Honduran-U.S. Relations
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
October 6, 2009February 1, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34027
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Summary
On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Manuel Zelaya and flew him to exile
in Costa Rica, ending 27 years of uninterrupted democratic, constitutional governance. Following
the ouster, the Honduran Supreme Court released documents asserting that an arrest warrant had
been issued for Zelaya as a result of his noncompliance with court decisions declaring his
proposed non-binding referendum illegal. Zelaya’s forced removal halted the judicial process
before a trial could be held, and the Honduran National Congress replaced him with head of
Congress Roberto Micheletti. The United States and international community have universally
condemned the events in Honduras and called for a restoration of Zelaya and the rule of law.
Those involved in the ouster have rejected the international response, and maintain that Zelaya’s
removal was done in accordance with the country’s constitution.
The political instability brought about by the removal of President Zelaya has created yet another
challenge for Honduras, one of the hemisphere’s poorest countries. In addition to significant
challenges in the areas of crime, human rights, and improving overall economic and living
conditions, the country faces a poverty rate of nearly 70%, high infant mortality, and a significant
HIV/AIDS epidemic.
While traditional agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important for the economy,
nontraditional sectors, especially the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown
significantly over the past decade. The economy, which grew by 6.3% in 2007 and 4% in 2008,
has benefitted from significant debt reduction by international financial institutions that have
freed government resources to finance poverty-reduction programs. The global financial crisis
and current political crisis, however, are expected to slow economic growth sharply in 2009.
The United States has a close relationship with Honduras, characterized by an important trade
partnership, a U.S. military presence in the country, and cooperation on a range of transnational
issues. In addition to Honduras being a party to the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), some 78,000 Hondurans living in the United States have been
provided temporary protected status (TPS) since the country was devastated by Hurricane Mitch
in 1998. The United States also provides significant foreign assistance to Honduras, amounting to
$40.5 million in FY2008 and an estimated $43 million in FY2009.
Several resolutions have been introduced in the 111th Congress regarding the political crisis in
Honduras. On July 8, 2009, H.Res. 619 (Mack) and H.Res. 620 (Serrano) were introduced in the
House. H.Res. 619 condemns Zelaya for his “unconstitutional and illegal” actions and calls on all
parties to seek a peaceful resolution. H.Res. 620 calls upon the Micheletti government to end its
“illegal seizure of power” and work within the rule of law to resolve the situation. On July 10,
H.Res. 630 (Delahunt) was introduced in the House. It condemns the “coup d’etat” in Honduras;
refuses to recognize the Micheletti government; calls for the reinstatement of Zelaya; urges the
Obama Administration to suspend non-humanitarian assistance to Honduras; calls for
international observation of the November 2009 elections; and welcomes the mediation efforts of
Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. On September 17, H.Res. 749 (Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced
in the House, calling for the Secretary of State to work with Honduran authorities to ensure free
and fair elections in Honduras. It also calls on President Obama to recognize the November
elections “as an important step in the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in Honduras.”January 27, 2010, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa was inaugurated President of Honduras. Lobo
assumed power after seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had
resulted from the June 28, 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. The political crisis has left
Lobo with a number of challenges, including considerable domestic political polarization, a lack
of international recognition, and a faltering economy. Nonetheless, the strength of Lobo’s
National Party in the legislature and the weakness of his opposition will likely allow the new
president to implement his policy agenda.
The Honduran economy has undergone a number of changes in recent years. While traditional
agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important, nontraditional sectors, especially the
maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly over the past decade.
Substantial economic growth (6.3% in 2007 and 4% in 2008) and considerable debt reduction by
international financial institutions have freed government resources to finance poverty-reduction
programs. Nonetheless, Honduras continues to face a poverty rate of nearly 70%, in addition to
widespread crime, high infant mortality, and a significant HIV/AIDS epidemic. Moreover,
Honduras experienced an estimated 4.4% economic contraction in 2009 as a result of the political
crisis and global economic downturn.
Although relations have been strained recently as a result of the political crisis, the United States
has traditionally had a close relationship with Honduras. Overall U.S. policy goals include a
strengthened democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes
the rule of law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy
and improved living conditions. In addition to providing Honduras with substantial amounts of
foreign assistance and maintaining significant military and economic ties, the United States
cooperates with Honduras to deal with transnational issues such as illegal migration, crime,
narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.
With respect to the political crisis, several resolutions were introduced during the first session of
the 111th Congress. These ranged from condemning Zelaya for his “unconstitutional and illegal”
actions (H.Res. 619, Mack) to condemning the “coup d’état” in Honduras (H.Res. 630, Delahunt)
and calling upon the Micheletti government to end its “illegal seizure of power”(H.Res. 620,
Serrano). Another resolution (H.Res. 749, Ros-Lehtinen) called on the Obama Administration to
recognize the November 2009 elections “as an important step in the consolidation of democracy
and rule of law in Honduras.”
This report examines current political and economic conditions in Honduras as well as issues in
Honduran-U.S. relations. For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see
CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2010.
Congressional Research Service
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Contents
Political Situation........................................................................................................................1
Zelaya AdministrationBackground ..........................................................................................................................1
1
2009 Political Crisis .....................................................................................................................2
Constitutional Referendum..2
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya..................................................................................2
Micheletti Government .............................2
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya..................................................................................3
Micheletti Government2
November 2009 Elections ...................................................................................................5
International Pressure..3
Results ...........................................................................................................................5
Current Situation.3
Legitimacy...............................................................................................................7
November 2009 Elections .......4
Prospects for the Lobo Administration...................................................................................5
Political Reconciliation ........................8
Economic and Social Conditions...........................................................................5
International Recognition .................................................................................................9
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations 6
Enactment of Policies.............................................................................................. 12
U.S. Response to Honduran Political Crisis ........6
Economic and Social Conditions ...................................................................................... 12
U.S. Foreign Assistance ...........7
Debt Reduction ................................................................................................................... 13
Military Cooperation..8
Effects of Financial and Political Crises ................................................................................8
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations ............................................................................................ 15
Economic Linkages10
U.S. Foreign Assistance ...................................................................................................... 11
Military Cooperation.............. 16
Crime............................................................................................. 13
Economic Linkages............................................................ 18................................................. 14
Migration Issues.................................................................................................................. 1915
Temporary Protected Status........................................................................................... 1915
Deportations ................................................................................................................ 19
Drug Trafficking 16
Crime.................................................................................................................................. 20
Human Trafficking16
Drug Trafficking ................................................................................................................ 21
Port Security . 18
Human Trafficking.............................................................................................................. 18
Port Security ............................. 21
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Honduras ....................................................................................................... 11
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2006-FY201019
Figures
Figure 1. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress..................................4
Figure 2. Map of Honduras .................................................................................................... 14
Appendixes
Appendix. Chronology of the 2009 Political Crisis ......... 10
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2007-FY2011 .............................................................. 23 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 2620
Congressional Research Service
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Political Situation
Prior to the June 2009 military-imposed exile of President Manuel Zelaya, Honduras—a Central
American nation with a population of about 7.4 million—had enjoyed 27 years of uninterrupted
elected civilian democratic rule. Zelaya’s forced removal marked the country’s first departure
from democratic, constitutional governance since the military relinquished control of the country
in 1982. Following the ouster, the Honduran National Congress replaced Zelaya with the head of
Congress, Roberto Micheletti (For more information, see “2009 Political Crisis,” and “Appendix”
below).
Zelaya Administration
Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party won the November 2005 presidential election 49.9% to
46.17%, narrowly defeating his National Party rival Porfirio Lobo Sosa, who had been the head
of the Honduran National Congress. The Liberal (PL) and National (PN) parties traditionally have
been the country’s two dominant political parties. Both are considered center-right parties, and
there appear to be few major ideological differences between the two. During the 2005 campaign,
both candidates broadly supported the direction of the country’s market-oriented economic policy,
but they emphasized different approaches in dealing with crime perpetrated by youth gangs. Lobo
called for tougher action against gangs by reintroducing the death penalty (which was abolished
in 1957) and increasing prison sentences for juvenile delinquents, whereas Zelaya opposed the
death penalty and emphasized a more comprehensive approach that would include job creation
and training. Zelaya also campaigned for more citizen involvement and transparency in
government and promised to increase social programs and combat corruption. In the 2005
legislative elections that were held simultaneously with the presidential elections, Zelaya’s
Liberal Party won 62 seats in the 128-member Congress, just short of a majority.
Zelaya—a wealthy landowner with considerable investments in the timber and cattle industries—
was generally regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a four-year term on January 27,
2006.1 As his term progressed, however, President Zelaya advanced increasingly populist
policies. These include free school enrollment, an increase in teachers’ pay, a reduction in fuel
costs, and a 60% increase in the minimum wage.2 Zelaya also forged closer relations with
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, joining PetroCaribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA) in 2008.3
On January 27, 2010, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa was inaugurated President of Honduras. Lobo
assumed power after seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had
resulted from the June 28, 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. The political crisis has left
Lobo with a number of challenges, including considerable domestic political polarization, a lack
of international recognition, and a faltering economy. Nonetheless, the strength of Lobo’s
National Party in the legislature and the weakness of his opposition will likely allow the new
president to implement his policy agenda.
Background
Prior to the forced removal of President Manuel Zelaya, Honduras, a Central American nation of
7.4 million people, enjoyed 27 years of democratic, constitutional governance. The Liberal (PL)
and National (PN) parties have been Honduras’ two dominant political parties since the military
relinquished control of the country in 1982. Both are considered to be ideologically center-right,
and there appear to be few major differences between the two.
Manuel Zelaya of the PL was elected president in November 2005, narrowly defeating his PN
rival, Porfirio Lobo. Zelaya—a wealthy landowner with considerable investments in the timber
and cattle industries—was generally regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a fouryear term in January 2006.1 As his term progressed, however, Zelaya advanced a number of
populist policies, including free school enrollment, an increase in teachers’ pay, and a 60%
increase in the minimum wage. 2 Zelaya also forged closer relations with Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez, joining PetroCaribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) in
2008.3 Although Zelaya’s populist policies allowed him to maintain considerable support among
certain sectors of Honduran society, they alienated many within the traditional economic and
political elite. Likewise, his Administration’s inability to achieve concrete results on a number of
issues of importance—such as poverty and violent crime—significantly weakened his public
standing. 4
1
“People Profile: Manuel ‘Mel’ Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, November 15, 2005; “Manuel Zelaya: empresario
conservador que transitó a la izquierda,” Agencia Mexicana de Noticias, June 29, 2009.
2
The minimum wage decree—which did not affect the maquila sector’s monthly minimum wage that fluctuates
between 6,000 and 7,000 Lempiras ($317.54318-$370.47)—increased the rural monthly minimum wage to 4,055 Lempiras
($214.61215) and the urban monthly minimum wage to 5,500 Lempiras ($291.08). ). Calculations are based on an exchange rate of
$1 U.S. dollar to 18.9 Honduran lempiras. “Elevan a L.5,500 el salario mínimo en
Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras),
December 24, 2008.
3
PetroCaribe is a Venezuelan program that provides oil at preferential discounted rates to Caribbean countries. ALBA
is a socially oriented trade block that includes cooperation in a range of areas such as health, education, culture,
investment, and finance. Other ALBA members include Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The
Honduran National Congress ratified PetroCaribe and ALBA, and both initiatives were supported by all 62 members of
the Liberal Party and some members of three smaller parties, with the National Party abstaining
Congress ratified Honduras’ entrance into both PetroCaribe and ALBA. “Honduras: Congress
signs up to Petrocaribe”
Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, March 2008; “Honduras: Congress
approves Alba, with
caveats,” Latin American Caribbean & Central American Report, October 2008.
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While Zelaya’s populist policies allowed him to maintain considerable support among certain
sectors of Honduran society, they alienated many within his own party. Likewise, his
Administration’s inability to achieve concrete results on a number of issues of importance
significantly weakened his public standing. Most Hondurans have not seen an improvement in
their living standards as poverty, unemployment, and inflation have remained high. Violent crime
has also increased. According to the United Nations Development Program, the country’s 2008
murder rate reached 57.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, a 25.2% increase from 2007 and one of the
highest rates in the world. 4 Although he advocated transparency in government, Zelaya faced
several corruption scandals during his term as well. A number of high ranking officials were
forced to resign and the transparency law passed by his Administration has been criticized as
having too many loopholes.5 Opinion polls conducted prior to his ouster indicated that Zelaya’s
approval rating had fallen to about 30%, though he maintained strong support among certain
groups, such as rural and public sector labor unions.6
2009 Political Crisis
Constitutional Referendum
In March 2009, President Zelaya issued an executive decree calling on the National Statistics
Institute (INE) to hold a popular referendum on June 28, 2009, to determine if the country should
include a fourth ballot box7 during the general elections scheduled to be held on November 29,
2009. The fourth ballot would consult Hondurans about whether the country should convoke a
national constituent assembly to approve a new constitution. In May 2009, Zelaya repealed the
March decree and issued a new decree—not published until June 25—that made the referendum
non-binding and removed the reference to a new constitution. The non-binding referendum would
have asked Hondurans, “Do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a fourth ballot box
should be installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent
Assembly?”8 Zelaya has argued that the constitution—drafted in 1982—must be amended to
reflect the “substantial and significant changes” that have taken place in Honduran society in
recent years.9
The proposal was immediately criticized by a number of officials. The PL President of Congress
Roberto Micheletti expressed ardent opposition, the 2009 presidential nominees of the PL and the
PN—both of whom have indicated they are open to a constitutional assembly10—accused Zelaya
of trying to perpetuate himself in power, the Attorney General’s Office accused Zelaya of
violating the constitution, and the Honduran judiciary11 declared Zelaya’s proposal
4
“Honduras report signals rising violence,” Latin News Daily, February 22, 2009.
