Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
May 3June 10, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV).
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy
estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant
FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimate of the cost of
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing
concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now
assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding planplan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, would authorize $20 billion per year for the
period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy ships to meet the ship force structure
requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan.The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006 ...............................................................................2
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................4
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................................6
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040..........................................................7
Oversight Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................8
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 10
H.R. 5035 (National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act) ......................................................... 10
Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs .......................................................... 11Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal.............................................................................................8
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ..............................................................................9
Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan................................................9
Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships................................................................................. 10
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 10
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)..................................................... 10
House ........................................................................................................................... 10
Senate........................................................................................................................... 17
National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035) ......................................................... 20
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs....................... 20
Tables
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001 ...........................................................2
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ...................................................4
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................6
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan......................................................7
Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan.....................................9
Table B-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948.................................................... 1525
Table B-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015 .................................... 1626
Appendixes
Appendix A. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet .................................................................... 1222
Appendix B. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate....................................................... 1424
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 1626
Congressional Research Service
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). 1
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year.2 Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy
estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant
FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimate of the cost of
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing
concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now
assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding planplan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. 3 The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”4
1
The proposed FY2011 budget also requests funding for the procurement of an oceanographic ship that does not count
against the 313-ship goal.
2
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
3
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table 2
(page 9).
4
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, p. vii.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Background
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet and compares it to previous
Navy ship force structure proposals.
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001
Ship type
February 2006 Navy
proposal for 313ship fleet
Early-2005 Navy
proposal for fleet of
260-325 ships
260-ships
325-ships
2002-2004 Navy
proposal for 375ship Navya
2001 QDR
plan for 310ship Navy
14
Ballistic missile
submarines
(SSBNs)
14
14
14
14
Cruise missile
submarines
(SSGNs)
4
4
4
4
Attack submarines
(SSNs)
48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11c
10
11
12
12
Cruisers,
destroyers,
frigates
88
67
92
104
116
Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs)
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
31
17
24
37
36
12d
14d
20d
0d
0d
Combat logistics
(resupply) ships
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
0
0
0
26e
16
Otherf
20
10
11
25
25
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
MPF(F)
shipsd
Total battle
force ships
2 or 4b
Sources: U.S. Navy data.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b.
The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
d.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contribute to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by
supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted by the Navy as battle force
ships.
e.
The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
f.
Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place as a Navy goal, some elements of Navy ship force
planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. For
example:
•
The Navy is planning to replace its 14 existing ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.35
•
The planned composition of the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force has changed
considerably since 2006 due to the truncation of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
destroyer program to three ships, the restart of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer procurement, and the Navy’s proposed cancellation of the CG(X)
cruiser program. 46 The Navy’s new mission of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations in Europe may also put upward pressure on the cruiser-destroyer
force-level goal.57
•
The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the
assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.68
•
Within the category of support ships, the original 313-ship plan included 3 Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a
force of about 23 JHSVs.79
•
Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of nextgeneration Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships; they now
call for building six new maritime prepositioning ships—three Lewis and Clark
(TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships (which have already been funded) and three
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that are to augment the three existing
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.
35
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
46
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
57
For further discussion, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
68
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
79
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, March
17, 2010.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a
forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).810 Such an assessment could produce a replacement
for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for
the 313-ship plan might be issued.
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal)
Ship type
FY11
FY12
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
FY13
FY14
FY15
Total
1
1
Total
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
2
1
2
1
2
8
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
2
3
4
4
4
17
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship
Large-deck amphibious assault ship (LHA[R])
1
1
1
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
1
1
1
1
3
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship
1
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
1
1
2
2
2
8
TOTAL
9
8
12
9
12
50
Source: FY2011 Navy budget submission.
Note: The FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in
FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
The plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per
year.911 This is an increase from the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that
have been funded each year since FY1993. Shipbuilding supporters for some
time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more ships per year. A
rate of 10 ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of
313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year (see Appendix B).
10.
8
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February
February 2010, pp. 14, 19, 25.
911
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Although LCSs and JHSVs account for less thanabout 25% of the 313-ship
requirement,
they account for 50% of the ships in the five-year plan. In this
sense, these
relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year
shipbuilding shipbuilding
plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship requirement, making it
easier to
procure an average of 10 ships per year within available resources. At
some point in the futureStarting a few
years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs run their course and
are no longer over-represented
overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of
next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an
procuring an average of
10 ships per year couldwill become a considerably more expensive
proposition. On
In this basissense, the FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding program’s average
of 10 ships per
year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the
challenge it faces
concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.
•
The FY2010 budget shifted the procurement of the next aircraft carrier from
FY2012 to FY2013.
•
The planned procurement rate of Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines is
consistent with Navy planning since the submission of the FY2009 budget to
increase the procurement rate of these ships to two per year starting in FY2011.
