U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
July 16Thomas K. Livingston
Air Force Fellow
December 3, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21048
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the
Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide
counterterrorism operations. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs increases in
SOF force structure, particularly in terms of increasing enabling units and rotary and fixed-wing
SOF aviation assets and units. The USSOCOM Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander,
Admiral Eric T. Olson, in
commenting on the current state of the forces under his command ,
noted that SOF forces are
deployed to more than 75 countries and 86% of these forces are in the
U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility. Admiral Olson also noted ongoing growth in SOF
units and aviation assets
and the effectiveness of Section 1208 authority, which provides funds for
SOF to train and equip
regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism
operations. USSOCOM’s
FY2011 budget request for $9.8 billion has been recommended by the
House and Senate Armed
Services Committees for full funding, and both committees have also
recommended additional
funding for unfunded requirements.
Afghan-related issues include the impact of new command relationships as well as rules of
engagement, which have limited SOF nighttime raids targeting insurgent leadership. These SOF
raids have been characterized as being highly successful, even though on some occasions they
have resulted in civilian casualties. U.S. SOF have been given the mission of training Afghan
Civil Order Police. A more controversial mission involves up to 23 Special Forces Operational
Detachments – Alphas (ODAs) training local militias in remote areas of Afghanistan to fill a
security void. Potential issues for congressional consideration include how command
relationships and rules of engagement are affecting special operations in Afghanistan and whether
training police and militias is the best use of U.S. SOF funding for unfunded requirements.
One SOF-related concern is that U.S. SOF is taking on roles that have been traditionally the
purview of the CIA. These operations, allegedly spanning almost a dozen countries, involve using
unmanned aerial vehicles as well as small teams to kill suspected terrorists as well the conduct of
intelligence-related activities. Concerns have been raised that these operations by U.S. SOF have
less transparency than similar CIA operations, some of which require a Presidential Finding and
congressional notification.
Another SOF-related issue is a possible expanded role for U.S. SOF in Yemen. Currently, SOF is
conducting overt training of Yemeni counterterror forces but it has been suggested that selected
SOF units might be placed under the CIA to conduct covert raids to capture or kill terrorists
operating in Yemen. If an enhanced role is undertaken, there are concerns that this involvement
might not be in the best long-term interest of the United States.
Congress might decide to further assess SOF involvement in covert operations. One question
might be the conditions or rules that apparently enable U.S. SOF to operate more secretively and
more rapidly under CIA control than under USSOCOM control. Another possible concern is
whether U.S. SOF are operating under CIA control in order to “get around restrictions placed on
military operations.” Congress might also consider the ramifications of a possible expanded role
for U.S. SOF in Yemen. Would an enhanced role damage U.S./Yemeni relations, particularly in
the area of intelligence sharing? Would these new efforts have a detrimental impact on the current
U.S. SOF mission of training Yemeni counterterrorism forces? Would such a model of SOF
involvement—training counterterror forces on the one hand while conducting secretive combat
actions to kill and capture alleged terrorists—dissuade other sovereign nations from accepting
U.S. military assistance? Perhaps a greater concern could be whether such an enhanced role
undermines long-term efforts to create a Yemeni military capacity to combat terrorists.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................1
Overview ..............................................................................................................................1
Command Structures and Components ..................................................................................1
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities .................................................................................1
Army Special Operations Forces ...........................................................................................2
Air Force Special Operations Forces .....................................................................................3
Naval Special Operations Forces ...........................................................................................34
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) ...............................................................4
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)...........................................................................4
Newly Established 5
NATO Special Operations Headquarters ......................................................4..........................5
Current Organizational and Budgetary Issues ..............................................................................5
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related Directives ...........................5
2010 USSOCOM Posture Statement .....................................................................................56
FY2011 USSOCOM Budget Request ....................................................................................6
House Armed Services Committee Mark-Up: H.R. 5136, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2011 ............................................................................................67
Senate Armed Services Committee Mark-Up: H.R. 5136, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2011 ............................................................................................7
AfghanistanSOF-Related Issues .........................................................................................................7
A Change of Command Relationship for U.S. SOF............8
A Growing SOF Role in Traditional CIA Operations?................................................................7
U.S. SOF Direct Action Against Afghan Insurgents8
Possible Enhanced U.S. SOF Role in Yemen? ...............................................................8
Training Afghan Police .................................................8
U.S. SOF Direct Action Against Afghan Insurgents ...............................................................9
Training Village Security Forces ........................Possible Issues for Congress...................................................................9
Issues for Congress ..........................................9
U.S. SOF Involvement in Covert Operations ......................................................................... 10
Are Current Command Relationships and Rules of Engagement Having a Detrimental
Impact on Special Operations in Afghanistan?...........................9
Possible Enhanced U.S. SOF Role in Yemen ....................................... 10
Are We Making the Best Use of SOF in Afghanistan? ......................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 1110
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
Overview
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite military units with special training and equipment that
can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations,
many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy specialized
training. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the training, doctrine,
and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.
Command Structures and Components
In 1986 Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning,
passed measures (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen its positionspecial operations’ position within the defense
community. These actions included the establishment
of USSOCOM as a new unified command.
USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force
Base in Tampa, FL. The Commander of
USSOCOM is a four-star officer who may be from any
military service. Commander,
USSOCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, although an
Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities
(ASD/SOLIC&IC) provides immediate civilian oversight over many
USSOCOM activities.
USSOCOM has about 57,000 Active Dutyactive duty, National Guard, and Reservereserve personnel from all four
Servicesservices and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four
components, and one sub-unified command.1 USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command
(NAVSPECWARCOM); the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); and the Marine
Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command.
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities
In addition to its Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional
responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM was given the responsibility for
synchronizing DOD plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global
operations against those networks.2 In this regard, USSOCOM “receives, reviews, coordinates
and prioritizes all DOD
plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes
recommendations to the
Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.”3 In October
1
1
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 7. DOD defines a sub-unified command as a command established by commanders of
unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a
continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may
be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and
responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned
commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area.
2
“Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2010, p. 6.
3
Ibid.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
requirements.”3 In October 2008, USSOCOM was designated as the DOD proponent for Security
Force Assistance (SFA). 4 In
this role, USSOCOM will perform a synchronizing function in global
training and assistance
planning similar to the previously described role of planning against
terrorist networks. In
addition, USSOCOM is now DOD’s lead for countering threat financing,
working with the U.S.
Treasury and Justice Departments on means to identify and disrupt terrorist
financing efforts.
Army Special Operations Forces
U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) includes approximately 30,000 soldiers from the Active Army,
National Guard, and Army Reserve who are organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special
operations aviation units, along with civil affairs units, psychological operations units, and special
operations support units. ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces
(SF) Groups (Airborne), 5 consisting of about 1,400 soldiers each, are stationed at Fort Bragg and
at Fort Lewis, WA, Fort Campbell, KY, and Fort Carson, CO. The 7th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) currently stationed at Ft. Bragg will be moving to Eglin Air Force Base, FL by
September 2011 as mandated by the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Act.5 Special Forces
Fort Carson, CO, and Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Special
Forces soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in various skills, including foreign
languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout the world. In December 2005,
the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC, to
provide combat service support and medical support to Army special operations forces.6
In FY2008, the ArmyU.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) began to increase the total
number of Army Special Forces battalions from
15 to 20, with one battalion being allocated to
each active Special Forces Group. In August 2008,
the Army stood up the first of these new
battalions—the 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Groups
(Airborne)—at Fort Campbell, KY.7 The
Army expects that the last of these new Special Forces
battalions will be operational by FY2013.8
Two Army National Guard Special Forces groups are
headquartered in Utah and Alabama. An
elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct
action operations9, the 75th Ranger
Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists
of three battalions. Army special
operations aviation units, including the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (Airborne),
headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY, feature pilots trained to fly
the most sophisticated Army
rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day or night, and
in adverse weather.
4
3
Ibid.
Information in this section is from testimony given by Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to the
House Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command, June 4, 2009.
5
Henry Cuningham, “Delays in 7th Group Move Could be Costly,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, November 7, 2008.Airborne refers to “personnel, troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation,
either by parachuting or touchdown.” Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, (As Amended Through 31 July 2010)
6
“Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2010, p. 11.
7
Sean D. Naylor, “Special Forces Expands,” Army Times, August 11, 2008.
4
8
Association of the United States Army, “U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint
Force,” Torchbearer National Security Report, March 2010, p. 3.
9
Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments, as well as employing specialized military capabilities
to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional
offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are civil affairs (CA) units, which provide
experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational
theaters. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit; all other CA units
reside in the Reserves and are affiliated with conventional Army units. Psychological operations
units disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media. The active duty 4th
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group (Airborne) is stationed at Fort Bragg, and two Army
Reserve PSYOPS groups work with conventional Army units. USSOCOM has recently decided
to replace the term “psychological operations” and instead adopt the term “Military Information
Support Operations,” or MISO, instead.10
Air Force Special Operations ForcesForces11
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) includes about 13,000 active and reserve
personnel. AFSOC is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, FL, along with the 720th Special Tactics
Group, the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) and the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School
and Training Center. 11 The 27th SOW is located at Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The 352nd
Special Operations Group is at RAF Mildenhall, England, and the 353rd Special Operations
Group is at Kadena Air Base, Japan. Reserve AFSOC components include the 193rd SOW, Air
National Guard, stationed at Harrisburg, PA, and the 919th Special Operations Wing, Air Force
Reserve, stationed at Duke Field, FL. AFSOC’s three active-duty flying units are composed of
more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
Naval Special Operations Forces12is one of the Air Force’s 10 major
commands with over 12,000 active duty personnel and over 15,000 personnel when civilians,
Guard and Reserve personnel and units are included. While administrative control of AFSOC is
overseen by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), operational control is managed by the
USSOCOM Commander. AFSOC units operate out of four major continental Unite States
(CONUS) locations and two overseas locations. The headquarters for AFSOC, the first Special
Operations Wing (1st SOW), and the 720th Special Tactics Group are located at Hurlburt Field,
FL. The 27th SOW is at Canon AFB, NM. The 352nd and 353rd Special Operations Groups provide
forward presence in Europe (RAF Mildenhall, England) and in the Pacific (Kadena Air Base,
Japan) respectively. The Air National Guard’s 193rd SOW at Harrisburg, PA, and the Air Force
Reserve Command’s 919th SOW at Duke Field, FL, complete AFSOC’s major units. A training
center, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and Training Center (AFSOTC), was
recently established and is located at Hurlburt Field. AFSOC conducts the majority of its
specialized flight training through an arrangement with Air Education and Training Command
(AETC) via the 550th SOW at Kirtland AFB, NM. AFSOC’s four active-duty flying units are
composed of more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
In March 2009, Headquarters AFSOC declared initial operational capability (IOC)12 for the CV22.13 USSOCOM plans for all 50 CV-22s to be delivered to AFSOC by 2015.14 Since 2009,
AFSOC has completed three overseas deployments, to Central America, Africa, and Iraq, and
continues to be engaged currently in overseas contingency operations. Despite critical reviews of
the aircraft, AFSOC considers the CV-22 “central to our future.”15 AFSOC operates a diverse fleet
of modified aircraft. Of 12 major design series aircraft, 7 are variants of the C-130, the average
age of some of which is over 40 years old and date from the Viet Nam era. Because of the age of
the fleet, AFSOC considers recapitalization one of its top priorities.
