Order Code RL34112
Gangs in Central America
Updated October 17, 2008
Clare Ribando Seelke
AnalystSpecialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Gangs in Central America
Summary
The 110th Congress has maintained a keen interest in the effects of crime and
gang violence in Central America and its spillover effects on the United States. Since
February 2005, more than 2,000 alleged members of the violent Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13) gang have been arrested in cities across the United States. These arrests
have raised concerns about the transnational activities of Central American gangs,
and governments throughout the region are struggling to find the right combination
of suppressive and preventive policies to deal with them. Some analysts assert that
increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records to Central American
countries may be contributing to the gang problem.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement
and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. An inter-agency
committee worked together to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs
from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central
American Integration System (SICA) summit on security issues. The strategy, which
is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated
anti-gang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.
During the first session of the 110th Congress, several Members introduced
immigration legislation – H.R. 1645 (Gutierrez), S. 330 (Isakson), and S. 1348
(Reid) – that included provisions to increase cooperation among the United States,
Mexico, and Central America in the tracking of gang activity and in the handling of
deported gang members. However, none of those bills were enacted. On October 2,
2007, the House passed H.Res. 564 (Engel) supporting expanded cooperation
between the United States and Central America to combat crime and violence. The
Consolidation Appropriations Act, FY2008 (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161), included the
provision of $8 million to the State Department to combat criminal youth gangs, $3
million more than the Administration’s request.
In June 2008, Congress appropriated $60 million for Central America in the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252). Those funds
will serve as initial funding for the Mérida Initiative, a new anticrime and counterdug
aid package for Mexico and Central America. With that funding, the State
Department reportedly plans to use roughly $13 million to support direct anti-gang
efforts, with another $4 million included for justice sector reform, $8.6 million for
police reform, and $18 million for related development programs.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country
and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect
to gangs in Central America. It will be updated periodically. For more information
on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Merida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime
and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America. For information on
the activities of Central American gangs in the United States, see CRS Report
RL34233, The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Defining Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Violent Crime Rates in Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities . . . 5
Societal Stigmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Role of the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Country and Regional Responses to the Gang Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Panama and Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Regional Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Organization of American States (OAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV) . . 11
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Regional Security Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Central American Integration System (SICA) Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from
Central America and Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reprogrammed Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) Funds for
Anti-Gang Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Congressional Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Mérida Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Policy Approaches and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Central America, FY2006-FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Mérida Initiative Funding for Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Gangs in Central America
Introduction
In recent years, Administration officials and Members of Congress have
expressed ongoing concerns about gangs and violence in Central America and their
spillover effects on the United States. Policy-makers in countries throughout the
region, including in the United States, are struggling to find the right mix of
suppressive and preventive policies to confront the gang problem. Most agree that
a comprehensive, regional approach to gangs is necessary to prevent further
escalation of the problem.
The 110th Congress has maintained an interest in crime and gang violence in
Central America, and in the related activities of Central American gangs in the
United States.1 Congress has considered what level of U.S. assistance is most
appropriate to help Central American countries combat gang activity and what types
of programs are most effective in that effort. In late June 2008, Congress provided
increased country and regional anti-gang assistance by approving the proposed
Mérida Initiative aid package for Mexico and Central America.2 In addition, as in the
first session, some Members of Congress have taken an interest in the effects of U.S.
immigration policy, particularly increasing deportations of individuals with criminal
records to Central America, on the gang problem. This report describes the gang
problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with
the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. It
concludes with a discussion of policy issues that Members of Congress may consider
as they continue to address aspects of U.S. international anti-gang efforts.
Defining Gangs
Academics and other experts on gangs continue to debate the formal definition
of the term “gang” and the types of individuals that should be included in definitions
of the term.3 There is general agreement that most gangs have a name and some
sense of identity that can sometimes be indicated by symbols such as clothing,
1
For information on Central American gangs active in the United States, see CRS Report
RL34233, The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats, by
Celinda Franco.
2
For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida
Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central
America.
3
This section was drawn from CRS Report RL33400, Youth Gangs: Background,
Legislation and Issues, by Celinda Franco.
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graffiti, and hand signs that are unique to the gang. Gangs are thought to be
composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members are
adults well over the age of 24. Typically, gangs have some degree of permanence
and organization and are generally involved in delinquent or criminal activity. Gangs
may be involved in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft,
robbery, and assaults to more serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking,
drug smuggling, money laundering, alien smuggling, extortion, home invasion,
murder, and other violent felonies.
Gangs are generally considered to be distinct from organized criminal
organizations because they typically lack the hierarchical leadership structure, capital,
and manpower required to run a sophisticated criminal enterprise. Gangs are
generally more horizontally organized, with lots of small subgroups and no central
leadership setting strategy and enforcing discipline. Although some gangs are
involved in the street-level distribution of drugs, few gangs or gang members are
involved in higher-level criminal drug distribution enterprises run by drug cartels,
syndicates, or other sophisticated criminal organizations.
Violent Crime Rates in Central America
Latin America has among the highest homicide rates in the world, and in recent
years murder rates have been increasing in several countries in Central America.
Latin America’s average rate of 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people is three times the
world average of 8.8 homicides per 100,000 people.4 Based on the most recent crime
trend surveys (CTS) data available from the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), Guatemala and El Salvador are internationally among the most
violent countries for which standardized data has been collected.5 Whereas homicide
rates in Colombia, historically the most violent country in Latin America, have fallen
in the past few years, homicides have increased in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. In 2005, the estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was roughly 56 in
El Salvador, 41 in Honduras, and 38 in Guatemala. In Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the
corresponding figures were 6.2 and 8 respectively. More recent figures cited during
the Second Ibero-American Forum on Citizen Security held in July 2008 indicated
that Guatemala now has the second highest murder rate in Central America (roughly
45 per 100,000 people) after El Salvador (55 per 100,000 people).6
4
World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health, 2002, Available at
[http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/].
5
No standardized CTS data are available for Honduras, but police statistics indicate that it
also has a serious murder problem. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May
2007, available at [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/central_america_study.pdf].
6
Although police statistics are not entirely reliable, they provide a starting point for
comparing the relative severity of violent crime in different countries. See “Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras Register Highest Crime Rates in Central America,” Global Insight
Daily Analysis, April 27, 2007; “Los Homicidios en Iberoamérica Triplican a los de Europa
y van en Aumento,” Agencia EFE, July 17, 2008.
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Since most Central American countries exhibit many of the risk factors that
have been linked to high violent crime rates, the region’s current crime problems and
related consequences are likely to continue in the near future. Scholars have
identified income inequality as the strongest predictor of violent crime rates. Central
America, along with Southern Africa and South America, is one of the most unequal
regions in the world.7 UNODC contends that Central American countries are
particularly vulnerable to violent crime fueled by drug trafficking and corruption
because they are geographically located between the world’s largest drug producing
and drug consuming countries. Some 90% of the cocaine shipped from the Andes
to the United States flows through Central America.8 Other traits that make some
Central American countries vulnerable to violent crime include highly urbanized
populations, growing youth populations, high unemployment rates, a widespread
proliferation of firearms, and a legacy of prolonged civil conflicts. Low criminal
justice capacity, corruption, and an absence of political will to fight crime in a
holistic manner have also hindered countries’ abilities to respond to violent crime.9
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and many U.S.
officials have attributed a large proportion of violent crime in the region to youth
gangs or maras, many of which have ties to the United States. The major gangs
operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street” gang
(also known as M-18), and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The 18th
Street gang was formed by Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in
the 1960s who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. It was the first
Hispanic gang to accept members from all races and to recruit members from other
states. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had
fled the country’s civil conflict. Although FBI officials have described MS-13 as a
loosely structured street gang, it is expanding geographically throughout the region
and becoming more organized and sophisticated.10
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary
widely, but the U.S. Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000, a
figure also cited by the United Nations. The gang problem is most severe in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Estimates of Central American gang
membership by country also vary considerably, but UNODC cites country
membership totals of some 10,500 in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, and 14,000
7
Costa Rica is an exception to this regional trend. See D. Ledermann et al., “Determinants
of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World,” World Bank, October 1998.
8
UNODC, May 2007.
9
Ibid.
10
Arian Campo-Flores, “The Most Dangerous Gang in America,” Newsweek, March 28,
2005; USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006, available at
[http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs.html].
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in Guatemala. These figures are compared to 4,500 in Nicaragua, 1385 in Panama,
and 2,660 in Costa Rica.11
Press reports and some current and former Central American officials have
blamed MS-13 and other gangs for a large percentage of violent crimes committed
in those countries, but some analysts assert that those claims may be exaggerated.12
Gang experts have argued that, although gangs may be more visible than other
criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad spectrum of violence in
Central America.13 In El Salvador, for example, officials have blamed gangs for
60% of all murders committed annually, but UNODC contends that evidence to
support that conclusion is lacking. In Guatemala, the regions of the country that have
the highest murder rates tend to be those without a significant gang presence, but
where organized criminal groups and narco-traffickers are particularly active.14
Although the actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in
Central America remains controversial, the gangs have been involved in a broad array
of other criminal activities. Those activities include kidnaping; human trafficking;
drug, auto, and weapons smuggling. Gangs have also been involved in extortions of
residents, bus drivers, and business-owners in major cities throughout the region. In
San Salvador, for example, gangs regularly demand that citizens pay “war taxes.”
Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence by gang members.
There have been some reports of gang activity in Mexico and along the U.S.Mexico border. Until Hurricane Stan hit in October 2005, MS-13 members were
active in southern Mexico where they often charged migrant smugglers to let their
groups pass and sometimes worked in collaboration with Mexican drug cartels. MS13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s warring
cartels to carry out revenge killings. Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed
gang involvement in regional drug trafficking.15
Notably, analysts find no link between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda
or other terrorist groups.16
11
Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 15, 2005; UNODC, May 2007.
12
For example, see Federico Brevé, former Minister of Defense of Honduras, “The Maras:
A Menace to the Americas,” Military Review, July-August 2007.
13
Testimony of Geoff Thale, Program Director of the Washington Office on Latin America,
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
June 26, 2007.
14
UNODC, May 2007; Washington Office on Latin America and the Instituto Tecnológico
Autónomo de México, Transnational Youth Gangs in Central America, Mexico and the
United States, March 2007.
15
“Gangs Undermine Security, Democracy,” Miami Herald, March 30, 2006; Jerry Seper,
“Border Drug Wars Threaten U.S.,” Washington Times, September 3, 2008.
16
Testimony of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House
(continued...)
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Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities.
