 2012.
Further, the Committee notes that the AFSB is planned for construction in the National
Defense Sealift Fund, whose purpose in ship construction is for strategic sealift acquisition.
The Committee is struggling with placing the mission of the AFSB into a strategic sealift
area and directs the Secretary of the Navy to accomplish any AFSB tasks in the traditional
Navy appropriation accounts.
The Committee applauds the Navy for finally attempting to satisfy such a longstanding need,
but it is confused as to the timing of satisfying this need in an era of decreasing budgets and
when two combatants were pulled out of the fiscal year 2014 shipbuilding program. The
Committee believes this mission need can continue to be satisfied as it has been satisfied to
date. The Committee directs the Navy to apply the fiscal year 2014 funding currently
projected for the construction of an AFSB toward fully funding an additional submarine to
help achieve cost savings and industrial base stability in that program. Accordingly, the
recommendation provides no funding for the AFSB. (Pages 259-260)

Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-196 of August 2, 2012) on H.R.
5856, recommended approving, with some adjustments, the Navy’s requests for procurement
funding for all 10 new battle force ships requested for procurement in FY2013. The committee
recommended reducing by $43.8 million the funding request for the aircraft carrier CVN-79. The
committee recommended an additional $777.7 million in FY2013 advance procurement funding
for the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarine in FY2014, an additional $1
billion in FY2013 procurement funding for the procurement of an additional DDG-51 in FY2013,

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and an additional $263 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of an
additional LPD-17 class amphibious ship in a future fiscal year. (Pages 124 and 125)
Section 8010 of the bill as reported would permit multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangements
for, among other things, up to 10 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class Flight IIA guided missile
destroyers, as well as the AEGIS Weapon Systems, MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems, and
SSN-774 Virginia class submarine and government-furnished equipment. Subsection (b) of
Section 8010 states:
(b) The Secretary of Defense may employ incremental funding for the procurement of
Virginia class submarines and government-furnished equipment associated with the Virginia
class submarines to be procured during fiscal years 2013 through 2018 if the Secretary of
Defense:
(1) determines that such an approach will permit the Navy to procure an additional Virginia
class submarine in fiscal year 2014; and
(2) intends to use the funding for that purpose.

Section 8103 of the bill as reported states:
Sec. 8103. There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States the `Ship
Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund’. There is appropriated $2,382,100,000,
for the `Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund’, to remain available until
September 30, 2014: Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy shall transfer funds from the
`Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund’ to appropriations for military
personnel; operation and maintenance; research, development, test and evaluation; and
procurement, only for the purposes of manning, operating, sustaining, equipping and
modernizing the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers CG-63, CG-64, CG-65, CG-66,
CG-68, CG-69, CG-73, and the Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships LSD-41 and LSD46: Provided further, That funds transferred shall be merged with and be available for the
same purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which they are
transferred: Provided further, That the transfer authority provided herein shall be in addition
to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That
the Secretary of the Navy shall, not less than 30 days prior to making any transfer from the
`Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund’, notify the congressional defense
committees in writing of the details of such transfer.

In addition to the funding provided by Section 8103, the committee recommended additional
FY2013 funding for keeping in service all four of the Aegis cruisers that the Navy has proposed
for early retirement in FY2013; the funding is in the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) account
(page 25, lines 50 and 100) and the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) account (page 54,
line 2B2G).
S.Rept. 112-196 states:
For the Department of the Navy, the Committee does not concur with the recommendation to
prematurely retire nine Navy ships and provides over $2,300,000,000 to man, operate, equip,
and modernize these ships. In addition, the Committee provides over $770,000,000 for
advance procurement of a tenth Virginia-class submarine, $1,000,000,000 for an additional
DDG–51 destroyer, and $263,255,000 for advance procurement of an amphibious warship.
These funds were not included in the budget request, but the Committee believes these ships

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are crucial to supporting our Navy’s global requirements, particularly as the U.S. military
shifts its focus to the Pacific. (Page 7)