Thelma Meja, “Corruption: Honduras Grapples with Murky Transparency Law,” Global Information Network,
February 23, 2007.
6
Mica Rosenberg, “Protests erupt, gunshots heard after Honduras coup,” Reuters, June 28, 2009.
5
7
There are generally three ballot boxes: one for the presidential race, another to choose deputies to the National
Congress, and a third for municipal elections.
8
“Llegó el día de verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras) June 28, 2009.
9
“Constitutional reform or power grab,” Latin American Weekly Report, March 26, 2009.
10
“Lobo the front runner in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, July 15, 2009.
11
It should be noted that the Honduran judiciary “is seen as neither effective nor fair” and “in practice, the judicial
system is open to political influence.” “Honduras Country Profile,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008.
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unconstitutional. 12 Nonetheless, Zelaya pushed forward, maintaining that the law of citizen
participation approved shortly after he took office allows him to consult the people of Honduras
in a non-binding poll. Zelaya also noted that the referendum did not propose specific
constitutional changes, and any changes arising from an eventual assembly would take place after
he left office. President Zelaya’s refusal to accept the court rulings, however, sparked rumors that
he was planning an institutional coup that would dissolve Congress and immediately call a
constitutional assembly.13
The political situation in the country deteriorated considerably the week before the non-binding
referendum was to be held as Honduran society and the country’s governmental institutions
became increasingly polarized. On June 23, the National Congress created an additional legal
obstacle, passing a law preventing referenda from occurring 180 days before or after general
elections. A day later, Zelaya ordered the resignations of Honduran Defense Minister Edmundo
Orellana Mercado and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Romeo Vasquez Velasquez after they
informed him that the Honduran military would not provide logistical support for the non-binding
referendum since the courts had ruled it unconstitutional. The removal of Orellana and Vasquez
prompted the resignation of 36 other Honduran military commanders, including the heads of the
army, navy, and air force.14 On June 25, the Supreme Court ordered that the Defense Minister and
Armed Forces Chief should be restored to their positions, and the National Congress began
debate on the possibility of censuring Zelaya. In response, Zelaya declared that the legislature and
courts were working with the country’s oligarchy to carry out a technical coup.15
By the day the non-binding referendum was to be held, the proposal had drawn the opposition of
the legislature, the judiciary, the Attorney General, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the hierarchy
of the Catholic Church, evangelical groups, business associations, and four of the five political
parties represented in the National Congress—including Zelaya’s own PL. Nearly all of these
social and political actors called on the people of Honduras to boycott the referendum.
Proponents of the referendum included unions, peasants, women’s groups, groups of ethnic
minorities, and the small leftist Democratic Unification party (DU).16
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya
On June 28, 2009, shortly before the polls were to open for the non-binding referendum, the
Honduran military surrounded the presidential residence, arrested President Zelaya, and flew him
to exile in Costa Rica. According to some, the action directly violated the Honduran Constitution,
which forbids the expatriation of Honduran citizens. Those involved in the removal maintain that
it was necessary to avoid chaos and bloodshed. 17 The military also confiscated all referendum
12
“Honduras: Fiscalía dice Zelaya no puede llamar a consulta popular,” Associated Press, March 25, 2009; Poder
Judicial de Honduras, “Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,” available at
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
13
“Honduras: Zelaya denies coup rumors,” Latin American Weekly Report, June 11, 2009.
14
“Consulta ciudadana genera crisis en Honduras,” Agencia Mexicana de Noticias, June 25, 2009; “Honduras lurches,”
Latin News Daily, June 25, 2009.
15
“Zelaya claims coup,” Latin News Daily, June 26, 2009.
16
“Llegó el día de verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Partidos políticos advirtieron de crisis,” El Heraldo
(Honduras), June 28, 2009.
17
Frances Robles, “Top Honduran military lawyer: We broke the law,” Miami Herald, July 3, 2009; Ginger Thompson,
“On TV, Honduran Generals Explain Their Role in Coup,” New York Times, August 5, 2009.
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materials from polling places across the country. In the aftermath of the ouster, the Honduran
Supreme Court produced documents asserting that an arrest warrant for President Zelaya had
been issued in secrecy on June 26 as a result of the executive branch’s noncompliance with
judicial rulings that had declared the non-binding referendum unconstitutional. Zelaya has been
charged with crimes against the form of government, treason, abuse of authority, and usurpation
of functions for calling a referendum without the approval of the National Congress and using the
INE to supervise the vote rather than the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.18 The judicial process was
halted before a trial could be held, however, as a result of the Honduran military’s actions.
Following Zelaya’s removal, the Honduran National Congress accepted a letter of resignation
allegedly signed by the exiled president.19 The Congress then passed20 a decree that disapproved
of Zelaya’s conduct for “repeated violations against the Constitution and laws of the Republic and
nonobservance of the resolutions and rulings of the judicial organs,” removed Zelaya from office,
and named Roberto Micheletti—the Head of Congress and the next in line constitutionally—the
president of Honduras for the remainder of Zelaya’s term, which ends on January 27, 2010.21
Meanwhile, Zelaya held a press conference in Costa Rica, denouncing his ouster as a coup d’état
and declaring the alleged letter of resignation to be fraudulent.22
Although some analysts maintain that Zelaya’s removal was done through legal means,23 a
number of Honduran legal observers have declared that the actions of the Honduran National
Congress were unconstitutional.24 They assert that the power to remove a president is reserved for
the judicial branch. They also note that since Zelaya never resigned and the judicial process
against him was terminated prematurely by the military’s actions, Zelaya was still President and
there was no vacancy for Congress to fill. While the Honduran Supreme Court initially seemed to
accept the legality of the actions of Congress given its June 29 ruling that ordered Zelaya’s legal
proceedings to continue through the ordinary judicial process since he “no longer holds high
office,”25 the Court now appears to be still considering the issue. The Court accepted an amparo
petition that called for the congressional decree removing Zelaya to be declared null in August,
and has since ordered the National Congress to deliver the congressional decree and all other
information relating to Zelaya’s ouster to the Court to be reviewed.26
18
Poder Judicial de Honduras, “Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,” available at
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
19
“Diputados hondureños aceptan una supuesta renuncia del presidente Zelaya,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
20
122 of the 128 members of the National Congress reportedly voted for the resolution, with an independent and the
five deputies of the DU not present for the vote. Some members of the Liberal Party maintain they were not present for
the vote and that the reported vote count is inaccurate. “Zelaya planificaba disolver el Congreso,” El Heraldo
(Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Aparecen más diputados declarando que hubo golpe,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 3,
2009.
21
“El decreto de la separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
22
“Zelaya ofrece conferencia en Costa Rica,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
23
Octavio Sánchez, “A ‘coup’ in Honduras? Nonsense,” Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2009; Miguel A. Estrada,
“When a coup isn’t; Under Honduras’ Constitution, the ouster of President Manuel Zelaya was legal,” Los Angeles
Times, July 10, 2009; U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Statement of Guillermo Perez-Cadalso, July 10, 2009.
24
Edmundo Orellana, “El 28 de junio y la Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), August 1, 2009; Ramón Enrique
Barrios, “No hubo sucesión constitucional,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 28, 2009.
25
Poder Judicial de Honduras, “Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,” available at
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
26
“Por recurso de amparo: Corte le pide al Congreso decreto que derrocó a Mel,” El Tiempo (Honduras), September
(continued...)
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Micheletti Government
Roberto Micheletti maintains that he is the legitimate president of Honduras, and that Zelaya’s
removal was a “constitutional substitution.”27 He has named a new cabinet, announced a plan of
governance, and assured the public that general elections will be held in November 2009, as
previously planned.28 Micheletti has also received strong support from some sectors of Honduran
society, with thousands of people marching in support of Zelaya’s removal. 29 A poll taken in the
days after the ouster, however, found that Honduras is closely split with 46% of Hondurans
opposing the removal of Zelaya and 41% supporting it.30
Despite Micheletti’s declarations that the country continues to function democratically, Honduran
society generally has been under strict control since Zelaya’s removal. On the day of the ouster,
security forces patrolled the streets; a curfew was put in place; a number of local and international
television and radio stations were shut down or intimidated; and members of Zelaya’s
Administration, other political and social leaders, and some members of the press were detained
or forced to go into hiding. 31 On July 1, the Honduran National Congress approved a decree
suspending a number of constitutional rights during curfew hours. It permits security forces to
enter private homes without a warrant, allows the detention of persons for 24 hours without
charges, and suspends the rights of free association and free movement.32 While the curfew was
temporarily lifted on July 12, it has been reinstated on various occasions, sometimes arbitrarily
and with little or no prior notification.33 Reports indicate that the Micheletti government has
continued to use disproportionate force against protestors and limit information by threatening
opposition media.34
International Pressure
The international community reacted quickly and forcefully to the events in Honduras. The
United States,35 European Union, and United Nations condemned the actions and called for
Zelaya’s immediate return, as did every regional grouping in the hemisphere from the System of
Central American Integration (SICA) to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR). Countries throughout Latin America and Europe have
withdrawn their ambassadors, further diplomatically isolating the Micheletti government, which
has yet to be recognized by a single country. Economic pressure has also been placed on
(...continued)
18, 2009.
27
“Honduran interim gov’t battles international isolation,” EFE News Service, June 30, 2009.
28
“Micheletti: promete combatir el hambre y la inseguridad,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 29, 2009.
29
“Rechazan manifestantes hondureños injerencia internacional,” Agencia Mexicana de Noticias, June 30, 2009.
30
Diana Logreira & Gesell Tobías, “41-46: Honduras un país dividido,” Voice of America, July 9, 2009.
31
“Honduras: Decretan toque de queda por 48 horas,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Honduras: Media
Blackout, Protests Reported,” Stratfor, June 29, 2009; “Al menos ocho ministros están detenidos,” La Prensa
(Honduras), June 28, 2009; “En la clandestinidad ministros de Zelaya,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 30, 2009;
“Denuncian violaciones a la libertad de expresión,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 30, 2009.
32
“Honduras suspende derechos constitucionales durante toque queda,” Reuters, July 1, 2009.
33
Amnesty International, “Honduras: human rights crisis threatens as repression increases,” August 2009.
34
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Preliminary Observations on the IACHR Visit to Honduras,”
August 21, 2009.
35
For more on the U.S. response, see “U.S. Response to Honduran Political Crisis.”
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Honduras, which has already suffered considerably as a result of the global financial crisis and
U.S. recession. Some Central American countries imposed a 48-hour commercial blockade, the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are withholding some $470 million in
loans and other transfers, and Venezuela—which provided 50% of Honduras’ petroleum imports
in 2008—has stopped supplying the country with oil.36
The democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere have also exerted significant pressure on the
Micheletti government through the Organization of American States (OAS). On the day of
Zelaya’s removal, the OAS held an emergency meeting and issued a resolution that vehemently
condemned the “coup d’état;” demanded the immediate, safe and unconditional return of Zelaya
to the presidency; declared that no government arising from the coup will be recognized; and
condemned all acts of violence. 37 On July 1, the OAS adopted another resolution that threatened
to suspend Honduras from the organization if the country failed to allow Zelaya to return to
power within three days.38 On July 4, the OAS unanimously voted to suspend Honduras for an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order in accordance with Article 21 of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter.39 Since the suspension, the OAS has supported the mediation
attempts of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights—an autonomous organ of the OAS—has assessed the human rights situation.
In July, Zelaya and Micheletti agreed to participate in talks mediated by Costa Rican President
Oscar Arias, who won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his efforts to end conflicts in Central
America during his first administration. Following their initial individual meetings with President
Arias on July 9 in Costa Rica, both leaders designated groups of negotiators to continue on their
behalves. Additional talks were held on July 18 and 19, during which President Arias proposed a
seven-point plan to end the political conflict in Honduras. The agreement called for President
Zelaya’s reinstatement, the creation of a national unity government representing all the leading
political parties, a general amnesty for all political crimes committed before and after Zelaya’s
removal, an agreement by Zelaya not to pursue constitutional reform, early elections to be held
the last Sunday in October, the transfer of control of the armed forces from the executive branch
to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month prior to the elections, and the creation of a
verification commission composed of notable Hondurans and representatives of international
organizations—such as the OAS—to guarantee compliance with the agreement.40 Although the
agreement was accepted in principle by Zelaya’s representatives, the Micheletti government
objected to several of its provisions, including the reinstatement of the exiled president.
On July 22, President Arias offered a final 12-point plan known as the “San José Accord” that
slightly altered his initial proposal. It added several provisions, including an acceptance of the
Micheletti government’s budget for 2009, an immediate end to international sanctions, and a
timetable for implementing the agreement. 41 Although Zelaya initially declared the negotiation
36
Nestor Ikeda, “Conservadores critican a Obama por apoyar a Zelaya,” Associated Press, July 1, 2009; “Venezuela
halts oil deliveries to Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 8, 2009; “Negociación solo es para que Zelaya enfrente la
justicia,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 7, 2009.
