Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
October 21December 22, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS20643
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
CVN-78 and CVN-79 are the first two ships in the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled to enter
service in 2015. The ship’s procurement cost is estimated in the proposed FY2010 budget at
$10,846 million in then-year dollars—$389 million (about 3.7%) more than the estimate in the
FY2009 budget. Although CVN-78 was procured in FY2008, it is being funded with four-year
incremental funding across FY2008-FY2011. The proposed FY2010 requests $739.3 million in
procurement funding to help complete the ship’s procurement cost. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) reported in June 2008 that it estimates that CVN-78 will cost about $900 million
more than the Navy estimates, and that if “CVN-78 experienced cost growth similar to that of
other lead ships that the Navy has purchased in the past 10 years, costs could be much higher
still.” The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other observers have expressed concern
that difficulties in developing the CVN-78’s new electromagnetic aircraft catapult (called the
electromagnetic aircraft launch system, or EMALS), could delay the schedule for building the
ship and increase the ship’s construction cost. GAO highlighted the issue in a March 2009 report
to Congress. The issue was the subject of a July 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
CVN-79 was scheduled under the FY2009 budget to be procured in FY2012. Under the proposed
FY2010 budget, the ship’s procurement would be deferred one year, to FY2013. CVN-79’s
procurement cost was estimated in the FY2009 budget at about $9.2 billion in then-year dollars.
The ship has been receiving advance procurement (AP) funding since FY2007 (including about
$1.2 billion in AP funding in FY2009). The proposed FY2010 budget requests $484.4 million in
AP funding for the ship. (The FY2009 budget had projected that about $807 million would be
requested in FY2010.) Deferring CVN-79’s procurement to FY2013 has almost certainly
increased the ship’s estimated procurement cost, but the Navy has not released a new cost
estimate for the ship.
One potential FY2010 issue for Congress is whether to approve DOD’s proposal to defer CVN79’s procurement to FY2013, or instead maintain FY2012 as the ship’s year of procurement. A
second potential FY2010 issue for Congress is whether to provide a legislative waiver permitting
the Navy’s carrier force to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10 ships during a 33-month
period between 2012 (when the aging aircraft carrier Enterprise [CVN-65] is scheduled to retire)
and 2015 (when CVN-78 is scheduled to enter service as its replacement).
Section 1022 of H.R. 2647 and Section 1011 of S. 1390 (the House- and Senate- reported
versions of the FY2010 defense authorization bill) would authorize a waiver to 10 USC 5062(b),
so as to permit the Navy’s carrier force to decline from 11 ships to 10 between the
decommissioning of the Enterprise (CVN-65) and the commissioning of CVN-78. Section 122 of
H.R. 2647 would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional
defense committees on the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction of Ford-class
aircraft carriers, and prohibit the Navy from using FY2010 research and development or advance
procurement funding for CVN-79 for activities that would limit the Navy’s ability to award a
construction contract for CVN-79 in FY2012 or CVN-80 in FY2016.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24,
2009 and S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009, respectively) on the FY2010 Department of
Defense (DOD) appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), both recommend approving the Navy’s request
for FY2010 In the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009), Section
124(b), permits the Navy to use advance procurement funding provided for CVN-79 in FY2010
and subsequent years for advance construction activities. Section 126 requires the Secretary of the
Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the effects of using a fiveyear interval for the construction of Ford-class aircraft carriers. Section 1023 authorizes a waiver
to 10 USC 5062(b), so as to permit the Navy’s carrier force to decline from 11 ships to 10
between the decommissioning of the Enterprise (CVN-65) and the commissioning of CVN-78,
and requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the operational risk of temporarily
reducing the size of the carrier force. Section 1076 expresses the sense of the Congress regarding
carrier air wing force structure.
The explanatory statement on the final version of the FY2010 DOD appropriations act (H.R.
3326/P.L., 111-118 of December 19, 2009) approves the Administration’s FY2010 request for
procurement and advance procurement funding for the CVN-78 program.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................1
The Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force .........................................................................................1
Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base.........................................................................1
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class Program ..............................................................................2
CVN-78 ..........................................................................................................................2
CVN-79 ..........................................................................................................................5
CVN-80 ..........................................................................................................................5
Procurement Cost Cap.....................................................................................................6
Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................6
Proposed Deferral of CVN-79 Procurement to FY2013 .........................................................6
Legislative Waiver For Temporary Decline to 10-Carrier Force .............................................7
Legislative Activity for FY2010 ..................................................................................................8
Defense Authorization BillAct (H.R. 2647/S. 1390)..P.L. 111-84)..................................................................8
House .............................................................................................................................8
Senate........................................................................................................................... 12
Conference.................................................................................................................... 13
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326)/P.L. 111-118) ........................................... 16
House ..................... 16
House ...................................................................................................... 16
Senate..................... 16
Senate...................................................................................................... 16
Final Version................................................................................................................. 16
Tables
Table A-1. Funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80 in FY2009 Budget ............................................... 1718
Appendixes
Appendix A. CVN-78 Funding in FY2009 Budget .................................................................... 1718
Appendix B. July 16, 2009, Hearing on EMALS ....................................................................... 1819
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 2324
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
CVN-78 and CVN-79 are the first two ships in the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).
One potential FY2010 issue for Congress concerning the CVN-78 program is whether to approve
DOD’s proposal to defer CVN-79’s procurement to FY2013, or instead maintain FY2012 as the
ship’s year of procurement. Congress’s decision on this issue could affect, among other things,
the amount of AP funding that Congress provides for the ship in FY2010.
A second potential FY2010 issue for Congress is whether to provide a legislative waiver
permitting the Navy’s carrier force to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10 ships during a 33month period between 2012 (when the aging aircraft carrier Enterprise [CVN-65] is scheduled to
retire) and 2015 (when CVN-78 is scheduled to enter service as its replacement). The Navy asked
for such a waiver in the FY2008 and FY2009 budgets. Congress each time did not grant the
waiver, and the Navy has asked for it again as part of the FY2010 budget. Congress’s decision on
whether to grant the waiver could affect FY2010 maintenance-related funding requirements for
the Enterprise.
Background
The Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force
The Navy’s aircraft carrier force consists of 11 nuclear-powered ships—the one-of-a-kind
Enterprise (CVN-65) and 10 Nimitz-class ships (CVNs 68 through 77). The most recently
commissioned carrier, the George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), the final Nimitz-class ship, was
procured in FY2001 and commissioned into service on January 10, 2009.1 CVN-77 replaced the
Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which was the Navy’s last remaining conventionally powered carrier. 2
Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base
All U.S. aircraft carriers procured since FY1958 have been built by Newport News Shipbuilding
of Newport News, VA, a shipyard that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
Newport News is the only U.S. shipyard that can build large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers. The aircraft carrier construction industrial base also includes hundreds of subcontractors
and suppliers in dozens of states.
1
Congress approved $4,053.7 million in FY2001 procurement funding to complete CVN-77’s then-estimated total
procurement cost of $4,974.9 million. Section 122 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of
November 18, 1997) limited the ship’s procurement cost to $4.6 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other
factors. The Navy testified in 2006 that with these permitted adjustments, the cost cap stood at $5.357 billion. The
Navy also testified that CVN-77’s estimated construction cost had increased to $6.057 billion, or $700 million above
the adjusted cost cap. Consequently, the Navy in 2006 requested that Congress increase the cost cap to $6.057 billion.