The report also states:
Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund.—The Department of Defense’s
2012 defense strategy (“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense”) calls for a “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region”; however, the Navy’s fiscal
year 2013 budget submission includes a proposal to prematurely retire seven cruisers and
two dock landing ships in the next 2 years. The Committee is concerned with this proposed
elimination of force structure and believes it is disconnected from the defense strategy,
creates future unaffordable shipbuilding requirements, and exacerbates force structure
shortfalls that negatively impact the Department’s ability to meet Combatant Commander
requirements.
The Committee is troubled by the impact that the proposed premature retirement of these
ships will have on the Department’s strategic realignment toward the Asia-Pacific region.
Specifically, the Committee is concerned about the operational impact of this reduction in
force structure on the balance of the Fleet as it attempts to meet requirements in the AsiaPacific, as well as demands in the Middle East and other parts of the world. In addition, the
Committee notes that with one exception, the cruisers proposed for premature retirement
were slated to receive ballistic missile defense capability that has already proven of
significant operational relevance and that the elimination of this capability creates further
strain on the Department’s ability to meet Combatant Commander requirements.
In addition, the Committee believes that prematurely retiring capable and relevant ships
following an initial investment of no less than $11,600,000,000 in current fiscal year 2012
dollars creates unnecessary and unaffordable future shipbuilding requirements. The
Committee notes that current fiscal pressures on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget are not
likely to be alleviated prior to the end of the next decade, when a large number of surface
ships are scheduled for retirement, and significant capital investments will be required to
procure the Ohio class replacement submarine and the next Ford class aircraft carrier. By the
Navy’s own estimates, implementation of the fiscal year 2013 30-year shipbuilding plan
requires a significant and sustained increase in the Navy’s shipbuilding budget over the next
2 decades. Absent this funding increase, platforms scheduled to be procured will be deferred,
and the desired force structure will not be achieved. The Committee notes that over the past 8
years, on average, the Navy’s actual ship procurements have been roughly three platforms
less than envisioned in the respective shipbuilding plans. Therefore, the Committee questions
the wisdom of eliminating force structure with premature ship retirements.
Finally, the Committee notes that a ship’s expected service life is a significant factor for
justifying its extensive up-front investments. Curtailing ship service lives, as the Navy is
again proposing, calls into question the Department of the Navy assumptions and
specifications when funding new ship acquisitions. The Committee notes that the nine
platforms proposed for premature retirement have a combined remaining service life in
excess of 120 years, roughly one-third of their service life, and that the Navy shipbuilding
plan does not include a sufficient quantity of ships to offset the loss of these platforms. In
fact, annual ship procurement will decline from an average of 10 or more battle ships per
year in the two previous 5-year shipbuilding plans to approximately 8 battle ships per year in
the current 5-year plan.
The Committee has been informed that the Navy still believes in the operational relevance
and capability of these platforms, and that the decision to request their premature retirement
in the fiscal year 2013 budget request was strictly driven by fiscal constraints. Therefore, the
Committee recommends denying these proposed premature retirements and retaining this

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force structure in its entirety. The Committee recommends full funding, as identified by the
Navy, to man, operate, sustain, upgrade, equip, and modernize only CG–63, CG–64, CG–65,
CG–66, CG–68, CG–69, CG–73, LSD–41, and LSD–46 in the Ship Modernization,
Operations and Sustainment Fund, as specified elsewhere in this act. The Committee
recommends full funding for all known requirements only for these platforms for the next 2
fiscal years, and provides the Secretary of the Navy the authority to transfer funds from the
Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund to the appropriate appropriation
accounts in the year of execution following 30-day prior notification to the congressional
defense committees. The Committee directs funds to be transferred in accordance with the
requirements identified to the Committee by the Navy and further directs that any deviation
from those requirements shall be fully and clearly identified to the congressional defense
committees prior to the initiation of any such transfer. The Committee believes that this
approach provides the fiscal relief required by the Navy to maintain this force structure and
allows the Navy sufficient time to plan and budget for this force structure in future budget
submissions. (Pages 9-11)

