Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
August 17September 28, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV).
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006 ...............................................................................2
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................4
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................................6
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040..........................................................7
Oversight Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................8
Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal.............................................................................................8
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ..............................................................................9
Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................................9
Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships................................................................................. 11
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 11
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)..................................................... 11
House ........................................................................................................................... 11
Senate........................................................................................................................... 17
FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)........................................................................ 20
Senate........................................................................................................................... 20
National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035) ......................................................... 2021
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs....................... 21
Tables
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001 ...........................................................2
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ...................................................4
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................6
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan......................................................7
Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................... 10
Table B-1. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan............................................. 2425
Table C-1. Comparison of 1993 BUR Report, 313-Ship Plan, and Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR ...................................................................................................... 2829
Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ................................................... 3132
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015.................................... 3233
Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Proposed 313-Ship Force Level .................. 2223
Appendix B. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan ......................................... 2425
Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR........................................................ 2627
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate....................................................... 3031
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 3233
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). 1
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year.2 Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. 3 The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”4
1
The proposed FY2011 budget also requests funding for the procurement of an oceanographic ship that does not count
against the 313-ship goal.
2
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
3
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table 2
(page 9).
4
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, p. vii.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Background
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet and compares it to previous
Navy ship force structure proposals.
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001
Ship type
February 2006 Navy
proposal for 313ship fleet
Early-2005 Navy
proposal for fleet of
260-325 ships
260-ships
325-ships
2002-2004 Navy
proposal for 375ship Navya
2001 QDR
plan for 310ship Navy
14
Ballistic missile
submarines
(SSBNs)
14
14
14
14
Cruise missile
submarines
(SSGNs)
4
4
4
4
Attack submarines
(SSNs)
48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11c
10
11
12
12
Cruisers,
destroyers,
frigates
88
67
92
104
116
Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs)
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
31
17
24
37
36
12d
14d
20d
0d
0d
Combat logistics
(resupply) ships
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
0
0
0
26e
16
Otherf
20
10
11
25
25
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
MPF(F)
shipsd
Total battle
force ships
2 or 4b
Sources: U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b.
The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
d.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contribute to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by
supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted by the Navy as battle force
ships.
e.
The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
f.
Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place as a Navy goal, some elements of Navy ship force
planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. For
example:
•
The Navy is planning to replace its 14 existing ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.5
•
The planned composition of the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force has changed
considerably since 2006 due to the truncation of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
destroyer program to three ships, the restart of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer procurement, and the Navy’s proposed cancellation of the CG(X)
cruiser program. 6 The Navy’s new mission of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations in Europe may also put upward pressure on the cruiser-destroyer
force-level goal.7
•
The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the
assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.8
•
Within the category of support ships, the original 313-ship plan included 3 Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a
force of about 23 JHSVs.9
•
Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of nextgeneration Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships; they now
call for building six new maritime prepositioning ships—three Lewis and Clark
(TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships (which have already been funded) and three
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that are to augment the three existing
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.
5
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7
For further discussion, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, March
17, 2010.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a
forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).10 Such an assessment could produce a replacement
for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for
the 313-ship plan might be issued.
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal)
Ship type
FY11
FY12
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
FY13
FY14
FY15
Total
1
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
2
1
2
1
2
8
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
2
3
4
4
4
17
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship
Large-deck amphibious assault ship (LHA[R])
1
1
1
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
1
1
1
1
3
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship
1
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
1
1
2
2
2
8
TOTAL
9
8
12
9
12
50
Source: FY2011 Navy budget submission.
Note: The FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in
FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
The plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per
year.11 This is an increase from the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that
have been funded each year since FY1993. Shipbuilding supporters for some
time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more ships per year. A
rate of 10 ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of
313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year (see Appendix D).
10
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, pp. 14, 19, 25.
11
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 25% of the 313-ship requirement,
they account for 50% of the ships in the five-year plan. In this sense, these
relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding
plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship requirement, making it easier to
procure an average of 10 ships per year within available resources. Starting a few
years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer
overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of
next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an
average of 10 ships per year will become a considerably more expensive
proposition. In this sense, the FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding program’s average
of 10 ships per year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the
challenge it faces concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.
•
The FY2010 budget shifted the procurement of the next aircraft carrier from
FY2012 to FY2013.
•
The planned procurement rate of Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines is
consistent with Navy planning since the submission of the FY2009 budget to
increase the procurement rate of these ships to two per year starting in FY2011.
Virginia-class submarines were procured in FY2010 and previous years at a rate
of about one per year.12
•
The planned procurement rate for DDG-51 class destroyers reflects the Navy’s
proposal, approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, to stop procurement of DDG-1000 class destroyers and restart
procurement of DDG-51s.