Congress approved this request: Section 123 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of
October 17, 2006), increased the cost cap for CVN-77 to $6.057 billion.
2
The Kitty Hawk was decommissioned on January 31, 2009.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class Program
The Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class carrier design is the successor to the Nimitz-class design. 3
Compared to the Nimitz-class design, the Ford-class design will incorporate several
improvements, including an ability to generate substantially more aircraft sorties per day and
features permitting the ship to be operated by several hundred fewer sailors than a Nimitz-class
ship, significantly reducing life-cycle operating and support costs. Navy plans call for procuring
at least three Ford-class carriers—CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80.
CVN-78
Overview
CVN-78, which was named in 2007 for president Gerald R. Ford,4 was procured in FY2008 and
is scheduled to enter service in 2015 as the replacement for Enterprise (CVN-65), which is
scheduled to retire in 2012, at age 52. The Navy projects that there will be a 33-month period
between the scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in November 2012 and the scheduled
commissioning of CVN-78 in September 2015. During this 33-month period, the Navy’s carrier
force is to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10.
CVN-78’s procurement cost was estimated in the FY2009 budget at about $10,457 million in
then-year dollars. This figure included about $2.4 billion in detailed design and non-recurring
engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the CVN-78 class, and about $8.1 billion to build CVN-78 itself.
(Including the DD/NRE costs for a ship class in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class
is a traditional Navy ship procurement budgeting practice.) CVN-78 in the FY2009 budget also
had about $3.3 billion in research and development costs, much of which is also for the class as a
whole. These research and development costs brought the ship’s total estimated acquisition (i.e.,
research and development plus procurement) cost in the FY2009 budget to about $13.7 billion.
The proposed FY2010 budget estimates CVN-78’s procurement cost at about $10,846 million in
then-year dollars—$389 million (or about 3.7%) more than the estimate in the FY2009 budget.
Although CVN-78 was procured in FY2008, it is being funded with four-year incremental
funding across FY2008-FY2011. This is consistent with Section 121 of the FY2007 defense
authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), which granted the Navy the
authority to use four-year incremental funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. The proposed
FY2010 budget requests $739.3 million in procurement funding to help complete the ship’s
procurement cost.
3
The CVN-78 class was earlier known as the CVN-21 class, which meant nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for the 21st
century.
4
Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) expressed the
sense of the Congress that CVN-78 should be named for president Gerald R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy
announced that CVN-78 would be so named. CVN-78 and other carriers built to the same design will consequently be
referred to as Ford (CVN-78) class carriers. For further discussion of Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478,
Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Potential for Cost Growth
Both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
have questioned the accuracy of the Navy’s cost estimate for CVN-78. CBO reported in June
2008 that it estimates that CVN-78 will cost $11.2 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, or about
$900 million more than the Navy’s estimate of $10.3 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, and that
if “CVN-78 experienced cost growth similar to that of other lead ships that the Navy has
purchased in the past 10 years, costs could be much higher still.” CBO also reported that,
although the Navy publicly expresses confidence in its cost estimate for CVN-78, the Navy had
assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the Navy believes there
is more than a 50% chance that the estimate will be exceeded. 5 GAO reported in August 2007
that:
Costs for CVN 78 will likely exceed the budget for several reasons. First, the Navy’s cost
estimate, which underpins the budget, is optimistic. For example, the Navy assumes that
CVN 78 will be built with fewer labor hours than were needed for the previous two carriers.
Second, the Navy’s target cost for ship construction may not be achievable. The
shipbuilder’s initial cost estimate for construction was 22 percent higher than the Navy’s cost
target, which was based on the budget. Although the Navy and the shipbuilder are working
on ways to reduce costs, the actual costs to build the ship will likely increase above the
Navy’s target. Third, the Navy’s ability to manage issues that affect cost suffers from
insufficient cost surveillance. Without effective cost surveillance, the Navy will not be able
to identify early signs of cost growth and take necessary corrective action.6
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS)
The Navy faces challenges in developing certain new technologies intended for CVN-78,
particularly the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)—an electromagnetic (as
opposed to the traditional steam-powered) aircraft catapult. Problems in developing EMALS or
other technologies could delay the ship’s completion and increase its development and/or
procurement cost. GAO reported in March 2009 that:
Nine of the CVN 21 program’s 14 critical technologies are not yet fully mature. Of these
technologies, EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar present the
greatest risk to the ship’s cost and schedule. Problems during EMALS development have
already resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. In order to meet CVN 78’s delivery
date, the Navy adopted a strategy that will test, produce, and ultimately install EMALS with
a high degree of concurrency. In September 2008, the contractor completed the first round of
high-cycle testing, gaining confidence in the performance of the generator—a source of past
problems. Contractor-led integrated land-based system testing will not be complete until the
end of fiscal year 2011—2-years later than estimated in December 2007. Assuming no
further delays, EMALS will not demonstrate full performance of a shipboard ready system
5
Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, June 9, 2008,
p. 20.
6
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier
Gerald R. Ford within Budget, GAO-07-866, August 2007, summary page. See also Government Accountability
Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of
Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, July 24, 2007 (GAO07-943T), p. 15.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
until at least 7 months after installation on CVN 78 has begun. The advanced arresting gear
has completed early verification tests that proved the system’s concept. Integrated land-based
testing with both simulated and live aircraft has slipped by one year since last year’s
assessment and is now scheduled for 2010. The Navy recently postponed delivery of the
arresting gear to the shipyard. Consequently, the shipbuilder will not install the gear prior to
laying the flight deck—a less optimal and more costly approach to building the ship. The
dual band radar—which includes the volume search and multifunction radars—is being
developed as part of the DDG 1000 program. While the multifunction radar has been tested
at sea, considerable testing remains for the volume search radar. Land-based tests of the
volume search radar prototype will not be completed until May 2009—2 years later than
planned. Upcoming land-based tests will be conducted at a lower voltage than needed to
meet requirements—and without the radome (the radar’s composite shield). Full power
output will not be tested on a complete system until 2012. Tests of carrier-specific
functionality will not conclude until shortly before shipyard delivery in 2013 leaving little
time to resolve problems before ship installation....
The program has faced challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the
receipt of technical information on EMALS and the advanced arresting gear; however, the
Navy believes this issue has been largely resolved. The shipbuilder anticipates changes to
CVN 78’s design based on the results of EMALS testing....
A February 2008 program assessment recommended a number of changes to the EMALS
program to improve performance. The Navy re-planned the test program and changed the
management approach. The CVN 21 program office is now responsible for overseeing
EMALS production and ship integration, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command. In
addition, EMALS will no longer be provided as government-purchased equipment. Instead,
the shipbuilder will purchase EMALS, giving it a more direct role in managing the
integration on CVN 78. The cost impact of this change has not been finalized.7
Navy officials testified on April 1, 2009, that they were reviewing the EMALS situation and that
“We do not see that it will have an impact on the actual schedule of the carrier at this point in
time.”8 On April 16, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had decided, based on its review of the
situation, to continue with the plan to build CVN-78 with EMALS.9
7
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09326SP, March 2009, pp. 68.
