Order Code RS20643
Updated April 7July 2, 2008
Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class (CVN-21)
Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requests $2,712 million in procurement
funding for CVN-78, the first ship in the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of aircraft
carriers, which was earlier known as the CVN-21 class. Although CVN-78 was
procured in FY2008, the Navy’s budget includes procurement funding for the ship in
FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011. The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget also requests
$1,214 million in advance procurement funding for CVN-79, the second ship in the
class, which the Navy wants to procure in FY2012. The Navy’s estimated procurement
costs for CVN-78 and CVN-79 are about $10.5 billion and $9.2 billion, respectively.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The Navy’s Current Carrier Force. The Navy’s current aircraft carrier force
includes one conventionally powered carrier, Kitty Hawk (CV-63), and 10 nuclearpowered carriers — the one-of-a-kind Enterprise (CVN-65) and 9 Nimitz-class ships
(CVN-68 through CVN-76). The most recently commissioned carrier, the Ronald Reagan
(CVN-76), was procured in FY1995 and entered service in July 2003 as the replacement
for the Constellation (CV-64). The next carrier, the George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), also
a Nimitz-class ship, was procured in FY2001 and is scheduled to enter service in 2008 as
the replacement for the Kitty Hawk.
The Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base. All U.S. aircraft carriers
procured since FY1958 have been built by Newport News Shipbuilding of Newport
News, VA, a shipyard that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
Newport News is the only U.S. shipyard that can build large-deck, nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers. The aircraft carrier construction industrial base also includes hundreds
of subcontractors and suppliers in dozens of states.
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CVN-77. CVN-77, which was named the George H. W. Bush on December 9, 2002,
is the Navy’s tenth and final Nimitz-class carrier. Congress approved $4,053.7 million
in FY2001 procurement funding to complete the ship’s then-estimated total procurement
cost of $4,974.9 million. Section 122 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R.
1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997) limited the ship’s procurement cost to $4.6
billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The Navy testified in 2006 that
with these permitted adjustments, the cost cap stood at $5.357 billion. The Navy also
testified that CVN-77’s estimated construction cost had increased to $6.057 billion, or
$700 million above the adjusted cost cap. Consequently, the Navy in 2006 requested that
Congress increase the cost cap to $6.057 billion. Congress approved this request: Section
123 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006), increases the cost cap for CVN-77 to $6.057 billion.
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class (CVN-21) Program. The Navy’s successor
to the
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier design is the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class design.
The The
design was earlier known as the CVN-21 class, which meant nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier for the 21st Century. Compared to the Nimitz-class design, the Ford-class design
will incorporate several improvements, including an ability to generate substantially more
aircraft sorties per day and features permitting the ship to be operated by several hundred
fewer sailors than a Nimitz-class ship, significantly reducing life-cycle operating and
support costs. Navy plans call for procuring at least three Ford-class carriers — CVN-78,
CVN-79, and CVN-80 — in FY2008, FY2012, and FY2016, respectively. Table 1 shows
funding for the three ships through FY2013.
Table 1. Funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80, FY1997-FY2013
(millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million; figures may not add due to rounding)
CVN
9700
019701
00
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Total
thru
FY13
Procurement (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN] account)
78
0 22 135 395 1163 623 619 736 2685 2712 688 679
0
0 10457
79
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53 124 1214 807 465 2312 2286 7261
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 201 886 1087
Subtotal
0 22 135 395 1163 623 619 789 2809 3926 1495 1144 2513 3172 18805
Subtotal
Research and development (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RDTEN] account)
78
308 231 277 317 306 350 303 284 202 223 153 109 107 106 3276
79
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
17
27
38
39
30
19
17 192
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
42
48
48 138
Subtotal 308 231 282 317 306 350 303 301 229 261 192 181 174 171 3606
TOTAL 308 253 417 712 1469 973 922 1090 3038 4187 1687 1325 2687 3343 22411
Source: Navy data provided to CRS on March 6, 2008.
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Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled
to enter service in 2015 as the replacement for Enterprise, which is scheduled to retire in
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2012, at age 52.1 The Navy projects that there will be a 33-month period between the
scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in November 2012 and the scheduled
commissioning of CVN-78 in September 2015. During this 33-month period, the Navy’s
carrier force will decline from 11 ships to 10.