37
Organization of American States, “OAS Permanent Council Condemns Coup D’état in Honduras, Calls Meeting of
Ministers and Entrusts Secretary General With Carrying Out Consultations,” June 28, 2009.
38
Nestor Ikeda, “OEA da a Micheletti 3 días para dar paso a Zelaya,” Associated Press, July 1, 2009.
39
Lesley Clark & Laura Figueroa, “OAS suspends Honduras over president’s ouster,” Miami Herald, July 5, 2009.
This is the first time the OAS has suspended a country since Cuba was suspended in 1962.
40
Presidente de la República de Costa Rica, “Es Posible Alcanzar La Reconciliación,” July 18, 2009.
41
Juan Pablo Carranza, “Arias presentó el ‘Acuerdo de San José’ para buscar reconciliación en Honduras,” La Nación
(continued...)
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process a failure, he has since signaled that he would accept the Arias proposal.42 Micheletti’s
negotiators said they would take the proposal back to the independent branches of the government
to consider. While some sectors of the Honduran military and Congress have indicated that they
are open to the agreement, Micheletti and the Honduran Supreme Court have rejected the
accord. 43 Nonetheless, the international community continues to push all of the parties to accept
the Arias proposal.
Current Situation
On September 21, President Zelaya revealed that he had clandestinely returned to Honduras and
was sheltered in the Brazilian embassy in the capital, Tegucigalpa. Zelaya had attempted to return
to the country on two previous occasions, but the Micheletti government prevented his plane from
landing on July 5 and soldiers prohibited him from walking more than a few feet across the
Nicaraguan border on July 24 and July 25. As his supporters rallied outside the embassy, Zelaya
appealed to members of the Micheletti government to engage in an open dialogue to resolve the
country’s political crisis.44
After initially denying Zelaya’s presence in the country, Micheletti insisted that it “changes
nothing.”45 He then reinstated a curfew and closed airports and border crossings. The Honduran
military also surrounded the Brazilian embassy, forcibly dispersing the crowd of Zelaya
supporters that had gathered outside and cutting the embassy’s utilities, leading the U.N. Security
council to issue a statement condemning “acts of intimidation” against the embassy.46
Zelaya remains within the Brazilian embassy with his family and several dozen supporters. While
utilities were restored, the Honduran military continues to surround the building. The curfew—
which was enforced for nearly three straight days—was lifted temporarily, but has been reinstated
on a number of nights.47 On September 26, the Micheletti government published a decree that
declared a state of siege for 45 days. It suspended freedom of the press and freedom of
movement, required police or military authorization for public meetings, and allowed for
detention without a warrant. The decree was used to shut down two of the leading sources of
media opposition to the Micheletti government before criticism from the presidential candidates,
members of the National Congress, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal led Micheletti to revoke it
on October 5.48 The media outlets that were shut down will reportedly have to go to court to win
(...continued)
(Costa Rica), July 22, 2009.
42
“Zelaya reafirma apoyo a Plan Arias para ser restituido como presidente,” Agence France Presse, August 4, 2009.
43
Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras, Dirección de Relaciones Públicas, “Communicado No. 7” July 24, 2009; “CN acepta
discutir amnistía de plan Arias,” El Heraldo (Honduras), August 3, 2009; “Honduras: De Facto Leader Rejects Part of a
Deal,” New York Times, August 1, 2009; “Corte Suprema opuesta a la restitución de Manuel Zelaya,” El Tiempo
(Honduras), August 24, 2009.
44
Elisabeth Malkin & Alexei Barrionuevo, “Ousted Leader Returns to Honduras,” New York Times, September 22,
2009.
45
Ibid.
46
“Embajada de Brasil en Honduras tuvo agua, luz y teléfono cortados,” Agence France Presse, September 22, 2009;
“UN condemns Brazil embassy harassment in Honduras,” Reuters, September 25, 2009.
47
Sophie Nicholson, “Honduras lifts embassy siege curfew,” Agence France Presse, September 24, 2009; “Toque de
anoche fue aplicado por zonas,” El Tiempo (Honduras), September 25, 2009.
48
“Gobierno ordena suspender garantías constitucionales,” El Tiempo (Honduras), September 28, 2009; Elisabeth
Malkin & Ginger Thompson, “Honduras Shuts Down 2 Media Outlets, Then Relents,” New York Times, September 29,
(continued...)
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the right to reopen. 49 Those who support the Micheletti government have rallied against
international pressure and Zelaya’s return, while those who oppose Micheletti continue to
demonstrate on a daily basis. Violent confrontations with the Honduran security forces have
increased, with the number of demonstrators killed since Zelaya’s ouster rising to 11 according to
Honduran human rights groups.50 While there has yet to be much movement by Zelaya or
Micheletti, a variety of sectors within Honduras—including the Catholic Church, members of the
business community, and some of the presidential candidates—have begun holding discussions in
an effort to put together a consensus solution to the country’s political crisis. Most of these
discussions have not included sectors that oppose Micheletti, however, which may prevent any
eventual agreement from receiving broad support across Honduran society.51
November 2009 Elections
General elections to fill nearly 3,000 posts nationwide, including the presidency and all 128 seats
in the National Congress, are scheduled to be held in Honduras on November 29, 2009.52 The
elections are likely to go forward regardless of whether Zelaya is returned to power, as both
Zelaya and Micheletti have asserted that they intend to serve only until the winner of the
presidential election is inaugurated in January 2010.53 While Micheletti has said the election will
be “the final and definitive solution to the current political crisis,” the United States and a number
of other countries in the region have suggested that elections held under the Micheletti
government would be considered illegitimate.54 The TSE expects some 20,000 Hondurans will
observe the elections, and Micheletti has announced that the armed forces will provide security. 55
Primary elections to select the parties’ nominees for all offices were held in November 2008.
Although the vote was deemed free and fair by an OAS electoral observation mission, four
politicians—three members of the PL and one member of the PN—were killed by masked
gunmen in the weeks before the elections. It is unclear whether the murders were political, drugrelated (one politician was a member of the congressional committee on security and narcotrafficking), or random acts of violence. 56 2005 candidate Porfirio Lobo Sosa won 81% of the PN
presidential primary vote to once again claim his party’s nomination. Former Vice President Elvin
Santos, though originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, became the PL
presidential nominee following a complicated series of events that included congressional
(...continued)
2009; Isabel Sanchez, “Coup-backed regime lifts rights curbs in Honduras,” Agence France Presse, October 5, 2009.
49
“Derogación de decreto que suspendía garantías entrará en vigencia cuando se publique en La Gaceta,” El Tiempo
(Honduras), October 6, 2009.
50
Elisabeth Malkin “State Forces Are Accused Of Abuses In Honduras,” New York Times, October 6, 2009.
51
“Honduras: where there’s a will, there’s a way,” Latin News Daily, October 1, 2009.
52
“Elecciones, incierto antídoto contra la crisis socio política,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 31, 2009.
53
William Booth, “Two Hondurans Headed for Clash; Rival Vows to Arrest Zelaya on His Return,” Washington Post
Foreign Service, July 1, 2009.
54
“Struggle ensues over legitimacy of Honduran elections,” Latin American Weekly Report, September 3, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto
Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009; “Aún sin unamidad en OEA para desconocer elección en Honduras: ex
embajador,” Agence France Presse, September 1, 2009.
55
“20 mil observadores verificarán elecciones,” La Prensa (Honduras), August 4, 2009; “Micheletti dice que Fuerzas
Armadas garantizan la seguridad en las elecciones,” EFE News Service, August 28, 2009.
56
“Honduras: Primaries turn bloody,” Latin News Weekly Report, November 27, 2008.
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passage of a special decree and a 52%-32% primary victory by his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio
Villeda, over then head of the Honduran National Congress, Roberto Micheletti.57 Four minor
party candidates are also running for president: Felícito Avila of the centrist Christian Democracy
party (DC), Bernard Martínez of the center-left Party of Innovation and Unity (PINU), César
Ham of the leftist Democratic Unification party (UD), and Carlos Reyes, a union leader who is
running as an independent.
Santos and Lobo are considered the front-runners for the presidential election given the PL and
PN’s historical domination of Honduran politics, though the current political crisis has
considerably altered the electoral landscape. A July 2009 poll found 31% of Hondurans supported
Lobo, 25% supported Santos, and 41% were undecided—a 15-point increase in the undecided
vote from a poll taken prior to the political crisis.58 While Lobo and Santos have sought to
straddle the divide in Honduran society regarding Zelaya’s removal and have nominally
supported the San José Accord, both are perceived to have backed the ouster. Lobo and Santos
have offered relatively similar campaign proposals as well, with both offering vague pledges to
maintain orthodox economic policies, address the country’s high crime rate, increase jobs, and
reduce poverty.59 Given the large portion of the electorate that is undecided and the substantial
strength of the organized resistance to the Micheletti government, some observers have suggested
that the November general election may present the Honduran left with an opportunity to
challenge the country’s two traditional parties, both of which are relatively conservative. The
Honduran left remains divided, however, with some leaders taking steps to create a political
coalition that would include the sectors of the PL that supported Zelaya, portions of PINU, the
UD, labor unions, and social movements, and others pledging to boycott the elections unless
Zelaya is restored to power. Those that support contesting elections are further divided between
support for César Ham and Carlos Reyes, both of whom have announced that they will not
participate unless Zelaya regains the presidency.60
Economic and Social Conditions
With a per capita income of $1,600 (2007), Honduras is classified by the World Bank as a lower
middle income developing economy. 61 Traditional agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are
still important for the Honduran economy, but nontraditional sectors, such as shrimp farming and
the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly over the past decade.
Among the country’s development challenges are an estimated poverty rate of nearly 70%; an
infant mortality rate of 31 per 1,000; and chronic malnutrition for one out of three children under
five years of age. Honduras also has a significant HIV/AIDS crisis, with an adult infection rate of
1.5% of the population. The Garifuna community (descendants of freed black slaves and
57
“Divisive primaries split ruling PL,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, December 2008;
“Honduras’ Vice President Regains the Right to Run; Elvin Santos is Partido Liberal Presidential Candidate,” Latin
America Data Base NotiCen, March 5, 2009.
58
“Lobo the front runner in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, July 15, 2009.
59
“Las propuestas de ‘Pepe’ Lobo a Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), September 2, 2009; “Las propuestas del
candidato Elvin Santos,” El Heraldo (Honduras), September 1, 2009.
60
“Alianza política tiene hoy su primera reunión,” El Heraldo (Honduras), “UD confirma alianza con el ‘lado oscuro’
del PL,” El Heraldo (Honduras), August 24, 2009; “Resistencia boicoteará campañas políticas no permitiendo entrada
de candidatos a los barrios,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 27, 2009.
61
World Bank, World Development Report, 2009.
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indigenous Caribs from St. Vincent) concentrated in northern coastal areas has been especially
hard hit by the epidemic. Despite these challenges, the World Bank maintains that increased
public spending on health and education has reaped significant improvements in development
indicators over the past decade.62
Honduras was devastated by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which killed more than 5,000 people and
caused billions of dollars in damage. The gross domestic product declined by 1.4% in 1999, and
the country felt the effects of the storm for several years, with roads and bridges washed out, the
agricultural sector hard hit, and scores of orphaned children, many of whom joined criminal
gangs. Spurred on by substantial U.S. foreign assistance, however, the economy rebounded by
6% in 2000, and has remained positive ever since. More recently, the economy registered growth
rates of 4.1% in 2005, 6.3% in 2006 and 2007, and 4% in 2008.63
Honduras has also benefited from several debt-reduction programs in recent years. A three-year
poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that imposed fiscal and monetary targets on the government to maintain firm
macroeconomic discipline and to develop a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy, made
Honduras eligible for about $1 billion in debt relief under the IMF and World Bank’s Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 2005. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
also implemented a debt forgiveness program for its poorest members in 2006, including
Honduras, which benefitted from a reduction of $1.4 billion in foreign debt, freeing government
resources to finance poverty-reduction programs.64 Nevertheless, Honduras remains one of the
most impoverished nations in Latin America.
The global financial crisis and the current political crisis have taken a toll on the Honduran
economy. Remittances, foreign investment, and demand for Honduran exports have fallen
sharply, with remittances expected to decline by $112 million in 2009 (a loss of 1% of GDP) and
export earnings down 13% in the first five months of 2009.65 The Micheletti government is
unable to implement an economic stimulus package to counteract these trends as a result of
economic sanctions imposed by the international community in response to the country’s political
situation. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are withholding some $470
million in loans and other transfers, the IMF is not allowing the Micheletti government to access
$165 million in special drawing rights (SDRs), the European Union suspended an estimated $93
million in budget support, the United States has terminated some $33 million in economic and
military aid, and Venezuela—which provided 50% of Honduras’ petroleum imports in 2008—has
stopped supplying the country with oil. 66 There is also considerable domestic pressure on the
62
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Social Panorama of Latin America,” 2008;
World Bank, “Honduras Country Brief,” September 2006; World Bank “Fighting Malnutrition in Central America,”
December 19, 2006; Also see CRS Report RL32713, Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U.S.
Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.
63
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2008 and January 2009.
64
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007; Nestor Ikeda, “Inter-American Development
Bank Forgives Debt of 5 Nations,” Associated Press, March 17, 2007.
65
“Downturn in the US leads to first decline in remittances by migrants,” Latin American Weekly Report, May 21,
2009; “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2009.