10
Associated Press, “Army Opts for a Neutral Name, New York Times, July 3, 2010.
Information in this section is from Lt Gen Wurster’s presentation to the Air Force Association, September 14 2010.
http://www.afa.org/events/conference/2010/scripts/Wurster_9-14.pdf.
12
According to DOD IOC is attained when some units and/or organizations in the force structure scheduled to
receive a system 1) have received it and 2) have the ability to employ and maintain it.
13
The CV-22 is the special operations versaion of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft used by the Marine Corps.
14
USSOCOM Acquisitions and Logistics office, http://www.socom.mil/soal/Pages/FixedWing.aspx.
15
For further detailed reporting on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
11
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
AFSOC’s Special Tactics experts include Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Special
Operations Weather Teams, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs). As a collective group, they
are known as Special Tactics and have also been referred to as “Battlefield Airmen.” Their basic
role is to provide an interface between air and ground forces, and these airmen have very
developed skill sets. Usually embedded with Army, Navy, or Marine SOF units, they provide
control of air fire support, medical and rescue expertise, or weather support, depending on the
mission requirements.
As directed in the 2010 QDR, AFSOC plans to increase aviation advisory manpower and
resources resident in the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). The 6th SOS’s mission is to
assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units with the intent to raise their capability and
capacity to interdict threats to their nation. The 6th SOS provides aviation expertise to U.S.
foreign internal defense (FID) missions.
Naval Special Operations Forces16
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is located in Coronado, CA. NSWC is organized
around 10 SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and three Special Boat
Teams. SEAL Teams consist of six SEAL platoons each, consisting of two officers and 16
enlisted personnel. The major operational components of NSWC include Naval Special Warfare
Groups One, Three, and Eleven, stationed in Coronado, CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups
Two and Four and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group in Little Creek, VA. These
components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams
worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contingency and wartime requirements of theater
commanders. NSWC has approximately 5,400 total active-duty personnel—including 2,450
SEALs and 600 Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC)—as well as a 1,200-person
reserve component of approximately 325 SEALs, 125 SWCC, and 775 support personnel. SEALs
are considered the best-trained combat swimmers in the world, and can be deployed covertly
from submarines or from sea and land-based aircraft.
10
Associated Press, “Army Opts for a Neutral Name, New York Times, July 3, 2010.
11
Information in this section is taken from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM
Public Affairs, February 2009, p. 27.
12
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 18 and the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command Website, http://www.navsoc.navy.mil,
accessed March 19, 2009.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 13Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 17
On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. MARSOC consists of three subordinate units—the
Marine Special Operations Regiment, which includes 1st , 2nd , and 3rd Marine Special Operations
Battalions,; the Marine Special Operations Support Group,; and the Marine Special Operations
School. MARSOC Headquarters, the 2nd and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine
Special Operations School, and the Marine Special Operations Support Group are stationed at
Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion is stationed at Camp Pendleton,
CA. MARSOC forces have been deployed world-wide to conduct a full range of special
operations activities.worldwide to conduct a full range of special
operations activities. By 2014, MARSOC is planned to have about 3,000 marines, sailors, and
civilians.
16
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 18 and the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command Website, http://www.navsoc.navy.mil,
accessed March 19, 2009.
17
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2010, p. 37.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
According to DOD, the JSOC is “a joint headquarters designed to study special operations
requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and
conduct joint special operations exercises and training; and develop joint special operations
tactics.”1418 While not officially acknowledged by DOD or USSOCOM, JSOC, which is
headquartered at Pope Air Force Base, NC, is widely believed to command and control what are
described as the military’s special missions units—the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEAL
Team Six, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the Air
Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. 1519 JSOC’s primary mission is believed to be identifying and
destroying terrorists and terror cells worldwide.
