Order Code RL33534
China’s Economic Conditions
Updated August 7September 16, 2008
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
China’s Economic Conditions
Summary
Since the initiation of economic reforms in 1979, China has become one of the
world’s fastest-growing economies. From 1979 to 2007 China’s real gross domestic
product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 9.8%. Real GDP grew 11.4% in
2007 (the fastest annual growth since 1994). While China is expected to continue to
enjoy rapid economic growth in the years ahead and could become the world’s largest
economy within a decade or so, it faces a number of challenges, including
widespread government corruption, an inefficient banking system, over-dependence
on exports and fixed investment for growth, pollution, widening income disparities,
and growing inflationary pressures, to name a few. The Chinese government has
indicated that it intends, over the coming years, to create a “harmonious society” that
would promote more balanced economic growth and address a number of economic
and social issues.
Trade and foreign investment continues to play a major role in China’s booming
economy. From 2004 to 2007, the value of total Chinese merchandise trade nearly
doubled. In 2007, China’s exports (at $1,218 billion) exceeded U.S. exports (1,162
billion) for the first time. China’s imports were $956 billion and its trade surplus was
$262 billion (a historic high). Well over half of China’s trade is conducted by
foreign firms operating in China. The combination of large trade surpluses, foreign
direct investment flows, and large-scale purchases of foreign currency have helped
make China the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at $1.5 trillion
at the end 2007.
China’s economy continues to be a concern to many U.S. policymakers. On the
one hand, U.S. consumers, exporters, and investors have greatly benefitted from
China’s rapid economic and trade growth. On the other hand, the surge in Chinese
exports to the United States has put competitive pressures on various U.S. industries.
Many U.S. policymakers have argued that China often does not play by the rules
when it comes to trade and they have called for greater efforts to pressure China to
fully implement its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and to change
various economic policies deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests, such as its
currency policy, its use of subsidies to support state-owned firms, trade and
investment barriers to U.S. goods and services, and failure to ensure the safety of its
exports to the United States. Concerns have also been raised over China’s rising
demand for energy and raw materials, its impact on world prices for such
commodities, increased pollution levels, and efforts China has made to invest in
energy and raw materials around the world, including countries (such as Iran and
Sudan) where the United States has political and human rights concerns.
This report provides an overview of China’s economic development, challenges
China faces to maintain growth, and the implications of China’s rise as a major
economic power for the United States. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
An Overview of China’s Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Introduction of Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
China’s Economic Growth Since Reforms: 1979-Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Causes of China’s Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Foreign Direct Investment in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
China’s Trade Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
China’s Major Trading Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Major Chinese Trade Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
China’s Growing Appetite for Imported Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
China’s Growing Overseas Direct Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Major Long-Term Challenges Facing the Chinese Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Outlook for China’s Economy and Implications for the United States . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix 1. China’s Growing Economic Ties with Africa, North Korea,
and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
China-Africa Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
China’s Imports From Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
China’s Mineral Fuel Imports From Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
China’s Exports to Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
China’s Trade with North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
China’s Trade With Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
List of Tables
Table 1. China’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth: 1960-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. Comparisons of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese GDP and Per Capita GDP
in Nominal U.S. Dollars and PPP, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3. Major Foreign Investors in China: 1979-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 4. Foreign Direct Investment by Sectors in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 5. China’s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 6. China’s Major Trading Partners: 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 7. Top 10 Chinese Exports: 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 8. Top 10 Chinese Imports: 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 9. Top 10 Destinations for China’s Overseas Direct Investment: 2005 . . 16
Table 10. Top Five African Sources of Chinese Imports: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . 22
Table 11. Top Five Chinese Imports from Africa: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 12.
Table 13.
Table 14.
Table 15.
Table 16.
Top Five African Suppliers of Mineral Fuel to China: 2007 . . . . . . . 23
China’s Top Five African Export Markets: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Top Five Chinese Exports to Africa: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Major Chinese Exports to North Korea: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Major Chinese Imports from North Korea: 2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
China’s Economic Conditions
The rapid rise of China as a major economic power within a time span of about
30 years is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories
in modern times. From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2007, China’s real
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of over 9.8%; in 2007,
it rose by 11.4%. The Chinese economy in 2007 (in real terms) was nearly 14 times
larger than it was in 1979, and real per capita GDP was more than 10 times larger.
By some measurements, China is now the world’s second largest economy and some
analysts predict it could become the largest within a few decades.
China’s economic rise has led to a substantial increase in U.S.-China economic
relations. Total trade between the two countries surged from $5 billion in 1980 to
$387 billion in 2007 (U.S. data). In 2007, China was the United States’ second
largest trading partner, its third largest export market, and its largest source of
imports. Many U.S. companies have extensive manufacturing operations in China
in order to sell their products in the booming Chinese market and to take advantage
of low cost labor for manufacturing products for export. These operations have
helped U.S. firms remain internationally competitive and have supplied U.S.
consumers with a variety of low cost goods. China’s large-scale purchases of U.S.
Treasury securities have enabled the federal government to fund its budget deficits
and keep U.S. interest rates relatively low.
However, the emergence of China as a major economic superpower has raised
concern among many U.S. policymakers. Some express concern over the large and
growing U.S. trade deficits with China, which rose from $10.4 billion in 1990 to
$256 billion in 2007, and are viewed by many Members as an indicator that U.S.Chinese commercial relations are imbalanced or unfair. Others claim that China uses
unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued currency and subsidies to domestic
producers) to flood U.S. markets with low cost goods, and that such practices
threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards. Congressional concerns over
perceived negative China’s economic practices have led to the introduction of
numerous bills in the 110th Congress, some of which would impose restrictions on
imported Chinese products.
Although most economists contend that China will continue to experience rapid
economic growth over the next several years, they note that it faces a number of
significant challenges, including a weak banking system, widening income gaps,
growing pollution, unbalanced economic growth (through over-reliance on exports),
and widespread economic efficiencies resulting from non-market policies.
This report provides background on China’s economic rise and current
economic structure and the challenges China faces to keep its economy growing
strong, and describes Chinese economic policies that are of concern to U.S.
policymakers.
CRS-2
Most Recent Developments
!
On August 8September 16, 2008, the Bank of China reported that the exchange
exchange rate between the Chinese Renminbi and the U.S. dollar
stood at 6.86,
82, an appreciation of 18.29% since China’s currency was
reformed in
July 2005. However, the exchange was 6.82 on July 29, 2008,
indicating that the Chinese government had (at least temporarily)
allowed its currency to depreciate against the dollar in part in order
to help Chinese exporters July 2005.
!
On September 11, 2008, the Chinese government reported that from
January to August 2008, exports and imports rose by 21.1% and
23.1%, respectively.
!
On August 6, 2008, the Chinese government reported that GDP grew
by 10.4% in the first half of 2008 over the same period in 2007. On
August 1, 2008, the government reported that foreign direct
investment in China had risen by 46% over the same period in 2007.