66
Nestor Ikeda, “Conservadores critican a Obama por apoyar a Zelaya,” Associated Press, July 1, 2009; “Honduras
can’t touch IMF resources—IMF” Reuters, September 9, 2009; “Unión Europea suspende ayuda financiera a
Honduras,” Reuters, July 20, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on
Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009; “Venezuela halts oil deliveries to Honduras,” EFE News
Service, July 8, 2009; “Negociación solo es para que Zelaya enfrente la justicia,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 7, 2009.
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Honduran economy as those opposed to Zelaya’s ouster have implemented transportation
blockades, strikes, and other measures designed to paralyze economic activity.67 Some
economists have estimated that the political crisis is costing Honduras $20 million daily in lost
trade, aid, tourism, and investment, and analysts have suggested that the Honduran government
faces a possible economic collapse since nearly 20% of the country’s 2009 budget was to be
financed by international donations and transfers.68 The Micheletti government has already cut
central government spending by 10%, and analysts maintain that further spending cuts will be
necessary. The Honduran economy is expected to contract by 4.4% in 2009.69
Figure 1. Map of Honduras
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics.
67
“Se toman el puente La Amistad e incomunican el Litoral Atlántico,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 10, 2009;
“Manifestantes aseguran que hoy paralizan el país,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 23, 2009; “Paralizan aeropuerto de
Tegucigalpa en apoyo a Zelaya,” Agencia Mexicana de Noticias, August 7, 2009.
68
Blake Schmidt, “Midence Says Honduras Economy to Shrink After Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 7, 2009; Keny López
de Carballo, “Honduras no puede prescindir de créditos,” La Prensa Grafica (El Salvador), July 9, 2009.
69
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2009.
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Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years, characterized by
significant foreign assistance, an important trade relationship, a U.S. military presence in the
country, and cooperation on a range of transnational issues. The bilateral relationship became
especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and became the
lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country became a staging area for
U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista forces known as the contras.
Today, overall U.S. policy goals for Honduras include a strengthened democracy with an effective
justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and the promotion of
sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved living conditions. The
United States also cooperates with Honduras to deal with transnational issues such as narcotics
trafficking, money laundering, the fight against terrorism, illegal migration, and trafficking in
persons, and supports Honduran efforts to protect the environment and combat HIV/AIDS. There
are some 800,000 to 1 million Hondurans residing in the United States, who sent an estimated
$2.8 billion in remittances to Honduras in 2008, roughly a quarter of the country’s gross domestic
product.70
According to some analysts, President Zelaya jeopardized Honduras’ traditional close relations
with the United states by forging closer relations with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his
allies.71 In addition to joining Venezuela’s PetroCaribe and Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA), Zelaya delayed the accreditation of U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Hugo
Llorens by one week in September 2008 in order to show solidarity with Bolivia in its diplomatic
spat with the United States. President Zelaya reportedly took a softer tone in his first official
meeting with Ambassador Llorens, however, and described the United States “as an ally and
friend.” Zelaya also maintains that he has been forced to turn to Venezuela for assistance in
addressing high food and energy prices as a result of insufficient U.S. support.72
U.S. Response to Honduran Political Crisis
In the weeks and months leading up to President Zelaya’s proposed non-binding referendum, the
U.S. embassy in Honduras repeatedly made it clear that the referendum was a matter for
Hondurans to resolve and that whatever was decided should comply with Honduran law.73 As the
situation deteriorated in the days before the proposed referendum was to take place, the United
States continued to “urge all sides to seek a consensual democratic resolution” to the political
impasse.74 The exhaustive efforts of U.S. officials, however, were unable to prevent Zelaya’s
removal and the resulting political crisis.
70
U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Honduras,” June 2008; “Latin America: Remittances slide,”
Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2009.
71
“Honduras: Zelaya Risks ALBA Membership,” Oxford Analytica, September 16, 2008.
72
Freddy Cuevas “Honduran Leader: U.S. Apathy Made Him Turn to Chávez,” Associated Press, September 19, 2008.
73
“‘El presidente Zelaya está equivocado’: Micheletti,” La Prensa (Honduras), March 23, 2009; “‘Uno no puede violar
la Constitución’: Llorens,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 4, 2009.
74
“State Department Regular News Briefing,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, June 26, 2009.
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Following the ouster, President Obama immediately expressed deep concern about the situation
and called on all Hondurans to respect democratic norms and resolve the dispute peacefully. 75 The
Obama Administration later condemned the events more forcefully, declaring them illegal, and
asserting that the United States views Zelaya as the legitimate president of Honduras.76 The U.S.
embassy in Honduras also provided security and refuge for Zelaya’s family.77
While the United States has largely worked with its partners in the hemisphere through the OAS
to address the situation in Honduras, it has also taken a number of bilateral steps. In the days after
Zelaya’s removal, U.S. Southern Command announced that it was minimizing cooperation with
the Honduran military,78 the U.S. State Department announced that it would suspend a variety of
foreign assistance programs in Honduras,79 and President Zelaya met in Washington, DC, with
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, Director of
Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council Dan Restrepo, and Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton.80 The United States has strongly supported the mediation of Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias, advising both Zelaya and Micheletti to accept President Arias’ proposed
San José Accord. In order to place pressure on Honduran officials to accept the Accord, the U.S.
Department of State has revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti
government, suspended non-emergency and non-immigrant visa services in the consular section
of the U.S. embassy in Honduras, terminated some $32.7 million in U.S. assistance, and
announced that it will not recognize the results of the planned November 2009 general election in
Honduras under the current circumstances.81
U.S. Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras over the past three
decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid
as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to
Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign assistance needs
grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the United States
provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the 1998 storm. As a
result of the new influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s amounted to
around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid
levels to Honduras again began to decline.
Recent foreign aid funding to Honduras amounted to about $49 million in FY2006, almost $44
million in FY2007, and $40.5 million in FY2008 (see Table 1). For FY2009, an estimated $43
75
White House, Office of the Press Secretary “Statement from President on the situation in Honduras,” June 28, 2009.
76
“Senior Administration Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, June 28, 2009.
77
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Remarks at the Top of the Daily Press Briefing,” July 7, 2009.
78
Fore more information, see “Military Cooperation.”
79
For more information, see “U.S. Foreign Assistance.”
80
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Remarks at the Top of the Daily Press Briefing,” July 7, 2009.
81
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” July 28, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Temporary Suspension of Non-Immigrant Visa Services in Honduras,”
August 25, 2009; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of Assistance and Other Measures
Affecting the De Facto Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold
Background News Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009.
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million in regular foreign aid funding was appropriated. In addition, Honduras could receive a
portion of the $105 million allocated to Central America through the Mérida Initiative to boost
the region’s narcotics interdiction capabilities and support a regional anti-gang strategy. For
FY2010, the Obama Administration requested more than $68 million in foreign aid for Honduras,
including over $53 million in Development Assistance, $12 million in Global Health and Child
Survival assistance, and $1.3 million in Foreign Military Financing. U.S. assistance in FY2010
will support a variety of projects designed to enhance security, strengthen democracy, improve
education and health systems, conserve the environment, and build trade capacity. In addition to
the $68 million in bilateral assistance requested, Honduras would also likely receive a portion of
the $100 million requested for Central America in FY2010 for the continuation of the Mérida
Initiative.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2006-FY2010
(U.S. $ in thousands)
Account
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
(est.)
FY2010
(req.)
Global Health and Child Survival
(USAID)a
13,140
12,034
12,035
11,750
11,000
Global Health and Child Survival (State)b
—
750
1,000
1,000
1,000
Development Assistance
20,604
15,540
15,149
21,382
53,434
Economic Support Funds
—
175
—
—
—
Foreign Military Financing
891
675
496
400
1,300
International Military Education &
Training
1,218
1,404
936
700
700
International Narcotics Control & Law
Enforcement
—
—
744
—
800
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism &
Demining
315
268
—
—
—
Food Aid (P.L. 480)
13,105
13,005
10,150
8,000
—
Total
49,273
43,851
40,510
43,232c
68,234d
a.
This foreign aid account used to be called “Child Survival and Health,” but was re-labeled with the FY2010
budget request. The majority of U.S. assistance to combat HIV/AIDS has been provided under this account.
b.
This foreign aid account used to be called “Global HIV/AIDS Initiative,” but was re-labeled with the FY2010
budget request.
c.
The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) provides $105 million for Central America under the
Mérida Initiative, some of which will likely go to Honduras.
d.
The Obama Administration’s FY2010 request includes $100 million to continue the Mérida Initiative in
Central America. Honduras would likely receive some of these funds.
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY2008-FY2010.
Additional foreign assistance is provided to Honduras through the Peace Corps, which has been
active in the country since 1963, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which
signed a five-year $215 million compact for Honduras in June 2005. The MCC compact has two
components: a rural development project and a transportation project. The rural development
project involves providing Honduran farmers with the skills needed to grow and market
horticultural crops. The transportation project will improve a highway linking the Atlantic port of
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Puerto Cortés to Pacific ports and major production centers in Honduras, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua. It will also involve improvements to main highways and secondary and rural roads, to
enable farmers and other businesses to get their products to markets more efficiently.82
As a result of the Honduran military’s detention and expulsion of President Zelaya, the United
States has terminated $32.7 million in U.S. foreign assistance appropriated for Honduras for
FY2009. Although the United States has yet to declare the events in Honduras a “military coup”
for the purposes of Section 7008 of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the
terminated assistance represents those funds that the United States would be legally required to
discontinue should it do so. 83 Some $10.3 million of the terminated funds were dedicated to
military assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing ($6.5 million), International
Military Education and Training ($0.36 million), global peacekeeping operations ($1.72 million),
and 1206 security assistance ($1.7 million). Another $11.4 million in terminated funds had been
allocated to the Global Child Survival and Health ($2.7 million) and Development Assistance and
Economic Support Fund ($8.7 million) accounts for trade capacity building, support for the
Honduran ministries of labor and education, and a number of other programs—such as basic
education, aid to small farmers, and anti-gang activities—that flow through the government of
Honduras.84 The final $11 million in terminated funds had been dedicated to two transportation
projects as part of the $215 million MCC compact that Honduras signed in 2005. The terminated
funds were all that remained from the compact, as $80 million had been dispersed and contracts
worth an additional $124 million had been signed prior to Zelaya’s ouster. An additional $4
million in MCC funding to Honduras has been put on hold.85 The terminated assistance could be
restored following a return to democratic, constitutional governance in Honduras.86 U.S. foreign
assistance programs that provide direct assistance to the Honduran people, such as food and child
aid, disease prevention, disaster assistance, and democracy promotion, remain in place.
Military Cooperation
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with
about 1,200 troops, who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S.
counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras
support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics
operations, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American
countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty and reserve components
82
Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Honduras Overview,” available at http://www.mcc.gov/countries/honduras/
index.php.
83
Section 7008 of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) states: “None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available” for bilateral economic assistance or international security assistance “shall be obligated or
expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is
deposed by military coup or decree.”
84
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009; U.S. Department
of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in
Honduras,” September 3, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on
Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009.
85
Information Provided to CRS by the Millennium Challenge Corporation; Millennium Challenge Corporation, “MCC
Board of Directors Upholds Importance of Country-Led Development and Accountability,” September 9, 2009.
86
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the
De Facto Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009.
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provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch
in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort. JTF
Bravo has responded to a number of natural disasters in the region in recent years, deploying two
disaster relief teams to Panama and Costa Rica to assist victims of severe flooding and landslides
in November and December 2008.87
The U.S. and Honduran militaries also cooperate on personnel training. In addition to joint
exercise opportunities at JTF-Bravo, members of the Honduran military have received training at
the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, formerly known as the
School of the Americas) in Fort Benning, GA.88 WHINSEC has trained tens of thousands of
military and police personnel from throughout Latin America, but has been criticized by a number
of human rights organizations because some of its graduates have participated in military coups
and committed human rights abuses. Supporters of the school maintain that WHINSEC
emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, develops camaraderie between U.S.
military officers and military and police personnel from other countries in the hemisphere, and is
crucial to developing military partners capable of effective combined operations.89
As a result of the Honduran military’s role in President Zelaya’s removal from office, the United
States has suspended joint military activities as well as military assistance to the country.90 The
events in Honduras have also led some analysts to question the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
military training programs. These analysts contend that such programs have not obtained their
desired outcomes given that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez—who has received U.S.
training—led the effort to remove President Zelaya, and the Honduran military reportedly cut off
contact with the United States prior to the ouster.91
On May 21, 2009, the Latin American Military Training Review Act (H.R. 2567, McGovern) was
introduced in the House. The bill would suspend all operations at WHINSEC, establish a joint
congressional task force to assess the types of training that are appropriate to provide Latin
American militaries, and establish a commission to investigate activities at WHINSEC and its
predecessor.
Economic Linkages
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased greatly since the early 1980s.
In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
the unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many goods
87
“Stavridis Praises U.S.-Honduran Cooperation in Confronting Mutual Threats,” U.S. Fed News, January 30, 2009.
For more information on the School of the Americas and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation,
see CRS Report RL30532, U.S. Army School of the Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Richard F.
Grimmett and Mark P. Sullivan and CRS Report RS20892, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, by
Richard F. Grimmett.
89
U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy Commander,
United States Southern Command, Before the 111th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 17, 2009.