Several organizations working directly with gang members have asserted that the
combination of poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of educational and job
opportunities for at-risk youth are perpetuating the gang problem. In Honduras, for
example, close to 30% of the population is youth ages 15-24. Those youth have very
limited opportunities in a country where some 65% of the population lives on less
than $2 a day and the unemployment rate was 25% in 2005. A 2007 World Bank risk
assessment for Honduras states that the country has large numbers of unemployed
youth who are not in school and, unable to develop the skills required for attending
a university or obtaining skilled employment, provide a ready pool of gang recruits.17
In the absence of familial and community support, many marginalized youth have
turned to gangs for social support, a source of livelihood, and protection.
Societal Stigmas. Societal stigmas against gangs and gang-deportees from
the United States have made the process of leaving a gang extremely difficult. A
recent State Department report on youth gangs in El Salvador identifies religious
conversion, marriage, enlistment in the military, or enrollment in a substance abuse
rehabilitation program as the few options available for those who seek to leave a
gang. Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those
with criminal records, say that offender reentry is a major problem in many countries.
Ex-gang members report that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed
former gang members, especially returning deportees from the United States who are
often native English speakers, have had the most difficulty finding gainful
employment. In El Salvador, several hundred gang members have gone through
complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, which many feel is necessary
to better blend into Salvadoran society.18
Role of the Media. Many studies have observed that sensationalist media
coverage of the gang phenomenon in Central America has contributed to a sense of
insecurity in the region and may have inadvertently enhanced the reputation of the
gangs portrayed. For example, a 2006 USAID gangs assessment found that rival
gangs in Honduras often compete to see who can portray the most brutal and/or
delinquent activities in order to capture the most media attention. Exaggerated media
reports may have also contributed to the popular perception, which has been backed
by some politicians in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, that youth gangs are
responsible for the majority of violent crime in those countries. This sentiment,
however erroneous, has led many Central American citizens to support tough law
16
(...continued)
Committee on International Relations, April 20, 2005.
17
Sara Michel, Elizabeth Utting, and Bob Moquin, “Honduras: a Risk Assessment,” World
Bank, February 2007.
18
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Issue Paper:
Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador,” June 2007.
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enforcement measures against gangs, hire private security firms, and, in isolated
cases, take vigilante action against suspected youth gang members.19
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts. While tough law enforcement
reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they
were cracking down on gangs, recent studies have cast serious doubts on their
effectiveness. Instead of focusing on law enforcement efforts aimed at capturing top
gang leaders, anti-gang initiatives in many countries have emphasized rounding up
any tattooed youth, many of whom were later released for lack of evidence against
them. For example, Salvadoran police estimate that more than 10,000 of some
14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were later released for lack of
evidence against them.20 In response to these law enforcement strategies, gangs are
now changing their behavior to avoid detection. Many gang members are now hiding
or removing their tattoos, changing their dress, and avoiding the use of hand signals,
making them harder to identify and arrest. A regional study partially funded by the
United Nations Development Program concluded that, largely in response to recent
law enforcement tactics, gangs have developed into more sophisticated military and
business organizations.21 Those findings are similar to the conclusions of a 2006
regional study which asserted that the repressive policing techniques adopted by
many Central American governments may have contributed to gangs “becoming
more organized and more violent.”22
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem
Some analysts argue that U.S. immigration policy has exacerbated the gang
problem in Central America. By the mid-1990s, the civil conflicts in Central
America had ended and the United States began deporting undocumented
immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region, particularly after the
passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
19
Testimony of Lainie Reisman before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 26, 2007. For more on the politicization
of the gang problem, see Lainie Reisman, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Respond to Central
American Gang Violence,” Sais Review, Vol. 26, Summer 2006. The State Department
Human Rights Reports covering Guatemala and Honduras for 2006 include references to
NGO reports that vigilante killings of youths (including suspected gang members) have
continued to occur. NGOs in both countries have asserted that these youth killings may
have been perpetrated by groups that included members of the security forces.
20
“Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released,” EFE News
Service, December 27, 2005.
21
“Central America: Maras Pose Greater Threat Than Ever,” Latin American Weekly
Report, February 7, 2008; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Maras y
Pandillas: Comunidad y Policia en Centroamérica,” October 2007.
22
“Youth Gangs in Central America,” Washington Office on Latin America, November
2006.
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of 1996. IIRIRA expanded the categories of aliens subject to deportation and made
it more difficult for aliens to get relief from removal.23
U.S. deportations to Latin American and Caribbean countries constitute the
overwhelming majority of U.S. deportations worldwide. In the last three fiscal years,
the Central American countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations after Mexico. In FY2007, for
example, over 74,000 Central Americans were deported to Honduras, Guatemala, and
El Salvador. Despite those large numbers, the Central American countries, with the
exception of Panama, have a lower percentage of criminal deportees than the regional
average. For example, criminal deportees accounted for about 16% of Guatemalans
and 18% of Hondurans deported in 2007, compared to close to 40% for the region.
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Central America,
FY2006-FY2008
FY2006
Country
Total Criminal
FY2007
NonCriminal
Total
Criminal
FY2008
(as of Sept. 28, 2008)
NonCriminal
Total
Criminal
NonCriminal
Costa Rica
563
92
471
436
88
348
469
122
347
El Salvador
10,312
3,679
6,633
19,804
4,948
14,856
18,930
5,242
13,688
Guatemala
18,386
3,589
14,797
25,173
3,914
21,259
25,642
4,804
20,838
Honduras
26,526
5,559
20,967
29,469
5,238
24,231
27,445
5,180
22,265
Nicaragua
2,241
585
1,656
2,205
510
1,695
2,064
492
1,572
Panama
152
117
35
150
98
52
148
93
55
Total:
Central
America
58,180
13,621
44,559
77,237
14,796
62,441
74,698
15,933
58,765
Source: Prepared with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal. Figures include “removals,” but not voluntary returns.
Policymakers in Central America are concerned that increasing U.S.
deportations of individuals with criminal records has worsened the gang and security
problems in the region.24 Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals
were sent back to Central America, many of whom had spent time in U.S. prisons for
drug and/or gang-related offenses. Many contend that gang-deportees have
“exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and that they have
23
For more information, see CRS Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Activity, by Michael John Garcia.
24
Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared
Strategy to Fight Gang Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
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recruited new members from among the local populations.25 Most analysts agree that
ties between U.S. and Central American gangs is increasing. However, both of the
recent United Nations studies previously cited in this report cast doubt on the
assertion that U.S. criminal deportees are one of the principal factors fueling the gang
problem in Central America.26
Central American officials have called on the United States to provide better
information on deportees with criminal records. In his 2007 testimony before the
House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the Honduran Ambassador
asserted that while the United States now provides information on the criminal
background of deportees, information is not provided on whether the repatriated
nationals are gang members.
Country and Regional Responses to the Gang
Problem
Most gang activity in Central America has occurred in El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala. Honduras and El Salvador have enacted aggressive anti-gang laws,
whereas Nicaragua and Panama — two countries in which the gang problem has yet
to pose a major security threat — have adopted youth crime prevention strategies.
The Guatemalan government, which has yet to enact comprehensive gang legislation,
supports both strengthening law enforcement capacity to combat criminal gangs, and
expanding gang prevention programs. An April 2006 USAID assessment found that
country and regional efforts to address gangs have been “fragmented, disjointed and
[that they] further underscore the need for coordinated action and leadership.”
Honduras
In 2003, Honduras passed tough anti-gang legislation that established stiff
prison sentences for gang membership. While the initial crackdown reduced crime
and was popular with the public, it was opposed by human rights groups concerned
about abuses of gang suspects by vigilante groups and police forces, and its effects
on civil liberties. The State Department’s March 2008 human rights report covering
Honduras includes NGO reports of killings of youth, including suspected gang
members, by vigilante groups. One NGO reports that some 2,000 youth have died
since the mano dura (“firm hand”) legislation was adopted.27 There has also been
ongoing concern about the law’s effects on already poor prison conditions.
Beginning in 2006, the new government of Manuel Zelaya announced measures
to use dialogue to convince gang members to give up violence and re-integrate into
society, but subsequently has focused more on traditional law enforcement action to
25
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June
2005.
26
27
UNODC, May 2007; UNDP, October 2007.
Thelma Mejía, “In Tecucigalpa, the Iron Fist Fails,”NACLA, Vol. 40, No. 4, July/August
2007.
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crack down on the gangs. The Honduran government also continues to rely on private
groups to run most rehabilitation and offender reentry programs. In September 2006,
the government launched Operation Thunder to increase the number of police and
military patrols in the streets and conduct joint raids. It led to 1,600 arrests. The
Zelaya government has been criticized by human rights organizations for proposing
the creation of a Special Forces Battalion in the national police; these groups fear that
such a move could lead to the “militarization” of the police. Despite government
efforts, crime and violence in Honduras have continued unabated.28
El Salvador
In July 2004, El Salvador’s Congress unanimously approved President Tony
Saca’s Super Mano Dura (“Super Firm Hand”) package of anti-gang reforms despite
vocal criticisms by the United Nations and others that its tough provisions violate
international human rights standards. Since that time, human rights groups have
reported examples of targeted harassment and violence by police against suspected
gang members and gang-deportees. However, a 2007 State Department paper on
youth gangs in El Salvador states that there have been “no credible reports of police
engaging in extrajudicial killings of gang members.”29
In addition to enacting tough anti-gang legislation, in 2005, El Salvador’s
legislature tightened gun ownership laws, especially for youths, and President Saca
initiated joint military and police patrols in high-crime areas. The Saca government
also began to allocate 20% of anti-gang funds for prevention and rehabilitation
programs. In 2006, the Salvadoran government created a new Ministry of Public
Security and Justice, increased joint military and police patrols, and unveiled a draft
law against organized crime. Despite those efforts, El Salvador recorded 3,761
murders in 2006, a slight increase from 2005. There were roughly 3,476 murders in
El Salvador in 2007. The March 2008 murders of eight gang members serving
sentences in two different Salvadoran jails has drawn attention to the continued
insecurity in the country’s jails.30
Guatemala
In Guatemala, youth gangs are just one part of a broader crime problem
involving organized crime and drug cartels. In December 2005, then-President Oscar
Berger announced that he would deploy joint military and police forces to contain
28
“Honduras’ Operation Thunder: The Effort to Stem Rising Crime,” Stratfor, October 30,
2006; “In Tegucigalpa, The Iron Fist Fails,” NACLA Report on the Americas, July 1, 2007.
For more information, see CRS Report RL34027, Honduran-U.S. Relations.
29
Several NGO reports are summarized in “No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine
Violence in El Salvador,” The International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School,
February 2007; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
“Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador,” June 2007.
30
“Salvadoran Murder Rate in 2006 Remains Unchanged,” Global Insight Daily Analysis,
January 3, 2007; Raul Gutiérrez, “Salvadorans Mark Anniversary of Peace Accords,” EFE,
January 16, 2008; “El Salvador: Murder of Inmates Reveals Insecurity of Prisons,” Inter
Press Service, March 18, 2008.
