Order Code RL33105
The United Kingdom:
Issues for the United States
Updated February 28, 2008
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Issues for the United
States
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
May 14, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33105
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States
Summary
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom as
Washington’s staunchest(UK) as the United
States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a
combination of factors: a shared sense of history and culture; the extensive,
including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; extensive and long-established bilateral
cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy, defense, and intelligence issues that
has developed over the course of many decades; and more recently, from the UK’s
strong support in countering terrorism and confronting Iraq. The United States and
Britain also share a and security issues; and the UK’s strong role in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States and the UK also cooperate closely on counterterrorism
efforts. The two countries share an extensive and mutually beneficial trade and economic
relationship, and are each
other’s biggest foreign direct investors.
Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic
question how “special” the “special relationship” is between Washington and
London. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair — who stepped down on June 27,
2007 — sought to build a good rapport with the Bush Administration to both
maximize British influence on the global stage, and to strengthen the UK as the
indispensable “bridge” between the United States and Europe. But many British
critics charged that Blair received little in return for his strong support of
controversial U.S. policies. Some suggest that new British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown may be less likely to allow the United States to influence UK foreign policy
to the same degree as did Blair, given the ongoing UK public unease with the war in
Iraq and the Bush-Blair alliance. Others contend that Brown is a strong supporter of
the Anglo-Saxon political alliance and economic model, and thus, is unlikely to
initiate any substantive changes in UK policy toward the United States.
Meanwhile, despite Britain’s traditional ambivalence toward the European
Union (EU), the UK, in its desire to play a key role in a bigger and more integrated
EU, may inevitably be drawn closer to Europe in the longer term. Analysts note that
some UK foreign policy impulses are closer to those of its EU partners than to the
United States. For example, like other EU member states, Britain places great
emphasis on multilateral institutions as a means for managing international crises and
legitimizing the use of force. Others argue that the conduct of British foreign policy
has never been nor will it ever be as simplistic as a black-and-white choice between
the United States and Europe. Preserving the UK’s position as a strong U.S. ally and
leading EU partner provides UK foreign policy with maximum flexibility to promote
its diverse interests in Europe and beyond. Consequently, the UK will continue to
seek close ties with both the United States and the EU for the foreseeable future.
This report assesses the current state of U.S.-UK relations. It examines the
pressures confronting London as it attempts to balance its interests between the
United States and the EU, and the prospects for the future of the U.S.-UK
partnership, especially in the unfolding Brown era. It also describes UK views on
political, security, and economic issues of particular importance to the United States,
and their implications for U.S. policy that may be of interest in the second session of
the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as needed. For information on
broader transatlantic relations, see CRS Report RL32577, The United States and
Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy, by Kristin Archick.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Blair Era (1997-2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The New Prime Minister: Gordon Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Brown, Foreign Policy, and Implications for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The UK Between the United States and the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
UK Foreign Policy Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Blair’s Transatlantic Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Relations Post-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Future Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Current Issues in U.S.-UK Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Countering Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
NATO and the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Defense Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Defense Industry Cooperation and Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The United Kingdom:
Issues for the United States
Introduction
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom as
Washington’s staunchest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a
combination of factors: a shared sense of history and culture; the extensive bilateral
cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy, defense, and intelligence issues that
has developed over the course of many decades; and more recently, from the UK’s
strong support in countering terrorism and confronting Iraq. Following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated
that he considered the attacks on the United States as attacks on Britain. Following
the deadly terrorist bombings in London on July 7, 2005 that killed 52 innocent
victims, the United States reciprocated, expressing solidarity with the British people
and government, and offering any intelligence, law enforcement, or other assistance
necessary. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in the 109th Congress each
passed unanimous resolutions condemning the 2005 London attacks (see S.Res. 193
and H.Res. 356). U.S. and UK authorities have also been working together on the
investigation into the June 2007 failed car bomb attacks on London and Glasgow that
came a few days after Gordon Brown assumed the UK prime ministership from Blair.
The modern U.S.-UK relationship was largely forged during the Second World
War, and cemented during the Cold War by the need to deter the Soviet threat. It is
often described as the “special relationship” by policymakers and scholars, in
particular because of the unusually close U.S.-UK intelligence arrangement and the
unique U.S.-UK cooperation in nuclear and defense matters. The United States and
the UK have collaborated in collecting and sharing intelligence since World War II,
and London continues to share intelligence with Washington and other Englishspeaking countries (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) that it does not share with
its European allies or EU partners. UK-U.S. cooperation on nuclear technology also
dates back to the 1940s, and the United States has supplied Britain with the missile
delivery systems for its nuclear warheads since 1963. During the Cold War, the UK
served as a vital base for U.S. forces and cruise missiles and continues to host U.S.
military personnel, albeit at reduced levels. And U.S. defense planners view the UK
as one of only two European allies (the other being France) able to project significant
military force over long distances and in high-intensity conflict situations.1
1
For more information on the history of U.S.-UK intelligence and defense relations, see
John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984 (New York: St. Martin’s Press),
1984; Martin Rudner, “Britain Betwixt and Between,” Intelligence and National Security,
Winter 2004.
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Such long-standing cooperation has engendered a degree of mutual trust
between the United States and the UK that also extends to the diplomatic and
political fields. The United States and Britain are two of five permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council, and are founding members of NATO. U.S. and UK
officials, from the cabinet level to the working level, consult frequently and
extensively on the full spectrum of global issues. Many U.S. and UK diplomats
report often turning to each other first and almost reflexively when seeking to build
support for their respective positions in multilateral institutions or during times of
crisis, as in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United
States. Some say that the common language and cultural similarities as well as the
habits of cooperation that have developed over the years contributes to the ease with
which U.S. and UK policymakers interact with each other.
The mutually beneficial U.S.-UK trade and economic relationship is another
important aspect of the U.S.-UK partnership. The UK has the fifth largest economy
in the world, and is the fifth largest U.S. export market worldwide. Even more
significantly, the UK and the United States are each other’s biggest foreign investors.
U.S. military and economic supremacy, however, has caused many to
characterize the UK as the “junior” partner in the U.S.-UK relationship, and to note
that the relationship is more “special” to Britain than it is to the United States. In the
aftermath of World War II, as the British Empire crumbled and the UK’s relative
poverty and military weakness became evident, the United Kingdom made a strategic
decision to stick close to the United States as a way to preserve as much of its fading
power as possible, leverage its influence internationally, and better protect its
interests in Europe and the world. This has been a guiding principle of British
foreign policy, especially since the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, during which the UK was
forced to abandon its joint military operation with France and Israel in the Middle
East in the face of U.S. disapproval and economic pressure that led to a run on the
pound. Nevertheless, there have been numerous ups and downs in the U.S.-UK
relationship over the years.2
Former Prime Minister Blair, who stepped down as UK leader on June 27, 2007
after 10 years in office, sought to build a good rapport with both the Clinton and
Bush Administrations in order to further the “special relationship,” maximize British
influence on the global stage, and strengthen the UK as the indispensable “bridge”
between the United States and Europe. As a result, some claimed that London had
more political capital in and influence on Washington than any other foreign
government, especially during the Bush Administration. British critics, however,
charged that Blair got little in return for his unwavering support of controversial U.S.
policies in the fight against terrorism and in Iraq. Some have called for a
reevaluation of the U.S.-UK partnership. Others note that Blair paid a high political
price both with the British public and his own Labour Party for his close alliance with
2
C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations
since 1945 (New York: Longman, Inc.), 1992; Gideon Rachman, “Is the Anglo-American
Relationship Still Special?,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2001; Timothy Garton Ash, Free
World (London: Penguin Books), 2004.
CRS-3
Bush, and some suggest that future British prime ministers may chart a more
independent course from the United States.
Upon assuming office in 1997, Prime Minister Blair and his Labour Party also
pursued a larger role for the UK in the European Union (EU). The UK stood aside
in the early 1950s when the six founding continental countries began the European
project. British leaders feared that UK participation in European integration would
infringe too much on UK sovereignty and detract from rather than add to British
influence in the world. They also worried that the U.S.-UK special relationship
would be endangered, despite Washington’s assertions to the contrary. The UK
finally joined the European Community (EC), the EU’s predecessor, in 1973,
although many Britons have remained skeptical of the EU and ambivalent in their
support for further European integration. The UK has been a consistent supporter of
EU enlargement and Turkish membership in the EU, and Blair was a key driver of
EU efforts to forge an EU defense arm and common foreign policy. The UK,
however, does not participate in the EU’s single currency, the euro, nor in the EU’s
open borders system. Some analysts suggest that the UK may inevitably be drawn
even closer to Europe in the longer term, especially if tensions in the broader U.S.European relationship drive the two sides of the Atlantic apart.
Gordon Brown, who served as UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent to
the U.S. treasury secretary) throughout Blair’s tenure, took over as Labour Party
leader on June 24, 2007 in an uncontested election and became Prime Minister upon
Blair’s resignation on June 27, 2007. Brown and Blair have been both close political
partners and rivals for over two decades, and Brown has long aspired to succeed
Blair. Although many regard Brown as something of an unknown quantity as far as
foreign policy is concerned, most experts do not believe that he will make any major
substantive changes in relations with the United States. At the same time, Brown
will likely be cautious of developing too close of a personal relationship with Bush
given the British public’s unease with the Bush-Blair alliance and the war in Iraq.
This report assesses the current state of U.S.-UK relations. It examines how
“special” the special relationship is between Washington and London, the pressures
confronting London as it attempts to balance its interests between the United States
and the EU, and the prospects for the future of the U.S.-UK partnership, especially
in light of Gordon Brown’s assumption of the British prime ministership. It also
describes UK views on political, security, and economic issues of particular
importance to the United States, and their implications for U.S. policy.
The Blair Era (1997-2007)
Tony Blair became UK Prime Minister in May 1997, following his Labour
Party’s landslide victory that ended 18 years of Conservative (Tory) Party rule. Blair
became Labour Party leader in 1994, and is recognized as one of the key architects
of “New Labour,” prompting the party to abandon its statist, trade union past and to
embrace free markets and competition. In 2001, Blair decisively secured a second
term, and in 2005, the Labour Party won an historic consecutive third term in office,
albeit with a reduced parliamentary majority.
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Throughout his tenure, Blair pursued a policy mix of fiscal conservatism,
cautious social reform, and international engagement. He was fortunate to preside
over a period of UK economic expansion that began in 1993; between 1997 and
2001, real GDP grew by an annual average of 3.1%. Unemployment is low at just
under 5%, and growth continues in the 2-3% range, although it has slowed since the
2001 global economic downturn. Key domestic goals for Blair included improving
the delivery of public services, promoting government reforms, and tackling crime,
immigration, and asylum issues. Many analysts view Blair as achieving some
progress in these areas, but perhaps falling short of the high expectations set in 1997
for sweeping reforms. Blair is widely credited, however, with being a driving force
behind a political settlement in Northern Ireland, a problem that many say he devoted
more time and attention to than any other British prime minister. He was
instrumental in forging the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and pushing the parties in
succeeding years toward fully implementing the peace plan and sharing power, a
process that culminated in May 2007 with the return of self-rule to Northern Ireland.
Internationally, Blair did not shy away from the use of military force, especially
to further humanitarian aims, such as stopping ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.
The September 2001 attacks on the United States put countering terrorism on the top
of Blair’s agenda, and he is viewed as one of the few European leaders who largely
shared President Bush’s vision of the fight against terrorism as one between “good
and evil.” British forces participated in the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan
from its start in October 2001, and Blair shared Bush’s belief that Iraq under Saddam
Hussein posed an immediate threat to international security.3
Public opposition to the UK role in the war in Iraq and domestic questions about
Blair’s trustworthiness contributed significantly to Labour’s diminished
parliamentary majority (from 161 to 66 seats) in the 2005 elections. Although
Labour won roughly 35% of the national vote, this represented a decrease of over 5
percentage points from Labour’s share of the vote in 2001, and the lowest share for
any majority British government in modern history. Since 2003, Blair had come
under repeated fire, including from some prominent members of his own party, for
allegedly exaggerating intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear and biological weapons
capabilities and misleading the UK into war. Labour’s opponents used ongoing
British casualties in Iraq and government documents leaked during the campaign —
that some suggested proved that Blair was committed to the use of force in Iraq as
early as the summer of 2002 — to keep the Iraq war and Blair’s character as
dominant issues in the election. In his own constituency, Blair was unsuccessfully
challenged for his seat by the father of a British soldier killed in Iraq.
Some critics contend that Labour was returned to power in 2005 despite, not
because of, Tony Blair. Both the Conservatives and the other main, albeit smaller,
opposition party, the Liberal Democrats, made net gains at Labour’s expense in the
2005 elections. However, they were largely unable to convince voters that they
3
“The Tony Blair Story,” BBC News, May 10, 2007; “How Will History Judge Blair?,”
BBC News, May 10, 2007; Quentin Peel, “Led Astray,” Financial Times, May 11, 2007;
“The Great Performer Leaves the Stage,” The Economist, May 12, 2007.
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represented real alternatives on domestic issues, especially given continued UK
economic growth.4
Table 1. May 2005 UK General Election Results
Party
# of Seats
(646 total)
Net # of Seats
+/ —
% of Vote
Labour
356
- 47
35.3%
Conservatives
198
+33
32.3%
Liberal Democrats
62
+11
22.1%
All Others
30
+3
10.3%
Source: “Full National Scoreboard,” BBC News, June 24, 2005.
British involvement in the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular, especially
amid Iraq’s difficult security situation and the ongoing political and ethnic strife.
Many commentators view Iraq as Blair’s greatest failure. Over the last few years,
some say that Iraq has also overshadowed much of Blair’s domestic agenda and other
international priorities, such as resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some credit
Blair, however, in succeeding in putting global climate change and African
development high on the international agenda.
Some analysts also contend that Blair’s ambitions to position the UK as a leader
in Europe were weakened by Blair’s close alliance with the Bush Administration.
They note that the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 bitterly divided the EU, and pitted
Blair against the former leaders of France and Germany, who strongly opposed the
use of force in Iraq. Moreover, they suggest that Blair’s limited political capital in
the aftermath of the war in Iraq further circumscribed his government’s ability to
bring the UK into the EU’s single currency, or to significantly reduce British
skepticism of the EU integration project. Although Blair initially championed a
proposed EU constitutional treaty implementing major internal reforms, much of the
British public feared that some changes could pave the way for an EU superstate. At
Blair’s final EU summit in June 2007, EU leaders agreed to what some view as a less
ambitious EU reform treaty, in part because Blair secured a number of changes to
guard British national prerogatives in the areas of foreign policy and home affairs.5
4
Christopher Adams, “Blair Defends Decision for War with Iraq,” Financial Times, May
2, 2005; Glenn Frankel, “Blair Wins Third Term,” Washington Post, May 6, 2005;”Who
Deserted Labor?,” BBC News, May 7, 2005.