As can be seen in Table 1, although CVN-78 was procured in FY2008, the Navy’s
FY2009 budget includes procurement funding for the ship in FY2009, FY2010, and
FY2011. This is consistent with Section 121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act
(H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), which granted the Navy the authority to
use four-year incremental funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. The Navy’s
proposed FY2009 budget requests $2,712 million in procurement funding for CVN-78.
The Navy estimates CVN-78’s total acquisition (i.e., research and development plus
procurement) cost at more than $13.7 billion. ThisAs shown in Table 1, this figure includes
about $3.23 billion in
research and development costs through FY2013, and (as shown in Table 1), a total of
about $10.5 about $10.5
billion in procurement costs. The procurement cost figure includes about
$2.4 billion for
detailed design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) work for the
CVN-78 class, and
about $8.1 billion for building CVN-78 itself. Including the DD/NRE
costs for a ship
class in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class is a traditional
Navy ship
procurement budgeting practice.
CVN-79 and CVN-80. The Navy wants to procure CVN-79 in FY2012 and have
it enter service in 2019. The Navy’s estimated procurement cost for CVN-79 is about
$9.2 billion in then-year dollars, and the Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requests $1,214
million in advance procurement funding for the ship. The Navy wants to procure CVN-80
in FY2016 and have it enter service around 2023. The Navy’s estimated procurement cost
for CVN-80 is about $10.7 billion in then-year dollars. As shown in Table 1, the Navy
plans to request an initial increment of $201 million in advance procurement funding for
the ship in FY2012.
Procurement Cost Cap. Section 122 of P.L. 109-364 establishes a procurement
cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors, and
a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus
adjustments for inflation and other factors. The conference report on P.L. 109-364
(H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) discusses Section 122 on pages 551-552.
Issues for Congress
Accuracy of Cost Estimate for CVN-78. Both the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have questioned the accuracy
of the Navy’s cost estimate for CVN-78. CBO reported in June 2008 that it estimates that
CVN-78 will cost $11.2 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, or about $900 million more
1
Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) expressed the sense of the Congress that CVN-78 should be named for president Gerald
R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78 would be so named. CVN-78
and other carriers built to the same design will consequently be referred to as Ford (CVN-78)
class carriers. For further discussion of Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship
Names: Background For Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Issues for Congress
Accuracy of Cost Estimate for CVN-78. Both the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have questioned the accuracy
of the Navy’s cost estimate for CVN-78.
than the Navy’s estimate of $10.3 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, and that if “CVN-78
experienced cost growth similar to that of other lead ships that the Navy has purchased
in the past 10 years, costs could be much higher still.” CBO also reported that, although
the Navy publicly expresses confidence in its cost estimate for CVN-78, the Navy had
assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the Navy
believes there is more than a 50% chance that the estimate will be exceeded.2
GAO reported in August 2007 that:
Costs for CVN 78 will likely exceed the budget for several reasons. First, the
Navy’s cost estimate, which underpins the budget, is optimistic. For example, the
Navy assumes that CVN 78 will be built with fewer labor hours than were needed for
the previous two carriers. Second, the Navy’s target cost for ship construction may not
be achievable. The shipbuilder’s initial cost estimate for construction was 22 percent
higher than the Navy’s cost target, which was based on the budget. Although the Navy
and the shipbuilder are working on ways to reduce costs, the actual costs to build the
ship will likely increase above the Navy’s target. Third, the Navy’s ability to manage
issues that affect cost suffers from insufficient cost surveillance. Without effective
cost surveillance, the Navy will not be able to identify early signs of cost growth and
take necessary corrective action.2
CBO testified in July 2007 that it estimates that CVN-78 will cost about $1 billion
more than the Navy estimates, and perhaps more than that. CBO also testified that,
although the Navy publicly expresses confidence in its cost estimate for CVN-78, the
Navy has assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the
Navy believes there is more than a 50% chance that the estimate will be exceeded.3
Technical Risk. The Navy faces challenges in developing certain new
technologies intended for CVN-21. Problems in developing these technologies could
delay the ship’s completion and increase its procurement cost. GAO reported in March
3
Technical Risk. The Navy faces challenges in developing certain new
technologies intended for CVN-21, particularly the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS) — an electromagnetic (as opposed to the traditional steam-powered) aircraft
catapult. Problems in developing EMALS or other technologies could delay the ship’s
completion and increase its development and/or procurement cost. GAO reported in
March 2008 that:
Five of 15 current critical technologies [for CVN-21] are fully mature, including
the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Six technologies are expected to approach
maturity, while four others will remain at lower maturity by construction contract
award.... Of CVN 21’s technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar (composed of the
volume search and multifunction radars) present the greatest risk to the ship’s cost and
schedule.... Challenges in technology development could lead to delays in maintaining
the design schedule needed for construction....
