Order Code RS21968
Updated September 25October 22, 2008
Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues
to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is
expressing optimismoptimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern
new provincial
elections to be held in early 2009, will heal remaining rifts and continue
to reducesustain recent reductions in violence. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004.
In line with a March 8, 2004,
“Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL), the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005,
for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
executive), four-year term
provincial councils in all 18 provinces (41 seats per council;
51 for Baghdad), and a
Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was
proportional representation ( proportional
representation/closed list): voters chose among “political entities” (a party,
a coalition of
parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine
were multi-party were multiparty coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted,
winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on Baghdad’sthe Baghdad provincial council. Radical Shiite
cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction
under-represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions — Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader
Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president,
a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting
committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as
CRS-2
full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing
CRS-2
for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main source”
of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which
courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory
(Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme
court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much
discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation
authority authority
(Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126),
and and
established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with its size and
powers to be determined by subsequent law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes — still unresolved — centered on regional versus centralized
power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous
“regions” — reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117 allows “regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding
the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central
government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries.
Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons
legislation — Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas deposits, and
favor centralized control of oil revenues. The Kurds want to maintain maximum control
of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a postDecember 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005 elections for a fouryear government (in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL), each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR) —
a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won
additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political
“entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing. As shown in the table, voters
chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged
dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but wrangling ensued and
Kurdish and other opposition caused the main Shiite bloc, thepolitical infighting caused
the Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance”
(UIA) to agree to to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On
April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue
as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the ConsensusAccord Front (Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Consensus
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue
Council party), is COR
speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
(including himself and two
deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National
Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006,
due to infighting. Of the 37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1
Christian. Four were women.
Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial Elections
The 2005 elections did not resolve the grievances in Iraq’s communities over their
new positions in the post-Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration
and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might
achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on eighteen political and security benchmarks —
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15, 2007
— were required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) to Iraq. The President used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an
assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks
have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
The Administration, as expressed in the April 8 and 9, 2008, testimony of U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and a May 2008 informal, non-mandated
Administration update on progress on the benchmarks, saw movement toward
reconciliation, facilitated by a reduction in violence attributed largely to the U.S. “troop
surge.” The February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two
significant laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national budget
represented breakthroughs, although U.S. officials say that the effects will depend on
implementation. However, other assessments, including a June 2008 study by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-837) say that these legislative moves have
had limited effect in healing the rifts in Iraqi politics.
The Administration is counting on new provincial elections, which were planned for
October 1, 2008, to continue the progress seen in 2008, particularly in the dramatic
reduction in Sunni-Shiite violence. Those elections have been delayed by Kurdish
restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the Kurdish
controlled region. The dispute caused a presidential veto of the July 22, 2008 COR vote
on the election law needed to hold provincial elections; the draft law provided for equal
division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is
finally resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition and subsequent communal strife in Kirkuk
city. However, the blocs agreed to put aside the Kirkuk dispute and passed a provincial
election law on September 24, 2008, providing for the provincial elections by January 31,
2009. The Administration believes that the elections will bring into the political structure
the tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who, along with their 100,000 “Sons of Iraq”
fighters, cooperate with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and help stabilize Sunni
regions. The Awakening Movement is likely to show strength at the expense of the
established Sunni parties currently in the COR.
Provincial elections could also move Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction firmly into political
competition and away from armed conflict against the mainstream Shiite parties. That
conflict surged in late March 2008, when Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) to Basra to defeat Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, militia, as well as militias from
CRS-4
the Fadhila Party, and Tharallah, in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with a
reported Iran-brokered ceasefire on March 30, 2008. Critics viewed the action as
Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of the provincial elections. Subsequently,
Basra and environs have been mostly normalized, Sunnis and Kurds rallied to support
Maliki. Sadr has announced he would not field a separate election list but instead support
Sadrists on other lists, and he has recast the JAM as a social and cultural movement.
Maliki’s growing perceived strength has helped him rebuild his government. The
pullout of the Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi in 2007 left the cabinet with about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet.
The return of the Consensus Front to the cabinet and the simultaneous filling of former
Sadrist cabinet seats with independent Shiites in July 2008, leaves the cabinet with only
one vacancy (ministry of Justice). All blocs are participating in the COR. At the same
time, Administration officials and outside experts are concerned that Maliki’s new
confidence could lead to reversals, for example by refusing to integrate the Sons of Iraq,
and by demanding a timetable for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq as part of a U.S.-Iraq
strategic agreement said to be in the final stages of negotiationAs of October 2008, citing the achievement of almost all of the major legislative
benchmarks – and the dramatic drop in sectarian-motivate violence attributed to the U.S.