5
“Blair in Europe: A False Messiah?,” BBC News, June 18, 2007; Tobias Buck, “EU Treaty
Breaks Years of Deadlock,” Financial Times, June 24, 2007.
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The New Prime Minister: Gordon Brown
Gordon Brown, 56, served as Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent to the
U.S. treasury secretary) throughout Blair’s tenure. As noted above, Brown and Blair
have been both close political partners and rivals for over two decades. They first
met in 1983, when they entered the House of Commons and shared an office as new
Members of Parliament. Brown and Blair discovered a mutual frustration with
Labour’s direction and the left-wing in-fighting; they were both convinced that
Labour had to change if it was ever going to win power again. The two quickly
became inseparable, and were both promoted into Labour leadership positions.
By 1994, however, Brown and Blair found themselves pitted against each other
as rivals for party leader. Brown and Blair had been joined in their mission to
modernize the party by Labour media chief Peter Mandelson, who reportedly became
convinced that Blair was the more charismatic of the two and better positioned to win
over crucial middle-England swing votes. A much commented on, but never
explicitly confirmed, deal was struck between Brown and Blair at the Granita
restaurant in north London. Brown supposedly agreed to stand aside to give Blair a
clear run at the leadership post, in return for a promise that Brown would become
chancellor in a future Blair government, be given unprecedented influence as
chancellor over domestic policy, and that Blair would hand over power to Brown at
a future date (rumored to be after Blair served two terms in office). Analysts say that
as the years went on, Brown came to believe that Blair had reneged on a key part of
the “Granita deal” and intended to remain as prime minister far longer than originally
planned. The tensions between the two, and their respective supporters, grew over
time, even as Brown remained publicly loyal to Blair.
In 2004, Blair came under increasing pressure over Iraq — including from many
prominent members of his own party — and faced questions about his health after
suffering heart problems. Blair attempted to kill the rampant speculation that he
might quit by announcing that he intended to fight the upcoming 2005 general
election, serve a full third term, but then stand down, allowing his successor to fight
a fourth term. Political commentators note, however, that this announcement only
served to increase speculation about Blair’s departure date, and led opponents —
both within and outside of Labour — to brand him as a “lame duck.”
Although Brown staunchly backed Blair in the 2005 election, observers suggest
that Brown supporters began to call more insistently for Blair to announce a
resignation date, especially given the election results and Labour’s diminished
parliamentary majority. Tensions came to a head in the summer of 2006, following
an interview in which Blair seemed to indicate that he would not step down for
several more years and in the midst of his failure to swiftly condemn Israel’s
bombing of Lebanon. Blair’s decision on Lebanon, which was in line with Bush
Administration policy, was viewed by many in Labour as yet another example of
Blair’s subservience to Washington, and some say was the final straw for many
normally loyal Labourites. Several junior ministers in Blair’s government resigned,
and Blair apparently faced a threatened coup from within the Labour Party.
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As a result, in September 2006, Blair publicly announced that he would resign
within a year. In early May 2007, Blair set June 27 as the date he would step down.
Some say this date was chosen to allow Blair to attend one last EU summit and one
final G8 summit in June 2007 as prime minister. Brown took over as Labour Party
leader on June 24, in an uncontested election, and became Prime Minister on June
27 following Blair’s resignation.
Brown hails from Scotland and is the son of a Presbyterian minister.
Recognized early on as academically gifted, he entered university at the age of 16,
and spent time as a university lecturer and television journalist before becoming an
MP. He is married with two young sons; the couple’s first child, a daughter, was
born prematurely and died shortly after birth. Some political commentators note that
Brown’s marriage and children have helped transform his public persona from a
bookish, dour, workaholic bachelor into a more approachable, outgoing, family man
with wider electoral appeal.6
Upon entering office, Brown and the Labour Party enjoyed an initial honeymoon
period. Opinion polls for most of the summer of 2007 showed Brown and Labour
ahead of the rival Conservative Party for the first time in almost a year. The
Conservatives had benefitted from declining public support for Blair and from their
new, younger leader, David Cameron, who sought to modernize the party and make
it more inclusive. Brown, however, received high marks over the summer for his
government’s effective response to the June 2007 failed car bomb attacks in London
and Glasgow, serious flooding in the UK, and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth cattle
disease. Brown also stressed the need to regain public trust, regarded by many
Labourites as one of the biggest casualties of the Blair government and its perceived
“spin” obsession. As such, Brown sought to increase public accountability with
proposals to establish a ministerial code of conduct and give Parliament more
oversight authority. Brown also emphasized domestic issues, in part some suggest
to contrast with his predecessor’s focus on foreign policy, and announced that he
would put priority on improving housing, health care, and education.7
In light of the favorable opinion polls in the summer of 2007, there was intense
media speculation that Brown might call an early election in the fall in order to gain
a public mandate as prime minister. Press reports suggested that Brown and his
political advisors had begun the process of planning for an autumn snap election. In
October 2007, however, Brown announced that he would not call an early election
in order to give himself more time to prove himself to voters. Analysts point out that
Brown’s decision came amid some political missteps (for example, a bungled
announcement about the number of UK forces that would be withdrawn from Iraq by
the end of the year), and polls in late September 2007 showing that the Conservatives
6
Christopher Adams, “Blair Tackles Dissent on Mideast Policy,” Financial Times, August
3, 2006; “Blair’s Middle East Stance Weakens His Authority,” Reuters, August 3, 2006;
“The Gordon Brown Story,” BBC News, June 27, 2007; “Why Tony Blair Is Stepping
Down,” BBC News, June 27, 2007.
7
“Brown Promises Change of Style,” Financial Times, June 24, 2007; “Britain’s Brown
Ahead in Polls After Week in Power,” Agence France Presse, July 7, 2007.
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would be poised to reduce Labour’s parliamentary majority in an early election. The
next UK general election must be held by spring 2010.
Observers assess that Brown’s decision to not call an autumn election in the face
of less favorable opinion polls severely damaged his political credibility and Labour’s
standing with voters. Some commentators believe that Brown’s decision shattered
the image he had sought to cultivate as a serious, “above politics” leader, in contrast
to certain public perceptions of Blair. Since then, the Brown government has been
buffeted by a series of crises, including the loss by government officials of personal
data on 25 million citizens and a Labour Party funding scandal. Polls in early 2008
show the Conservatives ahead of Labour by an average of four percentage points. In
an effort to regain the political initiative, press reports indicate that the Brown
government will embark in 2008 on a new round of “New Labour” reforms ranging
from immigration to welfare. Analysts note that Brown is unlikely to call for a new
election until 2009 at the earliest.8
Brown, Foreign Policy, and Implications for the
United States
Although many regard Prime Minister Brown as something of an unknown
quantity as far as foreign policy is concerned, most experts do not believe that he will
make any major substantive changes in relations with the United States. He is largely
expected to seek to retain the UK’s position as a key and influential U.S. ally. They
note that Brown has long been a strong supporter of the Anglo-Saxon political
alliance and economic model. In one of his first major foreign policy speeches in
November 2007, Brown asserted that “I believe our ties with America — founded on
values we share — constitute our most important bilateral relationship.”9
At the same time, some analysts suggest that Brown may be less likely to allow
the United States to influence UK foreign policy to the same degree as has Blair, in
part because Brown is viewed as more in tune with the Labour Party faithful. One
pundit put it this way: “Other things being equal, Brown would want to be a good
ally of the Americans. But he would care more about what the Party thinks.”10 Many
argue that at a minimum, Brown has been cautious of developing too close of a
personal relationship with President Bush given the British public’s unease with the
Bush-Blair alliance and the war in Iraq. During Brown’s first meeting as prime
minister with Bush in July 2007, commentators noted a clear difference in personal
dynamics between the two leaders, with Brown at pains to demonstrate a strictly
8
Jane Perlez, “British Prime Minister Opts Not To Have Elections in November,” New York
Times, October 8, 2007; Alex Barker and George Parker, “From the Shadow of His Bunker
Emerges a Battered Brown,” Financial Times, February 6, 2008; Andrew Grice, “Drifting
Tories See Poll Lead Cut in Half,” The Independent, February 7, 2008.
9
As quoted in “British PM Says Ties with U.S. a Priority,” Washington Post, November 12,
2007.
10
As cited in Glenn Frankel and Dan Balz, “Facing Roadblocks, Blair Quietly Begins Third
Term,” Washington Post, May 7, 2005.
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business-like relationship with Bush in contrast to the more informal, relaxed, cozy
atmosphere that prevailed during Bush-Blair visits. Others point out that Brown has
little incentive to develop a close relationship with Bush given that his term in office
will end in early 2009.11
The Brown government continues to support UK military and reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan, and has proceeded with Blair’s plan to reduce British forces
in Iraq, but not completely withdraw them at present. In October 2007, however,
Brown announced a further reduction of UK troops in Iraq, to roughly 2,500 by
spring 2008. Some analysts speculate that Brown is reviewing how long British
troops will stay in Iraq in the longer term, and this could pose a crucial test for the
U.S.-UK relationship (see below for more information). Regarding other foreign
policy priorities, Brown has sought to put renewed focus on promoting development
and education in Africa (a cause he championed while Chancellor), and is continuing
Blair’s pursuit of an international agreement on climate change.
As for UK relations with the EU, Brown is viewed as desiring an outwardlooking, economically vibrant EU and has sought to put more emphasis on this goal
than on deeper integration. Brown is often perceived as more euroskeptic than Blair,
a reputation he earned in part because of his opposition to Britain joining the single
European currency, the euro. Some observers assess that Brown has been largely
absent on the EU scene since assuming the prime ministership, both because of his
own ambivalence toward the EU and his focus on winning the next UK election.
Also, they suggest that Brown has been anxious to keep the EU off the public radar
screen given his government’s decision to ratify the new EU reform treaty (the
Lisbon Treaty) through parliament rather than risk holding a public referendum that
might fail and throw the EU into a new crisis. Brown reportedly views the Lisbon
Treaty as necessary to enable an enlarged EU to function more effectively, but has
also asserted that it should mark the end of EU institutional reform for the
foreseeable future, thereby allowing the EU to focus on other global concerns.
Brown’s assumption of the UK prime ministership followed the installation of
new leaders in Germany (Angela Merkel became Chancellor in 2005) and France
(Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President in May 2007). Merkel and Sarkozy are
widely viewed as sharing Brown’s inclinations toward putting the EU on a less
federalist, more reform-oriented path. Merkel and Sarkozy are also regarded as more
Atlanticist than their predecessors, and like Brown, favor a strong U.S.-EU
partnership. Many believe this new EU leadership trio will help to improve the
broader U.S.-European relationship. Others note that U.S.-EU differences on a
number of trade and foreign policy issues persist, and that none of the three new
leaders are likely to subjugate the national interests of their respective countries, or
of Europe, to that of the United States.12
11
Phillip Stephens, “The Ties That Bind Bush and Brown,” Financial Times, April 23,
2007; Jean Eaglesham, “Brown and Bush Take Measure of Each Other,” Financial Times,
July 30, 2007; Jim Rutenberg, “Bush and Brown Are Allies If Not Buddies,” New York
Times, July 31, 2007.
12
Molly Moore, “New Leadership Trio Could Put Europe Back on Political Map,”
(continued...)
CRS-10
The UK Between the United States and the EU
UK Foreign Policy Trends
As noted above, strong relations with the United States have been a cornerstone
of UK foreign policy, to varying degrees, since the 1940s. Most UK policymakers
have looked upon being a loyal ally to the United States as a way to magnify the
UK’s influence internationally and protect its global interests. In 1944, the UK
Foreign Office described its American policy as being to “steer this great unwieldy
barge, the United States, into the right harbor.”13 UK officials long viewed
themselves as America’s foreign policy guide and mentor, often attempting to quietly
exert restraint. Some experts suggest that the United States has been more inclined
to listen to the UK than to other European allies because of the UK’s more significant
military capabilities and willingness to use them against common threats.
The UK has also viewed maintaining good relations with the EU as an essential
part of British foreign policy, despite ongoing British ambivalence toward the EU.
The British government’s decision in the 1960s to apply for membership in the
European project was largely driven by concerns that the UK economy was suffering
from being outside the club, as well as fears that France’s political dominance of the
experiment was growing too strong. Ever since the UK acceded to the EC/EU in
1973, successive British governments have sought to balance British interests
between Washington and Brussels.
At the same time, some UK foreign policy impulses are closer to those of its EU
partners than to those of the United States. This has become more evident as the EU
has evolved into a political as well as economic actor and in the years since the 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States. Like its other EU partners, Britain places great
emphasis on multilateral institutions as a means for managing international crises and
legitimizing the use of force. Meanwhile, the United States views this approach as
only one option. Furthermore, the UK’s colonial history in the Middle East and its
relatively large Muslim community (between 1.5 to 2 million Muslims out of a
population of roughly 60 million) influences some of its policy choices in ways that
are distinct from those of the United States. For example, London views resolving
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a top priority — maintaining that it is the key to
reshaping the Middle East and decreasing the terrorist threat both at home and abroad
— while Washington stresses that peace and stability in the Middle East will not be
possible until the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are
confronted and removed.
12
(...continued)
Washington Post, May 20, 2007; George Parker, “Brown Says EU Reform Is Over,”
Financial Times, October 19, 2007; George Parker, “Brown Takes His Eye Off the EU
Ball,” Financial Times, November 26, 2007.
13
As quoted in Robin Harris, “The State of the Special Relationship,” Policy Review,
June/July 2002.
CRS-11
Blair’s Transatlantic Bridge
Upon entering office in 1997, Blair promoted the UK as the “transatlantic
bridge” between the United States and the EU. Blair’s “bridge” concept was
essentially an extension of long-standing British foreign policy tendencies, and was
meant as a way to engineer a stronger role for the UK in the EU while preserving
Britain’s position as Washington’s most trusted and influential ally. Blair and his
advisors argued that close U.S.-UK relations gave the UK more influence in the EU,
while the United Kingdom would have more influence in Washington if it played a
central role in Europe. They suggested that Britain might cease to matter to
Washington if London was perceived as being a fringe player in an EU that was
pursuing enlargement and further integration. Former UK Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook asserted shortly after Labour’s election in 1997 that “Britain will be a more
valuable, and a more valued, ally of America if we do actually emerge as a leading
partner within Europe. Because a Britain which does not have influence in Europe
will be of less interest to Washington.”14
Other experts suggest, however, that the Blair government was also eager to
promote the UK as a leader in Europe to give Britain more options in its foreign
policy and decrease British dependency on the United States. Many UK
policymakers were alarmed by U.S. hesitancy in the early 1990s to intervene in the
Balkan conflicts, prompting serious questioning of U.S. reliability and NATO’s role
in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, Blair and many of his advisors believed
that Europe had failed to pull its weight diplomatically or militarily in the Balkans.
They recognized that the violence in the Balkans laid bare Europe’s inability to
manage or intervene in such crises on the European continent, let alone further afield.