•
The planned procurement rate of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) does not rise
above four per year. Previous Navy plans called for building as many as six LCSs
per year. The new planned maximum rate of four ships per year reflects a new
acquisition strategy for LCSs announced by the Navy in September 2009.13
•
The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 would be
the 11th ship in the class. The 33-ship goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD17s.
•
The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2015.
This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build
amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s (NGSB’s) Gulf Coast
yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at
Pascagoula, MS). (On July 13, 2010, Northrop announced that it intends to wind
down shipbuilding operations at Avondale in 2013 and consolidate its Gulf Coast
shipbuilding operations at the Ingalls yard.)
•
The three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships in the plan reflect the Navy’s
decision to cancel the planned MPF(F) squadron and instead build six new ships,
12
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
13
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
including three MLPs, to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime
prepositioning ships.
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The plan
includes a total of 276 ships.
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
CVN
1
1
1
1
1
1
LSC
SSC
SSN
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
SSBN
AWS
CLF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Supt
Total
2
1
3
2
4
2
3
3
3
4
2
3
3
2
1
9
8
12
9
12
9
12
9
13
9
11
10
11
8
8
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
11
8
10
7
10
9
10
7
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support
ships.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040 that would result from
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan
FY
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
Goal in 313-ship
plan
11
88
55
48
4
14
31
30
20
313a
11
11
84
42
53
4
14
29
29
18
284
12
11
84
41
54
4
14
30
29
20
287
13
10
85
37
55
4
14
30
29
23
287
14
10
86
32
55
4
14
30
30
24
285
15
11
88
28
54
4
14
31
30
25
285
16
11
90
32
51
4
14
33
30
27
292
17
11
91
33
51
4
14
33
30
31
298
18
11
93
37
50
4
14
33
30
33
305
19
11
94
37
51
4
14
33
30
37
311
20
12
96
39
49
4
14
33
30
38
315
21
12
96
39
49
4
14
34
31
39
318
22
12
95
41
48
4
14
34
29
41
318
23
11
94
39
48
4
14
35
29
45
319
24
11
94
40
46
4
14
36
28
47
320
25
12
92
41
45
4
14
35
28
46
317
26
12
89
43
44
4
14
36
28
45
313
27
12
87
45
43
2
13
35
26
46
308
28
11
85
46
41
1
13
36
26
46
304
29
11
81
48
40
0
13
34
25
44
296
30
12
77
49
39
0
12
33
25
44
291
31
12
73
51
41
0
12
33
24
44
290
32
11
71
52
41
0
12
32
25
44
288
33
11
69
53
42
0
12
31
26
44
288
34
11
67
54
43
0
12
33
26
44
290
35
12
68
55
44
0
12
30
25
44
290
36
11
70
56
45
0
12
30
26
44
294
37
11
72
56
46
0
12
29
27
44
297
38
11
74
56
45
0
12
29
27
44
298
39
11
76
56
45
0
12
29
28
44
301
40
11
76
55
45
0
12
30
28
44
301
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Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
a.
The 313-ship plan also includes a 12-ship Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron. The
Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan does not contemplate building a 12-ship MPF(F) squadron.
Observations that can be made about the above force-level projections include the following:
•
The Navy projects that implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan would result
in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a
peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288
ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040.
•
The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48
boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below
48 boats through 2040. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops
below the required level of 88 ships in 2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in
FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040.
•
The Navy projects a force of more than 40 support ships in FY2022 and beyond,
compared to a goal of 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan. The 20 support ships
in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now plans to build and
maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.
Oversight Issues for Congress
Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the status of the Navy’s 313-ship goal.
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
14
•
Does the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) endorse the Navy’s 313-ship
goal? The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) final report on the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the levels of Navy and other forces
that are expected to be in place for the years FY2011-FY2015, but does not
explicitly establish force-level requirements for Navy or other forces for either
FY2011-FY2015 or subsequent years.14
•
What is the Navy’s schedule for performing the new force structure assessment
(FSA) mentioned in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan? Will this
FSA result in a new force-level goal to replace the 313-ship plan? If so, when
does the Navy intend to issue the replacement plan? Why has the Navy decided
to retain, the for time being at least, the 313-ship plan, when certain elements of
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 20o1, pp. 45-47.
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Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from
that plan?
•
Given the Administration’s September 2009 announcement of its new plan for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which includes a significant use of
BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and
destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate?
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR
shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the
2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommends a Navy of
346 ships (about 10% more than the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet), including 11 aircraft carriers
(the same number as in the Navy’s 313-ship plan) and 55 attack submarines (compared to 48 in
the Navy’s 313-ship plan).15 For additional discussion of the independent panel’s report, see
Appendix C.
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A second potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support
all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run. The Navy projects that implementing the 30year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020,
reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships
in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that
the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in
the latter years of the 30-year plan.
Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A third potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the affordability and executability of the
30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan
would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the
plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If the
Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over
the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able
to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”
15
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
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Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2010 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2011-FY2020)
Next 10 years
(FY2021-2030)
Final 10- years
(FY2031-FY2040)
Entire 30 years
(FY2011-FY2040)
Navy estimate
14.5
17.9
15.3
15.9
CBO estimate
15.2
20.4
21.4
19.0
% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates
5%
14%
40%
19%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table
2 (page 9). The CBO report calculates the percent difference between the Navy and CBO estimates for the
entire 30-year period as 20% rather than 19%. $19.0 billion is 19.497% greater than $15.9 billion.
As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding
plan with a total of 50 ships, or an average of 10 per year, within available resources in part
because half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from
now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan,
and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines
begins, procuring an average of 10 ships per year will become a considerably more expensive
proposition.
The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of
each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7 billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to almost onehalf of the Navy’s budget each year for procuring new ships. The May 2010 CBO report
estimates that a class of 12 SSBN(X)s would have an average unit procurement cost of $8.2
billion in constant FY2010 dollars.16 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other
shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding funding profile in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan
includes a “hump” of approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the
years (FY2019-FY2033) when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the 30year plan, however, contains little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in
shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no
real growth in coming years, as some observers, including some Navy leaders,17 expect. If the $2billion-per-year hump is not realized, the total number of ships of various kinds procured in
FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the 30-year plan. Attack submarines and
destroyers planned for those years could be among the ships that would not be procured. If so, the
shortfalls for these two categories of ships could be even deeper than the projections shown in
Table 4.
16
For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17
For example, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus reportedly told a group of defense reporters on April 21, 2010, that
“We [in the Navy] are looking at a [sic] no substantial growth and realistically no growth at all, in terms of the amount
of money we are allocated to spend.” As quoted in Geoff Fein, “Diminishing Budgets Forcing Navy To Closely
Examine Contracts, Navy Secretary Says,” Defense Daily, April 22, 1010: 4-5.
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Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships
A fourth oversight issue for Congress concerns current Navy plans for retiring certain older ships,
including several frigates and two amphibious assault ships, over the next few years. Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in deferring the retirements of at least some of
these ships, so as to increase the total number of Navy ships over the next few years. The Navy
has resisted proposals for deferring the retirements of the older ships, arguing that they Navy can
perform its expected missions with acceptable risk without these ships, and that the operation and
support costs of keeping these ships in service beyond their currently scheduled retirement dates
would reduce funding available for procuring new platforms and equipment, including new ships.
Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (pages 73-74).
The report states: “Demonstrating the committee’s commitment to reverse the decline in the size
of the Navy fleet, the committee authorizes 9 new ships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2
DDG 51 destroyers, and 2 Littoral Combat Ships.” (Page 20)
Section 121 of the bill as reported by the committee would broaden the Navy’s authority for
using incremental funding for procuring Navy ships.18
Section 123 would require the Navy to submit a report on, among other things, required numbers
of cruisers and destroyers, particularly in light of demands for these ships for ballistic missile
defense operations. 19
Section 1021 would amend the current law (10 U.S.C. 231) that requires DOD to annually submit
a 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Section 1022 states that the Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any battle force vessel
of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the congressional defense
committees written notification of such decommissioning in accordance with established
procedures.
18
For more on incremental funding, particularly in the procurement of Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke,
and CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
19
For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Section 1023 states that until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of the Navy reaches
313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in FY2011 or any subsequent
fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated for commissioning into the battle
force fleet for that fiscal year.
Section 1024 states that the Secretary of the Navy shall retain the amphibious assault ships
Nassau (LHA-4) and Peleliu (LHA-5) in a commissioned and operational status until the delivery
to the Navy of the new amphibious assault ships America (LHA-6) and LHA-7, respectively.
The text of Section 121 is as follows:
SEC. 121. INCREMENTAL FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF LARGE NAVAL
VESSELS.
(a) Incremental Funding of Large Naval Vessels- Except as provided in subsection (b), the
Secretary of the Navy may use incremental funding for the procurement of a large naval
vessel over a period not to exceed the number of years equal to three-fourths of the total
period of planned ship construction of such vessel.
(b) LPD 26- With respect to the vessel designated LPD 26, the Secretary may use
incremental funding for the procurement of such vessel through fiscal year 2012 if the
Secretary determines that such incremental funding—
(1) is in the best interest of the overall shipbuilding efforts of the Navy;
(2) is needed to provide the Secretary with the ability to facilitate changes to the shipbuilding
industrial base of the Navy; and
(3) will provide the Secretary with the ability to award a contract for construction of the
vessel that provides the best value to the United States.
(c) Condition for Out-year Contract Payments- A contract entered into under subsection (a)
or (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the
contract for a fiscal year after the fiscal year the vessel was authorized is subject to the
availability of appropriations for that purpose for that later fiscal year.
