Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
March 2April 9, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV).
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy
estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant
FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimate of the cost of
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing
concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now
assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006 ...............................................................................2
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................34
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................................46
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040..........................................................67
Oversight Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................78
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ..................................................................................................89
Tables
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001 ...........................................................2
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan ...................................................34
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................56
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan......................................................67
Table B-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948.................................................... 1213
Table B-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015 .................................... 1314
Appendixes
Appendix A. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet ......................................................................9 10
Appendix B. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate....................................................... 1112
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 1314
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy’s
report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force
structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship
plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship
plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). 1
The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force
ships, or an average of 10 per year.2 Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive
LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy
estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant
FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimate of the cost of
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing
concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now
assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
1
The proposed FY2011 budget also requests funding for the procurement of an oceanographic ship that does not count
against the 313-ship goal.
2
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Background
313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet and compares it to previous
Navy ship force structure proposals.
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001
Ship type
February 2006 Navy
proposal for 313ship fleet
Early-2005 Navy
proposal for fleet of
260-325 ships
260-ships
325-ships
2002-2004 Navy
proposal for 375ship Navya
2001 QDR
plan for 310ship Navy
14
Ballistic missile
submarines
(SSBNs)
14
14
14
14
Cruise missile
submarines
(SSGNs)
4
4
4
4
Attack submarines
(SSNs)
48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11c
10
11
12
12
Cruisers,
destroyers,
frigates
88
67
92
104
116
Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs)
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
31
17
24
37
36
12d
14d
20d
0d
0d
Combat logistics
(resupply) ships
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
0
0
0
26e
16
Otherf
20
10
11
25
25
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
MPF(F)
shipsd
Total battle
force ships
2 or 4b
Sources: U.S. Navy data.
a.
Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b.
The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
d.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contribute to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by
supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted by the Navy as battle force
ships.
e.
The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
f.
Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that
have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-aship plan. For example:
•
The 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now
plans to procure considerably more than three JHSVs.
•
The planned composition of the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force has changed
considerably since 2006.
•
The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the
assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.
•
Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of nextgeneration Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships.
The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a
forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).3ship plan. For example:
•
The Navy is planning to replace its 14 existing ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.3
•
The planned composition of the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force has changed
considerably since 2006 due to the truncation of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
destroyer program to three ships, the restart of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer procurement, and the Navy’s proposed cancellation of the CG(X)
cruiser program. 4 The Navy’s new mission of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
operations in Europe may also put upward pressure on the cruiser-destroyer
force-level goal.5
•
The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the
assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.6
•
Within the category of support ships, the original 313-ship plan included 3 Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a
force of about 23 JHSVs.7
•
Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of nextgeneration Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships; they now
call for building 6 new maritime prepositioning ships—three Lewis and Clark
(TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships (which have already been funded) and three
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that are to augment the three existing
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.
3
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
5
For further discussion, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7
Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, March
17, 2010.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a
forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).8 Such an assessment could produce a replacement
for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for
the 313-ship plan might be issued.
Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal)
Ship type
FY11
FY12
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
FY13
FY14
FY15
1
Total
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
2
1
2
1
2
8
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
2
3
4
4
4
17
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship
Large-deck amphibious assault ship (LHA[R])
1
1
1
1
3
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February
2010, pp. 14, 19, 25.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Ship type
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
1
FY15
Total
1
1
1
3
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship
1
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
1
1
2
2
2
8
TOTAL
9
8
12
9
12
50
Source: FY2011 Navy budget submission.
Note: The FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in
FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
•
The plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per
year.49 This is an increase from the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that
have been funded each year since FY1993. Shipbuilding supporters for some
time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more ships per year. A
rate of 10 ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of
313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year.
8
U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February
2010, pp. 14, 19, 25.
9
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
•
Although LCSs and JHSVs account for less than 25% of the 313-ship
requirement, they account for 50% of the ships in the five-year plan. In this
sense, these relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year
shipbuilding plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship requirement, making it
easier to procure an average of 10 ships per year within available resources. At
some point in the future, when the LCS and JHSV programs run their course and
are no longer over-represented in the shipbuilding plan, procuring an average of
10 ships per year could become a considerably more expensive proposition. On
this basis, the FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding program’s average of 10 ships per
year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces
concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.
•
The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2015.
This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build
amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s (NGSB’s) Gulf Coast
yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at
Pascagoula, MS). This dip could be deep enough to prompt speculation about a
possible consolidation of some kind at these yards.FY2010 budget shifted the procurement of the next aircraft carrier from
FY2012 to FY2013.