Virginia-class submarines were procured in FY2010 and previous years at a rate
of about one per year.1012
•
The planned procurement rate for DDG-51 class destroyers reflects the Navy’s
proposal, approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, to stop procurement of DDG-1000 class destroyers and restart
procurement of DDG-51s.
•
The planned procurement rate of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) does not rise
above four per year. Previous Navy plans called for building as many as six LCSs
per year. The new planned maximum rate of four ships per year reflects a new
acquisition strategy for LCSs announced by the Navy in September 2009.1113
•
The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 would be
the 11th ship in the class. The 33-ship goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD17s.
•
The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2015.
This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build
amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s (NGSB’s) Gulf Coast
yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at
Pascagoula, MS).
•
The three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships in the plan reflect the Navy’s
decision to cancel the planned MPF(F) squadron and instead build six new ships,
including three MLPs, to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime
prepositioning ships.
1012
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
1113
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The plan
includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9
billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO’s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than
the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective
affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year
shipbuilding plana total of 276 ships.
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
CVN
11
12
13
1
LSC
SSC
SSN
11
2
2
2
12
1
3
2
2
4
2
13
CVN
1
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
1
2
9
1
1
8
3
12
14
1
4
2
2
9
15
2
4
2
4
12
16
1
3
2
1
172
9
1
17
18
1
2
3
2
1
1
3
1
18
1
19
2
3
2
20
1
2
2
21
2
2
2
22
23
1
21
2
2
2
1
232
1
1
2
24
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
26
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
27
1
29
2
1
1
1
27
1
29
30
1
2
1
1
31
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
32
33
1
34
35
2
2
1
352
36
2
2
2
36
2
2
1
37
381
37
9
3
13
4
9
2
11
1
3
10
1
1
3
11
1
2
8
2
1
1
8
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
7
1
1
1
1
9
1
2
2
13
11
1
2
3
4
10
2
2
9
2
2
2
3
3
2
39
9
12
1
2
40
1
2
3
1
1
25
28
1
1
7
1
8
1
2
8
1
1
8
1
1
8
1
2
11
1
2
8
1
2
10
2
7
1
1
1
8
7
1
1
7
1
8
2
1
1
2
8
1
1
1
8
1
1
8
1
2
11
1
2
8
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
39
2
2
2
1
40
2
2
1
1
12
1
2
38
1
3
3
2
1
25
28
1
1
1
1
1
8
2
10
2
7
2
10
2
9
2
10
2
7
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support
ships.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040 that would result from
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan
FY
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
Goal in 313-ship
plan
11
88
55
48
4
14
31
30
20
313a
11
11
84
42
53
4
14
29
29
18
284
12
11
84
41
54
4
14
30
29
20
287
13
10
85
37
55
4
14
30
29
23
287
14
10
86
32
55
4
14
30
30
24
285
15
11
88
28
54
4
14
31
30
25
285
16
11
90
32
51
4
14
33
30
27
292
17
11
91
33
51
4
14
33
30
31
298
18
11
93
37
50
4
14
33
30
33
305
19
11
94
37
51
4
14
33
30
37
311
20
12
96
39
49
4
14
33
30
38
315
21
12
96
39
49
4
14
34
31
39
318
22
12
95
41
48
4
14
34
29
41
318
23
11
94
39
48
4
14
35
29
45
319
24
11
94
40
46
4
14
36
28
47
320
25
12
92
41
45
4
14
35
28
46
317
26
12
89
43
44
4
14
36
28
45
313
27
12
87
45
43
2
13
35
26
46
308
28
11
85
46
41
1
13
36
26
46
304
29
11
81
48
40
0
13
34
25
44
296
30
12
77
49
39
0
12
33
25
44
291
31
12
73
51
41
0
12
33
24
44
290
32
11
71
52
41
0
12
32
25
44
288
33
11
69
53
42
0
12
31
26
44
288
34
11
67
54
43
0
12
33
26
44
290
35
12
68
55
44
0
12
30
25
44
290
36
11
70
56
45
0
12
30
26
44
294
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
FY
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
37
11
72
56
46
0
12
29
27
44
297
38
11
74
56
45
0
12
29
27
44
298
39
11
76
56
45
0
12
29
28
44
301
40
11
76
55
45
0
12
30
28
44
301
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
a.
The 313-ship plan also includes a 12-ship Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron. The
Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan does not contemplate building a 12-ship MPF(F) squadron.
Observations that can be made about the above force-level projections include the following:
•
The Navy projects that implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan would result
in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a
peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288
ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040.
•
The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48
boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below
48 boats through 2040. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops
below the required level of 88 ships in 2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in
FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040.
•
The Navy projects a force of more than 40 support ships in FY2022 and beyond,
compared to a goal of 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan. The 20 support ships
in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now plans to build and
maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.
Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential oversight issues for Congress concerning the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, the fiveyear (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan, and the 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan
include the following:
Status of Navy’s 313-Ship Goal
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the status of the Navy’s 313-ship goal.