2
EMALS will not be tested at sea, but a production model is now scheduled to
begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing the generator and meeting
detailed Navy requirements have already led to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems
manufacturing the generator recently delayed testing scheduled to begin by February
2
Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009
Shipbuilding Plan, June 9, 2008, p. 20.
3
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Navy Faces Challenges
Constructing the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford within Budget, GAO-07-866, August 2007,
summary page. See also Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic
Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis,
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 15.
3
Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs,
Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 12-13..
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EMALS will not be tested at sea, but a production model is now scheduled to
begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing the generator and meeting
detailed Navy requirements have already led to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems
manufacturing the generator recently delayed testing scheduled to begin by February
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2008. The Navy is considering authorizing production of the generators prior to
completing initial testing in order to ensure delivery to support CVN 78’s construction
schedule. As a consequence, production may begin prior to demonstrating that the
generators work as intended. Timely delivery of EMALS remains at risk. Problems
that occur in testing or production will likely prevent EMALS from being delivered
to the shipyard to meet the construction schedule.
The dual band radar is being developed as part of the DDG 1000 [destroyer]
program.4 In 2007 DOD reassessed the multifunction radar’s readiness. Since modes
critical to CVN 21 have not yet been tested, including electronic protection and air
traffic control, the radar could not be considered fully mature. While the multifunction
radar has been tested at sea, considerable testing remains for the volume search radar.
Due to problems with a critical circuit technology, the volume search radar will not
demonstrate the power output needed to meet requirements during upcoming testing.
Full power output will not be tested on a complete system until the first production
unit in 2010, and the radar will not be fully demonstrated until operational testing on
DDG 1000 in 2013. Problems discovered during testing may affect installation on the
carrier scheduled to begin in 2012.
The advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests that proved the
system’s concept and tested components. Integrated testing with simulated and live
aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2009. Delays have led the Navy to consolidate test
events in order to maintain the shipyard delivery date, leaving little time to address
any problems prior to production. Late delivery will require the shipbuilder to install
this system after the flight deck has been laid, disrupting the optimal build sequence
and increasing cost.
Other technologies will not be fully matured by construction contract award, but
present less risk to ship construction....
According to the Navy, the design [for CVN-78] is on track to support construction.
However, the program may face challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to
delays in the receipt of technical information on some key technologies. In particular,
late delivery of information on EMALS is driving inefficiencies in design
development and must be resolved to prevent late delivery of design products needed
for construction.5
Decline in Carrier Force Between Enterprise Decommissioning and
CVN-78 Commissioning. As mentioned earlier, during the projected 33-month period
between the scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in 2012 and the scheduled
commissioning of CVN-78 in 2015, the Navy’s carrier force willcarrier force under Navy plans is to decline from
11 ships
to 10. 10 USC 5062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of at least 11
carriers. The
Navy in 2007 asked Congress for legislative relief to waiveto amend this lawprovision
so as to permit the carrier force to decline to 10 ships during the period between the
decommissioning of Enterprise and the commissioning of CVN-78. Congress in 2007 did
4
For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 Destroyer
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
5
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-08-467SP, March 2008, pp. 65-66.
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10 ships during the period between the decommissioning of Enterprise and the
commissioning of CVN-78. Congress in 2007 did not act on that request.