!
On July 28, 2008, the Chinese government announced that there
were 253 million internet users in China, a figure they claimed
exceeded the number of U.S. users.
!
On July 21, 2008, the government reported that the consumer price
index for January-June 2008 was had risen by 7.9% over the
previous year, raising concerns in China that inflation could threaten
future economic growth.1
!
On June 13, 2008, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency announced that, according to its estimates, China in 2007
became the world’s largest emitter of CO2, surpassing the United
States by 14%, and accounting for two-thirds of last year’s global
carbon dioxide increase.
!
On May 12, 2008, China’s Sichuan Province was struck by a strong
earthquake. The Chinese government estimated that (as of June 23,
2008) 69,181 people were killed, 374,171 injured, and 18,498 were
missing.
An Overview of China’s Economic Development
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms
Prior to 1979, China maintained a centrally planned, or command, economy.
A large share of the country’s economic output was directed and controlled by the
state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources
throughout most of the economy. During the 1950s, all of China’s individual
household farms were collectivized into large communes. To support rapid
industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale investments in
1
The CPI for 2007 was up 4.8% over the previous year (compared with 1.5% in 2006).
CRS-3
industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale investments in
physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly
three-fourths of industrial production was produced by centrally controlled stateowned enterprises according to centrally planned output targets. Private enterprises
and foreign-invested firms were nearly nonexistent. A central goal of the Chinese
government was to make China’s economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade
was generally limited to obtaining only those goods that could not be made or
obtained in China.
Government policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and
inefficient, mainly because there were few profit incentives for firms and farmers;
competition was virtually nonexistent, and price and production controls caused
widespread distortions in the economy. Chinese living standards were substantially
lower than those of many other developing countries. The Chinese government
hoped that gradual reform would significantly increase economic growth and raise
living standards.
The Introduction of Economic Reforms
Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms. The central
government initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them
to sell a portion of their crops on the free market. In addition, the government
established four special economic zones along the coast for the purpose of attracting
foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high technology products into
China. Additional reforms, which followed in stages, sought to decentralize
economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade. Economic control of
various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were
generally allowed to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under
the direction and guidance of state planning. Additional coastal regions and cities
were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed them to
experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract
foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were
gradually eliminated.
China’s Economic Growth Since Reforms: 1979-Present
Since the introduction of economic reforms, China’s economy has grown
substantially faster than during the pre-reform period (see Table 1). From 1960 to
1978, real annual GDP growth was estimated at 5.3% (a figure many analysts claim
is overestimated, based on several economic disasters that befell the country during
this time, such as the Great Leap Forward from 1958-1960 and the Cultural
Revolution from 1966-1976). During the reform period (1979-the present), China’s
average annual real GDP grew by 9.8%; it grew by an estimated 11.4% in 2007 over
the previous year. Since economic reforms were begun, the size of the economy in
real terms has increased 14-fold, and real per capita GDP (a common measurement
of living standards) has gone up 10-fold.2
2
Calculated by CRS from data in Global Insight’s Country Intelligence on China’s
Economy, Detailed Quarterly Forecast, January 2, 2008.(continued...)
CRS-4
Table 1. China’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth: 1960-2008
Time
Period
1960-1978 (pre-reform)
1979-2007 (post-reform)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
First half 2008
Average Annual
Growth (%)
5.3
9.8
3.8
9.3
14.2
14.0
13.1
10.9
10.0
9.3
7.8
7.6
8.4
8.3
9.1
10.0
10.1
9.9
11.1
11.4
11.4
Source: Official Chinese government data and Economist Intelligence Unit.
Causes of China’s Economic Growth
Economists generally attribute much of China’s rapid economic growth to two
main factors: large-scale capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and
foreign investment) and rapid productivity growth. These two factors appear to have
gone together hand in hand. Economic reforms led to higher efficiency in the
economy, which boosted output and increased resources for additional investment in
the economy.
China has historically maintained a high rate of savings. When reforms were
initiated in 1979, domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%. However,
most Chinese savings during this period were generated by the profits of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which were used by the central government for domestic
investment. Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic
production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings (these now
account for half of Chinese domestic savings). As a result, savings as a percentage
2
(...continued)
Economy, Detailed Quarterly Forecast, January 2, 2008.
CRS-5
of GDP has steadily risen; it reached nearly 50% in 2005, among the highest savings
rates in the world.
CRS-5
Several economists have concluded that productivity gains (i.e., increases in
efficiency in which inputs are used) were another major factor in China’s rapid
economic growth. The improvements to productivity were caused largely by a
reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors that were
formerly heavily controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and
services. For example, agricultural reforms boosted production, freeing workers to
pursue employment in the more productive manufacturing sector. China’s
decentralization of the economy led to the rise of nonstate enterprises, which tended
to pursue more productive activities than the centrally controlled SOEs.
Additionally, a greater share of the economy (mainly the export sector) was exposed
to competitive forces. Local and provincial governments were allowed to establish
and operate various enterprises on market principles, without interference from the
central government. In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in China brought
with it new technology and processes that boosted efficiency.
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy
The actual size of the China’s economy has been a subject of extensive debate
among economists. Measured in U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates, China’s
GDP in 2007 was $3.2 trillion; its per capita GDP (a commonly used living-standards
measurement) was $2,450. Such data would indicate that China’s economy and
living standards are significantly lower than those of the United States and Japan,
respectively considered to be the number-one and number-two largest economies (see
Table 2).
Many economists, however, contend that using nominal exchange rates to
convert Chinese data into U.S. dollars substantially underestimates the size of
China’s economy. This is because prices in China for many goods and services are
significantly lower than those in the United States and other developed countries.
Economists have attempted to factor in these price differentials by using a purchasing
power parity (PPP) measurement, which attempts to convert foreign currencies into
U.S. dollars on the basis of the actual purchasing power of such currency (based on
surveys of the prices of various goods and services) in each respective country. This
PPP exchange rate is then used to convert foreign economic data in national
currencies into U.S. dollars.
Because prices for many goods and services are significantly lower in China
than in the United States and other developed countries (while prices in Japan are
higher), the PPP exchange rate raises the estimated size of Chinese economy from
$3.2 trillion (nominal dollars) to $7.3 trillion (PPP dollars), significantly larger than
Japan’s GDP in PPPs ($4.3 trillion), and a little over half the size of the U.S.
economy. PPP data also raise China’s per capita GDP from $2,450 (nominal) to
$5,380. The PPP figures indicate that, while the size of China’s economy is
substantial, its living standards fall far below those of the U.S. and Japan. China’s
per capita GDP on a PPP basis was only 11.7% of U.S. levels. Thus, even if China’s
GDP were to overtake that of the United States in the next few decades, its living
CRS-6
standards would likely remain substantially below those of the United States for
many years to come.3
Table 2. Comparisons of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese GDP and
Per Capita GDP in Nominal U.S. Dollars and PPP, 2007
Nominal GDP
($ billions)
GDP in PPP
($ billions)
Nominal Per
Capita GDP
Per Capita
GDP in PPP
13,841
13,841
45,820
45,820
Japan
4,378
4,284
34,340
33,610
China
3,242
7,328
2,450
5,380
Country
United States
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (estimated, based on World Bank Data).
