Order Code RS22373
Updated July 8September 11, 2008
Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) — Background
and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of activities related to what the
Administration refers to as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Navy states that
as of February 2008, more than 11,300 Navy sailors (including Individual Augmentees)
were ashore supporting ground forces in the U.S. Central Command region (including
Iraq and Afghanistan). The Navy’s role in the GWOT raises several potential oversight
issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Longstanding Navy GWOT-Related Activities. The Navy for several years
has carried out a variety of activities related to what the Bush administration refers to as
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), including the following:
! Navy sailors, many of them individual augmentees (IAs), serving on the
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan in various mission areas, including but
not limited to medical and construction support;
! surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
! maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and
intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or
potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S.
territorial waters — an activity that includes Navy participation in the
multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);1
! operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are
directed against terrorists;2
1
For more on the PSI, see the CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by
Mary Beth Nikitin.
2
SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs
(continued...)
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Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps
and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March
3 and May 1, 2008,3 and those conducted in response to the 1998 terrorist
bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps
and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March
3 and May 1, 2008,1 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998
terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;2
1
Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008;
Stephanie McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to
Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda
Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times, May 2, 2008.
2
For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin LadenTaliban Tie,” NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
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operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are
directed against terrorists;3
surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and
intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or
potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S.
territorial waters — an activity that includes Navy participation in the
multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);4
working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness
(MDA) — a real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans;
assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;45
protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was
intensified following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer
Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen; and
protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities.
Initiatives Since 2005 To Expand Navy Role in GWOT. Since July 2005, the
Navy has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its capabilities for
participating in the GWOT, including the following:
! establishing a Navy Irregular Warfare Office;
! establishing a multilateral global maritime partnership (originally
known as the “1,000-ship navy” concept) for ensuring global maritime
security;
! establishing the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC);
! reestablishing the Navy’s riverine force;
! establishing small sea bases called Global Fleet Stations (GFSs) in
various regions around the world;
! establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, an MIO intelligence
exploitation pilot program, an intelligence data-mining capability at the
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), and a Navy Foreign Area
Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized
knowledge of foreign countries and regions;
! assuming command of a GWOT-related joint task force in the Horn of
Africa, the detainee operation at Guantanamo, Cuba, and Fort Suse, a
high-security prison in Iraq, and assuming the lead in defending the
Haditha Dam in Iraq;
5
! procuring Automatic Identification Systems (AISs) for surface ships;
2
(...continued)
3
SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs
and of the role of special operations forces in the GWOT, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
3
Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008;
Stephanie McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to
Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda
Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times, May 2, 2008.
4
For more on the
4
For more on the PSI, see the CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by
Mary Beth Nikitin.
5
See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And
Running’,” Defense Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To
Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,” Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the
Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators
and Their Role
in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake; and
CRS Report
RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities,
by Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli.
5
The AIS is a transponder-like device that transmits a ship’s identification, position, course,
speed, and other data to other ships and relevant authorities.
Parfomak and John Frittelli.
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procuring Automatic Identification Systems (AISs) for surface ships;6
!
developing a GWOT mission module for the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS);67
developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of
Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA); and
engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for
Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland
Security, particularly in the area of MDA.
In discussing its GWOT-related activities, the Department of the Navy, which
includes the Navy and the Marine Corps, states that naval forces (the Navy and Marine
Corps):
provide the bulk of the nation’s worldwide rotational military presence and an
increasing portion of the required support for ground units in Operations Enduring
Freedom / Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) [i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq]. These operations
support our nation’s interest by continuing intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance missions, expanded maritime interception operations, and
counter-piracy and counter-drug patrols. There are over 11,300 sailors ashore
(including Individual Augmentees supporting ground forces in core mission areas and
new capability areas) and 12,000 at sea in the U.S. Central Command region alone
engaged in the GWOT.
Since assumption in FY 2007, the Navy continues command of the detainee
mission in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and at Camp Bucca, a high-security prison in Iraq.
Additionally, Executive Agent responsibility remains in effect for command of the
GWOT related Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) in Djibouti.
Our presence in the Horn of Africa, which is an impoverished part of the world that
struggles with disease, drug running, human trafficking, smuggling and pockets of
extremism, is a key to ensuring that terrorism doesn’t gain a foothold in the region.