CRS-10
violent crime. These joint forces were necessitated by rank depletion within the
Guatemalan police that had occurred as thousands of officers were dismissed for
irregular or criminal activities. The need to develop other measures to counter
corruption by prison guards emerged after gang warfare in the prison system,
facilitated by contraband and unauthorized visitations allowed by prison staff,
resulted in 53 inmate deaths in August and September of 2005. More recently, the
February 2007 killing of three Salvadoran legislators and their driver and the
subsequent killing of the Guatemalan police officers accused of the legislators’
murders drew international attention to the related problems of corruption, crime and
impunity in Guatemala.31
In order to address these serious challenges, the Berger government secured
passage of a law against organized crime and legislative approval for the creation of
the United Nations International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG), which was inaugurated on January 11, 2008. Staffing and budget
limitations, as well as the fact that it does not have the authority to subpoena or indict
suspects have thus far hindered the CICIG’s efforts.32 President Álvaro Colom, a
businessman from the center-left who took office in January 2008, has recently
appointed a new attorney general who many hope will help that office work more
closely with the CICIG to secure convictions. Human rights groups, though
supportive of that move, have expressed concerns about Colom’s plan to expand the
Guatemalan army in order to bolster the security efforts of the national police.33
Panama and Nicaragua
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention
than El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, other Central American countries have
developed a variety of programs to deal with the gang problem. In Panama, the
Ministry of Social Development, in coordination with other government entities and
several NGOs, administers gang prevention programs, as well as a program to
provide job training and rehabilitation services to former gang members. In 2006,
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a $22.7 million loan to
Panama to fund that and other programs aimed at preventing youth violence in four
of the country’s largest municipalities. Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime
31
In July 2008, the public prosecutor assigned to investigate the so-called “Salvadoran”
murder case was assassinated. However, in a positive turn of events, the person suspected
of orchestrating the legislators’ murders was arrested in late August. “‘Salvadoran Murder
Case’ Suspect Jailed,” Latinnews Daily, September 1, 2008.
32
The U.N. International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was
established in September 2007 as the result of an agreement between the U.N. and the
Guatemalan government. CICIG is an independent body funded by voluntary contributions
from the international community that can investigate cases and help Guatemalan
prosecutors secure convictions in cases involving organized crime. See “The Americas: A
Test of Will; Guatemala,” Economist, March 22. 2008; “U.N.-Backed Probe of Illegally
Armed Groups in Guatemala Issues First Report,” States News Service, September 9, 2008.
33
“Guatemala: Attorney General Steps Down as High Level Changes Continue,” Latin
American Caribbean and Central American Report, August 21, 2008; “Guatemala: Colom
Announces Army Expansion,” Latin American Weekly Report, September 4, 2008.
CRS-11
prevention strategy that, with the active involvement of the police, focuses on family,
school, and community interventions. With support from other countries and NGOs,
the Nicaraguan National Police’s Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two antigang activities a month. The Ministry of the Interior is administering a five-year
program, which is supported by funding from the IDB, to target at-risk youth in 11
different municipalities.
Regional Efforts
Organization of American States (OAS). On June 7, 2005, the OAS
passed a resolution to hold conferences and workshops on the gang issue and to urge
member states to support the creation of holistic solutions to the gang problem. The
OAS unit focused on the problem of gangs in the Americas is located within the
Organization’s Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. In the past three years, the
OAS has hosted meetings and conferences on the gang problem in Latin America and
conducted a study on how to define and classify the types of gangs operating in the
region. The OAS is also developing a regional strategy for promoting inter-American
cooperation in dealing with gangs.
On June 5, 2007 the OAS General Assembly passed a resolution to promote
hemispheric cooperation in confronting criminal gangs that instructs the General
Assembly to support country anti-gang efforts and the Permanent Council to create
a contact group of member states concerned about the gang issue. The resolution
also requests that the Permanent Council hold a special meeting with member states,
other inter-American agencies (such as the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), other international
organizations, and civil society representatives to analyze the gang problem from an
integrated, cross-cutting perspective.
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV).
The IACPV is a multilateral group formed in 2000 to promote prevention as a viable
way of addressing crime and violence in Latin America. IACPV member
organizations include the OAS, World Bank, PAHO, IDB, USAID, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The IACPV has helped
municipalities in Central America develop violence prevention plans, developed a
user-friendly violence indicators document, hosted a major conference on gang
prevention, and provided technical and financial assistance to help form a counterpart
organization within the region, the Central American Coalition for the Prevention of
Youth Violence.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Among IACPV member
organizations, the IDB has taken the lead in funding major violence prevention
programs in Central America. The IDB is executing significant violence reduction
loans in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. On May 24, 2007, the
IDB, in coordination with UNODC and the OAS, hosted a seminar in Washington
D.C. on crime and violence in Central America.
World Bank. In 2003, the Sustainable Development section of the World
Bank launched a Crime and Violence Prevention Program for Latin America and the
CRS-12
Caribbean. The program has produced analytical studies, with a particular emphasis
on identifying best practices in reducing crime and violence; introduced crime and
violence prevention components into existing Bank-funded projects in urban areas;
developed a pilot program to give small grants to community-based initiatives in
Honduras and Nicaragua; and conducted impact evaluations on those initiatives.
Regional Security Meetings. In addition to these multilateral efforts,
Central American leaders and officials have regularly met, often accompanied by
their U.S. counterparts, to improve ways to coordinate security and informationsharing on gang members. Presidents Saca of El Salvador and Oscar Berger of
Guatemala agreed to set up a joint security force to patrol gang activity along their
common border. Berger and other leaders have also called for assistance from the
United States to create a regional “rapid-reaction force” to tackle drug traffickers and
gangs. Regional law enforcement efforts are already underway. In September 2005,
6,400 law enforcement officers from the United States, Mexico, and Central America
carried out a coordinated gang raid that resulted in the arrest of 650 suspects.34 In
October 2006, the governments of the Central American Integration System or SICA
(Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic
proposed legislation to make a local felony into a regional felony and pledged to
improve intelligence-sharing within the region.
Central American Integration System (SICA) Summit. At a July 2007
SICA summit in Guatemala, the United States government pledged some $4 million
to help Central American governments develop a regional anti-gang strategy. Central
American officials have said that they may need between $600 and $800 million to
fund the increased law enforcement and equipment that would be necessary to
implement a comprehensive regional security strategy.35 Thomas Shannon, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, has since stated his belief that
“Central America should probably receive in the area of $400 million [in U.S.
assistance through the Mérida Initiative] over three years” to support both country
and regional security efforts.36 The next SICA dialogue is scheduled to be held in
Washington D.C. in December 2008.
U.S. Policy
Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress have expressed
ongoing concerns about the effects of crime and gang violence in Central America,
and its spillover effects on the United States. In June 2007, after attending a meeting
with attorney generals from Central America, Colombia, and Mexico, then-U.S.
34
“Central America’s Crime Wave Spurs Plan for a Regional Force,” Los Angeles Times,
August 16, 2005; “Gang Crackdown Nets 650 Suspects,” Los Angeles Times, September 9,
2005.
35
36
“U.S. Offers Funds to Fight Central America Gangs,” Washington Post, July 18, 2007.
Testimony of Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, May 8, 2008.
CRS-13
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated that “the United States stands with all of
our neighbors in our joint fight against violent gangs.”37 U.S. officials are striving to
coordinate anti-gang initiatives on both the domestic and international fronts, taking
into account their likely impacts on domestic security, on the one hand, and on
foreign relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico, on the other.
U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement
and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. On the law
enforcement side, recent efforts by agencies include:
37
38
!
FBI: has created a special task force focusing on MS-13 and opened
a liaison office in San Salvador to coordinate regional informationsharing and anti-gang efforts.
!
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement: has created a national anti-gang initiative called
“Operation Community Shield” that, in addition to arresting
suspected gang members in the United States, works through its
offices overseas to coordinate with foreign governments that are also
experiencing gang problems. Since February 2005, ICE has arrested
more than 2,000 suspected MS-13 members in the United States.38
!
State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL): has provided training and technical assistance
to law enforcement officials throughout Central America, sponsored
anti-gang workshops at the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) in San Salvador, and designed a “model precinct” to improve
policing and police-community relations in Villanueva, Guatemala.
!
FBI/INL: are creating a Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Unit
composed of FBI agents and Salvadoran police.
!
FBI/INL: are implementing the Central American Fingerprinting
Exploitation (CAFÉ) initiative to facilitate information-sharing
about violent gang members and other criminals.
!
Department of Homeland Security (DHS): is implementing an
electronic travel document (eTD) system to provide biometric and
biographic information on persons being deported from the United
States to law enforcement officials in receiving countries. The eTD
“U.S. Vows to Help Latin America Fight Gangs,” Reuters, June 8, 2007.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), “News Releases: ICE Takes 10,000th
Violent Gang Member off U.S. Streets,” August 6, 2008.
CRS-14
system is in place in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.39
On the preventive side, U.S. agency efforts include:
!
USAID/Department of Justice’s International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP): created a
community policing program in some 200 municipalities in El
Salvador.
!
USAID: published an assessment of the gang problem in Central
America in April 2006 that included programming initiatives needed
to confront its root causes throughout Central American and
Mexico.40
!
USAID: is funding a new regional program to support public-private
partnerships in gang prevention that is also being supported by SICA
and private sector groups in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
!
State Department/INL: has supported “culture of lawfulness”
programs in schools throughout the region.
The U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from
Central America and Mexico. An inter-agency committee worked together to
develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico, which was announced at a July 18, 2007 U.S.-SICA summit on security
issues.41 The strategy acknowledges that, based on previous U.S. and regional
experiences, future anti-gang efforts should be holistic, comprehensive, and regional
in scope. It calls for active engagement with governments in the region, the OAS, and
the SICA. The strategy states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated antigang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity
enhancement, and prevention.
Reprogrammed Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) Funds for
Anti-Gang Efforts.42 On September 28, 2007, the State Department notified
Congress that some $16 million in unspent ACP funds would be re-programmed to
support INL’s drug interdiction operations, anti-gang efforts, and demand reduction
initiatives in Central America. Of the $16 million, some $4.55 million would be
spent on gang prevention and drug demand reduction projects in Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador.
39
“Face Sheet: Department of Justice Comprehensive Efforts to Fight Gang Violence,” U.S.
Federal News Service, June 24, 2008.
40
USAID, April 2006.
41
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Combating Criminal Gangs from
Central America and Mexico,” July 18, 2007.
42
U.S. Department of State, Determination Pursuant to Section 451 of the Foreign
Assistance Act Relating to the Central America Interdiction, Gang, and Demand Reduction
Enhancement Project, September 28, 2007.