Foreign Direct Investment in China
China’s trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in foreign
direct investment (FDI), which has been a major source of China’s capital growth.
Annual utilized FDI in China (excluding the financial sector) grew from $636 million
in 1983 to $75 billion in 2007.4 The cumulative level of FDI in China at the end of
2007 stood at nearly $760 billion, making China one of the world’s largest
destinations of FDI.
Based on cumulative FDI for 1979-2007 about 40% of FDI in China has come
from Hong Kong, 9.7% from the British Virgin Islands,5 8.1% from Japan, and 7.4%
from the United States. (See Table 3).6 The United States was China’s fifth largest
3
In December 2007, the World Bank lowered its previous estimate of China’s 2005 GDP
on a PPP basis by 40% (to $5.3 trillion), based on price survey data supplied by the Chinese
government for the first time. The new PPP estimates are believed to be more accurate than
those made previously. See CRS Report RS22808, How Large is China’s Economy? Does
it Matter?, by Wayne M. Morrison and Michael F. Martin.
4
In 2005, China announced that previous year’s FDI data excluded investment in the
banking, insurance, and securities sectors. It henceforth began to report two overall FDI
figures: one that includes the financial sector and one that excludes it. China’s FDI
including the financial sector totaled $72.4 billion in 2005, $69.5 billion in 2006, and $82.7
billion in 2007. China does not include the financial sector in its country breakdown of FDI.
5
6
The British Virgin Islands is a large source of FDI because of its status as a tax haven.
Much of the FDI originating from the British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong may originate
from other foreign investors. For example, Taiwanese businesses are believed to invest in
China through other countries in order to circumvent government restrictions. In addition,
some Chinese investors might be using these locations to shift funds overseas in order to reinvest in China to take advantage of preferential investment policies (this practice is often
referred to as “round-tipping”). Thus the actual level of FDI in China may be overstated.
CRS-7
source of U.S. FDI in 2007, accounting for 3.5% of total.7 U.S. FDI flows to China
peaked at $5.4 billion in 2002, but have declined every year since. U.S. FDI in
China China
in 2007 fell by nearly 13% over the previous year.
The largest sector for FDI flows to China in 2007 was manufacturing, which
accounted for about 55% of total (see Table 4).8 The Chinese government estimates
that through June 2007, it had approved over 610,000 foreign funded companies and
that 28 million people were employed by such firms (10% of all people employed in
urban areas).9
Table 3. Major Foreign Investors in China: 1979-2007
($ billions and % of total)
Cumulative Utilized
FDI: 1979-2007
Country
Total
Hong Kong
British Virgin Islands
Japan
United States
Taiwan
South Korea
Utilized FDI in 2007
Amount
% of Total
Amount
% of
Total
% Change
over 2006
760.2
300.0
73.8
61.2
56.6
45.7
38.7
100.0
39.5
9.7
8.1
7.4
6.0
5.1
74.8
20.2
16.6
3.6
2.6
1.8
3.7
100.0
37.1
22.1
4.8
3.5
2.4
4.9
13.4
30.0
41.8
-24.6
-12.8
-20.4
-7.9
Source: Invest in China, [http://www.fdi.gov.cn]. Top six investors according to cumulative FDI
from 1979 to 2007. Data do not reflect FDI in the financial sector, which the government does not
report by country.
Note: Chinese data on FDI differ significantly from that of investor countries.
7
According to the Chinese government , major U.S. investors in China (based on 2003 sales
volumes) include Motorola ($5.8 billion in sales volume), General Motors ($2.2 billion),
Dell Computer ($2.1 billion), Hewlett Packard ($1.3 billion), and Kodak ($0.6 billion).
8
Communications equipment, computers, and other electronic equipment accounted for the
largest manufacturing sector for FDI.
9
Xinhua News Agency, August 28, 2007.
CRS-8
Table 4. Foreign Direct Investment by Sectors in 2007
($ billions and % of total)
Utilized
FDI
Sectors
% of
Total
Total
74.8
100.0
Manufacturing
40.9
54.6
Real Estate Development
17.1
23.7
Leasing and Commercial Services
4.0
5.3
Wholesale and Retail Trade
2.7
3.6
Transport, Storage, and Posts
2.0
2.7
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
China’s Trade Patterns
Economic reforms have transferred China into a major trading power. Chinese
exports rose from $14 billion in 1979 to $1,218 billion in 2007, while imports over
this period grew from $16 billion to $956 billion (see Table 5). In 2004, China
surpassed Japan as the world’s third-largest trading economy, after the European
Union (EU) and the United States, and in 2007 it may have become the second
largest exporter, surpassing the United States. China’s exports has grown
dramatically in recent years, doubling in size from 2004 to 2007, with an average
annual growth rate of 29%. Imports over this period increased by 70%. China’s
trade surplus, which totaled $32 billion in 2004, surged to $262 billion in 2007.
Table 5. China’s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2007
Year
($ billions)
Year
Exports
Exports
Imports
Trade
Balance
1979
13.7
15.7
-2.0
1980
18.1
19.5
-1.4
1985
27.3
42.5
-15.3
1990
62.9
53.9
9.0
1995
148.8
132.1
16.7
2000
249.2
225.1
24.1
2001
266.2
243.6
22.6
2002
325.6
295.2
30.4
2003
438.4
412.8
25.6
2004
593.4
561.4
32.0
2005
762.0
660.1
101.9
2006
969.1
791.5
177.6
2007
1,218.0
955.8
262.2
2008 projection*
1,475.0
1,176.6
298.4
*Projections based on actual data for January-August 2008.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics and
Global Trade Atlas (using official Chinese statistics).
CRS-9
Merchandise trade surpluses, large-scale foreign investment, and large purchases
of foreign currencies to maintain its exchange rate with the dollar and other
currencies have enabled China to accumulate the world’s largest foreign exchange
reserves. China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has been particularly
acute over the past few years. China’s total reserves reached $1.5 trillion at the end
of December 2007 and by June, they rose to $1.8 trillion.
China’s Major Trading Partners
China’s trade data often differ significantly from those of its major trading
partners, especially with the United States. This is largely due to the large share of
China’s trade (both exports and imports) passing through Hong Kong (which reverted
back to Chinese rule in July 1997 but is treated as a separate customs area by most
countries, including China and the United States). China treats a large share of its
exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for statistical
purposes, while many countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong
generally attribute their origin to China for statistical purposes.