Newly Established NATO Special Operations Headquarters16
NATO’s newly establishedHeadquarters20
In May 2010, NATO established the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) reportedly will be, which is
commanded by U.S. Air Force Major General Frank Kisner, who had previously commanded
U.S. Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR). Major General Kisner reportedly will
be recommended for promotion to Lieutenant General before assuming his new post. The NSHQ
The NSHQ is envisioned to serve as the
core of a combined joint force special operations component
command, which would be the
the proponent for planning, training, doctrine, equipping, and evaluating
NATO special operations
forces from 22 countries. The NSHQ is located with the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and will consist of about 150
NATO personnel.
13
Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2010, p. 37.
14
NATO personnel.
Current Organizational and Budgetary Issues
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related
Directives21
The 2010 QDR contains a number of SOF-related directives pertaining to personnel,
organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
•
To increase key enabling assets22 for special operations forces.
•
To maintain approximately 660 special operations teams;23 3 Ranger battalions;
and 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft.
18
USSOCOM website http://www.socom.mil/components/components.htm, accessed March 19, 2008.
15
Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004
and Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006.
1620
Information in this section is taken from Carlo Muňoz, “SOCEUR Chief Pegged: Air Force Two-Star to Head Up
New NATO Special Ops Headquarters,” Inside the Air Force, May 28, 2010 and NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO Special
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ),” accessed from http://www.NATO.int on July 1, 2010.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Current Organizational and Budgetary Issues
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related
Directives17
The 2010 QDR contains a number of SOF-related directives pertaining to personnel,
organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
•
To increase key enabling assets for special operations forces.
•
To maintain approximately 660 special operations teams;18 3 Ranger battalions;
and 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft.
21
Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
22
Enabling assets are a variety of conventional military units that are assigned to support special operations forces.
19
23
These teams include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams; Navy Sea, Air, and Land
(SEAL) platoons; Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation
detachments.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
•
The Army and USSOCOM will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters
(MH-47G) to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
•
The Navy will dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval
special warfare units.
•
To increase civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM.
•
Starting in FY2012, purchase light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’s
6th Special Operations squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces
such aircraft might be appropriate, as well as acquiring two non-U.S. helicopters
to support these efforts.
2010 USSOCOM Posture Statement19Statement24
In March 2010, USSOCOM Commander Admiral Eric T. Olson testified to the House and Senate
Armed Service Committees, providing them with an update of the current state of U.S. SOF. Key
points emphasized by Admiral Olson included the following:
•
Of the more than 12,000 SOF and SOF support forces deployed daily to more
than 75 countries, 86% of these forces are in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility and under their operational control.
•
USSOCOM is growing organic combat service and service support units to
support special operations forces to include communications, information support
specialists, forensic analysts, military working dog teams, and intelligence
experts, to name but a few. In FY2011, this will represent a growth of about
2,700 personnel.
•
Section 1208 authority (Section 1208 of P.L. 108-375, the FY2005 National
Defense Authorization Act) provides authority and funds for U.S. SOF to train
17
Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
These teams include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams; Navy Sea, Air, and Land
(SEAL) platoons; Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation
detachments.
19
Admiral Eric T. Olson, “FY 2011 USSOCOM Posture Statement,” U.S. Special Operations Command, March 4,
2010, p. 2.
18
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
and equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism
operations. Section 1208 is considered a key tool in combating terrorism and is
directly responsible for a number of highly successful counter -terror operations.
•
In cooperation with the Army, USSOCOM will grow its helicopter fleet by eight
MH-47 Chinooks by FY2015; fielding is almost complete for upgraded MH-47G
and MH-60M helicopters. USSOCOM currently has 12 CV-22 Osprey aircraft
and hopes to add 5 more aircraft this year.
FY2011 USSOCOM Budget Request
USSOCOM’s FY2011 Budget Request is $9.8 billion—with $6.3 billion in the baseline budget
budget and $3.5 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget.20 Among other things,
this request is intended to support FY2011 USSOCOM growth of 2,787 military and civilian
25
USSOCOM has long maintained that it represents about 2% of the Department of
Defense budget and provides maximum operational impact for a limited investment.
Another one of SOCOM’s perceived benefits is that its components take proven, service24
Admiral Eric T. Olson, “FY 2011 USSOCOM Posture Statement,” U.S. Special Operations Command, March 4,
2010, p. 2.
25
Information in this section is from the United States Special Operations Command FY2011 Budget Estimates,
February 2010.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
common equipment and modify it with SOF funding for special operations-unique
capabilities.
Among other things, this request is intended to support FY2011 USSOCOM growth of 2,787
military and civilian personnel allocated as follows:
•
U.S. Army Special Operations Command: 1,638 personnel;
•
Air Force Special Operations Command: 1,119 personnel;
•
Naval Special Warfare Command: 26 personnel; and
•
Marine Corps Special Operations Command: 4 personnel.