CRS-15
Congressional Interest
Over the past three years, Congress has expressed ongoing concern about the
problem of transnational gangs and interest in the effectiveness of U.S. international
anti-gang efforts. The 109th Congress introduced legislation— S. 853 (Lugar) and
H.R. 2672 (Harris), the North American Cooperative Security Act — that included
provisions to increase cooperation among U.S., Mexican, and Central American
officials in the tracking of gang activity and in the handling of deported gang
members, but that legislation was not acted upon. Both House and Senate versions
of broader immigration legislation, H.R. 4437 (Sensenbrenner) and S. 2611 (Specter)
contained similar provisions, but neither were enacted.
In the 110th Congress, interest in the topic of gangs and violence in Central
America has included concerns about the unintended consequences of mano dura
policies, the relationship between gangs and drug cartels, and the effects of U.S.
immigration policy on the gang problem. At a June 2007 hearing of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, some
witnesses asserted that the emphasis on law enforcement approaches was not
effective in reducing gang activity. In subsequent questioning, several Members of
Congress expressed their concerns that drug-trafficking through Central America
might be at the root of violence in the region. Others questioned what types of U.S.
assistance would be most effective in offering youths alternatives to joining gangs.
A separate Subcommittee hearing held in July 2007 examined the effects of U.S.
deportations on Central America. On October 2, 2007, the House passed H.Res. 564
(Engel) supporting expanded cooperation between the United States and Central
America to combat crime and violence.
Mérida Initiative.43 During its second session, Congress has considered the
Mérida Initiative, a multi-year anticrime and counterdrug plan for U.S. assistance to
Mexico and Central America that was proposed by the Bush Administration in
October 2007. The Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50
million for Central America in the FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In
contrast to the request for Mexico, the composition of proposed aid to Central
America focused on anti-gang and law enforcement programs more than inspections
and surveillance equipment.
Both congressional leaders and Central American officials initially expressed
concerns about the Mérida Initiative. Some Members of Congress felt that they were
inadequately consulted by Bush Administration officials during the development of
the Initiative. Others questioned the use of an emergency spending measure as a
vehicle for the Initiative. Central American leaders expressed concerns that Mexico
was slated to receive the lion’s share of proposed funding in the FY2008
supplemental request.44 Those concerns were somewhat assuaged when the
43
For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida
Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America.
44
Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Central Americans See Peril in Bush’s Anti-Drug Priorities,”
Washington Post, November 29. 2007.
CRS-16
Administration released its FY2009 budget proposal, which included another $100
million request for Central America.
The FY2008 supplemental request proposed spending some $12.6 million to
support the U.S. Anti-Gang Strategy under the Public Security and Law Enforcement
category.45 Of that total, the Administration proposed spending $5 million on law
enforcement programs like the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang Units, $5 million on
community prevention activities, and $2.3 million to expand the eTD system to
provide information to receiving countries on U.S. gang-deportees. The request also
proposed spending $1.5 million to fund the Central America Fingerprint System
(CAFE).
The FY2009 request proposed spending $13 million to support the U.S. AntiGang Strategy, also under the Public Security and Law Enforcement category. Of
that total, the Administration proposed spending $3.1 million to improve law
enforcement capacity, $7.5 million for community prevention activities, and $2.3
million to expand the eTD system. The FY2009 request also included $1.5 million
to support the CAFÉ and $1 million to support an OAS drug demand reduction
program targeted at gang members.
In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $60 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance for Central America in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,
H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252). In contrast to the Administration, which requested all
Mérida funding in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account, Congress divided the funding for Central America between the
INCLE, Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) aid
accounts. In the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110252), Congress shifted the bulk of funding for anti-gang programs from law
enforcement to institution building, rule of law, and development programs. With
that funding, the State Department developed a spending plan for how it and the
other U.S. agencies involved will likely spend the FY2008 supplemental funding
appropriated for the Mérida Initiative.46 (See Table 2 for details).
According to the spending plan, the U.S. government will provide roughly $13.2
million in FY2008 supplemental funding for direct anti-gang assistance. That total
includes some $7 million for gang prevention programs; $4.7 million to support the
U.S. Anti-Gang Strategy, including $3.4 million for the FBI’s Transnational AntiGang Units, $1 million to improve U.S. repatriation policies for gang-deportees, and
$252,000 to support ongoing efforts of the U.S.-SICA dialogue; and $1.5 million to
fund the Central America Fingerprint System.
The U.S. government will also use FY2008 supplemental funding to support a
number of other programs that are indirectly related to addressing gangs in Central
45
Information for sections on proposed FY2008 supplemental funding components is from
a Department of State briefing paper that was submitted to Capitol Hill Offices.
46
U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mexico,
Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008.
CRS-17
America. Those programs include $4 million worth of justice sector reforms, $3
million in community policing programs, and a $10 million Community Action Fund
that aims to help communities address problems that make them vulnerable to gangs
and drug-related violence. Some $8.6 million of the FY2008 supplemental funds will
fund technical assistance and modernization programs for police in the region.
Another $1.5 million will support the ILEA in El Salvador. With that funding, the
ILEA will offer four modules of anti-gang programs that will train roughly 120 law
enforcement personnel from across the region on topics such as forensics, witness
and judicial security, investigative techniques, and prevention and rehabilitation.
Table 2. Mérida Initiative Funding for Central America
($ in millions)
FY2008
Supplemental
Request
(Central
America)
State Department
Spending Plan for
FY2008
Supplemental
(P.L. 110-252)
FY2009
Request
(Central
America)
Counternarcotics,
Counterterrorism, and
Border Security
16.6
16.7
40.0
Public Security and Law
Enforcement
25.7
13.3
32.0
Institution Building and
Rule of Law
7.7
29.0
23.0
Program Support
--
Type of Funding
Total
50.0
5.0
60.0
100.0
Source: U.S. Department of State briefing paper provided to Congressional offices; U.S.
Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, U.S. Department
of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009.
With respect to the FY2009 budget request, Congress passed a continuing
resolution (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329) that will provide funding for U.S. foreign aid
programs at FY2008 regular budget levels through March 6, 2009.
Policy Approaches and Concerns
Most policy-makers agree that finding regional solutions to the gang problem is
essential. At the same time, many argue that in order to effectively reduce gang-related
crime, a holistic approach to the problem must be developed that addresses its root
social, political, and economic causes. There is disagreement, however, over the level
and combination of preventive and suppressive policies that should be used in Central
America to address the gang problem and over what U.S. agency is best equipped to
oversee those efforts. Debates regarding the relative merits of prevention and
suppression methods have reemerged during congressional consideration of the
Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative.
CRS-18
Proponents of law enforcement solutions maintain that Central American law
enforcement officials lack the capacity and resources to target gang leaders effectively,
share data, and conduct thorough investigations that lead to successful prosecutions.
In addition to supporting specialized anti-gang units, the Mérida Initiative seeks to
address these issues by providing funding for police training to build investigative
capacity and communications equipment for police forces. The Bush Administration
requested $11 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $13 million in FY2009
funding to support technical assistance and modernization programs for police. It also
sought $2 million in proposed FY2008 supplemental assistance and another $6 million
in FY2009 funding to support the International Law Enforcement Academy based in
El Salvador. The Initiative, as proposed by the Administration, did not include funds
to support large-scale police reform, even though corruption within law enforcement
is a major obstacle to current anti-gang efforts. It did, however, aim to improve
police-community relations, which have been very poor in many communities,
through support for community policing programs modeled after the successful U.S.funded program in Villanueva, Guatemala. Due to the limited funding appropriated
for law enforcement assistance in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L.
110-252), the State Department plans to provide $7 million in police assistance to the
Central American countries ($4 million less than the request) and $1.5 million for the
ILEA ($500,000 less than the request).47
While most U.S. observers argue that the State Department and FBI should take
the lead in assistance to improve law enforcement capacity, others see a possible role
for the U.S. Southern Command in training regional security forces.48 In recent years,
the U.S. Southern Command has taken a leading role in discussing the problem of
citizen security in Central America, both within the U.S. inter-agency community and
with Central American officials. Critics of U.S. military involvement in anti-gang
efforts have noted that it is the State Department’s role to provide security assistance
to foreign governments, subject to human rights and democracy concerns. They have
expressed satisfaction that the Mérida Initiative emphasizes regional cooperation by
civilian agencies on public security issues through the U.S.-SICA dialogue, with no
explicit role established for the U.S. Southern Command or the region’s militaries.49
Based on the experiences of cities throughout the United States, proponents of
more prevention-based interventions argue that localities that provide social services
to at-risk youth have been more effective in preventing gang violence than those that
have relied only on law enforcement approaches.50 These findings mirror the results
47
U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mexico,
Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008.
48
The only military component in the Administration’s proposal for Mérida was the $21
million requested in FY2009 to support Enduring Friendship, a Department of Defense
program to provide naval equipment to Central American countries so that they can work
with the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy on maritime drug interdiction efforts.
49
U.S. Department of State, Office of Language Services Translating Division, “Not All
That is Gold Glitters and Not All That Glitters is Gold,” by Joel Fyke and Maureen Myer,
March 2008, originally published in Foreign Affairs en Español, Vol. 8, No. 1.
50
“Gang Wars,” Justice Policy Institute, Washington, DC, July 2007.
CRS-19
of several studies previously cited in this report that focus on reducing gang violence
in Central America.
Human rights groups maintain that the Mérida Initiative should include more of
an emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation than the Administration had originally
proposed, and that the U.S. government should encourage SICA and the governments
of the region to develop comprehensive youth violence prevention plans.51
Throughout Central America, government-sponsored gang prevention programs have
generally been small-scale, ad-hoc, and under-funded. Governments have been even
less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to leave
gangs. Government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations as a major
factor limiting their ability to implement more extensive prevention and rehabilitation
programs, yet the political will necessary to adopt those types of programs has also
been lacking. As previously stated, Congress increased funding for prevention
programs, as well as economic and social development programs, in the FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252).
51
“Memo: The Merida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central America,”
Washington Office on Latin America, March 2008.December 4, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34112
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Gangs in Central America
Summary
The 111th Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of crime and gang violence in Central
America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating
in the United States. The violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the “18th Street”
gang (also known as M-18) continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government
authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world.
Governments in those countries appear to have moved away, at least on a rhetorical level, from
repressive anti-gang strategies. However, they have yet to implement effective anti-gang policies
that include an emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation of former gang members.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the expanding presence of the MS-13 and M-18 in
cities across the United States, as well as reports that these gangs may be evolving into more
sophisticated transnational criminal enterprises. Between February 2005 and September 2009,
U.S. officials arrested some 2,572 alleged MS-13 members in cities across the United States,
many of whom were subsequently deported. Evidence suggests, however, that previously
deported members of both the MS-13 and the M-18 often reenter the United States illegally
across the U.S.-Mexico border.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive
side of dealing with Central American gangs. An inter-agency committee worked together to
develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, first
announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit on security
issues. The strategy, which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue
coordinated anti-gang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.