88
90
“U.S. suspends joint military activities with Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 1, 2009; U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
91
“U.S. suspends joint military activities with Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 1, 2009; “Senior Administration
Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
June 28, 2009; “When your aid recipients stop taking your calls,” Center for International Policy, June 28, 2008,
available at http://www.cipcol.org/.
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America Report, October 2008.
4
Mica Rosenberg, “Protests erupt, gunshots heard after Honduras coup,” Reuters, June 28, 2009.
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Political Crisis5
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya
On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Manuel Zelaya and flew him to
forced exile in Costa Rica. The ouster followed several months of political polarization between
Honduran governmental institutions resulting from Zelaya’s intention to hold a non-binding
referendum and eventually amend the constitution. After the military deposed the President, the
Honduran Supreme Court asserted that an arrest warrant had been issued for Zelaya as a result of
his noncompliance with judicial decisions that had declared the non-binding referendum
unconstitutional. However, the military’s actions halted the judicial process before a trial could be
held.6 The Honduran National Congress then adopted a resolution to replace Zelaya with the
President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti.7
The United States and the rest of the international community universally condemned Zelaya’s
ouster and called for his return. They leveled a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions
against the Micheletti government and pushed for a negotiated agreement to end the crisis.
Although Zelaya clandestinely returned to Honduras in September 2009, he was never restored to
office and was forced to remain in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa until January 27, 2010,
when newly inaugurated President Porfirio Lobo granted him safe passage to the Dominican
Republic. 8
Micheletti Government
Micheletti insisted that he took office through a “constitutional succession” throughout the seven
months between Zelaya’s forced removal and the inauguration of President Lobo.9 While in
power, Micheletti and the Honduran National Congress passed a 2009 budget and annulled more
than a dozen decrees and reforms approved under Zelaya, including Honduras’ accession to the
Venezuelan-led trade bloc known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).10 Prior
to adjourning in mid-January 2010, the Honduran National Congress named Micheletti a “deputyfor-life,” and offered life-long security to Micheletti and some 50 other Honduran officials
involved in his government or the ouster of Zelaya.11 Although Micheletti received substantial
support from some sectors of Honduran society, an October 2009 poll found that just 36% of
Hondurans approved of Micheletti’s job in office and 59% believed he rarely or never did what
was in the interest of the Honduran people. The same poll found that 42% of Hondurans
recognized Zelaya as president, while 36% recognized Micheletti. 12
5
For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis,
June 2009-January 2010.
6
Poder Judicial de Honduras, “Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,” available at
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
7
“El decreto de la separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
8
“Zelaya deja Honduras tras 4 meses en la Embajada de Brasil,” EFE News Service, January 27, 2010.
9
Roberto Micheletti, “Moving Forward in Honduras,” Washington Post, September 22, 2009.
10
“Honduras: Micheletti prepares to leave on high note,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 21, 2010.
11
“Congreso de Honduras designa a Micheletti ‘diputado vitalicio,’” Agence France Presse, January 13, 2010; “Más
de 50 funcionarios gozarán de seguridad vitalicia,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 15, 2010.
12
“Hondureños ven solución en presidente alternativo y elecciones, según sondeo,” EFE News Service, October 27,
(continued...)
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During his government, Micheletti maintained tight control of Honduran society, severely
restricting political opposition. On the day of the ouster, security forces patrolled the streets; a
curfew was put in place and a number of local and international television and radio stations were
shut down or intimidated. 13 Over the next several months, the Micheletti government periodically
implemented curfews—often arbitrarily and with little or no prior notification—and issued
decrees restricting civil liberties.14 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
an autonomous body of the Organization of American States (OAS), asserts that during the
Micheletti government, serious violations of human rights occurred, including “deaths, an
arbitrary declaration of a state of emergency, suppression of public demonstrations through
disproportionate use of force, criminalization of public protest, arbitrary detentions of thousands
of persons, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of
detention, militarization of Honduran territory, a surge in incidents of racial discrimination,
violations of women’s rights, serious and arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of
expression, and grave violations of political rights.”15
November 2009 Elections
Results
On November 29, 2009, Honduras held general elections to fill nearly 3,000 posts nationwide,
including the presidency and all 128 seats in the unicameral National Congress.16 Former
President of Congress and 2005 National Party (PN) presidential nominee Porfirio Lobo easily
defeated his closest rival, former Vice President Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party (PL), 56.6% to
38.1%. Three minor party candidates won a combined 5.3% of the presidential vote. 17 Lobo’s PN
also won an absolute majority in the unicameral National Congress, with 71 of the 128 seats (see
Figure 1, for the change in the balance of power). The election was a major defeat for the PL,
which has traditionally had the broadest base of support in Honduras. On top of its poor
presidential showing, it won just 45 seats in Congress, down from 62 in 2005.18 According to
some analysts, many Hondurans held the PL responsible for the country’s political crisis as a
result of Zelaya and Micheletti both belonging to the party. Likewise, traditional PL supporters
were divided over the ouster, leading many from Zelaya’s faction to stay home on election day.19
(...continued)
2009; “Honduras: 42% reconoce a Zelaya como presidente, 36% a Micheletti (encuesta),” Agence France Presse,
October 28, 2009.
13
“Honduras: Decretan toque de queda por 48 horas,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Honduras: Media
Blackout, Protests Reported,” Stratfor, June 29, 2009.
14
“Honduras suspende derechos constitucionales durante toque queda,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; Amnesty International,
“Honduras: human rights crisis threatens as repression increases,” August 2009.
15
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, Organization of
American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, December 30, 2009.
16
“Elecciones, incierto antídoto contra la crisis socio política,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 31, 2009.
17
“TSE confirma el triunfo de ‘Pepe’ en las elecciones,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 21, 2009.
18
“Final results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
19
Noé Leiva, “El Partido Liberal de Zelaya, el gran perdedor de los comicios hondureños,” Agence France Presse,
November 30, 2009; “Partido Liberal sacrificó el poder para salvar democracia,” La Tribuna (Honduras), December 3,
2009.
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Figure 1. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress
2005 and 2009 Election Results
Source: CRS Graphics.
Legitimacy
There has been considerable debate—both in Honduras and the international community—
concerning the legitimacy of the November 2009 elections. Supporters of the elections note that
the electoral process was initiated, and the members of the autonomous Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE) were chosen, prior to Zelaya’s ouster. They also note that the candidates were
selected in internationally observed primary elections in November 2008,20 and that election day
was largely21 free of political violence. 22 Nonetheless, some Hondurans and international
observers have argued that the Micheletti government’s suppression of opposition media and
demonstrators prevented a fair electoral campaign from taking place. This led to election boycotts
and a number of left-leaning candidates for a variety of offices withdrawing from the elections,
including an independent presidential candidate and some incumbent Members of Congress.23 It
20
Former Vice President Elvin Santos, although originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, became
the PL presidential nominee following a series of events that included congressional passage of a special decree and a
52%-32% primary victory by his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio Villeda, over then President of Congress, Roberto
Micheletti. "Honduras' Vice President Regains the Right to Run; Elvin Santos is Partido Liberal Presidential
Candidate," Latin America Data Base NotiCen, March 5, 2009.
21
A demonstration in San Pedro Sula by those opposed to the government of Roberto Micheletti was forcefully
dispersed on election day. “Police fire tear gas on Honduras poll protesters,” Agence France Presse, November 29,
2009.
22
José Saúl Escobar Andrade, Enrique Ortez Sequeira, and David Andrés Matamoros Batso, "Honduran Elections,"
Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, October 22, 2009; International Republican Institute,
“Hondurans Turn Out to Polls in Credible Elections: IRI’s Preliminary Statement on Honduras’ 2009 National
Elections,” November 30, 2009.
23
“Seguidores de Zelaya no particparán en elecciones aunque haya restitución,” EFE News Service, November 8, 2009;
“Renuncian importantes dirigentes del liberalismo,” El Tiempo (Honduras), November 22, 2009; “Zelayistas dicen que
(continued...)
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also led organizations that traditionally observe elections in the hemisphere, such as the OAS, the
EU, and the Carter Center, to cancel their electoral observation missions.24 Critics of the elections
also assert that the electoral turnout, which was just under 50% (5 points lower than 2005),
demonstrated a rejection of the elections by the Honduran people. Supporters of the elections
counter this assertion by arguing that Lobo won more absolute votes in 2009 than Zelaya did in
2005, and that the electoral rolls are artificially inflated—distorting the turnout rate—as a result
of Honduras not purging the rolls of those who have died or migrated overseas.25 Although a
growing number of Hondurans and members of the international community have recognized
Lobo as the legitimate President of Honduras, some have refused to do so. 26
Prospects for the Lobo Administration
Political Reconciliation
President Lobo has already taken a number of steps to ease the political polarization in Honduras.
Since his election, Lobo has called for a government of national unity and pledged to engage in
dialogue with all sectors of Honduran society. 27 He intends to create two outside advisory
councils: one composed of former presidents and another composed of members of the business
community, the churches, unions, peasant organizations, and the media.28 Lobo has also invited
members of each of the established political parties to join his administration, and the new
Honduran National Congress, which is controlled by Lobo’s National Party, incorporated
members of each of the political parties into the leadership committee. 29 Moreover, Lobo
arranged safe passage out of the country for Zelaya and immediately signed a bill providing
political amnesty to Zelaya and those who removed him from office. The amnesty covers political
and common crimes committed prior to and after the removal of President Zelaya, but does not
include acts of corruption or violations of human rights.30
Although these actions have partially reduced the polarization of Honduran society, a number of
analysts caution that the underlying cause of the crisis—the failure of the political elite to respond
to the interests of the majority of the population—remains.31 They assert that those who made up
the “National Resistance Front Against the Coup d’état,” an umbrella group of those opposed to
(...continued)
hay incongruencias en la UD,” El Tiempo (Honduras), November 23, 2009.
24
Gustavo Palencia, “Honduras busca convencer observadores para cuestionada elección,” Reuters, November 12,
2009; “La CE dice que no hay tiempo para una misión electoral y envía dos expertos,” EFE News Service, November
11, 2009.
25
“Honduras: Tug of War Between Opposition and De Facto Regime Regarding Flow of Voters,” Latin America Data
Base NotiCen, December 3, 2009; “Final results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
26
Frente Nacional de Resistencia Contra el Golpe de Estado, “Comunicado No. 41,” November 30, 2009; “El
Mercosur anuncia ‘pleno desconocimiento’ de nuevo gobierno de Honduras,” EFE News Service, December 8, 2009.
27
“Gobierno de austeridad y unidad anuncia Lobo,” El Heraldo (Honduras), January 12, 2010.
28
“Nueva administración creará y desaparecerá ministerios,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 18, 2010.
29
“UD analizará si acepta cargos en el gobierno de Lobo Sosa,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 24, 2010; “Congreso
hondureño elige directiva que incluye a la izquierda por primera vez,” EFE News Service, January 23, 2010.
30
“Lobo secures exit from Honduras for Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, January 21, 2010; “Congreso aprueba amnistía
para delitos políticos comunes conexos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 27, 2010.
31
Kevin Casas-Zamora, "A Discussion on the Honduran Elections," Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue,
Washington, DC, December 9, 2009; “¿Renovarse o morir? (Editorial),” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 26, 2010.
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Zelaya’s removal, are still fully committed to reforming the Honduran constitution and pushing
for greater political, economic, and social rights for traditionally excluded sectors of the
Honduran population. These analysts maintain that Honduras will continue to be susceptible to
political instability if Honduran leaders simply revert to that status quo that existed prior to the
political crisis and largely ignore the basic needs of the 70% of the population the lives below the
poverty line.
International Recognition
President Lobo faces a challenge in winning support from the international community.
Following the ouster of President Zelaya, many nations expressed concern about the state of
democracy in Latin America and the possibility that the events of June 28, 2009 could serve as an
example for other countries. Not a single nation recognized the Micheletti government, and since
Zelaya was not returned to office prior to the November 2009 election, a number of countries
refused to recognize the result. 32 Lobo has called on the international community to stop
“punishing” the people of Honduras for Zelaya’s ouster.33 Although the United States and several
other countries in the region have indicated that they will support Lobo, he still needs to win the
support of others—such as Brazil—in order to reintegrate Honduras into the international
community and end the diplomatic and economic sanctions that have been leveled against the
country.34
According to a number of analysts, the international community is likely to slowly restore
relations with Honduras.35 They assert that several countries have responded positively to Lobo’s
preliminary attempts at national reconciliation and have softened their positions. They also assert
that countries that have yet to recognize Lobo have few remaining options since a growing
number of nations and the majority of Hondurans have already recognized the new government.
Enactment of Policies
During the electoral campaign, Lobo indicated that the three priorities of his government would
be respectable wages for families, improved social services, and security.36 In order to generate
employment, Lobo has suggested providing support to small and medium-sized businesses. He
has asserted that he will seek to attract foreign investment by implementing orthodox economic
policies and proposing new laws to protect investors.37 Although Lobo has indicated that he will
give priority to private enterprise, he has said that some government action is necessary. He has
pledged to increase access to education and healthcare, and improve the quality of Honduran
social services. He has also proposed a conditional cash transfer program that would provide
32
“El Mercosur anuncia ‘pleno desconocimiento’ de nuevo gobierno de Honduras,” EFE News Service, December 8,
2009.
33
“Lobo pide a la comunidad internacional que no siga ‘castigando’ a su pueblo,” EFE News Service, November 30,
2009.