“troop surge” – the Bush Administration asserts that political reconciliation is well under
way. However, U.S. officials say the extent and durability of reconciliation will largely
depend on the degree of implementation of the adopted laws. The legislative progress
achieved a breakthrough on February 13, 2008 with passage (unanimously, with 206
members voting) of an amnesty law, the provincial powers law, and the 2008 national
budget. However, a June 2008 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO-08837) said the legislative moves have had limited effect in healing the rifts in Iraqi politics.
The Administration is placing significant weight on new provincial elections to
continue the reconciliation progress. Provincial councils in Iraq (each has 41 seats, except
Baghdad which has 51) choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in
each province, making them powerful bodies. The elections were planned for October 1,
2008, but are delayed because Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other
disputed territories into their region caused a presidential veto of the July 22, 2008
election law needed to hold these elections. The draft law provided for equal division of
power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally
resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any weakening of their dominance in Kirkuk.
Following the summer COR recess, the major political blocs agreed to put aside the
Kirkuk dispute and passed a revised provincial election law on September 24, 2008,
providing for the elections by January 31, 2009. The Administration believes that the
elections will bring into the political structure the tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”)
who, along with their 100,000 “Sons of Iraq” fighters, cooperate with U.S. forces against
Al Qaeda in Iraq. These Sunnis are likely to show strength at the expense of the
established Sunni parties. However, the revised law stripped out provisions in the vetoed
version to allot 13 total reserved seats (spanning six provinces) to the Christian, Yazidi,
and Shabek minorities. Attacks on Christians in the area of Mosul, possibly motivated by
the revision of the law, contributed to an exodus of Christians from northern Iraq and to
assessments of continued fragility in Iraq’s political and security situation.
It is also hoped that new provincial elections will move Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction
firmly away from armed conflict against the mainstream Shiite parties. That conflict
surged in late March 2008, when Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to
CRS-4
Basra to defeat Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, militia in that oil export hub. Basra
fighting ended with a ceasefire on March 30, 2008, and the city has now quieted. Critics
viewed the action as Maliki’s attempts to weaken Sadr in advance of the provincial
elections. Sadr has announced he would not field a separate list in the provincial elections
but support Sadrists on other lists.
Maliki’s growing perceived strength has helped him rebuild his government, but has
caused some adverse consequences. The pullout of the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and
the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi in 2007 left the cabinet with about 13
vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet. The return of the Accord Front to the cabinet and the
simultaneous filling of former Sadrist cabinet seats with independent Shiites in July 2008,
leaves the cabinet with only one vacancy (ministry of Justice). At the same time,
Administration officials are concerned that Maliki’s growing independence from the
United States could lead to reversals, for example by creating restiveness among the Sons
of Iraq fighters in his refusal to integrate them into the Iraqi Security Forces. Maliki also
has demanded substantial U.S. concessions in a U.S.-Iraq “status of forces agreement”
(SOFA) that has been negotiated and is now under consideration in the Iraqi cabinet.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total:
Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote.
Iraq ConsensusAccord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7);
independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. 2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million
in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/
December: 75% (12 million).
CRS-5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
1. Forming Constitutional Review
Committee (CRC) and completing review
July 12
Admin.
Report
(S)
satisfactory
unmet
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
S
2. Enacting and implementing laws on
De-Baathification
(U)
unsatisfact.
unmet
S
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws
that ensure equitable distribution of
resources
U
unmet
U
4. Enacting and implementing laws to
form semi-autonomous regions
S
partly met
S
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law
to establish a higher electoral
commission, (b) provincial elections law;
(c) a law to specify authorities of
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for
provincial elections
S on (a)
and U on
the others
overall
unmet; (a)
met
S on (a) and
(c)
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions
do
not
a l l o w
rating
conditions
do
not
allow rating
unmet
Same as
July
unmet
Same as
July
Benchmark
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
militia disarmamentno rating
unmet
Same as
July
Benchmark
GAO
(Sept. 07)
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration report, June
2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and
U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional powers and
presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing amendments.
Sunnis want presidential council to have enhanced powers relative to prime minister.
Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for final recommendations
repeatedly extended, now beyond latest May 2008 deadline.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth
ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would
would receive pensions. But, could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists
and to firing
of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars
ex-Saddam
security personnel from regaining jobs. Some reports suggest some De-Baathification
DeBaathification officials using the new law to purge political enemies or settle old
scores.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes; only
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and 2008
2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds and central
central government set up commission to resolve remaining disputes; U.S. Embassy
says it
expects near-term progress on revenue sharing law (an implementing law).
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of
provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs agreed
agreed that law would take effect April 2008. August 2008: petition being circulated among
among some Basra residents (another way to start forming a region) to begin process of
of converting Basra province into a single province “region.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008, took
effect April 2008. Election law required to implement elections adopted September 24,
2008. Puts aside issue of
took effect April 2008. Required implementing election law adopted September 24,
2008: (1) Provides for provincial elections by January 31, 2009; (2) postpones
elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces; (3) shunts broader issue of status of
Kirkuk and disputed territories to a parliamentary committee
to issue report by March 31, 2009. Provides for provincial elections by January 31,
2009; closed list voting; 25% quota for women on the councils; no elections in Kirkuk
or the three KRG provinces; no religious symbols on ballots; and no set aside seats for
Christian and other to report on the issue by
March 31, 2009; (4) provides open list/proportional representation voting, which
allows voting for individual candidates; (5) stipulates 25% quota for women; (6) bans
religious symbols on ballots; (7) does not set aside seats for Christian. Yazidi, and
Shabek minorities. About 4 months preparation (registration, candidate
vetting, ballot
distribution) needed to implement election; registration updating begun.
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February
13,
2008. Of 17,000 approved for release (mostly Sunnis and Sadrist Shiites), about 1,600
released to date by slow judicial process. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. not affected.
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move against
militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
CRS-6
met
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
met
S
partly met
S
U
unmet
Mixed: S to
pursue
extremists U
on political
interference
U
unmet
S
partly met
S
o n
military, U
on police
S
Mixed. S
on (a); U
on (b)
unmet
same as July
12
S
met
S
U
unmet
U
16. Ensuring protection of minority
parties in COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion
in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction.
S
met
S
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent. Another $22
billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget, including August 2008 supplemental portion.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
making false accusations against ISF
members
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
Benchmark
only a
few hundred released to date. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. not affected.
CRS-6
8. Establishing political, media,
economic, and services committee to
support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready
brigades to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
authorities to make decisions, without
political intervention, to pursue all
extremists, including Sunni insurgents
and Shiite militias
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
providing even-handed enforcement of
law
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in
Baghdad will not provide a safe haven
for any outlaw, regardless of sectarian
affiliationno matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and
(b) eliminating militia control of local
security
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of
operating independently
July 12
Admin.
Report
S
GAO
(Sept. 07)
S
met
met
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration report, June
2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and
U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move against
militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
S
partly met
S
No change. Eight brigades assigned to assist the surge. Surge now ended.
U
unmet
S to pursue
extremists U
on political
interference
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in
Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF - favoring Shiites.
Still, some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past year, the commander
of the National Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian or politically-motivated
behavior, and Ministry of Interior said to have been purged of sectarian administrators
and their bodyguards. Increasing number of Sunnis now in command jobs.
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law evenhandedly, but acknowledges continued militia influence and infiltration in some units.
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and ethno-sectarian
violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.But, National Police said to
include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago.
U
unmet
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law evenhandedly, but acknowledges continued militia influence and infiltration in some units.
S
partly met
S on
military, U
on police
S
Mixed. S
on (a); U
on (b)
unmet
same as July
12
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of
operating independently
S
met
S
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but Shiite militias still hold arms. 103,000 Sunni
“Sons of Iraq,” still distrusted as potential Sunni militiamen. Iraq government assumes
assumed payment of 54,000 Sons as of October 1, but opposes integrating more than
about 20%
into the ISF.
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operating, more than the 33 planned.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable to secure
Iraq internally until 2009-2012; and against external threats not for several years
thereafter. Basra operation initially exposed continued factionalism and poor leadership
in
U
unmet
U
16. Ensuring protection of minority
parties in COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion
in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction.
S
met
S
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent. Another
$22 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget, including August 2008 supplemental portion.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
making false accusations against ISF
members
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
Benchmark
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
militia disarmament
July 12
Admin.
Report
no rating
GAO
(Sept. 07)
unmet
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
Same as
July
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and ethnosectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable to
secure Iraq internally until 2009-2012; and against external threats not for several
years thereafter. Basra operation initially exposed factionalism and poor leadership in
ISF, but also ability to rapidly deploy.
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.