Order Code RS21968
Updated June 24August 4, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s current governmentpolitical system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed
to produce democracy, continues
to be riven by sectarianism and factional infighting.
However, the Administration saysethnic and factional infighting. The Administration
asserts that the passage of some key laws in 2008 represents
major progress on national reconciliation and that planned provincial elections will help
heal remaining communal rifts. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam
key laws in 2008 will help heal remaining rifts and continue
to reduce violence. Others see the schisms widening as Iraqi leaders wrangle over
unresolved issues that are complicating the holding of provincial elections. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL), the first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat
transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), provincial councils in all
18 provinces (41 seats per council; 51 for Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly
(111 seats). The election system was proportional representation (closed list): voters
chose chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities
were on
the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20%
of the
overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat
on on
Baghdad’s council. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S.
forces,
also boycotted the elections, leaving his faction under-represented on provincial
councils in the Shiite
south and in Baghdad. The resulting interim government placed
Shiites and Kurds in the most
senior positions, although Sunnis were Assembly speaker,
deputy president, a deputy
prime minister, and six ministers, including defense. The
presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
leader Jalal Talabani became President and Da’wa
(a (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari
became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
appointed a 55-member drafting committee, including
committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis
CRS-2
were later added as
CRS-2
full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced
a draft, providing
for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim
province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam
“a main source” of legislation and prohibiting laws from contradicting the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2)
of legislation;1 setting a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47);
allowing families to
choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and
inheritance (Article 41); making only primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and
including Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the
federal supreme court (Article
89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as
giving too much discretion to
males of their families, and Islamic extremists in Iraq purportedly cite these provisions
to impose restrictions against women males of their families. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation
occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA), applicable until amended
(Article 126),
and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with
its size and
powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continuestill unresolved — centered on regional versus central power.
centralized
power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous
“regions”
— reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117
allows each “region” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the
fielding the
Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central
central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
to population, and gives regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy
discoveries.
Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons
hydrocarbons legislation — Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas
deposits, and
favor centralized control of oil revenues. The Kurds want to maintain
maximum regional
control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a postDecember 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a
four four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a
“Council of Representatives” (COR) – a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation.
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, 2006, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA
to agree to another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies —
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
Adel Abd al-Mahdi. His two deputies are Adel Abd alMahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi,
leader of the Consensus Front (Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Consensus Front figure, the
hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosenis COR
speaker.
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two
deputy deputy
prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and
National National
Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of2006, due to infighting. Of the
37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
The elections did not resolve the grievances among Iraq’s communities over their
new positions in the post-Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government
and Iraq agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might promote
achieve political reconciliation.
Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress”
on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks —
as assessed in Administration
reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15, 2007
— were required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) to Iraq. The President has
used the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate also mandated an
assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks
have been achievedmet, as well
as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by
ret. Gen James Jones). Results, as well as subsequent actions and
implementation, are
shown in the chart below.
Iraq’s communities remain sharply divided over their relative positions in the power
structure. The Administration, as expressed in the April 8 and 9, 2008, testimony of U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, is seeing movement toward and a May 2008 informal, non-mandated
Administration update on progress on the benchmarks, sees movement toward
reconciliation, facilitated
by a reduction in violence attributed largely to the U.S. “troop
surge.” The February 13,
2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two
significant laws (amnesty
law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national budget
represented a breakthrough,
breakthroughs, although U.S. officials say that the effects will depend on
implementation. Others’
However, other assessments, including a June 2008 study by the
Government Accountability Office
(GAO-08-837) say that these legislative moves have
had limited effect in healing the rifts
among Iraq’s major communities. Splits in Iraqi politics.
Continuing divisions include that between Iraq Kurds and Iraq’s
Arabs (both Sunni
and Shiite), and within both the Shiite and Sunni communities, although not all of these
splits are violent. The Kurds are increasingly restive over the continued postponement of
the referendum that they hope will integrate Kirkuk into the Kurdish controlled region.
The Kirkuk dispute also caused a presidential veto of the July 22, 2008 COR vote on the
needed election law; the draft law provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk
(between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, prompting
Kurdish opposition and subsequent communal strife in Kirkuk city.