34
“Brasil sin representantes en investidura de Lobo en Honduras,” Agence France Presse, January 27, 2010.
35
“Insulza confía que OEA reanude diálogo con Honduras tras investidura de Lobo,” EFE News Service, January 14,
2010; Diego Urdaneta, “Comunidad internacional recompondrá relaciones con la Honduras de Lobo,” Agence France
Presse, January 26, 2010; “Honduras politics: Lobo takes charge,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2010.
36
“Las propuestas de ‘Pepe’ Lobo a Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), September 2, 2009.
37
Ibid; Helen Murphy and Eric Sabo, “Lobo wins Honduran Presidency After Peaceful Vote,” Bloomberg, November
30, 2009; “‘Pepe’ Lobo: Gobierno humanista-cristiano,” La Tribuna (Honduras), December 15, 2009;
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small cash subsidies to some 600,000 families that keep their children in school.38 In terms of
security, Lobo has pledged to crack down on crime and violence. He has backed away from his
2005 proposal to reinstate the death penalty in Honduras, however, he still favors a hard-line
approach.39 Since taking office, Lobo has initiated a new security strategy that has begun
deploying hundreds of police into the poorest neighborhoods of Tegucigalpa and other large
cities.40
A number of analysts maintain that Lobo’s political strength should facilitate policy
implementation, although a lack of funds could curtail his plans.41 The PN’s absolute majority in
the National Congress and the factionalism of the weakened PL, will likely ensure minimal
legislative opposition to Lobo’s policies. Lobo could face some opposition in the streets,
however, as most of those who participated in the “National Resistance Front Against the Coup
d’état” have refused to recognize Lobo and intend to push for a constitutional assembly. 42
Honduras’ economic situation is likely to be the most significant challenge to Lobo’s agenda. He
has indicated that he will seek to do more with limited funds by better targeting subsidies and
strictly controlling the use of government funds by state officials. He also intends to re-establish
flows of bilateral and multilateral aid and will negotiate a new stand by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).43
Economic and Social Conditions
The Honduran economy has gone through a number of changes in recent years. Traditional
agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important, but nontraditional sectors, such as
shrimp farming and the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly
over the past decade. In 1998, Honduras was devastated by Hurricane Mitch, which killed more
than 5,000 people and caused billions of dollars in damage. The gross domestic product declined
by 1.4% in 1999, and the country felt the effects of the storm for several years, with roads and
bridges washed out, the agricultural sector hard hit, and scores of orphaned children, many of
whom joined criminal gangs. Spurred on by substantial U.S. foreign assistance, however, the
economy rebounded with 6% growth in 2000. More recently, Honduras registered growth rates of
4.1% in 2005, 6.3% in 2006 and 2007, and 4% in 2008.44 Honduras is now classified by the
World Bank as a lower middle income developing economy, with a per capita income of $1,800
(2008).45
Despite experiencing substantial economic growth, Honduras continues to face a number of
development challenges. These include an estimated poverty rate of nearly 70%; an infant
mortality rate of 31 per 1,000; and chronic malnutrition for one out of three children under five
years of age. Honduras also has a significant HIV/AIDS crisis, with an adult infection rate of
38
“Las propuestas de ‘Pepe’ Lobo a Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), September 2, 2009.
“Honduras: Lobo seeks to unseat the PL,” Latin American Special Reports: Election Watch, 2009.
40
Gustavo Palencia “Nuevo Gobierno Honduras busca aplacar violencia ligada al narco,” Reuters, January 28, 2010.
41
“Honduras politics: Lobo takes charge,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2010.
42
“El Frente de la Resistencia afirma que le pondrá ‘las cosas difíciles’ a Lobo,” EFE News Service, January 25, 2010.
43
“Nuevo Gobierno de Honduras dice que recibe el país en ‘bancarrota’,” EFE News Service, January 28, 2010.
44
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2008 and January 2009.
45
World Bank, World Development Report, 2010.
39
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1.5% of the population. The Garifuna community (descendants of freed black slaves and
indigenous Caribs from St. Vincent) concentrated in northern coastal areas has been especially
hard hit by the epidemic. The World Bank maintains that development indicators have improved
over the past decade, however, as a result of increased public spending on health and education.46
Debt Reduction
Honduras has benefited from several debt-reduction programs. A three-year poverty reduction and
growth facility (PRGF) agreement with the IMF made Honduras eligible for about $1 billion in
debt relief under the IMF and World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in
2005. The agreement imposed fiscal and monetary targets on the government, and required
Honduras to maintain firm macroeconomic discipline and develop a comprehensive poverty
reduction strategy. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) implemented a debt forgiveness
program for its poorest members in 2006. Honduras benefitted from a reduction of $1.4 billion in
foreign debt, freeing government resources to finance poverty alleviation.47 Largely as a result of
these programs, Honduras’ public debt declined from nearly 46% of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2005 to under 19% in 2007. The country’s public debt had climbed back to an estimated
25% of GDP in 2009, however, and Honduras remains one of the most impoverished nations in
Latin America.48
Effects of Financial and Political Crises
The global financial crisis and the political crisis have taken a toll on the Honduran economy.
Over the first half of 2009, Honduras experienced significant declines in remittances (11%) and
export earnings (13%).49 The June 2009 forced removal of President Zelaya exacerbated these
economic problems, as the international community, which had been expected to finance 20% of
the country’s budget, imposed economic sanctions on Honduras.50 International financial
institutions withheld access to some $485 million in loans and other transfers, the European
Union and United States terminated $126 million in aid, and Venezuela—which provided 50% of
Honduras’ petroleum imports in 2008—stopped supplying the country with subsidized oil.51
Domestic opponents of the ouster placed additional pressure on the economy, engaging in strikes,
46
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Social Panorama of Latin America,” 2008;
World Bank, “Honduras Country Brief,” September 2006; World Bank “Fighting Malnutrition in Central America,”
December 19, 2006; Also see CRS Report RL32713, Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U.S.
Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.
47
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007; Nestor Ikeda, “Inter-American Development
Bank Forgives Debt of 5 Nations,” Associated Press, March 17, 2007.
48
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2010.
49
“Honduras: Struggling,” Latin American Economy & Business, October 2009; “Honduras economy: Political crisis
takes its toll,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 27, 2009.
50
Keny López de Carballo, “Honduras no puede prescindir de créditos,” La Prensa Grafica (El Salvador), July 9,
2009.
51
Robin Emmott, “Aid freeze in post-coup Honduras hurting poor,” Reuters, November 12, 2009; “Honduras can’t
touch IMF resources—IMF” Reuters, September 9, 2009; “Unión Europea suspende ayuda financiera a Honduras,”
Reuters, July 20, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009; “Venezuela halts oil deliveries to Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 8,
2009; “Negociación solo es para que Zelaya enfrente la justicia,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 7, 2009.
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transportation blockades, and other measures designed to paralyze economic activity.52 Some
economists have estimated that the political crisis cost Honduras 180,000 jobs and $20 million
daily in lost trade, aid, tourism, and investment.53 In order to offset steep declines in government
revenue, Micheletti and the Honduran Congress were forced to slash spending, reducing central
government expenditures by 10% and decentralized state body expenditures by 20%.54 According
to private analysts, the Honduran economy contracted by an estimated 4.4% in 2009.55
Some economists believe Honduras will need to re-establish flows of bilateral and multilateral aid
in order to turn the economy around. Access to the withheld and withdrawn aid would allow
Honduras to address its growing fiscal deficit and restore some of the spending that was cut in
2009.56 Restoration of international aid is likely, as some financial institutions have already
announced that they will normalize relations with Honduras and other members of the
international community are expected to do the same.57 Although analysts suggest that the
improving international economic situation should aid Honduras’ recovery, they caution that it
will be years before Honduras regains what was lost as a result of the political crisis.58
52
“Manifestantes aseguran que hoy paralizan el país,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 23, 2009.
53
Blake Schmidt, “Midence Says Honduras Economy to Shrink After Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 7, 2009; Laura
Figueroa, “Honduras’ business leaders hope elections restore investors’ faith,” Miami Herald, December 25, 2009.
54
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2009.
55
“Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2010.
56
“Honduras politics: Lobo takes charge,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2010.
57
“BCIE normaliza relaciones con Honduras tras el golpe de Estado,” Agence France Presse, January 21, 2010.
58
“Honduras politics: Lobo takes charge,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2010.
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Figure 2. Map of Honduras
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics.
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years. The bilateral
relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and
became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country became a
staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista forces known as the
contras.
Relations between the United States and Honduras have been strained recently as a result of the
country’s political crisis. Following Zelaya’s ouster, the United States cut off almost all contact
with the Honduran government. The United States suspended some foreign assistance, U.S.
Southern Command minimized cooperation with the Honduran military, and the U.S. State
Department revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti government, which
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assumed power following Zelaya’s removal.59 Micheletti reacted angrily to U.S. policy toward his
government, declaring, “it isn’t possible for anyone, no matter how powerful they are, to come
over here and tell us what we have to do.”60 Relations have begun to improve as the United States
recognized the November 2009 Honduran elections and is expected to restore full relations with
Honduras now that President Lobo has taken office. 61
Today, overall U.S. policy goals for Honduras include a strengthened democracy with an effective
justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and the promotion of
sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved living conditions. In
addition to providing Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign assistance and maintaining
significant military and economic ties, the United States cooperates with Honduras to deal with
transnational issues such as illegal migration, crime, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons,
and port security.
U.S. Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras over the past three
decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid
as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to
Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign assistance needs
grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the United States
provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the 1998 storm. As a
result of the new influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s amounted to
around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid
levels to Honduras again began to decline.
Recent foreign aid funding to Honduras amounted to nearly $44 million in FY2007, $40.5 million
in FY2008, and about $42.5 million in FY2009 (see Table 1). For FY2010, an estimated $51.3
million in regular foreign aid funding was appropriated. For FY2011, the Obama Administration
requested nearly $68 million in foreign aid for Honduras, including almost $54 million in
Development Assistance, $12 million in Global Health and Child Survival assistance, and $1.3
million in Foreign Military Financing. U.S. assistance in FY2011 will support a variety of
projects designed to enhance security, strengthen democracy, improve education and health
systems, conserve the environment, and build trade capacity.
59
“Senior Administration Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, June 28, 2009; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of
Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009; U.S. Department of
State, Office of the Spokesman, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” July 28, 2009.
60
Carlos Salinas, “Honduran de facto leader vows to cling to power over US objections,” El País (Spain), August 5,
2009.
61
“Clinton says Lobo trying to reconcile Hondurans,” Reuters, December 9, 2009.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2007-FY2011
(U.S. $ in thousands)
Account
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010(est.)
FY2011(req.)
Global Health and Child
Survival (USAID)
12,034
12,035
11,750
11,000
11,000
Global Health and Child
Survival (State)
750
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
Development Assistance
15,540
15,149
21,382
37,491
53,934
Economic Support Funds
175
—
—
—
—
Foreign Military Financing
675
496
—
1,075
1,300
1,404
936
329
700
700
—
744
—
—
—
268
—
—
—
—
Food Aid
13,005
10,150
8,000
NA
NA
Total
43,851
40,510
42,461
51,266
67,934
International Military Education
and Training
International Narcotics & Law
Enforcement
Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism & Demining
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY2008-FY2010; U.S.
Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 and Other International Programs, FY2011.
Notes: Global Health and Child Survival (USAID) was formerly called “Child Survival and Health,” but was relabeled with the FY2010 budget request. Likewise, Global Health and Child Survival (State) was formerly called
“Global HIV/AIDS Initiative,” but was re-labeled with the FY2010 budget request.
Additional foreign assistance is provided to Honduras through the Peace Corps, which has been
active in the country since 1963; the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which signed a
five-year $215 million compact for Honduras in June 2005; and the Mérida Initative, which is a
multiyear program designed to boost narcotics interdiction capabilities and support a regional
anti-gang strategy in Mexico and Central America. The MCC compact has two components: a
rural development project and a transportation project. The rural development project involves
providing Honduran farmers with the skills needed to grow and market horticultural crops. The
transportation project will improve a highway linking the Atlantic port of Puerto Cortés to Pacific
ports and major production centers in Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. It will also involve
improvements to main highways and secondary and rural roads, to enable farmers and other
businesses to get their products to markets more efficiently. 62 Under the Mérida Initiative, some
$248 million has been appropriated for Central America between FY2008 and FY2010. A portion
of this assistance likely went to Honduras.63
In September 2009, the United States terminated $32.7 million in foreign assistance appropriated
for Honduras for FY2009 as a result of the country’s political crisis. Some $10.3 million was
intended for security assistance. Another $11.4 million was intended for economic and social
62
Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Honduras Overview,” available at http://www.mcc.gov/countries/honduras/
index.php.
63
For more information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and
Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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development programs administered by the government of Honduras, including funds for antigang activities, trade capacity building, and aid to small farmers.64 The final $11 million was
intended for two transportation projects, and was all that remained of the $215 million MCC
compact that Honduras signed in 2005.65 Nonetheless, Honduras still received an estimated $42.5
million in U.S. foreign aid in FY2009, which provided direct assistance to the Honduran people
(See Table 1). The assistance included funds for education, disease prevention, and democracy
promotion.66 The U.S. government would have been legally required to terminate some foreign
assistance if it had declared Zelaya’s ouster a “military coup.”67 Although the United States never
made such a declaration, it terminated the foreign assistance that it would have been required to
discontinue had it done so.
