Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 25October 26, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21049
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Summary
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. attention to
terrorism in Latin America has intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation.
In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in August 2010), the State Department
maintained that terrorism in
the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in
Colombia and by the remnants
of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report
maintained that the threat of a
transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the
hemisphere. Cuba has
remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since
1982 pursuant to
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of
economic sanctions.
Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of
countries determined to be
not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to
Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past
several years about Venezuela’s
lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with
Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s
sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report
noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the
FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in
modern Latin America.
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United
States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the
sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated
information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s
increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist
attacks in Argentina.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a
report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House
approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994
AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to
curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the
Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which
included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in
the final enacted measure. Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R.
2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear
cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272
(Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism
list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of
terrorismPresident Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) on July 1, 2010, which includes a
provision making gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. (In 2009, Venezuela promised
to supply some gasoline to Iran in the case of U.S. sanctions.) In June 2010, the Senate
Committee on Armed Services reported S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011, with a provision requiring a report on Venezuela related to terrorism issues. In July
2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which condemned the 1994 AMIA
bombing in Buenos Aires, and urged Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the
activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. In June 2009, the House
approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, with a
provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere,
although the Senate has not taken action on the measure. Other introduced measures include H.R.
375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place
restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or
Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state
sponsors of terrorism list; H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state
sponsor of terrorism; and H.Con.Res. 295 (Ros-Lehtinen), which would again condemn the 1994
AMIA bombing.
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Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Contents
Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns .................................................................................1
Colombia ..............................................................................................................................1
Peru ......................................................................................................................................23
Cuba .....................................................................................................................................3
Venezuela .............................................................................................................................4
Iran’s Growing Relations with Latin AmericaIran ...........................................................................................6
Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions ..........................................................................5...7
Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay...............................................................9
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 10
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11 ......................................................................... 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 13
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Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and
Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or
overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war
on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and
international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their
causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about
terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained
that terrorism(issued in August
2010) maintained that terrorist attacks in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist
organizations in Colombia and
by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall,
however, the report maintained that the
threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
most countries in the hemisphere. The report also asserted that there were no know operational
cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but noted that
“ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean …continued to provide financial
aid and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.”1
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their
counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by
“corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack ofinsufficient interagency cooperation, weak
or non-existent or nonexistent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded
counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but
singled out
Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico for undertaking serious prevention and preparedness efforts,
but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism
deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United
States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law
enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining
elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the
leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership
of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the
increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking. Peace
talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000
members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC
renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the
terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and
investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial
benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return
all illicit profits Caribbean nations were reported to have strong
political will to combat terrorism despite limited resources and capabilities.
The State Department currently lists two Latin American countries—Cuba and Venezuela—on its
annual list of countries that are not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts”
pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. The most recent annual determination
was made in May 2010.2 In addition, Cuba has been on the State Department’s state sponsors of
terrorism list pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 since
1982. The state sponsors of terrorism list is not an annual list. Rather, countries remain on the list
until either the President or Congress take action to remove a country. The EAA sets forth
procedures for the President to remove a country from the list.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), remaining elements
1
U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” August 5, 2010, available at:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm
2
Department of State, "Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act," 75
Federal Register 28848, May 24, 2010.
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of the demobilized rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and the
leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters with diminished resources and
reduced offensive capability, but has continued to inflict casualties through the use of land mines
and continues to fund its operations through taxation of illegal crops, kidnapping, and extortion.
Past peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government ended in 2008.
With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal
organization, but some former AUC paramilitaries continued to engage in criminal activities,
mostly drug trafficking, in newly emerging criminal organizations (known as BACRIM, Bandas
Criminales Emergentes). According to the terrorism report, the Colombian government continued
to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which
offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their
crimes and return all illicit profits. Many former AUC members also were receiving some
reintegration benefits.
The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it,
including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command,
Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1,
2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of
a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held
hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003—Thomas Howes,
Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism
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report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008
and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among
FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.
Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit
(including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap
victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian
and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political
opponents in dozens of attacksWhile the 2009 terrorism report maintained that the
Colombian military’s momentum against the FARC slowed somewhat in 2009, the military dealt
a significant blow to the terrorist group in September 2010 when it killed a top military
commander in a bombing raid on his camp in southern Colombia.3 Desertions among the FARC
were just over 2,000 in 2009 compared to 3,000 in 2008, while current overall estimates of the
strength of the FARC is between 8,000-9,000. Despite the government’s campaign against the
FARC, the group continued a campaign of terrorist attacks, extortion, and kidnappings.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors,
—
Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, and Panama—according to the State Department’s terrorism report.
The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest,
recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and
productionrecuperation, medical aid, weapons and explosives
procurement, and coca processing. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remainbecame tense in the
aftermath of
Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory,
Ecuador’s
military has military increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.
Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to
rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance
their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not
systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of
armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and
ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the
hands of Colombian terrorist groups. In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially
assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report
maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have
entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to
closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to
Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest,
regroup, and make arms purchases
region. Nevertheless, according to the 2009 terrorism report, insufficient resources, corruption
among members of the Ecuadorian military and police, the challenging border region terrain, and
a tense bilateral relationship with Colombia have made it difficult to thwart cross-border
incursions. In 2010, under new Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the two countries were
reported to be making progress in improving bilateral relations.4
Both the FARC and the ELN reportedly crossed into Venezuelan territory regularly to rest and
regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their
3
4
Sibylla Bodzinsky, “With Honcho’s Death, Colombia’s FARC at Crossroads,” Miami Herald, September 24, 2010.
“Ecuador & Colombia: Making Progress,” Latin American Regional Report, Andean Group, September 2010.
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operations. According to the 2009 terrorism report, it remained unclear to what extent the
Venezuelan government of President Hugo Chávez provided support to the FARC and ELN. In
2010, outgoing Colombian President Álvaro Uribe asserted at the Organization of American
States that Venezuela was harboring FARC guerrillas. In response, Venezuela suspended
diplomatic relations on July 22, 2010, yet less than three weeks later new Colombian President
Santos met with Venezuelan President Chávez and the two leaders agreed to reestablish
diplomatic relations and to improve military patrols along their border.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State
has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader
Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison. According to the
current2009 State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the
Upper Upper
Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were
reported reported
to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and
carried out 64 carried
out more than 100 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians2009, with 3 police officers and 26 civilians killed.
As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the ColombianPeruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department
terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine
production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
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Cuba
Since 1982Cuba
As noted above, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism since 1982
(the other states
currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history
of supporting
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in
1992, then Cuban
leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a
thing of the past.
Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because
the breakup of the
Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The language in the State Department’s most recent terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much
more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba
no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.” While
the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several
terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it
notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of
Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also
notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding
without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their
abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live
legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or
Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban
government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since
2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of
hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those
who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist
acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s
continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea
and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention
from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban
Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most
recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was
accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement
in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but
was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press
reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role
in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1
1
Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and
“Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.
(continued...)
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In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would
remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress. For background, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism
List.
Venezuela
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not
“cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). The most recent determination was made in May 2009. As a result,
the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms
sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include
Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of
terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo
Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation
with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008
and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is
“out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior
FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008,
the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the
FARC’s drug trafficking activities.
As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants
of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort
protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan
government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the
movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of
weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have
ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as
noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain,
making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that
passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to
cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin
America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for
the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God),
which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos
Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of
(...continued)
Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More
Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
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two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress,
the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s
efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation
with Iran. (Also see “Iran’s Growing Relations with Latin America” and “Tri-Border Area of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay” below.)
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within
90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the
State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights
connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory
immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that
would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s
military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan
2009 terrorism report maintained that the Cuban government and its
official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism by Al Qaeda and its affiliates, but at the same
time remained critical of the U.S. approach to combating international terrorism. The report noted
that while Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America or elsewhere, that it
continued to provide physical safe haven and ideological support to members of three terrorist
organizations—Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and the Colombian FARC and ELN. The
report noted that Cuba cooperated with the United States on a limited number of law enforcement
matters, but also pointed out that the Cuban government continued to permit U.S. fugitives to live
legally in Cuba, including convicted murders and hijackers.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those
who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist
acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s
continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
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Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea
and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention
from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism
list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list
may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress
certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is
providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and
certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.
If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could
seek to block the rescission through legislation.
Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example,
legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), includes a provision that
would rescind the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban
Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most
recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was
accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement
in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but has
been rescheduled three times an is now scheduled to take place in January 2011.5 In early July
2010, Venezuelan authorities extradited to Cuba an alleged Posada associate, Francisco Chávez
Abarca, a Salvadoran national, who is charged with involvement in 1997 bombings in Havana.6
In Cuba, Chávez Abarca allegedly confessed that he was hired by Posada to plant the bombs in
Havana and was shown in videos reenacting one of the bombings.7
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress. For background, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism
List.
Venezuela8
U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of
cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for
Colombian terrorist groups, and Venezuela’s relations with Cuba and Iran. Since May 2006, the
5
“Cuban Militant’s Trial Set for Jan. 11,” San Angelo Standard-Times, June 5, 2010.
Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela Extradites Suspected Terrorist to Cuba to Face Bombing Charges,” AP Newswire,
July 7, 2010.
7
Frances Robles, “Mystery Man in Terror Plot Points at Miami Exiles,” Miami Herald, October 18, 2010.
8
For additional background on Venezuela, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues in the 111th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
6
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Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela has not been “cooperating
fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA). The most recent determination was made in May 2010. As a result, the
United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela in 2006, which ended all U.S. commercial
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include
Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of
terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
In its 2009 terrorism report (issued in August 2010), the State Department maintained that
President Chávez persisted in his public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and repeatedly
referred to the United States as a “terrorist nation.” It noted that Venezuela’s cooperation with the
United States on counterterrorism was reduced to an “absolute minimum” after the United States
and Colombia signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2009. The State Department also noted
that President Chávez continued to strengthen Venezuela’s relationship with Iran, and that both
countries continued weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas (see discussion
below on “Growing Relations with Iran”). The State Department also reiterated in its terrorism
report a concern that has been raised for several years—that Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and
travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially viable way for
terrorists to travel internationally.