(d) Definitions- In this section:
(1) The term `large naval vessel’ means a vessel—
(A) that is—
(i) an aircraft carrier designated a CVN;
(ii) an amphibious assault ship designated LPD, LHA, LHD, or LSD; or
(iii) an auxiliary vessel; and
(B) that has a light ship displacement of 17,000 tons or more.
(2) The term `total period of planned ship construction’ means the period of years beginning
on the date of the first authorization of funding (not including funding requested for advance
procurement) and ending on the date that is projected on the date of the first authorization of
funding to be the delivery date of the vessel to the Navy.
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The text of Section 123 is as follows:
SEC. 123. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Report- Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to missile defense.
(b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be
accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by
procuring additional combatant surface vessels.
(2) Whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of
combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313ship fleet plan of the Navy.
(3) The number of Aegis ships needed by each combatant commander to fulfill ballistic
missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to
ballistic missile defense in Europe.
(4) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of
the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set.
(5) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a
balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States.
(6) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological
advancements in the sea-based missile defense program.
(7) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile ships
within the context of the fleet response plan.
The text of Section 1021 is as follows:
SEC. 1021. REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels
`(a) Quadrennial Naval Vessel Construction Plan- At the same time that the budget of the
President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 during each year in which the
Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction of
combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force structure
recommendations of the quadrennial defense review.
`(b) Matters Included- The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following:
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`(1) A detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the ten-year period beginning on
the date on which the plan is submitted, including a certification by the Secretary that the
budget for the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted and the budget for the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title are sufficient for funding such
schedule.
`(2) A probable construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 10
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(3) A notional construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 20
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(4) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the construction schedules
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
`(5) For the construction schedules under paragraphs (1) and (2)—
`(A) a determination by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the level
of funding necessary to execute such schedules; and
`(B) an evaluation by the Director of the potential risk associated with such schedules,
including detailed effects on operational plans, missions, deployment schedules, and
fulfillment of the requirements of the combatant commanders.
`(c) Naval Composition- In submitting the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
ensure that such plan—
`(1) is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title; and
`(2) phases the construction of new aircraft carriers during the periods covered by such plan
in a manner that minimizes the total cost for procurement for such vessels.
`(d) Assessment When Budget Is Insufficient- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for
funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is less than the level determined
necessary by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection
(b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the budget,
including the risk associated with a reduced force structure that may result from funding
naval vessel construction at such a level.
`(e) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a), the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the
construction schedules and the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with
respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the futureyears defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(f) Changes to the Construction Plan- In any year in which a quadrennial defense review is
not submitted, the Secretary of the Navy may not modify the construction schedules
submitted in the plan under subsection (a) unless—
`(1) the modification is an increase in planned ship construction;
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`(2) the modification is a realignment of less than one year of construction start dates in the
future-years defense plan submitted under section 221 of this title and the Secretary submits
to the congressional defense committees a report on such modification, including—
`(A) the reasons for realignment;
`(B) any increased cost that will be incurred by the Navy because of the realignment; and
`(C) an assessment of the effects that the realignment will have on the shipbuilding industrial
base, including the secondary supply base; or
`(3) the modification is a decrease in the number or type of combatant and support vessels of
the Navy and the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such
modification, including—
`(A) an addendum to the most recent quadrennial defense review that fully explains and
justifies the decrease with respect to the national security strategy of the United States as set
forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a); and
`(B) a description of the additional reviews and analyses considered by the Secretary after
the previous quadrennial defense review was submitted that justify the decrease.
`(g) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels.’.
In summarizing Section 1021, the committee’s report states:
This section would amend section 231 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels with
each submission of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The long-range plan would be
required to have 3 distinct sections each spanning a period of 10 years. The first section
would be a detailed construction plan for the first 10 years, the second a probable
construction plan for the second 10 years, and the third a notional construction plan for the
last 10 years. This section would require that during the intervening years between
submissions of the QDR, the plan may not be modified unless the change is accompanied by
an addendum to the QDR which explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the
national security of the United States. This section would further require that the plan fully
comply with section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a minimum of 11
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operational aircraft carriers and to phase the construction of such carriers as to minimize the
total cost of procurement. (Page 363)
The text of Section 1022 is as follows:
SEC. 1022. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Notice of Decommissioning- The Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any
battle force vessel of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the
congressional defense committees written notification of such decommissioning in
accordance with established procedures.
(b) Content of Notification- Any notification provided under subsection (a) shall include
each of the following:
(1) The reasons for the proposed decommissioning of the vessel.
(2) An analysis of the effect the decommissioning would be likely to have on the deployment
schedules of other vessels in the same class as the vessel proposed to be decommissioned.
(3) A certification from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decommissioning
of the vessel will not adversely affect the requirements of the combatant commanders to
fulfill missions critical to national security.
