The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance:
Implications for U.S. Interests
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Weston S. Konishi
Analyst in Asian Affairs
July 23, 2009January 18, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33740
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
Since the late 1990s, and particularly since 2000, the U.S.-Japan alliance has undergone
significant changes. During the first term of the Bush Administration, converging U.S. and
Japanese objectives in confronting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and Japan’s
participation in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced the notion of the U.S.-Japan
alliance as one of the central partnerships of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Asia. By 2007,
political developments in Japan and diverging policy approaches to North Korea created some
distance in the relationship, but defense officials in the Obama Administration continue to work
on implementing significant agreements to upgrade the alliance.
As U.S. personnel and facilities in Japan are realigned as part of the broader Pentagon strategy of
deploying a more mobile force, Japan is expected to take an active role in contributing to global
stability. However, political turmoil in Tokyo has led to considerable uncertainty about Japan’s
future security policies, including its stance towards U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. Japan’s
main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is widely expected to gain seats in
the August 30, 2009 Lower House of parliament elections, and it may achieve its goal of
replacing the Liberal Democratic Party as Japan’s governing party. The election is widely seen as
a potential watershed—should the LDP lose its grip on power, which it has held since the 1950s
with only a brief interruption, it is unclear whether its successor would be as supportive a security
partner for the United States. Some observers say that alliance transformation could ultimately be
de-stabilizing if regional powers feel their own security is threatened by a more assertive Japan,
or if Japan fails to live up to U.S. expectations.
Changes to the U.S.-Japan alliance are of interest to Congress because of the range of U.S.
security interests in East Asia. Those concerns include the development of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons programs, the presence of militant Islamic groups based in Southeast Asia, the
possibility of conflict with China over Taiwan, and the overall ascendance of China as a potential
challenger to U.S. influence in the region. For its oversight and budgetary responsibilities,
Congress has an interest in how the alliance might change under current proposals.
After a brief historical review, this report examines policy changes that have driven actual and
proposed shifts in the alliance. Key features of the proposals include a reduction in the number of
U.S. Marines in Japan, the relocation of a controversial Marine air base in Okinawa, expanded
cooperation in training and intelligence sharing, and command structure changes. The proposed
changes would create new roles and missions in the alliance, with an emphasis on
interoperability, joint missile defense, and more Japanese participation in international operations.
Some of the most prominent operational, budgetary, legal, and societal challenges to upgrading
the alliance are discussed in this report. The dynamic nature of the alliance and the strategic
environment in northeast Asia present a number of challenges for U.S. policy, including
containing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, dealing with a rising China, sustaining political
alignment with Tokyo, managing the U.S.-South Korea relationship, and considering the nuclear
future of the region.
The report concludes with a number of potential options for U.S. policymakers to protect U.S.
security interests in the Asia Pacific. Those options include further bolstering Japan’s military,
reducing the U.S military presence in the region, encouraging Japan to focus on international
peacekeeping and reconstruction operations, developing trilateral defense cooperation, and
creating a security forum in northeast Asia.
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The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. InterestsU.S.-Japan Alliance
Summary
Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in
Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. In exchange for the
bases, the United States guarantees Japan’s security. The alliance has endured over 50 years,
through periods of intense partnership and stretches of political drift. In the past decade, the
relationship has seen both ends of the spectrum. During the first term of the George W. Bush
Administration, converging U.S. and Japanese objectives in confronting North Korea’s nuclear
and missile programs and Japan’s participation in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
reinforced the notion of the U.S.-Japan alliance as one of the central partnerships of U.S. foreign
policy, particularly in Asia. By 2007, political developments in Japan and diverging policy
approaches to North Korea created some distance in the relationship. After the Democratic Party
of Japan took power in a historical election in September 2009, a disagreement over the
relocation of the Futenma Marine airbase in Okinawa erupted into a public rift that led many to
question the fundamental soundness of the alliance.
Regional developments in 2010, however, appeared to refocus attention in Washington and Tokyo
on the value of the alliance. North Korea’s continued and increasingly aggressive actions, coupled
with a diplomatic crisis after a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship in disputed
waters, drove the allies back together. A new DPJ administration in Tokyo affirmed its intent to
work out U.S. base realignment issues and renewed its financial support for hosting the troops. At
the same time, solidarity grew in confronting North Korea provocations.
After a brief historical review, this report examines the regional environment that Japan and the
United States face in shaping the alliance. While history-related grievances have traditionally
dominated Tokyo’s relations with China and the Korean Peninsula, there are some trends that
indicate a shift in regional relations. Tensions with Beijing over territorial disputes and China’s
growing military capabilities and maritime activities are growing, while Seoul and Tokyo have
developed an increasingly cooperative relationship, even exploring nascent military-to-military
pacts. North Korea continues to provide ample justification for Japanese supporters of developing
a strong missile defense system.
The report then explores the national challenges that frame the alliance, particularly the large
presence of U.S. military bases in the southern prefecture of Okinawa. While the Futenma base
relocation controversy has dominated the debate, Okinawan frustration with the bases has existed
for many years, with outcries spiking in the event of military accidents or crimes committed by
U.S. soldiers. For these reasons, the Futenma relocation plan faces major challenges, despite
Tokyo’s agreement and pledge to implement it.
The report then examines key features of bilateral agreements to upgrade the alliance, with
updates on progress on agreements outside of base realignment and discussion of Japan’s internal
and evolving views on security as reflected in official guidelines. Accomplishments in ballistic
missile defense co-development, strong maritime cooperation, and Japanese contribution to
international missions are outlined, along with some of the unresolved issues that remain. The
report concludes with a discussion of the most prominent operational, budgetary, legal, and
normative constraints that some see as a cap on expanding the alliance’s effectiveness. Despite
the alliance’s sustainment over a half-century, it still faces fundamental challenges, including
political paralysis and increasingly tight fiscal conditions in Tokyo and long-standing
constitutional and societal limits on Japan’s military.
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The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Historical Review of the Alliance ................................................................................................2
Post-World War II Occupation...............................................................................................2
Bilateral Alliance Establishment............................................................................................2
Post-Cold War Adjustments...................................................................................................2
Bush Administration Policy...................................................................................................3
The Koizumi Years..........................................................................................................3
Post-Koizumi ..................................................................................................................3
Policy Changes in Tokyo and Washington: 2000-2009.................................................................4
Changes to Overall U.S. Military Posture ..............................................................................4
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy..........................3
Post-9/11 Changes.................................................................................................................3
U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ Administrations.................................................4
North Korea’s Role in Changing Japan’s Defense Posture ...............................................5
Bilateral Reviews of the Alliance ..4
Regional Relations and Security Environment ........................................................................................5
Okinawa as Focus of Realignment Efforts5
China .............................................................................7
Alliance Transformation: Roles and Missions........................................................................8
Ballistic Missile Defense..5
South Korea ...............................................................................................9
Emphasis on Interoperability...........................................................................................9
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation................................6
North Korea ...................................................................... 10
International Peace and Humanitarian Operations.......................................................... 11
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance ..................................................................... 11
Domestic Japanese Factors.................................................................................................. 11
The DPJ’s Opposition ................................................................................................... 11
Japanese Budgetary Pressure......................................................................................... 12
Japan’s Constitutional and Legal Constraints................................................................. 12
Local Resistance to Troop Realignment......................................................................... 13
Japanese Public Opinion and Rising Nationalism .......................................................... 14
Bilateral Obstacles .............................................................................................................. 14
Operational Military Challenges.................................................................................... 14
Difficult Working-Level Negotiation Process ................................................................ 15
Regional Concerns ......................................................................7
U.S. Military Presence in Japan and Futenma Controversy ..........................................................7
U.S.-Japan Alliance: Policy and Bilateral Agreements .................................................................9
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy............................................................................................ 15
History Issues .......... 10
Ballistic Missile Defense..................................................................................................... 15
Territorial Disputes ....................................................................................................... 15
Issues for U.S. Policy ....................................11
Efforts to Upgrade Capabilities and Interoperability ............................................................................ 16
Diplomatic Divergences with Japan.... 12
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation................................................................................. 16
Managing China’s Rise ....................................................................................................... 17
Challenges for the U.S.-South Korean Alliance ................................................................... 17
East Asia’s Nuclear Future .................................................................................................. 17
Options for U.S. Policymakers12
International Operations and the “Global Commons” .......................................................... 13
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance ..................................................................... 14
Political Paralysis in Japan ........................................................................... 18
Press Japan to Strengthen its Military .................................................................................. 18
Reduce the U.S. Military Presence in Japan......................................................................... 19
Encourage SDF to Focus on Humanitarian and Peace Operations 14
Budgetary Pressure ........................................ 19
Develop Multilateral Defense Cooperation.......................................................................... 20
Create a Northeast Asia Security Forum .............................................................................. 20
Conclusion............................................. 14
Constitutional and Legal Constraints ................................................................................... 21
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The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests15
Figures
Figure 1. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan .......................................................................79
Figure 2. Map of Japan and Surrounding Countries ................................................................... 2216
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 2317
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The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests
Introduction
The U.S.-Japan alliance, forged in the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II,
provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89
facilities throughout the archipelago.1 Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S.
forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region.
The security landscape of East Asia is changing, driven by China’s ascendance. With the
organizing principles of the Cold War obsolete and a resurgence of nationalism in countries with a
history of conflict, uncertainty is increasing. The Bush Administration designated the U.S.-Japan
alliance as the fulcrum of American presence in the region. Obama Administration officials have
stated their desire to continue this approach. Yet this policy holds both promises and risks. Some
strategists see a strong advantage to employing Japan’s help as part of a containment strategy to
deter China from asserting itself in ways hostile to U.S. interests. In addition, the Japanese SDF
may alleviate some of the burden on the U.S. military by expanding its role in non-combat
missions overseas.
On the other hand, Japan’s neighbors harbor historical distrust of Tokyo’s ambitions. Japan’s
relations with Beijing and Seoul reached a low point under former Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi (2001-2006), leading to concern that regional rivalries could become destabilizing.
Although relations have improved under Koizumi’s successors, China and South Korea remain
wary of any sign of Japanese ascendance. As Japan under successive Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) leaders has considered taking a more active role in contributing to global stability, perhaps
through increased coordination with the U.S. military, leaders in Beijing and Seoul have
expressed concern that the Japanese military will benefit from enhanced capabilities and
challenge their own sense of security.
Further, after enjoying a period of extremely close relations, the U.S.-Japan relationship slipped
somewhat when the Bush Administration adjusted its policy on North Korea. As the Bush
Administration moved aggressively to reach a deal on denuclearization with North Korea in the
Six-Party Talks, distance emerged between Washington and Tokyo. The Obama Administration
has subsequently sought to reassure Tokyo that the United States remains committed to the
bilateral alliance. Political uncertainty in Tokyo calls into question how robustly alliance reform
efforts will proceed. Specifically, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) appears poised
to take over the government in August 30 Lower House elections. As discussed below, members
of the DPJ have objected to an active role in coordination with the U.S. military. Thus, political
changes, both in and between Washington and Tokyo, could undermine a regional security
strategy that depends on unwavering ties.