According to Chinese trade data, its top five trading partners in 2007 were the
European Union (EU), Japan, the United States, the 10 nations that constitute the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Hong Kong (see Table 6).
China’s largest export markets were, the EU, the United States, and Hong Kong,
while its top sources for imports were the Japan, the EU, and ASEAN (the United
States ranked sixth). China maintained substantial trade surpluses with the United
States, the EU, and Hong Kong, but had deficits with Japan and ASEAN. China
reported that it had a $163 billion trade surplus with the United States (U.S. data
show that it had a $256 billion deficit with China).
U.S. trade data indicate that the importance of the U.S. market to China’s export
sector is likely to be much higher than is reflected in Chinese trade data. Based on
U.S. data on Chinese exports to the United States and Chinese data on total Chinese
exports, it is estimated that Chinese exports to the United States as a share of total
Chinese exports totaled 33.6% in 2007. A growing level of Chinese exports is from
foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) in China. According to Chinese data, FFEs were
responsible for 57% of Chinese exports in 2007 compared with 41% in 1996. A
large share of these FFEs are owned by Hong Kong and Taiwan investors, many of
whom have shifted their labor-intensive, export-oriented, firms to China to take
advantage of low-cost labor. A large share of the products made by such firms is
likely exported to the United States.
Additional information on China’s trade with other countries and regions,
including Africa, Iran, and North Korea, can be found in Appendix 1.
CRS-10
Table 6. China’s Major Trading Partners: 2007
($ billions)
Country
Total Trade
Chinese
Exports
Chinese
Imports
356.2
245.2
111.0
China’s
Trade
Balance
134.2
302.1
236.0
232.7
102.1
69.4
134.0
163.3
-31.9
202.5
197.2
94.2
184.3
108.4
12.8
-14.1
171.6
European Union
United States
Japan
ASEANa
Hong Kong
Source: China Monthly Statistics.
Note: Chinese data on its bilateral trade often differ substantially from the official trade data of many
of its trading partners.
a. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam.
Major Chinese Trade Commodities
China’s abundance of cheap labor (the average labor cost per hour in China was
$1.35, compared with $24.50 in the United States in 2006)10 has made it
internationally competitive in many low-cost, labor-intensive manufactures. As a
result, manufactured products constitute an increasingly larger share of China’s trade.
A substantial amount of China’s imports is comprised of parts and components that
are assembled in Chinese factories (major products include consumer electronic
products and computers), then exported. China’s top 10 exports and imports in 2007
are listed in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, using the harmonized tariff system (HTS)
on a four digit level.11
10
11
EIU Industry Wire, April 4, 2007.
Rankings and classification descriptions differ according to what tariff classification
system is used and at what digit level. HTS digit levels range from two to ten. To illustrate,
on a 2-digit HTS level, China’s top five exports in 2007 were electrical machinery,
machinery, knit apparel, woven apparel, and iron and steel. China’s top imports on a 2-digit
level were electrical machinery; machinery; optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus, and parts and
accessories; and ores.
CRS-11
Table 7. Top 10 Chinese Exports: 2007
HS #
2006
% of
Total
Exports
2006-2007
% Change
1,218.0
100.0
25.7
Automatic data processing
machines and units thereof;
magnetic or optical readers,
machines for transcribing and
processing coded data, NESOI
93.5
7.7
0.5
Electric apparatus for line
telephony etc, parts
78.6
6.5
566.2
Television receivers, including
video monitors and video
projectors
36.2
3.0
182.4
Parts etc for typewriters and other
office machines
32.7
2.7
-0.9
Electronic integrated circuits and
micro-assemblies; parts thereof
24.0
2.0
11.1
Liquid crystal devices nesoi,
lasers, optical appliances and
instruments, and parts
20.6
1.7
39.2
Printing machinery used for
printing by means of plates,
cylinders and other printing
components; other printers,
copying machines and facsimile
machines, whether or not
combined; parts and accessories
thereof: printing machinery used
for printing by means of
plates, cylinders and other
printing components
18.7
1.5
4,548.1
Sweaters, pullovers, and vests,
etc, knit or crocheted
16.0
1.3
24.8
Electrical transformers, static
converters (for example,
rectifiers) and inductors; parts
14.2
1.2
29.1
Women’s or girls’ suits,
ensembles, etc. not knit
13.4
1.1
7.8
Description
Total Exports
8471
8517
8528
8473
8542
9013
8443
6110
8504
6204
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Notes: Harmonized Tariff, four-digit level. NESOI means not elsewhere specified or included.
CRS-12
Table 8. Top 10 Chinese Imports: 2007
Value
($billions)
% of
Total
2006-2007
% Change
Total
995.8
100.0
20.8
Electronic integrated circuits and
micro-assemblies; parts thereof
129.5
13.5
20.8
Crude oil from petroleum and
bituminous minerals
79.7
8.3
20.0
Liquid crystal devices NESOI; lasers;
optical appliances and instruments
NESOI; parts and accessories thereof
45.2
4.7
25.9
2601
Iron ores and concentrates
33.8
3.5
62.5
8471
Automatic data processing machines
and units thereof; magnetic or optical
readers, machines for transcribing and
processing coded data, NESOI
20.0
2.1
0.5
Electric apparatus for line telephony
etc, and parts
18.8
2.0
416.5
Parts etc for typewriters & other office
machines
17.5
1.8
-8.7
Parts for television, radio and radar
apparatus
19.7
2.5
18.8
Oil (not crude) from petrol and
bituminous mineral etc.
16.3
1.7
5.0
Diodes, transistors and similar devices;
photosensitive semiconductor devices;
light-emitting diodes; mounted
piezoelectric crystals; parts thereof
15.6
1.6
18.7
Soybeans
11.5
1.2
53.1
HS #
8542
2709
9013
8517
8473
8529
2710
8541
1201
Description
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Notes: Harmonized Tariff, four-digit level. NESOI means not elsewhere specified or included.
China’s Growing Appetite for Imported Oil
China’s rapid economic growth has fueled a growing demand for energy, such
as petroleum, and that demand is becoming an increasingly important factor in
determining world oil prices. China is now the world’s second largest consumer of
oil products (after the United States) at 7.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2007
(compared to 4.8 million in 2007), and that level is projected to 13.6 million bpd by
CRS-13
2030 (depending on China’s future growth and energy policies).12 China became a
net oil importer (i.e., imports minus exports) in 1993. Net oil imports grew from
632 632
thousand bpd in 1997 to about 3.7 million bpd in 2007, nearly a six fold increase
(see figure (see
Figure 1), and making it the world’s third largest net oil importer (after the
United United
States and Japan). China’s net oil imports are projected to rise to 13.1 million
bpd bpd
by 2030, a level that would be comparable to the European Union in that year.
