Order Code RS21968
Updated May 12June 5, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed
to produce democracy, is instead a sectarian government incapable of reconciliation. The
Administration says that the passage of some key laws represents progress on national
reconciliation, and is a result of the U.S. “troop surge.” Others say that combat among
Shiite groups since March 2008, possibly motivated by provincial elections planned for
October 2008, shows that force will not stabilize Iraq. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law”
(TAL). The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was
proportional representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a
party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which
nine were multi-party coalitions. A female candidate occupied every third position on
electoral lists to produce 25% female membership. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall
population), perceiving electoral defeat, boycotted and won only 17 seats. At the
provincial level, Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council.
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr boycotted the elections as a sign of opposition to
the U.S.-led political process, and his supporters arefaction believes it is under-represented on the provincial
provincial councils in the Shiite south. After the elections, an interim government was
formed that
placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions, although it had Sunnis
as Assembly
speaker, deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister, and five other
other ministers. The presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal
Talabani and Da’wa (a Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirdstwo-
CRS-2
thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
CRS-2
appointed a 55-member drafting committee. It included, including only two Sunni Arabs, although
(15 Sunnis
were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, including the following provisions produced
a draft, providing for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to
hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the Kurdish region
(Article 140); designation of Islam
“a main source” of legislation and prohibiting laws
from contradicting the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 setting a 25%
electoral goal for women (Article 47);
allowing families to choose which courts to use for
family issues such as divorce and
inheritance (Article 41); making only primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and
including Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the
federal supreme court (Article
89). Many women opposed the two latter provisionprovisions as giving
too much discretion to
males of their families, and Islamic extremists in Iraq purportedly
cite these provisions to impose, including through killings,
to impose restrictions against women.
It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation
authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA), applicable until amended (Article 126),
and established a “Federation Council”
(Article 62), a second chamber with its size and
powers to be determined by subsequent
law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continue unresolved — centered on regional versus
central power.
The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new
autonomous “regions”
– reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117
allows each “region” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the
fielding of
militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109
requires the
central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields”
in proportion
to population, and gives “regions”regions a role in allocating revenues from new
energy energy
discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation – Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas
deposits, and favor centralized control of the oil industry and oil revenues. The Kurds want
to maintain
maximum regional control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a postDecember 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
four year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, 2006, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
to agree to Jafari’sanother Da’wa deputyfigure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies —
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front coalition. Another Consensus Front figure, the
hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR
speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two
deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National
National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of infighting. Of the
37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 11028), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15 — were required for
the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The
President has used the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by the
GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been achieved,
as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside commission
(headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results, as well as subsequent legislative actions and
implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major Iraq’s communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power
structure, but the Administration, as expressed in the April
8 and 9, 2008 testimony of
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, sees signs of
movement, movement toward reconciliation,
facilitated by a reduction in violence attributed partly to the 2007 - 2008
“troop surge.” The February
13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting)
of two significant laws
(amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national
budget, represented possible breakthroughs, although Ambassador Crocker and other U.S.
budget represented a
breakthrough, although U.S. officials say that theirthe effects will depend on implementation.
Others believe that these
legislative moves pale in significance to ongoing, and in some cases deepening, rifts
have done little to heal the rifts among Iraq’s
major communities. Some see a widening splitThese splits include that between Iraq Kurds and
Iraq’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite)
Sunni and Shiite), and within the Shiite community in the form of the often violent rift
between ISCI and the Da’wa Party on the one side, and the faction of Moqtada Al Sadr
on the other. The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab
assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a
figure already agreed to in
previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to
determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a
new flag was adopted
(January 22, 2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some
factions refuse to fly it. The De-Baathification reform law adopted January 12, 2008 could
result in the expulsion of more Sunnis from government than it re-instates factions refuse to fly it.
There is also a growing split within the Sunni community between the established
political parties and the tribal leaders who, as of 2007, have cooperated with U.S. forces
to expel the tribal leaders’ former allies, Al Qaeda in Iraq, from Sunni areas.
Signs point to a political strengthening of Prime Minister Maliki, who was reeling
in mid-2007 by
considered politically vulnerable in mid-2007 after the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the Consensus
by the
Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi. Those
Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet. Of those
those three have since been filled by new appointments and one returning Minister (Ali
Baban,
Minister of Planning). All blocs have resumed participating in the COR.
CRS-4
Some experts viewed fighting in southern Iraq and in Shiite sections of Baghdad in
late March 2008 as a setback to the assertions of progress on political reconciliation whether “top-down” or “bottom-up.” The fighting was sparked by a decision by Maliki
to send about 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat militias (Sadr’s Jaysh
al-Mahdi, or JAM, and Fadhila Party) in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with a
reported Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not
require the JAM to surrender or disarm, and in which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics
viewed the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of planned October 1,
2008 provincial elections in which Sadr’s movement is expected to do well, but the
Administration asserted the move was a bold decision by Maliki to confront criminals and
illegal militias. Sunni and Kurdish leaders saw the move as an indicator of increased
sectarian even-handedness, and subsequently rallied to Maliki; the Consensus Front is
currently negotiating a possible return to the cabinet (six seats). Subsequently, the ISF
has slowly gained control over formerly JAM controlled areas of Basra, but clashes have
continued with the JAM in Baghdad, despite a May 10, 2008 tentative ceasefire
agreement, as U.S. and Iraqi forces seek to stop JAM rocket attacks on U.S. installations.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents 30. Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. Minister of Planning). The Consensus Front has been negotiating since April
CRS-4
2008 to rejoin the cabinet (six seats), but a deal fell through in May 2008 when Maliki
refused to give the bloc some of the important ministerial positions it wanted, instead
offering what the bloc felt were relatively insignificant position such as Minister of
Communications. All blocs have resumed participating in the COR.