U.S.-Japan alliance has endured several geopolitical transitions, at times flourishing and at
other moments seeming adrift. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organizing principles of
the Cold War became obsolete, forcing the United States and Japan to re-adjust the alliance. The
shock of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 ushered in a period of
rejuvenated military ties, raising expectations that Japan would move toward a more forwardleaning defense posture and shed the pacifist limitations that have at times frustrated U.S. defense
officials. However, the partnership struggled to sustain itself politically in the late 2000s; a
softening of U.S. policy toward North Korea by the George W. Bush Administration dismayed
Tokyo, and political opposition to an Okinawan airbase plan disappointed Washington. As the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September 2009, some observers noted that
Japan may be turning away from the U.S. alliance toward a more Asia-centric policy.
Despite the public flap over the relocation of the Futenma airbase that dominated the relationship
between September 2009 and June 2010, regional conflicts in 2010 appeared to reset the
relationship on more positive footing. As a result of repeated provocations from North Korea and
a confrontation with China over a ship collision in disputed waters, the DPJ seemed to change its
approach to the alliance and re-prioritize strong relations with the United States. The focus of the
alliance appears squarely set on the changing security contours of the region, with an explicit
attention to China’s activities. When the alliance appeared to falter in the face of the Okinawa
dispute, neighboring countries, including Southeast Asian states, voiced concern, suggesting that
the alliance is valued as a stabilizing force region-wide. North Korea’s unpredictable course has
also driven nascent but promising trilateral cooperation with South Korea. Whereas
disagreements over history issues stemming from Japan’s colonial policies and wartime
aggression were prominent in Tokyo’s relations with its neighbors in past years, these concerns,
while still present, have receded somewhat as contemporary threats have surfaced.
Problems remain in the partnership. Although Washington and Tokyo have settled on a plan for
the resolution of the base relocation in Okinawa, many hurdles remain for implementation,
particularly strong local opposition to the base. Japan’s overall limitations and resistance to
engage more expansively in defense cooperation continue to frustrate U.S. military officials.
Japan’s constitution—drafted by U.S. officials during the post-war occupation—explicitly bans
the formation of military forces, though Japan has maintained a “Self-Defense Force” (SDF)
since the 1950s. Over the decades, the United States has generally encouraged Japan to move
toward a more “normal” military posture and contribute more actively to international defense
efforts. Although Japan has sometimes acceded, it remains conservative in its interpretation of the
constitution, including a ban on participation in collective self-defense. More recently, Japan’s
severe fiscal conditions have placed additional pressure on spending decisions to boost Japan’s
1
According to U.S. military figures, about 39,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed onshore and about 14,000
afloat in Japan. Source: U.S. Forces Japan at http://www.usfj.mil/welcome.html.
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capabilities in the face of regional threats. Japan’s constraints on military activities remain in
budgetary, legal, normative, and political terms.
Historical Review of the Alliance
Post-World War II Occupation
Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Allied Powers, led by the United States, occupied
the archipelago from 1945-1952. Occupation officials initially set distinct goals of thoroughly
demilitarizing Japan. The Japanese constitution, drafted by U.S. Occupation officials and adopted by
by the Japanese legislature in 1947, renounced the use of war in Article 9, stating that “land, sea, and
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” However, as confrontation
confrontation with the Soviet Union materializedgrew, the goals of the occupation shifted to building Japan up
as a
strategic bulwark against the perceived Communist threat. After the outbreak of the Korean War
War in 1950, U.S. officials pressed for the establishment of a Japanese national police force,
which in
1954 became the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Debate about whether the SDF, which
evolved in practice into a well-fundeda wellfunded and well-equipped military, violates Article 9 remains continues
today. Japan regained its
sovereignty in 1952 after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty,
which officially ended
the conflict and allocated compensation to Allied victims of Japanese war
crimes.
Bilateral Alliance Establishment
During the Cold War, the United States increasingly viewed Japan as a strategically important ally
to counter the Soviet threat in the Pacific. A Mutual Security Assistance Pact signed in 1952 was
replaced by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, in which Japan grants the U.S.
military basing rights on its territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s security. Unlike
other defense treaties with allies, this pledge is not mutual: Japan does not extend such a pledge if
the United States is attacked. A military aid program during the 1950’s provided equipment
deemed to be necessary for Japan’s self-defense, and Japan continued to expand the SDF and
contribute more host nation support (HNS) for U.S. forces. Under Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida’s leadership (1946-47 and 1948-1954), Japan essentially ceded its foreign policy and
security concerns to the United States and focused on economic development. The so-called
The “Yoshida Doctrine” was controversial: as U.S. officials pushed for further Japanese rearmament,
. Yoshida himself resisted U.S. officials’ push for a fullscale Japanese rearmament (i.e. the establishment of a full-fledged military in name and in fact).
In addition, many elements of Japanese society resisted the obligations of the agreement.
U.S.-Japan defense relations thenrejected the arrangement. For much of the 1950s,
forces on the political right tried unsuccessfully to revise or even abrogate the Constitution’s
Article 9 and portions of the Treaty. When one of their number, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi,
negotiated a revision to the Treaty in 1960, the political left mobilized opposition to the changes.
Although Kishi rammed the revisions through parliament, hundreds of thousands of protestors
took to the streets in Tokyo, causing the cancellation of a visit by President Dwight Eisenhower
and the resignation of Kishi and his government.
U.S.-Japan defense relations again entered a period of uncertainty because of U.S. President
Richard Nixon’s so-called Guam Doctrine of 1969 (which called on U.S. allies to provide for
their own defense), the normalization of relations between China and the United States, and the
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. One major irritant was resolved when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
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and Nixon signed a joint communiquecommuniqué that returned administrative control of the Okinawa islands
to Japan in 1972, although the United States has continued to maintain large military bases on the
territory. The establishment of the bilateral Security Consultative Committee in 1976 led to
greater defense cooperation, including joint planning for response to an attack on Japan.
Post-Cold War Adjustments
In the post-Cold War period, Japan was criticized by the some in the international community for
its its
failure to provide direct military assistance to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War in
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1990-1991 19901991, despite its contribution of over $13 billion toward U.S. military costs and
humanitarian humanitarian
assistance. 2 After Japan’s passage of a bill in 1991 to allow for its participation in United
Nations Nations
(U.N.) peacekeeping operations, the Japanese Self Defense Forces were dispatched to
Cambodia,
Mozambique, East Timor, and the Golan Heights. Increasing concern about tensions
Tensions over North Korea and the Taiwan
Strait contributed to a revision of the defense guidelines in
1996-1997 by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that granted the U.S.
military greater use of Japanese
installations in time of crisis and vaguely referred to a possible,
limited Japanese military role in
“situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Those areas were
That was assumed to be referring to potential U.S.
conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula,
although military officials insisted that
the phrase was “situational” rather than geographic. The
North Korea’s launch of a long-range
Taepodong missile over Japan by North Korea in 1998 galvanized political
support for undertaking joint research
with the United States on ballistic missile defense.
Bush Administration Policy
The Koizumi Years
PolicyPost-9/11 Changes
U.S. policy toward East Asia under the Bush Administration took a decidedly pro-Japan approach
from the outset.3 Several senior foreign policy advisors with extensive background in Japan took
their cues from the so-called Armitage-Nye report (the lead authors were Richard Armitage and
Joseph Nye), the final paper produced by a bipartisan study group before the 2000 U.S.
presidential election. The report called for a more equal partnership with Japan and enhanced
defense cooperation in a number of specific areas.
With this orientation in place, Japan’s response
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
reinforced the notion of the U.S.-Japan alliance as
one of the central partnerships of U.S. foreign
policy, particularly in Asia. Under the leadership of
former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the
Japanese legislature passed anti-terrorism
legislation that allowed Japan to dispatch refueling
tankers to the Indian Ocean to support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. In February 2004,
Japan sent over 600 military personnel to Iraq to
assist in reconstruction activities—the first time
Japan had sent soldiers overseas without an
international mandate since World War II.4 The
ground troops were withdrawn in 2006. A
Japanese SDF air division remained until 2008, when
U.N. authorization for multinational forces
in Iraq expired.
Post-Koizumi
Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s hand-picked successor, came into office in September 2006 promising to
further strengthen Japan’s national security apparatus. He succeeded in upgrading the Defense
Agency to a full-fledged ministry, and pledged to create Japanese versions of the National
Security Council and pass a permanent deployment law to allow the government to dispatch SDF
troops without a U.N. resolution. Abe’s weak performance and eventual resignation a year after
taking office coincided with a Bush Administration decision to actively pursue negotiations with
North Korea over their nuclear weapons program. Tokyo appeared to feel that their largest
in Iraq expired.
2
“‘Great Japan’ Turns Inward Over Gulf Response,” The Boston Globe. March 26, 1991.
3
For more information on U.S.-Japan relations, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
4
The SDF operated under restrictions in Iraq: no combat unless fired upon, and no offensive operations, and protection. Protection was
provided by Dutch and Australian forces.
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priority in the negotiations—resolution of the issue of several Japanese citizens abducted by
North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s—was largely disregarded by Washington. Former Prime
Minister Fukuda, elected in September 2007, was considered a friend of the alliance, but more
cautious in security outlook than his predecessors. He also faced an empowered opposition party
– the DPJ –
After a period of rejuvenated defense ties in the first years of the George W. Bush Administration,
expectations of a transformed alliance with a more forward-leaning defense posture from Japan
diminished. Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) successors—Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda,
and Taro Aso—each survived less than a year in office and struggled to govern effectively. Abe
succeeded in upgrading the Defense Agency to a full-fledged ministry, but faltered on his pledges
to create Japanese versions of the National Security Council and to pass a permanent deployment
law to allow the government to dispatch SDF troops without a U.N. resolution. Fukuda, elected in
September 2007, was considered a friend of the alliance, but more cautious in security outlook
than his predecessors. He also faced an empowered opposition party—the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ)—that temporarily forced Japan to end its naval deployment of refueling ships to
support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. Like Abe, Fukuda resigned within a year. He was
succeeded by current Prime Minister Taro Aso in September 2008. Aso, who served as Foreign
Minister in the Abe Cabinet, is considered a defense hawk but has been
Cabinet, was largely unable to pursue a
more active military role for Japan due to his precarious political position. The Aso government
was, however, successful in producing a law that allows Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
vessels to engage in antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and other international waters.
Policy Changes in Tokyo and Washington: 2000-2009
Changes to Overall U.S. Military Posture
In 2004, the Pentagon put forth the Global Posture Review, a series of proposed changes to how
the U.S. military structures its forces overseas. As envisioned, the program would bring 70,000
U.S. military personnel currently stationed in Europe and Asia back to the United States and rearrange the configuration of foreign bases. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated
that the changes are in line with the transformation of the military to become a more agile force,
capable of deploying quickly to conflicts worldwide. In East Asia, the position and number of
U.S. troops in South Korea also are scheduled to be adjusted and a build-up in Guam is
anticipated. The transformation of forces in Japan was considered and negotiated against this
regional backdrop. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has continued the process of military
transformation and has launched a new round of negotiations with Tokyo to implement plans for
the realignment of U.S. forces based in Japan.