China’s dependence on imported oil could rise from about the current level of about
50% to 80% by 2030.13
Figure 1. China’s Net Oil Imports: 1997-2007
Source: U.S. Energy Administration.
China’s Growing Overseas Direct Investment
A key aspect of China’s economic growth strategy has been to attract foreign
investment into China. However, in 2000, China’s leaders initiated a new “go
global” strategy, which sought to encourage firms (especially state-owned
enterprises) to invest overseas. The Chinese government generally refers to these
activities as overseas direct investment (ODI). There appears to be several factors
driving this investment:
12
13
Global Insight, Global Petroleum Outlook Forecast Tables (Long-Term), August 2008.
International Energy Agency, 2007 World Energy Outlook, p. 168. Estimates are based
on Reference Scenario projections, which assume no new government policies and measures
or technological breakthroughs.
CRS-14
14
!
China’s massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has led
government officials to seek more profitable ways of investing these
holdings (which traditionally have mainly been put into relatively
safe, low yield assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities). On
September 29, 2007, the Chinese government officially launched the
China Investment Corporation (under the direction of the State
Council) in an effort to better manage its foreign exchange reserves.
It reportedly will initially manage over $200 billion, making it one
of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds. Some analysts believe
that China will increasingly use its reserves to purchase foreign
firms, or shares of foreign firms, that are perceived to be profitable.
!
As a developing country, China has traditionally sought to attract
FDI into the country in order to, through joint ventures, gain access
to foreign technology and management skills to help domestic firms
become more efficient and internationally competitive. Now the
Chinese government is attempting to promote the development of
internationally recognized Chinese brands. One strategy has been to
purchase (or attempt to purchase) existing companies and their
internationally-recognized brand names (as well as to obtain
technology and management skills). For example, in April 2005
Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese computer company, purchased
IBM Corporation’s personal computer division for $1.75 billion.14
On June 20, 2005, Haier Group, a major Chinese home appliances
manufacturer, made a $1.28 billion bid to take over Maytag
Corporation, although the bid was later withdrawn.
!
Acquisition of energy and raw materials has been a major priority of
China’s overseas investment strategy. As such, China has sought to
either purchase or invest in foreign energy and raw material
companies, infrastructure projects (such as oil and gas pipelines, oil
refineries, and mines), and joint ventures.15 For example, in June
2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
through its Hong Kong subsidiary (CNOOC Ltd.), made a bid to buy
a U.S. energy company, UNOCAL, for $18.5 billion, although
CNOOC later withdrew its bid due to opposition by several
congressional Members. In August 2005, the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest oil company,
purchased PetroKazakhstan Inc., a Canadian-registered company, for
$4.2 billion.16 According to the Eurasia Group, since the 1990s
The Chinese government is believed to be the largest shareholder in the company.
15
For a monthly listing of China’s international activities relating to energy and raw
materials, see China Institute at the University of Alberta at [http://www.uofaweb.
ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/index.cfm].
16
Asia Times, August 24, 2005.
CRS-15
CNPC has signed energy deals with Sudan worth $10 billion, with
$4 billion in actual investment.17
China reported that its ODI in 2007 (excluding the finance sector) totaled $18.7
billion (up from $2.9 billion in 2003), ranking it as the world’s 13th largest investor.
It is estimated that China’s cumulative ODI through 2007 was $93.7 billion.18 One
Chinese official estimated that annual ODI flows could reach $60 billion, with a total
cumulation of $120 billion by 2010.19
Table 9 lists the top 10 destinations for China’s cumulative ODI as of 2005.
Hong Kong was by far the major destination (accounting for 64%), followed by the
Cayman Island, the British Virgin Islands, South Korea, and the United States.20
Some analysts contend that much of the ODI going to Hong Kong and Caribbean
islands represents “round tipping,” that is investment that is sent overseas but then
re-invested elsewhere (including China). Some analysts suspect that some of that
capital could be going into tax havens.
17
Eurasia Group, China’s Overseas Investments in Oil and Gas Production, October 16,
2006, p. 20.
18
Cygnus, Economy Monitor, Chinese Economy, May-June 2008, p.7.
19
Anbound-China Market, June 12, 2007 (for estimate of estimated annual flow in 2010)
and Glob@l Finance Center, Chinese Outward Direct Investment (ODI), May 5, 2007 (for
estimate of cumulative flow in 2010).
20
In terms of regions, Asia accounted for 71.0% of China’s ODI, followed by Latin America
(20.0%), Europe (2.8%), Africa (2.8%), North America (2.2%), and Oceania (1.1%).
CRS-16
Table 9. Top 10 Destinations for China’s
Overseas Direct Investment: 2005
($ millions)
Country
Cumulative FDI
Hong Kong
36,510
Cayman Islands
8,936
British Virgin Islands
1,984
South Korea
882
United States
823
Macau
599
Australia
587
Russian Federation
466
Sudan
352
Bermuda
337
Total Chinese ODI
57,200
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2006.
Major Long-Term Challenges
Facing the Chinese Economy
China’s economy has shown remarkable economic growth over the past several
years, and many economists project that it will enjoy fairly healthy growth in the near
future. However, economists caution that these projections are likely to occur only
if China continues to make major reforms to its economy. Failure to implement such
reforms could endanger future growth.
!
An inflexible currency policy. China does not allow its currency
to float and therefore must make large-scale purchases of dollars to
keep the exchange rate within certain target levels. Although the
yuan has appreciated someone since reforms were introduced in July
2005, analysts contend that it remains highly undervalued against the
dollar. Economists warn that China’s currency policy has made the
economy overly dependent on exports and fixed investment for
growth and has promoted easy credit policies by the banks. These
policies may undermine long-term economic stability by causing
overproduction in various sectors, increasing the level of nonperforming loans held by the banks (see below), and boosting
CRS-17
inflationary pressures.21 In recent months, the Chinese government
has expressed growing concerns over “hot money” that is pouring in
from outside the country from investors who hope to take advantage
of China’s rapid economic growth and rising exchange rate with the
dollar. Such hot money flows into the economy and adds additional
inflationary pressures.22
!
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which account for about onethird of Chinese industrial production, put a heavy strain on China’s
economy. Over half are believed to lose money and must be
supported by subsidies, mainly through state banks. Government
support of unprofitable SOEs diverts resources away from
potentially more efficient and profitable enterprises. In addition, the
poor financial condition of many SOEs makes it difficult for the
government to reduce trade barriers out of fear that doing so would
lead to widespread bankruptcies among many SOEs.
!