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
14
•
Does the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) endorse the Navy’s 313-ship
goal? The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) final report on the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the levels of Navy and other forces
that are expected to be in place for the years FY2011-FY2015, but does not
explicitly establish force-level requirements for Navy or other forces for either
FY2011-FY2015 or subsequent years.14
•
What is the Navy’s schedule for performing the new force structure assessment
(FSA) mentioned in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan? Will this
FSA result in a new force-level goal to replace the 313-ship plan? If so, when
does the Navy intend to issue the replacement plan? Why has the Navy decided
to retain, the for time being at least, the 313-ship plan, when certain elements of
Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from
that plan?
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 20o1, pp. 45-47.
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Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from
that plan?
•
Given the Administration’s September 2009 announcement of its new plan for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which includes a significant use of
BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and
destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate?
•
Has the Navy accurately estimated the cost of implementing the 30-year
shipbuilding plan? In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s)
estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been
higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers
about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the
potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan.
•
What would be the operational implications of the shortfalls in attack submarines
and cruisers-destroyers that the Navy projects for the latter years of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan?
Regarding the prospective affordability of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated the following in May 3, 2010, speech:
I have in the past warned about our nation’s tendency to disarm in the wake of major wars.
That remains a concern. But, as has always been the case, defense budget expectations over
time, not to mention any country’s strategic strength, are intrinsically linked to the overall
financial and fiscal health of the nation.
And in that respect, we have to accept some hard fiscal realities. American taxpayers and
the Congress are rightfully worried about the deficit. At the same time, the Department of
Defense’s track record as a steward of taxpayer dollars leaves much to be desired.
Now, I know that part of the problem lies outside the Defense Department—and it has been
this way for a long time.…
None of that, however, absolves the Pentagon and the services from responsibility with
regards to procurement. These issues are especially acute when it comes to big-ticket items
whose costs skyrocket far beyond initial estimates. Current submarines and amphibious ships
are three times as expensive as their equivalents during the 1980s—this in the context of an
overall shipbuilding and conversion budget that is 20 percent less. Just a few years ago, the
Congressional Budget Office projected that meeting the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would cost
more than $20 billion per year—double the shipbuilding budget of recent years, and a
projection that was underfunded by some 30 percent. It is reasonable to wonder whether the
nation is getting a commensurate increase in capability in exchange for these spiraling costs.
The Navy’s DDG-1000 [destroyer] is a case in point. By the time the Navy leadership
curtailed the program, the price of each ship had more than doubled and the projected fleet
had dwindled from 32 to seven. The programmed buy is now three.
Or consider plans for a new ballistic missile submarine, the SSBN(X). Right now, the
Department proposes spending $6 billion in research and development over the next few
years—for a projected buy of twelve subs at $7 billion apiece. Current requirements call for
a submarine with the size and payload of a boomer—and the stealth of an attack sub. In a
congressional hearing earlier this year, I pointed out that in the later part of this decade the
new ballistic missile submarine alone would begin to eat up the lion’s share of the Navy’s
shipbuilding resources.
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To be sure, the most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan is a step in the right direction.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead have worked hard to create reasonable budgets and
reset the service “in stride” to reduce operational disruptions. At the same time, the Navy’s
innovative energy security and independence initiative not only helps the environment, but
also will save money in the long term.
Even so, it is important to remember that, as the wars recede, money will be required to reset
the Army and Marine Corps, which have borne the brunt of the conflicts. And there will
continue to be long-term—and inviolable—costs associated with taking care of our troops
and their families. In other words, I do not foresee any significant top-line increases in the
shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask
whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 to 6 billion destroyers, $7
billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.
Though I have addressed a number of topics today, I should add that I don’t pretend to have
all the answers. But, mark my words, the Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to
reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats, and
budget realities. We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and
more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms—thereby risking a situation
where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could
potentially become wasting assets.12
Legislative Activity for FY2011
H.R. 5035 (National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act)
H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, would authorize $20 billion per year for the
period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy ships to meet the ship force structure
requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan. (It would also
authorize $60 million per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for loan guarantees for the
construction of commercial ships.) The text of H.R. 5035 states:
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for the construction of vessels for the Navy and to authorize
appropriations for loan guarantees for commercial vessels.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act’.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.
12
Source: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, address to Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo, Gaylord Conventional
Center, National Harbor, MD, Monday, May 3, 2010, remarks as prepared.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
(a) Navy- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011
through 2015 for the construction of vessels for the Navy to meet the force requirements of
the Navy (as described in the annual naval vessel construction plan required by section 231
of title 10, United States Code) in the amount of $20,000,000,000.
(b) The Merchant Marine- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal
years 2011 through 2015 for loan guarantees and commitments authorized under chapter 537
of title 46, United States Code, for the construction of new vessels to replace and expand the
domestic fleet of commercial vessels (as that term is defined in that chapter) in the amount of
$60,000,000.
Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see the following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet
Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships would be
adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger total numbers of ships.