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy
Under Koizumi, Japan undertook significant revisions of its security stance, as seen in two
overlapping official reports, the Araki Commission Report and the 2004 National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG).5 Both documents retain a self-defense-oriented policy, but call for a
more integrated security strategy and a military that employs “multi-functional flexible defense
forces” to deal with the changing security environment. The reports emphasize the need to make
the U.S.-Japan alliance more robust and credible, and single out missile defense, intelligence
exchange, and operational coordination as areas for cooperation. This framework presents a shift
from considering the alliance as only a means to defend the territory of and areas surrounding
Japan to adopting a global perspective that views the security of Japan and the region as linked
with international stability. Further, the 2004 NDPG specifies that Japan and the United States
would improve operational coordination “in areas surrounding Japan,” a clause interpreted to
refer to the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Under Abe, the Japanese Defense Agency
5
The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, an advisory committee established by the Prime Minister’s office,
produced the Araki Commission Report to recommend a new approach to Japan’s security policy. The tenets of the
Araki report were adopted into the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2005, which outlined the
official policy.
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was upgraded to a full ministry for the first time since the end of World War II, but his plans to
create a Japanese NSC faltered. The Ministry of Defense is currently preparing a revised NDPG
that will take into account regional and global security developments since 2004.
North Korea’s Role in Changing Japan’s Defense Posture
After the Cold War threat from the Soviets receded, many analysts questioned if the pacifistleaning Japanese public would support a sustained military alliance with the United States. The
shared threat from North Korea—particularly acute to the geographically proximate Japanese—
appeared to shore up the alliance in the late 1990s and into the next century. North Korea’s 1998
test of a Taepodong missile over Japan consolidated support to develop ballistic missile defense
with the United States. The sinking of a North Korean spy ship that had entered Japan’s exclusive
economic zone in 2001 by the Japanese Coast Guard again publicly raised the specter of the
threat from Pyongyang. The incident also led to Japan’s assertion of its right to pursue and fire
upon intruding ships and to the training of a commando team to deal with future threats. Perhaps
most importantly, the admission by Kim Jong-il in 2002 that North Korea abducted several
Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s shocked the Japanese public and led to popular support
for a hardline stance on North Korea, which in turn gave rise to hawkish political figures like
former Prime Minister Abe. In 2003, Japan launched its first spy satellite in order to track North
Korean threats without relying on others’ intelligence.
North Korea’s test-launch of several missiles in July 2006 and its test of a nuclear device in
October 2006 bolstered Abe’s case to develop a more robust Japanese military. Broad public and
political support emerged for the government’s imposition of harsh unilateral sanctions and the
pledge that Japan would assist the U.S. military in stopping North Korean cargo ships for
inspections, as called for in the U.N. Security Council resolution 1718 condemning the North
Korea nuclear test.6
A recent round of North Korean saber-rattling has led to additional Japanese measures to pressure
the regime. In April and July of 2009, North Korea conducted long and medium range missile
tests, and Pyongyang also conducted its second underground nuclear test in May 2009. In
response, the Aso government worked closely with the Obama Administration to draft U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1874, which permits a new set of economic sanctions as well as
maritime interdiction operations to control the flow of weapons from North Korea.
Bilateral Reviews of the Alliance
Concurrent with Japan’s internal reviews, U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives reinforced the new and
expanded commitment to security cooperation by establishing common strategic objectives,
outlining major command changes, explicitly identifying the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the
Korean peninsula as common priorities in the Pacific region for the first time, and calling on
China to make its military modernization more transparent. These unprecedented agreements and
statements emerged first through the working-level Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI),
launched in 2002, and later at the cabinet level through the Security Consultative Committee
6
See CRS Report RL33709, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, by Emma
Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni.
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(SCC, also known as the “2+2” meeting), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State
and their Japanese counterparts.7
The October 2005 “2+2” report outlines the major command changes agreed to by Japanese and
U.S. officials. One would shift 300 American soldiers from the 1st Army Corps headquarters from
Washington State to Camp Zama (25 miles southwest of Tokyo) to establish a forward operational
headquarters. (The headquarters were opened in December 2007.) The Ground Self Defense
Forces (GSDF) would also base a rapid-response headquarters at Camp Zama. A bilateral and
joint operations center will be built at Yokota U.S. Air Base (about 23 miles northwest of Tokyo)
to enhance coordination between the Japanese and U.S. air and missile defense command
elements. The headquarters of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, meanwhile, would be moved
from Okinawa to Guam, reducing the number of Marines by about 8,000.
Despite reports of frustration on the part of negotiators because of the slow process,8 the DPRI
talks led to more joint contingency planning and provided a mechanism to sort through bilateral
issues, particularly those involving the bases in Okinawa (see later section). According to U.S.
and Japanese officials at the time, the DPRI also led to increased coordination between the Japan
Defense Agency (JDA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Prime Minister’s
Cabinet office, which had been problematic in the past. Alliance managers consider cooperation
in the inter-agency process crucial to implementing further security cooperation.
7
The SCC released three separate documents: the February 2005 statement set out the common strategic objectives of
the United States and Japan as the rationale for the alliance; the October 2005 “Transformation and Realignment for the
Future” report called for specific command changes; and the May 2006 “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”
outlined the steps to be undertaken to both strengthen the alliance and reduce the burden of hosting U.S. bases on local
communities.
8
Tatsumi, Yuki. “The Defense Policy Review Initiative: A Reflection,” PacNet Newsletter 19. April 27, 2006.
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Figure 1. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan
Okinawa as Focus of Realignment Efforts
The reduction of Marines from about 18,000 to 11,000 on Okinawa seeks to quell the political
controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S. forces in the southernmost part of Japan for
years. Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl
by an American serviceman, and was renewed after a U.S. military helicopter crashed into a
crowed university campus in 2004. Though constituting less than 1% of Japan’s land mass,
Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. forces in Japan. Okinawan politicians, along with
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the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, have called for a renegotiation of the Japan-U.S. Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction in U.S. troop strength. The U.S. and central
Japanese governments have opposed revising the SOFA, but Japan has increasingly pushed the
U.S. to alleviate the burden of its military presence in Okinawa.9
The DPRI review identified friction between the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa and the local
population as a key obstacle to a durable alliance. In addition to the 1995 rape conviction,
complaints about noise pollution from the air bases and concern about safety issues after the crash
of a helicopter in August 2004 convinced alliance managers that the burden on Okinawa’s urban
areas needed to be reduced in order to make the alliance more politically sustainable. As part of
the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials agreed to move most aircraft and crews constituting
the Marine Air Station at Futenma (a highly populated area) to expanded facilities at Camp
Schwab, located in a less-congested area of Okinawa. The challenge of replacing Futenma had
dogged alliance managers for years: since 1996, both sides had worked to implement the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report, which called for the return of 12,000 acres of
land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate replacement facilities were arranged. In addition
to the Futenma agreement, the United States agreed to relocate the Okinawa-based III Marine
Expeditionary Force (III MEF), which includes 8,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents, to
new facilities in Guam. In return, Tokyo promised to pay $6.09 billion of the $10.27 billion
estimated costs associated with the move. With the DPRI review and the revitalized alliance, new
momentum led to a tentative agreement in 2006.
However, implementation of the agreement has been slow and reflects the long-standing struggle
between the Okinawan and central Tokyo governments. Public opposition and cost overruns
threaten to further stall the Futenma relocation plan. Nevertheless, some progress has been made
in the Guam relocation initiative. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and
Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone signed a new agreement on implementing the
Guam relocation plans by 2014.
Alliance Transformation: Roles and Missions
Although resolving the base realignment issues is anticipated to consume the bulk of bilateral
efforts in the short term, U.S. and Japanese officials envision sweeping changes to the entire
defense relationship. The “2+2” reports of recent years outline a new alliance approach to both
enhance the defense of Japan and to move beyond traditional realms of cooperation. Areas
specifically mentioned for cooperation include air defense, ballistic missile defense, counterproliferation, counter-terrorism, maritime security operations, search and rescue efforts,
intelligence and surveillance, humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, peace-keeping,
protection of critical infrastructure, response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks,
mutual logistics support, provision of facilities for a non-combatant evacuation, and the use of
civilian infrastructure for emergency purposes. Joint efforts in several of these areas have existed
for decades, whereas other programs are in their infancy. Security and regional analysts have
offered a range of opinions on which areas are most appropriate for further development of joint
capabilities.10 Below are some of the most notable aspects of bilateral cooperation.
9
For more on the Okinawan bases, see Sheila Smith, Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military
Presence in Asia. East-West Center, March 2006.
10
See “CSIS Japan Chair Study Group, New Roles and Missions: Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Japan Chair
(continued...)
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Ballistic Missile Defense11
Many analysts see U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense as perhaps the most robust form of
bilateral cooperation in recent years. In December 2003, Koizumi announced that Japan would
jointly develop and deploy missile defense capabilities with the United States. Similar to and
interoperable with U.S. missile plans, Japan will acquire upper and lower ballistic missile defense
systems, including the sea-based AEGIS combat system and an SM-3 interceptor missile. The
decision has led to defense industry cooperation between Japanese and American firms.
Developing the system requires that Japan improve its joint operations capability and upgrade its
command and control networks to allow timely decisions. Further cooperation will require that
Japan lift or relax its ban on exporting arms, as Japanese defense officials have urged in order to
further develop U.S.-Japan research and development coordination. The test-launch of several
missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated plans to develop missile defense. In December
2007, the missile defense program got a boost when a Japanese destroyer successfully intercepted
a missile in a test exercise near Hawaii. Japan mobilized its land- and sea-based missile defense
systems for the first time in response to the North Korean missile tests in April 2009.
Emphasis on Interoperability
The “2+2” proposals envisage greater integration of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, and several
of the areas mentioned will depend on the success of efforts to make the forces more
interoperable. A bilateral coordination center at Yokota Air Base will focus on missile defense
cooperation, while a new SDF “Central Readiness Force Command” will be established at Camp
Zama to create a joint operations facility with the U.S. Army command. The co-located
headquarters, due to be completed by 2012, are anticipated to facilitate both greater U.S.-Japan
cooperation as well as overall SDF “jointness.”
As part of its effort to improve its own capability as well as work more closely with U.S. forces,
Japan has created a joint staff office that puts all the ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces
under a single command. Under the previous organization, a joint command was authorized only
if operations required multiple service participation, which had never occurred in the SDF’s
history. In July 2005, an amendment was made to the law establishing the SDF that required the
Joint Chief of Staff to counsel Japan’s defense chief on all SDF operational matters and that all
military orders will be given through the JCS in both peacetime and during contingencies. The
need for smoother coordination with the U.S. joint command was one of the primary reasons for
adopting the new organization. 12
The 1997 guidelines outlined rear-area support roles that Japanese forces could play to assist U.S.
operations the event of a conflict in areas surrounding Japan. The passage of special legislation
since 2001 has allowed Japanese forces to take on roles in Iraq and in the Indian Ocean under the
category of international peace cooperation activities. Further, SDF participation in operations has
led to substantial interaction and cooperation with U.S. forces, from logistics training in Kuwait
(...continued)
Platform. July 12, 2006.