(4) Any budgetary implications associated with retaining the vessel in commission,
expressed for each applicable appropriation account.
The text of Section 1023 is as follows:
SEC. 1023. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIZE OF THE NAVY BATTLE FORCE FLEET.
(a) Limitation on Decommissioning- Until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of
the Navy reaches 313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in fiscal
year 2011 or any subsequent fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated
for commissioning into the battle force fleet for that fiscal year.
(b) Treatment of Submarines- For purposes of subsection (a), submarines of the battle force
fleet slated for decommissioning for any fiscal year shall not count against the number of
vessels the Secretary of the Navy is required to maintain for that fiscal year.
The text of Section 1024 is as follows:
SEC. 1024. RETENTION AND STATUS OF CERTAIN NAVAL VESSELS.
The Secretary of the Navy shall retain the vessels the U.S.S. Nassau (LHA 4) and the U.S.S.
Peleliu (LHA 5), in a commissioned and operational status, until the delivery to the Navy of
the vessels the U.S.S. America (LHA 6) and the vessel designated as LHA 7, respectively.
The committee’s report also states:
The committee notes that the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels,
known as the 30–year shipbuilding plan, submitted in accordance with section 231 of title
10, United States Code, proposes an average of 10 new vessels per year during the 5-year
period of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). While this is a positive step in shipbuilding
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procurement, the total number of battle force vessels remains essentially constant during the
FYDP due to the high rate of ship retirements planned during the period. Only after the
FYDP, do the battle force levels begin to increase in real terms and the stated goal of a 313ship Navy is not achieved until fiscal year 2018. The committee further notes that a short
term solution to the stagnant number of battle force ships through the FYDP is to delay
retirement of vessels with useful service life and that a planned approach to retire no more
ships in any one fiscal year than are being delivered to the Navy would accomplish this goal.
(Page 75)
The report also states:
U.S. shipbuilding industrial base
The committee has reservations as to the continued health of the shipbuilding industrial base
and its ability to remain viable in its current form. The shipbuilding industrial base currently
serving the needs of Navy and the nation is a legacy from the cold war when the size of the
Navy fleet, and the construction required to maintain that fleet, was significantly higher than
today. The committee is concerned that the relatively low orders for new ships as proposed
in the 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient to maintain all shipyards currently
constructing naval vessels. This is a very difficult situation for the Navy since reducing the
number of shipyards constructing vessels could have the unintended consequence of driving
up cost due to limited or no competition for particular classes of ships, yet the current
industrial base adds increased costs due to the significant overhead rates that must be
charged to each vessel.
Perhaps even more significant than shipyard over-capacity for the current shipbuilding plan
is the reduction in vendors willing to provide equipment and materiel necessary for the
shipbuilding industry. Low orders coupled with significant government requirements for
testing, traceability, and financial controls have driven many former suppliers out of the
market altogether. The committee received testimony that the vendor supply base is currently
60 to 70 percent sole source. While this almost total lack of competition may be manageable
in terms of maintaining the ability to construct vessels, it is not a condition that is bringing
the best value to the taxpayer.
The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has embarked on a comprehensive
review of the industrial base, including the supply base. The committee requests the
Secretary of the Navy to inform the committee when the comprehensive review is complete
and to make available to the committee those officials who participated in the review to
testify before the committee at a hearing in open session aimed at oversight of this potential
threat to national security. (Page 78)
Senate
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (see pages
677-678 of the printed version of S. 3454).
Section 124 of the bill states:
SEC. 124. INCLUSION OF BASIC AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN IN ASSESSMENTS
REQUIRED PRIOR TO START OF CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SHIP OF A
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM.
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(a) Inclusion in Assessments- Subsection (b)(1) of section 124 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 28; 10 U.S.C. 7291 note) is
amended by inserting `(and in particular completion of basic and functional design)’ after
`completion of detail design’.
(b) Basic and Functional Design Defined- Subsection (d) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(5) BASIC AND FUNCTION DESIGN- The term `basic and functional design’, for a ship,
means design, whether in the form of two-dimensional drawings, three-dimensional models,
or computer-aided models, that fixes the hull structure of the ship, sets the hydrodynamics of
the ship, routes all major distributive systems (including electricity, water, and other utilities)
of the ship, and identifies the exact positioning of piping and other outfitting within each
block of the ship.’.
Regarding Section 124, the committee’s report states:
Inclusion of basic and functional design in assessments required prior to start of
construction of first ship of a shipbuilding program (sec. 124)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 124 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) to tighten the
requirements under which the Secretary of the Navy is required to certify that a new
shipbuilding program has achieved sufficient design maturity at the time the Navy begins
construction on the first ship of any major shipbuilding program.