The State Department also stated in its terrorism report that the FARC and ELN often crossed into
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap
Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The State Department maintained that some
weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities have turned up in the
hands of the FARC and ELN. As noted above, outgoing Colombian President Uribe asserted at
the OAS in July 2010 that Venezuela was harboring FARC guerrillas. While Venezuela suspended
diplomatic relations, less than three weeks later new Colombian President Santos met with
Venezuelan President Chávez and the two leaders agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations and to
improve military patrols along their border.
In the 111th Congress, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) on July 1, 2010, which includes a
provision making gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. As noted below, in 2009,
Venezuela promised to supply some gasoline to Iran in the case of U.S. sanctions (see discussion
below on “Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions”). In June 2010, the Senate Committee on
Armed Services reported S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, with a
provision requiring a report on Venezuela related to terrorism issues. In 2009, the House approved
H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009,
with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s
actions in the Western Hemisphere, but the Senate never considered the bill. On July 23, 2009,
the Senate had approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S.
1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to
provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and
Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th
Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions,
place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of
Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to
that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with
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countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October
27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its
alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
For additional information on Venezuela and terrorism concerns, see CRS Report R40938,
Venezuela: Issues in the 111th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Iran’s Growing Relations with Latin America
Over the past several years, U.S. officials and other observers have expressed concerns about
Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America, particularly under the government of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For example, in January 2009 congressional testimony, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates maintained that he was concerned about the level of “subversive activity
that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America, particularly South
America and Central America.”2
There has been some contention, however, over the level and significance of Iran’s linkages with
the region. One view emphasizes that Iran’s relations with several Latin American leaders who
have employed strong anti-U.S. rhetoric and its past support for terrorist activities in the region
are reasons why its presence should be considered a potential destabilizing threat to the region.
Another school of thought emphasizes that Iran’s domestic politics and strategic orientation
toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf region will preclude the country from sustaining a focus
on Latin America. Adherents of this view assert that Iran’s promised aid and investment to Latin
America have not materialized. Some observers holding both of these views contend that while
2
“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Challenges Facing the Defense Department,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, January 27, 2009.
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Iran’s activities in Latin America do not currently constitute a major threat to U.S. national
security, there is enough to be concerned about to keep a watchful eye on developments in case it
becomes a more serious threat. On October 27, 2009, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on “Iran in the Western Hemisphere” that reflected these
range of views.
Iran’s ties to the region precede its recent increased attention. Venezuela’s relations with Iran
have been longstanding because they were both founding members of OPEC in 1960. In the
aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran fostered closer relations with Cuba and with
Nicaragua (after the 1979 Sandinista revolution). Under the government of President Mohammed
Khatami (1997-2005), Iran made efforts to increase its trade with Latin America, particularly
Brazil, and there were also efforts to increase cooperation with Venezuela. Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez first visited Iran in 2001 and 2003 which ultimately led to a joint venture agreement
to produce tractors in Venezuela.3
Not until President Ahmadinejad’s rule began in 2005, however, did Iran aggressively work to
increase its diplomatic and economic linkages with Latin American countries. A major rationale
for this increased focus on Latin America appears to be Iran’s efforts to overcome its international
isolation. For some observers, a key reason for Ahmadinejad’s increased interest in the region,
especially with countries such as Venezuela, has been to develop leverage against the United
States in its own neighborhood, rather than any real economic interest in Latin America.4
The rise of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, a radical populist who has often employed strong
anti-U.S. rhetoric and advocated an anti-U.S. agenda, also has been a key factor in the increased
ties between Iran and Latin America. In February 2008 testimony before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Michael McConnell
maintained that most cooperation between Iran and Venezuela has been on the economic and
energy fronts, but that military cooperation is growing, and the two nations have discussed
cooperation on nuclear energy. 5 Iranian President Ahmadinejad has visited Caracas on several
occasions since 2006, most recently in November 2009, and President Chávez has visited Iran
several times, most recently in September 2009. The personal relationship between the two
leaders has driven the strengthening of bilateral ties. The two nations have signed a variety of
agreements in agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela,
and the manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. During an April 2009 trip to Tehran,
Chávez and Ahmadinejad inaugurated a new development bank for economic projects in both
countries, with each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital.6 Weekly flights
between the two countries began in 2007; the State Department has expressed concern about
these flights in its annual terrorism report, maintaining that the flights, which connect Iran and
Syria with Caracas, are only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls.
3
Farideh Farhi “Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?,” paper presented at conference of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C. July 10, 2008; Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran &
Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1, 2009.
4
Farideh Farhi, op. cit.
5
J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National
Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 5, 2008, p. 36.