The Navy in 2008 has again asked to Congress that Congress to amend 10 USC
5062(b) to permit the carrier force to decline to 10 ships during the period between the
decommissioning of Enterprise and the commissioning of CVN-78. On March 6, 2008,
for example, the Navy testified that:
The Navy is committed to maintaining an aircraft carrier force of 11. However,
during the 33-month period between the planned 2012 decommissioning of USS
ENTERPRISE and the 2015 delivery of the USS GERALD R. FORD, legislative
relief is requested to temporarily reduce the carrier force to ten. Extending
ENTERPRISE to 2015 would involve significant technical risk, challenge our
manpower and industrial bases, and require significant resource expenditure; with
only minor gain for the warfighter in carrier operational availability and significant
opportunity costs in force structure and readiness. The Navy is adjusting carrier
maintenance schedules to meet the FRP and ensure a responsive carrier force for the
Nation during this proposed ten carrier period.6
Some Members, in hearings this year on the Navy’s proposed FY2009 defense
budget, have expressed ambivalence or reluctance to amend 10 USC 5062(b) to permit
the carrier force to decline to 10 ships during the period between the decommissioning
of Enterprise and the commissioning of CVN-78. Some of them have noted that if the
completion of CVN-78 is delayed because of problems in developing key technologies
or other issues, the period between the decommissioning of Enterprise and the
commissioning of CVN-78 could become longer than 33 months. The Navy has argued
that extending the service life of Enterprise to cover the projected 33-month period would
cost about $2.2 billion in ship-maintenance and other costs, and would result in only one
more 7-month deployment for the Enterprise during this period. The Navy states that the
this $2.2 billion cost is not currently programmed into the Navy’s budget, and that
incorporating this cost into its budget would reduce funding for other Navy programs.
Some Members have noted in response that, under 10 USC 5062(b), the Navy is
responsible for maintaining the carrier force consistently at 11 ships, and that the Navy
consequently is obliged to include this $2.2-billion cost in its budget plans.
Legislative Activity in 2008
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget was submitted to Congress in early February
2008.
6
Statement of Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, Before the House Armed
not act on that request. The Navy in 2008 has again asked Congress for legislative relief
on this issue.6
Legislative Activity for FY2009
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 110652 of May 16, 2008 and S.Rept. 110-335 of May 12, 2008, respectively) on the FY2009
defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001), recommended approval of the Navy’s
FY2009 procurement and advance procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program
(see page 79, lines 001-002 of H.Rept 110-652, and page 57, lines 001-002 of S.Rept.
110-335).
Neither committee agreed to the Navy’s request for legislative relief to temporarily
waive 10 USC 5062(b) so as to permit the carrier force to temporarily decline to 10 ships.
H.Rept. 110-652 states:
The committee notes that section 5062 of title 10, United States Code, requires
the Department of Defense to maintain 11 active aircraft carriers. The committee is
aware that the Department of Defense requested legislative relief to waive this
statutory requirement for the period between the proposed decommissioning of the
USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and the initial operating capability of the USS Ford (CVN78). The committee is concerned with the position of the Department of Defense,
especially since the Department recently reached a compromise with Congress to
reduce the statutory requirement from 12 aircraft carriers to 11 in section 1011 of the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law
109-364). Moreover, the committee notes that the period between the proposed
decommissioning of CVN-65 and the initial operating capability of CVN — 78 will
be a minimum of 33 months and may be more than 4 years, depending on the
construction progress of the first-of-class CVN-78 and its post-commissioning testing
and evaluation period.
Consequently, the committee rejects the request of the Department to allow a
waiver to section 5062 of title 10, United States Code, for the purpose of retiring
CVN-65 in fiscal year 2013. However, the committee understands that there are
significant schedule and cost implications associated with a depot maintenance period
which would be necessary to maintain CVN — 65 in active service after fiscal year
2013 and that, even with an overhaul, the CVN — 65 has limited nuclear fuel life.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to
the congressional defense committees on the cost and potential schedule implications
of either returning USS Kennedy (CV-67) to service or retaining USS Kitty Hawk
(CV-63) in service during the period between the scheduled retirement of CVN-65
and the commissioning of CVN-78. The committee directs the Secretary to include
in the report the number and location of dry-docks in United States shipyards, both
public and private, which have the capacity to dock and make repairs to either CV-63
or CV-67. The report should be submitted within 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, but in any event not later than February 3, 2009. (Page 81)
6
See, for example, the Statement of Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, Before
the House Armed Services Committee, 6 March 2008, p. 10.