11
For background on U.S.-Japan missile defense, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic
Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin.
12
Noboru Yamaguchi, “U.S. Defense Transformation and Japan’s Defense Policy,” draft of paper prepared for JapanU.K. Security Cooperation Conference, June 2006.
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before dispatching to Iraq to working together on disaster relief operations following the
December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Bilateral interoperability was also tested in JuneJuly 2006 as North Korea was preparing to test-launch a missile. Ballistic missile defense
coordination was carried out again under real threat circumstances during the 2009 North Korean
missile launches.
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have particularly strong capabilities and
defense cooperation with their U.S. counterparts.13 U.S. Navy officials have claimed that they
have a closer daily relationship with the MSDF than any other navy in the world, with over 100
joint exercises annually. Honed during the Cold War, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF developed strong
combined anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cooperation and played a key role in containing the
Soviet threat in the Pacific. The services developed joint operations in order to protect key sea
lines of communication (SLoCs). The most significant help extended by Japan since 2001 in the
support of U.S. operations has come from the MSDF: deployment of an oil tanker and an Aegis
destroyer in the Indian Ocean in support of the campaign in Afghanistan, the dispatch of several
ships, helicopters, and transport aircraft to assist in disaster relief in the Indian Ocean tsunami,
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises, 14 and the
deployment of MSDF vessels for antipiracy missions off the coast of Somalia. Similar equipment
and shared technology contribute to the strong interoperability between the Japanese and U.S.
militaries.
Japanese and U.S. naval officials have some concerns that the overall cost of transforming the
alliance will come at the expense of MSDF procurement plans. Priorities for new Aegis ships,
submarines, patrol aircraft, and a next-generation helicopter-carrying destroyer may be at risk
given the need to trim the overall defense budget and pay for realignment costs.
Operationally, the MSDF faces considerable restrictions. In the past, defense officials have said
that it is not clear constitutionally if the MSDF can go beyond Japanese waters, although recent
legislation permitting the antipiracy mission has extended the reach of MSDF operations. Earlier
in the decade, some restrictions were removed in response to two crises in Japan’s waters: the
intrusion of a North Korean spy ship in 2001 and the detection of a Chinese submarine in 2004.
After the North Korean vessel took the MSDF by surprise, an order was put in place that allowed
the MSDF to engage without convening a Japanese Security Council meeting to secure
permission; the order was then invoked in response to the submarine sighting.15 Adjustments to
Japan’s system of military command indicate a trend toward a more streamlined process, but also
highlight the existing gaps in U.S. and Japanese operational doctrine.
13
For a discussion on the strategic thinking of the Japan MSDF, see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Japanese
Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?” Naval War College Review: Volume 59; Issue 3. July 1, 2006.
14
Japan’s Coast Guard is the lead agency in the PSI, but a 2004 Diet bill allowed the MSDF to take place in later
rounds of the multilateral exercises.
15
“Suspected Chinese Nuclear Sub Triggers Security Alert in Japan,” The Times. November 11, 2004.
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International Peace and Humanitarian Operations
Because of the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq, to Indonesia in the wake of the tsunami, and to
several U.N. missions around the world, the SDF has gained experience in peace-keeping,
humanitarian relief and reconstruction, and disaster relief operations. Some prominent Japanese
defense specialists have argued that non-combat missions—considered more politically
acceptable to the Japanese public—are the most promising areas for development. 16 Japan played
a leading role in establishing an information sharing center in Singapore that will combat piracy
threats in the Strait of Malacca shipping lanes. SDF participation in non-traditional security
cooperation activities may prove valuable to the United States: the 2006 U.S. Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes the use of allies to improve the fight against terrorist
networks, or to operate in areas where the United States is not welcome. 17
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance
Despite the accomplishment of reaching agreement in the “2+2” talks during the mid-2000s, a
variety of challenges—domestic, bilateral, and regional—remain to upgrade the alliance to the
extent envisioned in policy documents. This section outlines some of the most prominent
operational, budgetary, legal, societal, and geopolitical challenges.
Domestic Japanese Factors
The DPJ’s Opposition
The U.S.-Japan alliance has historically benefited from strong political leadership on both sides
of the Pacific. However, Japan is facing a potential political realignment that may have significant
implications for the bilateral alliance. Much will depend on the August 30 national elections for
Japan’s Lower House of Parliament, the more powerful in Japan’s bicameral legislature (called
the Diet). As of mid-July, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was leading in most
polls. A DPJ takeover of the Lower House would oust the current Aso Cabinet and would amount
to a political earthquake. Except for a ten-month period in the 1990s, Japan has been ruled by the
conservative-leaning Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955. Although most members of the
DPJ are broadly supportive of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the general thrust of Japanese foreign
policy, many features of the alliance may come under greater questioning if the DPJ, which has
called for more “equality” with the United States, wins the Lower House. Specifically, the party
has:
•
opposed the February 2009 U.S.-Japan Guam accord that pledges to implement
the transfer of 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The DPJ opposes the
associated relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Nago. In April
2009, the DPJ-led Upper House voted against the accord.
16
See Noboru Yamaguchi, “Thoughts about the Japan-U.S. Alliance after the Transformation with a Focus on
International Peace Cooperation Activities,” The National Institute of Defense Studies News. January 2006.
17
QDR can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
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•
opposed the SDF deployment to the Indian Ocean to refuel allied ships involved
in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. (However, the DPJ has
reportedly modified its position on the Indian Ocean operation in the run up to
the Lower House elections.) Some in the DPJ support the dispatch of civilian
and/or noncombat troops to the Afghanistan theater.
•
said it would seek to reduce host nation support for U.S. forces stationed in
Japan.
•
proposed revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in
order to make the alliance more “equal.”
It is not clear how much DPJ stances to these initiatives were tactically driven to create obstacles
for the LDP, or how some DPJ positions might soften if it becomes the ruling party after August
30.
Japanese Budgetary Pressure
There is concern among U.S. officials that Japan will face severe budgetary constraints to fully
implement the “2+2” plans. Japanese leaders are under pressure to stem government spending
overall, and many ministries face budget cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. According to U.S.
defense officials, Japan should expect to pay up to $20 billion for the realignment costs alone.
Japan’s defense budget at $45 billion is the fifth-largest in the world after the United States ($421
billion), China ($63 billion), Russia ($62 billion) and the United Kingdom ($51 billion).18
Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders are wary of
surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although the cap is not a law. If costs of the realignment
come from the defense budget, some analysts say that Japan’s military could face degraded
capability because expensive equipment purchases will have to be forgone. In interviews, U.S.
military officials have voiced concerns that the SDF ran the risk of becoming a “hollow force”
because of its insufficient procurement system. Funding is also needed from the Japanese in order
to increase the amount of joint training with U.S. forces. The government, especially if it is led by
the DPJ, may be compelled to cut the amount of host nation support traditionally provided to the
United States if the public perceives Japan to be contributing more actively to the alliance.
Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the demographic reality of an aging and
shrinking population with a shortage of workers.
Japan’s Constitutional and Legal Constraints
There are several legal factors that could restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with
the United States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,
drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign
right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted
this clause to mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1991, has
allowed the SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping
missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
18
U.S. Military Spending vs. the World, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, February 6, 2006. Figures are
from 2004 or 2005.
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The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense
cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member
nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in
collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the
constitution to forbid collective actions because it would require considering the defense of other
countries, not just the safety of Japan itself. Participation in non-combat logistical operations and
rear support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm of collective selfdefense. Abe had spoken out about the need to reconsider this restriction, but efforts to alter the
interpretation stalled after his resignation.
During their deployment to Iraq, the interpretation prevented Japanese forces from defending
other nations’ troops.19 Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis destroyers should
not use their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be allowed to respond
to an incoming attack. As the United States and Japan increasingly integrate missile defense
operation, the ban on collective self-defense also raises questions about how Japanese
commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is being targeted. Under the
current interpretation, Japanese forces could not respond if the United States were attacked.
U.S. officials have, over the years, criticized Japan’s legal interpretation of defense policy. In
2004, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the press that he supported Japan’s bid to
become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, but added that “if Japan is going to
become a full active member of the Security Council and have the kind of obligations that it
would pick up as a member, then Article 9 would have to be examined in that light.”20 This
followed similar comments by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage; as early as
1997, Armitage stated that “Japan’s self-prohibition on engaging in collective defense no longer is
applicable—in fact, it can be harmful.”21 Visiting Tokyo in November 2007, U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates also encouraged Japan to do more to guarantee stability and security in
the region.
Despite comments by some high-level U.S. officials, some U.S. alliance managers have
reservations about Japan debating Article 9, citing concern that alliance activities could actually
be more restricted if the article is narrowly revised and that the current flexibility of interpretation
allows for expanded cooperation. U.S. military officials label Article 9 as exerting “strong
normative constraints,” making it necessary to proceed incrementally on increased coordination.22
Local Resistance to Troop Realignment
Announcement of the details of realignment sparked an outcry from local communities slated to
host U.S. troops and facilities. 23 Near the proposed relocation site of the Futenma facility,
19
SDF members on overseas missions are not permitted to use weapons if unattended Japanese nationals or foreign
troops in a multilateral coalition with Japan come under attack.
20
“Powell Urges Gov’t to Review Article 9,” Nikkei Weekly. August 23, 2004.
21
Armitage gave this statement in an interview with the Japan Economic Institute in Washington on October 31, 1997.
Cited in “Japan-U.S. Military Relationship Adds Muscle,” Defense News. May 22, 2006.
22
These statements were made by U.S. diplomatic and military officials during interviews in Japan in June 2006
conducted by the author of this report.
23
“Okinawa, Others Unhappy with Japan’s Approval of U.S. Military Realignment Plan,” BBC Monitoring Asia
(continued...)
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protestors staged a lengthy sit-in and blocked the government from carrying out an environmental
survey for the proposed runway. A non-binding popular referendum held in Iwakuni, the site of
proposed aircraft base relocation, showed that the public overwhelmingly opposed the measure.
Local activists in Yokosuka campaigned against the scheduled replacement of a conventional
aircraft carrier with a nuclear-powered carrier in the city’s port. Although the central Japanese
government has achieved some agreements with some local officials, including from local
officials in Iwakuni and Yokosuka, the question of how to distribute the burden of hosting the
U.S. military in Japan will likely continue to present problems for Tokyo, particularly in
Okinawa.
Japanese Public Opinion and Rising Nationalism
Public opinion on defense issues in Japan appears to be shifting somewhat, but the pacifism that
characterized post-war Japan remains significant. Whereas in the past, Japanese public opinion
strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF, this opposition has softened considerably
since the late 1990s. The Japanese public has expressed ambivalence about the value of Article 9
and the ban on collective self-defense as well. The threat of North Korea, growing trepidation
about China’s intentions, the fear of international terrorism, and the personal popularity of
Koizumi made the Japanese public more accepting of the SDF dispatches to Iraq and elsewhere.
Despite these shifts, however, some regional analysts question whether the Japanese public is
ready to accept a magnified role for Japan in international security matters.