The report also states:
Navy Shipbuilding Plans.—The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes $13,579,845,000 in
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN], a decrease of $1,339,269,000 from amounts
appropriated in fiscal year 2012. The Navy’s projected fiscal year 2014 SCN budget request
is a further decrease of no less than $1,000,000,000.
The Committee is concerned with the apparent disconnect between the Navy’s publicly
stated priorities and the Navy’s fiscal year 2013 shipbuilding budget submission which, as
compared to the fiscal year 2012 plan, reduces planned ship procurement for the next 5 years
by 16 ships and eliminates funding for one Virginia class attack submarine, one amphibious
ship, and three oilers. In addition, the Navy’s budget request omits funding for an additional
Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer contrary to the Navy’s force structure goals.
The Committee is concerned that these proposed adjustments will drive up costs for multiple
classes of ships and negatively impact the industrial base, almost certainly leading to
additional cost growth in shipbuilding.
The Committee notes that it was just 3 years ago that the Navy had implemented sufficient
cost-reduction measures to allow for the procurement of two Virginia class attack
submarines per year. The Committee is troubled that the Navy removed one Virginia class
attack submarine from its near-term shipbuilding plan, particularly when the Navy is seeking
multiyear procurement authority for Virginia class submarines to be procured from fiscal
years 2014 through 2018. The Committee has been informed by the Navy that procuring 10
Virginia class submarines in the next multiyear procurement instead of 9 as proposed in the
fiscal year 2013 budget request would result in an average submarine unit cost reduction in
excess of $120,000,000. The Committee believes that these cost savings and the avoidance
of industrial base perturbations warrant the inclusion of a tenth Virginia class submarine in
the next multiyear procurement.
The Committee has been advised by the Navy that the addition of a tenth submarine, which
would be procured in fiscal year 2014, to the multiyear procurement necessitates Advance
Procurement funding in fiscal year 2013. Therefore, the Committee recommends an
additional $777,679,000 only for Advance Procurement of a second Virginia class submarine
in fiscal year 2014, as authorized in S. 3254, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, as reported. As noted in Senate Report 112–173 to accompany S. 3254, as
reported, procurement of an additional submarine in fiscal year 2014 will help alleviate an
attack submarine shortfall anticipated in 2022. In addition, the Committee understands that
current budget constraints make full funding of all 10 submarines included in the multiyear
procurement in accordance with the Department’s Financial Management Regulations

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unaffordable, but that incrementally funding these submarines allows for their procurement
within the current budget. While incremental funding authority is currently only provided for
aircraft carriers and largedeck amphibious ships, the Committee notes the precedence for
incrementally funding a submarine and recommends incremental funding authority only for
the Virginia class submarines to be procured under the next multiyear procurement.
In addition, the fiscal year 2013 budget request includes a proposal to procure nine Arleigh
Burke class guided missile destroyers at a rate of two ships per year for the next 5 years with
the exception of fiscal year 2014, where the Navy has only budgeted for one Arleigh Burke
class guided missile destroyer. The Committee has been informed by the Navy that a tenth
destroyer could be added to this multiyear procurement at a significantly lower ship unit
cost. According to the Navy, those costs could be partially offset with savings generated
from previous competitive procurements, with the balance of funding required in the fiscal
year 2014 shipbuilding budget request. Recognizing the fiscal pressures on the Navy’s fiscal
year 2014 shipbuilding budget, the Committee recommends taking advantage of these
significant cost savings now and recommends an additional $1,000,000,000 in fiscal year
2013 to fully fund a tenth Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer within the next
multiyear procurement.
The Committee notes that within this multiyear procurement, the Navy intends to include
next generation Flight III Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers with an improved
radar suite and combat systems capability as an Engineering Change Proposal [ECP]. Since
the radar is still in development, acquisition authorities within the Department have yet to be
established, and the ECP has no defined scope and associated cost estimates, the Committee
finds it premature to request authority for this ECP within the multiyear procurement at this
time. Therefore, the Committee provides multiyear procurement authority only for Flight IIA
Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers, as authorized in S. 3254, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as reported.
Finally, the fiscal year 2013 budget request includes a proposal to eliminate an amphibious
class warship from the 5-year shipbuilding plan, and defers funding for the only other
amphibious ship in the Navy’s 5-year plan until fiscal year 2017. As detailed in section 130
of S. 3254, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as reported, the
Navy and Marine Corps have agreed on a fiscally constrained minimum force of 33 ships to
meet a 38 amphibious warship force requirement. Currently, there are 29 ships in the
Department of the Navy’s amphibious fleet and the most recent shipbuilding and retirement
plan submitted to Congress reduces the force to 28 vessels in fiscal year 2015. If all
amphibious warships currently in the inventory were operationally available, the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade assault echelon would be lacking approximately 400,000 square feet
of vehicle stowage and 3 million gallons of JP–5 jet fuel. However, since 10 to 15 percent of
warships are in overhaul and unavailable at any given time, the number of operationally
available amphibious warships leaves an even greater shortfall and is significantly below the
minimum lift requirement stated by the Department of the Navy.
The Committee is deeply concerned about the level of risk being assumed with amphibious
lift capability and the impact this has on Commanders to meet operations plans and crisis
response requirements, particularly as the Department of Defense rebalances its global
posture towards the Asia-Pacific region. The Committee is also concerned about the ability
to address this assumed risk when the next amphibious class warship in the Navy’s
shipbuilding plan does not appear until 5 years from now. As noted earlier, this proposal and
funding gap will almost certainly have a negative industrial base impact and lead to
additional cost growth in multiple shipbuilding programs. Therefore, to start addressing the
amphibious lift shortfall that exists today, the Committee recommends an additional
$263,255,000 only for Advance Procurement of continued LPD–17 Class amphibious ship
production. (Pages 125-127; material in brackets as in original)