One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being
proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are
more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships
that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,13 and as of September 30, 2009, had declined to a total of 285 battle force ships. The
FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on
countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while the September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of
mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and seabased military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist
organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009
fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems. 14
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities. 15 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 285-ship fleet of September 2009 may or nor may not have been capable of
performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or
may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission
requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree
independent of one another.
13
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
14
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
15
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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A second potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support
all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run. The Navy projects that implementing the 30year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020,
reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships
in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that
the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in
the latter years of the 30-year plan.
Affordability and Executability of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A third potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the affordability and executability of the
30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan
would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the
plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars for newconstruction ships, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If the
Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over
the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able
to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”
Table 5. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2010 dollars
First 10 years
(FY2011-FY2020)
Next 10 years
(FY2021-2030)
Final 10- years
(FY2031-FY2040)
Entire 30 years
(FY2011-FY2040)
Navy estimate
14.5
17.9
15.3
15.9
CBO estimate
15.2
20.4
21.4
19.0
% difference
between Navy and
CBO estimates
5%
14%
40%
19%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, Table
2 (page 9). The CBO report calculates the percent difference between the Navy and CBO estimates for the
entire 30-year period as 20% rather than 19%. $19.0 billion is 19.497% greater than $15.9 billion.
As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding
plan with a total of 50 ships, or an average of 10 per year, within available resources in part
because half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from
now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan,
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and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines
begins, procuring an average of 10 ships per year will become a considerably more expensive
proposition.
The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of
each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7 billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to almost onehalf of the Navy’s budget each year for procuring new ships. The May 2010 CBO report
estimates that a class of 12 SSBN(X)s would have an average unit procurement cost of $8.2
billion in constant FY2010 dollars.15 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other
shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding funding profile in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan
includes a “hump” of approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the
years (FY2019-FY2033) when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the 30year plan, however, contains little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in
shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no
real growth in coming years, as some observers, including some Navy leaders,16 expect. If the $2billion-per-year hump is not realized, the total number of ships of various kinds procured in
FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the 30-year plan. Attack submarines and
destroyers planned for those years could be among the ships that would not be procured. If so, the
shortfalls for these two categories of ships could be even deeper than the projections shown in
Table 4.
Scheduled Retirements of Older Ships
A fourth oversight issue for Congress concerns current Navy plans for retiring certain older ships,
including several frigates and two amphibious assault ships, over the next few years. Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in deferring the retirements of at least some of
these ships, so as to increase the total number of Navy ships over the next few years. The Navy
has resisted proposals for deferring the retirements of the older ships, arguing that they Navy can
perform its expected missions with acceptable risk without these ships, and that the operation and
support costs of keeping these ships in service beyond their currently scheduled retirement dates
would reduce funding available for procuring new platforms and equipment, including new ships.
Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
15
For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16
For example, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus reportedly told a group of defense reporters on April 21, 2010, that
“We [in the Navy] are looking at a [sic] no substantial growth and realistically no growth at all, in terms of the amount
of money we are allocated to spend.” As quoted in Geoff Fein, “Diminishing Budgets Forcing Navy To Closely
Examine Contracts, Navy Secretary Says,” Defense Daily, April 22, 1010: 4-5.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (pages 73-74).
The report states: “Demonstrating the committee’s commitment to reverse the decline in the size
of the Navy fleet, the committee authorizes 9 new ships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2
DDG 51 destroyers, and 2 Littoral Combat Ships.”(Page 20)
Section 121 of the bill as reported by the committee would broaden the Navy’s authority for
using incremental funding for procuring Navy ships.17
Section 123 would require the Navy to submit a report on, among other things, required numbers
of cruisers and destroyers, particularly in light of demands for these ships for ballistic missile
defense operations. 18
Section 1021 would amend the current law (10 U.S.C. 231) that requires DOD to annually submit
a 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Section 1022 states that the Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any battle force vessel
of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the congressional defense
committees written notification of such decommissioning in accordance with established
procedures.
Section 1023 states that until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of the Navy reaches
313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in FY2011 or any subsequent
fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated for commissioning into the battle
force fleet for that fiscal year.
Section 1024 states that the Secretary of the Navy shall retain the amphibious assault ships
Nassau (LHA-4) and Peleliu (LHA-5) in a commissioned and operational status until the delivery
to the Navy of the new amphibious assault ships America (LHA-6) and LHA-7, respectively.
The text of Section 121 is as follows:
SEC. 121. INCREMENTAL FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF LARGE NAVAL
VESSELS.
(a) Incremental Funding of Large Naval Vessels- Except as provided in subsection (b), the
Secretary of the Navy may use incremental funding for the procurement of a large naval
vessel over a period not to exceed the number of years equal to three-fourths of the total
period of planned ship construction of such vessel.