Military Cooperation
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with
about 1,200 troops, who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S.
counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras
support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics
operations, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American
countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty and reserve components
provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch
in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort. JTF
Bravo has responded to a number of natural disasters in the region in recent years. In November
2009 for example, JTF Bravo provided humanitarian relief to the victims of severe flooding in El
Salvador.68
The June 28, 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya has led some to reassess the state of U.S.Honduran military cooperation. As a result of the Honduran military’s role in Zelaya’s removal,
the United States suspended joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the
country.69 The events in Honduras also led some analysts to question the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign military training programs.70 These analysts contend that such programs have not
64
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009; U.S. Department
of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in
Honduras,” September 3, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on
Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009.
65
Prior to Zelaya’s ouster, $80 million of the MCC compact had been dispersed and contracts worth an additional $124
million had been signed. Information Provided to CRS by the Millennium Challenge Corporation; Millennium
Challenge Corporation, “MCC Board of Directors Upholds Importance of Country-Led Development and
Accountability,” September 9, 2009.
66
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Congressional Notification #7,” December 18, 2009.
67
Section 7008 of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) states: “None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available” for bilateral economic assistance or international security assistance “shall be obligated or
expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is
deposed by military coup or decree.”
68
Staff Sgt. Chad Thompson, “U.S. military helicopters airlift 61,000 pounds of aid to El Salvador,” Joint Task ForceBravo Public Affairs, November 14, 2009.
69
“U.S. suspends joint military activities with Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 1, 2009; U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
70
“When your aid recipients stop taking your calls,” Center for International Policy, June 28, 2008, available at
(continued...)
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obtained their desired outcomes given that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez—who has
received U.S. training—led the effort to remove President Zelaya, and the Honduran military
reportedly cut off contact with the United States prior to the ouster.71
On May 21, 2009, the Latin American Military Training Review Act (H.R. 2567, McGovern) was
introduced in the House. The bill would suspend all operations at the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, formerly known as the School of the Americas),
which has trained tens of thousands of military and police personnel from throughout Latin
America.72 The bill would also establish a joint congressional task force to assess the types of
training that are appropriate to provide Latin American militaries and establish a commission to
investigate activities at WHINSEC and its predecessor.
Economic Linkages
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased greatly since the early 1980s.
In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
the unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many goods
from the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing arrangements
with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States of certain apparel products
assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or export-assembly companies flourished, most
concentrated in the north coast region. The passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
in 2000 (CBTPA), which provided Caribbean Basin nations with NAFTA-like preferential tariff
treatment, further boosted Honduran maquiladoras. Trade relations expanded again following the
implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), which entered into force with Honduras in April 2006.
The United States is by far Honduras’ largest trading partner. In 2008, the United States was the
destination of about 37% of Honduran exports and the origin of about 37% of its imports.
Honduras is the largest Central American exporter to the United States and the top Latin
American exporter of knit apparel to the United States. In 2008, U.S. exports to Honduras
amounted to about $4.8 billion, up 31% from 2006. Knit and woven apparel inputs accounted for
a substantial portion, as did machinery and petroleum. U.S. imports from Honduras amounted to
about $4 billion in 2008, with knit and woven apparel (assembled products from the maquiladora
sector) accounting for the lion’s share. Other Honduran exports to the United States include
coffee, seafood, bananas, electrical wiring, gold, and tobacco.92
In terms of investment, the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras amounted to $968
million in 2007, concentrated in the manufacturing sector.93 More than 150 U.S. companies
operate in Honduras, with the most significant U.S. investments in the maquila or export
73
(...continued)
http://www.cipcol.org/.
71
“U.S. suspends joint military activities with Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 1, 2009; “Senior Administration
Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
June 28, 2009.
72
WHINSEC has been criticized by a number of human rights organizations because some of its graduates have
participated in military coups and committed human rights abuses. Supporters of the school maintain that WHINSEC
emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, develops camaraderie between U.S. military officers and
military and police personnel from other countries in the hemisphere, and is crucial to developing military partners
capable of effective combined operations. For more information, see CRS Report RL30532, U.S. Army School of the
Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Richard F. Grimmett and Mark P. Sullivan and CRS Report
RS20892, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, by Richard F. Grimmett.
73
U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, 2009.
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U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras amounted to $700 million in 2008.74 More than 150
U.S. companies operate in Honduras, with the most significant U.S. investments in the maquila or
export assembly sector, fruit production, tourism, energy generation, shrimp farming, animal feed
production, telecommunications, fuel distribution, cigar manufacturing, insurance, brewing, food
processing, and furniture manufacturing.94 To date,75 U.S. businesses appear to be relatively
unaffected by the operating in Honduras were negatively
affected by the country’s political crisis in Honduras. While there have been some reports of concerned
U.S. businesses and investors making contingency plans in case the situation in Honduras
deteriorates further or trade sanctions are imposed, most reports suggest that business is
proceeding as usual.952009. The tourism and manufacturing sectors were
especially hard hit as international travelers stayed away and government-imposed curfews
prevented workers from getting to their places of employment.76
Despite the increases in trade and investment that have occurred since the implementation of
CAFTA-DR, a number U.S. and Honduran officials have expressed concerns about the
agreement. Honduran officials are concerned about the loss of agricultural jobs in the corn, rice,
beef, poultry, and pork sectors since the country opened its market to U.S. agricultural products.
Some fear that the loss of agricultural employment could lead to social unrest if not addressed
properly through long-term investment. WhileAlthough CAFTA-DR has provisions to enforce domestic
labor codes and improve labor rights, a number of U.S. officials maintain that the provisions are
inadequate given the history of non-compliance with labor laws in many Central American
nations. The U.S. State Department’s 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
Honduras found credible evidence that employees engaged in union duties were blacklisted
within the maquiladoras and that union leaders were occasionally targeted with threats and
violence. 96
92
U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, 2009.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Survey of Current Business,” September 2008.
94
U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Honduras,” February 2009.
93
95
Greg Flakus, “Honduran Economy in Peril From Political Crisis,” Voice of America, July 9, 2009; Mica Rosenberg,
“Honduras textile industry vulnerable to drawn out crisis,” Reuters, July 6, 2009.
96
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2008 Country Reports on Human
(continued...)
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Crime
Honduras, along with neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, has become fertile ground for
gangs, which have been fueled by poverty, unemployment, leftover weapons from the conflicts of
77
Migration Issues
Temporary Protected Status
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided temporary protected
status (TPS) to eligible Hondurans who may otherwise have been deported from the United
States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS status has now been extended seven times
due to the U.S. government’s assessment that Honduras would have difficulty in coping with the
deportees’ returns. The most recent TPS extension came in October 2008, when then-Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff announced that the U.S. would continue to provide TPS for
an additional 18 months, expiring on July 5, 2010. Homeland Security officials maintain that the
TPS extension was necessary because Honduras continues to face social and economic challenges
in its efforts to restore the nation to normalcy despite the significant progress the country has
made in terms of recovery and rebuilding. Some 78,000 of the more than 800,000 Hondurans
residing in the United States benefit from TPS.78
74
Marilyn Ibarra & Jennifer Koncz, “Direct Investment Positions for 2008,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, July 2009.
75
U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Honduras,” February 2009.
76
Brian Wagner, “Honduran Businesses Suffer as Political Crisis Continues,” Voice of America, October 16, 2009;
Kevin Bogardus, “U.S. Business sees Honduran elections as solution to crisis ,” The Hill, October 28, 2009.
77
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2008 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices,” February 25, 2009.
78
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Extension of the Designation of
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status,” October 1, 2008. For background on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844,
Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
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Deportations 79
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. Approximately
27,600 Hondurans were deported from the United States in FY2009, making Honduras one of the
top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.80 Increasing deportations from the United States
have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit country for
Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are concerned
about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often difficult for
those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not speak Spanish,
who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support face additional
difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social problems, leaders are
concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of deportations continue. 81 In
March 2007, the Honduran Congress approved a motion calling for the United States to halt
deportations of undocumented Honduran migrants who live and work in the United States.82
Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. By the mid1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended and the United States began deporting
unauthorized immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region. Between 2000 and
2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many of whom had spent
time in prisons in the United States for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Some observers
contend that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America, and
that they have recruited new members from among the local populations.83 Although a recent
United Nations study found little conclusive evidence to support their claims, the media and
many Central American officials have attributed a large proportion of the rise in violent crime in
the region to gangs, particularly gang-deportees from the United States.84 In July 2007 testimony
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the Honduran Ambassador to the
United States asserted that although the United States provides information to countries on the
criminal background of deportees, the information does not include whether the repatriated
nationals are gang members. About 25% of Hondurans deported from the United States in
FY2009 were removed on criminal grounds. 85
Crime
Honduras, along with neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, has become fertile ground for
gangs, which have been fueled by poverty, unemployment, leftover weapons from the conflicts of
79
Clare Ribando Seelke contributed information to this section. Also see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
80
Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Detention and Removal.
81
Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington Post,
June 27, 2007.
82
“CN Pide a EEUU que Cesen las Deportaciones de Compatriotas,” La Tribuna (Honduras), March 14, 2007.
83
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
84
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
85
Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Detention and Removal.
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the 1980s, and the U.S. deportation of criminals to the region. The two major gangs in
Honduras—Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, and the 18th Street gang, or M-18—were first
established in Los Angeles in the 1980s by Salvadoran immigrants who were excluded from
Mexican-American gangs. The U.S. deportation of criminals back to the region in the 1990s may
have helped lay the foundation for the development of MS-13 and M-18 in Central America.9786
Although estimates of the number of gang members in Central America vary widely, the U.S.
Southern Command maintains that there are some 70,000, concentrated largely in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala.98
87
Recent Honduran presidents have implemented varying anti-crime strategies, however, none of
them have achieved much success. During his term, President Maduro (2002-2006) increased the
number of police officers and
signed legislation that made maras (street gangs) illegal and gang
membership punishable with
12 years in prison. Although the crackdown won popular support
and initially reduced crime, its
success was short-lived. Following his election, President Zelaya
(2006-2010) replaced the previous
administration’s zero-tolerance policy with dialogue and other
outreach techniques designed to
convince gang members to give up violence and reintegrate into
society.9988 Failure to achieve
concrete results, however, led the Zelaya Administration to shift its
emphasis toward more
traditional anti-gang law enforcement operations. The AdministrationZelaya increased the
number of
police and military troops in the streets and conducted raids against suspected
criminals.
Nonetheless, crime and violence in Honduras have continued unabated.10089 In 2008,
Honduras had one of the highest murder rates in the world at 57.9 per 100,000 inhabitants.90
Several U.S. agencies have been involved in assisting Honduras and other Central American
countries in dealing with the gang problem. 10191 On the law enforcement side, the FBI and the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have worked closely with Honduran law
enforcement and the United States has provided anti-gang training for Honduran police and
prosecutors.10292 The U.S. Agency for International Development, while not having does not have a specific
program program
focusing on gangs, however, it supports several programs that attack the risk factors associated with
with gang membership and violence. These include a program to provide basic education skills to atrisk
at-risk youths and a program to improve the effectiveness and transparency of the justice
system. 103
93 In July 2007, the United States pledged $4 million to help Central American
governments draft a
(...continued)
Rights Practices,” February 25, 2009.
97
regional security strategy to fight street gangs and drug trafficking.94 As
noted above, Congress has also provided funding to Central America through the Mérida
86
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2005.
98
House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern
Command, March 9, 2005.
9988
“Honduran Government Reaches Out to Rehabilitate Gangs,” ACAN-EFE, January 30, 2006.
10089
Marion Barbel, “Homicide Rate Confirms Honduras as One of Region’s Most Violent Nations,” Global Insight
Daily Daily
Analysis, September 11, 2008.
10190
“Honduras report signals rising violence,” Latin News Daily, February 22, 2009.
91
See CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
10292
House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement of John P.
Torres, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Hearing on “Gangs and
Crime in Latin America,” April 20, 2005.
103
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, Annex 3: Honduras
Profile,” April 2006.
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regional security strategy to fight street gangs and drug trafficking.104 As noted above, Congress
has also provided funding to Central America through the Mérida Initiative to boost the region’s
counternarcotics capabilities and support the development of a regional anti-gang strategy.
Migration Issues
Temporary Protected Status
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided temporary protected
status (TPS) to eligible Hondurans who may otherwise have been deported from the United
States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS status has now been extended seven times
due to the U.S. government’s assessment that Honduras would have difficulty in coping with the
deportees’ returns. The most recent TPS extension came in October 2008, when then-Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff announced that the U.S. would continue to provide TPS for
an additional 18 months, expiring on July 5, 2010. Homeland Security officials maintain that the
TPS extension was necessary because Honduras continues to face social and economic challenges
in its efforts to restore the nation to normalcy despite the significant progress the country has
made in terms of recovery and rebuilding. Some 78,000 Hondurans benefit from TPS.105
Deportations 106
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. About 30,000
Hondurans were deported from the United States in both FY2007 and FY2008, making Honduras
one of the top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.107 Increasing deportations from the
United States have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit
country for Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are
concerned about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often
difficult for those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not
speak Spanish, who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support
face additional difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social
problems, leaders are concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of
deportations continue.108 In March 2007, the Honduran Congress approved a motion calling for
the United States to halt deportations of undocumented Honduran migrants who live and work in
the United States.109
104
“U.S. Offers Funds to Help Fight Central America Gangs,” Reuters, July 18, 2007.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Extension of the Designation of
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status,” October 1, 2008. For background on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844,
Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
106
Clare Ribando Seelke contributed information to this section. Also see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
107
Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Detention and Removal.