6
Parisa Hafezi, “Iran and Venezuela Open Joint Bank to Boost Ties,” Reuters News, April 3, 2009.
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In September 2009, Venezuela and Iran signed three energy sector memorandums of
understanding during President Hugo Chávez’s visit to Tehran. As reported in the press, the first
of these agreements would provide for Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), to acquire a 10% stake in Iran’s South Pars gas project valued at some
$760 million. The second agreement would provide for Iran’s state oil company, Petropars, to
invest $760 million in developing two oil fields in Venezuela. Under the third agreement, in the
case of U.N. or U.S. sanctions against Iran’s gasoline imports, Venezuela would supply Iran with
gasoline (reportedly some 20,000 barrels per day) with the money earned from the gasoline sales
to be deposited to a fund that would be set up by Iran to finance Venezuelan purchases of Iranian
machinery and technology. 7
While such gasoline sales to Iran would not currently subject PdVSA to U.S. sanctions under the
Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), pending legislation that would amend the ISA (such as House-passed
H.R. 2194 and S. 908, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act) would change that. A number
of observers, however, have raised questions about whether Venezuela would have the ability to
provide gasoline to Iran since it needs to import gasoline to help meet its own domestic demand.
Venezuela reportedly has been facing significant refining problems because of mismanagement
and a drop in foreign investment.8 Moreover, while Venezuela potentially could use a third-party
gasoline supplier close to the Persian Gulf to purchase and resell the gasoline to Iran, finding a
third party could prove difficult if U.S. sanctions are imposed against suppliers of gasoline.9
Venezuelan comments about support for Iran’s nuclear program and about potential Iranian
support for the development of nuclear energy in Venezuela have raised concerns among U.S.
officials and other observers. President Chávez repeatedly has expressed support for Iran’s
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including most recently during a
September 2009 visit to Iran.10 President Chávez also announced during the visit that Venezuela
is working on a preliminary plan for the construction of a “nuclear village” in Venezuela with
Iranian assistance so that “the Venezuelan people can count in the future on this marvelous
resource for peaceful purposes.”11 The transfer of Iranian nuclear technology from Iran would be
a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions—1737 (2006), 1747 ( 2007), and 1803 (2008)—
that imposed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear technology transfers.
In late September 2009, comments by Venezuelan officials offered conflicting information about
Iran’s support for Venezuela’s search for uranium deposits. Venezuelan Minister of Basic Industry
and Mining Rodolfo Sanz said that Iran was assisting Venezuela in detecting uranium reserves in
the west and southwest of Venezuela.12 Subsequently, however, Venezuela’s Minister of Science,
Technology, and Intermediary Industry Jesse Chacon denied that Iran was helping Venezuela seek
7
“Venezuela Pledges to Help Iran with Investment, Gasoline Supplies,” The Oil Daily, September 10, 2009.
“Iran Sanctions (Special Series), Part 3, Preparing for the Worst,” Stratfor, September 25, 2009; “Venezuelan Oil
Expert Questions Viability of Chávez Energy Accords,” BBC Monitoring Americas, September 14, 2009.
9
“Iran, Venezuela: Testing the Mettle of an Alliance,” Stratfor, September 9, 2009.
10
“Visiting Chávez Backs Iran Nuclear Programme,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 5, 2009.
11
“Iran Will Not Back Down on Nuclear Energy: Hugo Chávez” Agence France Presse, September 4, 2009.
8
12
See the following press reports: “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus,
September 26, 2009; and “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 26,
2009.
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uranium, while Venezuela’s Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez maintained that Venezuela has yet
to develop a plan to explore or exploit its uranium deposits.13
To date, the United States has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela because of
connections to Iran’s proliferation activities. In August 2008, the State Department imposed
sanctions on the Venezuelan Military Industries Company (CAVIM) pursuant to the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353) for allegedly violating a ban on technology
that could assist Iran in the development of weapons systems. 14 The sanctions prohibit any U.S.
government procurement or assistance to the company. In October 2008, the U.S. Treasury
Department imposed sanctions on an Iranian-owned bank based in Caracas, the Banco
Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., under Executive Order 13382 that allows the President to block
the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The bank is linked
to the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), which the Treasury Department asserts has
provided or attempted to provide services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics.15
Venezuela also has played a key role in the development of Iran’s expanding relations with the
region. DNI Dennis Blair maintained in February 2009 congressional testimony that Venezuela
“is serving as a bridge to help Iran build relations with other Latin American countries.”16 In
recent years, Iran’s relations have grown with Bolivia under President Evo Morales, with Ecuador
under President Rafael Correa, and with Nicaragua under President Daniel Ortega. According to
the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in April 2009), President Morales
announced that Iran would help develop Bolivia’s petrochemical, cement fabrication, and
agricultural sectors. While Iran has promised significant assistance and investment to these
countries, observers maintain that there has been no evidence that such promises have
materialized. 17 In Nicaragua for example, Iran has not followed through with its promise to
finance the construction of a deep-water port. The only Iranian project that reportedly has gone
forward in Nicaragua is the construction of a hospital that began in September 2009.18 Likewise
in Bolivia and Ecuador, there is little evidence showing that Iran has followed up with its
promises of investment.