8
They stated that “We're looking at all options. There has been cost growth to the EMALS system. We're looking at—
at the total cost of acquisition and life cycle for EMALS and steam [catapults]. We're looking at schedule and what
does—does that do if we went back to steam [catapults] on CVN-78. What would that do to schedules? We’re in the
process of getting information from industry so that we can make an informed decision and we’ve had independent
technical looks at it within the department.” They also stated that “The technology itself is not new, but it’s the
application in the aircraft carrier [that’s new]. And so there is a lot of rigor we want to go through for component
testing so that we understand the reliability of the components as well as system testing. We are in the component
testing phase right now. We have seen minor issues in testing which we've been able to resolve. But there is some
concurrency with the schedules [for EMALS development and CVN-78 construction] and that’s one of the things we
want to evaluate going forward. Is the [EMALS] development schedule still ongoing? How do we—how do we
mitigate the risk to this carrier schedule so that that does (inaudible). Right now, we don’t see an impact to the carrier
schedule.” The Navy officials testified that they were waiting to receive an estimate from Northrop Grumman Newport
News on the potential cost impact of shifting to steam catapults for CVN-78. They stated that: “Right now, Mr.
Chairman, the plan is—is to go to EMALS, or to continue with Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System. That’s
going to be briefed to the CNO and the acting secretary here in the next week to 10 days.” (Source: Transcript of
spoken testimony of Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy [Ship Programs], and [for the final quote]
Vice Admiral Bernard McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, at
an April 1, 2009, hearing on Navy shipbuilding before the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee. The comments by Stiller and McCullough came in response to questions on the EMALS issue posed by
(continued...)
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The EMALS development effort was the subject of a July 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower
and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Materials from
this hearing are presented in Appendix B.
CVN-79
CVN-79 was scheduled under the FY2009 budget to be procured in FY2012. Under the proposed
FY2010 budget, the ship’s procurement would be deferred one year, to FY2013.10 CVN-79’s
procurement cost was estimated in the FY2009 budget at about $9.2 billion in then-year dollars.
After factoring out inflation, this figure equates to something a bit less than the FY2009 budget’s
estimate of $8.1 billion to build CVN-78 itself. The ship has been receiving advance procurement
(AP) funding since FY2007 (including about $1.2 billion in AP funding in FY2009). The
proposed FY2010 budget requests $484.4 million in AP funding for the ship. (The FY2009
budget had projected that about $807 million would be requested in FY2010.) Deferring CVN79’s procurement to FY2013 has almost certainly increased the ship’s estimated procurement
cost, but the Navy has not released a new cost estimate for the ship. Deferring CVN-79’s
procurement to FY2013 may have also increased the cost of Virginia-class submarines under
construction at the same shipyard.
CVN-80
Under the FY2009 budget, CVN-80 was scheduled to be procured in FY2016, and to enter
service around 2023. Under the proposed FY2010 budget, which proposes shifting carrier
procurement to five-year intervals, the ship’s procurement would presumably be deferred two
years, to FY2018 (i.e., five years after the procurement of CVN-79 in FY2013). CVN-80’s
procurement cost was estimated in the FY2009 budget at about $10.7 billion in then-year dollars.
This estimate has almost certainly been affected by the deferral of the ship’s procurement to
FY2018, but the Navy has not released a new cost estimate for the ship. The FY2009 budget
projected that $201 million in initial AP funding for the ship would be requested in FY2012, but
(...continued)
Representative John Murtha, the subcommittee chairman.)
For press reports during this period discussing the EMALS issue, see Peter Frost, “Questions Swirl About New Aircraft
Catapult Systems For Next Carrier,” DailyPress.com (Newport News, VA), March 31, 2009; Emelie Rutherford and
Geoff Fein, “Navy Exploring Impact of Switching From EMALS To Steam Catapults For CVN-78,” Defense Daily,
April 2, 2009: 7-8; Rebekah Gordon, “Navy Examining Impacts of Switching to Steam Catapult on CVN-78,” Inside
the Navy, April 6, 2009; and Christopher P. Cavas, “Next-Gen Carrier Launch System Could Be Shelved,”
DefenseNews.com, April 6, 2009.
9
A Navy spokesman stated: “This decision is based on completion of an extensive review of the EMALS program,
which included consideration of many significant factors and represents a balance between cost, schedule, technical
performance, and consideration of the risks to each.” (Andrew Tilghman, “Navy to Press on With EMALS,”
NavyTimes,com, April 16, 2009.) Another Navy spokesman stated: “To ensure the program delivers on schedule, while
limiting cost growth, the Navy is entering into detailed, fixed-price contract negotiations for procurement of
production-level equipment while implementing additional risk management efforts associated with completion of
development testing, production planning, installation and test.” (Geoff Fein, “Navy Stands By EMALS As Aircraft
Launch System For CVN-78,” Defense Daily, April 17, 2009: 3-4.)
10
On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of decisions regarding the Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) proposed FY2010 defense budget. Among these was a decision to “shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier
program to a five-year build cycle[,] placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path.” The previous carrier procurement
schedule included a combination of four- and five-year intervals. Shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals
would defer the procurement of CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013.
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the deferral of the ship’s procurement to FY2018 might defer the ship’s initial AP funding to
FY2014.
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for
inflation and other factors, and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1
billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The conference report on P.L. 109364 (H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) discusses Section 122 on pages 551-552.
Issues for Congress
Proposed Deferral of CVN-79 Procurement to FY2013
One potential FY2010 issue for Congress is whether to approve DOD’s proposal to defer CVN79’s procurement to FY2013, or instead maintain FY2012 as the ship’s year of procurement.
Congress’s decision on this issue could affect, among other things, the amount of AP funding that
Congress provides for the ship in FY2010. In considering whether to defer procurement of CVN79 to FY2013, Congress may consider various factors, including the following:
•
the comparative costs of procuring CVN-79 in FY2012 or FY2013;
•
the impact of deferring CVN-79’s procurement to FY2013 on the procurement
costs of other Navy ships, particularly Virginia-class submarines being built at
the same shipyard;11
•
the comparative impact on the aircraft carrier industrial base (including
component makers) of procuring CVN-79 in FY2012 or FY2013; and
•
the potential impact on funding for other defense programs of procuring CVN-79
in FY2012 or FY2013.12
Regarding the first and second points above, a May 2009 Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding
statement on the cost impact of shifting to five-year intervals for procuring CVN states:
11
Virginia-class submarines are jointly built at Newport News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics’ Electric Boat
Division. For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
12
A potential additional factor to consider concerns the timing of CVN-79’s entry into service relative to the retirement
of the ship it replaces. CVN-79 may replace Nimitz (CVN-68), which entered service in 1975. Since CVNs have 50year expected service lives, the Nimitz’s expected service life would appear to extended to 2025. If CVN-79 is
procured in FY2013, it might enter service in 2020 or perhaps 2021. On this basis, it would appear that CVN-68 has
more than enough expected service life to remain in service until CVN-79 enters service, even if CVN-79’s
procurement is deferred to FY2013. Expected service lives, however, are generally accurate to within plus or minus
10% or so of the quoted figure. If CVN-68s turns out to be 45 years rather than 50 years, deferring procurement of
CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013 might create a possibility of the carrier force dropping temporarily from 11 ships to
10 for a short period between the retirement of CVN-68 and the entry into service of CVN-79.
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One element of the announcement by the Secretary of Defense last week was to shift from
four (4) years to five (5) years between construction start for each new Ford Class carrier.
Past Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding experience with carrier new construction has shown
that the optimum time between carrier construction is less than 4 years. This allows the most
efficient flow of the work force from one ship to the next, and facilitates a learning curve for
carriers. Moving to five (5) year intervals between starts will require the shipyard to suboptimize manning level sequencing and result in added trade training, loss of learning, and
added startup costs.