As a result, they concluded that the European allies needed to be better prepared to
undertake peacekeeping or crisis management missions on their own in the event that
the United States chose not to participate.
In 1998, Blair reversed Britain’s long-standing opposition to the development
of an EU defense arm and threw greater support behind EU efforts to forge a
common foreign policy. The 1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo further exposed
Europe’s military weakness and gave added momentum to these initiatives. The
British moves were widely interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate Britain’s
leadership in Europe at a time when the UK’s influence had lessened due to its
absence from the launch of the EU’s single currency. Blair maintained that any EU
defense role should not undermine NATO, and argued that improving European
military capabilities would enable the allies to better share the security burden.
However, U.S. critics were suspicious that Britain’s policy reversal on an EU defense
arm indicated that the UK was inclined to support French ambitions to develop the
EU as a counterweight to the United States.
14
As quoted in “Britain Tough on Human Rights,” Associated Press, May 12, 1997; also see
Rachman, op. cit.
CRS-12
Relations Post-September 11
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, some
analysts contend that Prime Minister Blair hewed more closely to Washington than
to his other EU partners. Many argue that this was because Blair, unlike other
European leaders, immediately grasped how September 11 changed everything, both
for the United States, but also with regard to the international threat posed by
terrorists, especially if they were able to acquire weapons of mass destruction. UK
diplomats stress that Blair was deeply concerned about such threats, including the
one posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, long before September 11, 2001.
Regardless, after September 11, the Blair government made a strategic choice
to stand by the United States, and stuck with this choice as the Bush Administration
began to pursue regime change in Iraq. According to an account of a March 2002
Cabinet meeting by Robin Cook, who was then Leader of the House of Commons,
Blair stated that Britain’s national interest laid in “steering close” to the United States
because otherwise, the UK would lose its influence to shape U.S. policy. He argued
that by seeking to be the closest U.S. ally, Britain stood a better chance of preventing
Washington from overreacting, pursuing its objectives in Iraq in a multilateral way,
and broadening the U.S. agenda to include what the UK and other EU partners
viewed as the root causes of Islamist terrorism, such as the ongoing IsraeliPalestinian conflict.15
The degree to which the UK has successfully influenced U.S. policy choices in
the war on terrorism, Iraq, and other issues has been a topic of much debate on both
sides of the Atlantic. UK officials contend that Blair played a crucial role in
convincing the Bush Administration to work through the United Nations to disarm
Iraq, even though this initiative ultimately failed. They argue that the priority Blair
placed on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict helped encourage U.S. efforts in
the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war in the late spring of 2003 to become more
engaged in the search for peace. British officials also point to the 2001 war in
Afghanistan, the 2002 Indian-Pakistani nuclear crisis, and the rehabilitation of Libya
as issues where the UK has worked closely with the United States and affected U.S.
policy choices. For example, the UK was instrumental in pressing for a meaningful
international peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan, which resulted in the creation
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).16
In addition, British diplomats cite the close relationship and trust built between
Prime Minister Blair and President Bush as a key reason why the UK gained U.S.
acquiescence to the December 2003 NATO-EU deal to enhance EU defense planning
capabilities. Many U.S. officials had worried that allowing the EU to develop its
own operational planning cell would duplicate and compete with NATO structures,
and be a first step in driving the alliance apart. However, Blair reportedly called
Bush at least twice to discuss the issue and reassure him that the new EU planning
cell would not weaken NATO, thereby securing U.S. support. President Bush
15
Ash, op. cit., p. 49; and Glenn Frankel, “From Memos, Insights Into Ally’s Doubts on Iraq
War,” Washington Post, June 28, 2005.
16
Discussions with UK officials and experts, Spring-Summer 2005.
CRS-13
asserted publicly that he believed that Blair would “be true to his word” that the EU
plan would not undermine the alliance.17 Most recently, some point to the signing
of a U.S.-UK treaty on defense cooperation as another tangible benefit of the close
U.S.-UK relationship cultivated by Blair. Signed in late June 2007 on one of Blair’s
final days in office, the treaty, among other measures, seeks to ease the export of
sensitive U.S. defense technology to the UK, something long pressed for by British
officials.
Critics contend, however, that Blair got little in return for his staunch support
of controversial U.S. policies. Over the last few years, many British commentators
have described Blair as the American president’s “poodle.” Blair opponents point
out that he did not succeed in keeping the United States on a multilateral path with
regard to the use of force in Iraq, and although Blair supported giving the United
Nations a significant role in reconstructing Iraq, the Bush Administration initially
opted for more limited U.N. involvement. Although President Bush made some
efforts toward being more engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East in the
immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, British critics claim that Bush has not made
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a priority. UK critics have also suggested
that U.S. responses to Blair’s initiatives on African development and climate change
have often fallen short, and further demonstrate that Blair’s close relationship with
Bush has yielded few benefits for Britain.18
Some British officials complain privately that many U.S. policymakers expect
the UK to function automatically as the U.S. “water carrier” in the EU, that is, to
fight for U.S. policy positions on political and security issues such as EU defense
structures or EU relations with China. Although UK views on such issues often align
with those of the United States, British diplomats assert that U.S. reliance on the UK
to support U.S. interests in the EU or be the “peacemaker” often puts them in an
uncomfortable position, causing some EU members to view the UK as little more
than America’s Trojan horse. They argue that Washington must be more
sophisticated in managing its relationship with the EU, and should engage robustly
with other EU capitals, not just London, to argue for its point of view, especially
when potentially divisive issues are concerned.19
Future Prospects
UK officials argue that the conduct of British foreign policy has never been as
simplistic as a black-and-white choice between the United States and Europe. They
point out that UK foreign policy decisions have always been and will continue to be
determined primarily by British national interests, and these would not be served by
forcing a false and artificial choice between the United States and Europe. UK views
17
Judy Dempsey, “EU’s Big Three in Deal Over Defense,” Financial Times, December 11,
2003; Discussions with U.S. and European officials.
18
Glenn Frankel, “Party Critics Urge Blair to Stand Up to Bush,” Washington Post, October
1, 2004; Richard Stevenson, “In Bush Talks, Blair To Push Africa Aid,” New York TImes,
June 7, 2005; “Enough Payback for Iraq?,” BBC News, June 8, 2005.
19
Discussions with UK officials and experts, Spring-Summer 2005.
CRS-14
on certain international challenges may align more closely with one side of the
Atlantic or the other; preserving the UK’s position as a strong U.S. ally and leading
EU partner provides UK foreign policy with maximum flexibility to promote its
diverse interests in Europe and beyond. Consequently, the UK will continue to seek
close ties with both the United States and EU for the foreseeable future, regardless
of which party or personalities holds power in either London or Washington. Many
experts also note that British instincts toward protecting UK national sovereignty
from EU encroachment remain strong, and UK officials are not about to cede their
freedom of action in foreign policy and defense matters to the EU anytime soon.
Nevertheless, some analysts suggest that the balance in the triangular U.S.-UKEU relationship could change in the years ahead, with the UK ultimately drawn
closer to Europe. They point out that geographically, the UK is much closer to
continental Europe than to the United States, and over 50% of UK trade is with its
other EU partners. As a member of the EU, the UK has already given up some
sovereignty to the Union in certain areas, and is therefore bound to the EU in a much
more fundamental way than it is to Washington. Many believe it is only a matter of
time before the UK joins the euro, which would reduce the degree of UK
exceptionalism within the EU. In addition, commentators suggest that younger
Britons feel more European, and future generations of British policymakers, farther
removed from World War II and the Cold War, may not share the same conviction
as previous generations about the importance of the “special relationship.”
Several analysts argue that the effect of the Iraq war on the 2005 British election
may also make future British governments more hesitant about being as bold of a
U.S. ally as Blair was to the Bush Administration. Blair’s successors may be more
inclined to ensure that UK policies are in line with those of other major EU partners.
BBC correspondent John Simpson commented that, “For the first time since 1941,
it may no longer be the automatic choice to stick close to Washington... None of Mr.
Blair’s successors for the next half-century will entirely forget what happened to
Tony Blair [in the 2005 election] when he chose to support an American president
in preference to most of the rest of Europe.”20 Some suggest that the internal EU
crisis over Iraq also convinced Blair of the need to forge a more common EU foreign
policy, in part to help bolster the UK’s clout in Washington. In March 2003, during
Blair’s statement opening the debate on Iraq in the House of Commons, he asserted
that Europe, “with one voice,” should have firmly committed itself to backing the
United States in addressing the threats posed by Saddam Hussein, but demanded in
return that “the U.S. should choose the U.N. path and...recognize the fundamental
overriding importance of restarting the Middle East peace process.”21
At a minimum, some experts suggest that U.S. policymakers should not take
future British support for U.S. foreign policy choices for granted. They say the
United States will need to devote greater attention to managing the “special
relationship” and be willing to take British concerns on board. Several UK analysts
20
“Costly Victory for Chastened Blair,” BBC News, May 9, 2005. Also see William
Kristol, “An Electoral Trifecta,” Weekly Standard, May 16, 2005.
21
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech to the UK House of Commons, March 18, 2003.
CRS-15
point out that Brown and successor governments may make more explicit demands
of the United States in the future as the price for its support of U.S. policies.
Other UK-watchers maintain that the United States will retain an edge in the
triangular U.S.-UK-EU relationship, arguing that there is no place in British politics
for a UK foreign policy that does not put strong relations with the United States at
its center given the UK public’s euroskepticism and U.S.-UK cultural and historic
ties. Many also point out that the UK’s more liberal, free-style market economy is
more in line with the U.S. economic and social model than with the highly
protectionist, statist social systems that exist in much of continental Europe.
Furthermore, they suggest that the balance of power within the EU has shifted in
favor of the UK vision for the EU, which is outward-looking and Atlanticist. They
assert that following EU enlargement, France and Germany are no longer able to
drive the EU forward alone; this will make it easier for the UK to ensure that the EU
evolves in a U.S.-friendly way, minimize U.S.-EU tensions, and decrease pressure
on the UK to have to choose between Washington and Brussels.22
Current Issues in U.S.-UK Relations
As noted above, U.S.-UK cooperation is extensive and mutually beneficial on
a wide range of foreign policy, defense, and economic issues. At times, however,
UK national interests come into conflict with Washington and/or its EU partners.
This section examines some of the most prominent issues in U.S.-UK relations.
Although not exhaustive, the issues chosen seek to demonstrate instances of close
U.S.-UK cooperation as well as differences, and serve to evaluate the extent to which
some UK policy choices are influenced by competing U.S. and EU preferences.
Countering Terrorism
UK officials assert that London is Washington’s leading ally in the fight against
terrorism. UK forces participate in the U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq (see below), and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies serve as
key investigative partners for U.S. authorities in the fight against terrorism. Since
September 2001, the UK has sought to strengthen its counterterrorism legislation,
stem terrorist financing, and enhance its border controls.
In the wake of the deadly July 2005 terrorist attacks on London’s mass transport
system — carried out by four British Muslims — the former Blair government began
placing greater emphasis on promoting Muslim integration and combating
extremism. Approximately 1.6 million Muslims live in the UK, out of a total UK
population of almost 60 million. At the same time, the Blair government also
introduced legislation to make it easier to deport or exclude foreign individuals who
advocate violence and incite hatred. Other new security measures included extended
detention times for terrorist suspects and increased police surveillance powers over
mosques and other religious institutions. The June 29-30, 2007 failed car bomb
attacks on London and Glasgow have led to another review of UK security,
22
Discussions with U.S. and UK officials and experts, Spring-Summer 2005.
CRS-16
immigration, and border control measures. The failed attacks came two days after
Gordon Brown assumed the prime ministership. The Brown government is largely
expected to continue Blair’s efforts to both strengthen UK security measures against
terrorism and promote Muslim integration.23
Despite the ongoing close U.S.-UK cooperation against terrorism, some tensions
exist. Some U.S. critics assert that UK measures to clamp down on Islamist
extremists and Muslim clerics who espouse terrorism are long overdue. They charge
that traditionally liberal asylum and immigration laws in the UK, as well as the
country’s strong free speech and privacy protections, have attracted numerous radical
Muslim clerics claiming persecution at home. As a result, some say the UK has
become a breeding ground for Islamist terrorists, such as airplane “shoe bomber”
Richard Reid and the “20th” September 11 hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui, both of
whom were apparently indoctrinated at radical mosques in London. Until recently,
UK authorities have emphasized extended surveillance of extremists as a way to
gather intelligence, but some U.S. officials have expressed frustration with what they
view as dangerous delays in arresting terrorist suspects or instigators in the UK.24
The UK has been trying to balance its counterterrorism policies against wellestablished civil liberty protections and democratic ideals. At times, this has also
created tensions with the United States. For example, British courts have rejected
some U.S. extradition requests for terrorist suspects on the grounds of insufficient or
inadmissable evidence. Like its EU partners, London has also expressed serious
concerns about some U.S. practices in combating terrorism, such as the terrorist
detentions at Guantánamo Bay, U.S. rendition policy, and the CIA program to detain
and question terrorist suspects outside the United States. British officials fear that
such policies weaken Washington’s hand in the battle for Muslim “hearts and
minds.” However, U.S. and British officials discount worries that frictions over such
issues could impede future law enforcement cooperation, arguing that both sides
remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks and cooperation serves mutual interests. The
UK also supports EU efforts to improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation
both among its 27 members and with the United States.25
Afghanistan
Prime Minister Brown has reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to promoting
security and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The UK views doing so as
crucial to fostering stability in the region and protecting British national interests; UK
Foreign Secretary David Miliband has noted that many terrorist plots by Islamist
extremists uncovered in the UK can be traced back to the borderlands between
23
Stephen Fidler, “UK Forced To Confront Wider Threat,” Financial Times, July 2, 2007.
24
Steve Coll and Susan Glasser, “In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Haven,” Washington
Post, July 10, 2005; “Different Approach To Tackling Terrorism Exposed,” Financial
Times, July 12, 2005.
25
For more on UK efforts against terrorism, CRS Report RL31612, European
Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, and CRS
Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, both coordinated
by Paul Gallis.
CRS-17
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The UK shares U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s perceived
ineffectiveness both militarily and politically in curbing Al Qaeda and Taliban
elements on its territory. At the same time, British officials worry about nucleararmed Pakistan’s own stability, and some privately criticize the United States for not
developing a comprehensive strategic policy to engage Pakistan and other
neighboring countries in a regional stabilization effort.
UK forces participate in both the U.S.-led combat mission Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) against Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants and in the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that aims to stabilize the country and
assist in reconstruction efforts. About 7,800 British service personnel are deployed
in Afghanistan; most are combat units in ISAF and operate in the south of the
country. British combat aircraft support both OEF and ISAF. The UK, with
Denmark and Estonia, leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand
province that concentrates on promoting good local governance and economic
development. Although UK officials were initially hesitant about ISAF engaging in
combat operations as well as reconstruction activities, the British government has
adopted a more aggressive stance since summer 2006 following a resurgence of
Taliban activity. Like the United States, the UK has been urging fellow NATO allies
to increase their force contributions to better combat the Taliban and supports the
appointment of a “strong” U.N. envoy to coordinate international security,
governance, and developmental programs in Afghanistan.