Nevertheless, on the diplomatic front, Iran has opened embassies over the past several years in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, as well as in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay. This is in addition
to having existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.19 Reports that
13
“Venezuela Denies Iran is Helping It,” New York Times, September 27, 2009; and Fabian Cambero, “Interview:
Venezuela Says No Plans Yet on Exploring Uranium,” Reuters, September 27, 2009.
14
Although the sanction became effective in August 2008, it was not published in the Federal Register until October
2008. See: Federal Register, pp. 63226-63227, October 23, 2008.
15
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Export Development Bank of Iran Designated as a Proliferator,”
October 22, 2008.
16
Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 12, 2009.
17
For example, see: Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran & Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1,
2009; and Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold
Never Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
18
Steve Stecklow and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Global Foray Has Mixed Results,” Wall Street Journal, September 28,
2009.
19
Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold Never
Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
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Iran was building a large embassy in Managua (which even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
noted in public remarks) turned out to be erroneous.20 As noted above, President Ahmadinejad
has visited Venezuela several times, and has also visited Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In
early May 2009, a scheduled first trip by Ahmadinejad to Brazil was unexpectedly postponed
until after Iran’s election in June. There had been some protests in Brazil against Ahmadinejad’s
visit, but the trip ultimately took place in November 2009. Brazilian President Lula da Silva
maintains that the West should not isolate Iran. On the same trip, the Iranian President once again
visited Bolivia and Venezuela.21
In 2007, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon said that
one of the concerns about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America is that Iran is a major
supporter of the radical Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. According to Shannon, “What
worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links to Hezbollah and the
terrorist attack that took place in Buenos Aires [in 1994].”22 In March 2009 congressional
testimony, Admiral James G. Stavridis, then commander of the U.S. Southern Command
(Southcom), also asserted that the main concern about Iran’s increased activity in Latin America
is its links to Hezbollah. He maintained that there was Hezbollah activity throughout South
America, particularly the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay as well as parts of
Brazil and the Caribbean Basin.23 (See “Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay”
below.)
Growing Relations with Iran
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s growing interest in Latin America,
particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Chávez. Venezuela’s relations with Iran
have been longstanding because they were both founding members of OPEC in 1960, but not
until President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rule began in 2005, however, did Iran aggressively work
to increase its diplomatic and economic linkages with Latin American countries. A major
rationale for this increased focus on Latin America appears to be Iran’s efforts to overcome its
international isolation. The personal relationship between Ahmadinejad and Chávez has driven
the strengthening of bilateral ties. The two nations have signed a variety of agreements in
agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the
manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. During an April 2009 trip to Tehran, Chávez
and Ahmadinejad inaugurated a new development bank for economic projects in both countries,
with each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital.
Weekly flights between the two countries began in 2007. As noted above, the State Department
has expressed concern about these flights in its annual terrorism report, maintaining that the
flights, which connect Iran and Syria with Caracas, are only subject to cursory immigration and
customs controls. There were press reports in September 2010 that the weekly flights had been
cancelled, but is unclear whether this is the case or whether the flights were affected by the
temporary suspension of all flights by the Venezuelan carrier Conviasa after one of its planes on a
domestic flight crashed in mid-September 2010.9
An April 2010 unclassified Department of Defense report to Congress on Iran’s military power
(required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84)
maintained that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which
maintains operational capabilities around the world, has increased its presence in Latin America
in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.10 Despite the report, the commander of the U.S.
Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, maintains that the focus of Iran in the region has
been diplomatic and commercial, and that he has not seen an increase in Iran’s military presence
in the region.11
Venezuela also has played a key role in the development of Iran’s expanding relations with other
countries in the region. In recent years, Iran’s relations have grown with Bolivia under President
Evo Morales, with Ecuador under President Rafael Correa, and with Nicaragua under President
Daniel Ortega. While Iran has promised significant assistance and investment to these countries,
9
“Venezuela State Airline Suspends Flights for 2 Weeks to Review Procedures after Plane Crash,” AP Newswire,
September 17, 2010.
10
Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010. For the full text of the report,
see: http://www.politico.com/static/PPM145_link_042010.html. For background on the Qods Force, see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
11
Anne Flaherty, “Pentagon Says Iran’s Reach in Latin America Doesn’t Pose Military Threat,” AP Newswire, April
27, 2010.