House Armed Services Committee Mark-Up: H.R. 5136, National
Defense Authorization Act for FY201121FY201126
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recommended fully funding USSOCOM’s $9.8
billion budget request and included an additional $301.5 million for USSOCOM unfunded
requirements, including tactical vehicles, operational enhancements, and special operations
technology, as well as expanding counterterrorism support authorities. Recognizing the benefits
of the 1208 Authority program, the HASC recommended expanding the program and authorized
up to $50 million for the program. The HASC was encouraged by the steps being taken by the
Department of Defense to address special operations rotary wing requirements, but there was
concern that proposed solutions would not provide adequate relief fast enough and that continued
shortfalls could affect future operations. The HASC encouraged the Secretary of Defense and
USSOCOM Commander to aggressively identify and implement solutions to address SOF rotary
wing shortfalls, including non-standard aviation platforms and aviation foreign internal defense
activities.
20
Information in this section is from the United States Special Operations Command FY2011 Budget Estimates,
February 2010.
21
Summary of H.R. 5136, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, May 2010, pp. 23-24.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
defense27
activities.
Senate Armed Services Committee Mark-Up: H.R. 5136, National
Defense Authorization Act for FY201122FY201128
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommended fully funding USSOCOM’s $9.8
billion budget request and included an additional $113.4 million, as opposed to the HASC, which
recommended $301.5 million ($188.1 million difference) for USSOCOM unfunded requirements.
These unfunded requirements included ground mobility vehicles, deployable communications
equipment, thermal and night vision goggles, the Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle
(SCAR), and non-lethal weapons technologies. The SASC also expanded the requirement for
USSOCOM to provide quarterly reports on the use of Combat Mission Requirement fund to
satisfy urgent operational needs.
Afghanistan-Related Issues
A Change of Command Relationship for U.S. SOF
A March 4, 2010, decision by Secretary of Defense Gates, which gave operational control of most
U.S. SOF as well as all Marine Forces to the former Commander of NATO’s International
Security Forces (ISAF) U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal, has raised a number of issues.23
U.S. SOF affected by this decision are Theater Mission Forces. Theater Mission Forces are
assigned or attached to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)—in this case the
Combined Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), which was
under the operational control of Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCent). Theater
Mission Forces are intended to develop long-term military relationships in Afghanistan and
provide special operations support to combatant commanders. National Mission Forces were not
affected by this decision and remain under the control of the Commander of USSOCOM.
National Mission Forces conduct highly sensitive and often secretive operations of national
importance.
Some press reports have suggested that this change was made because of an alleged large number
of civilian casualties resulting from U.S.-led SOF night missions, as well as a lack of unity of
effort, as SOF often operated independently in Afghanistan’s various regional commands.24 U.S.
defense officials have denied that this move was made for reasons other than improving overall
unity of command. One of the concerns of this new command arrangement is that SOF units
would be disaggregated and used by General Purpose Forces commanders within their regional
commands, as well as SOF command and control organizations such as CFSOCC-A would have
no role in the employment of Theater Mission Forces.
22
Senate Armed Services Committee Press Release, “Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Mark Up of
National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2011,” U.S. Senate, May 28, 2010, pp. 19-20.
23
Sean D. Naylor, “Change at the Top: Special Forces, Marines in Afghanistan Come Under McChrystal’s Control,”
Army Times, March 29, 2010, pp. 16-17.
24
Carlo Muňoz, “Unity of Effort Sought – Official: New Special Ops Guidance Not Sparked by Casualty Concerns,”
Inside the Air Force, March 26, 2010, and Sean D. Naylor, “Change at the Top: Special Forces, Marines in Afghanistan
Come Under McChrystal’s Control,” Army Times, March 29, 2010, pp. 16-17.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Another concern is that this new command arrangement was a result of an earlier decision by
General McChrystal to limit not only U.S.-led SOF night missions, but also air and artillery
strikes in order to hopefully lessen civilian casualties, which was viewed as a necessary step to
support the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. USSOCOM Commander, Admiral
Eric Olson, reportedly has expressed concerns that counterinsurgency has “become more focused
on operations to protect the local populace and less on finding, capturing, and killing
insurgents.”25 These views are seemingly shared by many U.S. service members in the ranks who
view current rules as too restrictive, playing into the hands of the insurgents who are aware of
these rules and use them to negate superior U.S. firepower, resulting in more U.S. casualties.26 It
is not known whether General McChrystal’s successor, General David Petraeus, who approved
these rules of engagement when he was Commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
will continue to abide by these rules or adopt a less restrictive approach. During his Senate
confirmation hearing, however, General Petraeus stated that the protection of his troops was a
moral imperative and that he would closely review current restrictions. 27
U.S. SOF Direct Action Against Afghan Insurgents28
Despite limitations on SOF night raids under current rules of engagement, reports suggest that
U.S. SOF efforts to capture or kill senior insurgent leaders have been highly effective. Senior U.S.
military officials have stated that raids by SOF have killed or captured 186 insurgent leaders and
detained an additional 925 lower-level insurgents in the past 110 days. These raids have
reportedly been most effective in and around Kandahar; officials have seen indications that
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have decreased and that Taliban control appears to be
weakening. Senior NATO officials note that intelligences suggests that SOF missions aimed at
provincial insurgent leaders has compelled some Taliban leaders to begin internal discussions
about accepting the Karzai government’s offer of reconciliation. It has also been reported that a
number of insurgent leaders have left their bases in Afghanistan to seek sanctuary in Pakistan
because of the raids.