The UK also leads international counternarcotic efforts in Afghanistan, and has
a vested interest in poppy interdiction and eradication given that most heroin found
in the UK comes from Afghanistan. The UK, however, is opposed to a U.S. proposal
to begin an aerial eradication program. Like most other European allies, the UK
argues that such an eradication effort would be ineffective and counterproductive.
Instead, the UK emphasizes the need for enhanced economic development measures
in order to curtail Afghanistan’s opium production and trade.26
Iraq
Like President Bush, Prime Minister Blair believed that Saddam Hussein and
his quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction posed an immediate threat to
international security. Although London would have preferred a second U.N.
resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, it ultimately agreed
with Washington to forego such a resolution given the opposition of veto-wielding
members France, Russia, and China. As noted earlier, Blair backed the U.S.-led war
in Iraq over significant public opposition and paid a political cost, especially within
his own Labour party, which was severely divided over the use of force.
26
Philip Stephens, “Basra to Helmand: From the Fyring Pan into the Fire,” Financial Times,
August 31, 2007; “Afghan Battle Being Won,” BBC News, December 12, 2007; Jonathan
Soble, “U.S. and Allies Split on Afghan Poppy Spraying,” Financial Times, February 5,
2008. Also see CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic
Alliance, by Paul Gallis.
CRS-18
About 45,000 British forces served with U.S. troops during the major combat
phase of the war. In June 2004, Washington and London worked together to gain
unanimous U.N. Security Council approval of a new resolution endorsing the transfer
of Iraqi sovereignty and giving the United Nations a key role in supporting Iraq’s
ongoing political transition. Echoing the view of other EU partners, the UK had been
a consistent advocate for a significant U.N. role in rebuilding Iraq to help bolster the
credibility of the international troop presence and the reconstruction process. The
Bush Administration had initially favored a more narrow, advisory U.N. role in Iraq.
UK officials assert that current UK and U.S. goals in Iraq are the same: to root
out the Iraqi insurgency, to support Iraqi efforts to establish democratic institutions,
and to build up Iraqi security capabilities. The UK has supported a role for NATO
in training Iraqi security forces. Despite the Bush Administration’s decision in early
2007 to augment U.S. forces in Iraq, namely around Baghdad, with a troop “surge,”
the former Blair government announced plans in February 2007 to reduce its forces
in southern Iraq to 5,500. UK officials insist that the drawdown was part of their
long-standing goal to progressively turn over provinces under British control to Iraqi
security forces, and that security conditions in the British areas in the south were
better than those in Baghdad. In October 2007, Prime Minister Brown announced
that the UK would further reduce its forces in Iraq to 2,500 by spring 2008.
Prime Minister Brown stresses that the UK remains committed to helping Iraq
achieve security, political reconciliation, and economic reconstruction. UK officials
also state that their force reductions are being carried out in consultation with U.S.
military planners. Nevertheless, some U.S. critics question the British contention
that security in southern Iraq is improving and thus makes the drawdown possible;
they view the drawdown as an indication that Brown hopes to extricate the UK from
Iraq as soon as possible, thereby distancing himself from his predecessor’s unpopular
policy ahead of the next UK election. According to media reports, some British
officials suggest that all UK forces may be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2008.27
Iran
The United States and the UK share similar goals with respect to Iran, including
encouraging reforms, ending Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, and curbing Tehran’s
nuclear ambitions. However, Washington has generally favored isolation and
containment, while London has preferred conditional engagement. The UK, with
France and Germany (the “EU3”), has been working to persuade Iran to permanently
end activities that could lead to nuclear weapons production in exchange for political
and trade rewards. In late 2004, Iran agreed to temporarily suspend its uranium
enrichment-related work, and Iran and the EU3 opened talks on a long-term
agreement on nuclear, economic, and security cooperation. UK officials stressed that
such engagement was the only practical option, argued that the EU3’s negotiations
were slowing Iranian nuclear progress to some degree, and urged U.S. involvement.
London welcomed the Bush Administration’s March 2005 decision to offer limited
economic incentives if Iran agreed to cooperate with the EU3 on nuclear matters. In
27
Stephen Fidler, “UK on Glide Path Out of Iraq,” Financial Times, October 8, 2007; Jane
Perlez, “Britain To Halve Its Forces in Iraq,” New York Times, October 9, 2007.
CRS-19
return, the Europeans pledged, if negotiations failed, to refer Iran to the U.N. Security
Council, where Iran could face trade sanctions.
The EU3’s negotiations with Iran have been stalled since August 2005,
following Iran’s resumption of uranium conversion, an early stage in the nuclear fuel
cycle. In December 2006, and again in March 2007, the EU3 and the United States
gained U.N. Security Council approval for limited sanctions on Iran related to its
nuclear work. Despite the release in December 2007 of a U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) concluding that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003,
U.S., British, and other European officials contend that Iran remains a threat given
that it continues to enrich uranium. The United States and the EU3 are continuing
to press for another round of U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran. Press reports
indicate that before the release of the NIE, the United States, Britain, and other EU
members were also considering a separate U.S.-EU sanctions package on Iran, but
that now appears unlikely in light of the NIE and some European concerns that a
separate package could undermine U.N. authority and EU diplomatic efforts in Iran.
U.S. officials have been urging European countries — including the UK — to
go even further than the U.N. sanctions and cut off bank lending and other financial
interactions with Iran. British officials have so far responded tepidly to such calls,
arguing that their legal system is more restrictive and does not permit quick action.
Some British banks, however, have voluntarily cut back business dealings with
Tehran and Iranian banks. For example, the UK’s largest bank (HSBC), has
announced that it will not conduct any new business with Iranian clients.
UK-Iranian tensions have risen following Iran’s seizure in March 2007 of 15
British naval personnel off the Iraq/Iran coast. Like the United States, the UK is also
concerned about Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, and has urged Tehran to play a
constructive role in bringing stability to that country and the region. Prime Minister
Brown has asserted that diplomacy and economic sanctions remain the preferred
course for managing the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear efforts, but he has refused
to rule out military action. However, many analysts doubt that the UK would have
much appetite for military intervention in Iran given the ongoing war in Iraq and
amid UK force overstretch issues.28
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The UK views a just and lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as
vital to promoting lasting stability in the region and diminishing the threats posed to
both the United States and Europe by terrorism and Islamist militancy. Like its EU
partners, the UK supports the two-state solution outlined in the largely stalled “road
map” for peace developed by the diplomatic “Quartet” of the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. Progress on the “road map” has
most recently been complicated by the January 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian
28
“U.S. Expected To Slap Sanctions on Iranian Bank,” Reuters, January 8, 2007; “Brown
Hopes for Diplomacy on Iran,” BBC News, October 8, 2007; “Six Powers Back U.N. Draft
on Iran,” Washington Post, January 23, 2008.
CRS-20
legislative elections, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza by force in June 2007, and the
resulting collapse of the Hamas-Fatah coalition government.
UK officials have repeatedly urged the United States to become more engaged
in the Middle East peace process. They argue that only sustained U.S. engagement
at the highest levels will force the parties to the conflict, especially Israel, back to the
negotiating table. Critics contend that Blair had little tangible success in this regard.
At times, the Blair government sought to inject its own momentum into the peace
process. In March 2005, for example, London hosted an international conference that
focused on promoting Palestinian efforts to democratize and reform. Press reports
indicate that London initially proposed a wider peace conference, but Washington
preferred a narrower approach. Some analysts suggest that Blair’s support for the
U.S.-led war in Iraq and his government’s reluctance to call for an early halt to
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 weakened
London’s influence and credibility as an honest broker in the region. Press reports
indicate that Prime Minister Brown will likely emphasize economic development as
key to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.29
The British government welcomed President Bush’s decision to hold an
international conference in November 2007 aimed at renewing the peace process.
The Annapolis conference resulted in a pledge by the Israelis and Palestinians to
work toward a final peace agreement by the end of 2008. Talks began in December
2007, but little progress has been made so far.
NATO and the EU
The UK strongly supports NATO and continued U.S. engagement in European
security. At the same time, the UK under Blair was a driving force behind EU efforts
to create an EU defense arm, or common European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP), to enable the Union to conduct military operations “where NATO as a
whole is not engaged” and to help boost European military capabilities. London
insists that ESDP be tied to NATO, despite traditional pressure from Paris for a more
autonomous defense arm. British officials stress that ESDP provides a more
compelling rationale for European governments to spend scarce resources on
improved defense capabilities that, in turn, will also benefit the alliance.
Some U.S. experts worried, however, that as the Blair government sought to
burnish its European credentials in the aftermath of the Iraq war, it became more
willing to cede ground to the French view on ESDP; they feared this could lead to a
duplication of NATO structures and erode NATO in the longer term. They were
critical of Britain’s acceptance of French-German-led efforts in 2003 to establish an
EU operational planning cell independent of NATO. UK officials counter that the
new EU cell considerably scales back earlier proposals for a European military
29
Upon leaving the prime ministership, Blair was named as the international envoy for
“Quartet.” Some press reports suggest that the Brown camp was not happy with Blair’s
appointment, viewing it as detracting attention from Brown’s plans to promote peace
through economic means. See James Blitz, “Blair Set for Mideast Envoy Role,” Financial
Times, June 24, 2007.
CRS-21
headquarters, and that language in the NATO-EU agreement paving the way for the
new EU cell reaffirms NATO as Europe’s preeminent security organization.30
Some observers suggest that Prime Minister Brown is not as enthusiastic as
Blair about ESDP. Reasons for Brown’s attitude toward ESDP range from being a
reaction to Blair’s role in launching ESDP to a reflection of ESDP’s limited
capabilities and ambitions. News reports indicate that Brown weakened an intended
statement on ESDP in a speech by his Foreign Secretary David Miliband. At the
same time, new French President Nicolas Sarkozy has sought to downplay ESDP as
a way to counterbalance the United States and as an alternative to NATO, thereby
closing the gap between the traditional French and UK views of ESDP. Sarkozy still
advocates, however, that the EU should develop a full military command and
planning structure of its own — a position rejected by both U.S. and UK officials as
needlessly creating a rival to NATO and wasting scarce European defense personnel
and funding resources.31
UK policymakers, like the Bush Administration, have also been cool to
suggestions from some EU members over the last several years that the EU, rather
than NATO, should be the primary forum for discussions of international security
and political issues, such as managing Iran or the rise of China. British hesitancy in
this regard may reflect UK concerns that a formal U.S.-EU strategic dialogue could
erode NATO or the U.S. role as Europe’s ultimate security guarantor.32
Defense Relations
As noted previously, close U.S.-UK defense ties date back many decades.
During the Cold War, the UK served as a vital base for U.S. forces and cruise
missiles. The United Kingdom currently hosts roughly 11,000 U.S. military
personnel plus almost 1,000 civilians, as well as their dependents. Britain provides
about $134 million in host nation support, mostly in indirect contributions such as
waived taxes and rents.33 The United States has supplied Britain with the missile
delivery systems for its nuclear warheads since 1963. In early 2007, former Prime
Minister Blair announced plans to renew the UK’s current nuclear weapons system
by joining a U.S. program to extend the life of its U.S.-made Trident missiles into the
2040s and by building a new generation of submarines in the UK. The decision on
Trident’s future in the UK was controversial, especially within the Labour Party, and
30
For more information, see CRS Report RL32342, NATO and the European Union, by
Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis.
31
“La France Veut Profiter de sa Présidence de l’UE pour Relancer la Défense
Européenne,” Le Monde, October 17, 2007, George Parker and Laura Dixon, “Miliband
Declares Death of EU Superstate,” Financial Times, November 16, 2007; Conference on
“Britain Beyond Blair: The Implications for Transatlantic Relations,” sponsored by The
Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 19, 2007.
32
33
Discussion with UK officials, Summer 2005.
See from the U.S. Department of Defense: Allied Contributions to the Common Defense
2003, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2003/allied2003.pdf]; and Base
Structure Report FY2005 [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20050527_2005BSR.pdf].
CRS-22
Blair had to rely on opposition votes in Parliament to secure approval. Gordon
Brown, however, endorsed Blair’s decision to modernize the Trident nuclear
weapons system, and will be expected to take early planning for it forward.34
Missile Defense. The United Kingdom has participated, albeit cautiously,
since the 1980s in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program; about $300
million in U.S. funding has been devoted to joint U.S.-UK missile defense activities
since 1986, according to the U.S. Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency.
In February 2003, the Blair government agreed to a U.S. request to upgrade the early
warning radar complex at Fylingdales, a Royal Air Force base in northern England,
for a possible role in the U.S. BMD system.35 UK officials believe that the potential
aspirations of North Korea or Iran to acquire nuclear weapons strengthen the case for
BMD, but the issue remains controversial for many British parliamentarians and
public activists. British critics doubt the technical viability of BMD, worry it could
spark a new arms race with Russia and China, and claim that helping Washington
will make the UK a more likely target of a ballistic missile attack. In June 2003,
Washington and London signed an agreement to facilitate bilateral BMD information
exchanges and help pave the way for further UK industrial participation in BMD.36
In early 2007, the Bush Administration began bilateral negotiations to base 10
missile interceptors in Poland and associated radar in the Czech Republic. The
system is meant primarily to defend the United States, U.S. forces in Europe, and
some European allies from a possible future ballistic missile attack by Iran.
Although some European allies argued that the Administration should have sought
to develop such a system under NATO auspices, rather than bilaterally with Prague
and Warsaw, and expressed concerns about the vociferous Russian objections to the
planned U.S. system, the Blair government offered support for the proposed missile
defense project. Press reports indicate that the Blair government quietly lobbied
Washington to base at least some U.S. interceptor missiles on British soil. Although
the Bush Administration appears to remain focused on Poland and the Czech
Republic as European basing sites, U.S. officials maintain they continue to value UK
participation in missile defense and are open to discussions about further potential
UK contributions to BMD.37
Defense Industry Cooperation and Export Controls. The United
Kingdom and the United States are also key customers and suppliers of defense
equipment for each other. U.S. government-to-government sales agreements of
defense articles, services, and technology to the UK for FY2006 are valued at $166
34
“Is This End of Trident Debate?,” BBC News, March 14, 2007.
35
Fylingdales is one of three long-range radar posts, along with similar installations in
Greenland and Alaska, that comprise the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Data
from Fylingdales feeds into the North American Air Defense Command headquarters in the
United States and its UK counterpart.
36
“UK to Help Son of Star Wars,” BBC News, February 5, 2003; “U.S., Britain Pen Formal
Agreement,” Defense Daily International, June 20, 2003.
37
“Blair Seeks British Role in U.S. Missile Defense,” Financial Times, February 24, 2007;
“U.S. Missile Deals Bypass, and Annoy, European Union,” New York Times, April 18, 2007.