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observers maintain that there is little evidence to show that such promises have been fulfilled. 12 In
Nicaragua for example, Iran has not followed through on its promise to finance the construction
of a deep-water port. An Iranian project that has gone forward in Nicaragua is the construction of
a hospital that began in September 2009.13 Likewise in Bolivia and Ecuador, there has been little
evidence showing that Iran has followed up on its promises of investment. Nevertheless, in late
August 2010, Iran announced that it would provide a $250 million loan to Bolivia for the
construction of dairy, textile cement and other plants, and geological prospecting for minerals
such as uranium and lithium. 14
On the diplomatic front, Iran has opened embassies over the past several years in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, as well as in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay. This is in addition to
existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.15 Reports that Iran was
building a large embassy in Managua, Nicaragua (which even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
noted in public remarks) turned out to be erroneous.16 As noted above, President Ahmadinejad has
visited Venezuela several times, and has also visited Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In
early May 2009, a scheduled first trip by Ahmadinejad to Brazil was unexpectedly postponed
until after Iran’s election in June. There had been some protests in Brazil against Ahmadinejad’s
visit, but the trip ultimately took place in November 2009. Brazilian President Lula da Silva
maintains that the West should not isolate Iran. On the same trip, the Iranian President once again
visited Bolivia and Venezuela.17
Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions
To date, the United States has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela because of
connections to Iran’s proliferation activities. In August 2008, the State Department imposed
sanctions on the Venezuelan Military Industries Company (CAVIM) pursuant to the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353) for allegedly violating a ban on technology
that could assist Iran in the development of weapons systems. 18 The sanctions prohibit any U.S.
government procurement or assistance to the company. In October 2008, the U.S. Treasury
Department imposed sanctions on an Iranian-owned bank based in Caracas, the Banco
Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., under Executive Order 13382 that allows the President to block
the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The bank is linked
to the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), which the Treasury Department asserts has
12
For example, see: Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran & Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1,
2009; and Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold
Never Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
13
Steve Stecklow and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Global Foray Has Mixed Results,” Wall Street Journal, September 28,
2009.
14
“Iran Announces 250m Dollar-Loan to Bolivia to Assist Uranium Prospecting,” BBC Monitoring Americas,
September 1, 2010.
15
Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold Never
Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
16
Ibid; and Sylvie Lanteaume, “Iran’s Hand in Latin America Not as U.S. Feared,” Agence France Presse, July 14,
2009.
17
Juan Forero, “Ahmadinejad Boosts Latin American Ties,” Washington Post, November 28, 2009.
18
Although the sanction became effective in August 2008, it was not published in the Federal Register until October
2008. See Federal Register, pp. 63226-63227, October 23, 2008.
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provided or attempted to provide services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics.19
In September 2009, during President Chávez’s visit to Tehran, Venezuela and Iran signed several
energy sector memorandums of understanding. As reported in the press, one of these agreements
would provide for Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA),
to acquire a 10% stake in Iran’s South Pars gas project valued at some $760 million. Such
investment, if it occurs, would appear to subject PdVSA to sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act
(P.L. 104-172). Under another accord, Venezuela agreed to help Iran circumvent any potential
U.S. or UN sanctions against Iranian gasoline imports by supplying Iran with gasoline (reportedly
some 20,000 barrels per day) with the money earned from the gasoline sales to be deposited to a
fund that would be set up by Iran to finance Venezuelan purchases of Iranian machinery and
technology.20 Under new Iran sanctions legislation signed into law July 1, 2010 (P.L. 111-195,
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010), gasoline sales to
Iran valued at more than $1 million (or $5 million over a 12-month period) would subject PdVSA
to U.S. sanctions.21 A number of observers have raised questions about whether Venezuela would
have the ability to provide significant amounts of gasoline to Iran since it has had problems in the
past meeting its own domestic demands for gasoline. 22 In late July 2010, press reports maintained
that that a gasoline shipment from Venezuela was headed to Iran as part of a deal agreed to in
2009.23
Venezuelan comments about support for Iran’s nuclear program and about potential Iranian
support for the development of nuclear energy in Venezuela have raised concerns among U.S.
officials and other observers. President Chávez repeatedly has expressed support for Iran’s
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including during a September 2009 visit to
Iran.24 President Chávez also announced during the visit that Venezuela is working on a
preliminary plan for the construction of a “nuclear village” in Venezuela with Iranian assistance
so that “the Venezuelan people can count in the future on this marvelous resource for peaceful
purposes.”25 The transfer of Iranian nuclear technology from Iran would be a violation of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions—1737 (2006), 1747 ( 2007), and 1803 (2008)—that imposed
restrictions on Iran’s nuclear technology transfers. In late September 2010, President Chávez
maintained that his government was carrying out initial studies into starting a nuclear energy
program while in mid-October 2010, Russia agreed to help Venezuela build its first nuclear power
plant.26
19
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Export Development Bank of Iran Designated as a Proliferator,”
October 22, 2008.
20
“Venezuela Pledges to Help Iran with Investment, Gasoline Supplies,” The Oil Daily, September 10, 2009.
21
For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
22
“Iran Sanctions (Special Series), Part 3, Preparing for the Worst,” Stratfor, September 25, 2009; “Venezuelan Oil
Expert Questions Viability of Chávez Energy Accords,” BBC Monitoring Americas, September 14, 2009; and
Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela in No Position to Boost Iran Oil Exports,” Reuters News, July 26, 2010.