Increasing the time between carrier construction can have a large impact on the supplier
base, driving cost increases of 5-10 percent, or higher in some cases, above normal
escalation. Material costs of suppliers who provide similar components to other Navy
programs currently under contract will also experience cost growth. Some equipment
suppliers can be expected to exit the market as a result of the additional year with the
expense of component requalification being realized.
Finally, the decrease in production labor volume on an annual basis, created by the increase
in the time interval between carrier construction starts will increase the cost to other
programs in the yard. This applies to work already under contract, namely Virginia class
submarines (VCS) Block 2 and Block 3, and CVN 78 predominately; and for future work not
yet under contract, namely Carrier RCOH’s, CVN79 and follow-on Ford class carrier
construction, and later Blocks of VCS. The impact to work already under contract is
expected to be in the range of $100M of cost growth. We also expect cost increases for
future contracts yet to be priced. Conservative projections of the shipbuilder cost impact to
CVN 79 and CVN80 for the one year delay will be on the order of a 9-15 percent cost
increase.13
Regarding the second point above, a July 2009 DOD information paper states:
The Navy is currently assessing the impact of the proposed shift to 5 year centers for CVN
construction, however in general the cost per ship would increase due to workload
reallocation at the Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) facility in Newport News, VA.
The increased cost per ship, is due to overhead reallocation for labor and materials, includes
impacts to the shipbuilder’s cost as well as the cost impact on Government Furnished
Equipment. The actual cost increase of each ship varies, and is being evaluated as part of
FY11 budget deliberations. The preliminary expected impact to individual Virginia Class
submarines varies between $20M and $50M per hull across the program.14
Legislative Waiver For Temporary Decline to 10-Carrier Force
A second potential FY2010 issue for Congress is whether to provide a legislative waiver to permit
the Navy’s carrier force to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10 ships during the period 20122015. As mentioned earlier, during the projected 33-month period between the scheduled
decommissioning of Enterprise in 2012 and the scheduled commissioning of CVN-78 in 2015,
the carrier force is to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10. To permit this to happen, the Navy
needs a legislative waiver in connection with 10 USC 5062(b), which requires the Navy to
13
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding statement dated May 1, 2009, entitled “NGSB Statement Regarding Extending the
Time Interval between New Build Starts For the Ford Class of Aircraft Carriers,” provided to CRS by Northrop
Grumman.
14
DOD information paper dated July 15, 2009, on the subject “5 Year Centers for CVN, Impact on VIRGINIA Class,”
provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
maintain a force of at least 11 operational carriers. The Navy asked for such a waiver in the
FY2008 and FY2009 budgets. Congress each time did not grant the waiver, and the Navy has
asked for it again as part of the FY2010 budget. Congress’s decision on whether to grant the
waiver could affect FY2010 maintenance-related funding requirements for the Enterprise.
The Navy testified in 2008 and 2009 that keeping Enterprise in operation for an additional three
years (i.e., to 2015) would require performing more than $1 billion in maintenance work on the
ship and the expenditure of an additional $1 billion or so in ship operation and support costs, the
result of which would be one additional six- or seven-month deployment of the ship during the
period 2012-2015. The Navy also stated that doing the required maintenance work on Enterprise
would throw off the schedule for performing mid-life nuclear refueling overhauls on other Navy
CVNs, affecting the operational availability of those ships. The Navy argued that the total cost of
about more than $2 billion and the disruption to the CVN refueling schedule would not be worth
the one additional deployment for Enterprise, and that the operational risks associated with
having the carrier force temporarily decline to 10 ships will be mitigated by taking steps (such as
rescheduling certain maintenance actions for other carriers away from the 2012-2015 period) to
maximize the operational availability of the other 10 carriers during the period 2012-2015.15
Skeptics of the Navy’s request for a legislative waiver have expressed concern that problems in
developing EMALS or other issues could delay CVN-78’s entry into service, which would
increase the time during which the Navy has 10 operational carriers from 33 months to some
greater period. In light of this risk, they argue, the cost to keep Enterprise in operation beyond
2012 could be worthwhile. They have also argued that until the Navy receives a legislative
waiver, the Navy is required by law to budget the funds needed to keep Enterprise in service until
it is replaced by CVN-78.
Legislative Activity for FY2010
Defense Authorization BillAct (H.R. 2647/S. 1390P.L. 111-84)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, recommends approving the Administration’s FY2010 request for procurement funding for
CVN-78 and advance procurement funding for CVN-79.
Section 122 of H.R. 2647 would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees on the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction
of Ford-class aircraft carriers, and prohibit the Navy from using FY2010 research and
development or advance procurement funding for CVN-79 for activities that would limit the
Navy’s ability to award a construction contract for CVN-79 in FY2012 or CVN-80 in FY2016.
The text of Section 122 is as follows:
15
Source: Transcripts of spoken remarks of Vice Admiral Bernard McCullough at March 14, 2008, and May 15, 2009,
hearings on Navy shipbuilding before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
SEC. 122. FORD-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER REPORT AND LIMITATION ON USE
OF FUNDS.
(a) Report Required- Not later than February 1, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on the effects of using a five-year interval
for the construction of Ford-class aircraft carriers. The report shall include, at a minimum, an
assessment of the effects of such interval on the following:
(1) With respect to the supplier base—
(A) the viability of the base, including suppliers exiting the market or other potential
reductions in competition; and
(B) cost increases to the Ford-class aircraft carrier program.
(2) Training of individuals in trades related to ship construction.
(3) Loss of expertise associated with ship construction.
(4) The costs of—
(A) any additional technical support or production planning associated with the start of
construction;
(B) material and labor;
(C) overhead; and
(D) other ship construction programs, including the costs of existing and future contracts.
(b) Limitation on Use of Funds- With respect to the aircraft carrier designated CVN-79, none
of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 for research, development,
test, and evaluation or advance procurement for such aircraft carrier may be obligated or
expended for activities that would limit the ability of the Secretary of the Navy to award a
construction contract for—
(1) such aircraft carrier in fiscal year 2012; or
(2) the aircraft carrier designated CVN-80 in fiscal year 2016.
Section 123(b) would permit the Navy to use advance procurement funding provided for CVN79 in FY2010 and subsequent years for advance construction activities. The text of Section 123 is
as follows:
SEC. 123. ADVANCE PROCUREMENT FUNDING.
(a) Advance Procurement- With respect to a naval vessel for which amounts are authorized
to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2010 or any fiscal year
thereafter for advance procurement in shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, the Secretary of
the Navy may enter into a contract, in advance of a contract for construction of any vessel,
for any of the following:
(1) Components, parts, or materiel.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(2) Production planning and other related support services that reduce the overall
procurement lead time of such vessel.
(b) Aircraft Carrier Designated CVN-79- With respect to components of the aircraft carrier
designated CVN-79 for which amounts are authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2010 or any fiscal year thereafter for advance procurement in
shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into a contract for
the advance construction of such components if the Secretary determines that cost savings,
construction efficiencies, or workforce stability may be achieved for such aircraft carrier
through the use of such contracts.
(c) Condition of Out-year Contract Payments- A contract entered into under subsection (b)
shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under such contract
for any fiscal year after fiscal year 2010 is subject to the availability of appropriations for
that purpose for such fiscal year.