The Administration is counting on the provincial elections to continue the progress
it believes the Maliki government has made in 2008. He was weakened in 2007 by the
pullout of the cabinet by the Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former
Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 13 vacant
seats out of a 37 seat cabinet. With the return of the Consensus Front to the cabinet in July
2008, and the simultaneous filling of former Sadrist cabinet seats with independent
Shiites, the cabinet now only has one vacancy (ministry of Justice). All blocs are
participating in the COR. The provincial elections are partly intended to narrow the
growing split within the Sunni community between the established political parties and
the tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who are cooperating with U.S. forces to expel
CRS-4
the tribal leaders’ former allies, Al Qaeda in Iraq, from Sunni areas. With no election law
yet finalized, despite special COR meetings following August 1, 2008 adjournment,
provincial elections (planned for October 1, 2008) will not likely be held until early 2009.
A key factor in Maliki’s recent political rise was his confrontation of fellow Shiites,
in this case the Sadr faction. In late March 2008, Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, militia, as well as militias
from the Fadhila Party, and Tharallah, in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with
a reported Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not
require the JAM to surrender or disarm, and in which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics
viewed the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of the provincial
elections. Maliki fears Sadr’s movement will do well in the elections, even though Sadr
has announced he will not field a separate election list but instead support Sadrists on
other lists. Sunni and Kurdish leaders saw the move as an indicator of increased sectarian
even-handedness. Subsequently, the ISF has slowly gained control over formerly JAM
controlled areas of Basra, as well as of the Sadr City region of Baghdad. In May and June
2008, Maliki followed up his successes with offensives against Al Qaeda in Iraq in Mosul
and against pro-Sadr militiamen in Amarah.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total:
Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote.
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7);
independents (4).
the Shiite community in the form of the often
violent power struggle between ISCI and the Da’wa Party on the one side, and Sadr
faction on the other. The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous — a figure already agreed to
in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a new flag was adopted
(January 22, 2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it.
There is also a growing split within the Sunni community between the established
political parties and the tribal leaders who, as of 2007, have cooperated with U.S. forces
to expel the tribal leaders’ former allies, Al Qaeda in Iraq, from Sunni areas.
The Administration also asserts that the Maliki government is becoming stronger and
more capable in 2008, emerging from weakness in 2007 caused by a pullout of the cabinet
by the Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad alAllawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat
cabinet. Of those three have since been filled by new appointments and one returning
Minister (Ali Baban, Minister of Planning). The Consensus Front has been negotiating
since April 2008 to rejoin the cabinet (six seats), but a deal fell through in May 2008
CRS-4
when Maliki refused to give the bloc some of the important ministerial positions it
wanted, instead offering what the bloc felt were relatively insignificant position such as
Minister of Communications. All blocs have resumed participating in the COR.
A key factor in Maliki’s recent political rise has been his confrontation of fellow
Shiites, in this case the Sadr faction. In late March 2008, Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat militias (Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, Fadhila
Party, and Tharallah militia) in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with a reported
Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not require the
JAM to surrender or disarm, and in which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics viewed
the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of planned provincial elections
in which Sadr’s movement is expected to do well, even though Sadr has announced he
will not field a separate election list but instead support Sadrists on other lists. Sunni and
Kurdish leaders saw the move as an indicator of increased sectarian even-handedness, and
some rallied to Maliki. Subsequently, the ISF has slowly gained control over formerly
JAM controlled areas of Basra, and U.S.-Iraq clashes with the JAM in Baghdad have
tailed off following a May 10, 2008 tentative ceasefire agreement between Maliki and the
Sadr faction. In May and June 2008, Maliki has followed up his successes with
offensives against Al Qaeda in Iraq in Mosul and against pro-Sadr militiamen in Amarah.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. 2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents - 30. Sadr
faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million
in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/
December: 75% (12 million).
CRS-5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
July 12
Admin.
Report
(S)
satisfactor
ysatisfactory
GAO
(Sept.
07)
unmet
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
S
2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
(U)
unsatisfact
.
unmet
S
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
ensure equitable distribution of resources
U.
unmet
U
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
semi-autonomous regions
S
partly
met
S
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a
date for provincial elections
S on (a)
and U on
the and
U on the
others
overall
unmet;
(a) met
S on (a) and
(c)
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions
do not
allow a
rating
conditions
do not
allow
rating
unmet
Same as
July
unmet
Same as
July
Benchmark
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
Subsequent Actions allow
a rating
unmet
Same as
July
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
conditions
do not allow
rating
unmet
Same as
July
Benchmark
Subsequent Actions
(May 2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO report, and International
Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional powers and
presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing amendments.