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In regard to the budget request for the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), the report states:
Afloat Forward Staging Base [AFSB].—The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes no
funds for the installation of an Engineering Change Proposal [ECP] to convert Mobile
Landing Platform [MLP] 3 to an AFSB. The Committee has been informed by the Navy that
the installation of this capability requires a total investment of $135,000,000, which the Navy
plans to fund by reallocating $38,000,000 that is requested in fiscal year 2013 as Advance
Procurement of a second AFSB to the MLP 3 ECP, and by requesting the balance of required
funding in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The Committee is concerned by this funding strategy
and recommends transferring the $38,000,000, as requested by the Navy, to MLP 3 for the
ECP. In addition, the Committee recommends an additional $97,000,000 in fiscal year 2013
only for the MLP 3 ECP to fully fund the conversion of MLP 3 to an AFSB, subject to the
Department’s approval of validated requirements. (Pages 223-224; material in brackets as in
original)

CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and
modernization programs, see the following CRS reports:
•

CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

•

CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy
Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests
This appendix presents three instances in 2012 when Navy officials testified that a Navy of more
than 500 ships would be required to fully meet combatant commander COCOM requests for
Navy forces.

March 22, 2012, Hearing
At a March 22, 2012, hearing on Navy readiness before the Readiness subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES:
We have a lot of requests for our combatant commanders—of the validated requests that
come from combatant commanders. How many ships would it take in our navy, based on
your estimation, to meet all of the validated requests from our commanders, combatant
commanders?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Let me—give me just a minute on that, sir.
FORBES:
Please. And if you’d like, on any of these questions, if you’d rather take them for the record
and get back I’m OK with that, too.
BURKE:
I’m—no, I'm happy to answer the question. I just want to make sure I elaborate a little to
make sure we get—get the point right.
FORBES:
Please.
BURKE:
The—the combatant commander requests come in to the—to the services, and then the—
there’s a—a very high number of requirements from the services, or from the—the
combatant commanders which are then prioritized and adjudicated by the joint staff.
Essentially, a way to adjudicate supply—a lesser supply and a greater demand. So—so
those—of those requests that come in, some are determined to be more valid than others, if
you will. But to get to your exact question, of those requests that come in from the combatant
commanders, if we ...
(CROSSTALK)