(b) LPD 26- With respect to the vessel designated LPD 26, the Secretary may use
incremental funding for the procurement of such vessel through fiscal year 2012 if the
Secretary determines that such incremental funding—
(1) is in the best interest of the overall shipbuilding efforts of the Navy;
17
For more on incremental funding, particularly in the procurement of Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke,
and CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
18
For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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(2) is needed to provide the Secretary with the ability to facilitate changes to the shipbuilding
industrial base of the Navy; and
(3) will provide the Secretary with the ability to award a contract for construction of the
vessel that provides the best value to the United States.
(c) Condition for Out-year Contract Payments- A contract entered into under subsection (a)
or (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the
contract for a fiscal year after the fiscal year the vessel was authorized is subject to the
availability of appropriations for that purpose for that later fiscal year.
(d) Definitions- In this section:
(1) The term `large naval vessel’ means a vessel—
(A) that is—
(i) an aircraft carrier designated a CVN;
(ii) an amphibious assault ship designated LPD, LHA, LHD, or LSD; or
(iii) an auxiliary vessel; and
(B) that has a light ship displacement of 17,000 tons or more.
(2) The term `total period of planned ship construction’ means the period of years beginning
on the date of the first authorization of funding (not including funding requested for advance
procurement) and ending on the date that is projected on the date of the first authorization of
funding to be the delivery date of the vessel to the Navy.
The text of Section 123 is as follows:
SEC. 123. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Report- Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to missile defense.
(b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be
accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by
procuring additional combatant surface vessels.
(2) Whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of
combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313ship fleet plan of the Navy.
(3) The number of Aegis ships needed by each combatant commander to fulfill ballistic
missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to
ballistic missile defense in Europe.
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(4) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of
the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set.
(5) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a
balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States.
(6) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological
advancements in the sea-based missile defense program.
(7) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile ships
within the context of the fleet response plan.
The text of Section 1021 is as follows:
SEC. 1021. REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) In General- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels
`(a) Quadrennial Naval Vessel Construction Plan- At the same time that the budget of the
President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 during each year in which the
Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction of
combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force structure
recommendations of the quadrennial defense review.
`(b) Matters Included- The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following:
`(1) A detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the ten-year period beginning on
the date on which the plan is submitted, including a certification by the Secretary that the
budget for the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted and the budget for the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title are sufficient for funding such
schedule.
`(2) A probable construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 10
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(3) A notional construction schedule for the ten-year period beginning on the date that is 20
years after the date on which the plan is submitted.
`(4) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the construction schedules
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
`(5) For the construction schedules under paragraphs (1) and (2)—
`(A) a determination by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the level
of funding necessary to execute such schedules; and
`(B) an evaluation by the Director of the potential risk associated with such schedules,
including detailed effects on operational plans, missions, deployment schedules, and
fulfillment of the requirements of the combatant commanders.
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`(c) Naval Composition- In submitting the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
ensure that such plan—
`(1) is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title; and
`(2) phases the construction of new aircraft carriers during the periods covered by such plan
in a manner that minimizes the total cost for procurement for such vessels.
`(d) Assessment When Budget Is Insufficient- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for
funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is less than the level determined
necessary by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection
(b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks associated with the budget,
including the risk associated with a reduced force structure that may result from funding
naval vessel construction at such a level.
`(e) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a), the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the sufficiency of the
construction schedules and the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with
respect to the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the futureyears defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(f) Changes to the Construction Plan- In any year in which a quadrennial defense review is
not submitted, the Secretary of the Navy may not modify the construction schedules
submitted in the plan under subsection (a) unless—
`(1) the modification is an increase in planned ship construction;
`(2) the modification is a realignment of less than one year of construction start dates in the
future-years defense plan submitted under section 221 of this title and the Secretary submits
to the congressional defense committees a report on such modification, including—
`(A) the reasons for realignment;
`(B) any increased cost that will be incurred by the Navy because of the realignment; and
`(C) an assessment of the effects that the realignment will have on the shipbuilding industrial
base, including the secondary supply base; or
`(3) the modification is a decrease in the number or type of combatant and support vessels of
the Navy and the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such
modification, including—
`(A) an addendum to the most recent quadrennial defense review that fully explains and
justifies the decrease with respect to the national security strategy of the United States as set
forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a); and
`(B) a description of the additional reviews and analyses considered by the Secretary after
the previous quadrennial defense review was submitted that justify the decrease.
`(g) Definitions- In this section:
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`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels.’.
In summarizing Section 1021, the committee’s report states:
This section would amend section 231 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels with
each submission of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The long-range plan would be
required to have 3 distinct sections each spanning a period of 10 years. The first section
would be a detailed construction plan for the first 10 years, the second a probable
construction plan for the second 10 years, and the third a notional construction plan for the
last 10 years. This section would require that during the intervening years between
submissions of the QDR, the plan may not be modified unless the change is accompanied by
an addendum to the QDR which explains and justifies the decrease with respect to the
national security of the United States. This section would further require that the plan fully
comply with section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a minimum of 11
operational aircraft carriers and to phase the construction of such carriers as to minimize the
total cost of procurement. (Page 363)
The text of Section 1022 is as follows:
SEC. 1022. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Notice of Decommissioning- The Secretary of the Navy may not decommission any
battle force vessel of the active fleet of the Navy unless the Secretary provides to the
congressional defense committees written notification of such decommissioning in
accordance with established procedures.