Maliki’s political position was enhanced by his willingness to confront fellow
Shiites, in this case the Sadr faction. In late March 2008, Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat militias (Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, Fadhila
Party, and Tharallah militia) in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with a reported
Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not require the
JAM to surrender or disarm, and in which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics viewed
the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of planned provincial elections
in which Sadr’s movement is expected to do well. Sunni and Kurdish leaders saw the
move as an indicator of increased sectarian even-handedness, and some rallied to Maliki.
Subsequently, the ISF has slowly gained control over formerly JAM controlled areas of
Basra, and U.S.-Iraq clashes with the JAM in Baghdad have tailed off following a May
10, 2008 tentative ceasefire agreement between Maliki and the Sadr faction.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. 2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents - 30. Sadr
faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in
January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5
million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
CRS-5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
Administrati
on Report
satis.1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
July 12
Administra
tion Report
(S)
satisfactory
GAO
unmet
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
satisfactoryS
2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
unsatis(U)
unsatisfact.
unmet
satisfactoryS
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
ensure equitable distribution of resources
unsatisU.
unmet
unsatisfact.U
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
semi-autonomous regions
satis.S
partly
met
satis.S
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a
date for provincial elections
satis. on (a)
and unsatis.
on the S on (a) and
U on the
others
overall
unmet;
(a)
met
satis.S on (a)
and (c). and
(c)
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions do
not allow a
rating
conditions do
do not allow
a rating
conditions
do not allow
rating
satis.S
unmet
Same as
July
unmet
Same as July
met
met
July
met
met
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
Subsequent Actions
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional powers
and and
presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing
amendments. Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for
recommendations repeatedly extended, now tobeyond latest May 2008 deadline.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in COR
present. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and
3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions instead. Could
allow . But, could allow
for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 exBaathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-Saddam security
personnel personnel
from regaining jobs. Seven members to be nominated toby the cabinet to a High
Commission that will implement the law.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes; only
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably,
and 2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains 17% revenue sharefor KRG.
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshholdthreshold to form new
regions, but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. No active
movement to form new regions yet evident.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13,
2008, took effect April 2008 after dropping of presidential council objection to
provision for BaghdadBaghdad’s ability to remove provincial governors. Election law due by May
2008 and provincial elections planned by October 1,In order to meet October 1,
2008 election schedule, election law was due by June 1, 2008. Law not yet
adopted because of differences over election system (Sadr faction wants “open
list”), meaning elections delayed until at least November 2008. Some of the nine
Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members to be replaced by UNAMI due to
“non-transparent” selection process, despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 detainees held by Iraq, passed on
February 13, 2008. Only a few hundred released to date due to slow judicial
process. Does not affect 25,000 detainees held by U.S.
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move
against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as
condition for their parties to participate in October 2008 provincial elections.
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
satis.
partial
satisfactory
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
GAO
Subsequent Actions
CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
Administrati
on Report
unsatis.
CRS-6
Benchmark
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities
to make decisions, without political
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
July 12
Administra
tion Report
S
GAO
partial
U
unmet
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
providing even-handed enforcement of law
unsatisU.
unmet
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will
not provide a safe haven for any outlaw,
regardless of sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
eliminating militia control of local security
satis.
partial
Overall
mixed.
Satis.(a);
unsatis. (b)
satis.
unmet
same as July
12
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating despite Basra
operation. 90,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
as potential Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
met
satis.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.S
partial
Mixed. S
on (a); U on
(b)
S
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
S
Subsequent Actions
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
Mixed: S to
pursue
extremists U
on political
interference
Mixed. S on
Iraqi
military, U
on police
S
No significant change. Still some, although diminished, concern over the Office
of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to
the ISF - favoring Shiites and excluding many Sunnis. Still, some politicallymotivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past year, the commander of the National
Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian or politically-motivated behavior.
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law
even-handedly, but acknowledges continued militia influence and infiltration in
some units.
unmet
same as July
12
met
S
U.
unmet
U
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
capital budget for reconstruction projects.
satis.S
met
satis.
S
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still armed, despite Basra
operation. 91,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combating Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
as potential Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operational, manyoperating, more than the 33
planned.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable
to to
secure Iraq internally until 2012; and against external threats not until 20182020. 2018-2020.
Basra operation widely viewed as exposing continued factionalism and
poor poor
leadership in ISF, but also ability to rapidly deploy.
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
satis.S
partial.
satis.S
An estimated 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was
spent. Another $18 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making
false accusations against ISF members
unsatis.U
unmet
unsatis.
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities
to make decisions, without political
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
GAO
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
Mixed: satis.
to pursue
extremists,
but unsat on
political
interference
overall
mixed. Satis.
on Iraqi
military,
unsatis on
police
satis
Subsequent Actions
No significant change. Still some, although diminished, concern over the
Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over
appointments to the ISF - favoring Shiites and excluding many Sunnis. Still,
some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past year, the
commander of the National Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian
or politically-motivated behavior.
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law
even-handedly, but acknowledges continue militia influence and infiltration in
some units.U.
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and
ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.