Section 1022 would authorize a waiver to 10 USC 5062(b), so as to permit the Navy’s carrier
force to decline from 11 ships to 10 between the decommissioning of the Enterprise (CVN-65)
and the commissioning of CVN-78, and require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the
operational risk of temporarily reducing the size of the carrier force. The text of section 1022 is as
follows:
SEC. 1022. TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN MINIMUM NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
(a) Temporary Waiver- Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code,
during the period beginning on the date of the inactivation of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN65) scheduled, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, for fiscal year 2013 and ending on
the date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the
number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy may be 10.
(b) Evaluation and Report(1) EVALUATION- During the fiscal year 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in coordination with the commanders of the combatant commands, shall evaluate the
required postures and capabilities of each of the combatant commands to assess the level of
increased risk that could result due to a temporary reduction in the total number of
operational aircraft carriers following the inactivation of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65).
(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS- Together with the budget materials submitted to Congress by
the Secretary of Defense in support of the President’s budget for fiscal year 2013, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing the findings of the evaluation conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), and the basis
for each such finding.
Section 1051 expresses the sense of the Congress requiring carrier air wing force structure. The
text of Section 1022 is as follows:
SEC. 1051. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CARRIER AIR WING FORCE
STRUCTURE.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(1) The requirement of section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, for the Navy to
maintain not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers, means that the naval combat forces of
the Navy also include not less than 10 carrier air wings.
(2) The Department of the Navy currently requires a carrier air wing to include not less than
44 strike fighter aircraft.
(3) In spite of the potential warfighting benefits that may result in the deployment of fifthgeneration strike fighter aircraft, for the foreseeable future the majority of the strike fighter
aircraft assigned to a carrier air wing will not be fifth-generation assets.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) in addition to the forces described in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, the
naval combat forces of the Navy should include not less than 10 carrier air wings (even if the
number of aircraft carriers is temporarily reduced) that are comprised of, in addition to any
other aircraft, not less than 44 strike fighter aircraft; and
(2) the Secretary of the Navy should take all appropriate actions necessary to make resources
available in order to include such number of strike fighter aircraft in each carrier air wing.
The committee’s report states:
Aircraft carriers
The committee includes a provision in title X of this Act [Section 1022] that would provide a
temporary waiver to the requirement in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to
maintain 10 operational aircraft carriers. This waiver would be in effect for the time period
between the inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and the delivery of USS Ford (CVN
78). The committee agrees with the Navy’s determination that the cost to conduct a depot
level maintenance availability for USS Enterprise (CVN 65) which would allow for only one
additional deployment is excessive. The committee further understands that conducting such
a maintenance period will decrease the actual operational availability of the aircraft carrier
fleet by delaying the complex refueling overhaul of USS Lincoln (CVN 72) with cascading
delays for other Nimitz class carriers. The committee understands that with the
commissioning of the USS Ford (CVN 78) in fiscal year 2015, the aircraft carrier force
structure will return to 11 carriers.
However, the committee continues to have serious reservations regarding the Navy’s force
planning, transparency with Congress, and the risk to the national security of the United
States. During consideration of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364), the committee was assured that the Navy supported
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, which concluded that 11 aircraft
carriers are needed to meet the combat capability requirements of the National Military
Strategy (NMS). Yet, less than one year later, the Navy proposed the inactivation of the USS
Enterprise as part of the consideration of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008
and submitted such a proposal again for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In addition, the Navy
failed to program the funds required to maintain the USS Enterprise, in accordance with their
statutory obligation. The Secretary of Defense has also announced plans to permanently
reduce the carrier force structure in the out-years. The committee believes that it is most
appropriate to consider aircraft carrier force structure within the context of a new QDR and
NMS and not as part of a budgetary process. Therefore, the committee encourages the
Secretary to revisit this issue as part of the ongoing QDR and does not intend this temporary
waiver to reflect the committee’s approval of the Secretary’s recommendation to
permanently reduce the aircraft carrier force structure.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Aircraft carrier construction
On April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense stated, ‘‘ ... the healthy margin of dominance at
sea provided by America’s existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow
production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs. We will shift
the Navy aircraft carrier program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally
sustainable path. This will result in 10 carriers after 2040.’’ The committee recognizes that
aircraft carrier construction is a significant investment and consistently represents a large
portion of the President’s budget request for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy. The
committee also acknowledges that shifting from the planned four-year build cycle to a fiveyear build cycle will reduce the annual funding required for aircraft carrier construction.
However, the committee has not been provided with a cost-benefit analysis justifying the
plan to extend carrier construction schedules. Lacking such an analysis, the committee is
concerned that this shift may increase the total funding required for aircraft carrier
construction and other shipbuilding programs in the aircraft carrier construction yard, such as
Virginia-class submarines and refueling and complex overhaul of the current aircraft carrier
fleet. The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to take a holistic view of
shipbuilding affordability, to optimize the construction of aircraft carriers for greater
efficiency and retention of skilled labor, and to re-evaluate his decision following the
completion of the aircraft carrier construction report required by a provision in title I of this
Act.
Electromagnetic aircraft launch system
The committee is monitoring the progress of the development efforts of the electromagnetic
aircraft launch system (EMALS) and the detrimental effect on cost and schedule that this one
system could have on the delivery of the USS Ford (CVN 78). The committee concurs with
the decision made by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development, and Acquisition to continue with development of EMALS and
avoid the cost and delay associated with a return to steam catapults. However, because of the
enormity of the impact that a failure of this program to deliver on time would have on
delivery of the USS Ford (CVN 78), the committee believes that it is imperative that a single
officer or civilian official oversee key development, production, and integration efforts.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to retain the current program
manager in his position throughout the completion of the system design and development
efforts, including production of the first ship-set of components. Additionally, the Secretary
is encouraged to identify and assign to the program office the relief for the current program
officer at least six months prior to the detachment of the current program manager. The
Secretary is directed to maintain the relieving program manager in position until completion
of EMALS shipboard installation, integration, and testing on USS Ford (CVN 78). The
committee directs the secretary to submit a report to the congressional defense committees
not less than 30 days prior to any planned change of the program manager, and as soon as
practicable for any emergent change of the program manager. (Pages 73-74)
Senate
Division D (Section 4001) of the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390)S. 1390 as reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee
(S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) presents the detailed line-itemlineitem funding tables that in previous
years have been included in the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s report on the defense
authorization bill. Section 4001 recommends approving the
Administration’s FY2010 request for
procurement funding for CVN-78 and advance procurement
funding for CVN-79 (page 619, line
items 001 and 002, of the printed bill).
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Section 1011 would authorize a waiver to 10 USC 5062(b), so as to permit the Navy’s carrier
force to decline from 11 ships to 10 between the decommissioning of the Enterprise (CVN-65)
and the commissioning of CVN-78. The text of Section 1011 is as follows:
SEC. 1011. TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN MINIMUM NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS IN ACTIVE SERVICE.
Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, during the period beginning
on the date of the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN 65) and ending on the
date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the
number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy may be 10.
Regarding Section 1011, the committee’s report states:
The committee has reluctantly concluded that the expense of extending the Enterprise
beyond her planned retirement date to cover this gap is not worth the $1.0 billion to $2.0
billion the Navy would have to divert from other important programs to get one extra
deployment from that ship.