(b) Content of Notification- Any notification provided under subsection (a) shall include
each of the following:
(1) The reasons for the proposed decommissioning of the vessel.
(2) An analysis of the effect the decommissioning would be likely to have on the deployment
schedules of other vessels in the same class as the vessel proposed to be decommissioned.
(3) A certification from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decommissioning
of the vessel will not adversely affect the requirements of the combatant commanders to
fulfill missions critical to national security.
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(4) Any budgetary implications associated with retaining the vessel in commission,
expressed for each applicable appropriation account.
The text of Section 1023 is as follows:
SEC. 1023. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIZE OF THE NAVY BATTLE FORCE FLEET.
(a) Limitation on Decommissioning- Until the number of vessels in the battle force fleet of
the Navy reaches 313 vessels, the Secretary of the Navy shall not decommission, in fiscal
year 2011 or any subsequent fiscal year, more than two-thirds of the number of vessels slated
for commissioning into the battle force fleet for that fiscal year.
(b) Treatment of Submarines- For purposes of subsection (a), submarines of the battle force
fleet slated for decommissioning for any fiscal year shall not count against the number of
vessels the Secretary of the Navy is required to maintain for that fiscal year.
The text of Section 1024 is as follows:
SEC. 1024. RETENTION AND STATUS OF CERTAIN NAVAL VESSELS.
The Secretary of the Navy shall retain the vessels the U.S.S. Nassau (LHA 4) and the U.S.S.
Peleliu (LHA 5), in a commissioned and operational status, until the delivery to the Navy of
the vessels the U.S.S. America (LHA 6) and the vessel designated as LHA 7, respectively.
The committee’s report also states:
The committee notes that the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels,
known as the 30–year shipbuilding plan, submitted in accordance with section 231 of title
10, United States Code, proposes an average of 10 new vessels per year during the 5-year
period of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). While this is a positive step in shipbuilding
procurement, the total number of battle force vessels remains essentially constant during the
FYDP due to the high rate of ship retirements planned during the period. Only after the
FYDP, do the battle force levels begin to increase in real terms and the stated goal of a 313ship Navy is not achieved until fiscal year 2018. The committee further notes that a short
term solution to the stagnant number of battle force ships through the FYDP is to delay
retirement of vessels with useful service life and that a planned approach to retire no more
ships in any one fiscal year than are being delivered to the Navy would accomplish this goal.
(Page 75)
The report also states:
U.S. shipbuilding industrial base
The committee has reservations as to the continued health of the shipbuilding industrial base
and its ability to remain viable in its current form. The shipbuilding industrial base currently
serving the needs of Navy and the nation is a legacy from the cold war when the size of the
Navy fleet, and the construction required to maintain that fleet, was significantly higher than
today. The committee is concerned that the relatively low orders for new ships as proposed
in the 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient to maintain all shipyards currently
constructing naval vessels. This is a very difficult situation for the Navy since reducing the
number of shipyards constructing vessels could have the unintended consequence of driving
up cost due to limited or no competition for particular classes of ships, yet the current
industrial base adds increased costs due to the significant overhead rates that must be
charged to each vessel.
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Perhaps even more significant than shipyard over-capacity for the current shipbuilding plan
is the reduction in vendors willing to provide equipment and materiel necessary for the
shipbuilding industry. Low orders coupled with significant government requirements for
testing, traceability, and financial controls have driven many former suppliers out of the
market altogether. The committee received testimony that the vendor supply base is currently
60 to 70 percent sole source. While this almost total lack of competition may be manageable
in terms of maintaining the ability to construct vessels, it is not a condition that is bringing
the best value to the taxpayer.
The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has embarked on a comprehensive
review of the industrial base, including the supply base. The committee requests the
Secretary of the Navy to inform the committee when the comprehensive review is complete
and to make available to the committee those officials who participated in the review to
testify before the committee at a hearing in open session aimed at oversight of this potential
threat to national security. (Page 78)
Senate
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) recommends approval of the Navy’s request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for all of its shipbuilding programs (see pages
677-678 of the printed version of S. 3454).
Section 124 of the bill states:
SEC. 124. INCLUSION OF BASIC AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN IN ASSESSMENTS
REQUIRED PRIOR TO START OF CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SHIP OF A
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM.
(a) Inclusion in Assessments- Subsection (b)(1) of section 124 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 28; 10 U.S.C. 7291 note) is
amended by inserting `(and in particular completion of basic and functional design)’ after
`completion of detail design’.