•
The planned procurement rate of Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines is
consistent with Navy planning since the submission of the FY2009 budget to
increase the procurement rate of these ships to two per year starting in FY2011.
Virginia-class submarines were procured in FY2010 and previous years at a rate
of about one per year.10
•
The planned procurement rate for DDG-51 class destroyers reflects the Navy’s
proposal, approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget, to stop procurement of DDG-1000 class destroyers and restart
procurement of DDG-51s.
•
The planned procurement rate of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) does not rise
above four per year. Previous Navy plans called for building as many as six LCSs
per year. The new planned maximum rate of four ships per year reflects a new
acquisition strategy for LCSs announced by the Navy in September 2009.11
•
The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 would be
the 11th ship in the class. The 33-ship goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD17s.
•
The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013-FY2015.
This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build
amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s (NGSB’s) Gulf Coast
yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at
Pascagoula, MS).
•
The three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships in the plan reflect the Navy’s
decision to cancel the planned MPF(F) squadron and instead build six new ships,
including three MLPs, to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime
prepositioning ships.
10
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
11
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The plan
includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9
billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO’s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than
4
The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count
against the 313-ship goal.
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the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective
affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan
FY
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
11
2
2
2
1
2
9
12
1
3
2
1
1
8
2
4
2
3
12
14
13
1
1
4
2
2
9
15
2
4
2
4
12
16
1
3
2
1
2
9
17
2
3
2
1
3
12
1
3
1
3
918
1
19
2
3
2
3
13
20
1
2
2
4
9
21
2
2
2
1
2
11
22
1
2
2
1
3
10
2
2
1
23
1
1
2
24
1
2
1
3
11
24
1
2
1
1
1
2
8
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
26
2
2
1
1
27
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
29
2
1
1
1
30
1
2
1
1
13
18
23
28
CVN
1
1
1
1
SSBN
1
AWS
1
2
1
1
2
1
31
2
1
1
1
32
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
11
33
1
34
2
2
1
35
2
2
2
36
2
2
1
37
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
39
2
2
2
1
40
2
2
1
38
1
1
1
7
1
7
1
2
1
1
1
1
31
1
1
1
32
33
CLF
8
8
2
38
1
1
3
11
1
2
8
2
1
1
8
1
7
1
1
7
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
8
2
8
1
1
1
1
9
1
2
2
13
11
1
2
3
4
10
2
2
9
2
2
2
3
3
2
39
9
12
1
2
40
1
2
3
1
1
25
28
1
1
8
1
1
8
1
1
8
1
2
11
1
2
8
1
2
10
2
7
1
1
2
10
2
9
2
10
2
7
1
1
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.
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Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support
ships.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040 that would result from
implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan
FY
CVN
LSC
SSC
SSN
SSGN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt
Total
Goal in 313-ship
plan
11
88
55
48
4
14
31
30
20
313a
11
11
84
42
53
4
14
29
29
18
284
12
11
84
41
54
4
14
30
29
20
287
13
10
85
37
55
4
14
30
29
23
287
14
10
86
32
55
4
14
30
30
24
285
15
11
88
28
54
4
14
31
30
25
285
16
11
90
32
51
4
14
33
30
27
292
17
11
91
33
51
4
14
33
30
31
298
18
11
93
37
50
4
14
33
30
33
305
19
11
94
37
51
4
14
33
30
37
311
20
12
96
39
49
4
14
33
30
38
315
21
12
96
39
49
4
14
34
31
39
318
22
12
95
41
48
4
14
34
29
41
318
23
11
94
39
48
4
14
35
29
45
319
24
11
94
40
46
4
14
36
28
47
320
25
12
92
41
45
4
14
35
28
46
317
26
12
89
43
44
4
14
36
28
45
313
27
12
87
45
43
2
13
35
26
46
308
28
11
85
46
41
1
13
36
26
46
304
29
11
81
48
40
0
13
34
25
44
296
30
12
77
49
39
0
12
33
25
44
291
31
12
73
51
41
0
12
33
24
44
290
32
11
71
52
41
0
12
32
25
44
288
33
11
69
53
42
0
12
31
26
44
288
34
11
67
54
43
0
12
33
26
44
290
35
12
68
55
44
0
12
30
25
44
290
36
11
70
56
45
0
12
30
26
44
294
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
37
11
72
56
46
0
12
29
27
44
297
38
11
74
56
45
0
12
29
27
44
298
39
11
76
56
45
0
12
29
28
44
301
40
11
76
55
45
0
12
30
28
44
301
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
a.
