Order Code RS21968
Updated April 8May 12, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s current government is, the result of a U.S.-supported election process
designed designed
to produce democracy, although many believe it has producedis instead a sectarian
government incapable of reconciliation. The Administration says that, partly as a result
of the U.S. “troop surge,”the passage of some key laws represents progress on national
political reconciliation. Others say that the intense combat among Shiite groups in
March 2008 – possibly motivated by new provincial elections planned for October 2008
– shows that U.S. force and strategy alone will not yield a stable Iraq. See CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq:
Administration says that the passage of some key laws represents progress on national
reconciliation, and is a result of the U.S. “troop surge.” Others say that combat among
Shiite groups since March 2008, possibly motivated by provincial elections planned for
October 2008, shows that force will not stabilize Iraq. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law ”
(TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
proportional representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a
party, a coalition
of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which
nine were multipartymulti-party coalitions. A female candidate occupied every third position on
electoral lists to
produce 25% female membership. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall
population),
perceiving electoral defeat, boycotted and won only 17 seats. At the
provincial level,
Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council.
Radical Shiite cleric
Moqtada Al Sadr boycotted the provincial elections as a sign of opposition to
the U.S.-led
political process, and his supporters are under-represented on the provincial
councils in
the Shiite south. After the elections, an interim government was formed that U.S. officials
said under-represented Sunnis
placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions, although it had Sunnis as Assembly
speaker, deputy
president, deputy prime minister, defense minister, and five other
ministers. The
presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal
Talabani and Da’wa
(a Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
CRS-2
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
CRS-2
appointed a 55-member drafting committee which. It included only two Sunni Arabs,
although although
15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as advisors. In August
2005, the talks
produced a draft, including the following provisions: a December 31,
2007, deadline to
hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the
Kurdish region
(Article 140); designation of Islam “a main source” of legislation and
prohibiting laws
from contradicting the “established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1
setting a 25%
electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowing families to choose which
courts to use for
family issues such as divorce and inheritance (Article 41); making only
primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and including Islamic law experts and civil law
judges on the
federal supreme court (Article 89). These provisions concern many women
who fear that Many women opposed the latter provision as giving
too much discretion was given to males of their families, and Islamic
extremists in Iraq are purportedly citingpurportedly
cite these provisions to impose, including through
killings, restrictions against women.
It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation
authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA), applicable until amended (Article 126),
and established a “Federation Council”
(Article 62), a second chamber with its size and
powers to be determined by subsequent
law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continue unresolved — centered on regional versus
central power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new
autonomous “regions” – reaffirmed in an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117 allows each “region” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the
fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109
requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields”
in proportion to population, and gives “regions” a role in allocating revenues from new
energy discoveries. TheseDisputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons
hydrocarbons legislation – Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas
deposits, and
favor centralized control of the oil industry and revenues. The Kurds want
to maintain
maximum regional control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a postDecember 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies —
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front coalition. Another Consensus Front figure, the
hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR
speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two
deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National
Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of infighting. Of the 37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 11028), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15 — were required for
the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The
President has used the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by the
GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been achieved,
as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside commission
(headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results, as well as subsequent legislative actions and
implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration, as expressed in the April
8 and 9, 2008 testimony of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, sees signs of
movement,
facilitated by a reduction in violence attributed at least partly to the 2007 - 2008
“troop
surge.” The February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting)
of two
significant laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national
budget,
represented assertedpossible breakthroughs, although Ambassador Crocker and other U.S.
officials say that their effects will depend on implementation. Others believe that these
legislative moves pale in significance to ongoing, and in some cases deepening, rifts
among Iraq’s major communities. Some see a widening split between Iraq Kurds and
Iraq’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite). The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab
assertions that the 17% revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a
figure already agreed to in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to
determine long term percentage allocations for the Kurds. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a
new flag was adopted (January 22, 2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some
factions refuse to fly it. The De-Baathification reform law adopted January 12, 2008 could
result in the expulsion of more Sunnis from government than it re-instates.
Prior to March 2008, signs pointedSigns point to a political stabilizationstrengthening of Prime Minister
Maliki, who was reeling
in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs,
including the Consensus
Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi. Those
withdrawals left the cabinet with about 1613 vacant seats out of a 37
CRS-4
seat cabinet. Of those
three have since been filled by new appointments and one returning
Minister (Ali Baban,
Minister of Planning). All blocs arehave resumed participating in the COR.
Many outside experts viewed the rapid spread of
CRS-4
Some experts viewed fighting in southern Iraq and in
Shiite sections of Baghdad in
late March 2008 as a setback to the assertions of progress
on political reconciliation - whether “top-down” or “bottom-up.” The fighting was
sparked by a decision by Maliki
to send about 7,000 additional 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
to Basra to defeat militias (Sadr’s Jaysh
al-Mahdi, or JAM, and Fadhila Party) in the oil
export hub. Major fighting ended with a
reported Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by
Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not
require the JAM to surrender or disarm, and in
which many ISF refused to which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics
viewed the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat
Sadr in advance of planned October 1,
2008 provincial elections in which Sadr’s
movement is expected to do well, but the
Administration asserted the move was a bold
decision by Maliki to confront criminals and
illegal militias. Some Sunnis saw the Maliki
Sunni and Kurdish leaders saw the move as an indicator of increased sectarian even-handedness. Subsequently, U.S.-JAM
clashes have continued in Baghdad as U.S. forces seek to stop JAM rocket attacks on U.S.