The Government Accountability Office, in its May 2009 report, “Best Practices: High Levels
of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding
(GAO–09–322),” identified key steps that leading commercial shipbuilders and ship buyers
follow to ensure their vessels deliver on-time, within planned costs, and with a high degree
of innovation.
One critical step in this process is achieving design stability before start of fabrication.
Leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable once all basic and functional design
activities have been completed (usually in the form of a complete 3D product model).
Section 124 as currently written does not specifically require that the assessment of design
maturity directly address the completeness of the 3D modeling or completion of the activities
that make up basic and functional design. This provision would add that requirement. (Page
13)
The committee’s report also states:
Surface ship construction and industrial base issues
The committee recognizes that the Navy’s most recent Long-Range Plan for the Construction
of Naval Vessels continues the Navy’s long stated goal of a minimum fleet of 313 battle
force ships. The committee notes that this plan is based on a 2005 Force Structure
Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded
requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare
support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee
encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can
be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan.
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The committee continues to have significant concerns regarding the implications of the plan
for the non-nuclear surface ship industrial base. If the Navy and industry, working together,
are unable to control requirement driven cost growth and deliver the ships in the plan for the
projected costs, the inevitable reductions in quantity will likely impact the Navy’s ability to
reach the required fleet size and further jeopardize the industrial base. The committee notes
that the current shipbuilding plan includes the cost of the SSBN (X) program and the
committee encourages the Navy to closely scrutinize requirements for this program in order
to minimize its impact on the recapitalization of the Navy’s battle force.
Furthermore, the committee urges the Navy and the contractors to negotiate as expeditiously
as possible fair and reasonable construction contracts for ships previously authorized in order
to reduce uncertainty and maintain and foster affordability in the procurement of large
surface combatants and other naval vessels.
In reviewing the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels in conjunction with
recent program performance highlights, the committee notes the following observations and
expectations:
The stated requirement for amphibious ships is 38 vessels; however, the Long-Range Plan
projects accepting moderate risk by having 33 ships by 2016, but then declining to 29 or 30
ships after 2034. Although there have been improvements in recently delivered ships, cost
and quality issues have been all too common in the procurement of large and medium
amphibious ships, making an already constrained shipbuilding budget more difficult to
execute. A new dock landing ship class, LSD(X), is important to the recapitalization of the
amphibious force. The requirements for this ship must be closely validated to ensure
affordability. The committee notes the Navy’s plan to have a gap year following the lead
ship of the class and believes that this may help alleviate cost, schedule, and performance
issues. Overall, the committee remains concerned with the Navy’s management of the
amphibious ship accounts and expects continued close scrutiny of these programs by Navy
leadership.
In large surface combatants, the Navy’s last official report stated that the industrial base can
only be effectively sustained if naval ship yards were building the equivalent of three DDG–
51 destroyers per year, with additional work assumed at one of the yards. Even if the Navy
fully executes both of the large surface combatant programs of record in the near-term, the
President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and future-years defense program propose to buy
an average of 1.5 large surface combatants per year. Even at projected procurement rates, the
number of cruisers and destroyers falls below the required level of 88 ships in 2027 and
remains below that level for the following 13 years. At its worst, the number of large surface
combatants is 21 ships below the expected requirement in 2034.
The Navy has testified that continued demand for large surface combatants to meet forward
presence and strike operations requirements coupled with emerging ballistic missile defense
requirements drives the Navy to consider abandoning lesser priority missions for more
recent, higher priority ones. In light of the current pressure on the large surface combatant
force, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s projected rate of production is insufficient,
and anticipates that the Navy will closely assess future demand for large surface combatants,
and operational and additional risk to the industrial base of maintaining relatively low rates
of procurement for large surface combatants.
The committee remains concerned with the Navy’s ability to execute what it believes is an
overly optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants. The truncation of the
DDG–1000, the restart of the DDG–51 class and the proposed Flight III variant of the DDG–
51 inject a great deal of instability into the SCN accounts. The Navy’s testimony before
Congress has led this committee to identify six risk areas in the Navy’s plan for DDG–51s:
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
(1) the availability of the Air and Missile Defense Radar; (2) the extent and cost of
modifications to the underlying ship’s design package to support proposed changes to the
ship; (3) increased limitation on service life margins of the early restart ships; (4) combat
system software integration; (5) the overall complexity of various separate programs that
need to converge for successful completion of the restart and Flight III programs; and (6)
cost and schedule growth for the Aegis Combat System Modernization. The committee
expects the Navy to keep it closely apprised of developments in these risk areas so that it can
monitor appropriate risk mitigation efforts.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has made progress during the past year and the
recent decision to move to a single design should improve affordability. The LCS fleet is
expected to comprise 55 vessels of the Navy’s 313–ship fleet force structure. Even modest
cost growth in this large component of the fleet magnifies the problem of achieving that
objective. The committee notes that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the LCS program
introduces competition for this class of ships and is therefore cautiously optimistic that this
program is making progress.