23
Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela in No Position to Boost Iran Oil Exports,” Reuters News, July 26, 2010; and Amena
Bakr and Luke Pachymuthu, “Iran Fuel Imports Nosedive as Sanction Bite,” Reuters News, July 26, 2010.
24
“Visiting Chávez Backs Iran Nuclear Programme,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 5, 2009.
25
“Iran Will Not Back Down on Nuclear Energy: Hugo Chávez” Agence France Presse, September 4, 2009.
26
“Hugo Chávez Says Venezuela Is Studying Idea of Starting Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program,” AP Newswire,
September 28, 2010; “Russia to Build Nuclear Power Plant in Venezuela,” Reuters News, October 15, 2010.
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In late September 2009, comments by Venezuelan officials offered conflicting information about
Iran’s support for Venezuela’s search for uranium deposits. Venezuelan Minister of Basic Industry
and Mining Rodolfo Sanz said that Iran was assisting Venezuela in detecting uranium reserves in
the west and southwest of Venezuela.27 Subsequently, however, Venezuela’s Minister of Science,
Technology, and Intermediary Industry Jesse Chacon denied that Iran was helping Venezuela seek
uranium, while Venezuela’s Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez maintained that Venezuela has yet
to develop a plan to explore or exploit its uranium deposits.28 U.N Security Council Resolution
1929 (June 9, 2010) bars Iranian investment in uranium mining projects abroad.
Another reason for U.S. concerns about Iran’s deepening relations with Venezuela is Iran’s ties to
the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have
been linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s (see “TriBorder Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay” below). On June 18, 2008, the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it was freezing the U.S.
assets of two Venezuelans—Ghazi Nasr al Din (a Venezuelan diplomat serving in Lebanon) and
Fawzi Kan’an—for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. U.S. citizens are also
prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the two Venezuelans, including any business
with two travel agencies in Caracas owned by Kan’an.
Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim
Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the tri-border area (TBA) of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has a large Muslim population. The TBA has long been
used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and currency fraud, money
laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods. A 2009 RAND study examines
how Hezbollah has benefitted from film piracy proceeds in the tri-border.2429 The State Department
terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas
sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable were participating illicit activities and soliciting donations from sympathizers in the sizable
Middle Eastern communities in the region, but
stated that there was no corroborated information
that these or other Islamic extremist groups had
an operational presence in the area.
Allegationsregion.
As noted above, allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992
bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of
the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. In
November 2006, an
Argentine judge issued arrest warrants in the AMIA case for nine individuals:
an internationally
wanted Hezbollah militant from Lebanon, Imad Mughniyah, and eight Iranian government
government officials, including former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Interpol subsequently posted a
20
Ibid; and Sylvie Lanteaume, “Iran’s Hand in Latin America Not as U.S. Feared,” Agence France Presse, July 14,
2009.
21
Juan Forero, “Ahmadinejad Boosts Latin American Ties,” Washington Post, November 28, 2009.
22
Andres Oppenheimer, “Beware Iran in Latin America,” Miami Herald, September 30, 2007.
23
“Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Subject: United States Southern Command, United States
Northern Command, United States Africa Command and United States Transportation Command,” Federal News
Service, March 17, 2009.
24
subsequently posted a Red Notice for Mughniyah, and in November 2007, its General Assembly
voted to approve notices for five of the Iranians wanted by Argentina (not including Rafsanjani).
The action had been held up since March 2007, when Iran appealed the decision by Interpol’s
Executive Committee to issue the notices. In February 2008, Imad Mughniyah was killed by a car
27
See the following press reports: “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus,
September 26, 2009; and “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 26,
2009.
28
“Venezuela Denies Iran is Helping It,” New York Times, September 27, 2009; and Fabian Cambero, “Interview:
Venezuela Says No Plans Yet on Exploring Uranium,” Reuters, September 27, 2009.
29
Gregory F. Treverton et al, Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, RAND, 2009.
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Red Notice for Mughniyah, and in November 2007, its General Assembly voted to approve
notices for five of the Iranians wanted by Argentina (not including Rafsanjani). The action had
been held up since March 2007, when Iran appealed the decision by Interpol’s Executive
Committee to issue the notices. In February 2008, Imad Mughniyah was killed by a car bomb in
bomb in Damascus, Syria. In December 2008, an Argentine judge in a civil suit against the Iranian
Iranian suspects ordered the attachment of six commercial properties in Argentina owned by a former
former Iranian cultural attaché who is one of the suspects in the AMIA bombing.
According to Argentina’s Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman, appointed to lead the AMIA
investigation in 2004, the AMIA case is still alive and progressing. To date, $1.5 million in
Iranian assets have been seized and the seizure of more than $600 million in assets is pending;
such funds would help cover restitution to the families of the victims and material damage from
the bombing. 2530 In October 2009, an Argentine judge charged former President Carlos Menem, his
brother Munir Menem, former Judge Juan José Galeano, and several other high-ranking former
police and intelligence officials with obstructing the AMIA investigation and protecting suspects.