CRS-23
million.38 However, the UK also acquires U.S. defense articles and services directly
from U.S. defense firms; experts believe that these U.S. commercial defense sales to
the UK are substantially higher than government-to-government sales. The British
government estimates that total U.S. defense equipment sales to the UK average $2
billion per year, while UK sales of defense items to the United States average around
$1 billion annually.39
Furthermore, the United States and Britain are engaged in major joint defense
procurement projects, such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, and British
defense companies supply components for several U.S. weapons systems, such as the
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile and the Predator unmanned aerial
vehicle. British defense firms also have a significant presence in the United States.
Most notable is British defense contractor BAE Systems. Since the late 1990s, BAE
has acquired several sensitive U.S. defense firms; with BAE’s acquisition of U.S.
defense company United Defense Industries in 2005, the U.S. Defense Department
replaced the UK Ministry of Defense as BAE’s largest customer. BAE’s U.S. branch
employs roughly 45,000 in the United States, including 35,000 Americans.40
However, some British defense officials and industry leaders complain that
while the UK defense market is relatively open, foreign access to the U.S. defense
marketplace remains restricted and heavily protected. They point out that the U.S.
military uses very little equipment bought from or developed outside of the United
States, and this largely accounts for the U.S.-UK defense trade imbalance. Many UK
policymakers are also frustrated that U.S. security restrictions hamper technology
transfers, which they say impedes UK efforts to cost-effectively enhance British
defense capabilities and improve interoperability with U.S. forces.
Some military analysts believe that U.S. technology-sharing restrictions may
make the United States a less attractive defense supplier or industrial partner for the
UK in the longer term. They note that the UK is already under some pressure from
its EU partners to “buy European,” in order to help create European jobs, to ensure
a European defense base strong enough to support the military requirements of the
EU’s evolving defense arm, and to guarantee that European governments and defense
industries are not left completely dependent on foreign technology. In March 2006,
Britain’s top defense procurement official warned that the UK would walk away from
its $2 billion investment in the JSF program if it did not receive access to JSF design
data and weapons technology; the UK argued that such access was essential for
Britain to be able to maintain or modify its own JSFs. In December 2006, the United
States and the UK signed a memorandum of understanding effectively guaranteeing
38
See “Estimating Foreign Military Sales,” in the Congressional Budget Justification for
Foreign Operations, FY2008, available at [http://www.state.gov].
39
40
Office of the British Defense Staff (Washington), “US/UK Defense Trade,” March 2002.
United Defense Industries is a key supplier of combat vehicles (such as the Bradley
armored infantry vehicle), munitions, and weapons delivery systems to the U.S. Defense
Department. “BAE Systems’ Acquisition of UDI Clears Final Hurdle,” Jane’s Defence
Industry, June 24, 2005.
CRS-24
that Britain would receive the sensitive JSF technology it demanded if it eventually
purchased the JSF.41
For many years, the UK has also been pushing for an exemption from the
requirements of Section 38(j) of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act to make it easier
for British companies to buy U.S. defense items; this has generally been referred to
as seeking a waiver from the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
However, London has been unable to overcome Congressional concerns, especially
in the House of Representatives, that UK export controls are not strong enough to
ensure that U.S. technologies sold to or shared with Britain would not be re-exported
to third countries, such as China. Although Congress granted the UK “preferred”
ITAR status in October 2004 — intended to expedite the export licensing process for
British defense firms — some in the British defense industry maintain that the
process remains too time-consuming. UK officials also bristle at the U.S. refusal to
grant a full ITAR waiver given the UK’s role as a key U.S. ally.
In an effort to address long-standing British concerns about U.S. technologysharing restrictions and export controls, the United States and the UK signed a new
treaty on defense cooperation in June 2007. The treaty seeks to ease the exchange
of defense goods, services, and information — in part by ending the need for a
separate U.S. export license for certain designated defense equipment purchased by
the UK government and select British companies. The treaty is reciprocal and is
intended to cover defense equipment for which the U.S. and UK governments are the
end-users. The treaty also calls for the creation of “approved communities” of
companies and individuals in each country with security clearances to deal with
technological transfers.
The new defense cooperation treaty must be approved by the UK Parliament and
the U.S. Senate. Analysts note that the treaty represents a change in approach by the
Bush Administration, and that the Administration has effectively abandoned its
pursuit of an ITAR waiver for the UK. U.S. supporters point out that the new treaty
will also make the export of UK defense items, such as roadside bomb detection
equipment for U.S. troops in Iraq, faster. However, some suggest that the treaty
could still face hurdles in the Senate and may not be ratified for some time.42
Economic Relations
The bilateral U.S.-UK trade and economic relationship is extensive and
increasingly interdependent. The UK is the fifth largest economy in the world, with
a gross domestic product of roughly $2.2 trillion. The UK is the United States’
41
“Specious Relationship,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 17, 2006; “U.S., UK
Resolve Technology Transfer Dispute, Sign JSF Agreement,” Inside the Pentagon,
December 14, 2006.
42
In September 2007, the Bush Administration transmitted the U.S.-UK defense cooperation
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent. Stephen Fidler, “Bush Signs Accord Easing
Defence Exports to UK,” Financial Times, June 22, 2007; U.S. State Department, “U.S.-UK
Defense Treaty Signed,” June 27, 2007; William Matthews, “UK-U.S. Trade Treaty Facing
Uncertain Future,” DefenseNews.com, July 7, 2007.
CRS-25
largest European export market and fifth largest export market worldwide after
Canada, Mexico, Japan, and China. In 2006, U.S. exports of goods and services to
the UK totaled about $92 billion, while U.S. imports of goods and services from the
UK were roughly $93 billion. The United States has had a trade deficit with the UK
since 1998. Major U.S. exports to the UK include aircraft and parts, information
technology, telecommunication equipment, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural
products.
Even more significantly, the UK and the United States are each other’s biggest
foreign investors. U.S. investment in the UK reached roughly $324 billion in 2005,
while UK investment in the United States totaled $282 billion. This investment
sustains an estimated 1 million U.S. jobs. According to studies conducted by the
SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, the UK accounted for almost 20% of total
global investment flows into the United States in the first half of this decade, and the
UK ranked as the single most important foreign market in terms of global earnings
for U.S. companies — accounting for 11% of total affiliate income — from 20002005. The contribution of U.S. affiliates to the British economy is also notable. For
example, in 2002, U.S. affiliates accounted for 6.7% of the UK’s aggregate output.
U.S. exporters and investors are attracted to the UK because of the common
language, similar legal framework and business practices, relatively low rates of
taxation and inflation, and access to the EU market.43
UK trade policy is formulated within the EU context, and U.S.-UK trade
disputes are taken up within the EU framework.44 Although most of the U.S.-EU
economic relationship is harmonious, trade tensions persist. Current U.S.-EU trade
disputes focus on aircraft subsidies, hormone-treated beef, and genetically-modified
(GM) food products. Like elsewhere in the EU, UK public opposition to GM food
products is high, in part because of a series of major European food crises over the
last several years, including an outbreak of “mad cow disease” in the UK.
Despite such frictions, the UK has been a consistent supporter of U.S.-EU
efforts to lower trade barriers and strengthen the multilateral trading system. Like the
United States, the UK supported Germany’s initiative during its 2007 EU presidency
to enhance the transatlantic marketplace and further liberalize U.S.-EU trade by
reducing non-tariff and regulatory barriers. At the April 30, 2007 U.S.-EU summit
in Washington, DC, the two sides agreed to establish a Transatlantic Economic
Council to tackle such trade obstacles. UK officials say they also continue to support
efforts to conclude the ongoing Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations at the
43
Joseph Quinlan, Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic
Economy (SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University), 2003;
Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan (eds.), Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets
Are Leading Globalization (SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins
University), 2005; U.S. State Department, Background Note on the United Kingdom,
January 2008.
44
A British official, Peter Mandelson, has been EU Trade Commissioner since November
2004. He is the U.S. Trade Representative’s key interlocutor on U.S.-EU trade disputes.
As a member of the European Commission, however, Mandelson serves the Union as a
whole and does not represent the British government.
CRS-26
World Trade Organization (WTO). The Doha round is largely stalled, however, over
a number of issues, including U.S.-EU differences over how and when to liberalize
agricultural trade. The UK also supports efforts to reform the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy, a perennial source of U.S.-EU trade disputes.45
Climate Change
In 2005, the UK held the year-long rotating presidency of the G8 group of
leading industrialized nations and made climate change one of its top priorities. Like
its EU partners, the Blair government was dismayed with the Bush Administration’s
rejection of the U.N. Kyoto Protocol on climate change that set limits on heattrapping gas emissions in an attempt to reduce global warming. The Bush
Administration maintained that such mandatory caps would be too costly and that the
Kyoto Protocol lacked sufficient developing country participation; instead, it has
sought to promote research and technological advances to increase energy efficiency
and decrease emissions. At the 2005 G8 summit, UK officials claimed that they
succeeded in narrowing the gap between the United States and Europe on climate
change. They pointed out that Washington agreed to language in the G8
communique acknowledging, for the first time, the role of human activity in global
warming and the need for urgent action. Critics maintained that the final G8
statement on climate change was significantly weaker than earlier British versions,
which had called for ambitious greenhouse gas reductions and committed G8
countries to spend a certain amount on new environment-friendly projects.
Some British critics also argued that the lack of a more positive U.S. response
to Blair’s climate change proposals in 2005 further demonstrated that Blair’s close
relationship with Bush had yielded few benefits. Others contend that Blair has
played a crucial role in shaping the Bush Administration’s evolving stance on climate
change, and point to the most recent G8 summit in June 2007 as an example. At the
June 2007 G8 summit — Blair’s last as UK leader — the United States joined
Germany (the current G8 presidency country), the UK, and other European states in
agreeing to “seriously consider” halving emissions by 2050. Moreover, despite its
previous reluctance, the Bush Administration committed to working toward a new
climate change treaty within the U.N. framework by 2009.
European critics claimed that the 2007 G8 agreement fell short of Germany’s
goal of a firm commitment to a 50% cut in emissions by 2050. They also suggested
that the Administration could still try to circumvent the U.N. process, noting
President Bush’s announcement in May 2007 that it would seek to forge a separate
agreement by the end of 2008 on a reduction strategy with the world’s top 15
greenhouse gas emitters. Blair tried to deflect such concerns, stating that he was
“very pleased at how far we have come” since 2005 and that “we have an agreement
that there will be a climate change deal, it will involve everyone, including the U.S.
45
For more information, see CRS Report RL34381, European Union-U.S. Trade and
Investment Relations: Key Issues, coordinated by Raymond Ahearn; and CRS Report
RS22645, U.S.-European Union Relations and the 2007 Summit, by Raymond Ahearn,
Kristin Archick, and Paul Belkin.
CRS-27
.... and it will involve substantial cuts.”46 At the December 2007 U.N. climate change
conference in Bali, the United States essentially reiterated its pledge to work toward
a new U.N. climate change treaty by 2009, but refused to bow to EU demands for
industrialized countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 25% to 40% below
1990 levels by 2020.
Northern Ireland
The United States strongly supports UK efforts to implement an enduring
political settlement to the conflict in Northern Ireland, which has claimed over 3,200
lives since 1969 and reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and
religious identities. Northern Ireland’s Protestant majority (53%) defines itself as
British and largely supports continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). The
Catholic minority (44%) considers itself Irish, and many Catholics desire a united
Ireland (nationalists). For years, the British and Irish governments, with U.S.
support, sought to facilitate a political settlement. The resulting Good Friday
Agreement was reached in April 1998. It calls for devolved government — the
transfer of power from London to Belfast — and sets up government structures in
Northern Ireland in which unionists and nationalists share power. It recognizes that
a change in Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom can only come
about with the consent of the majority of its people.
Despite a much improved security situation in the years since, full
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement has been difficult. In October 2002,
the devolved government was suspended for the fourth time amid a breakdown of
trust and confidence on both sides. Decommissioning (disarmament), especially by
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and police reforms were two key sticking points.
As noted earlier, Blair was a key driver of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement,
which the Bush Administration and many Members of Congress continue to view as
the best framework for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. Over the years, the Bush
Administration and many Members repeatedly sought to support the efforts of
London and Dublin to fully implement the Agreement and to broker a deal to
reinstate Northern Ireland’s devolved government and power-sharing institutions.
U.S. and British officials frequently asserted that the IRA and other paramilitaries
must “go out of business” in order to move the peace process forward, and that Sinn
Fein, the IRA’s associated political party, must join the Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. At the same time, U.S. and British policymakers pressed unionists
to recognize Sinn Fein’s evolution and important steps taken by the IRA, such as its
July 2005 decision to end its armed struggle and “dump” its weapons.
Efforts to fully implement the Good Friday Agreement culminated on May 8,
2007, when Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions were restored following
a power-sharing deal between Sinn Fein and the traditionally anti-Agreement
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). London, Dublin, and Washington view this deal
as entrenching the political settlement embodied in the 1998 Agreement and believe
46
“Enough Payback for Iraq?,” BBC News, June 8, 2005; “G8 Leaders Agree To Climate
Deal,” BBC News, June 7, 2007.
CRS-28
it has ushered in a new era in Northern Ireland politics, producing a permanent and
politically stable devolved government.47
Conclusions
Despite occasional tensions between the United States and the United Kingdom
on specific issues, the so-called “special relationship” offers the United States certain
tangible benefits and often serves to buttress U.S. international policies. UK support
has been important to the global fight against terrorism, U.S. military action in
Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led war to oust Saddam Hussein and efforts to stabilize
and rebuild Iraq. UK military capabilities and resources have helped share the U.S.
combat and peacekeeping burden in these conflicts, as well as in the Balkans. Britain
has been a consistent proponent of developing a greater EU political and security role
in a way that complements NATO and promotes a stronger EU as a better and more
effective partner for the United States. The two allies also share a mutually
beneficial and increasingly interdependent economic relationship, and UK policies
within the EU and with the United States have helped to maintain and promote a
more open and efficient world trading system.
Whether the UK position within the U.S.-EU relationship and traditional UK
foreign policy tendencies are changing are questions that have vexed policy analysts
for many years. But beyond the issue of whether changes are afoot lay perhaps two
more profound questions: Does it really matter for the United States if the UK draws
closer to Europe in the longer term? And in light of the EU’s ongoing evolution,
how might a UK either more inside or outside of the EU affect U.S. interests?
Part of the answer to these questions depends on whether the EU evolves into
a more tightly integrated body, especially in the foreign policy and defense fields.
Some U.S. analysts say that if the EU becomes a more coherent foreign policy actor,
this could make the UK a less reliable ally for the United States. If the UK
increasingly turns toward its EU partners in formulating foreign policy decisions, this
could make it harder for Washington to gain London’s support for its initiatives in
NATO or the United Nations. The UK may also be more resistant to being the U.S.