CJTF HOA was initially formed in November 2002 as a seafaring force aimed at
blocking terrorists fleeing Afghanistan from establishing a new safe haven. Soon after,
the task force moved ashore and its mission morphed into a blend of military
cooperation, military-to-military training and humanitarian assistance over a massive,
eight-country region. The Navy is now engaged to help bring stability, security and
hope to the region....
The Navy spearheads OEF by providing sovereign deck space from which to launch
combat sorties into Afghanistan, continues to support ground operations in Iraq from
the sea, in the air and on the land as part of OIF, and conducts deterrence operations
in the Persian Gulf. The Navy also responds to humanitarian crisis, patrols for pirates,
interacts with the developing navies around the world and supports counter-terrorism
operations in the Philippines....
Under the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-41), we are
continuing to cultivate relationships and develop capabilities to maximize the
advantage that operating in the maritime domain brings to homeland security. Because
more than 90 percent of the world’s commerce moves by sea, protection of merchant
shipping from potential terrorist networks is critical. United States naval forces are
66
The AIS is a transponder-like device that transmits a ship’s identification, position, course,
speed, and other data to other ships and relevant authorities.
7
For more on the LCS, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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more than 90 percent of the world’s commerce moves by sea, protection of merchant
shipping from potential terrorist networks is critical. United States naval forces are
well trained to carry out the mission of deterring, delaying, and disrupting the
movement of terrorists and terrorist-related material at sea. However, the United
States cannot accomplish this monumental task alone. We are broadening our
relationship with the navies of international allies to prosecute the GWOT. We are
expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative to other countries and working bilateral
boarding initiatives in all hemispheres.
We are also integrating intelligence and command and control systems with
other government agencies like the Department of Homeland Security to effectively
evaluate the maritime environment and anything that could adversely influence the
security, safety or economy of America and our allies. We continue to develop the
Navy’s role in the Maritime Domain Awareness concept, including ship tracking and
surveillance, to identify threats as early and as distant from our borders as possible in
order to determine the optimal course of action. We are working with the Department
of Homeland Security to develop a comprehensive National Maritime Security
Response Plan to address specific security threats and command and control
relationships.7
8
Navy Irregular Warfare Office. In July 2008, the Navy established the Navy
Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the Navy’s words, to “institutionalize
current ad hoc efforts in IW [irregular warfare] missions of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence
operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to
[counterterrorism] and [counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special
Operations Command, and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
information, plans, and strategy.9
Global Maritime Partnership (Previously 1,000-Ship Navy). The Global
Maritime Partnership, previously known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy
initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and
foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring
global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states that
the future of maritime security depends more than ever on international cooperation
and understanding. There is no one nation that can provide a solution alone. A global
maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators,
commercial shippers, and international, governmental and non-governmental agencies
to address mutual concerns. Ongoing discussions of a “1,000-ship navy” continue.
The name itself captures the scope of the effort. The concept is not actually about
having 1,000 international ships at sea. Rather, it is more about capabilities, such as
speed, agility and adaptability. Membership in this navy is purely voluntary and has
no legal or encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime
8
U.S. Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2009 Budget.
Washington, 2008. (February 2008) pp. 2-1 through 2-3.
9
Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,”
Inside the Navy, September 1, 2008.
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partners — good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather
than to divide.810
NECC. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at
Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005
and formally on January 13, 2006. The Department of the Navy states that NECC
will help meet the irregular challenges of the 21st Century. It will serve as a functional
command to organize, man, train, and equip forces that operate in an expeditionary
environment. It will be the single advocate for all Navy Expeditionary Forces to
include Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Naval Construction Force (NCF),
Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF, formerly Navy Coastal Warfare) and
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG), and key new capabilities:
Expeditionary Training Command (ETC), Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center
7
U.S. Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2009 Budget.
Washington, 2008. (February 2008) pp. 2-1 through 2-3.
8
U.S. Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2009 Budget.