Sunnis want presidential council to have enhanced powers relative to prime minister.
Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for recommendations repeatedly
final recommendations
repeatedly extended, now beyond latest May 2008 deadline.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in COR present.
Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists
in top three party ranks would receive pensions. But, could allow for judicial
prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam
security services, and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. No
appointments yet to the seven-seat High Commission that will implement the law.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes; only
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and
2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Reports in
June 2008 say Kurds and Kurds and
central government will resume discussions to move the
legislation forwardsetting up commission to resolve remaining disputes.
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold to form new regions,
but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. No active movement to
form new regions yet evident.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments (and elections by October 1,
2008) adopted February 13, 2008, took effect April 2008 after dropping of presidential
council objection to Baghdad’s ability to remove provincial governors. Election law
required to implement elections not yet adopted because of differences over election
system (Sadr faction wants “open list”), and U.S. estimates 4 - 5due to Kurdish opposition to proposed
interim arrangements for Kirkuk power sharing, as well as Arab attempt to replace
peshmerga in Kirkuk with ISF. Agreement apparently reached to use “open list” (vote
for candidates) voting system, favored by Sadrists. About 4 months preparation
(registration, candidate vetting, ballot printing) needed after law is passed. Some of the
nine Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members to be replaced by UNAMI due to
“non-transparent” selection process, despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 detainees held by Iraq, passed on
February 13, 2008. Of 17,000 approved for release (mostly Sunnis and Sadrist Shiites),
only about 1,600 released to date due to slow judicial process. Does not affect 25,000
detainees held by U.S.
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move against
militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for
their their
parties to participate in October 2008 provincial elections. Law on
disarmament and
demobilization stalled.
CRS-6
July 12
Admin.
Report
S
GAO
(Sept.
07)
met
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
met
S
partial
S
U
unmet
Mixed: S to
pursue
extremists U
on political
interference
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
providing even-handed enforcement of law
U.
unmet
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad
will not provide a safe haven for any outlaw,
regardless of sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
eliminating militia control of local security
S
partial
Mixed: S to
pursue
extremists U
on political
interference
Mixed. S on
military, U
on police
S
. S on
military, U
on police
S
Mixed. S on
(a); U on (b)
unmet
same as July
12
S
met
S
U.
unmet
U
S
met
S
S
partial.
S
U
unmet
U.
Benchmark
8. Establishing political, media, economic,
and services committee to support U.S.
“surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades
to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
authorities to make decisions, without
political intervention, to pursue all extremists,
including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in
2007 capital budget for reconstruction
projects.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making
false accusations against ISF members
Subsequent Actions
(May 2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO report, and International
Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
No significant change. Still some, although diminished, concern over the Office of the
Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF favoring Shiites and excluding many Sunnis. Still, some politically-motivated leaders
remain in ISF. In the past year, the commander of the National Police has fired over
5,000 officers for sectarian or politically-motivated behavior, and Ministry of Interior
said to have been purged of sectarian administrators and their bodyguards.
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law evenhandedly, but acknowledges continued militia influence and infiltration in some
units.
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and ethnosectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
Mixed. S
on (a); U
on (b)
S
U.
unmet
same as July
12
met
unmet
S
U
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in
2007 capital budget for reconstruction projects.
S
met
S
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still armed, despite Basra operation.
91103,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combating Al Qaeda, but still distrusted as potential Sunni
Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operating, more than the 33 planned.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable to secure
Iraq internally until 2009-2012; and against external threats not until 2018-2020. Basra
for several years
thereafter. Basra operation initially exposed continued factionalism and poor leadership
in ISF, but also
ability to rapidly deploy.
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
S
partial.
S
An estimated 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
Another $18 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making
false accusations against ISF members
U
unmet
U.
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.
Benchmark
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades
to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
authorities to make decisions, without political
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
Subsequent Actions
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge, and
significant additional capital funds in $22 billion supplemental budget of July 2008.
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.