Many observers have recognized a trend of growing nationalism in Japan, particularly among the
younger generation. Some Japanese commentators have suggested that this increasing patriotism
could jeopardize closer cooperation with the United States: if Japan feels too reliant on U.S.
forces and driven by U.S. priorities, some may assert the need for Japan to develop its own
independent capability. A strategist for Japan’s largest opposition party criticized Japan’s China
policy as being overly dependent on the U.S. approach to China, leaving Tokyo with “only a
hedge policy, and no core policy” on China.24 There also remains a deep fear of abandonment by
the United States in the Japanese mentality, a fear exacerbated by the shift in U.S. policy toward
North Korea in 2007.
Bilateral Obstacles
Operational Military Challenges
Despite plans to establish more joint U.S. and Japanese facilities, achieving true interoperability
is a difficult task. Constitutional, legal, and normative constraints limit SDF participation in many
of the operations and training that traditionally integrate different national forces. Increasing the
sophistication of bilateral training requires funding and facilities, currently under pressure
because of the SDF’s other requirements. Language barriers, differences in military doctrine, and
other factors also present challenges.
(...continued)
Pacific. May 30, 2006.
24
Kiyoshi Sugawa, in remarks made at a CSIS/Asahi Shimbun Conference entitled: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in a New
Era: Will Strategic Convergence Continue?” October 23, 2006.
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Difficult Working-Level Negotiation Process
Despite high-level praise for the alliance’s progress forward, many of the U.S. officials involved
in the DPRI and “2+2” process describe the negotiations with their Japanese counterparts as
onerous and halting. Although strong senior leadership drove major agreements in the early
2000s, some U.S. officials privately characterize the Japanese defense establishment as resistant
to change and excessively cautious. Progress can be quickly derailed by press coverage of
incidents involving the U.S military. Further operational coordination will take strong political
will, which may be scarce if there is not widespread consensus among all the players involved in
the alliance.
Regional Concerns
China and South Korea have voiced concern about plans to bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance,
largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945 militarism.
Despite recent improvements in relations, distrust of Tokyo’s intentions by its East Asian
neighbors limits Japan’s strategic flexibility to contribute to regional stability.
History Issues
Most of the tension between Japan and its neighbors focuses on historical grievances, particularly
those centered around Japan’s behavior during and preceding World War II. The most divisive
issue involves the visits of high-level Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine
that honors Japanese soldiers who died in war. Those enshrined include several Class A war
criminals who were convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East following
Japan’s defeat in World War II. Koizumi’s annual visits incensed Chinese and South Korean
leaders and chilled relations. Subsequent Japanese leaders have largely avoided visits to the
shrine, thereby contributing to the uptick in relations with Seoul and Beijing. However, history
issues have not been completely settled and many analysts anticipate that they will surface again.
Other history-related disputes involve Japan’s depiction of its involvement in World War II in
history textbooks for school children. China and the Koreas feel that the texts downplay the
atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against civilian populations. Seoul has claimed that
Japan is legally responsible for compensating thousands of South Korean “comfort women,”
(women forced to provide sex for Japanese soldiers during World War II) and that consideration
of the women was excluded from the agreements that established diplomatic relations. China
successfully demanded payment for damage caused by chemical weapons abandoned by the
Japanese imperial army on Chinese territory.
Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes—at times heated—have aggravated Japan’s relations with China and South
Korea. Seoul and Tokyo have sparred over the ownership of two islets in the Sea of Japan
referred to as the Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese). In
April 2006, some observers thought a military confrontation was possible when Japan’s Coast
Guard sent ships to survey the islands and South Korea sent armed vessels in response. A few
days of bad weather and a diplomatic compromise defused the standoff, but the fundamental
question of ownership has not been resolved. Beijing and Tokyo also have faced a series of
confrontations over the territorial rights of areas in the East China Sea, which is potentially rich in
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oil and gas reserves. 25 Japan considers the area surrounding a group of islands (known as the
Senkakus to the Japanese and Diaoyu to the Chinese) to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). The SDF has detected periodic Chinese military activities in the area, including a
submarine incursion in 2004 close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships near a disputed gas field in
2005.
Although Japan has held talks with South Korea and China on the disputed territories and no
military crisis appears imminent, such tensions are of concern for the United States because of its
treaty obligations to protect Japan. U.S. and Japanese officials have given mixed answers when
questioned about whether the U.S. military would engage if armed conflict were to occur over
one of the territories in question. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage asserted
that the U.S.-Japan treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands,26 but official guidance from the
Departments of State and Defense declare that the U.S. government does not take a position on
the question of sovereignty of the islands.
Issues for U.S. Policy
Diplomatic Divergences with Japan
After converging for several years, some U.S. and Japanese national security interests are not as
closely aligned. Until 2007, similar views on North Korea and the global war on terrorism, as
well as the personal chemistry between Koizumi and Bush, facilitated agreements to strengthen
the alliance. Actual and potential political differences, however, could derail efforts to build a
more sound security relationship. Although ties remain strong fundamentally, the Bush
Administration shift on North Korean nuclear negotiations, the July 2007 House resolution
criticizing the Japanese government for past “comfort women” policies, and the apparent decision
not to consider exporting the F-22 to Japan may have somewhat shaken Japanese confidence in
the robustness of the alliance over the past two years.27 Partly in response to these concerns, the
Obama Administration has reiterated to Tokyo that the bilateral alliance remains the
“cornerstone” of the U.S. strategic commitment to Asia.
Other potential differences remain as well. Iran, upon which Japan depends heavily to meet its
energy needs, and Burma, with which Japan has normalized relations, are examples of states that
the United States has worked to ostracize; public differences on these and other foreign policy
issues could at some point degrade the strong relations between Tokyo and Washington. In the
1980s and 1990s, differences over trade policies frayed bilateral ties; echoes of the old disputes
25
For more, see CRS Report RL31183, China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Kerry
Dumbaugh, et al.
26
Remarks and Q&A at the Japan National Press Club, February 2, 2004.
27
For more information on the “comfort women” resolution, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues
for Congress. As of mid-July 2009, increased production of F-22 Raptors, including a measure to explore possible F-22
sales to Japan, appears in question. President Obama has threatened to veto any defense spending bill that includes
additional funds for F-22 production. On July 21, 2009, the Senate passed (58-40, Record Vote Number: 235) an
amendment (S.Amdt. 1469) to the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1390), that eliminates funding for
additional F-22 aircraft production. The House version of the defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), however, allocates
$369 million for additional F-22 parts. A final decision on F-22 spending will take place when the House-Senate
conference completes the FY2010 defense spending bill later this year. For more background information on the
possible F-22 sale to Japan, see CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan.
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were heard in Japan’s ban on importing U.S. beef because of mad cow disease fears from
December 2003-July 2006. Some members of Congress have indicated concern with Japan’s
treatment of World War II history issues, particularly the comfort women controversy and the
depiction of the conflict in the Yushukan museum adjacent to the Yasukuni Shrine.28 Others have
at various times voiced frustration with Japan’s agricultural protectionism, stalled economic
reform efforts, and alleged currency manipulation.
Managing China’s Rise
Although the U.S.-Japan security partnership grew out of a need to contain the Soviet Union and
has endured in large part because of North Korea’s threat, many analysts see countering China as
the primary driver of the campaign to enhance cooperation today. The U.S. approach to rising
China is often characterized by observers as having two prongs that roughly correspond to the
“engagement” and “containment” camps. The “engagement” approach includes the “responsible
stakeholder” concept outlined most prominently by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick, which aims to convince Beijing to contribute peacefully to the international system that
has allowed its economic and political rise. The “containment” aspect of U.S. policy seeks to
counter a China that could develop in ways inimical to U.S. interests. The U.S.-Japan alliance
plays a role in both approaches. In the former, Japan could serve as a model of responsible
multilateral engagement as well as a key economic partner for China in the region. In the latter,
enhanced joint defense capabilities from neighboring Japan could deter any aggressive behavior
by China’s military. U.S. forward deployment in Japan plays a particularly important role in
contingency strategies for a conflict with China over Taiwan. 29
Challenges for the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
As U.S.-Japan security ties have strengthened, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has undergone
transition that some regional observers see as an indication of a weakened partnership. As part of
the global repositioning of the U.S. military, the number of troops stationed in South Korea is
falling from 37,000 in 2003 to 25,000 by September 2008 and a U.S. infantry division has
relocated from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the border with North Korea to south of Seoul.
In addition, alliance officials are discussing a timeline for changing the current unified military
command into separate U.S. and South Korean commands. Prospects for the alliance brightened,
however, with the U.S. shift in approach to North Korea, as well as the election of Lee Myungbak in December 2007, who is perceived to be more friendly to the U.S. alliance than his
predecessor Roh Moo-hyun.
East Asia’s Nuclear Future
Many regional experts fear that North Korea’s nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009 could
stimulate an arms race in the region. Although most commentators think that it is unlikely that
28
Former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee Henry Hyde convened a hearing on Japan’s
“history problem” and suggested in a letter to then-Speaker Dennis Hastert that Prime Minister Koizumi should not
address a joint session of Congress unless he pledged to stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Source: “US Lawmaker
Concerned About Japan PM Shrine Visits,” Reuters News. May 17, 2006.
29
For more information, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Japan would abandon its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, the strategic implications for
the United States and the region could be weighty. Some analysts predict that a Japanese nuclear
weapons program could inspire South Korea and Taiwan to develop their own nuclear capability,
which may in turn convince China to significantly add to its existing arsenal. Most
nonproliferation experts believe that Japan, using existing but safeguarded stocks of plutonium,
could quickly manufacture a nuclear arsenal.
Japan is not likely to move forward precipitously with nuclear weapons development.30 Japan has
abided by the self-imposed “three non-nuclear principles,” which ban the possession, production,
or import of nuclear arms. With memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still vivid, the Japanese
public remains largely resistant to arming themselves with nuclear weapons. Many Tokyo
strategists may recognize that “going nuclear” could actually undermine their security by further
eroding the global nonproliferation regime and reinforcing mistrust in the region. Under the terms
of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan remains protected under the “nuclear umbrella.” Following the
2006 North Korea nuclear test, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the firm U.S.
commitment to defend Japan and South Korea against any threat from North Korea. Former
Foreign Minister Taro Aso had called for a discussion on developing nuclear weapons, but he and
then-Prime Minister Abe later both reiterated that Japan had no intention of doing so. The May
2009 North Korea nuclear test has similarly failed to change Japan’s three principles on nuclear
armaments.
Options for U.S. Policymakers
The dynamic security landscape and the range of U.S. interests in East Asia demand that
policymakers carefully consider their priorities as the U.S.-Japan alliance evolves. Below is a
range of options, many of them non-exclusive, that U.S. policymakers could pursue to protect
American security interests in the Asia-Pacific.
Press Japan to Strengthen its Military
Some military strategists see Japan’s well-funded military as a key asset in managing or hedging
against a rising China. These advocates argue that Japan’s development into a more assertive
military force could counter China’s ongoing military modernization. Key assets that may counter
Chinese military modernization include enhanced missile defense, maritime surveillance, and
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. If U.S. planners felt the threat from China intensify, U.S.
officials could push Japan to move forward further by exceeding the 1% threshold in defense
spending, stepping up training to respond to possible conflicts with China, and developing
nuclear weapons. Critics of this policy point out the potential for inadvertent conflict through a
classic security dilemma scenario: if China feels acutely threatened by Japanese advancements,
political tension could escalate into armed conflict in a moment of crisis.