“water carrier” in Europe. Some fear that the UK may become less willing to deploy
its military force in support of U.S. objectives, or be tempted to support traditional
French aspirations to develop the EU as a rival to the United States.
Others argue that a more integrated, cohesive EU in which the UK plays a
leading role could make the EU a better partner for the United States in tackling
global challenges. Conversely, if a “core Europe” were to develop in which a
vanguard of EU member states drove further integration — but which did not include
economically liberal and pro-Atlanticist Britain — Washington could lose one of its
key advocates within the EU and U.S.-EU tensions could increase. Many assess that
further EU integration in the foreign policy and defense fields, however, is
impossible without continued British participation, given UK global interests and
47
For more information, see CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,
by Kristin Archick.
CRS-29
military capabilities. Thus, EU initiatives in these areas are unlikely to go forward
in any significant way without British commitment and leadership. While the former
Blair government was instrumental in EU efforts to develop a common foreign policy
and defense arm, a future, more euroskeptic Conservative-led government might seek
to slow these EU projects.
Others are skeptical about the EU’s ability to play a bigger role on the world
stage. Those of this view maintain that the EU is far from speaking with one voice
on contentious foreign policy issues. If the EU does not move toward further
political integration and remains a looser association of member states whose foreign
policies continue to be determined primarily at the national level, little may change
in the current state of the U.S.-UK-EU relationship, even if the UK moved closer to
the EU by joining the euro. This may be the most realistic scenario, in light of the
UK’s own ambivalence toward deeper EU political integration; many experts
contend that no British government would ever relinquish UK sovereignty in the
foreign policy or defense fields to the EU.
The future shape and identity of the EU, however, does not rest solely in British
hands. It will also depend upon the views and ambitions of other EU members,
particularly France and Germany, and the political parties in power. As noted earlier,
many point out that the new leaders of France and Germany are viewed as more
economically-liberal, reform-minded, and Atlanticist than their predecessors.
Consequently, Brown or future UK leaders may find themselves sharing more
common ground with their French and German counterparts, thereby enabling the
UK to promote its vision of a politically strong, economically vibrant EU working
in partnership with the United States. An EU shaped more fully to the UK liking,
and to that of the United States, may ease U.S.-EU tensions and the pressure on the
UK to serve as bridge or peacemaker between the two. However, improved relations
among London, Paris, and Berlin might also in the longer term lead the UK to turn
more frequently to its other EU partners first — rather than Washington — on
foreign policy concerns. As a result, Washington might not hold quite the same
influence over London as it has in the past.
At the same time, regardless of whether the EU evolves into a more coherent
actor on the world stage or whether the UK draws closer to Europe in the years
ahead, the U.S.-UK relationship will likely remain an important factor in the conduct
of British foreign policy. In general, the “special relationship” helps to boost
Britain’s international standing and often gives the UK greater clout in the EU and
other multilateral organizations. British officials will persist in efforts to shape
decision-making in Washington. However, the extent of U.S. influence on British
foreign policymaking in the future may depend in part on British perceptions of the
value that Washington places on the UK as an ally. Although British support for
U.S. policies should not be automatically assumed, many UK policymakers and
experts believe that it is not in British interests to choose between the United States
and Europe, and thus, the UK will continue to try to avoid such a choice for the
foreseeable future.each is the other’s largest foreign investor.
The term “special relationship” is often used to describe the deep level of U.S.-UK cooperation
on diplomatic and political issues, as well as on security and defense matters such as intelligencesharing and nuclear weapons. British officials enjoy a unique level of access to U.S. decisionmakers, and British input is often cited as an element in shaping U.S. foreign policy debates. Few
question that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate on many
important global issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and efforts to
curb Iran’s nuclear activities. At the same time, some observers have called for a reassessment of
the “special relationship” concept. Some British analysts express concern that the UK tends to be
overly deferential to the United States, sometimes at the possible expense of its own national
interests. Others assert that British policymakers are in the process of adjusting to new
geopolitical realities in which changing U.S. priorities may mean that the UK will not always be
viewed as a centrally relevant actor on every issue.
The UK is one of the 27 member countries of the European Union (EU). While the UK’s relations
with the EU have historically involved a degree of ambivalence and a reluctance to pursue certain
elements of integration, British policy and the UK’s outlook on many global issues are often
shaped in the context of its EU membership. For example, analysts note that some UK policy
positions, such as its approach to climate change, are closer to those of its EU partners than to
those of the United States.
The Conservative Party won the most seats in the UK election of May 6, 2010, although they fell
short of winning an absolute majority. On May 11, 2010, the Conservatives agreed to form a
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, who finished third in the election. Conservative
leader David Cameron became the UK’s new prime minister, and Liberal Democrat leader Nick
Clegg was named deputy prime minister. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat government is the
UK’s first coalition government since World War II. After losing a considerable number of seats
in the election and finishing in second place, the Labour Party moved into opposition. Labour had
led the UK government for 13 years, first under Tony Blair (1997-2007) and then under Gordon
Brown.
U.S.-UK relations and the implications of the 2010 British election may be of interest in the
second session of the 111th Congress. This report provides an overview of the election and
discusses some of the key issues facing the new government. The report also examines the UK’s
relationship with the European Union and assesses some of the main dimensions of the U.S.-UK
relationship. For broader analysis of transatlantic relations, see CRS Report RS22163, The United
States and Europe: Current Issues, by Derek E. Mix.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
The 2010 UK Election ................................................................................................................2
State of the Economy ............................................................................................................3
Political Reform....................................................................................................................3
Implications for the United States..........................................................................................4
The UK and the European Union.................................................................................................4
A Coalition Compromise on Europe......................................................................................5
The UK Between the United States and the EU .....................................................................5
U.S.-UK Relations ......................................................................................................................6
Political Relations .................................................................................................................6
Defense Relations .................................................................................................................8
Economic Relations ............................................................................................................ 10
Selected Issues in U.S.-UK Relations ........................................................................................ 11
Counterterrorism................................................................................................................. 11
Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 13
Iran..................................................................................................................................... 14
Tables
Table 1. May 2010 UK General Election Results .........................................................................2
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 15
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The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States
Introduction
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United
States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors,
including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; extensive and long-established bilateral
cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy and security issues; and the UK’s strong role in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States and the UK also cooperate closely on counterterrorism
efforts.
The modern U.S.-UK relationship was forged during the Second World War, and cemented during
the cold war by the need to deter the Soviet threat. It is often described as the “special
relationship.” This term describes the high degree of mutual trust between the two counties in
cooperating on diplomatic and political issues. The United States and the UK are two of the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and are both founding members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). U.S. and UK officials, from the Cabinet level to
the working level, consult frequently and extensively on many global issues. American and
British diplomats report often turning to each other first and almost reflexively when seeking to
build support for their respective positions in multilateral institutions or during times of crisis, as
in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Some observers assert that a
common language and cultural similarities, as well as the habits of cooperation that have
developed over the years, contribute to the ease with which U.S. and UK policymakers interact
with each other.1
The “special relationship” also encompasses unusually close intelligence-sharing arrangements
and unique cooperation in nuclear and defense matters. During the cold war, the UK served as a
vital base for U.S. forces and continues to host U.S. military personnel and equipment. 2 U.S.
defense planners view the UK as one of the most capable European allies—if not the most
capable—in terms of combat forces and the ability to deploy them.
The mutually beneficial trade and economic relationship is another important aspect of the U.S.UK partnership. The UK is the sixth-largest economy in the world and the sixth-largest export
destination for U.S. goods. It is also the sixth-largest supplier of U.S. imports. Even more
significantly, the UK and the United States are one another’s largest foreign investors.
U.S. military and economic preponderance, however, has caused many to characterize the UK as
the “junior” partner in the U.S.-UK relationship, and to note that the relationship often appears to
be more “special” to the UK than it is to the United States. While few question that the UK’s role
as a close U.S. ally and partner on a host of important global issues will continue, some observers
have asserted a need for the UK to reassess its approach to the “special relationship,” and to
adjust its mindset in accordance with changing geopolitical realities.
1
See, for example, C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945
(New York: Longman, Inc.), 1992.
2
For more information on the history of U.S.-UK intelligence and defense relations, see John Baylis, Anglo-American
Defense Relations 1939-1984 (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1984.
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The 2010 UK Election
The UK general election of May 6, 2010, resulted in a hung parliament, an outcome in which no
single party wins a majority of seats in the House of Commons. The Conservative Party, led by
David Cameron, won the most seats but fell 20 short of the 326 needed to form a majority
government on its own. The Labour Party suffered substantial losses and finished in second place.
Labour had won the three previous elections and led the UK government since 1997, first under
Tony Blair (1997-2007) and then under Gordon Brown.
After five days of negotiations, the Conservatives reached an agreement on forming a coalition
government with the Liberal Democrats, led by Nick Clegg, who finished third in the voting.
With this deal reached, Gordon Brown resigned as prime minister and David Cameron became
the new prime minister of the United Kingdom on May 11, 2010. Cameron appointed five Liberal
Democrats to serve in his cabinet, including Nick Clegg as deputy prime minister.
Table 1. May 2010 UK General Election Results
# of Seats
(649 total declared)
Net # of Seats +/—
% of Vote
Conservatives
306
+97
36.1%
Labour
258
-91
29.0%
Liberal Democrats
57
-5
23.0%
All Others
28
-1
11.9%
Party
Source: “Election 2010,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/.
Given ideological differences between the two parties, some analysts assert that the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are an unlikely pairing for the UK’s first coalition
government since World War II. Adding up the numbers, however, this combination was the only
one that could deliver a solid majority, a fact that may have provided a strong argument for
ideological compromise. The two parties reached an initial policy agreement with a swiftness and
ease that surprised some observers, and both appeared willing to give ground on some issues.
Some observers, nevertheless, wonder how well and how long the arrangement will work.
Before the past 13 years of Labour government, the Conservatives had led the UK government
for a stretch of 18 years, first under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990), followed by John Major
(1990-1997). The Conservatives, who are often also called the Tories, are generally considered to
be a party of the center-right, although some elements of the party also tend to be more right-wing
than centrist. While critics charge that the Conservative Party remains dominated by the interests
of the country’s social and economic elites, David Cameron, who became the party leader in 2005
and now becomes prime minister at the age of 43, has sought to portray the party as more modern
and inclusive. For instance, Cameron has spoken forcefully in support of efforts to address
climate change.
The Liberal Democrats were formed by the 1988 merger of the Liberal Party and the Social
Democratic Party. The Liberal Democrats are considered a center-left party, and members often
describe themselves as progressive. Since their formation, the Liberal Democrats have been the
UK’s “third party,” struggling to assert their voice alongside Labour and the Conservatives. Nick
Clegg, who became the party leader in 2007 and now becomes deputy prime minister at the age
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of 43, campaigned on the themes of fairness and social equality, portraying the Liberal Democrats
as the alternative to either of the larger parties.
State of the Economy
The economy will be the most pressing issue facing the new government. Between 1993 and
2008, the British economy enjoyed an unprecedented period of sustained growth. The UK,
however, was severely impacted by the global financial crisis and entered a deep recession in
2008—the British economy contracted nearly 5% in 2009 and unemployment rose from 5.6% in
2008 to an expected 8.3% in 2010. The recession appears to be ending this year, with growth
forecast at 0.8% for 2010 and 1.1% for 2011.3
During the years of economic expansion, however, the UK developed a large structural deficit
and accumulated considerable public sector debt. The financial crisis and recession greatly
exacerbated this situation: the government budget deficit grew from 4.8% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2008 to 11.3% in 2009 and is forecast to be 12% in 2010. Public sector debt is
expected to grow from 52% of GDP in 2008 to 85% in 2011.4
Against this backdrop, many analysts argue that the new government must take quick and
decisive steps to improve the outlook for the country’s public finances. David Cameron is
expected to introduce an emergency budget during his first months in office that contains
dramatic cuts in public spending. Although some tax increases are also likely to be unavoidable,
the Conservatives’ instinct is that cutting spending while holding down taxes is the best way to
stimulate growth and hiring.
Political Reform
The result of the 2010 election could usher in landmark changes in the British political system.
The coalition partners quickly agreed to terms that offer one another a measure of insurance. The
partners installed “fixed term” Parliaments of five years, setting the next election for May 2015.
Previously, general elections could not be held more than five years apart, but the prime minister
could, by custom, dissolve Parliament and call for a new election at his discretion. The coalition
also agreed that the votes of 55% of the members of Parliament would now be required to bring
down the government in a vote of no confidence—previously, a no confidence vote could be won
by a simple majority.
More broadly, the coalition partners plan to hold a national referendum on introducing an
“Alternate Vote System” for future general elections.5 The vagaries of the UK’s “first-past-thepost” electoral system (i.e., winner take all within each electoral district) operate to the great
benefit of the two largest parties—and to the detriment of the Liberal Democrats—in terms of
transferring the popular vote into parliamentary seats (see Table 1). The Liberal Democrats have
3
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: United Kingdom, May 2010.
ibid.
5
According to the BBC’s Election 2010 Q&A on Electoral Reform and proportional representation, in an Alternate
Vote System, “Voters rank the candidates. If no candidate has 50% of first preferences then second preferences are
counted and so on until someone has a majority.”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8644480.stm
4
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long advocated the introduction of some type of proportional representation electoral system,
such as those used in many countries in continental Europe (the Alternate Vote System is regarded
as one of the least proportional models of proportional representation voting systems). Although
agreeing to the referendum, the Conservatives oppose such reform and are expected to campaign
against it. The introduction of proportional representation voting, even if in its “lightest” form,
could potentially make it much more difficult in the future for one party to achieve a majority,
possibly making coalition politics a more permanent fixture in the UK.
Implications for the United States
The main dimensions of transatlantic cooperation and partnership are unlikely to be altered under
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Media coverage of the election has made much of
assertions that the United States and the UK are drifting apart, that the special relationship is over,
and that the UK will seek a more independent course in foreign policy. Officials and analysts are
reassessing the nature of the U.S.-UK relationship (see “Political Relations”), but most agree that
suggestions of a dramatic break or shift in the relationship are exaggerated. David Cameron and
his new ministers are expected to seek a close relationship with President Obama, the U.S.
Administration, and the U.S. Congress. No sudden moves are expected in British policy on key
issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and Iran’s nuclear program
(see “Selected Issues in U.S.-UK Relations”), as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relations
with Russia, the future of NATO, and international trade and economic policy.
The UK and the European Union
The relationship between the UK and the EU has long been marked by a certain degree of
ambivalence. The UK stood aside in the 1950s when the six founding countries (Belgium, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany) launched the first steps of European
integration, fearing a loss of national sovereignty and influence. The UK finally joined the
precursor of the modern-day EU in 1973, largely in order to derive the economic benefits of
membership but also to have a political voice on the inside as integration took shape.
Nevertheless, historically many British leaders and citizens have remained skeptical of the EU
and ambivalent in their support for further European integration (including, notably, former Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher).