The banking system faces several major difficulties due to its
financial support of SOEs and its failure to operate solely on marketbased principles. China’s banking system is regulated and
controlled by the central government, which sets interest rates and
attempts to allocate credit to certain Chinese firms. The central
government has used the banking system to keep afloat moneylosing SOEs by pressuring state banks to provide low- interest loans,
without which a large number of the SOEs would likely go bankrupt.
Currently, over 50% of state-owned bank loans now go to the SOEs,
even though a large share of loans are not likely to be repaid. The
precarious financial state of the Chinese banking system has made
Chinese reformers reluctant to open the banking sector to foreign
competition. Corruption poses another problem for China’s banking
system because loans are often made on the basis of political
connections. This system promotes widespread inefficiency in the
economy because savings are generally not allocated on the basis of
obtaining the highest possible returns.
!
Growing public unrest. The Chinese government reported that
there were over 87,000 protests (many of which became violent) in
2005 (compared with 53,000 protests in 2003) over such issues as
pollution, government corruption, and land seizures.23 A number of
protests in China have stemmed in part from frustrations among
many Chinese (especially peasants) that they are not benefitting from
21
For further information on the economic consequences of China’s currency policy, see
CRS Report RL32165, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade
Policy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
22
See CRS Report RS22921, China's 'Hot Money' Problems, by Michael F. Martin and
Wayne M. Morrison.
23
See CRS Report RL33416, Social Unrest in China, by Thomas Lum.
CRS-18
China’s economic reforms and rapid growth, and perceptions that
those who are getting rich are doing so because they have
connections with government officials. Protests have broken out
over government land seizures and plant shutdowns in large part due
to perceptions that these actions benefitted a select group with
connections. A 2005 United Nations report stated that the income
gap between the urban and rural areas was among the highest in the
world and warned that this gap threatens social stability. The report
urged China to take greater steps to improve conditions for the rural
poor, and bolster education, health care, and the social security
system.24
24
25
!
The lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread
government corruption, financial speculation, and misallocation of
investment funds. In many cases, government “connections,” not
market forces, are the main determinant of successful firms in China.
Many U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China because
rules and regulations are generally not consistent or transparent,
contracts are not easily enforced, and intellectual property rights are
not protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system).
The lack of the rule of law in China limits competition and
undermines the efficient allocation of goods and services in the
economy. Recent reports of slave labor in northern China has also
raised public anger over the lack of enforcement of labor laws.
!
Poor government regulatory environment. China maintains a
weak and relatively decentralized government structure to regulate
economic activity in China. Laws and regulations often go
unenforced or are ignored by local government officials. As a result,
many firms cut corners in order to maximize profits. This has lead
to a proliferation of unsafe food and consumer products being sold
in China or exported abroad.25 Growing concerns over the health
and safety of Chinese products (such as fish, petfood, tires, and toys)
in the United States and other countries could lead consumers to
reduce their purchases of Chinese products and could undermine
China’s efforts to develop and promote internationally recognized
Chinese brands.
!
Growing pollution. The level of pollution in China continues to
worsen, posing series health risks to the population. The Chinese
government often disregards its own environmental laws in order to
promote rapid economic growth. According to the World Bank, 20
out of 30 of the world’s most polluted cities are in China, with
significant costs to the economy (such as health problems, crop
failures and water shortages). According to one government
China’s Human Development Report 2005.
See CRS Report RS22713, Health and Safety Concerns Over U.S. Imports of Chinese
Products: An Overview, by Wayne M. Morrison.
CRS-19
estimate, environmental damage costs the country $226 billion, or
10% of the country’s GDP, each year. The Chinese government
estimates that there are over 300 million people living in rural areas
that drink unsafe water (caused by chemicals and other
contaminants). Toxic spills in 2005 and 2006 threatened the water
supply of millions of people. China is the largest producer and
consumer of coal, which accounts for about 70% of China’s energy
use. Although growing environmental degradation has been
recognized as a serious problem by China’s central government, it
has found it difficult to induce local governments to comply with
environmental laws, especially when such officials feel doing so will
come at the expense of economic growth.
In October 2006, the Chinese government formally outlined its goal of building
a “harmonious socialist society” by taking steps (by 2020) to lessen income
inequality, improve the rule of law, beef up environmental protection, reduce
corruption, and improve the country’s social safety net (such as expanding health care
and pension coverage to rural areas). In March 2007, the Chinese National People’s
Congress (NPC) passed a law to strengthen property laws to help prevent local
governments from unfairly seizing land from farmers, and in June 2007 it passed a
new labor contract law to enhance labor rights. In addition, the government has
scrambled to improve health and safety laws and regulations.
Outlook for China’s Economy and Implications
for the United States26
The short-term outlook for the Chinese economy appears to be positive, but it
will likely be strongly influenced by the government’s ability to reform the SOEs
and banking system to make them more responsive to market forces, increase the
flexibility of its exchange rate policy, and to assist workers who lose their jobs due
to economic reforms (in order to maintain social stability). Global Insight, an
economic forecasting firm, projects that China’s real GDP will average 7.8% over
grow at an average
rate of 7% over the next 10 years, indicating that China could double the size of its
economy in less
than 10 years. Real GDP is projected to rise by 10.2% in 2008.27 However, rising
costs of energy and raw Global Insight projects China’s real GDP will slow
to 9.9% in 2008 and to 8.9% in 2009.27 However, rising costs of energy and raw
materials, an economic slowdown in the United States
(China’s most import important
export market), and efforts to slow inflation, could negatively
affect China’s
economic growth prospects.
China’s rise as an economic superpower is likely to pose both opportunities and
challenges for the United States and the world trading system. China’s rapid
economic growth has boosted incomes and is making China a huge market for a
variety of goods and services. In addition, China’s abundant low-cost labor has led
multinational corporations to shift their export-oriented, labor-intensive
26
For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33604, Is China a Threat to the
U.S. Economy?, by Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison.
27
Global Insight, China: Interim Forecast Analysis: Economic Growth, June 10, 2008.
CRS-20
August 25, 2008.
CRS-20
multinational corporations to shift their export-oriented, labor-intensive
manufacturing facilities to China. This process has lowered prices for consumers,
boosting their purchasing power. It has also lowered costs for firms that import and
use Chinese-made components and parts to produce manufactured goods, boosting
their competitiveness. Conversely, China’s role as a major international
manufacturer has raised a number of concerns. Many developing countries worry
that growing FDI in China is coming at the expense of FDI in their country.
Policymakers in both developing and developed countries have expressed concern
over the loss of domestic manufacturing jobs that have shifted to China (as well as
the downward pressures on domestic wages and prices that may occur from
competing against low-cost Chinese-made goods).