In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Congress appropriated roughly $7.9 million in FY2008 and $5 million in FY2009 in global
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in
Central America. Congress provided additional support for anti-gang efforts in the region through
the Mérida Initiative, including, by CRS calculation, at least $22 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance and close to $19 million in FY2009 funding. For FY2010, the Obama Administration
requested $7 million in global INCLE funds for gang activities in Central America, and another
$100 million for Mérida programs in Central America, including funding for gang-related
programs. The House-passed version of the FY2010 State Department/Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, H.R. 3081, would provide $8 million in global INCLE for gang programs
and $83 million for a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), whereas the
Senate Appropriation Committees’ version of the bill, S. 1434, would provide $90 million to
Central America through the existing Mérida framework.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional
approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central
America. For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida
Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues. For information on
Central American gangs in the United States, see CRS Report RL34233, The MS-13 and 18th
Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?, by Celinda Franco.
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Gangs in Central America
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background on Violent Crime in Central America .......................................................................2
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America ...........................................................................3
Defining Gangs.....................................................................................................................3
Transnational Gangs in Central America................................................................................4
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America ..................................................6
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities .................................6
Societal Stigmas..............................................................................................................6
Role of the Media ...........................................................................................................7
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts................................................................................7
Prisons in Need of Reform ..............................................................................................7
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem ................................................8
Country Anti-Gang Efforts ..........................................................................................................9
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies ................................................................ 10
What Have Been the Effects of Mano Dura Policies? .......................................................... 10
Alternative Approaches ....................................................................................................... 11
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts................................................ 11
Regional and Multilateral Efforts ........................................................................................ 12
Central American Integration System (SICA) ................................................................ 12
Organization of American States (OAS) ........................................................................ 13
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV) ................................ 13
Multilateral Development Banks and Donor Agencies ................................................... 13
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 14
Congressional Interest......................................................................................................... 14
U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts ................................................................................... 15
State Department........................................................................................................... 15
Department of Justice.................................................................................................... 16
USAID ......................................................................................................................... 17
Policy Approaches and Concerns......................................................................................... 17
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants........................................................2
Table 2. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2007-FY2009 ...................................8
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19
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Introduction
In recent years, analysts and U.S. officials have expressed ongoing concerns about the increasing
rates of violent crimes committed by drug traffickers, organized criminal groups, and gangs in
Central America.1 U.S. concerns about gangs have accelerated as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),
a particularly violent group with ties to Central America, has increased its presence and illicit
activities in the United States.2 Policy-makers in countries throughout the region, including in the
United States, are struggling to find the right mix of suppressive and preventive policies to
confront the gang problem. Most agree that a comprehensive, regional approach to gangs is
necessary to prevent further escalation of the problem.
Congress has maintained an interest in crime and gang violence in Central America, and in the
related activities of Central American gangs in the United States.3 Congress has considered what
level of U.S. assistance is most appropriate to help Central American countries combat gang
activity and what types of programs are most effective in that effort. Members of Congress have
also taken an interest in the effects of U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records to
Central America on the gang problem, as well as the evolving relationship between Mexican drug
trafficking organizations and the gangs. Congress has funded anti-gang efforts in Central America
through global funds appropriated to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). In June 2008, Congress increased country and regional
anti-gang assistance by approving initial funding for the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and
counterdrug foreign aid package for Mexico and Central America.4
The 111th Congress appropriated a second tranche of Mérida funding for Central America in the
FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), enacted in March 2009, and is currently
considering how much assistance to provide for the region for FY2010. Congress is likely to
exercise oversight over the implementation of the Mérida Initiative, with a particular interest in
how agencies are coordinating their various anti-gang efforts. Congress may also help influence
the design of whatever follow-on program is proposed for the region in President Obama’s
FY2011 budget request.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional
approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central
America. It concludes with a discussion of policy issues that Members of Congress may consider
as they continue to address aspects of U.S. international anti-gang efforts.
1
The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama. This report focuses on the “northern triangle” countries of Central America where the gang problem has been
most acute, which include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. It refers to the other countries and governments in
the region periodically for comparative purposes.
2
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Gang Intelligence Center, “National Gang Threat Assessment (NGTA)
2009,” January 2009.
3
For information on Central American gangs active in the United States, see CRS Report RL34233, The MS-13 and
18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?, by Celinda Franco.
4
For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central
America: Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Background on Violent Crime in Central America
Latin America has among the highest homicide rates in the world, and in recent years homicide
rates in several Central American countries have significantly exceeded the regional average (see
Table 1). According to figures cited in a recent U.N. Development Program (UNDP) report, in
2005, Latin America’s average homicide rate stood at roughly 25 homicides per 100,000 people,
almost three times the world average of 9 homicides per 100,000 people. 5 That same year,
average homicide rates per 100,000 people in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras reached
approximately 62, 44, and 37, respectively. Whereas homicide rates in Colombia, historically the
most violent country in Latin America, have fallen in the past few years, homicide rates have
remained at elevated levels in El Salvador, Guatemala, and, to a lesser extent, Belize. Homicide
rates have increased significantly in Honduras. By 2008, the estimated murder rate per 100,000
people stood at roughly 32 in Belize, 52 in El Salvador, 48 in Guatemala, and 58 in Honduras. In
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama, the corresponding figures were 11, 13, and 11, respectively. 6
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants
(2000-2008)
Country
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Belize
19
25
30
24
27
28
31
30
32
Costa Rica
6
6
6
7
7
8
8
8
11
El Salvador
45
40
39
40
49
62
65
57
52
Guatemala
28
30
32
37
38
44
47
45
48
Honduras
n/a
n/a
69
65
35
37
46
50
58
Nicaragua
9
10
10
12
12
13
13
13
13
Panama
10
10
12
11
10
11
11
13
19
Source: U.N. Development Program, “Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010:
Abrir Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano,” October 2009.
Central America—particularly the “northern triangle” countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras—exhibit many risk factors that have been linked to high violent crime rates. For
example, studies have shown that high levels of income inequality and social exclusion are often
strong predictors of high violent crime rates. Latin America has been among the most unequal in
terms of income and levels of social exclusion and most violent regions in the world.7 This
linkage holds true in Central America except for the case of El Salvador, a country with relatively
low inequality but high crime rates.8 With the exceptions of Belize and Costa Rica, Central
American countries have also had a long history of armed conflicts and/or dictatorships, which
has inhibited the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law.
Protracted armed conflicts also resulted in the widespread proliferation of illicit firearms in the
5
U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir
Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano,” October 2009. This report also contains sections on other
types of violent crime in Central America, including rape, kidnapping, assault, and domestic violence.
6
Ibid.
7
D. Ledermann et al., “Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World,” World Bank, October 1998.
8
UNDP, October 2009.
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region, as well as a cultural tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling disputes. 9 Other
traits that make some Central American countries vulnerable to violent crime include highly
urbanized populations, growing youth populations, and high unemployment rates. Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador, which have large percentages of their populations living in the United
States, have reportedly suffered more from the negative effects of emigration (such as family
disintegration and deportations) than other countries. 10
According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central American countries are
particularly vulnerable to violent crime fueled by drug trafficking and corruption because they are
geographically located between the world’s largest drug producing and drug consuming countries.
11
In 2008, some 84% of the cocaine shipped from the Andes to the United States flowed through
Mexico and Central America. Stepped up enforcement efforts in Mexico has reportedly led
traffickers to use Central America as a primary transshipment point for Andean cocaine bound for
the United States.12 Low criminal justice capacity, corruption, and an absence of political will to
fight crime in a holistic manner have hindered countries’ abilities to respond to violent crime.
These problems may be most pronounced in Guatemala, a country struggling, with U.N.
assistance, to confront sophisticated organized criminal groups and drug traffickers that have been
aligned with some of the country’s most powerful political, military, and business actors.13
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed,
sometimes erroneously, a significant proportion of violent crime in the region to youth gangs or
maras, many of which have ties to the United States.
Defining Gangs
Academics and other experts on gangs continue to debate the formal definition of the term “gang”
and the types of individuals that should be included in definitions of the term.14 There is general
agreement that most gangs have a name and some sense of identity that can sometimes be
indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti, and hand signs that are unique to the gang. Gangs
are thought to be composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members
are adults well over the age of 24. Typically, gangs have some degree of permanence and
organization and are generally involved in delinquent or criminal activity. Gangs may be involved
in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assaults to more
9
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Armas Pequeñas y Livianas: Amenaza a la Seguridad
Hemisférica, 2007.
10
UNDP, October 2009.
11
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire,” May 2007.
12
Testimony of Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Group, before the House
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere hearing on “Assessing U.S. Drug Policy in the Americas,” October 15,
2009.
13
Ivan Briscoe, “A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in Guatemala,” Fundación Para las Relaciones
Internacionales y El Diálogo Exterior, September 2009.
14
This section was drawn from CRS Report RL33400, Youth Gangs: Background, Legislation, and Issues, by Celinda
Franco.
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serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, alien
smuggling, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent felonies.
Gangs are generally considered to be distinct from organized criminal organizations because they
typically lack the hierarchical leadership structure, capital, and manpower required to run a
sophisticated criminal enterprise. Gangs are generally more horizontally organized, with lots of
small subgroups and no central leadership setting strategy and enforcing discipline. Although
some gangs are involved in the street-level distribution of drugs, few gangs or gang members are
involved in higher-level criminal drug distribution enterprises run by drug cartels, syndicates, or
other sophisticated criminal organizations.
When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the term pandillas and maras
interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two.15 Studies that make a distinction
between the two types of Central America gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups
that have long been present in the region, and maras as a more recent phenomenon that has
transnational roots.
Transnational Gangs in Central America
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street”
gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).16 The 18th
Street gang was formed by Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s
who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. It was the first Hispanic gang to accept
members from all races and to recruit members from other states. MS-13 was created during the
1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later
expanded their operations to Central America. This process accelerated after the United States
began deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region after the
passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.17
Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many
of whom had spent time in U.S. prisons for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Many contend that
gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and that they
have recruited new members from among the local populations. 18
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S.
Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000, a figure also cited by the United
Nations. The gang problem is most severe in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Estimates of
Central American gang membership by country also vary considerably, but UNODC cites country
membership totals of some 10,500 in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, and 14,000 in Guatemala.
These figures are compared to 4,500 in Nicaragua, 1385 in Panama, and 2,660 in Costa Rica.19
15
See, for example, Demoscopia S.A., “Maras y Pandillas: Comunidad y Policía en Centroamérica,” October 2007, as
opposed to Dennis Rodgers et al., “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions,” Small Arms Survey
Occasional Paper 23, May 2009.
16
For the history and evolution of these gangs, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and
American Law Enforcement, Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009.