The 313-ship plan also includes a 12-ship Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron. The
Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan does not contemplate building a 12-ship MPF(F) squadron.
Observations that can be made about the above force-level projections include the following:
•
The Navy projects that implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan would result
in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a
peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288
ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040.
•
The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48
boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below
48 boats through 2040. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops
below the required level of 88 ships in 2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in
FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040.
•
The Navy projects a force of more than 40 support ships in FY2022 and beyond,
compared to a goal of 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan. The 20 support ships
in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now plans to procure
many more than three JHSVs. The Navy’s projection of more than 40 support
ships in FY2022 and beyond suggests that the Navy may be planning to procure
20 or morebuild and
maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.
Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential oversight issues for Congress concerning the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, the fiveyear (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan, and the 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan
include the following:
•
What is the Navy’s schedule for performing the new force structure assessment
(FSA) mentioned in the Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan? Will this
FSA result in a new force-level goal to replace the 313-ship plan? If so, when
does the Navy intend to issue the replacement plan? Why has the Navy decided
to retain, the for time being at least, the 313-ship plan, when certain elements of
Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from
that plan?
•
Given the Administration’s September 2009 announcement of its new plan for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which includes a significant use of
BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and
destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate?
•
Given that the Navy and Marine Corps agree that a force of 33 amphibious ships
is the minimum needed to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary
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Brigades (MEBs), and that this lift goal would be more robustly met by a 38-ship
amphibious force, would the 31-ship amphibious force called for in the 313-ship
plan be adequate?
•
Given past goals for a force of 55 attack submarines, would the 48-boat attack
submarine forceBMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and
destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate?
•
Has the Navy accurately estimated the cost of implementing the 30-year
shipbuilding plan? In past years, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s)
estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been
higher than the Navy’s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers
about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the
potential cost of the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan.
•
What would be the operational implications of the shortfalls in attack submarines
and cruisers-destroyers that the Navy projects for the latter years of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan?
Legislative Activity for FY2011
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission, including the five-year (FY2011-FY2015) and 30-year
(FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plans, were submitted to Congress in early February 2010.
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see the following CRS reports:
•
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
•
CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet
Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships would be
adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger total numbers of ships.
One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being
proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are
more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships
that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,512 and as of September 30, 2009, had declined to a total of 285 battle force ships. The
FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on
countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while the September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of
mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and seabased military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist
organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009
fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems. 613
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities. 714 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of shipbased unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 285-ship fleet of September 2009 may or nor may not have been capable of
performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or
may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission
requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree
independent of one another.
512
Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a peak
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the
same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
613
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
714
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.8
815
15
Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s, the
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration,
the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base
Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key
features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
a
346
~305/310b
~600
~450/416
Total ships
c
45-55
50/55d
100
80/~55
Attack submarines
12
11+1f
11+1f
15e
Aircraft carriers
g
~150
~124
116
242/228
Surface combatants
51i
36i
36i
~75h
Amphibious ships
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet this goal changed from Base
Force plan to the BUR plan—a result of new, larger amphibious ship designs.
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Appendix B. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table B-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.916 The Navy fell below 300 battle
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of September 30, 2009.
As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy
ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the
total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of
change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and
average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily
mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission
requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship
capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing
quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.
916
Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as
of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this
case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential
statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a
single counting method.
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Table B-1.Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1969
926
1990
547
1949
690
1970
769
1991
526
1950
634
1971
702
1992
466
1951
980
1972
654
1993
435
1952
1,097
1973
584
1994
391
1953
1,122
1974
512
1995
373
1954
1,113
1975
496
1996
356
1955
1,030
1976
476
1997
354
1956
973
1977
464
1998
333
1957
967
1978
468
1999
317
1958
890
1979
471
2000
318
1959
860
1980
477
2001
316
1960
812
1981
490
2002
313
1961
897
1982
513
2003
297
1962
959
1983
514
2004
291
1963
916
1984
524
2005
282
1964
917
1985
541
2006
281
1965
936
1986
556
2007
279
1966
947
1987
568
2008
282
1967
973
1988
565
2009
285
1968
976
1989
566
2010
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a.
Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table B-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2010) and requested (FY2011-FY2015) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
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Table B-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015
(Procured FY1982-FY2010; requested FY2011-FY2015)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
5
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
5
6
6
6
5
7
8
4a
5a
3a
8
7
9
8
12
9
12
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a.
The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the
cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in
FY2008.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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