The committee is taking no position at this time on the recommendation of the Secretary of
Defense that the long-term carrier force structure should be 10 rather than 11. (Page 169)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October
28, 2009, approves the
Administration’s FY2010 request for procurement funding for CVN-78
and advance procurement
funding for CVN-79. (Page 939)
Section 124(b) permits the Navy to use advance procurement funding provided for CVN-79 in
FY2010 and subsequent years for advance construction activities. The text of Section 124 is as
follows:
SEC. 124. ADVANCE PROCUREMENT FUNDING.
(a) ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.—With respect to a naval vessel for which amounts are
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2010 or any fiscal
year thereafter for advance procurement in shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, the Secretary
of the Navy may enter into a contract, in advance of a contract for construction of any vessel,
for any of the following:
(1) Components, parts, or materiel.
(2) Production planning and other related support services that reduce the overall
procurement lead time of such vessel.
(b) AIRCRAFT CARRIER DESIGNATED CVN–79.—With respect to components of the
aircraft carrier designated CVN–79 for which amounts are authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2010 or any fiscal year thereafter for advance
procurement in shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into
a contract for the advance construction of such components if the Secretary determines that
cost savings, con struction efficiencies, or workforce stability may be achieved for such
aircraft carrier through the use of such contract.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(c) CONDITION OF OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.—A contract entered into
under subsection (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment
under such contract for any fiscal year after fiscal year 2010 is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose for such fiscal year.
Section 126 of H.R. 2647 requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees on the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction
of Ford-class aircraft carriers. The text of Section 126 is as follows:
SEC. 126. FORD-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER REPORT.
Not later than February 1, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction of
Ford-class aircraft carriers. The report shall include, at a minimum, an assessment of the
effects of such five-year interval on the following:
(1) With respect to the supplier base—
(A) the viability of the base, including suppliers exiting the market or other potential
reductions in competition; and
(B) cost increases to the Ford-class aircraft carrier program.
(2) Training of individuals in trades related to ship construction.
(3) Loss of expertise associated with ship construction.
(4) The costs of—
(A) any additional technical support or production planning associated with the start of
construction;
(B) material and labor;
(C) overhead; and
(D) other ship construction programs, including the costs of existing and future contracts.
Regarding Section 126, the conference report states:
Ford-class aircraft carrier report (sec. 126)
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 122) that would require the Secretary of the Navy
to make an assessment of the cost of shifting to 5-year intervals for the construction of
aircraft carriers, including the effect of such shifting of that interval on other programs. The
House bill would have placed a limitation on the use of any funds for the aircraft carrier,
designated CVN–79, for shifting to a 5-year interval.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes with an amendment that would remove the limitation on the use of funds
for CVN–79.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The conferees note that a 5-year interval for aircraft carrier construction, as proposed by the
Secretary of Defense, may be the appropriate course of action for the Department of the
Navy. However, the conferees are concerned that this decision may not have been made
following a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, the conferees expect that the Secretary
of the Navy will take no further action to preclude the ability of the Secretary to award a
construction contract for CVN–79 in fiscal year 2012 or the aircraft carrier designated CVN–
80 in fiscal year 2016, consistent with the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2009, until he completes the required assessment and fully
informs the congressional defense committees of any such a decision. (Page 680)
Section 1023 would authorizeauthorizes a waiver to 10 USC 5062(b), so as to permit the Navy’s carrier
force to
decline from 11 ships to 10 between the decommissioning of the Enterprise (CVN-65)
and the
commissioning of CVN-78, and requirerequires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the
operational risk of temporarily reducing the size of the carrier force. The text of section 1023 is as
follows:
SEC. 1023. TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN MINIMUM NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
(a) TEMPORARY WAIVER.—Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States
Code, during the period beginning on the date of the inactivation of the U.S.S. Enterprise
(CVN–65) scheduled, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, for fiscal year 2013 and
ending on the date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford
(CVN–78), the number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy
may be 10.
(b) EVALUATION AND REPORT.—
(1) EVALUATION.—During fiscal year 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
coordination with the commanders of the combatant commands, shall evaluate the required
postures and capabilities of each of the combatant commands to assess the level of increased
risk that could result due to a temporary reduction in the total number of operational aircraft
carriers following the inactivation of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN–65).
(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Together with the budget materials submitted to Congress
by the Secretary of Defense in support of the President’s budget for fiscal year 2013, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing the findings of the evaluation conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), and the basis
for each such finding.
Section 1076 expresses the sense of the Congress regarding carrier air wing force structure. The
text of Section 1076 is as follows:
SEC. 1076. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CARRIER AIR WING FORCE
STRUCTURE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, requires the Department of the Navy to
maintain not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers.
(2) In repeated testimony before Congress, the Navy has pledged its long-term commitment
to naval combat forces that include 11 operational aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings,
composed of 44 strike-fighter aircraft per wing.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) in addition to the forces described in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, the
Navy should meet its current requirement for 10 carrier air wings (even if the number of
aircraft carriers is temporarily reduced) that are comprised of not less than 44 strike-fighter
aircraft, in addition to any other aircraft associated with the air wing; and
(2) the Congress and the Secretary of the Navy should take all appropriate actions necessary
to achieve the current requirement for such carrier air wings until such time that
modifications to the carrier air wing force structure are warranted and the Secretary of the
Navy provides Congress with a justification of any proposed modifications, supported by
rigorous and sufficient warfighting analysis.
Regarding Section 1076, the conference report states:
Sense of Congress regarding carrier air wing force structure (sec. 1076)
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1051) that would express the sense of Congress
that the Navy should achieve and maintain the goal of having a 10 carrier air wings with 44
strike-fighter aircraft.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes with an amendment that would modify the provision to state that the
Navy should meet its current requirement for 10 carrier air wings with 44 strike-fighter
aircraft until such time that modifications to the carrier air wing force structure are
warranted, and the Secretary of the Navy provides Congress with a justification of any
proposed modifications, supported by rigorous and sufficient analysis. (pages 814-815)
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009) on H.R.
3326, recommends approving the Navy’s request for FY2010 procurement and advance
procurement funding for the CVN-78 program. (Page 163)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on
H.R. 3326, recommends approving the Navy’s request for FY2010 procurement and advance
procurement funding for the CVN-78 program. (Page 112)
Congressional Research Service
16Final Version
In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009,
released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the
House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on
December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. The explanatory statement states on page 1 that it “is an
explanation of the effects of Division A [of H.R. 3326], which makes appropriations for the
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Department of Defense for fiscal year 2010. As provided in Section 8124 of the consolidated bill,
this explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and
the implementation of this as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of the
conference.”
The explanatory statement approves the Administration’s FY2010 request for procurement and
advance procurement funding for the CVN-78 program. (Page 165)
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix A. CVN-78 Funding in FY2009 Budget
Table A-1 shows procurement and research and development funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80
ships as planned in the FY2009 defense budget. The proposed FY2010 defense budget was
submitted as a single-year budget, without an accompanying Future Years Defense Plan for the
period FY201-FY2015 or a 30-year shipbuilding plan for the period FY2010-FY2039.
Consequently, funding data like that shown in the table below is not readily available in the
FY2010 budget documentation. The table below is provided as a reference for what the program’s
multi-year funding profile looked like under the FY2009 budget. Readers are cautioned that a
similar profile under the FY2010 budget would have showed different funding figures,
particularly for FY2010 and subsequent years.