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FORBES:
Admiral, could—could I just—on the nomenclature, just make sure I’m right, too. As they
come in, one of the first weed-out processes is we determine whether they’re validated or
not. In other words, we go through and make sure they’re legal, they don't have the other
asset somewhere. And—and then we stamp them as validated.
And then like you said, they go through a process where we then look at the resources we
have and allocate what we can. And we adjudicate which ones we can give and which ones
we can’t. So I want the top number. The—the ones that we have validated and said, “Yes,
this is legal, it’s a proper request.”
Of those combatant commander requests, approximately how many ships would it take us to
be able to meet those if we had them?
BURKE:
It would take a navy of over 500 ships to meet the combatant commander requests. And, of
course, it would take a similar increase in the aircraft and—and other parts of the—of the
Navy, as well, to meet the combatant commander requests.41

March 29, 2012, Hearing
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN D. HUNTER:
If you were to build the amphibs [i.e., amphibious ships] where would you prioritize? I
mean, where would you take money out of to be able to get the Marine Corps to where they
need to be?
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN TERENCE BLAKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES:
Here’s the issue we deal with: I don’t have the luxury of dealing with any single issue in
isolation; I have to deal with it across the entire...
HUNTER:
Well, we can. That’s why I'm asking.
BLAKE:
Well, we have to deal with it, though, across the entire portfolio.
HUNTER:
Sure.

41

Source: Transcript of hearing.

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BLAKE:
And so what we have to do is we have to balance the requirement for amphibs, the
requirement for surface combatants, the requirement for the carriers, the submarines—every
category of ships that we have. And so when we do that we then have to say, all right, as we
balance across that where are we going to be able to assume more risk? And that’s how we—
that’s how we end up where we are.
HUNTER:
So you’re saying there is less risk but still risk in the Marine Corps being short on amphibs
than there are in the other—the rest of the picture?
BLAKE:
No. I’m saying that we have assumed risk in all areas. The best example I can give you: It
was only a short time ago, if we tried to fill all the COCOM needs we said the number was
around 400 ships we’d need in the fleet. Today—and we see no abatement in that
commitment or the...
HUNTER:
No (inaudible) signal.
BLAKE:
Today we look at it and we see that we would—if we wanted to hit 100 percent of all the
COCOM requirements we’d need in excess of 500 ships. So what we end up having to do is
we go through the—the global management process and we look at it and we say, here are
our highest priorities, these are how we are going to address them, and then we—we have
those units available and we push that...
HUNTER:
I understand.
I’m going to yield back in just one second.
So I would take from your statement, then, that you did go through a prioritization process
and the amphibs are not at the top of that list. And second, when you say that you assume
risk all the way around I would argue that when you do your risk assessment and you
prioritize your needs the fact that the COCOMs wanted more ships and needed more ships
due to the international environment and where we find ourselves with the world today,
going down is probably – it’s going the wrong way.
We all know that, but I—I would—I would argue that your prioritization—I would like to
see that, if you don’t mind, the—the way that you analyzed this and the—and the way that
you said, hey, we’re going to—we’re going to keep them there to make sure that we have
this over here. That’s all I'm asking for.

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BLAKE:
OK. When we put it together we do it across the entire spectrum; we don’t—and by that I
mean, as we look at the entire requirement we say, this is what we need to do in order to be
able to meet the COCOM demand signal.42

April 19, 2012, Hearing
At an April 19, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR ROGER WICKER:
Admiral Burke and General Mills, from an operational perspective, the Navy budget cost for
decreases in large amphibious ships among other categories, in my opening statement, I
mentioned that the requests from combatant commanders for amphibious ships has increased
over 80 percent in the last five years—a very dramatic number. What is the reason for that
and what will be the impact if these requests are—are not met?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Senator, thanks for the question. You're right, the COCOM demand signal has gone up
significantly to the point where if we were to meet their—all their requirements, it would
take a Navy of greater than 500 ships.
So, I certainly am not here to begrudge the COCOM demand signal because they have
challenges that they’re trying to deal with. But—but we can’t meet—meet all their demands.
So there is a process in the—in the Pentagon run by the joint staff called the Global Force
Management process by which they take in the COCOM requirements and adjudicate that
along with the forces we have to come to a reasonable allocation of—of force. And so that’s
the—that’s a process we’re dealing with today. We’ve been using that process for a number
of years, and I would expect we will continue to use that process in the future to—to bridge
the gap between supply and demand.43

42
43

Source: Transcript of hearing.
Source: Transcript of hearing.