In summary, the committee considers the specialized shipbuilding industrial base for large
surface combatants, amphibious ships, Navy auxiliary ships, and littoral vessels as a critical
component of national security and expects the Department of Defense to appropriately
sustain this industrial base. The committee expects the Department of the Navy to include
these considerations as it incorporates the updated force structure assessment in the
upcoming Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels.
The committee understands that the Navy is conducting a comprehensive review of the
shipbuilding industrial base and calls upon the Navy to update the committee on the scope
and timeline for such a study. The committee understands the objective of the study is to
identify the challenges facing the Navy and the associated shipbuilding industrial base and
the strategies for mitigating the effects of those challenges. The committee expects that this
study will inform its deliberations in connection with the fiscal year 2012 budget. As a
general proposition, the committee expects that the Department of Defense will provide the
Navy with the support it needs to focus on the matters referred to above. (Pages 40-42)
FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-295 of September 16, 2010) on
S. 3800, recommends approval of the Navy’s FY2011 requests for procurement and advance
procurement funding for new ships, with two exceptions:
•
For the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the report recommends $615.5
million for the procurement of one LCS, a reduction of $615.5 million and one
ship from the Navy’s request (pages 7, 86, and 87). For the text of the report’s
discussion of the LCS, see the CRS report on the LCS program. 20
•
For the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) program, which is funded through the
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), the report recommends an increase of
20
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
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$100 million for advance procurement and advance construction activities (page
181).
National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035)
H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, and referred to the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2010,
would authorize $20 billion per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy
ships to meet the ship force structure requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year
shipbuilding plan. (It would also authorize $60 million per year for the period FY2011-FY2015
for loan guarantees for the construction of commercial ships.) The text of H.R. 5035 states:
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for the construction of vessels for the Navy and to authorize
appropriations for loan guarantees for commercial vessels.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act’.
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SEC. 2. NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Navy- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011
through 2015 for the construction of vessels for the Navy to meet the force requirements of
the Navy (as described in the annual naval vessel construction plan required by section 231
of title 10, United States Code) in the amount of $20,000,000,000.
(b) The Merchant Marine- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal
years 2011 through 2015 for loan guarantees and commitments authorized under chapter 537
of title 46, United States Code, for the construction of new vessels to replace and expand the
domestic fleet of commercial vessels (as that term is defined in that chapter) in the amount of
$60,000,000.
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see the following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to
Proposed 313-Ship Force Level
One possible method for assessing the Navy’s proposed 313-ship force level is to compare it to
historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might
not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship
fleet, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to
be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-cold war peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,2021 and as of July 16, 2010, had declined to a total of 289 battle force ships. The FY1987
fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering
Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the
September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements
centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of
potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In
addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009 fleet in areas such
as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships,
and sophistication of C4ISR systems.2122
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities. 2223 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 289-ship fleet of July 2010 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
2021
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
2122
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
2223
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a cold war set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.23
2324
24
Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
a
346
~305/310b
~600
~450/416
Total ships
c
45-55
50/55d
100
80/~55
Attack submarines
12
11+1f
11+1f
15e
Aircraft carriers
g
~150
~124
116
242/228
Surface combatants
51i
41i
36i
~75h
Amphibious ships
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
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Appendix B. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s
313-Ship Plan
Table B-1 summarizes some alternatives to the Navy’s 313-ship plan that have been proposed by
various study groups. These proposals reflect differing views about factors such as U.S. interests
and potential threats to those interests, potential future levels of defense spending, the kinds of
missions that the Navy will be required to perform in the future, and the relative cost
effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.
Table B-1. Recent Proposed Alternatives to Navy’s 313-Ship Plan
Independent
Panel
Assessment of
2010
Cato
Institute
(September
2010)a
Independent
Panel
Assessment
of 2010
QDR
(July 2010)
Sustainable
Defense Task
Force
(June 2010)
Heritage
Foundation
(January 2009)
Center for a New
American
Security (CNAS)
(November 2008)
Center for
Strategic and
Budgetary
Assessments
(CSBA)
(2008)ab
SSBN
6
14
7
n/a
14
12
SSGN
0
4
4
n/a
0
2
SSN
40
55
37
at least 60
40
41
CVN
8
11
9
13
8
11
CVE
0
0
0
n/a
0
4
Cruiser
22
n/a
14
65
n/a
100
18
Destroyer
85
56
73
Frigate
14
n/a
0
n/a
0
9c
LCS
4
n/a
25
20
48
55
SSC
0
n/a
0
n/a
40
0d
Ship type
Submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatantsn/a
0
4
85
100
18
14
56
73
Ship type
Submarines
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
Cruiser
n/a
Destroyer
n/a
Frigate
n/a
0
n/a
0
9b
LCS
n/a
25
20
48
55
SSC
n/a
0
n/a
40
0c
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious ships
ships
23
n/a
27
n/a
36
33
MPF(F) ships
0
n/a
n/a
n/a
0
3d3e
LSD station
ships
0
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7e
7f
Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW
11
0
CLF ships
21
n/a
Support
ships
27
n/a
36
n/a
40
31
TOTAL
ships
241
346
230
n/a
300
326g
Congressional Research Service
0
0
0
n/a
0
31
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman
and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010
(Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by email on
September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel Assessmentn/a
TOTAL ships
346
36
230
n/a
n/a
n/a
40
300
31
31
326f
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmencochairmen, et al., The QDR in
Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final
Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59;. For
Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and Defense, A Way
Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable
Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20;. For Heritage Foundation: Baker Spring and Mackenzie M.