Table A-1. Funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80 in FY2009 Budget
(figures in millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million; figures may not add due to rounding)
CVN
97-00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Total
thru
FY2013
Procurement (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN] account)
78
0
22
135
395
1163
623
619
736
2685
2712
688
679
0
0
10457
79
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53
124
1214
807
465
2312
2286
7261
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
201
886
1087
Subtotal
0
22
135
395
1163
623
619
789
2809
3926
1495
1144
2513
3172
18805
Research and development (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RDTEN] account)
78
308
231
277
317
306
350
303
284
202
223
153
109
107
106
3276
79
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
17
27
38
39
30
19
17
192
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
42
48
48
138
Subtotal
308
231
282
317
306
350
303
301
229
261
192
181
174
171
3606
TOTAL
308
253
417
712
1469
973
922
1090
3038
4187
1687
1325
2687
3343
22411
Source: Navy data provided to CRS on March 6, 2008, based on FY2009 budget submission.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. July 16, 2009, Hearing on EMALS
This appendix presents materials from a July 16, 2009, hearing on the EMALS development
effort before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee.
Chairman’s Opening Statement
The text of the opening statement of Representative Gene Taylor, the ranking member of the
subcommittee, is as follows:
The subcommittee will come to order.
Today the subcommittee meets in open session to receive testimony from officials of the
United States Navy on the current status of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or
EMALS. The EMALS system is an electromagnetic catapult designed for use on the Fordclass aircraft carriers. If the system delivers its full promised capability, the Ford-class
carriers will have a catapult system which is far superior to the steam catapults of the Nimitzclass. The operational advantages are increased launch envelopes, that is, the ability to
launch both heavier and lighter aircraft than steam catapaults, higher sortie rates, reduced
weight, reduced mechanical complexity, reduced maintenance, and reduced carrier manning.
Unfortunately, what brings us together today is that the development of this program is so far
behind schedule that it threatens the delivery date for the USS Ford. For the record, I would
like to briefly summarize the history of this program and the current status:
EMALS was a core capability in the design of the next generation aircraft carrier, which the
Navy called “CVN 21” for “21th century” technology, and which eventually became the USS
Ford (CVN 78) class. In 1999 the Navy entered into technology demonstration contracts with
two different contractors; General Atomics and Northrop Grumman Marine Systems to
develop prototypes for an electromagnetic catapult. By 2004 the Navy down-selected to the
system proposed by General Atomics and entered into a System Design and Development
contract, or SDD contract, to build a full scale, ship representative prototype at the Navy test
facility in Lakehurst, New Jersey. That prototype was contracted to be completed in time for
testing to begin in 2007, testing was to have concluded after two years and presumably the
lessons learned from the test program would influence the final production system which
would be shipped to the carrier construction yard for erection into the ship. It is now July
2009 and full scale testing has yet to begin at the Lakehurst facility. The Navy is now faced
with almost complete concurrency of testing and production of the first ship-set if they are to
meet the in-yard deliver dates to keep the USS Ford on schedule. There are a number of subsystems to the complete EMALS system and each subsystem has different in-yard deliver
dates, but some of those dates are as early as the summer of 2011, and to meet those dates
the production of the components or at least the ordering of the material for the components
must begin now—before full scale testing of the prototype system has begun. To be fair,
some testing has already occurred. The High Cycle Test for the Energy Storage System is
well underway, as is the Highly Accelerated Life Cycle Testing of the launch motor
segments. Those tests have identified some minor redesign issues which can be incorporated
into the production components. But until a full scale catapult launch from the prototype
occurs, questions will remain on the systems overall performance.
I have been briefed, as I believe other Members of this subcommittee have been briefed, that
the issues in completing and delivering the SDD components were a result of the contractor’s
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inexperience managing a major production effort. I find that answer unsettling because it is
the Navy’s responsibility to oversee what their contractors are doing and to identify
problems before they are problems. I will note that a little over a year and a half ago, the
contractor did put in place an entirely new management and engineering team, hiring away
proven production engineers from both General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. This
new team seems to have righted the ship, but that ship is still in very dangerous seas.
So what we have is a program that is so essential to the carrier that if it does not work, the
nation has paid billions of dollars for an unusable ship. If the system is delayed, the carrier is
automatically delayed. And every day of delay will push the cost of that carrier higher.
This is the first in what I intend to be a series of hearings on this program over the next few
years. This is too important to not have close congressional oversight. I intend to continue
close oversight of this program until it is delivered, installed, tested, and certified for
launching naval aircraft off the deck of the USS Ford.
Our witnesses today are:
•
VADM David Architzel, Principle Deputy to Assistant Secretary Stackley
•
CAPT Randy Mahr, Program Manager for EMALS
•
CAPT Brian Antonio, Program Manager, Ford Class Aircraft Carrier
VADM Architzel is representing the Assistant Secretary as the senior acquisition executive
who is ultimately responsible for all Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs. CAPT
Mahr, is the official whose only responsibility is this program. CAPT Antonio is responsible
for building the entire carrier—he obviously has an interest in the success of EMALS.
This year’s National Defense Authorization Act directs the Secretary of the Navy to keep
CAPT Mahr in his position until the completion of the system development testing and the
successful production of the first ship-set of components. That means the CAPT, who has
been selected to the rank of Rear Admiral, will be in place for another few years and will
have the opportunity to visit with us again on this subject.
I would now like to call on my friend from Missouri, the Ranking Member of this
subcommittee, the Honorable Todd Akin for any opening remarks he may wish to make.
Ranking Member’s Opening Statement
The text of the opening statement of Representative Todd Akin, the ranking member of the
subcommittee, is as follows:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses. We appreciate your willingness to
appear before us today. As the Chairman has indicated, the Electromagnetic Launch System,
known as EMALS, is a critical part of the military’s largest and most expensive ship, the
next generation aircraft carrier. The EMALS system is important because of the capability it
delivers to the Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, allowing our Navy to increase its sortie
generation rate and the carrier to launch both heavier and lighter aircraft, in more operating
conditions, than is currently possible. This is a significant attribute, because the first of these
carriers will be in service until at least 2065, and in order to maintain its relevance, the
carrier will need to be able to launch F-35s, UAVs, and whatever else we may develop in the
meantime.
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Additionally, EMALS is important because the schedule delays and cost growth experienced
by the system have put the construction and cost of the carrier in jeopardy. As this
subcommittee has noted on multiple occasions, the scale of our investment in aircraft carrier
construction means that even small increases in cost have the potential to break the bank.
Other shipbuilding programs have recently seen cost growth of close to 200 percent. If the
carrier grows by even 10 percent, the impact is in the billions of dollars per vessel. Simply
put, the EMALS program has no room for error. It must deliver on time, or put the carrier at
risk. To get there, the EMALS program must engage in con-current development and
production of the first ship set—a practice we know well from past experience is highly
risky.
But there is some good news. The contractor has been holding to schedule since the
beginning of the year and has agreed to a fixed price production contract. The Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition got personally involved
and conducted an in-depth review of the program. Secretary Stackley has elected to proceed
with the effort, a decision that I agree with, but has taken several steps to strengthen the
management of the program. One of these steps includes lengthening the tour of the current
program manager, CAPT Mahr, who is with us today. I have often noted that one of the first
lessons I learned during my time at IBM, is that for any project to succeed, you need to have
one person who is in charge. CAPT Mahr, this subcommittee has heard many good things
about you, and your colleague CAPT Brian Antonio, the CVN 21 Program Manager. But we
will be holding you to a very high standard. This is your baby and you must deliver. The
consequences for the rest of naval shipbuilding are too great to tolerate anything less.