(b) Basic and Functional Design Defined- Subsection (d) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(5) BASIC AND FUNCTION DESIGN- The term `basic and functional design’, for a ship,
means design, whether in the form of two-dimensional drawings, three-dimensional models,
or computer-aided models, that fixes the hull structure of the ship, sets the hydrodynamics of
the ship, routes all major distributive systems (including electricity, water, and other utilities)
of the ship, and identifies the exact positioning of piping and other outfitting within each
block of the ship.’.
Regarding Section 124, the committee’s report states:
Inclusion of basic and functional design in assessments required prior to start of
construction of first ship of a shipbuilding program (sec. 124)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 124 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) to tighten the
requirements under which the Secretary of the Navy is required to certify that a new
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shipbuilding program has achieved sufficient design maturity at the time the Navy begins
construction on the first ship of any major shipbuilding program.
The Government Accountability Office, in its May 2009 report, “Best Practices: High Levels
of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding
(GAO–09–322),” identified key steps that leading commercial shipbuilders and ship buyers
follow to ensure their vessels deliver on-time, within planned costs, and with a high degree
of innovation.
One critical step in this process is achieving design stability before start of fabrication.
Leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable once all basic and functional design
activities have been completed (usually in the form of a complete 3D product model).
Section 124 as currently written does not specifically require that the assessment of design
maturity directly address the completeness of the 3D modeling or completion of the activities
that make up basic and functional design. This provision would add that requirement. (Page
13)
The committee’s report also states:
Surface ship construction and industrial base issues
The committee recognizes that the Navy’s most recent Long-Range Plan for the Construction
of Naval Vessels continues the Navy’s long stated goal of a minimum fleet of 313 battle
force ships. The committee notes that this plan is based on a 2005 Force Structure
Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded
requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare
support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee
encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can
be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan.
The committee continues to have significant concerns regarding the implications of the plan
for the non-nuclear surface ship industrial base. If the Navy and industry, working together,
are unable to control requirement driven cost growth and deliver the ships in the plan for the
projected costs, the inevitable reductions in quantity will likely impact the Navy’s ability to
reach the required fleet size and further jeopardize the industrial base. The committee notes
that the current shipbuilding plan includes the cost of the SSBN (X) program and the
committee encourages the Navy to closely scrutinize requirements for this program in order
to minimize its impact on the recapitalization of the Navy’s battle force.
Furthermore, the committee urges the Navy and the contractors to negotiate as expeditiously
as possible fair and reasonable construction contracts for ships previously authorized in order
to reduce uncertainty and maintain and foster affordability in the procurement of large
surface combatants and other naval vessels.
In reviewing the Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels in conjunction with
recent program performance highlights, the committee notes the following observations and
expectations:
The stated requirement for amphibious ships is 38 vessels; however, the Long-Range Plan
projects accepting moderate risk by having 33 ships by 2016, but then declining to 29 or 30
ships after 2034. Although there have been improvements in recently delivered ships, cost
and quality issues have been all too common in the procurement of large and medium
amphibious ships, making an already constrained shipbuilding budget more difficult to
execute. A new dock landing ship class, LSD(X), is important to the recapitalization of the
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amphibious force. The requirements for this ship must be closely validated to ensure
affordability. The committee notes the Navy’s plan to have a gap year following the lead
ship of the class and believes that this may help alleviate cost, schedule, and performance
issues. Overall, the committee remains concerned with the Navy’s management of the
amphibious ship accounts and expects continued close scrutiny of these programs by Navy
leadership.
In large surface combatants, the Navy’s last official report stated that the industrial base can
only be effectively sustained if naval ship yards were building the equivalent of three DDG–
51 destroyers per year, with additional work assumed at one of the yards. Even if the Navy
fully executes both of the large surface combatant programs of record in the near-term, the
President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and future-years defense program propose to buy
an average of 1.5 large surface combatants per year. Even at projected procurement rates, the
number of cruisers and destroyers falls below the required level of 88 ships in 2027 and
remains below that level for the following 13 years. At its worst, the number of large surface
combatants is 21 ships below the expected requirement in 2034.
The Navy has testified that continued demand for large surface combatants to meet forward
presence and strike operations requirements coupled with emerging ballistic missile defense
requirements drives the Navy to consider abandoning lesser priority missions for more
recent, higher priority ones. In light of the current pressure on the large surface combatant
force, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s projected rate of production is insufficient,
and anticipates that the Navy will closely assess future demand for large surface combatants,
and operational and additional risk to the industrial base of maintaining relatively low rates
of procurement for large surface combatants.