While SOF raids have resulted in civilian casualties and collateral damage, military officials who
have tracked the raids note that on about 80% of these raids, no shots are fired as U.S. SOF and
Afghan commando units have achieved tactical surprise, usually at night. SOF reportedly carry
out an average of five raids per day against a constantly updated list of high-value targets. A little
over half of the time, the raid captures or kills its intended high-value target. If the intended target
is not present, however, SOF have rounded up other insurgents who have provided valuable
intelligence.
25
Carlo Muňoz, “SOCOM Commander Concerned Over Direction of Pentagon COIN Strategy,” Inside the Navy, May
31, 2010.
26
Robert H. Reid, “Petraeus Faces Complaints on War Rules,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 26, 2010.
27
Elisabeth Bumiller, “Petraeus Pledges Look at Strikes in Afghanistan, New York Times, June 30,2010.
28
Information in this section is taken from Thom Shanker and Alissa Rubin, “Quest to Neutralize Afghan Militants is
Showing Glimpses of Success, NATO Says,” New York Times, June 29, 2010 and David S. Cloud and Julian E. Barnes,
“Afghan War Strategy May Change,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2010.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Training Afghan Police29
As a means of reducing the high attrition rate and to improve unit performance, senior U.S.
military leadership in Afghanistan directed U.S. SOF to provide additional training and establish
long-term partnerships with a number of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) units. To
address the high attrition rate—ranging from 50% to 140%—U.S. SOF trainers put the ANCOP
Kandaks (a battalion sized organization of about 500 personnel) on a red-amber-green training
cycle similar the cycle adopted by Afghan commando units previously trained by U.S. SOF. It is
hoped that the new cycle, which provides for rest, refit, education, and training opportunities as
well as training by and partnering with SOF, will enable these units to be employed in anticipated
future military operations around Kandahar. ANCOP units are intended to augment Afghan
National Police (ANP) units and are generally considered better trained, more effective, and more
professional than the ANP.
Training Village Security Forces30
A reportedly long-advocated U.S. SOF strategy to train and equip Afghan villagers is set to be
enacted in about 23 rural areas in Afghanistan beyond the reach of U.S. and Afghan regular
forces. The program, known as “The Village Stabilization Program,” is expected to be approved
by Afghan President Karzai in the next few weeks. It calls for organizing, equipping, and training
local militias that would then be placed under the control of local Afghan police chiefs. Army
Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alphas (ODAs) would oversee these efforts. It is hoped
that these village militias will counteract Taliban forces, but past U.S. SOF efforts to train local
militias have met with resistance from the U.S. Embassy and the Afghan government, who were
concerned that these local militias would instead conduct operations against tribal rivals as
opposed to Taliban forces. Under the Village Stabilization Program, officials believe that this
concern will be unwarranted, as the village militias will take their directions from the local police
chief. In turn, the local police chief is answerable to the Minister of the Interior in Kabul, who
will provide wages and weapons to the militia. While the Village Stabilization Program might
enhance local security in outlying regions as intended, past tendencies for changing loyalties
amongst the various Afghan tribal and ethnic groups could result in U.S. SOF-trained militias
instead supporting insurgent groups as opposed to the Afghan central government. In deference to
this possibility, U.S. SOF trainers might consider limiting training so as not to provide these
village militias with tactics, techniques, and procedures—known as TTPs—used by U.S. and
NATO forces that could be turned against Coalition forces if militias later switch loyalties to the
insurgents.
29
Information in this section is taken from Sean D. Naylor, “Special Partnership: Special Forces Add Training for
Afghan Police Units,” Army Times, June 14, 2010, p. 16.
30
Information in this section is from Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.S. Enlists New Afghan Village Forces,” Wall Street
Journal, July 1, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress
Are Current Command Relationships and Rules of Engagement
Having a Detrimental Impact on Special Operations in
Afghanistan?
Command relationships and rules that limit the conduct of certain types of military operations are
critical components in the planning and conduct of special operations. Under current command
arrangements, the ISAF Commander, General David Petraeus, will have an enhanced level of
authority over the organization and conduct of special operations in Afghanistan. Prior to March
2010, special forces operations forces were commanded by battalion-level special operations task
forces operating in the various regional commands that were under CFSOCC-A. Some General
Purpose Force commanders in these regions suggested that the autonomous operations of special
forces units in their regions had negative effects on their counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.
After March 2010, regional commanders would have much greater control over these SOF task
forces, and some SOF commanders have expressed a concern that conventional commanders do
not know how to properly employ SOF. Given the levels of concern of both conventional and
special operations commanders, a comprehensive examination of command authority over SOF in
Afghanistan might be warranted.