The UK has zealously guarded elements of its national sovereignty to a greater degree than most
EU countries. On the whole, the UK’s “Anglo-Saxon” economic philosophy and approach to
social issues differs from those of its continental partners, and the UK has been especially
adamant about shielding its national prerogatives in these areas. Most famously, the UK retains
the pound sterling as its national currency and appears unlikely to adopt the euro anytime soon.
The UK does not participate in the Schengen Agreement that creates a virtually borderless visaand passport-free zone among most EU countries. The UK secured an exemption from the
Charter of Fundamental Rights that was attached to the Lisbon Treaty and details a sweeping
range of social protections, and negotiated the right, in effect, to choose which policies in “Justice
and Home Affairs” areas (such as police and judicial cooperation) it wishes to take part in under
the new treaty. Many British officials and observers have long opposed the “Federalist” vision of
EU integration, preferring instead an “intergovernmental” arrangement between sovereign states.
British leaders have also tended to express impatience with what they view as the EU’s tendency
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to look inward and focus on process and institutional arrangements, arguing instead for an
outward-looking and results-oriented EU focused on action.
On the other hand, there is no question that the EU and the 26 other member countries of the EU
are, alongside the United States and select others, among the UK’s main allies and partners in the
world. Although “euro-skepticism” is considerable among the British public, it is far from
universal. Geographically, the UK is much closer to continental Europe than to North America,
and over half of British trade is conducted with fellow EU members. Moreover, some observers
assert that many of the UK’s diplomatic and foreign policy impulses, in areas such as climate
change policy, for example, are closer to those of its EU partners than to those of the United
States. During the Blair years, the UK was a driving force behind EU efforts to strengthen its
foreign policy and defense cooperation. For many European policymakers, including in the UK,
the need for the EU to speak with “one voice” in a more cohesive EU Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) was one of the great lessons of the Iraq War. In 1998, Blair reversed the
UK’s long-standing opposition to the development of an EU defense arm, and British
involvement is viewed by many as an essential ingredient for the viability of the EU Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
A Coalition Compromise on Europe
Many members of the Conservative Party are critical of the European Union and opposed to the
current level of European integration, in which they believe the UK has surrendered too much
national sovereignty. The prevalence of such “euro-skeptics” among the Conservative ranks has
had many in Brussels wondering about how a Conservative-led government might manage the
UK’s relations with the EU. In summer 2009, David Cameron pulled the British Conservative
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) out of the main center-right political group that
includes the parties of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy
to caucus with much smaller “euro-skeptic” parties. The Conservatives opposed ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty, the EU reform treaty that came into effect in December 2009, and Cameron had
long suggested that the UK should hold a national referendum on the treaty rather than approving
it by parliamentary vote. There remains some sentiment among Conservatives that the UK should
try to reclaim aspects of national sovereignty that have been pooled into the EU.
The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, are the most pro-EU of the UK’s three major parties,
as demonstrated by their calls for the UK to adopt the euro as its national currency. The initial
policy agreement announced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition indicated that the
two parties had agreed to a “truce” on Europe under which the UK would be a “positive
participant” in the EU. The coalition has ruled out any moves toward joining the euro during the
lifetime of the current Parliament, and has pledged to hold a referendum on any future EU
proposals that would transfer additional power or sovereignty to Brussels. In addition, the
Conservatives have agreed not to seek opt-outs from EU social legislation, although they will try
to limit the application of an EU law that caps the number of hours an employee can work in a
given week. While the coalition compromise indicates a constructive British approach to the EU
under Prime Minister Cameron, the potential for friction still remains.
The UK Between the United States and the EU
Some analysts have long described the UK as caught in a balancing act between the United States
and the European Union. The UK has, at times, sought to play the role of a “transatlantic bridge”
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between Washington, DC, and the EU. Prime Minister Blair sought to perform such a role after
taking office in 1997, believing that strong U.S.-UK and UK-EU relations would be mutually
reinforcing. Blair is often credited, for example, with having a key role in gaining U.S.
acquiescence to the December 2003 NATO-EU deal to enhance EU defense planning capabilities.
Ultimately, however, domestic political struggles and the bitter intra-European divisions
stemming from the 2003 Iraq War limited some of the possibilities for UK-EU relations under
Blair. Nonetheless, the UK remained a highly influential voice through its EU presidency during
the second half of 2005 and Blair’s last EU Summit, in June 2007, which launched the Lisbon
Treaty.
Other analysts assert that the dimensions of British foreign policy have never been as simplistic
as a black-and-white choice between the United States and Europe. According to many,
depictions of a zero-sum choice between one or the other are false and artificial—the United
States and the EU generally have similar interests and compatible outlooks, work together in an
expanding range of issues, and are far more often partners than adversaries. In addition, there is a
significant NATO dimension to the discussion: 21 members of the EU, including the UK, are also
members of NATO. In the end, UK officials and analysts assert what might appear obvious to
some: UK foreign policy decisions have always been and will continue to be determined
primarily by British national interests, and preserving the UK’s position as a strong U.S. ally and
leading EU partner provides the UK with the greatest ability to promote its diverse interests in
Europe and beyond.
U.S.-UK Relations
Strong relations with the United States have been a cornerstone of UK foreign policy, to varying
degrees and with some ups and downs, since the 1940s. Observers assert that the UK’s status as a
close and loyal ally of the United States has often served to enhance its global influence. The UK
is often perceived to be the leading allied voice in shaping U.S. foreign policy debates: in 1944,
the UK Foreign Office described its American policy as being to “steer this great unwieldy barge,
the United States, into the right harbor,” a statement that well describes the mindset of many
British diplomats over the ensuing decades.6 Beyond the bonds of similar interests and values,
some experts suggest that the United States has been more inclined to listen to the UK than to
other European allies because of the UK’s more significant military capabilities and willingness
to use them against common threats. On the other side, British support has often helped add
international credibility and weight to U.S. policies and initiatives, and the close U.S.-UK
partnership has benefitted the pursuit of common interests in bodies such as the U.N., NATO, and
other multilateral institutions.
Political Relations
The U.S.-UK political relationship encompasses a deep and extensive network of individuals
from across the public and private sectors. Relationships between the individual national leaders,
however, are often analyzed by some observers as emblematic of countries’ broader political
relations. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair established a close personal relationship with both
President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush. Following the terrorist attacks of
6
As quoted in Robin Harris, “The State of the Special Relationship,” Policy Review, June/July 2002.
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September 11, 2001, Blair established himself as a key Bush Administration ally in the U.S. “War
on Terrorism.” He also famously backed the Bush Administration with regard to the Iraq War, and
was an important advocate in support of the case for invasion. In a March 2002 Cabinet meeting,
Blair reportedly stated that the UK’s national interest lay in “steering close” to the United States
because otherwise the UK would lose its influence to shape U.S. policy. He argued that by
seeking to be the closest U.S. ally, the UK stood a better chance of preventing the United States
from overreacting, could encourage the U.S. Administration to pursue its objectives in Iraq in a
multilateral way, and could try to broaden the U.S. agenda to include what the UK and other EU
partners viewed as the root causes of Islamist terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The degree to which the UK influenced U.S. policy choices in the war on terrorism, Iraq, and
other issues has been a topic of much debate on both sides of the Atlantic. Some observers
contend that Blair played a crucial role in convincing the Bush Administration to initially work
through the United Nations with regard to Iraq. They argue that the priority Blair placed on
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict helped keep that issue on the Bush Administration’s radar
screen, and that the UK was instrumental in pressing for a meaningful international peacekeeping
presence in Afghanistan, which resulted in the creation of the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF).
Critics, however, charge that Blair and the UK got little in return for their unwavering support of
controversial U.S. policies. Opponents point out Blair was unable to prevent the United States
from abandoning efforts to reach a comprehensive international consensus regarding Iraq, that
little progress has been made in recent years on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that tepid U.S.
responses to Blair’s initiatives on African development and climate change further demonstrate
that Blair’s close relationship with Bush yielded few benefits for the UK. Some commentators
came to describe Blair as the American president’s “poodle,” and Blair paid a high political price
with the British public and within his own Labour Party for his close alliance with President
Bush. The question of how the UK benefitted from its support of the United States during the
Blair-Bush years raised some debate in the UK about the nexus between transatlantic solidarity
and British national interests, and whether future British prime ministers may think twice about
boldly supporting controversial U.S. policies or make more explicit demands of the United States
as the price for support. Some British observers are anxious to assert that British national interests
come first and foremost in deciding British policy, arguing that these interests are not always
identical to U.S. national interests, and that the UK should not be overly deferential to the United
States in foreign policy issues.
Upon taking over as prime minister in 2007, Gordon Brown sought to distance himself from some
of the domestically unpopular foreign policy choices of his predecessor. Given the British
public’s unease with the close Blair-Bush alliance, Brown appeared disinterested in developing a
close personal relationship with the U.S. President, demonstrating instead a business-like
approach that kept his counterpart at arm’s length. Some observers pointed out that because of the
political timetable, Brown had little incentive to develop a close relationship with Bush, and that
he was to a large extent awaiting the arrival of a new U.S. President in January 2009.
Nevertheless, far from reorienting UK foreign policy in a new direction, Brown also attempted to
maintain the portrayal of the “special relationship” and made no major substantive changes in
relations with the United States: he maintained the UK’s commitment to a strong counterterrorism
policy and to the mission in Afghanistan, even if proceeding with the planned withdrawal of
British forces in Iraq, which raised some questions and concerns among U.S. policymakers.
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Prime Minister Brown pursued closer relations with President Obama. Brown visited Washington,
DC, in March 2009 to meet with Obama ahead of the G-20 and NATO Summits that were held in
Europe in early April. He also addressed a joint session of Congress. In being the first European
leader to visit the Obama White House, some observers pointed to an intention to symbolically
reaffirm the vitality of the “special relationship.” Critics, however, sensed that some aspects of
Brown’s reception seemed lukewarm, raising speculation as to whether Obama shares quite the
same level of enthusiasm about the bilateral relationship.
Some observers assert that Obama is the first post-war U.S. President with no sentimental
attachments to Europe, and many argue that with U.S. foreign policy priorities increasingly
focused on the Middle East and Asia, Europe, including the UK, faces a growing struggle to
remain relevant in U.S. eyes. Media reports in September 2009 indicating that Brown had been
“rebuffed” over the course of the year in numerous attempts to secure another personal meeting
with Obama created a degree of heightened anxiety in the UK about the future of the “special
relationship” and how it is viewed by the Obama Administration. Some observers, however,
assert that certain sources—in particular the British media—tend to read too much into the
appearance of personal relations between the individual leaders, noting that the functional aspects
of the U.S.-UK relationship run much broader and deeper.
Nevertheless, many analysts agree that a reassessment of the “special relationship” concept is in
order. As part of an on-going debate about emergent geopolitical trends and the UK’s changing
global role, British officials and analysts may seek to adjust outlooks and expectations to better
match perceptions of national interests and capabilities. Most agree that the U.S.-UK political
relationship is likely to remain intimate, and that the “special relationship” in areas such as
defense and intelligence cooperation will almost certainly remain strong. On vital issues such as
Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, most observers agree that the UK is a crucial U.S. ally. In
an increasingly “G-20 world,” however, the UK may not be centrally relevant to the United States
in all of the issues and relations considered a priority on the U.S. agenda.7
Defense Relations
U.S.-UK defense cooperation became especially close and well established during the cold war,
as both countries worked together bilaterally and within the context of NATO to counter the
threat of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the UK was an important U.S. ally in the first Gulf
War, and the two countries later worked together in stabilization and peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans. The UK was the leading U.S. ally in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent
stabilization operations, and is the largest non-U.S. contributor to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Many observers consider the UK the most
valuable and effective U.S. ally in such military operations, noting that the United States and the
UK tend to have similar outlooks on issues such as the use of force, the development of military
capabilities, and the role and shape of NATO.
The UK has long hosted important U.S. forces at airbases on British soil, and also hosts vital U.S.
radar and intelligence-gathering installations. U.S. and British forces have established extensive
liaison and exchange arrangements with one another, with British officers routinely seconded to,
for example, the Pentagon, U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, FL, and U.S. Naval
7
See, for example, the November 11, 2009 testimony of Dr. Robin Niblett in House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, Global Security: UK-US Relations, March 18, 2010, pp. Ev3.
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Headquarters in Norfolk, VA. British sources reportedly often have access and input into U.S.
defense planning and efforts such as Quadrennial Defense Reviews and the 2009 U.S. Strategic
Review on Afghanistan and Pakistan.8
The 1958 U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement established unique cooperation with regard to
nuclear weapons, allowing for the exchange of scientific information and nuclear material.9 The
United States has supplied Britain with the missile delivery systems for its nuclear warheads since
1963. The UK’s nuclear deterrent currently consists of several Vanguard class submarines, each
armed with up to 16 Trident missiles (totaling as many as 48 nuclear warheads). In 2007, former
Prime Minister Blair announced plans to renew the UK’s current nuclear weapons system by
joining a U.S. program to extend the life of the Trident missiles into the 2040s and by building a
new generation of submarines in the UK. Although the Liberal Democrats campaigned for
phasing out the UK’s nuclear role, the Conservatives support maintaining Trident, and the
coalition plans to continue with the maintenance and updating of the UK’s weapons.
Given the difficulties with the UK’s public finances, concerns are growing about the UK’s ability
to maintain its core defense budget to meet the equipment needs of the military. The new
government is launching a defense spending review, and while the defense budget may not be
affected immediately, projected spending cuts in the years ahead are likely and will probably
include equipment procurement programs.10 This reality is likely to force the UK to make tough
decisions about its future force structure. On the one hand, the UK could attempt to maintain a
military with “full spectrum” capabilities mirroring those of the United States, allowing the
British military to fight alongside U.S. forces as well as undertake a broad range of independent
missions and operations. On the other hand, some suggest that the UK could decide to cut back,
focusing on centrally important capabilities and abandoning others, and increasingly seeking to
leverage joint capability planning and development efforts offered by European defense
integration initiatives.
The United Kingdom and the United States are also key partners in terms of defense industry
cooperation and defense sales. The two countries are engaged in more than 20 joint equipment
programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).11 In FY2008, U.S. foreign military sales
(government-to-government) to the UK reportedly topped an estimated $1.1 billion and shipment
of U.S. direct commercial sales (contractor-to-government) to the UK reportedly exceeded an
estimated $3.1 billion. 12 The United States is the largest overseas supplier of the UK Ministry of
Defense. The UK, in turn, is the largest overseas supplier to the U.S. Department of Defense, and
8
See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit. pp. 23-24.
The document can be accessed on the website of the British American Security Information Council at
http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/MDA.htm.
10
The direct cost of military operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan is covered by a Treasury reserve fund that is
separate from the core defense budget. In the 2008/09 fiscal year, operations in Afghanistan cost the Treasury reserve
over £2.6 billion, and over £14 billion total has been spent on operations (mostly Iraq and Afghanistan) since 2001. See
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, information document from the 2009 Annual Session, The Global Financial Crisis
and its Impact on Defense Budgets, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1928.