In conclusion, I am interested in learning more today about the contract you are putting in
place with the EMALS contractor for the production ship set, and the activities required to
conclude system development and minimize risk to the CVN 21 program going forward.
Thank you again for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
Navy Statement
Chairman Taylor, Ranking Member Akin, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the development of the
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class
aircraft carriers and the Department’s plan ahead for this effort.
Steam catapults will continue to deliver the minimum required aircraft launching capability
and remain the launching system on the NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier for the next fifty years.
However, the steam catapult system limits the full potential of the inherent improved
capability of the FORD-class aircraft carrier. As modern aircraft, including the Joint Strike
Fighter, grow heavier and require higher launching end speeds, and the maintenance manhours required to maintain the readiness of the steam catapult increases, it is imperative that
the Navy continue development of a launching system with reduced manning and increased
operational availability. In response to meeting this future need, EMALS is being developed
for the CVN 78 class to replace the steam catapult system. EMALS design requirements
support the CVN 78 sortie generation rate Key Performance Parameter (KPP) through
increased reliability and system capability. It provides a higher energy launch capability as
well as an expanded launch envelope to support future airwing capabilities. EMALS is also
projected to reduce shipboard manning requirements, improve aircraft launching system
maintainability, and provide better control and more efficient application of acceleration
forces throughout the aircraft launch cycle.
EMALS development began with a competitive prototyping effort between General Atomics
(GA) and Northrop Grumman Marine Systems in 1999. The Navy down-selected to the GA
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design in 2004 following completion of approximately 1500 launch demonstration events
conducted on both competing systems. Based on the successful prototype testing, the Navy
awarded the EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract to GA in
2005, which is scheduled to complete in early 2012.
The EMALS program is currently executing the test portions of the SDD phase and
procuring long lead time material as it begins production of the CVN 78 ship set. Near term
events such as successful completion of High Cycle Test (HCT) Phase I and commencement
of High Cycle Test (HCT) Phase II, Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT), as well as
start of commissioning testing for System Functional Demonstration (SFD), will validate the
system design and enable transition into production. HCT II testing of a complete power
train, with the exception of the launch motor, is ongoing at the GA Tupelo, Mississippi site.
HALT testing of the launch motor is taking place at the Naval Air Warfare Center test site in
Lakehurst, NJ. Production Readiness Reviews (PRRs) are currently ongoing to support
release of EMALS subsystem components for production. Baseline drawing packages are
projected to complete by the end of FY 2009. Full scale, full length testing of EMALS,
including the launch of manned aircraft, is scheduled to begin at Lakehurst during the
summer of 2010.
Concurrent with testing, EMALS manufacturing and production efforts began in December
2007 with the first Long Lead Time material procurements to support CVN 78 required in
yard delivery dates and will continue through 2014 for delivery of all CVN 78 ship set
components. The Navy has placed an undefinitized contract action (UCA) with a not to
exceed value with General Atomics leading to an Advanced Acquisition Fixed Price contract
for the remaining ship set material. Definitization of this contract is targeted for later this
year. The Navy’s and GA’s support for a fixed price contract reflects our collective
confidence in the EMALS’ technology maturity and capability. The contract will be based on
the EMALS performance specification and Procurement Data Packages. Specific component
production release will be tied to Production Readiness Reviews and successful completion
of specific test events. The Production Integrated Master Schedule shows the program will
meet CVN 78 production required in yard delivery dates.
As EMALS progressed through SDD tests and began the transition to production, schedule
delays and cost overruns were experienced. A series of actions aimed at improving
management of the EMALS prime and subcontractors were taken by the Navy. In late 2007,
Navy leadership initiated a three-month independent and in-depth Production Assessment
Review (PAR). The PAR provided specific recommendations for processes and leadership
improvements, which are being implemented. Most recently, senior Navy leadership
conducted a detailed assessment of the viability of continuing with EMALS or reverting to a
legacy steam catapult system for CVN 78 based on indications that schedule and cost
performance was declining. After an extensive review, the Navy re-confirmed it’s
commitment to EMALS as the CVN 78-class aircraft launching system, while implementing
additional actions to improve performance and mitigate risk.
The production contract will ensure rigorous management and oversight. In April 2004, the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L))
established a critical technology Integrated Product Team (IPT) to maintain oversight of all
CVN 78 critical technologies, including EMALS development. Additionally, the Navy has
implemented two detailed reviews to identify needed improvements to support better
schedule and cost performance while completing technical efforts. The review of the PAR in
2008 provided a thorough assessment of GA’s ability to transition from development to
production and to support the CVN 78 production schedule. The Navy aggressively
implemented many of the PAR recommendations including leadership changes, new
program and technical governance processes, increased involvement of the shipbuilder and a
revised test program to mitigate production schedule risks. A three-star Executive
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Committee, which includes the OPNAV resource sponsor, Commanders of the Naval Sea
Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command, and the Principal Military Deputy for
ASN RDA meet quarterly for program reviews and to provide oversight of EMALS
development. Most importantly, direct responsibility for EMALS is being executed by the
NAVAIR program manager for Aircraft Launch & Recovery Equipment (ALRE), who
reports to PEO TACAIR and COMNAVAIR to support delivery of this new program within
cost and schedule.
Issues with cost and schedule performance have created overlaps between production
component manufacturing and system level testing. Cost and schedule performance have not
been where they need to be. Recognizing this, the Navy has taken steps to better define
needed testing, improved management oversight, insisted on near term definitization of the
DCA into a fixed price contract, and increased funding to the program to cover anticipated
growth. With system level testing ongoing the potential for additional cost increases and
schedule delays remain. However, the Navy is putting additional oversight in place to
maximize performance and minimize the likelihood of overruns. Given the advantages that
EMALS is projected to afford the next generation of aircraft carriers, these actions are
essential for providing the fleet what it needs.
Component, subsystem, and system testing is identifying technical issues, retiring technical
risk, and demonstrating the capability of the EMALS. Key to the Navy’s strategy is having a
management team in place both within the Navy and at its prime contractor that is
aggressively attacking these issues and retiring risks on a schedule that supports ship
construction. We are working hard towards these ends. The management focus, review
processes and oversight that the Navy is employing are mitigating future EMALS SDD
phase technical, cost and schedule risks. The Navy will leverage management processes
established during the SDD phase by building upon these lessons learned during system
production and ship integration, including the extensive involvement of the shipbuilder in the
production and integration process. A rigorous process exists for incorporating the results of
upcoming testing in the production baseline which will mitigate cost and schedule risks of
concurrency between the SDD and production phases. The Navy has also taken steps to
include, as mentioned previously, the use of fixed price contracting where appropriate, to
control EMALS cost and schedule variances during the subsystem production phase.
Mr. Chairman, the Navy understands the concerns you and your subcommittee have
expressed, and is aggressively working to improve performance. We are implementing your
recommendations to breakout EMALS cost and performance data for separate review by
Congress, and to provide stability in the program’s key technical and management teams.
The Department is committed to delivering CVN 78 with EMALS on time and on budget.
EMALS will enable current and future generations of Naval Aviators to perform their
missions more safely, efficiently and effectively. I thank you for the opportunity to testify
and look forward to answering your questions.16
16
Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, and Captain Randy Mahr, USN, Program Manager for Aircraft Launching and Recovery Equipment
(ALRE) and Captain Brian Antonio, USN, Program Manager for Future Aircraft Carrier, Before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [Hearing] On
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS}, July 16, 2009, 43 pp.
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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