30
For a discussion of the politics of the nuclear debate, see Andrew L. Oros, “Godzilla’s Return: The New Nuclear
Politics in an Insecure Japan,” Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century. Henry L.
Stimson Center, 2003.
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Reduce the U.S. Military Presence in Japan
Some analysts argue that the Cold War formula for the U.S.-Japan alliance is outdated and that
the forward presence of 53,000 U.S. troops is an unnecessary burden to the U.S. military. They
assert that Japan has the resources to develop into a more autonomous defense force and could
cooperate with the U.S. military in areas of mutual concern on a more limited, “normal” countryto-country basis. Further, advocates argue that the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Japanese soil could cement a more durable strategic partnership than the current configuration.31
Opponents of this strategy argue that the large-scale U.S. military presence is necessary in a
region with simmering tension and the rise of China, a power that may challenge U.S. hegemony
in Asia. Some military experts argue that reducing the number of Marines stationed in Japan,
while maintaining air and sea assets, could reduce some of the burden on local communities and
still maintain a strong U.S. deterrence in the region.
Encourage SDF to Focus on Humanitarian and Peace Operations
To deflect regional concerns that Japan is remilitarizing, the SDF could focus its activities largely
on humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Japan already has participated in several
international peace-keeping missions, as well as contributed to disaster relief efforts and
antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. U.N. endorsement of humanitarian operations makes
SDF dispatches more palatable for both the Japanese public and other nations. Japanese
policymakers drew upon U.N. resolutions to justify Japan’s participation in operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States could encourage such participation by offering specific
training for SDF troops; for example, Japanese defense officials have expressed interest in
learning more about disaster relief from the U.S. military. Utilizing non-military assets, such as
the Coast Guard instead of the MSDF, could reduce the concern about Japan exceeding its selfdefense framework. Washington could also benefit from the presence of Japanese troops in areas
where U.S. troops are not welcome; the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project showed that Japan
was one of the world’s most favorably-viewed states as the U.S. image worldwide slipped at the
time. 32
To encourage Japan to play a more active role in international operations, the United States could
advance its support for Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC). Although the Bush Administration backed Japan, it did not support the so called “G-4
proposal,” which would grant a non-veto UNSC membership to Germany, India, and Brazil.
China, a permanent member of the UNSC, and South Korea also voiced opposition to Japan’s bid.
The Obama Administration has so far held off declaring its position on the matter. However,
Washington would likely need to extend strong diplomatic pressure to secure sufficient support
from other nations. Several Members of Congress have also spoken out in favor of Japan’s bid.
Japan pays more than 20% of the U.N. regular budget, the second-largest contribution.
31
See Christopher Preble, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship,” Cato Institute
Policy Analysis. April 2006.
32
Full Pew Global Attitude Project results can be found at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=824.
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Develop Multilateral Defense Cooperation
For more traditional military operations and training, particularly in East Asia, the development
of multilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and other regional allies may help
assuage concerns about Japan’s growing capabilities.33 If historical and political tension can be
overcome, security cooperation with the South Korean military may be particularly productive
given the two countries geographical proximity, common security concerns, and shared
democratic values. Some analysts have suggested reviving the Trilateral Coordination and
Oversight Group (TCOG),34 established in 1998 by Defense Secretary William Perry, to draw
South Korea and Japan into dialogue on mutual issues of concern.35 Other U.S. defense partners
in the region—Australia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and, potentially, India—may also
be interested in developing security ties with Japan if the United States provides cooperative
frameworks. Multilateral exercises, such as the annual Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand, provide a
possible arena for SDF forces to become more integrated into regional defense cooperation.
Some have suggested that military engagement with China could help ease regional tensions. 36
Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. forces in Asia and the Pacific, has been a
proponent of renewed U.S. military ties with Beijing, with a particular focus on joint exercises in
humanitarian operations. After a long hiatus because of political tensions among the capitals, in
2007 Japan and China resumed military-to-military ties with meetings of defense ministers and a
Chinese naval port visit, the first since World War II. In July 2009, the JMSDF chief of staff
visited Beijing for a first-of-its-kind meeting with his counterparts in the Chinese military.
Create a Northeast Asia Security Forum
The February 2007 Six-Party Talks agreement includes the establishment of a working group to
create a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. Although the Six-Party Talks are currently
suspended, analysts say that such a forum could resolve outstanding territorial concerns, establish
cooperation in fields like energy security, and ease the distrust that has characterized post-World
War II relations. U.S. leadership would likely be crucial to forming such a mechanism. Some
experts argue that such a regional organization could allow Japan to follow the example of
Germany’s reintegration into Europe. 37 To China, American leadership of a NATO-like
organization in East Asia could help the United States regain its reputation as the “cork in the
bottle” that prevents Asian hostilities from flaring up, as opposed to a view within some circles in
Beijing that the United States is helping Japan to remilitarize.
33
For more information, see CRS Report RL34312, Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral
and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce
Vaughn.
34
Balbina Hwang, “Rice’s Trip to Asia: Seeking Coordination on North Korea,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo #787.
July 8, 2005.
35
Secretary Rice convened a trilateral meeting with her Japanese and South Korean counterparts in October 2006, the
first trilateral meeting in over three years.
36
For more information, see CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by Shirley A.
Kan.
37
Ikenberry, G. John, “Japan’s History Problem,” The Washington Post. August 17, 2006.
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Conclusion
Expanding the U.S.-Japan defense relationship is an appealing option for strengthening U.S.
security for many reasons. Japan’s powerful economy and developed democratic system make it a
natural and stable partner for the United States and its well-funded military can complement U.S.
defense capabilities. Since the late 1990s, strategic interests in Washington and Tokyo appeared to
converge on countering the threat from North Korea and hedging against China’s growing
influence. Bush and Koizumi’s leadership and strong personal rapport pushed forward
unprecedented agreements on bilateral cooperation. Military support for U.S.-led operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced the notion that the alliance had developed a global reach.
Despite these advances, political developments since then may have decelerated the progress.
Political turmoil in Tokyo and shifting policy approaches toward North Korea in Washington
challenge the robustness of the alliance. In the short- to medium-term, some observers predict a
period of downturn for U.S.-Japan relations. The experience may serve as a cautionary tale to
those who saw the alliance changes as a major re-tooling of the strategic relationship.
In the longer-term, the United States must also pay heed to regional dynamics. Japan’s increased
assertiveness unnerved China and South Korea. In the face of regional tension, the challenge for
the United States is to take advantage of strong defense cooperation with Japan without
reinforcing the notion among some that Japan is remilitarizing in a way that destabilizes the
region. Transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance brings the promise of delivering a stalwart and
capable ally closely integrated with U.S. forces. However, closely aligning American priorities
with Japan in a region with widespread unease about Japan’s past behavior could limit U.S.
diplomatic flexibility. Realizing the stated goals for the alliance will require not only sustained
management of U.S.-Japan bilateral concerns but also careful attention to regional security
dynamics as well.
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Figure 2. Map of Japan and Surrounding Countries
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Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
Congressional Research Service
Weston S. Konishi
Analyst in Asian Affairs
wkonishi@crs.loc.gov, 7-7525
23
political position.
After Koizumi stepped down, the Bush Administration decided to actively pursue negotiations
with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. Tokyo lamented that its greatest priority in
the negotiations—resolution of the whereabouts of several Japanese citizens abducted by North
Korea in the 1970s and 1980s—was largely disregarded by Washington. In the final years of the
decade, political paralysis and budgetary constraints in Tokyo, Japan’s minimal progress in
implementing base realignment agreements, Japanese disappointment in Bush’s policy on North
Korea, and a series of smaller concerns over burden-sharing arrangements led to reduced
cooperation and a general sense of unease about the partnership.
U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ
Administrations
The Obama Administration came into power in 2009 indicating a policy of broad continuity in its
relations with Japan, although some Japanese commentators fretted that Washington’s overtures
to Beijing would marginalize Tokyo. It was changes in leadership in Tokyo, however, that
destabilized the relationship for a period. In the fall of 2009, when the DPJ came into power
under Yukio Hatoyama’s leadership, relations with Washington got off to a rocky start because of
differences over the relocation of the Futenma Marine base (see “U.S. Military Presence in Japan
and Futenma Controversy” section below). Stalemate on the Okinawa agreement had existed for
several years under previous LDP governments, but the more public airing of the dispute raised
concern that the alliance—long described by the United States as the “cornerstone of the U.S.
Asia-Pacific strategy”—was eroding. In addition, the DPJ initially advocated a more Asia-centric
foreign policy, which some observers interpreted as a move away from the United States.
After months of intense deliberation with the United States and within his government, Hatoyama
eventually agreed to move ahead with the relocation. However, the political controversy
surrounding the Futenma issue played a major role in his decision to resign in June 2010. His
successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, looked to mend frayed relations and stated that his
administration supported the agreement. In addition, Japan agreed to continue Host Nation
Support (HNS), the funds provided to contribute to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, at
current levels for the next five years, starting in FY2011.
A series of alarming provocations from North Korea and China’s increased maritime
assertiveness appeared to restore some momentum to the alliance in 2010. (See “Regional
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Relations and Security Environment” section below for details.) North Korea’s aggression drove
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington closer together, with Beijing isolated in its apparent desire to
shield Pyongyang in international and regional fora. The collision at sea near the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands of a Chinese fishing vessel and Japanese Coast Guard ship led to a major
diplomatic crisis and further reinforced the sense that the U.S.-Japan alliance remained relevant
and essential. Although many problems remain in the alliance, particularly the lack of resolution
of the Okinawan base issue, the fundamental confidence in its value in both the United States and
Japan appeared to be shored up by these regional developments.
After Japan’s release of new defense guidelines in late 2010, U.S. defense planners were pleased
with some aspects, such as the explicit identification of concern with China’s activities and
pledge to develop more elaborate defense cooperation with several other countries such as
Australia, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asian and NATO states. However, the guidelines did
not indicate a move forward on initiatives like developing a law to facilitate deployment of the
SDF without legislative permission, reinterpreting the constitution to allow for collective self
defense, or, perhaps most importantly, an increase in defense spending to bolster capabilities.
Regional Relations and Security Environment
Historical issues have long dominated Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, and particularly
China and South Korea, who remain resentful of Japan’s occupation and belligerence during the
World War II period and earlier. The DPJ government has indicated a willingness to more
emphatically address Japan’s history of aggression. Both Hatoyama and Kan pledged not to visit
the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine that honors Japanese soldiers who died in war, including
several convicted Class A war criminals, thereby removing one of the most damaging obstacles to
Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing and Seoul in the past several years. At the outset of the DPJ’s
rule, relations with Seoul and Beijing improved, with ceremonial visits marked by exceptional
warmth. The relationship with China, however, has chilled significantly, particularly with recent
developments in the East China Sea, while Seoul-Tokyo relations strengthened further. It appears
that tension based on historical conflict may be receding as classic territorial conflicts emerge,
understandable in a region where the power balances are shifting. Whereas history-based
controversy was often sparked by Japan’s symbolic or ceremonial gestures such as shrine visits,
textbooks, and local proclamations of sovereignty over disputed territory, the more recent conflict
appears grounded in physical threats.