Many analysts contend that China’s currency policy (despite reforms undertaken
in 2005 and the yuan’s gradual appreciation), is having a negative impact on the
economies of many of its trading partners (including the U.S.) by artificially making
its exports cheaper, and imports more expensive, than they would be under a floating
system. They have urged China to move toward a floating exchange rate regime as
soon as possible, contending that such a move would benefit China’s economy and
those of its trading partners.28 For example, China’s accumulation of large foreign
exchange reserves has forced it to increase the money supply, which may eventually
lead to inflationary pressures on the economy.29 In addition, many analysts contend
that easy money policies have led to over-investment in certain economic sectors.
However, Chinese officials have expressed concern that further currency reforms, if
implemented too quickly, could prove disruptive to the economy. A number of bills
have been introduced in the 110th Congress to address Chinese currency policy,
including some that would impose sanctions against China.
China is attempting to establish and promote companies that can compete
globally, especially in advanced technologies. In some cases, China has attempted
to purchase large foreign companies. China’s possession of large currency reserves
and desire to become a world leader in the production of a variety of goods and
strategic commodities will likely lead the Chinese government to expand efforts to
take over major international corporations. Many Members charge that China’s use
of extensive subsidies to support state-owned firms threatens U.S. economic interests
and may violate its WTO commitments.
Obtaining energy supplies has become a major focus of China’s foreign policy.
This has increased concerns among U.S. policymakers for a number of reasons.
First, China is becoming increasingly dependent on oil producers in the Persian Gulf
region. Currently, China gets about 32% of its oil imports from the region, but by
2030, that level is projected to rise to 53%. This could induce China to become
increasingly involved in Middle East affairs. In addition, China is actively involved
in gaining greater access to energy in Africa, where it gets nearly a third of its oil
imports. Angola was China’s second largest source of oil in 2006. Second, instead
of just buying oil in international markets, China has increasingly sought to purchase
28
For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RS21625, China’s Currency: A Summary
of the Economic Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
29
So far, most of the inflationary pressures on the economy have come from food, which
was affected by severe storms this past winter.
CRS-21
of just buying oil in international markets, China has increasingly sought to purchase
or invest in foreign oil companies, production facilities, pipelines, oil fields, and
refineries around the world.30 Finally, China’s thirst for oil has led it to obtain
agreements with countries the United States has major human rights and foreign
policy concerns with (such as Iran and Sudan). Many U.S. policymakers are
concerned that China’s energy needs will lead it to oppose U.S. foreign policy
objectives and that this could result in increased tensions between the United States
and China.
A growing concern over China’s energy use and rising demand is the possible
global environmental consequences. According to one estimate, one-third of the air
pollution in the West Coast of the United States comes from China.31 The
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency estimates that China was the largest
CO2 emitter in 2007, surpassing the United States by 14% and accounting for twothirds of last year’s global carbon dioxide increase.32 According to the International
Energy Agency, between 2005 and 2030, China will build more new electricity
generating capacity than currently exists in the United States.
Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over China’s rising ownership
of U.S. government debt, due to fears that China might attempt to use its holdings as
leverage in its dealings with the United States on economic and/or political matters.
China is the second largest foreign holder of Treasury securities (after Japan), and
both the level of those holdings and China’s share of total foreign holdings have
increased sharply over the past few years. These went from $51.8 billion in 1999 to
$507519 billion as of MayJuly 2008. China’s U.S. Treasury securities holdings as a share
of of
total foreign holdings over this period have grown from 4.1% to 19.4%. Some
have have
raised concerns that threats by China to halt future purchases, or to sell existing
holdings, could cause the value of the dollar to depreciate in world markets (raising
import prices), increase U.S. interest rates, lead to a decline in U.S. stock and bond
markets, and possibly cause the U.S. economy to slow. However, any such
disruption to the U.S. economy would also hurt China’s economy since about a third
of China’s exports go to the United States.33
Appendix 1. China’s Growing Economic Ties
with Africa, North Korea, and Iran
China has sought to expand its trade with countries around the world, especially
those that posses energy and raw materials China needs to sustain its rapid economic
growth, such as those in Africa. Although China’s trade with these countries is
30
See the National Bureau of Asian Research, China’s Search for Energy Security:
Implications for the United States, by Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg April 2006.
31
The Aspen Institute, U.S.-China Relations, Eight Conference (April 9-15, 2006), China
Energy Issues, by Hal Harvey, M.S., p. 15.
32
See the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency’s report at [http://www.mnp.nl/
en/publications/2008/GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007.html].
33
See CRS Report RL34314, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S.
Economy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
CRS-22
growth, such as those in Africa. Although China’s trade with these countries is
relatively small (compared with its major trading partners), it is growing rapidly.
China is also a major trading partner of various countries that pose challenges to U.S.
foreign policy, such as Iran, Sudan, and North Korea.34
China-Africa Trade
China’s Imports From Africa. China’s imports from Africa as a percent of
its total imports grew from 2.8% in 2004 to 3.8% in 2007 (to $36.3 billion).35 As a
whole, Africa was China’s seventh largest source of imports in 2007. China’s
imports from Africa grew by 25.9% over the previous year (compared to total
Chinese imports growth of 20.8%). Mineral fuels were by far China’s largest import
from Africa, accounting for 72% of total imports. Angola was China’s largest source
of imports from Africa, accounting for 35% of those imports in 2007, followed by
South Africa, Sudan, the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. China’s imports from Sudan
were up 112% over the previous year (see Tables 11 and 12). In 2006, China was
Sudan’s largest source of imports (18.2% of total).36
Table 10. Top Five African Sources of Chinese Imports:
2004-2007
($ millions)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2006-2007
% Change
15,641
21,114
28,768
36,330
25.9
Angola
4,718
6,581
10,931
12,885
17.9
South Africa
2,955
3,444
4,095
6,608
61.4
Sudan
1,706
2,615
1,941
4,114
111.9
Congo
1,569
2,278
2,785
2,828
1.6
995
1,486
2,538
1,697
-33.1
Africa Total
Equatorial Guinea
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
34
For additional information on policy challenges posed by North Korea, see CRS Report
RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A.
Niksch; and CRS Report RL32493, theThe North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy
Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto, Emma Chanlett-Avery. For information on policy challenges
posed by Sudan, see CRS Report RL33574, Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the
North-South Peace Agreement, by Ted Dagne.
35
In comparison, U.S. imports from Africa in 2006 were $92.0 billion. Note, the United
States reports import trade data on a customs basis, while China reports imports on a cost,
insurance, and freight (C.I.F.) basis. The C.I.F. basis differs from the customs basis in that
the former includes the cost of insurance and freight and thus raises the value of imports
(which the customs basis does not), by about 10%.
36
Central Intelligence Agency, the 2008 World Factbook.