Eaglen, Quadrennial Defense Review: Building Blocks for National Defense. Washington, Heritage Foundation, January
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
28, 2009. (Backgrounder, revised and updated February 9, 2009) p. 15;. For CNAS: Frank Hoffman, From
Preponderance to
Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington, Center for a New
American Security,
November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2); and. For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US Navy[:] Charting a
Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet.
Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008. p. 81 (Figure 5).
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a.
Figures shown are for the year 2028.
b2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.
b.
Figures shown are for the year 2028.
c.
Maritime Security Frigates.
cd.
Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.
de.
Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
ef.
T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.
fg.
The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 313-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.
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Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs (10 U.S.C. 118) states that the results of each QDR
shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent panel that assessed the
2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report recommends a Navy of
346 ships (about 10% more than the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet), including 11 aircraft carriers
(the same number as in the Navy’s 313-ship plan) and 55 attack submarines (compared to 48 in
the Navy’s 313-ship plan).2425 The report states the following, among other things:
•
“The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)
•
“In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)
•
“The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)
•
“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)
•
“Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
2425
Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
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that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The
United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
•
“To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)
In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table C-1 compares the 346-ship Navy
recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in subsequent Navy testimony and
publications), the Navy’s 313-ship plan, and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.
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Table C-1. Comparison of 1993 BUR Report, 313-Ship Plan, and Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR
Ship Type
Bottom-Up Review (BUR)
(1993)
Navy’s 313-Ship Plan
(2006)
Independent Panel
Assessment of 2010 QDR
(July 2010)
18
14
14
4
4
48
55
11 active + 1 operational/reserve
11 active
11 active
124
143
n/a
SSBNs
(SSBN force was later reduced to
14 as a result of the 1994 Nuclear
Posture Review)
SSGNs
0
(SSGN program did not yet exist)
SSNs
45 to 55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term goal
of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
Surface combatants
(114 active + 10 frigates in Naval
Reserve Force; a total of 110-116
active ships was also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
n/a
88
n/a
Frigates
n/a
0
n/a
(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs
0
55
n/a
41
31
n/a
(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)
(33 needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)
0
12
n/a
26
0
n/a
(LCS program did not exist)
(to be replaced by LCSs)
CLF ships
43
30
n/a
Support ships
22
20
n/a
346
313
346
(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
MPF(F) ships
(MPF(F) program did not exist)
Dedicated mine warfare ships
TOTAL ships
(numbers above add to 331341; Navy testified in 1994
that the planned number was
adjusted from 346 to 330 to
reflect reductions in numbers
of tenders and early
retirements of some older
amphibious ships)
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
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Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with
the Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s
(BUR’s) fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of
the then-planned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
323 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.25
2526
26
Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table D-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-cold war
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.2627 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of September 30, 2009.
As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy
ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the
total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of
change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and
average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily
mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission
requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship
capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing
quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.
2627
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as
of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this
case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential
statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a
single counting method.
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Table D-1.Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1969
926
1990
547
1949
690
1970
769
1991
526
1950
634
1971
702
1992
466
1951
980
1972
654
1993
435
1952
1,097
1973
584
1994
391
1953
1,122
1974
512
1995
373
1954
1,113
1975
496
1996
356
1955
1,030
1976
476
1997
354
1956
973
1977
464
1998
333
1957
967
1978
468
1999
317
1958
890
1979
471
2000
318
1959
860
1980
477
2001
316
1960
812
1981
490
2002
313
1961
897
1982
513
2003
297
1962
959
1983
514
2004
291
1963
916
1984
524
2005
282
1964
917
1985
541
2006
281
1965
936
1986
556
2007
279
1966
947
1987
568
2008
282
1967
973
1988
565
2009
285
1968
976
1989
566
2010
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.
Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table D-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2010) and requested (FY2011-FY2015) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015
(Procured FY1982-FY2010; requested FY2011-FY2015)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
5
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
5
6
6
6
5
7
8
4a
5a
3a
8
7
9
8
12
9
12
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a.
The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the
cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in
FY2008.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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