installations, and further violence could result from Maliki’s April 7, 2008 demand that
Sadr disband the JAM in order to participate in the provincial elections
sectarian even-handedness, and subsequently rallied to Maliki; the Consensus Front is
currently negotiating a possible return to the cabinet (six seats). Subsequently, the ISF
has slowly gained control over formerly JAM controlled areas of Basra, but clashes have
continued with the JAM in Baghdad, despite a May 10, 2008 tentative ceasefire
agreement, as U.S. and Iraqi forces seek to stop JAM rocket attacks on U.S. installations.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents 30. Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
CRS-5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
Administration
Administrati
on Report
satis.
unmet
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
satisfactory
2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
unsatis.
unmet
satisfactory
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
ensure equitable distribution of resources
unsatis.
unmet
unsatisfact.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semiautonomous
semi-autonomous regions
satis.
partly
met
satis.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
establish a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
authorities of
provincial bodies, and (d) set a
date for provincial
elections
satis. on (a) and
and unsatis.
on the
others
overall
unmet;
(a)
met
satis. on (a)
and (c).
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions do
not allow a
rating
conditions do
not allow
rating
satis.
unmet
Same as July
unmet
Same as July
met
met
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
GAO
Subsequent Actions
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional
powers
and presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing constitutional
amendments. Deadlines for CRC Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for
recommendations repeatedly extended,
now to May 2008.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in
COR COR
present. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their
jobs, and
3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions
instead. Could
allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to
firing of about 7,000 ex-BaathistsexBaathists in post-Saddam security services, and
bars ex-Saddam security
personnel from regaining jobs. Seven members to be nominated to High
Commission that will implement the law.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes;
only only
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed
equitably,
and 2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 at least temporarily
maintains existingmaintains 17% revenue share for Kurdish regionKRG.
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshhold to form
new new
regions, but main blocs agreed to moratorium on implementation until
that law would take effect April 2008. No active
movement to form new regions yet evident.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February
13,
2008, takestook effect April 2008 after dropping of presidential council
objection to
provision for Baghdad to remove provincial governors.
Election law due by May
2008 and provincial elections planned by October
1, 2008. Some of the nine
Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members
to be replaced by UNAMI due to
“non-transparent” selection process,
despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by Iraq (almost all
Sunnis - of about 20,000 detainees) passed on February 13, 2008. Does not
“non-terrorists” among 25,000 detainees held by Iraq, passed on
February 13, 2008. Only a few hundred released to date due to slow judicial
process. Does not affect 25,000 detainees held by U.S.
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as
move move
against militias. Many saw it as intra-Shiite strife.
No change
CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
Administration
Report
satis.
GAO
unsatis.
unmet
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as
condition for their parties to participate in October 2008 provincial elections.
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
satis.
partial
satisfactory
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
GAO
Subsequent Actions
CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
Administrati
on Report
unsatis.
unmet
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
providing even-handed enforcement of law
unsatis.
unmet
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
not provide a safe haven for any outlaw,
regardless of
sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
eliminating militia control of local security
satis.
partial
Overall
mixed.
Satis.(a);
unsatis. (b)
satis.
unmet
same as July
12
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating despite Basra
operation. 90,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
as potential Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
met
satis.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
satis.
unsatis.
met
unmet
satis.
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR
satis.
met
satis.
COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
capital budget for reconstruction projects equitably
satis.
partial.
satis.
About 4.5% of the $10 billion for capital projects spent by August 2007;
another $13.2.
satis.
met
satis.
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operational, many more than the 33
planned.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable
to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and against external threats not until 20182020. Basra operation widely viewed as exposing continued factionalism and
poor leadership in ISF, but also ability to rapidly deploy.
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
satis.
partial.
satis.
An estimated 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was
spent. Another $18 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making false
false accusations against ISF members
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
No change
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
to make decisions, without political
intervention, to
pursue all extremists, including
Sunni insurgents
and Shiite militias
partial14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
GAO
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
satisfactory
Mixed: satis.
to pursue
extremists, but
but unsat on
political
interference
continues
overall overall
mixed.
Satis. on Iraqi
military,
unsatis on
police
satis
Subsequent Actions
No change
No significant change
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce
law even-handedly.
Basra operation viewed by Administration as attempt to deny safehaven
to JAM and other militias.
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating despite
Basra operation. 90,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but
still distrusted as potential Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join
ISF to date.
No change
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely
unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and against external threats
not until 2018-2020. Basra operation widely viewed as exposing
continued factionalism and poor leadership in ISF.
No change
on Iraqi
military,
unsatis on
police
satis
Subsequent Actions
No significant change. Still some, although diminished, concern over the
Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over
appointments to the ISF - favoring Shiites and excluding many Sunnis. Still,
some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past year, the
commander of the National Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian
or politically-motivated behavior.
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law
even-handedly, but acknowledges continue militia influence and infiltration in
some units.
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and
ethno-sectarian violence fallen sharply in Baghdad.