China
Sino-Japanese relations warmed in the past few years, in considerable part due to the deepening
economic ties, but have suffered setbacks as historical mistrust and contemporary rivalries
surfaced. An incident in September 2010 in a disputed area of the East China Sea re-ignited longstanding sovereignty tensions. The Japanese Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese fishing
vessel after the trawler apparently collided with two Coast Guard ships in the areas surrounding
the Senkaku Islands (called the “Diaoyu” Islands by the Chinese). The islands, located between
Taiwan and Okinawa and reportedly rich in energy deposits, are administered by Japan but
claimed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Taipei. After Japan released the crew but kept the captain of the
Chinese ship in custody, Chinese officials reacted vociferously with threats of unspecified
“countermeasures,” the suspension of high-level exchanges and visits, the arrest of four Japanese
nationals suspected of spying in an apparently retaliatory move, and, according to some, a
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temporary halt in the export of rare earth minerals that are essential to Japanese automakers’
operations.
The captain’s release later in the month calmed the hostile rhetoric, but the episode points to some
troubling trends. The historical sensitivity over territorial issues and the potential abundance of
natural resources in the disputed waters are a combustible combination. China’s maritime
activities have become more assertive in recent years, including Chinese naval helicopters
buzzing Japanese destroyers in the East China Sea in April 2010. China’s intense and immediate
escalation of rhetoric in what could have been a more routine matter also disturbed many regional
observers. The incident appeared to play a key role in changing the DPJ’s approach to the U.S.
alliance and may have crystallized a shift in Japan to seeing China as a military threat. Although
Japanese security officials had been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing
capabilities for years, the Senkakus dispute may have convinced governing politicians and the
broader public of the need to adjust Japan’s defense posture to counter China.
As the Senkakus dispute played out, the United States reasserted its position that it would not
weigh in on territorial disagreements but that the islands are subject to Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the
Administration of Japan.” This was the clearest statement yet that the United States would honor
its treaty obligations to defend the Senkakus, raising the remote but sobering possibility of a U.S.China confrontation over the islands. In general, the U.S.-Japan alliance complicates U.S.-China
relations; Beijing regularly complains about any indication that Japan is strengthening its defense
capabilities, even though some Chinese sources acknowledge the stabilizing role that the U.S.
presence provides in the region.
South Korea
Japan’s relations with South Korea have been on a positive trajectory under South Korean
President Lee Myung-bak, who took power in 2008. The year 2010 marked the 100th anniversary
of Japan’s annexation of the Korean peninsula and subsequent colonial rule. In August 2010, Kan
issued a statement that expressed Japan’s “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for its past
actions. The statement was welcomed by the government in Seoul, although much of the Korean
public remains skeptical about Tokyo’s sincerity. Diplomatically the two nations appear to be
drawing closer together. North Korea’s provocative acts have served to drive closer trilateral
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In the aftermath of North Korea’s
shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November 2010, the South Koreans sent military observers to
participate in joint U.S.-Japan defense exercises for the first time in history and, later, both sides
announced plans to sign an agreement to allow for the exchange of military goods and services
during peacetime operations.
In the past, U.S. officials’ attempts to foster this coordination were often frustrated because of
tension between Seoul and Tokyo. Tokyo’s new activism in pursuing trilateral and bilateral
cooperation with South Korea may have been inspired by a demonstrated strengthening of the
U.S.-South Korean alliance. Some analysts see a sense of competition between the two capitals
that may drive Tokyo to move forward more aggressively on the alliance in order to avoid being
left behind.
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North Korea
North Korea has played a singular role in driving Japan’s security policy, usually pushing
Japanese leaders to pursue and the public to accept a more forward-leaning defense posture. After
the Cold War threat from the Soviets receded, many analysts questioned if the pacifist-leaning
Japanese public would support a sustained military alliance with the United States. The shared
threat from North Korea—particularly acute to the geographically proximate Japanese—appeared
to shore up the alliance in the late 1990s and into the next century. North Korea’s 1998 test of a
Taepodong missile over Japan consolidated support for development of ballistic missile defense
with the United States. The Japanese Coast Guard’s sinking of a North Korean spy ship that had
entered Japan’s exclusive economic zone in 2001 again publicly raised the specter of the threat
from Pyongyang. Perhaps most importantly, the admission by Kim Jong-il in 2002 that North
Korea had abducted several Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s shocked the Japanese public
and led to popular support for a hard-line stance on North Korea, which in turn gave rise to
hawkish political figures such as former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In 2003, Japan launched its
first spy satellite in order to track North Korean threats without relying on others’ intelligence.
In the past several years, North Korea’s behavior—repeated missile launches, two tests of nuclear
devices, and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship and artillery attack on Yeonpyeong
island—has continued to drive Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington closer together. In 2010, Japan
attended U.S.-South Korean military exercises as an observer and, months later, the South
Koreans reciprocated by attending U.S.-Japan exercises. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosted
her counterparts in a trilateral meeting in December 2010 that demonstrated solidarity among the
three capitals in the face of North Korea’s actions and indicated strong potential for more
effective trilateral coordination in the future.
U.S. Military Presence in Japan and Futenma
Controversy
The reduction of marines on Okinawa seeks to quell the political controversy that has surrounded
the presence of U.S. forces in the southernmost part of Japan for years. Okinawa occupies a
strategically valuable space in the region that would allow for quick deployment to contingencies
on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, or Southeast Asia. Although the bases-for-security
swap that is the essence of the alliance has proved durable for many decades, the residents of
Okinawa have long voiced grievances over the arrangement. The current controversy reflects a
fundamental tension in the relationship between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo:
while the country reaps the benefit of the U.S. security guarantee, the Okinawans must bear the
burden of hosting thousands of foreign troops. Though constituting less than 1% of Japan’s land
mass, Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. forces in Japan. Although the host cities are
economically dependent on the bases, residents’ grievances include occasional violence by U.S.
troops, noise, petty crime, and environmental degradation stemming from the U.S. presence.
Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by an
American serviceman, and was renewed after a U.S. military helicopter crashed into a crowded
university campus in 2004.
A 2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma Marine
Air Station from its current location in crowded Ginowan to the less populated area around Camp
Schwab in Nago (near Henoko Bay) is the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S. forces in
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The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Japan. Per the agreement, the redeployment of some units of the III Marine Expeditionary Force
(III MEF), which includes 8,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents, to new facilities in Guam5
would lead to the return of thousands of acres of land to the Japanese. Even before the latest
episode, the challenge of replacing Futenma had dogged alliance managers for years: since 1996,
both sides had worked to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report,
which called for the return of 12,000 acres of land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate
replacement facilities were arranged. In 2006, Japan agreed to pay around 60% of the $10.3
billion estimated costs. The transfer is contingent upon finding replacement facilities for the
Futenma base.
The fate of the Futenma air station remains unclear. Although the current DPJ government has
officially endorsed the plan to build the replacement facility in Nago, local opposition remains
strong and the central government has limited political capital to push forward with
implementation. In a key gubernatorial election in November 2010, the incumbent Hirokazu
Nakaima was re-elected. Despite earlier supporting the plan, Nakaima opposed the base
relocation during the campaign, though he is seen as more conciliatory to Tokyo than his
opponent was.
5
For more, see CRS Report RS22570, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, by Shirley A. Kan.
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Figure 1. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan
U.S.-Japan Alliance: Policy and Bilateral
Agreements
Over the past decade, U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives reinforced an expanded commitment to
security cooperation by establishing common strategic objectives, outlining major command
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changes, explicitly identifying the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula as
common priorities in the Pacific region for the first time, and calling on China to make its
military modernization more transparent. These agreements and statements emerged first through
the working-level Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched in 2002, and later at the
cabinet level through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC, also known as the “2+2”
meeting), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts.6
The 2005 “2+2” proposals envisage greater integration of the U.S. and Japanese militaries and
outline a new alliance approach both to enhance the defense of Japan and to move beyond
traditional realms of cooperation. Areas specifically mentioned for cooperation include air
defense, ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security
operations, search and rescue efforts, intelligence and surveillance, humanitarian relief,
reconstruction assistance, peace-keeping, protection of critical infrastructure, response to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, mutual logistics support, provision of facilities for
a non-combatant evacuation, and the use of civilian infrastructure for emergency purposes. Joint
efforts in several of these areas have existed for decades, whereas other programs are in their
infancy.
Since the 2+2 agreement was inked in 2005, controversy over the Futenma relocation proposal
has dominated alliance conversations, but other areas have moved forward according to plans. A
U.S. P3 carrier wing is being relocated from Atsugi to the Iwakuni base, where a new airfield is
operational. The transfer of 300 American soldiers from Washington state to Camp Zama to
establish a forward operational headquarters is in progress (though delayed by deployments to the
Middle East), and an Air Self Defense Force facility at Yokota is near completion. A training
relocation program allows U.S. aircraft to conduct training away from crowded base areas to
reduce noise pollution for local residents. Since 2006, a bilateral and joint operations center at
Yokota U.S. Air Base allows for data-sharing and coordination between the Japanese and U.S. air
and missile defense command elements.
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy
In December 2010, Japan announced that it had adopted a new set of National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG). The guidelines report had been due the year before, but was postponed after
the DPJ took power. The 2010 NDPG builds on the 2004 version issued by the Koizumi
government, which retained a self-defense-oriented policy, but called for a more integrated
security strategy and a military that employs “multi-functional flexible defense forces” to deal
with the changing security environment. Both reports emphasize the importance of the U.S.
alliance, and the 2010 iteration explicitly mentions the need to advance cooperation with other
countries, including South Korea, Australia, India, and ASEAN states. Whereas the 2004 version
leaned toward a global perspective that viewed the security of Japan and the region as linked with
international stability, the 2010 guidelines appear to shift the focus back to the Asia-Pacific
region.
6
The SCC released three separate documents: the February 2005 statement set out the common strategic objectives of
the United States and Japan as the rationale for the alliance; the October 2005 “Transformation and Realignment for the
Future” report called for specific command changes; and the May 2006 “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”
outlined the steps to be undertaken to both strengthen the alliance and reduce the burden of hosting U.S. bases on local
communities.
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The 2010 NDPG lays out a definitive shift away from the Cold War framework, which had called
for strong bulwarks against the Soviets based in the northern areas of Japan, to a focus on the
southwestern islands of the Japanese archipelago, where Japanese forces have encountered
Chinese military activities and incursions. It also explicitly identifies China’s military
modernization and lack of transparency as concerns for the region; this attention to China appears
to permeate many aspects of the report, even as it calls for promoting confidence-building
measures with Beijing. The document outlines a new “dynamic deterrence” concept that
emphasizes operational readiness to enhance deterrence. In terms of equipment, the NDPG lists
the plan to procure new submarines and additional destroyers, while the number of tanks and
artillery will be reduced.