17
IRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants
to get relief from removal.
18
Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
19
Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
(continued...)
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Nicaragua has a significant number of gang members, but does not have large numbers of MS-13
or M-18 members, perhaps due to the fact that Nicaragua has had a much lower deportation rate
from the United States than the “northern triangle” countries.20
While MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, there is evidence that both
gangs, but particularly the MS-13, have expanded geographically and become more organized
and sophisticated. By early 2008, for example, Salvadoran police had found evidence suggesting
that some MS-13 leaders jailed in El Salvador were ordering retaliatory assassinations of
individuals in Northern Virginia, as well as designing plans to unify their clicas (cliques) with
those in the United States.21 Studies have shown that, as happened in the United States, gang
leaders in Central America are using prisons to recruit new members and to increase the
discipline and cohesion among their existing ranks. 22
Press reports and some current and former Central American officials have blamed MS-13 and
other gangs for a large percentage of violent crimes committed in those countries, but some
analysts assert that those claims may be exaggerated.23 Gang experts have argued that, although
gangs may be more visible than other criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad
spectrum of violence in Central America.24 In El Salvador, for example, officials have blamed
gangs for 60% of all murders committed annually, but UNODC contends that evidence to support
that conclusion is lacking. In Guatemala, the regions of the country that have the highest murder
rates tend to be those without a significant gang presence, but where organized criminal groups
and narco-traffickers are particularly active.25
Although the actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central America
remains controversial, the gangs have been involved in a broad array of other criminal activities.
Those activities include kidnapping; human trafficking; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling.
Gangs have also been involved in extortions of residents, bus drivers, and business-owners in
major cities throughout the region. In San Salvador, for example, gangs regularly demand that
citizens pay “war taxes.” Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence by gang members.
While some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal
groups have increased, others have downplayed the connection. In recent years, there have been
some reports of gang activity in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border. Until Hurricane Stan
hit in October 2005, MS-13 members were active in southern Mexico where they often charged
migrant smugglers to let their groups pass and sometimes worked in collaboration with Mexican
drug cartels. MS-13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s
(...continued)
Committee, March 15, 2005; UNODC, May 2007.
20
Rodgers et al., 2009.
21
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Regional Gang
Initiative: Assessments and Plan of Action,” July 1, 2008.
22
Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
23
For example, see Federico Brevé, former Minister of Defense of Honduras, “The Maras: A Menace to the Americas,”
Military Review, July-August 2007.
24
Testimony of Geoff Thale, Program Director of the Washington Office on Latin America, before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 26, 2007.
25
UNODC, May 2007; Washington Office on Latin America and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
(ITAM), “Transnational Youth Gangs in Central America, Mexico and the United States,” March 2007.
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warring cartels to carry out revenge killings. Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed
increasing gang involvement in drug trafficking and drug-related violence. 26
Notably, analysts have found no links between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups.27
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities
Several organizations working directly with gang members have asserted that the combination of
poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of educational and job opportunities for at-risk youth are
perpetuating the gang problem. In Honduras, for example, close to 30% of the population is youth
ages 15-24. Those youth have very limited opportunities in a country where some 65% of the
population lives on less than $2 a day and the unemployment rate was 25% in 2005. A 2007
World Bank risk assessment for Honduras states that the country has large numbers of
unemployed youth who are not in school and, unable to develop the skills required for attending a
university or obtaining skilled employment, provide a ready pool of gang recruits.28 In the
absence of familial and community support, many marginalized youth have turned to gangs for
social support, a source of livelihood, and protection.
Societal Stigmas
Societal stigmas against gangs and gang-deportees from the United States have made the process
of leaving a gang extremely difficult.29 A State Department report on youth gangs in El Salvador
identifies religious conversion, marriage, enlistment in the military, or enrollment in a substance
abuse rehabilitation program as the few options available for those who seek to leave a gang.
Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those with criminal
records, say that offender reentry is a major problem in many countries. Ex-gang members report
that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members, especially
returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have had the
most difficulty finding gainful employment. In El Salvador, several hundred gang members have
gone through complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, which many feel is
necessary to better blend into Salvadoran society.30
26
UNDP, October 2009, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2009,” March 2009.
27
Testimony of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Committee on International Relations, April 20,
2005. Testimony of David Shirk, Professor and Director of the Trans-Border Institute, before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science, and Related Appropriations, March 24, 2009.
28
Sara Michel, Elizabeth Utting, and Bob Moquin, “Honduras: a Risk Assessment,” World Bank, February 2007.
29
Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
30
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations
in El Salvador,” June 2007.
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Role of the Media
Many studies have observed that sensationalist media coverage of the gang phenomenon in
Central America has contributed to a sense of insecurity in the region and may have inadvertently
enhanced the reputation of the gangs portrayed. For example, a 2006 USAID gangs assessment
found that rival gangs in Honduras often compete to see who can portray the most brutal and/or
delinquent activities in order to capture the most media attention. Exaggerated media reports may
have also contributed to the popular perception, which has been backed by some politicians in
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, that youth gangs are responsible for the majority of
violent crime in those countries. This sentiment, however erroneous, has led many Central
American citizens to support tough law enforcement measures against gangs, hire private security
firms, and, in isolated cases, take vigilante action against suspected youth gang members.31
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts
While tough law enforcement reforms (discussed below in the section “Mano Dura”) initially
proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they were cracking down on gangs,
recent studies have cast serious doubts on their effectiveness. In response to law enforcement
roundups of any and all tattooed youth, gangs are now changing their behavior to avoid detection.
Many gang members are hiding or removing their tattoos, changing their dress, and avoiding the
use of hand signals, making them harder to identify and arrest. A regional study concluded that,
largely in response to recent law enforcement tactics, gangs have developed into more
sophisticated military and business organizations.32 Those findings are similar to the conclusions
of a 2006 regional study which asserted that the repressive policing techniques adopted by many
Central American governments may have contributed to gangs “becoming more organized and
more violent.”33
Prisons in Need of Reform
The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central
America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding,
inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already teeming with
inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of suspected gang members,
many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, for example, as of
December 2008, some 19,814 inmates were being held in prisons designed to hold a maximum of
8,227 people. 34
Due to a lack of security within the prisons, gangs are often able to carry out criminal activities
from behind bars, sometimes with assistance from corrupt prison officials. As previously
31
Testimony of Lainie Reisman before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, June 26, 2007. For more on the politicization of the gang problem, see Lainie Reisman, “Breaking the
Vicious Cycle: Respond to Central American Gang Violence,” Sais Review, Vol. 26, Summer 2006. The State
Department Human Rights Reports covering Guatemala and Honduras for 2008 include references to NGO reports that
vigilante torture and even killings of youths have continued to occur. NGOs in both countries have asserted that these
abuses may have been perpetrated by groups that included current and former members of the security forces.
32
Demoscopia, S.A., 2007.
33
“Youth Gangs in Central America,” Washington Office on Latin America, November 2006.
34
U.S. Department of State, “Human Rights Report 2009,” February 2009.
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mentioned, there is evidence that gangs have become larger, better organized, and more cohesive
within the confines of many of the region’s prisons. Some observers have described prisons as
“gangland finishing schools”35 where, rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often
deepen their involvement in illicit gang activities.
Disputes between members of rival gangs, between gang and non-gang inmates, and between
gangs and prison guards regularly occur. Between January and October 2008, the Honduran
Ministry of Security reported 39 inmate deaths, a majority of which occurred as a result of intergang violence. 36 Prisoner abuse and torture is also not uncommon.
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem
Policymakers in Central America have expressed ongoing concerns that increasing U.S.
deportations of individuals with criminal records is worsening the gang and security problems in
the region.37 The Central American countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after Mexico) for the last several fiscal years.
Despite the large numbers of deportees repatriated to the region, the Central American countries
have typically had a lower percentage of criminal deportees than other top receiving countries
(see Table 2). In FY2008, for example, criminal deportees accounted for just 19% of
Guatemalans and Hondurans deported. In contrast, criminal deportees accounted for 79% of
Jamaican deportees and 55% of Dominican deportees. In FY2009, however, the percentage of
Central American deportees with criminal records increased significantly. This may be due to
increasing efforts by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in partnership with local
and state officials, to identify illegal immigrants subject to deportation.
Table 2. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2007-FY2009
(Including Annual Percentage of Deportees with Criminal Records)
Country
Mexico
FY2007
% Crim.
FY2008
% Crim.
FY2009
% Crim.
176,815
42.7%
251,875
33.8%
274,577
37.9%
Honduras
30,227
17.6%
29,758
18.8%
27,566
25.1%
Guatemala
26,429
15.3%
28,866
18.5%
30,229
21.5%
El Salvador
21,029
24.2%
20,949
27.4%
21,049
30.0%
Dom. Republic
3,709
56.4%
3,776
55.4%
3,824
56.8%
Brazil
3,708
10.0%
3,640
10.7%
3,229
11.7%
Colombia
3,239
37.7%
2,823
39.7%
2,617
42.8%
Ecuador
1,612
27.4%
2,478
23.6%
2,503
25.7%
Nicaragua
2,310
22.7%
2,334
23.4%
2,142
28.6%
Haiti
1,572
34.2%
1,649
25.8%
687
67.8%
35
Arana, 2005.
Ibid.
37
Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared Strategy to Fight Gang
Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
36
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Country
Jamaica
FY2007
1,451
% Crim.
FY2008
81.2%
1,599
% Crim.
78.9%
FY2009
1,620
% Crim.
77.3%
Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal. Figures include “removals,” but not voluntary returns.
FY2009 figures are not yet available.
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each criminal deportee, including whether or not he or
she is a member of a gang. While ICE does not provide a complete criminal record for deportees,
it may provide some information regarding an individual’s criminal history when specifying why
the individual was removed from the United States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless
it is the primary reason why the individual is being deported. However, law enforcement officials
in receiving countries are able to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in order to
request a criminal history check on particular criminal deportees after they have arrived in that
country. With support from the Mérida Initiative, ICE and the FBI have developed a pilot
program called the Criminal History Information Program (CHIP) to provide more information
about deportees with criminal convictions to officials in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and other
countries vary widely across Latin America. While a few large and relatively wealthy countries
(such as Colombia and Mexico) have recently established comprehensive deportee reintegration
assistance programs, most countries provide few, if any, services to returning deportees. In
Central America, for example, the few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered
by either the Catholic Church, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the International
Organization for Migration (IOM). The U.S. government does not currently support any deportee
reintegration services programs in Central America, although it has in the past.38
Country Anti-Gang Efforts
Country efforts to deal with gangs and gang-related violence has varied significantly. In general,
governments in the “northern triangle” countries have adopted more aggressive law enforcement
approaches than the other Central American countries. These policies, which will subsequently be
discussed, failed to stave off rising crime rates in the region and had several negative unintended
consequences. As a result, recent studies maintain that governments appear to be moving away
from “enforcement-first” policies towards “second-generation” anti-gang programs. Newer
programs have emphasized, among other things, prevention programs for at-risk youth,
interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against
crime and violence. 39
38
Testimony of Maureen Achieng, Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Haiti
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 24, 2007.