CRS-23
Table 11. Top Five Chinese Imports from Africa: 2004-2007
($ millions and %)
2004
2005
2006
2007
% of
Total
2007
2006-2007
% Change
10,135
14,676
21,083
25,997
71.8
23.3
1,393
1,577
2,116
3,298
9.1
55.9
Precious stones and
metals
742
967
1,196
1,358
3.8
13.5
Wood
473
524
705
915
2.5
29.8
Iron and steel
439
475
315
851
2.4
170.6
HS 2 Commodity
Description
Mineral fuel, oil, etc
Ores, slag, ash
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
China’s Mineral Fuel Imports From Africa. Africa has become an
important source of China’s surging energy needs. In 2007, 72% of China’s imports
from Africa were mineral fuels. China’s fuel imports from Africa rose from $10.1
billion in 2004 to $26.0 billion in 2007. In 2007, Africa supplied 24.8% of China’s
imported mineral fuels (compared with 9.1% in 1997). Angola was China’s second
largest overall mineral fuel supplier and its largest African supplier. Other major
African suppliers (and the world rank) of mineral fuel to China were Sudan (7th), the
Congo (12th), Equatorial Guinea (18th), and Libya (19th) (see Table 12).
Table 12. Top Five African Suppliers of
Mineral Fuel to China: 2007
Imports
($millions)
Rank as a Supplier
of Mineral Fuel to
China
Angola
12,876
2
Sudan
4,086
7
Congo
2,307
12
Equatorial Guinea
1,566
18
Libya
1,528
19
Africa Total
25,997
—
Country
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
China’s Exports to Africa. The share of Chinese exports going to Africa
rose from 2.3% in 2004 to 3.1% in 2007 (to $37.3 billion).37 If Africa were treated
as a single trading partner, it would rank as China’s seventh largest export market in
2007. Exports to Africa grew by 39.7% over the previous year (compared to China’s
37
In comparison, total U.S. exports to Africa in 2007 were $23.7 billion (2.0% of total U.S.
exports in 2007).
CRS-24
total exports growth of 25.7%). Major Chinese exports to Africa in 2007 included
electrical machinery, machinery (such as computers and components), vehicles
(mainly motorcycles and trucks), apparel, and iron and steel products. The top five
African destinations of Chinese exports in 2007 were South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria,
Algeria, and Morocco (see Tables 13 and 14). In 2006, China was Sudan’s second
largest export market (31% of total).38
Table 13. China’s Top Five African Export Markets: 2004-2007
($ millions)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2006-2007
% Change
Africa Total
13,815
18,687
26,705
37,314
39.7
South Africa
2,952
3,826
5,769
7,429
28.8
Egypt
1,389
1,935
2,976
4,432
48.9
Nigeria
1,719
2,305
2,856
3,800
33.1
Algeria
981
1,405
1,952
2,709
48.8
Morocco
944
1,206
1,570
2,162
37.8
Country
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
Table 14. Top Five Chinese Exports to Africa: 2004-2007
($ millions)
2004
2005
2006
2007
% of
Total
2007
Electrical machinery
and partsa
1,905
2,799
4,122
5,806
15.6
40.9
Machinery, mechanical
appliances, and parts
1,374
2,141
3,220
4,517
12.1
40.3
Vehicles (excluding
railway)
936
1,448
2,023
3,165
8.5
56.4
Knit apparel
828
938
1,537
2,940
7.9
91.3
Iron/steel products
654
903
1,225
1,920
5.1
56.7
HS 2 Commodity
Description
2006- 2007
% Change
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
a. Includes electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
and reproducers;
television image and sound recorders and reproducers; and
parts and accessories of such articles.
38
Central Intelligence Agency, the 2008 World Factbook
CRS-25
China’s Trade with North Korea
China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and a major supplier of foreign
aid (largely in the form of food and fuel).39 In 2007, Chinese exports to, and imports
from, North Korea totaled $1.4 billion and $582 million, respectively. North Korea
was China’s 68th largest source of imports (0.06% of total) and its 68th largest export
market (0.11% of total).40 Chinese exports to North Korea rose by 13.0% and
imports were up 24.3%, over 2006 levels. China accounted for 37.3% of North
Korea’s exports and 39.8% of its imports (2005 data).41 According to Chinese data,
its top five exports to North Korea (2007) were oil, machinery, electrical machinery
(such as TVs), plastics, and vehicles (see Table 15), while its top imports from North
Korea were ores, coal, woven apparel, fish, and iron and steel (see Table 16).
Table 15. Major Chinese Exports to North Korea: 2004-2007
($ millions and % change)
Total Exports
Mineral fuel, oil, etc. (mainly oil)
Machinery
Electrical machinery (such as TVs)
Plastics
Vehicles (except railway)
2004
2005
2006
2007
795
204
40
46
32
18
1,085
286
77
57
52
28
1,232
348
83
98
52
28
1,392
402
104
69
55
54
2006-/2007
% Change
13.0
15.7
25.0
-29.0
5.0
92.1
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Table 16. Major Chinese Imports from North Korea: 2004-2007
($ millions and % change)
Total Imports
Mineral fuel, oil, etc. (mainly coal)
Ores, slag, and ash
Woven apparel
Iron and steel
Fish and seafood
2004
2005
2006
2007
2006-2007
% Change
582
53
59
49
75
261
497
112
92
58
72
92
468
102
118
63
35
43
582
170
164
60
45
30
24.3
55.1
38.5
-4.7
28.2
-30.8
Source: World Trade Atlas.
39
See CRS Report RL31785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin; and
CRS Report RL32493, The North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis, by
Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery.
40
Source: World Trade Atlas.
41
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, North Korea, February 2008, p. 5.
CRS-26
China’s Trade With Iran
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China was Iran’s largest
second trading partner, after EU in 2006.42 China was Iran’s fourth largest export
market (at $9.0 billion), and its second largest source of imports (at $4.9 billion).
China has become an increasingly important trading partner for Iran in recent years.
Iranian exports to China as a share of its total exports rose from 9.7% in 2002 to
12.9% in 2006, while Iranian imports from China as a share of its total imports
increased from 4.7% to 10.6%.
Iran constitutes a relatively minor, though growing, trading partner for China.
According to Chinese data, Iran was its 16th largest trading partner in 2007. China’s
exports to, and imports from, Iran totaled $7.3 billion and $13.3 billion, respectively.
China’s exports to Iran rose by 62.1% and imports from Iran were up by 33.7%.
China’s top exports to Iran in 2007 were iron and steel ($1.6 billion), machinery
($1.1 billion), vehicles and parts ($880 million). China’s imports from Iran were
dominated by crude oil, which totaled $11.6 billion and constituted 87.2% of total
Chinese imports. Iran was China’s third largest source of mineral fuels imports in
2007; these constituted 11.1% of China’s total world oil of these products.43
According to press reports, China’s state-owned oil companies have signed oil and
gas deals with Iran worth over $100 billion.44
42
China was the largest if EU countries are counted separately.
43
The Iran Daily (July 25, 2007) contended that Iran had become China’s largest source of
oil imports.
44
Reuters News, December 21, 2006.