Although the guidelines indicate an evolving security stance, they also display Japan’s resistance
to becoming a “normal” military state. Neither document indicates a move toward reinterpreting
the constitution to allow for collective self defense, let alone revising Article 9. Expectations that
the 2010 guidelines would officially loosen Japan’s ban against exporting arms to facilitate
cooperation in ballistic missile defense were not met, apparently because of political placation of
the Social Democratic Party ahead of a crucial budget vote. Perhaps most significantly, there have
been no indications that Japan intends to increase its defense budget in order to accomplish the
objectives laid out in the document.
Ballistic Missile Defense7
Many analysts see U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense as perhaps the most robust form of
bilateral cooperation in recent years. In December 2003, Koizumi announced that Japan would
jointly develop and deploy missile defense capabilities with the United States. Japan decided to
acquire upper and lower ballistic missile defense systems, including the sea-based AEGIS combat
system and an SM-3 interceptor missile, equipment similar to and interoperable with U.S. missile
plans. The decision has led to defense industry cooperation between Japanese and American
firms. Co-development milestones established under the DPRI process have been accomplished
on schedule with successful tests of the technology. For example, in December 2007, a Japanese
destroyer successfully intercepted a missile in a test exercise near Hawaii.
With these results, the alliance now faces the question of production, which was scheduled to
begin in FY2010. Differences have emerged over the export of co-developed technology to third
countries in the future, with Japan demanding that the United States receive Japanese consent
prior to any sale. Although Japanese officials earlier provided an exception to Japan’s ban on
exporting arms specifically for the bilateral development scheme, third-country sales could face a
process of obtaining permission from the Japanese cabinet. Although the conflict probably will
not ultimately jeopardize the plan to jointly develop next-generation missile defense, it is
emblematic of how Japanese constraints limit the extent of bilateral cooperation and frustrate
U.S. defense planners, even for technically successful projects.
7
For background on U.S.-Japan missile defense, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic
Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin.
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Efforts to Upgrade Capabilities and Interoperability
As part of its effort to improve its own capability as well as work more closely with U.S. forces,
Japan has created a joint staff office that puts all the ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces
under a single command. Under the previous organization, a joint command was authorized only
if operations required multiple service participation, which had never occurred in the SDF’s
history. In July 2005, an amendment was made to the law that had established the SDF requiring
Japan’s Joint Chief of Staff to counsel Japan’s defense chief on all SDF operational matters and
that all military orders be given through the JCS in both peacetime and during contingencies. The
need for smoother coordination with the U.S. joint command was one of the primary reasons for
adopting the new organization. 8
The 1997 guidelines outlined rear-area support roles that Japanese forces could play to assist U.S.
operations the event of a conflict in areas surrounding Japan. The passage of special legislation
since 2001 has allowed Japanese forces to take on roles in Iraq and in the Indian Ocean under the
category of international peace cooperation activities. Further, SDF participation in operations has
led to substantial interaction and cooperation with U.S. forces, from logistics training in Kuwait
before dispatching to Iraq to working together on disaster relief operations following the
December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Bilateral interoperability was also tested in JuneJuly 2006 as North Korea was preparing to test-launch a missile. Ballistic missile defense
coordination was carried out again under real threat circumstances during the 2009 North Korean
missile launches.
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have particularly strong capabilities and
defense cooperation with their U.S. counterparts.9 U.S. Navy officials have claimed that they
have a closer daily relationship with the MSDF than with any other navy in the world, with over
100 joint exercises annually. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF developed strong
combined anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cooperation and played a key role in containing the
Soviet threat in the Pacific. The services developed joint operations in order to protect key sea
lines of communication (SLoCs). The most significant help extended by Japan since 2001 in the
support of U.S. operations has come from the MSDF: deployment of an oil tanker and an Aegis
destroyer in the Indian Ocean in support of the campaign in Afghanistan; the dispatch of several
ships, helicopters, and transport aircraft to assist in disaster relief in the Indian Ocean tsunami;
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises;10 and the
deployment of MSDF vessels for antipiracy missions off the coast of Somalia. Similar equipment
and shared technology contribute to the strong interoperability between the Japanese and U.S.
militaries.
Operationally, the MSDF faces considerable restrictions. In the past, defense officials have said
that it is not clear constitutionally if the MSDF can go beyond Japanese waters, although recent
8
Noboru Yamaguchi, “U.S. Defense Transformation and Japan’s Defense Policy,” draft of paper prepared for JapanU.K. Security Cooperation Conference, June 2006.
9
For a discussion on the strategic thinking of the Japan MSDF, see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Japanese
Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?” Naval War College Review: Volume 59; Issue 3. July 1, 2006.
10
Japan’s Coast Guard is the lead agency in the PSI, but a 2004 Diet bill allowed the MSDF to take place in later
rounds of the multilateral exercises.
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legislation permitting the antipiracy mission has extended the reach of MSDF operations. Earlier
in the decade, some restrictions were removed in response to two crises in Japan’s waters: the
intrusion of a North Korean spy ship in 2001 and the detection of a Chinese submarine in 2004.
After the North Korean vessel took the MSDF by surprise, an order was put in place that allowed
the MSDF to engage without convening a Japanese Security Council meeting to secure
permission; the order was then invoked in response to the submarine sighting.11 Adjustments to
Japan’s system of military command indicate a trend toward a more streamlined process, but also
highlight the existing gaps in U.S. and Japanese operational doctrine.
Security trends in the region and beyond indicate that Japan will increasingly come to rely on its
maritime defense forces. In addition to the ongoing anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
Japan is set to build facilities on Okinotori, the southernmost island in Japan, in order to protect
waters that Japan claims in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 2010 NDPG also
emphasized the need to boost maritime capabilities while modestly drawing down Ground SDF
equipment and personnel.
The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) plays an important role in strengthening Japan’s maritime
capabilities. Along with rescue and environmental protection, it includes “securing the safety of
the sea lanes” and “maintaining order in the seas” among its core missions. Because it is not
considered a branch of the military, its budget is not included in the overall defense budget, which
is capped at 1% of GDP. Further, the Coast Guard’s engagement in protection of Japanese waters
and participation in exercises overseas is more politically palatable compared to the MSDF, to
both the Japanese public and to foreign countries.12 Although the U.S. Coast Guard works with its
Japanese counterparts on safety and law enforcement issues, limited communication between the
JCG and the MSDF constrain more integrated alliance cooperation and training.
International Operations and the “Global Commons”
Because of the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq, to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami,
to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and to several U.N. missions around the world, the SDF has
gained experience in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and reconstruction, anti-piracy, and
disaster relief operations. Some prominent Japanese defense specialists have argued that noncombat missions—considered more politically acceptable to the Japanese public—are the most
promising areas for development.13 Japan may particularly focus its efforts in these areas towards
Southeast Asia, offering technical assistance and training to military personnel in ASEAN
countries. Japan played a leading role in establishing an information sharing center in Singapore
that will combat piracy threats in the Strait of Malacca shipping lanes.
The SDF has been engaged in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden since March 2009.
Approximately 400 marine and ground personnel are stationed in Djibouti and currently housed
in Camp Lemonier, the large U.S. military base located close to Djibouti’s airport. In April 2010,
the Japanese government announced plans to build its own $40 million facility in Djibouti,
effectively establishing an overseas base for its military. Although this would be Japan’s first
11
“Suspected Chinese Nuclear Sub Triggers Security Alert in Japan,” The Times. November 11, 2004.
See Richard J. Samuel, “’New Fighting Power!’ for Japan?” MIT Center for International Studies. September 2007.
13
See Noboru Yamaguchi, “Thoughts about the Japan-U.S. Alliance after the Transformation with a Focus on
International Peace Cooperation Activities,” The National Institute of Defense Studies News. January 2006.
12
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foreign base since World War II, the move has sparked little controversy among the generally
pacifist Japanese public.
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance
Despite the accomplishment of reaching agreement in the “2+2” talks during the mid-2000s, a
variety of challenges remain to upgrade the alliance to the extent envisioned in policy documents.
This section outlines some of Japan’s most prominent political, budgetary, and legal challenges to
fulfill the outlined goals.
Political Paralysis in Japan
Since 2007, Japanese politics has been beset by turmoil. Five men have served as prime minister
during that time, making coherent policy formation in Tokyo difficult and complicating many
aspects of U.S.-Japan relations. The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in
the August 2009 elections for the Lower House of Japan’s legislature, which brought an end to
the 55-year period of nearly uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), brought
promise of a new stability in Tokyo politics. However, the DPJ’s tenure in power has been rocky,
making it difficult for Japan to assert itself internationally and creating problems in U.S.-Japan
relations. After the Upper House elections in July 2010, the DPJ lost control of one chamber of
the Diet (Japan’s legislature), therefore allowing the opposition to block much legislation. With
the ruling government forced to cobble together ad-hoc coalitions on particular legislative
priorities, Tokyo has struggled to advance national security issues that would help to improve the
alliance relationship. Ambitious plans like amending Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,
passing a law that would allow for a more streamlined dispatch of Japanese troops, or altering the
current interpretation of collective self defense are far more difficult to accomplish given the
political gridlock.
Budgetary Pressure
U.S. officials are concerned that Japan will face severe budgetary constraints that will preclude
major alliance development. Japan’s public debt stands at around 200% of its GDP.14 Japanese
leaders are under pressure to stem government spending overall, and many ministries face budget
cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Japan’s defense budget, at $51 billion, is the sixth-largest in
the world. 15 Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders
are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although the cap is not a law. According to U.S.
defense officials, Japan should expect to pay up to $20 billion for the realignment costs alone. If
costs of the troop realignment come from the defense budget, some analysts say that Japan’s
military could face degraded capability because expensive equipment purchases will have to be
forgone. In interviews, U.S. military officials have voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of
becoming a “hollow force” because of its insufficient procurement system. Funding is also
needed from the Japanese in order to increase the amount of joint training with U.S. forces.
14
15
According to the CIA World Factbook, Japan’s public debt stands at 196.4% of GDP (2010 estimate).
SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Figures are from 2009.
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Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the demographic reality of an aging and
shrinking population with a shortage of workers.
Constitutional and Legal Constraints
Several legal factors could restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United
States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by
American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of
Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well
as other war potential will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted this clause to
mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the
SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions and
in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense
cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member
nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in
collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the
constitution to forbid collective actions because it would require considering the defense of other
countries, not just the safety of Japan itself. Participation in non-combat logistical operations and
rear support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm of collective selfdefense. Former Prime Minister Abe had spoken out about the need to reconsider this restriction,
but efforts to alter the interpretation stalled after his resignation in 2007.
During the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq, the interpretation prevented them from
defending other nations’ troops.16 Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis
destroyers should not use their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be
allowed to respond to an incoming attack on those vessels. As the United States and Japan
increasingly integrate missile defense operation, the ban on collective self-defense also raises
questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is
being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could not respond if the United
States were attacked.
16
SDF members on overseas missions are not permitted to use weapons if unattended Japanese nationals or foreign
troops in a multilateral coalition with Japan come under attack.
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Figure 2. Map of Japan and Surrounding Countries
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Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
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