39
Rodgers et al., May 2009.
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Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies
Mano Dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El
Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media
pressure for these governments to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime.
Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those
with visible tattoos) for illicit association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and
gang-related crimes. A Mano Dura law was passed by El Salvador’s Congress in 2003, followed
by a Super Mano Dura package of anti-gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms outlawed gang
membership, enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected gang members, and stiffened
penalties for convicted gang members. Similarly, in July 2003, Honduras enacted a penal code
amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of up to 12 years in prison for gang
membership. Changes in legislation have been accompanied by the increasing use of joint
military and police patrols to round-up gang suspects. Guatemala introduced similar legislation in
2003, but the legislation never passed. Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched periodic
law enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members.
What Have Been the Effects of Mano Dura Policies?
Mano Dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they
were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about their
potential infringements on civil liberties and human rights. Early public reactions to the tough
anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely positive, supported by
media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members. Tony Saca was
elected to the presidency of El Salvador largely on the basis of his promises to further crack down
on gangs and crime. Mano Dura enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected gang
members, including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid 2004 and late 2005. In
addition, according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released,
gang detainees provided law enforcement officials with invaluable sources of intelligence
information that those officials have since used to design better anti-gang strategies.40
Despite the early apparent benefits of Mano Dura policies, effects on gangs and crime have been
largely disappointing. This may be because a large percentage of violent crime in Central
America is not actually gang related. Six years after the implementation of mano dura policies, it
has become apparent that
40
41
•
Violent crime remains at extremely elevated levels in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, making them among the most violent countries in the world.
•
Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions have been subsequently
released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime. Salvadoran police
estimated that more than 10,000 of 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in
2005 were later released.41
•
Some youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement have been
recruited into the gang life while in prison.
U.S. Department of State, INL, “Regional Gang Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action,” July 1, 2008.
“Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released,” EFE News Service, December 27, 2005.
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•
Gang roundups have exacerbated prison overcrowding and inter-gang violence
within the prisons has resulted in several inmate deaths.
•
There have been credible reports that extrajudicial youth killings by vigilante
groups have continued since mano dura went into effect, including alleged
assassinations of gang suspects and gang deportees from the United States.
•
Finally, in response to mano dura, gangs are changing their behavior to avoid
detection.
Alternative Approaches
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety of
programs to deal with the gang problem. In Panama, the Ministry of Social Development, in
coordination with other government entities and several NGOs, administers gang prevention
programs, as well as a program to provide job training and rehabilitation services to former gang
members. In 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a $22.7 million loan
to Panama to fund that and other programs aimed at preventing youth violence in four of the
country’s largest municipalities. Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention
strategy that, with the active involvement of the police, focuses on family, school, and community
interventions. With support from other countries and NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police’s
Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang activities a month. The Ministry of the
Interior is administering a five-year program, which is supported by funding from the IDB, to
target at-risk youth in 11 different municipalities. While less is known about Costa Rica’s gang
prevention efforts, the country has adopted a prison model based on rehabilitation. As of 2006,
some 33% of prisoners in Costa Rica studied and 70% worked, primarily in agriculture.42
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
In the last few years, Central American leaders, including those from the “northern triangle
countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, towards more comprehensive antigang approaches. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President Tony Saca opened a summit
of the Central America Integration System by stating that the gang problem had shown the
importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most important element of those efforts
being prevention. 43 All of the Central American countries have created institutional bodies to
design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units within their national police
forces engaged in prevention efforts. In general, however, government-sponsored gang prevention
programs have tended, with some exceptions, to be small-scale, ad-hoc, and underfunded.
Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals
seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs.
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing
concerns, such as drug trafficking, as major factors limiting their ability to implement more
42
Bernardo Kliksberg, “Mitos y Realidades Sobre la Criminalidad en América Latina: Algunas Anotaciones
Estratégicas Cómo Enfrentarla y Mejorar la Cohesión Social,” Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de
Administración y Políticas Públicas,” 2007.
43
“Centroamérica Revisa Estrategias Para Luchar Contra Pandillas,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2007.
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extensive prevention and rehabilitation programs. Experts have asserted, however, that it is
important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to
leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also
critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.44
Research has shown that successful anti-gang efforts involve governments working in close
collaboration with civil society, the private sector, churches, mayors, and international donors in
order to leverage limited public resources. 45 In fact, many successful anti-gang programs have
developed as a result of community-driven efforts to respond to particular problems which are
then supported by capacity-building programs for leaders from those communities. Although
these types of programs may benefit from financial contributions from local and/or national
governments, they may also need non-financial support, including “training, information sharing,
leadership, or simply the provision of a dedicated space for programming or meetings.”46
Regional and Multilateral Efforts
Central American Integration System (SICA)
Some analysts maintain that the emergence of gangs as a regional security threat has led the
Central American countries to “engage in unprecedented forms of regional cooperation.”47 For the
last several years, Central American leaders and officials have regularly met, often accompanied
by their U.S. and Mexican counterparts, to discuss ways to coordinate security and informationsharing on gang members and other criminal groups. Most of these regional security meetings
have been organized by the Security Commission of the Central American Integration System
(SICA).48 The leaders of the SICA members states and the President-elect of Mexico began
developing a regional security strategy in October 2006, which was subsequently adopted at a
summit held in August 2007.49 The strategy identifies eight threats to regional security, including
organized crime, drug trafficking, deportees with criminal records, gangs, homicide, small arms
trafficking, terrorism, and corruption. In the strategy, the leaders vow to: designate transnational
gang liaison offices in each country that will compile and share information, conduct joint
investigations, and establish a regional database on gangs.
Up until this point, however, most regional anti-gang cooperation has occurred on a declarative,
rather than an operational level. At least one youth violence prevention project is now being
implemented by the Secretariat, based in El Salvador, in cooperation with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). 50 SICA has estimated that the costs to implement its
44
Kliksberg, 2007.
USAID Gang Assessment, 2006; José Miguel Cruz, Street Gangs in Central America, San Salvador: UCA Editors,
2007.
46
See the section by Caterina Gowis Roman in “Daring to Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang
Violence in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States, WOLA, October
2008.
47
Ibid.
48
The Central American Integration System (SICA) is a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador that is
comprised by the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts.
49
A copy of the strategy is available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm.
50
USAID, “Press Release: USAID-SICA Regional Youth Alliance Offices Inaugurated,” April 9, 2008, available at
(continued...)
45
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regional security plan could exceed $953 million, including $60 million for anti-gang efforts.51
Some observers think that more regional anti-gang cooperation is possible, but others predict that
political differences among Central American governments and instability in particular countries
is likely to inhibit future efforts.
Organization of American States (OAS)
On June 7, 2005, the OAS passed a resolution to hold conferences and workshops on the gang
issue and to urge member states to support the creation of holistic solutions to the gang problem.
In the past four years, the OAS has hosted meetings and conferences on the gang problem in
Latin America and conducted a study on how to define and classify the types of gangs operating
in the region. On June 5, 2007 the OAS General Assembly passed a resolution to promote
hemispheric cooperation in confronting criminal gangs that instructs the General Assembly to
support country anti-gang efforts and the Permanent Council to create a contact group of member
states concerned about the gang issue. On January 12, 2008, the OAS Permanent Council held a
special session devoted to the problem of criminal gangs.
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV)
The IACPV is a multilateral group formed in 2000 to promote prevention as a viable way of
addressing crime and violence in Latin America. IACPV member organizations include the OAS,
World Bank, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), USAID, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The IACPV has helped
municipalities in Central America develop violence prevention plans, developed a user-friendly
violence indicators document, hosted a major conference on gang prevention, and provided
technical and financial assistance to help form a counterpart organization within the region, the
Central American Coalition for the Prevention of Youth Violence.
Multilateral Development Banks and Donor Agencies
The U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the IDB, and the World Bank are some of the
multilateral donors involved in supporting violence reduction and anti-gang programs in Central
America. UNDP, for its part, has supported small arms control; police reform; violence reduction;
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Central America. UNDP has also
conducted research projects on the costs of violence in El Salvador, as well as a comprehensive
regional study published in October 2009 on security challenges facing Central America. The
IDB has executed significant violence reduction loans in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Panama. On May 24, 2007, the IDB, in coordination with UNODC and the OAS, hosted a
seminar in Washington, DC, on crime and violence in Central America. The World Bank has
produced analytical studies, with a particular emphasis on identifying best practices in reducing
crime and violence; introduced crime and violence prevention components into existing Bank(...continued)
http://www.usaid.gov/sv/pressreleases/2008-009_Inauguration%20of%20USAIDSICA%20Regional%20Youth%20Alliance%20Offices.pdf.
51
SICA General Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Drafting Proposals to Finance Central American
Security, May 13-14, 2008.
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Gangs in Central America
funded projects in urban areas; and developed a program to give small grants to community-based
violence prevention initiatives.
U.S. Policy
In recent years, Administration officials and Members of Congress have expressed ongoing
concerns about gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United
States. In September 2009 congressional testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that
“criminal gangs ... are of increasing concern for domestic and international law enforcement ...
[and that] the MS-13 [in particular] continues to expand its influence in the United States.”52 U.S.
officials are striving to coordinate anti-gang initiatives on both the domestic and international
fronts, taking into account their likely impacts on domestic security, on the one hand, and on
foreign relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico, on the other.
Congressional Interest
Congress has expressed increasing concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest
in the effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. In the 110th Congress, interest in the
topic of gangs and violence in Central America included concerns about the unintended
consequences of mano dura policies, the relationship between gangs and drug cartels, and the
effects of U.S. deportation policy on the gang problem. On October 2, 2007, the House passed
H.Res. 564 (Engel) supporting expanded cooperation between the United States and Central
America to combat crime and violence.
During its first session, the 110th Congress also enacted the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, P.L. 110-161, which included $7.9 million in global INCLE funding for the State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) anti-gang programs. In
October 2007, the Bush Administration proposed the Mérida Initiative, a new anticrime and
counterdrug program for Mexico and Central America. During its second session, the 110th
Congress considered the proposal, eventually appropriating $60 million for the Central America
portion of the Mérida Initiative in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, (P.L. 110-252).
As compared to the Bush Administration’s budget request, Congress shifted the bulk of Mérida
funding for anti-gang programs from law enforcement to institution building, rule of law, and
development programs.