108
Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington
Post, June 27, 2007.
109
“CN Pide a EEUU que Cesen las Deportaciones de Compatriotas,” La Tribuna (Honduras), March 14, 2007.
105
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Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. By the mid1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended and the United States began deporting
unauthorized immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region. Between 2000 and
2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many of whom had spent
time in prisons in the United States for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Some observers
contend that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America, and
that they have recruited new members from among the local populations.110 Although a recent
United Nations study found little conclusive evidence to support their claims, the media and
many Central American officials have attributed a large proportion of the rise in violent crime in
the region to gangs, particularly gang-deportees from the United States.111 In July 2007 testimony
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the Honduran Ambassador to the
United States asserted that although the United States provides information to countries on the
criminal background of deportees, the information does not include whether the repatriated
nationals are gang members. About 19% of Hondurans deported from the United States in
FY2008 were removed on criminal grounds. 11293
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, Annex 3: Honduras
Profile,” April 2006.
94
“U.S. Offers Funds to Help Fight Central America Gangs,” Reuters, July 18, 2007.
87
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Initiative to boost the region’s counternarcotics capabilities and support the development of a
regional anti-gang strategy.
Drug Trafficking
Honduras is a transit country for cocaine and heroin flowing from the Andean region of South
America to the United States and Europe. It is also increasingly a transshipment point for
precursor chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. Remote and poorly controlled
areas of Honduras along the country’s north coast are natural safe havens for drug traffickers,
providing them with isolated areas for trafficking operations, such as refueling maritime assets
and making boat-to-boat transfers.
The U.S. State Department’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report acknowledges
the government of Honduras for its ongoing cooperation with the United States on
counternarcotics efforts, noting that successful joint operations led to an increase in narcotics
arrests and seizures. In 2008, the government of Honduras seized 6.5 metric tons of cocaine, 2
kilograms of crack cocaine, 19.6 kilograms of heroin, 3 metric tons of marijuana, 3.5 million
pseudoephedrine pills, and over five tons of precursor chemicals. These seizures also led to 721
arrests and the confiscation of $6.7 million in assets. The United States has supported a variety of
anticorruption, police training, and maritime operations programs intended to improve Honduras’
counternarcotics capabilities.11395
Honduras’ counternarcotics efforts continue to face a number of obstacles, however, including
funding constraints, official corruption, and insufficient precursor chemical controls. Additionally,
Mexican drug cartels have expanded their operations in Honduras. It has been reported that the
Gulf and Sinaloa cartels now engage in direct and indirect operations within Honduras, especially
110
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
112
Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Detention and Removal.
113
U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2009 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),” February 27, 2009.
111
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along the northern and Atlantic coast, and that Los Zetas have cells in every department of the
country.11496
In October 2008, President Zelaya became the first Latin American president to openly suggest
the legalization of narcotics. He argued that drug trafficking has led to increased violence and that
supporting addict treatment programs would be a better use of the government’s resources.11597
Nonetheless, Honduras has continued its counternarcotics efforts. In January 2009, President
Zelaya signed a letter of agreement with the United States to implement the Mérida Initiative, and
in February 2009, the United States began construction on a counternarcotics base in the
Honduran department of Gracias a Dios, which borders Nicaragua and the Caribbean and is a
major corridor for traffickers.
Human Trafficking
According to the State Department’s 2009 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, Honduras is
primarily a source and transit country for women and children trafficked for the purpose of
95
U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2009 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),” February 27, 2009.
96
“Carteles mexicanas azotan a Honduras,” La Prensa (Honduras), August 27, 2008; “Los Zetas hondureños, nueva
pesadilla para los inmigrantes,” El Tiempo (Honduras), March 18, 2009.
97
“Honduras floats drug legalisation,” Latin News Daily, October 14, 2008.
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commercial sexual exploitation. Many victims are trafficked from rural areas to tourist and urban
locales such as Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the Bay Islands. Destination countries for
trafficked Honduran women and children include the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Belize. There are also foreign victims of commercial sexual exploitation in
Honduras, most having been trafficked from neighboring countries, including economic migrants
en route to the United States.
While theThe State Department maintains that Honduras does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, however, it notes that the government is making significant
significant efforts to do so. As a result, Honduras is considered a so-called “Tier 2” country. The report
report recognizes the Honduran government’s increased efforts to investigate trafficking. While
Although Honduras opened just 24 trafficking-related investigations in 2006, and 74 in 2007, it
opened 82
investigations in 2008, leading to 18 prosecutions and 11 convictions. The report also recognized
recognized some progress in trafficking protection and prevention. In addition to training police
to better
identify trafficking victims, the Honduran government trained 500 tourism sector
workers in
trafficking prevention. Nonetheless, the report indicates a number of areas in which
Honduras can
do more to combat trafficking. It recommends that the Honduran government
increase its shelter
aid and victims services, amend anti-trafficking laws to prohibit labor
trafficking, continue raising
public awareness, and increase criminal investigations—including
investigations of corrupt public
officials involved in trafficking activities. 11698
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security. For the United
States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to
114
“Carteles mexicanas azotan a Honduras,” La Prensa (Honduras), August 27, 2008; “Los Zetas hondureños, nueva
pesadilla para los inmigrantes,” El Tiempo (Honduras), March 18, 2009.
115
“Honduras floats drug legalisation,” Latin News Daily, October 14, 2008.
116
U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, “Trafficking in Persons Report,”
June 2008 and June 2009.
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ensure the speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S.
investment in the country.
In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest
port in Honduras, Puerto
Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated
by the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, and
uses a security regime to
ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are
identified and inspected at
foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. Honduras also
participates in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which
supplies ports with
equipment capable of detecting nuclear or radioactive materials, and the
Secure Freight Initiative
(SFI), which deploys equipment capable of scanning containers for
radiation and information risk
factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States.
Puerto Cortés was one of six ports
around the world chosen to be part of the first phase of the SFI.117
117
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative,” Press Release,
December 7, 2006, and “Secure Freight Initiative Becomes Fully Operational in United Kingdom, Pakistan, and
Honduras,” Press Release, October 12, 2007.
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Appendix. Chronology of the 2009 Political Crisis
On March 23, 2009, President Zelaya announced an executive decree—which was never
officially published—calling for a popular referendum on June 28 on whether to include a fourth
ballot box during the November 2009 general elections. The fourth ballot would consult
Hondurans about whether the country should convoke a national constituent assembly to approve
a new constitution.
On May 26, 2009, President Zelaya issued two executive decrees that were officially published
on June 25, 2009. One annulled the March 23 decree. The other called for a non-binding
referendum on June 28 on whether to include a fourth ballot box during the November 2009
general elections in which Hondurans could choose to convoke a national constituent assembly.
On May 27, 2009, a Honduran lower court judge ordered the suspension of the referendum that
President Zelaya proposed on March 23.
On May 29, 2009, a Honduran lower court judge issued an order clarifying that the May 27 ruling
applied to any other executive decree that would lead to the same ends as the suspended decree.
On the same day, President Zelaya ordered the Honduran military and police to provide logistical
support for the proposed referendum.
On June 16, 2009, a Honduran Appeals Court upheld the lower court ruling that declared
President Zelaya’s proposed non-binding referendum illegal.
On June 19, 2009, the Honduran Supreme Court ordered the Honduran security forces not to
provide any support for the proposed non-binding referendum.
On June 23, 2009, the Honduran Congress passed a plebiscite and referendum law that prevents
referenda from occurring within 180 days of a general election.
On June 24, 2009, President Zelaya asked for the resignations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Defense Minister after they refused to provide logistical support for the proposed
non-binding referendum.
On June 25, 2009, the Honduran Supreme Court ruled that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Defense Minister should remain in their positions despite Zelaya’s request for their
resignations.
On June 26, 2009, the OAS adopted a resolution offering support for the preservation of
democratic institutions and the rule of law in Honduras, and calling on all social and political
actors to maintain social peace and prevent the rupture of the constitutional order.
On June 28, 2009, shortly before the polls were to open for the non-binding referendum, the
Honduran military arrested President Zelaya, flew him to Costa Rica, and seized all referendum
materials. The Honduran Supreme Court indicated that an arrest warrant had previously been
issued for the deposed president, and the National Congress replaced Zelaya with the President of
Congress, Roberto Micheletti. The United States and governments around the world condemned
the action and called for President Zelaya’s reinstatement.
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On July 1, 2009, the OAS adopted a resolution that would suspend Honduras’ membership in the
organization if the country failed to restore President Zelaya to power within three days. On the
same day, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Zelaya’s ouster
and calling for his immediate return, U.S. Southern Command ordered U.S. troops to minimize
contact with the Honduran military, and the Honduran National Congress suspended a number of
constitutional rights—such as the freedom of association and the freedom of movement—during
curfew hours.
On July 2, 2009, the U.S. State Department announced it would suspend foreign assistance
programs to Honduras that it would be legally required to terminate should it declare the events in
Honduras a “military coup.”
On July 4, 2009, the OAS unanimously voted to suspend Honduras for an unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and the OAS resolution adopted three days earlier.
On July 5, 2009, Zelaya attempted to return to Honduras but the Micheletti government prevented
his plane from landing.
On July 7, 2009, Zelaya met with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, DC.
Following their meeting, Secretary Clinton announced that Zelaya and Micheletti had agreed to
engage in negotiations mediated by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias.
On July 9, 2009, Zelaya and Micheletti met separately with President Arias in Costa Rica to
discuss a solution to the situation in Honduras. Zelaya and Micheletti never spoke face to face,
and left the country after the meetings, designating representatives to continue negotiations.
On July 18, 2009, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias proposed a seven-point plan to end the
political conflict in Honduras. While the plan was agreed to in principle by Zelaya’s
representatives, it was rejected by Micheletti.
On July 22, 2009, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias modified his previously rejected proposal
and offered a 12-point plan, known as the San José Accord, to resolve the Honduran political
crisis. Zelaya accepted the plan, and Micheletti’s negotiation team said it would take the proposal
back to the independent branches of government in Honduras to consider.
On July 24, 2009, exiled President Manuel Zelaya briefly crossed the Nicaraguan border, entering
Honduras for the first time since his June 28 removal.
On July 28, 2009, the U.S. Department of State announced that it had revoked the diplomatic
visas of four members of the Honduran government and is reviewing the visas of others.
On August 21, 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concluded a
five-day visit to Honduras. The Commission—which met with representatives of the Micheletti
government, representatives of various sectors of civil society, and more than 100 individuals—
“confirmed the existence of a pattern of disproportionate use of public force on the part of police
and military forces, arbitrary detentions, and the control of information aimed at limiting political
participation by a sector of the citizenry ... [that have] resulted in the deaths of at least four
persons, dozens of injuries, thousands of arbitrary detentions, the temporary shutdown of
television channels, and threats and assaults against journalists.”
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On August 23, 2009, the Honduran Supreme Court issued a statement in opposition to several
provisions of the San José Accord.
On August 25, 2009, a delegation of foreign ministers from the OAS left Honduras after a threeday mission that failed to convince the Micheletti government to accept the San José Accord. On
the same day, the U.S. State Department announced that it was suspending non-emergency, nonimmigrant visa services in the consular section of the embassy in Honduras.
On August 31, 2009, the electoral campaign for the November 29, 2009, general elections in
Honduras officially commenced.
On September 3, 2009, exiled President Manuel Zelaya met with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton. On the same day, the U.S. State Department announced that it was terminating nearly
$22 million in previously suspended foreign assistance to Honduras, revoking the visas of some
members and supporters of the Micheletti government, and would be unable to support the
outcome of the November elections given the current conditions
On September 9, 2009, the Millennium Challenge Corporation terminated two transportation
projects totaling $11 million from its compact with Honduras and put another $4 million on hold.
On September 21, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya revealed that he had returned to Honduras and
was sheltered in the Brazilian embassy in the capital, Tegucigalpa.
On September 25, 2009, the United Nations Security Council condemned acts of intimidation
against the Brazilian embassy by the Honduran military.
On September 26, 2009, the Micheletti government published a decree—dated September 22,
2009—that declares a state of siege and suspends a number of basic civil liberties for 45 days.
The decree suspends freedom of the press and freedom of movement, requires police or military
authorization for public meetings, and allows for detention without a warrant.
On September 27, 2009, Honduras expelled four diplomats from the Organization of American
States (OAS) who formed part of an advance team planning a visit of foreign ministers from the
region. On the same day, the Micheletti government warned Brazil that it would strip its embassy
of diplomatic status if Brazil did not grant Zelaya political asylum or hand him over to Honduran
authorities within 10 days.
On September 28, 2009, the Honduran military shut down Radio Globo and television Channel
36, two of the principal sources of media opposition to the Micheletti government.
On October 5, 2009, the Micheletti government revoked the state of siege that entered into force
on September 26, though Radio Globo and television Channel 36 remain shut down.
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SFI.99
98
U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, “Trafficking in Persons Report,”
June 2008 and June 2009.
99
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative,” Press Release, December
7, 2006, and “Secure Freight Initiative Becomes Fully Operational in United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Honduras,” Press
Release, October 12, 2007.
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Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
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