Limitations on SOF night raids against insurgent leadership, as well as SOF access to artillery and
air support, might also be considered for review. Military analysts agree that civilian casualties
and collateral damage are tragic inevitabilities in any type of conflict and that these occurrences
can also compel friends and relatives of victims to support or even join insurgents. Special
operations raids against insurgent leadership have proven effective and have been characterized
by some as the most successful aspect of the war in Afghanistan. Restricting these raids, while
possibly reducing civilian casualties, might in fact prolong the conflict, resulting in more civilian
and coalition casualties over time.
Are We Making the Best Use of SOF in Afghanistan?
While specific information about the employment of SOF National Mission Forces in
Afghanistan is not known, it can be assumed that they are focused on capturing or killing the
most senior terrorists operating in the region, even if they are not directly involved with Afghan
insurgents. Theater Mission Forces, however, are engaged in the full range of special operations
missions, from killing or capturing insurgents to training military, paramilitary, and police forces.
These Theater Mission Forces are operating under counterinsurgency guidelines, which have
been interpreted by some as population-centric as opposed to enemy-centric. While there is no
known delineation between high-value targets killed or captured by National Mission Forces as
opposed to Theater Mission Forces, it is known that Theater Mission Forces have been involved
in successful combat operations in their own right. While the Village Stabilization Program might
prove successful, the utilization of 23 Army Special Forces ODAs to train local militias and other
might not be the best use of these critical SOF assets. In a similar manner, dedicating SOF to train
Afghan National Civil Order Police, who are intended to man checkpoints and interact with
civilians, seems to be a mission that could be handled by conventional forces. While SOF training
is certainly warranted for elite or highly specialized Afghan military and police units, General
Purpose Forces are also capable of providing training to militias and paramilitary units. Another
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
possibility is that current rules of engagement, which restrict SOF night raids, have resulted in
fewer opportunities for Theater Mission Forces to conduct raids against insurgents, and because
there are fewer opportunities, SOF units have been reassigned the aforementioned training
missions. A comprehensive review, focusing on ensuring that the most effective balance between
allocating SOF units between combat and training is achieved, might prove beneficial.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
1126
Summary of H.R. 5136, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, May 2010, pp. 23-24.
DOD defines foreign internal defense as “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of
the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID.”
28
Senate Armed Services Committee Press Release, “Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Mark Up of
National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2011,” U.S. Senate, May 28, 2010, pp. 19-20.
27
Congressional Research Service
7
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
SOF-Related Issues
A Growing SOF Role in Traditional CIA Operations?29
A recent article maintains that U.S. SOF, in conjunction with the CIA, have “significantly
increased military and intelligence operations, pursuing the enemy using robotic drones and
commando teams, paying contractors to spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists.”30
These operations are said to be occurring in roughly a dozen countries, ranging from North
Africa, to Pakistan, to former Soviet republics “crippled by ethnic and religious strife.”31 One of
the concerns raised in this article is that U.S. SOF units, allegedly operating under secret “execute
orders” are conducting spy missions that were once the preserve of civilian intelligence agencies.
These operations are described as having less transparency and congressional oversight than
traditional CIA covert operations. Some suggest that this “covert war” is an appropriate response
to a covert war being waged against the United States, but others are concerned that it represents
a new model for war that deviates from well-defined rules for covert action. Another question
raised is “who should be running this war” if it is going to be conducted in a covert manner?
Possible Enhanced U.S. SOF Role in Yemen? 32
In the aftermath of the recent failed cargo aircraft bombing allegedly by suspected Al Qaeda
militants in Yemen, it has been reported that the Administration is considering putting U.S. SOF
forces under CIA control in Yemen in order to attack terrorist targets unilaterally. This command
arrangement supposedly will give the U.S. greater leeway to covertly strike terrorists in Yemen
without the approval of the Yemeni government. This practice of putting U.S. SOF under CIA
control has apparently been used in the past, in Iraq, for example, to “get around restrictions
placed on military operations.”33 It has been argued that this proposal could create problems for
the overt U.S. SOF program to train Yemeni security forces in counterterrorism operations. In this
case, U.S. SOF are in Yemen at the request of the Yemeni government, and if U.S. SOF is used to
covertly attack suspected terrorists in Yemen, some have expressed concern that the Yemeni
government could suspend the counterterrorism training program. Some analysts believe that it is
in United States’ best long term interest to train Yemeni forces so that they can manage their own
internal counter terror operations and that more direct U.S. SOF involvement could result only in
short-term gains.
29
Information in this section is taken from Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Robert F. Worth, “The Shadow War:
Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents,” New York Times, August 15, 2010.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Information in this section is taken from Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “Yemen Covert Role Pushed: Failed
Bomb Plot Heightens Talk of Putting Elite U.S. Squads in CIA Hands,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2010.