Washington, 2008. (February 2008) pp. 1-3 to 1-4
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(ECRC), Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) and Riverine Force. These forces
will conduct Maritime Security Operations and Theater Security Cooperation and are
capable of protecting critical infrastructure, securing the area for military operations
or commerce, preventing the flow of contraband, enabling power projection
operations, joint, bi-lateral or multilateral exercises, personnel exchanges, and
humanitarian assistance. Whether extending a helping hand or finding and prosecuting
our enemies, we are redefining the limits and meaning of 21st Century Seapower.911
Riverine Force. The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine
capabilities of the SEALs and relieve Marines who have been conducting maritime
security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The consists of three squadrons of 12
boats each, and include a total of about 900 sailors. The Navy established Riverine Group
1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA,
in May 2006. The first riverine squadron was established in FY2006, deployed to Iraq in
March 2007, and returned in October 2007.1012 The second squadron was established in
February 2007 and deployed to Iraq in October 2007 to relieve the first squadron.1113 The
third squadron was established in July 2007.1214 Following the completion of the first
squadron’s deployment, the Navy in 2007 reportedly was considering expanding the
riverine mission to other parts of Iraq.13
Global Fleet Stations (GFSs). The Navy envisages establishing as many as five
GFSs around the world, each of which might be built around a single amphibious ship or
high-speed sealift ship. Under Navy plans, GFSs could host or support Marines, Navy
LCSs or patrol craft, Coast Guard small boats, and Army and Air Force personnel. GFSs
under Navy plans would be capable of conducting or supporting various operations,
including some that could be considered GWOT-related.14
Potential Oversight Issues For Congress
Potential oversight issues for Congress relating to the Navy’s role in the GWOT
include the following:
915
10
U.S. Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2009 Budget.
Washington, 2008. (February 2008) pp. 1-3 to 1-4
11
U.S. Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2009 Budget.
Washington, 2008. (February 2008) p. 2-2.
1012
For a discussion of this deployment, see Tim Fish, “RIVRON 1 Claims Success in Tackling
Iraqi IEDs, But New Boats May Be Needed,” Jane’s Navy International, January/February 2008:
12-13. See also John Suits, “RIVRON 1 Sailors Return Home,” Navy News Service, October 23,
2007.
1113
“Riverine Squadron 2 Deploys,” Navy News Service, October 4, 2007.
1214
Louis Hansen, “Third Riverine Squadron Formally Established At Yorktown,” Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, July 7, 2007; Chris Johnson, “Navy Creates Third Squadron For Riverine
Missions in Iraq,” Inside the Navy, July 9, 2007; Matthew D. Leistikow, “NECC Establishes
Riverine Squadron 3,” Navy News Service, July 10, 2007.
1315
Chris Johnson, “Navy Mulling Expansion of Riverine Mission to More Areas in Iraq,” Inside
the Navy, July 23, 2007.
14
For more on GFSs, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches —
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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(continued...)
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Global Fleet Stations (GFSs). The Navy envisages establishing as many as five
GFSs around the world, each of which might be built around a single amphibious ship or
high-speed sealift ship. Under Navy plans, GFSs could host or support Marines, Navy
LCSs or patrol craft, Coast Guard small boats, and Army and Air Force personnel. GFSs
under Navy plans would be capable of conducting or supporting various operations,
including some that could be considered GWOT-related.16
Potential Oversight Issues For Congress
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
! To what degree can or should Navy GWOT-related activities be used to
reduce the burden on other services for conducting GWOT-related
activities? Are the Navy’s steps to increase its role in the GWOT partly
motivated by concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to
secure a portion of GWOT-related funding?
!
! How many Navy personnel globally are involved in GWOT-related
activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy
expending each year on GWOT-related activities?
!
17
! Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA)
program?15
!
IA program?
! Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between GWOT-related
activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential
future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?16
!
18
! Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine
warfare?17
!
19
! Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil
affairs battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in the
GWOT have for Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size
and composition of the Navy)?
!
! Is the Navy adequately coordinating its GWOT-related activities and
initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?
!
! Are the Navy’s recent GWOT-related organizational changes, such as the
establishment of NECC, appropriate? Does NECC include the right
collection of Navy organizations? What other Navy organizational
changes might be needed?
15
(...continued)
the Navy, July 23, 2007.
16
For more on GFSs, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches —
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
17
For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet
Forces Takes Charge of IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.
1618
For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
1719
For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock,
“The Navy’s Not Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January
2008: 14-19.