Trials of the former officials are expected to proceed in 2010. In In March 2010, an Argentine federal court confirmed that the prosecutions could go forward. In
December 2009, an Argentine
judge ordered reopening the case of Carlos Telleldín, a mechanic
alleged to have prepared the car
bomb used in the AMIA attack.2631
Over the years, the U.S. Congress has continued to express concern about progress in Argentina’s
investigation of the 1994 AMIA bombing, with the House often passing resolutions on the issue
around the time of the anniversary of the bombing on July 18. In the 110th Congress, H.Con.Res.
188 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved by the House by voice vote on July 30, 2007, applauded the
Argentine government for increasing the pace of the AMIA investigation, and called upon the
General Assembly of Interpol to issue red notices for five Iranians implicated in the bombing;
H.Con.Res. 385 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved by the House by voice vote on July 15, 2008,
condemned the AMIA bombing, and urged Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to
curb activities that support Hezbollah and other Islamist terrorist organizations. Another
resolution, H.Res. 435 (Klein), approved November 5, 2007, by voice vote, expressed concern
over the emerging national security implications of Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin
America, and emphasized the importance of eliminating Hezbollah’s financial network in the triborder area of South America. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved
July 17, 2009, again condemns the AMIA bombing and urges Western Hemisphere governments
to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groupsIn the 111th
Congress, H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved July 17, 2009, again condemned the AMIA
bombing and urged Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that
support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. H.Con.Res. 295 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced
July 1, 2010, would again condemn the AMIA attack, applaud Argentina’s ongoing efforts in the
investigation, and urge Western Hemisphere governments who have not done so already to draft,
adopt, and implement legislation designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
U.S. Policy
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean
nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the
region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador
with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla
insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat
terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism
25assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the
OAS. Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that
assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the Andean region has also been a
30
Presentation by Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington D.C.,
December 2, 2009.
2631
“Ordenan reabrir juicio a mecánico argentino absuelto por atentado a la AMIA,” Agence France Presse, December
15, 2009.
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assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the
OAS. Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that
assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means
means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same
same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region.
Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years,
attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against
terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of
U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism
assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and
rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral
relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United
States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC)
and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation
of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the
blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the
effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the
United States has about them. As noted above, the United States has included Cuba on its list of
state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and
Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism
capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State,
including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these program is the ATA program that over the years has provided training and
equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport
security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering
terrorism financing. Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two
bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those
countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in
FY2008, $9.3 million in FY2009, and an estimated $9.3 million in FY2009. For FY2010, the FY2010. For FY2011, the
Administration requested
$16.4 $12.75 million for Latin American countries, with $64.5 million for
Mexico, $4.42.25 million for
Colombia, and $6 million for assistance to other countries through a regional program. The
FY2010 budget request states that ATA assistance for Central and South America enhances border
control and provides fraudulent document training$2 million for Caribbean countries under the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and $4 million for other Latin American countries through a
regional program.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent
states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million
in EXBS assistance in FY2008, $2.1 million in FY2009, and an estimated $2.1925 million in FY2009. The FY2010 request is
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for $2.9
FY2010. The FY2011 request is for $7.950 million for assistance to Mexico, ArgentinaArgentina, Caribbean
countries under the CBSI, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and a regional
program.
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CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial
networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while in FY2009, an
estimated $225,000 was provided. The FY2010 request is for $875,000, with assistance for
Mexico, Colombia, and$225,000 was
provided in FY2009, largely to Mexico, and an estimated $460,000 is being provided in FY2010
for countries under a regional program.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that
enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land or sea ports of entry.
No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but for FY2010 the
Administration requested $1.3 million for a Western Hemisphere regional, an estimated
$1.3 million is being provided for a Western Hemisphere regional program. The FY2011 request
is for $1 million for a regional funding program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The
Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS
uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are
identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a
program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and
interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is
operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and
Panama.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that
facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. To date,
TTUs have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also workshas worked closely with the governments of the tri-border area—
Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay—through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,”
established in 2002 to
serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries.
Argentina hosted the fifth plenary session of the 3+1 mechanism in December 2006 that focused
on such issues as early warning among states, information exchange in order to prevent illegal
activity, and the denial of refuge to those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism.
all four countries.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation
against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly
condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat
terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September
19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also
known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s
defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on
Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and
punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support
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to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent
future terrorist acts.”
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In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has
cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law
enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE
meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen
hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures. At
the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their
commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport,
and cyber security. CICTE’s seventh regular session in Panama in February/March 2007 focused
on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region. In March 2008, CICTE’s eighth regular
session held in Washington D.C. focused on cyber security, document security and fraud
prevention, and port security. CICTE’s ninth regular session held in Washington, D.C. in March
2009 focused on the topic of strengthening border controls. CICTE’s 10th regular session is
planned for March 17-19, 2010, in Washington, DC; a featured topic on the agenda is publicprivatewas held
in Washington, D.C. in March 2010, and focused on public-private partnerships in the fight
against terrorism.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The
Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits
parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of
terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention
to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee
formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005,
the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its
instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
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