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Appendix B. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess
Proposed Force Levels
One possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to
compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size,
however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the
future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few
years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,44 and as of October 25, 2012, included a total of 287 battle force ships. The FY1987
fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering
Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the
October 2012 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements
centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of
potential regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese military forces and nonstate terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the
October 2012 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers
of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.45
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 287-ship fleet of October 2012 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
44

Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
45
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

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number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.46

46

Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
Total ships
Attack submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Amphibious ships

600-ship
~600
100
15e
242/228g
~75h

Base Force
~450/416a
80/~55c
12
~150
51i

1993 BUR
346
45-55
11+1f
~124
41i

1997 QDR
~305/310b
50/55d
11+1f
116
36i

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.

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Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that
the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent
panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report
recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.47 The
report stated the following, among other things:
•

“The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)

•

“In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)

•

“The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)

•

“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)

•

“Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The

47
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.

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United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
•

“To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)

In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table C-1 compares the Navy’s 310-316 ship
goal of March 2012 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in
subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.

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Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 310-316 ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and
Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel

Ship Type

Navy’s 310-316 ship goal
of March 2012

Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) (1993)

2010 QDR
Independent
Review Panel
(July 2010)

12-14

18

14

SSBNs

(SSBN force was later
reduced to 14 as a result of
the 1994 Nuclear Posture
Review)
SSGNs

0-4

0

4

(SSGN program did not yet
exist)
SSNs

~48

45 to 55

55

(55 in FY99, with a long-term
goal of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants

11 active

11 active + 1
operational/reserve

11 active

~145

124

n/a

(114 active + 10 frigates in
Naval Reserve Force; a total
of 110-116 active ships was
also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
Frigates

~90

n/a

n/a

0

n/a

n/a

0

n/a

(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs

~55

(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships

~32

41

(30 operational ships
needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)

(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)

0

26

(to be replaced by LCSs)

(LCS program did not exist)

CLF ships

~29

43

n/a

Support ships

~33

22

n/a

~310-316

346

346

Dedicated mine
warfare ships

TOTAL ships

n/a

n/a

(numbers above add to
331-341)a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting

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 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
a.

The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in
numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships.

In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the
Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s)
fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the thenplanned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.48

48

Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.

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Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table D-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.49 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 287 battle force ships as of October 25, 2012.
As discussed in Appendix B, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends
over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the
direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of
ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions
is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might
not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the
fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because
average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be
increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.

49
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.

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Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa

Number

FYa

Number

FYa

Number

1948

737

1970

769

1992

466

1949

690

1971

702

1993

435

1950

634

1972

654

1994

391

1951

980

1973

584

1995

373

1952

1,097

1974

512

1996

356

1953

1,122

1975

496

1997

354

1954

1,113

1976

476

1998

333

1955

1,030

1977

464

1999

317

1956

973

1978

468

2000

318

1957

967

1979

471

2001

316

1958

890

1980

477

2002

313

1959

860

1981

490

2003

297

1960

812

1982

513

2004

291

1961

897

1983

514

2005

282

1962

959

1984

524

2006

281

1963

916

1985

541

2007

279

1964

917

1986

556

2008

282

1965

936

1987

568

2009

285

1966

947

1988

565

2010

288

1967

973

1989

566

2011

284

1968

976

1990

547

2012

1969

926

1991

526

2013

Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.

Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.

Shipbuilding Rate
Table D-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2012) and requested (FY2013-FY2017) rates of Navy ship
procurement.

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Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2017
(Procured FY1982-FY2012; requested FY2013-FY2017)
82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

17

14

16

19

20

17

15

19

15

11

11

7

4

4

5

4

5

5

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

6

6

6

5

7

8

4a

5a

3a

8

7

10

11b

10

7

8

9

7

Source: CRS compilation based on Navy budget data and examination of defense authorization and
appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships
that do not count toward the 310-316 ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
a.

The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006,
another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.

b.

The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were
being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in
FY2012, and this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and
Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the JHSV
that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget
submission. The four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to FY2012, however, are
not included in the annual totals shown in this table.

Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610

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