33
Ibid.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
U.S. SOF Direct Action Against Afghan Insurgents
A number of reports suggest that U.S. SOF efforts to capture or kill senior insurgent leaders have
been highly effective.34 According to General Petraeus, the senior U.S. commander in
Afghanistan, from June to September 2010, special operations missions had killed or captured
235 militant leaders, killed another 1,066 lower-level insurgents, and detained another 1,673
rank-and-file insurgents. These raids have reportedly been most effective in and around
Kandahar; officials have seen indications that improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have
decreased and that Taliban control appears to be weakening. Senior NATO officials note that
intelligence suggests that SOF missions aimed at provincial insurgent leaders have compelled
some Taliban leaders to begin internal discussions about accepting the Karzai government’s offer
of reconciliation. It has also been reported that a number of insurgent leaders have left their bases
in Afghanistan to seek sanctuary in Pakistan because of the raids. Although these raids have
proven successful, President Karzai has recently called for these “night raids” to cease, which has
supposedly created friction between the Afghan leader and senior U.S. military officials in the
region. 35
While SOF raids have resulted in civilian casualties and collateral damage, military officials who
have tracked the raids note that on many of these raids, no shots are fired. These missions are
being carried out at an extremely high tempo, with nearly 4,000 such missions carried out
between May and August 2010. One SOF task force reported no shots fired in 973 out of 1,225
missions in the 12 months ending in August 2010. Afghan and Coalition special forces from
another 18 countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Lithuania, and France, have also played a
central role in many of these operations.
Possible Issues for Congress
U.S. SOF Involvement in Covert Operations36
Reports suggest that selected U.S. SOF units and personnel are being used in covert and
clandestine military operations both unilaterally and under CIA control on a more frequent basis.
It has been suggested that by having U.S. SOF placed under the CIA, they can function more
stealthfully and quickly and can “get around restrictions placed on military operations.”37 The use
of U.S. SOF in this manner raises a number of questions. One question is what are the conditions
or rules that allegedly enable U.S. SOF to operate more secretively and more rapidly under CIA
34
Information in this section is taken from Thom Shanker and Alissa Rubin, “Quest to Neutralize Afghan Militants is
Showing Glimpses of Success, NATO Says,” New York Times, June 29, 2010 and David S. Cloud and Julian E. Barnes,
“Afghan War Strategy May Change,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2010; Kimberly Dozier, “Petraeus Highlights
Special Ops Successes in Afghanistan,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, September 4, 2010; Sean D. Naylor, “The
Deadliest Insurgents: JSOC Task Force Battles Haqqani Militants,” Army Times, September 20, 2010.
35
Thom Shanker, Elisabeth Bumiller, and Rod Nordland, “Despite Gains, Night Raids Split U.S. and Karzai,” New
York Times, November 16, 2010.
36
For information on covert and classified operations see CRS Report RL33715, Covert Action: Legislative
Background and Possible Policy Questions, by Alfred Cumming.
37
Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “Yemen Covert Role Pushed: Failed Bomb Plot Heightens Talk of Putting Elite
U.S. Squads in CIA Hands,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2010.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
control than under USSOCOM control. Another concern is whether U.S. SOF are operating under
CIA control in order to “get around restrictions placed on military operations.” While a greater
understanding of these “restrictions” might be useful, it is reported that in order to carry out
counterterrorism operations, that U.S. SOF must “shop around” to find circumstances (i.e.,
operating under CIA Title 50 authorities) conducive to mission accomplishment. As U.S. SOF
forces are shifted between CIA and USSOCOM control, the issue of congressional oversight
bears consideration. While CIA covert operations require a Presidential Finding and
congressional notification, similar military operations do not have the same legal requirements. In
instances where U.S. SOF may be operating in a covert manner—either unilaterally or under CIA
control—are there adequate provisions to ensure that Congress knows what rules U.S. SOF
operates under—Title 10 or Title 50—and are there certain “advantages” incurred by operating
under these different legal provisions?
Some maintain that these concerns and questions suggest that the current “model” for CIA and
DOD covert military operations needs to be re-examined. From their perspective, the apparent
unprecedented use of U.S. SOF in clandestine and covert roles as well as being assigned to the
CIA might require revision or modification to both Title 10 and Title 50 to ensure that these
missions are not only effective and not overly constrained, but also relatively transparent to
relevant Members of Congress.
Possible Enhanced U.S. SOF Role in Yemen
If the decision is made to expand U.S. SOF’s role in Yemen—either covertly or clandestinely—a
number of issues might merit further examination. Will an enhanced role damage U.S./Yemeni
relations, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing? Will these new efforts have a detrimental
impact on the current U.S. SOF mission of training Yemeni counterterrorism forces? Would such
a model of SOF involvement—training counterterror forces on the one hand while conducting
secretive combat actions to kill and capture alleged terrorists—dissuade other sovereign nations
from accepting U.S. military assistance? Perhaps a greater concern is would such an enhanced
role undermine long-term efforts to create a Yemeni military capacity to combat terrorists? Some
assert that while covertly targeting terrorists might eliminate a short-term threat to U.S. national
security, it could possibly disenfranchise the Yemeni government in this regard and possibly
create a long-term dependence on the U.S. military to combat terrorists in Yemen. Another
possibility is that secretive SOF raids could result in Yemeni resentment, thereby limiting U.S.
influence in the region.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
Thomas K. Livingston
Air Force Fellow
tlivingston@crs.loc.gov, 7-0432
10