The committee remains concerned with the Navy’s ability to execute what it believes is an
overly optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants. The truncation of the
DDG–1000, the restart of the DDG–51 class and the proposed Flight III variant of the DDG–
51 inject a great deal of instability into the SCN accounts. The Navy’s testimony before
Congress has led this committee to identify six risk areas in the Navy’s plan for DDG–51s:
(1) the availability of the Air and Missile Defense Radar; (2) the extent and cost of
modifications to the underlying ship’s design package to support proposed changes to the
ship; (3) increased limitation on service life margins of the early restart ships; (4) combat
system software integration; (5) the overall complexity of various separate programs that
need to converge for successful completion of the restart and Flight III programs; and (6)
cost and schedule growth for the Aegis Combat System Modernization. The committee
expects the Navy to keep it closely apprised of developments in these risk areas so that it can
monitor appropriate risk mitigation efforts.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has made progress during the past year and the
recent decision to move to a single design should improve affordability. The LCS fleet is
expected to comprise 55 vessels of the Navy’s 313–ship fleet force structure. Even modest
cost growth in this large component of the fleet magnifies the problem of achieving that
objective. The committee notes that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the LCS program
introduces competition for this class of ships and is therefore cautiously optimistic that this
program is making progress.
In summary, the committee considers the specialized shipbuilding industrial base for large
surface combatants, amphibious ships, Navy auxiliary ships, and littoral vessels as a critical
component of national security and expects the Department of Defense to appropriately
sustain this industrial base. The committee expects the Department of the Navy to include
these considerations as it incorporates the updated force structure assessment in the
upcoming Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels.
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The committee understands that the Navy is conducting a comprehensive review of the
shipbuilding industrial base and calls upon the Navy to update the committee on the scope
and timeline for such a study. The committee understands the objective of the study is to
identify the challenges facing the Navy and the associated shipbuilding industrial base and
the strategies for mitigating the effects of those challenges. The committee expects that this
study will inform its deliberations in connection with the fiscal year 2012 budget. As a
general proposition, the committee expects that the Department of Defense will provide the
Navy with the support it needs to focus on the matters referred to above. (Pages 40-42)
National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act (H.R. 5035)
H.R. 5035, which was introduced on April 15, 2010, and referred to the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2010,
would authorize $20 billion per year for the period FY2011-FY2015 for the construction of Navy
ships to meet the ship force structure requirements presented in the Navy’s report on its 30-year
shipbuilding plan. (It would also authorize $60 million per year for the period FY2011-FY2015
for loan guarantees for the construction of commercial ships.) The text of H.R. 5035 states:
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for the construction of vessels for the Navy and to authorize
appropriations for loan guarantees for commercial vessels.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `National Shipbuilding Budget Policy Act’.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Navy- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2011
through 2015 for the construction of vessels for the Navy to meet the force requirements of
the Navy (as described in the annual naval vessel construction plan required by section 231
of title 10, United States Code) in the amount of $20,000,000,000.
(b) The Merchant Marine- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal
years 2011 through 2015 for loan guarantees and commitments authorized under chapter 537
of title 46, United States Code, for the construction of new vessels to replace and expand the
domestic fleet of commercial vessels (as that term is defined in that chapter) in the amount of
$60,000,000.
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see the following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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•
CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet
Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships would be
adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger total numbers of ships.
One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being
proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are
more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships
that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,19 and as of September 30, 2009, had declined to a total of 285 battle force ships. The
FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on
countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while the September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of
mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and seabased military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist
organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009
fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems. 20
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities. 21 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 285-ship fleet of September 2009 may or nor may not have been capable of
performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or
may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission
requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree
independent of one another.
19
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
20
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
21
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.16
1622
22
Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
a
346
~305/310b
~600
~450/416
Total ships
c
45-55
50/55d
100
80/~55
Attack submarines
12
11+1f
11+1f
15e
Aircraft carriers
g
~150
~124
116
242/228
Surface combatants
51i
36i
36i
~75h
Amphibious ships
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet this goal changed from Base
Force plan to the BUR plan—a result of new, larger amphibious ship designs.
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Appendix B. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table B-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.1723 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of September 30, 2009.
As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy
ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the
total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of
change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and
average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily
mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission
requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship
capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing
quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.
1723
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as
of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this
case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential
statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a
single counting method.
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Table B-1.Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1969
926
1990
547
1949
690
1970
769
1991
526
1950
634
1971
702
1992
466
1951
980
1972
654
1993
435
1952
1,097
1973
584
1994
391
1953
1,122
1974
512
1995
373
1954
1,113
1975
496
1996
356
1955
1,030
1976
476
1997
354
1956
973
1977
464
1998
333
1957
967
1978
468
1999
317
1958
890
1979
471
2000
318
1959
860
1980
477
2001
316
1960
812
1981
490
2002
313
1961
897
1982
513
2003
297
1962
959
1983
514
2004
291
1963
916
1984
524
2005
282
1964
917
1985
541
2006
281
1965
936
1986
556
2007
279
1966
947
1987
568
2008
282
1967
973
1988
565
2009
285
1968
976
1989
566
2010
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.
Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table B-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2010) and requested (FY2011-FY2015) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table B-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015
(Procured FY1982-FY2010; requested FY2011-FY2015)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
5
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
5
6
6
6
5
7
8
4a
5a
3a
8
7
9
8
12
9
12
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a.
The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the
cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in
FY2008.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Congressional Research Service
1626