The 111th Congress appropriated another $5 million in global INCLE funding for INL efforts in
Central America, as well as $100 million in Mérida funding for the region in the FY2009
Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) in March 2009, including $12 million for ESDF
programs. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $7 million in global INCLE funds
for INL programs in Central America, as well as $100 million for the Central American portion of
the Mérida Initiative. The House-passed version of the FY2010 State Department/Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, H.R. 3081, would provide $8 million in global INCLE funds for
anti-gang efforts. It would also provide $83 million for a new Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI). The Senate Appropriation Committees’ version of the bill, S. 1434, would
52
Testimony by Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 16, 2009.
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provide $90 million to Central America through the existing Mérida framework. Congress is
likely to exercise oversight over the implementation of the Mérida Initiative, and may also help
influence the design of whatever follow-on program is proposed for the region in President
Obama’s FY2011 budget request.
U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts
For at least the last five years, several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law
enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. In 2004, the FBI
created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information-sharing and intelligence-gathering among
U.S. and Central American law enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security created a national antigang initiative called “Operation Community Shield.” In addition to arresting suspected gang
members in the United States, ICE began working more closely with its offices overseas to
coordinate with foreign governments also experiencing gang problems. Since February 2005, ICE
has arrested more than 2,572 suspected MS-13 members in the United States.53 Also in 2005, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) undertook a comprehensive assessment of
the gang problem in Central America and Mexico. In that assessment, USAID found that while a
few U.S. programs addressed some aspects of the gang phenomenon, several new initiatives
would be needed in the areas of prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation/reintegration.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, an inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S.
Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at
a July 18, 2007 U.S.-SICA summit on security issues.54 The strategy acknowledged that, based on
previous U.S. and regional experiences, future anti-gang efforts should be holistic,
comprehensive, and regional in scope. It called for active engagement with governments in the
region, the OAS, and the SICA. The strategy stated that the U.S. government will pursue
coordinated anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement,
capacity enhancement, and prevention. Selected current initiatives by U.S. agencies to implement
the international components of that strategy are discussed below.
State Department
Over the last several years, the State Department’s INL Bureau has provided training and
technical assistance to law enforcement officials throughout Central America, sponsored antigang workshops at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)55 in San Salvador, and
implemented a “model precinct” to improve policing and police-community relations in
Villanueva, Guatemala. Some initial funding for these programs came from $16 million in
unspent Andean Counterdrug Program funds that were reprogrammed in September 2007 to
support INL’s drug interdiction operations, anti-gang efforts, and demand reduction initiatives in
53
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), “ICE Arrests More Than 1,780 During the Largest-Ever
Nationwide Gang Surge,” October 16, 2009.
54
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico,” July 18, 2007.
55
The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional law
enforcement training academies funded by the State Department’s INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers
training and technical assistance to law enforcement officials from throughout Latin America. In 2009, the ILEA
conducted five anti-gang courses.
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Central America. Since FY2008, INL programs have also been funded by a line item in the
Foreign Operations budget designated for “Criminal Youth Gangs.” Funding for this program
totaled $7.9 million in FY2008 and an estimated $5 million in FY2009.
In January 2008, INL sent a Regional Gang Advisor to El Salvador to coordinate its Central
American gang programs. In July 2008, that Advisor produced a detailed assessment of the gang
problem in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala and a work plan focusing on six key areas:
investigative capacity, legal capacity, intelligence capacity, community policing, prevention, and
prisons. Since that time, the Regional Gang Advisor has initiated country and regional prevention
activities, sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for police and prison officers from across
the region, taught an ILEA anti-gang course, and identified sites for community policing
programs to be established in El Salvador and Honduras.56
Additionally, the Department of State, which is charged with coordinating the implementation of
the Administration’s Mérida Initiative in Central America, has identified gangs as one of the
critical threats facing the citizens of Central America, and has allocated resources accordingly to
the Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development to enable these
implementing agencies to counter the impact of gangs in the region.
Department of Justice
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve
the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share
intelligence on gang suspects. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance,
and Training (OPDAT) has also provided some training on prosecuting gang-related cases to
judicial officials in the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosive (ATF) Regional Advisor to San Salvador will also enable ATF to support transnational
gang investigations involving U.S. origin firearms. Many FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are
supported by the Mérida Initiative or other State Department funding and are carried out in
collaboration with INL. Recent programs include
56
•
Central American Fingerprinting Exploitation (CAFÉ): a criminal
file/fingerprint retrieval initiative that has incorporated more than 72,000 finger
prints from gang members from Mexico, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and
Guatemala into the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
since 2006. The data are accessible to Central American police officials. FY2009
Mérida funding will be used to expand this program to all countries in the region.
•
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Units: a program that began in El Salvador in
October 2007 involving the creation of vetted police units that work with FBI
agents stationed in San Salvador on investigating gang-related cases. TAG
activities are being expanded into Guatemala with FY2009 Mérida funding, and
further expansion into Honduras is expected to occur once the political situation
in that country permits renewed levels of U.S.-Honduran law enforcement
cooperation.
•
Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE): a joint FBI/INL
program that recently began to bring law enforcement officials from Central
U.S. Department of State, INL, “FY2010 Program and Budget Guide.”
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America together with their counterparts from several large U.S. cities to share
information and intelligence.
•
Repatriation-Criminal History Information Program (CHIP): a joint
FBI/ICE, Mérida Initiative-funded program to provide more complete criminal
history information on U.S. deportees to Central American law enforcement
officials in receiving countries. CHIP will begin in El Salvador in 2010, and then
be expanded to Guatemala and Honduras.57
USAID
USAID has provided $2.8 million for a regional anti-gang program cosponsored by SICA, known
as the “Regional Youth Alliance USAID-SICA.” The program, which began in April 2008,
involves: 1) the creation of public-private partnerships to support prevention and rehabilitation
programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador; 2) an assessment of the juvenile justice
systems in each of those countries followed by efforts to reform those systems; and, 3)
collaborating with SICA to evaluate each of these initiatives and to create and implement new
policy responses. As part of its efforts to sponsor community-based programs, the Regional Youth
Alliance aims to provide 45 sub-grants to local NGOs in targeted communities, many of which
are offering computer-based job training to at-risk youth. Those sub-grants aim to reach some 300
community leaders and 3,000 youth.
USAID is also implementing country and regional anti-gang programs with support from the
Mérida Initiative Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) for Central America that was
created by P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act. With ESDF funding,
USAID plans to support Community Action Fund (CAF) activities that provide at-risk youth in
high-crime communities with basic or secondary education and job training. CAF activities will
be modeled after the Regional Youth Alliance program. USAID will also support Community
Crime and Gang Prevention Programs (CCGP) that focus on strengthening the role of local
governments in developing citizen security and anti-gang programs. ESDF will also fund
community policing activities.
One problem currently being encountered in the region relates to the timely delivery of funds for
anti-gang programs. For instance, many Mérida-funded efforts are just getting underway, as
FY2008 supplemental funding did not arrive to most of the USAID Missions in Central America
until August 2009. Mérida programs in Honduras have yet to begin because of the termination of
some USAID assistance to that country in the wake of President Manuel Zelaya’s ouster in late
June 2009.
Policy Approaches and Concerns
Most policy-makers agree that finding regional solutions to the gang problem is essential. Many
also concur that in order to effectively reduce gang-related crime, a holistic approach to the
problem must be developed that addresses its root social, political, and economic causes. There is
57
FBI Press Release, “United Against MS-13; Our Central American Partnerships,” November 10, 2009. For
information on Mérida funding for these programs, see U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Spending Plan: Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008, and
FY2009 Spending Plan: Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, August 13, 2009.
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disagreement, however, over the proper level and combination of preventive and suppressive
policies that should be used in Central America to address the gang problem and over what U.S.
agency is best equipped to oversee those efforts.
Debates regarding the relative merits of prevention and suppression methods reemerged when the
110th Congress considered the Bush Administration’s FY2008 supplemental budget request for
the Mérida Initiative. As previously mentioned, Congress increased funding for rule of law,
prevention, and development programs and reduced funding for some police training and
equipment programs as compared to the budget request. It did so by earmarking $25 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund
(ESDF) for Central America. Congress also increased the amount of funds appropriated to
USAID vis-à-vis INL and other law enforcement agencies by stipulating that of the FY2008 ESF
funds provided, $20 million are to be administered by USAID. The 111th Congress included
another $12 million for the ESDF in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) to
support USAID programs in violence-prone communities.
Proponents of law enforcement solutions maintain that Central American law enforcement
officials lack the capacity and resources to target gang leaders effectively, share data, and conduct
thorough investigations that lead to successful prosecutions. In addition to supporting specialized
anti-gang units, the Mérida Initiative seeks to address these issues by providing funding for police
training to build investigative capacity and communications equipment for police forces. The
Initiative does not include funds to support large-scale police reform, even though corruption
within law enforcement is a major obstacle to current anti-gang efforts. It does, however, aim to
improve police-community relations, which have been very poor in many communities, through
support for community policing programs modeled after the successful U.S.-funded program in
Villanueva, Guatemala.
While most U.S. observers argue that the State Department and FBI should take the lead in
assistance to improve law enforcement capacity, others see a possible role for the U.S. Southern
Command in training regional security forces.58 In recent years, the U.S. Southern Command has
taken a leading role in discussing the problem of citizen security in Central America, both within
the U.S. inter-agency community and with Central American officials. Critics of U.S. military
involvement in anti-gang efforts have noted that it is the State Department’s role to provide
security assistance to foreign governments, subject to human rights and democracy concerns.
They have expressed satisfaction that the Mérida Initiative emphasizes regional cooperation by
civilian agencies on public security issues through the U.S.-SICA dialogue, with no explicit role
established for the U.S. Southern Command or the region’s militaries.59
Based on the experiences of cities throughout the United States, proponents of more preventionbased interventions argue that localities that provide social services to at-risk youth have been
more effective in preventing gang violence than those that have relied only on law enforcement
approaches. 60 These findings mirror the results of several studies previously cited in this report
58
The only military component in the Administration’s proposal for Mérida was the $21 million requested in FY2009
to support Enduring Friendship, a Department of Defense program to provide naval equipment to Central American
countries so that they can work with the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy on maritime drug interdiction efforts.
59
U.S. Department of State, Office of Language Services Translating Division, “Not All That is Gold Glitters and Not
All That Glitters is Gold,” by Joel Fyke and Maureen Myer, March 2008, originally published in Foreign Affairs en
Español, Vol. 8, No. 1.
60
“Gang Wars,” Justice Policy Institute, Washington, DC, July 2007.
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that focus on reducing gang violence in Central America. As a result, human rights groups urged
Congress to include more of an emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation in the Mérida Initiative
than the Bush Administration had originally proposed. 61 As previously stated, Congress increased
funding for prevention programs, as well as economic and social development programs, in the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) and the FY2009 Omnibus Act (P.L.
111-8).
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
61
“Memo: The Merida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central America,” Washington Office on Latin
America, March 2008.
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