11
The Joint Strike Fighter program is a multinational procurement effort—involving the United States, the UK, six
other NATO allies, and Australia—to develop and produce the next generation fighter/strike aircraft, the F-35. For
more information, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
12
U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Assistance, Title IV Supporting
Information, pp. 4, 270-276, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124296.pdf.
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the United States is the UK’s second-largest defense market overall (behind Saudi Arabia). The
United States, however, acquires a relatively small proportion of its defense equipment from
overseas: the balance of U.S.-UK defense exports is about 2 to 1 in favor of the United States.
Most major U.S. defense companies have a UK presence and, led by BAE Systems, numerous
British companies operate in the United States. British defense companies’ U.S. operations tend
to be part of a larger supply chain, with sales consisting mostly of components and niche
equipment, rather than entire platforms.13
U.S. regulations related to technology transfer and the export of defense articles have long been a
source of frustration for British officials. For years, the UK sought a waiver to the U.S.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that would eliminate the requirement for
individual export licensing of each article. British officials have argued that ITAR and the related
licensing process unduly hinder defense trade and cooperation and prevent greater military
interoperability, citing the UK’s status as a valuable and trustworthy ally as grounds for waving
the regulation. British arguments, however, have come up against strong congressional opposition
due to U.S. concerns that technology could be reexported to third countries. Congress
nevertheless granted the UK “preferred” ITAR status in October 2004—intended to expedite the
export licensing process for British defense firms—but many in the UK still maintained that the
process remained too burdensome. In the context of the Joint Strike Fighter program, the British
became concerned they would not have sovereign access to key technologies involved in the
aircraft. In December 2006, the United States and the UK signed a memorandum of
understanding effectively guaranteeing that the UK would receive the sensitive JSF technology it
demanded.
In June 2007, in an effort to address long-standing British concerns about U.S. technologysharing restrictions and export controls, the countries signed a Defense Trade and Cooperation
Treaty that would eliminate individual licensing requirements for certain ITAR-controlled defense
articles and services. The treaty is reciprocal and is intended to cover defense equipment for
which the U.S. and UK governments are the end-users. The treaty also calls for the creation of
“approved communities” of companies and individuals in each country with security clearances
to deal with technological transfers.14 The UK has ratified the treaty, and it is currently pending
before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. U.S. concerns persist over whether UK
safeguards and enforcement mechanisms will be sufficient to protect transferred material. If
ratified, the U.S. Department of State would amend ITAR to account for the treaty provisions.
Economic Relations
The U.S.-UK bilateral investment relationship is the largest in the world. In 2008, UK investment
in the United States totaled $454 billion, supporting over 1 million American jobs. U.S.
investment in the UK totaled $421 billion. Between 2000 and 2009, the UK was the secondlargest overseas market for U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI), behind the Netherlands, and
received nearly 20% of U.S. FDI flows to Europe.15 Tourism and trade are also important pillars
13
See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit. pp. 25, Ev111-Ev112.
See Claire Taylor, UK-US Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty, House of Commons Library, International Affairs
and Defence Section, February 17, 2009, http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-04381.pdf.
The full text of the treaty can be accessed at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/92770.htm.
15
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, The Transatlantic Economy 2010, p. 99-100.
14
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of the economic relationship. In 2008, nearly 3 million Americans visited the UK and 4 million
British residents visited the United States. Also in 2008, the United States ran a trade surplus with
the UK, with exports of goods and services worth $116 billion and imports worth $104 billion. 16
The global financial crisis and recession has had a significantly negative impact on world trade
and investment flows. Both the United States and the UK are home to major world financial
centers, and the U.S.-UK economic relationship has been affected. British banks have suffered
massive losses from their exposure to asset-based securities linked to the U.S. sub-prime
mortgage market. Over the first three quarters of 2009, U.S. FDI flows to the UK fell 65%
compared to the first three quarters of 2008.17 Prime Minister Brown has led efforts to forge an
international response to the crisis through the G-20. As the EU and the United States seek to
formulate and implement new rules for financial sector regulations, analysts believe that thinking
in the UK on such issues tends to be more aligned to that of the United States than countries such
as France and Germany.
The European Commission negotiates a common EU trade policy on behalf of its member states,
and therefore UK trade policy is formulated within an EU context. Although most of the U.S.-EU
economic relationship is harmonious and mutually beneficial, some tensions persist. Current
U.S.-EU trade disputes focus on poultry, aircraft subsidies, hormone-treated beef, and genetically
modified (GM) food products. The UK has been a consistent supporter of U.S.-EU efforts to
lower transatlantic and global trade barriers, and to reach an agreement in the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations.18
Selected Issues in U.S.-UK Relations
The United States and the UK share a long list of similar global interests, and act in close concert
on a wide range of international issues. While a full list would include such topics as the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, relations with Russia, and
many more, this section highlights three issues to illustrate the nature of U.S.-UK cooperation.
Counterterrorism
Most analysts and officials agree that U.S.-UK counterterrorism cooperation is close, wellestablished, and mutually beneficial. 19 The UK’s Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) routinely cooperate closely with their U.S. counterparts in the sharing of
information, and U.S. and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies regularly serve as
investigative partners. Counterterrorism cooperation with the UK also takes place in the context
of the many U.S.-EU agreements that have been put in place in recent years. According to the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, the U.S.-UK intelligence and law enforcement
16
U.S. Department of State, Background Note: United Kingdom, October 2009,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm.
17
Center for Transatlantic Relations, op. cit., p. 97.
18
For more information, see CRS Report RL34381, European Union-U.S. Trade and Investment Relations: Key Issues,
coordinated by Raymond J. Ahearn; and CRS Report RS22645, U.S.-European Union Relations and the 2007 Summit,
by Raymond J. Ahearn, Kristin Archick, and Paul Belkin.
19
See, for example, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: UK-US Relations, March 18,
2010, pp. 39-42.
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relationship “far outstrips the level of interaction and co-operation with other nations.”20 In
addition to efforts seeking to disrupt terrorist attacks against U.S. and European targets, U.S. and
UK officials cooperate closely with regard to developments in countries such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
The UK has extensive experience in dealing with issues of terrorism and homeland security,
having long faced terrorist attacks from groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). More
recently, as highlighted by the deadly July 2005 attacks on the London transportation system and
the failed car bomb attempts in London and Glasgow in the summer of 2007, radical Islamist
terrorism has developed into a primary domestic threat. Many were alarmed that the majority of
the perpetrators in these attacks were “homegrown” British Muslims. The British government
launched its long-term Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST) in 2003. The
CONTEST strategy consists of four strands: (1) disrupting terrorist attacks through prosecution
and other measures at home, combined with military and intelligence operations abroad; (2)
working with vulnerable communities to prevent radicalization and extremism; (3) reducing the
vulnerability of national infrastructure, crowded places, transportation systems, and borders; and
(4) mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks through well-trained and equipped regional and local
resilience networks and crisis management structures. As of 2008, the UK’s annual spending on
counterterrorism, resilience, and intelligence activities had doubled since 9/11, to some £2 billion
(about $3 billion).21
In recent years, the UK has strengthened its anti-terrorism laws and expanded the powers of its
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.22 The Terrorism Act 2006 created a series of new
terrorism-related criminal offenses, including the encouragement of terrorism and the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda, including via the Internet. It also gave the government the
right to ban groups that glorify terrorism, and extends the allowable period of detention without
charge from 14 to 28 days. The Counterterrorism Act 2008 further increased the powers of law
enforcement authorities in terrorism-related cases, changing rules related to searches,
interrogations, asset seizures, and the collection and use of evidence. The act also increased
sentences for some terrorism-related offenses. Civil liberties advocates have sharply criticized
these pieces of legislation. Sharing some such concerns, Parliament rejected a proposal in the
Counterterrorism Act 2008 to increase the legal period of detention without charge to 42 days.
Although the overall U.S.-UK intelligence and counterterrorism relationship is overwhelmingly
positive, some tensions exist. The relationship was damaged by public accusations of British
complicity in U.S.-led renditions and the alleged torture of terrorist suspects between 2002 and
2008. Related court cases sought the release of intelligence documents and raised concerns in the
intelligence community about the risk of confidential information coming into the public domain
through the British legal system. In the past, some British officials have objected to the U.S.
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and complained that the United States concealed practices
20
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., pp. Ev 61.
See the March 2009 update of the CONTEST strategy, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/newspublications/publication-search/contest/contest-strategy/contest-strategy-20092835.pdf?view=Binary.
22
UK counterterrorism legislation includes the Public Order Act 1986; the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism Act 2006; and the Counterterrorism
Act 2008.
21
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such as waterboarding. Some British officials also complain that the updated bilateral extradition
treaty that was signed in March 2003 favors the United States.23
Some U.S. critics have also charged that UK measures to clamp down on Islamist extremists are
long overdue. They argue that until recently, traditionally liberal asylum and immigration laws in
the UK, as well as the country’s strong free speech and privacy protections, attracted numerous
radical Muslim clerics claiming persecution at home. As a result, some say the UK became a
breeding ground for Islamist terrorists—some observers have sarcastically described an open
culture of radical Islamism in London as “Londonistan.” In recent years, the UK has expelled
some foreign imams and others who espouse extremism and terrorist violence, and denied entry
to others. Concerns about radicalization in the UK resurfaced in December 2009 when a Nigerian
who had lived and studied in London attempted to blow up an airliner en route from Amsterdam
to Detroit.
Afghanistan
The UK is the second-largest troop contributor to the NATO-led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.24 The UK contributes 9,500 soldiers to ISAF. Counting an
additional 500 special forces operating in the country, there is a total of approximately 10,000
British soldiers in Afghanistan. The UK is also the largest European donor of bilateral aid to
Afghanistan, contributing some £740 million (about $1.15 billion) since 2001 for development
and security assistance, and pledging a further £510 million (about $790 million) for the next four
years.25
Most British forces are based in the volatile southern province of Helmand, where they have
engaged in frequent combat with Taliban insurgents. The UK has suffered approximately 240
military fatalities in Afghanistan since operations began in 2001, which is more than the number
of casualties the UK had in Iraq. British casualties in Afghanistan spiked in July 2009 during a
preelection offensive against the Taliban, and over 100 British soldiers were killed in 2009 alone.
Like their U.S. and NATO counterparts, British officials have repeatedly called for greater troop
and equipment contributions from some of the European allies. “National caveats”—restrictions
that some governments place on their troops to prevent them from engaging in combat
operations—have been a sore spot within the Alliance.
The UK has contentious relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Tensions grew when
Karzai criticized the 2006 British compromise with insurgents in the Musa Qala district of
Helmand. The UK negotiated a deal under which both the British military and the Taliban would
withdraw from the area and leave it under the control of tribal leaders. The Taliban subsequently
returned and overran the district in early 2007. In addition to frustrations with the pace of efforts
to build Afghan security self-sufficiency, the UK has been highly critical of alleged corruption in
Karzai’s government.
23
The U.S.-UK extradition treaty is treaty number 108-23.
For more information on international efforts in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
25
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The UK Effort in Afghanistan, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/globalissues/conflict-prevention/uk-effort-in-afghanistan/ and UK Department for International Development (DFID), ,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Afghanistan/.
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By and large, the UK has concurred with the Obama Administration’s Afghanistan strategy, and
British sources have reportedly had significant input into elements of U.S. strategic review. Points
of agreement include focusing on Afghan army and police training and civilian efforts regarding
governance, rule of law, and economic development. Some British officials and observers have
long asserted that the key to defeating the insurgency lies in political solutions and incentives
aimed at militants who may not be motivated by radial Islamic ideology, and some have long
advocated negotiations with the more moderate elements of the Taliban. In August 2009, the
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a report asserting that the direction and
tendencies of U.S. policy under the Bush Administration—including an excessive focus on
military goals—bear substantial responsibility for many of the problems facing international
efforts in Afghanistan today.
The UK strongly supports a regional approach to Afghanistan that includes Pakistan. Prime
Minister Brown stated that three-quarters of the terrorist plots uncovered in the UK have their
roots in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The UK is helping train and equip Pakistani
forces for counter-insurgency operations along the Afghan border and plans to provide £665
million (approximately $1 billion) in aid to Pakistan over the period 2009-2013.26
Iran
The United States and the UK share the same goals with respect to Iran, starting with curbing its
nuclear program and ending its sponsorship of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Officials in
London have long advocated conditional engagement with Iran over isolation, and as one of the
“EU-3” (with France and Germany) the UK has played a leading role in diplomatic efforts to
curtail Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. British leaders are committed to a diplomatic
resolution, pressing Iran to make a choice between harsh sanctions and isolation versus economic
and technical cooperation. The UK has also been central in pushing for the three rounds of
limited sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program that have been adopted by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) since 2006 (Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803).
Tensions between the UK and Iran increased following the controversial and disputed reelection
of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2009. Iranian authorities blamed postelection unrest on Western interference, and particularly singled out the UK. Although Prime
Minister Brown strongly criticized the behavior of the Iranian government, the UK Foreign
Office vehemently denied any British involvement in organizing opposition activities. In late
June, Iran expelled two British diplomats (prompting the UK to expel two Iranian diplomats) and
angered the British government with the arrest of nine local staff of the UK embassy in Tehran.
Eight of the nine were eventually released, but in October 2009 Hossein Rassam was sentenced to
four years in prison for “inciting unrest,” a move that drew sharp condemnation from British and
EU officials. Iran has also long accused the UK of supporting Jundallah, a militant Sunni group
that operates along the Iran-Pakistan border. Iranian officials harshly asserted that the British
government was behind an October 2009 Jundallah suicide bombing against Iranian
Revolutionary Guard troops. In December 2009, Iran released five British citizens who had been
detained for a week when their yacht strayed into Iranian waters. Previously, Iran had forcibly
detained British naval personnel in 2004 and 2007.
26
UK Department for International Development (DFID), Afghanistan Country Plan: 2009-13,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/Afghanistan-Country-Plan-2009.pdf.
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With Iran’s apparent rejection of renewed Western overtures in 2009, the new British government
is expected to continue its predecessor’s support for a new round of more stringent U.N. sanctions
on Iran. The likelihood of new sanctions increased in September 2009 when the UK, along with
France and the United States, presented the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with
evidence of a previously secret Iranian enrichment facility near the city of Qom. U.S. officials
have long urged European countries—including the UK—to do more to limit their trade and
business ties with Iran and to adopt and enforce tighter sanctions, even if outside the U.N.
framework. The EU and a number of member countries have taken some such autonomous
measures, but many Europeans prefer to work strictly within the U.N. process regarding
international sanctions. In recent years, some British banks, including the UK’s largest (HSBC),
have voluntarily cut back business dealings with Tehran and Iranian banks. The UK and the EU
have long opposed the U.S. Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
although no firms have ever been sanctioned under ISA. Some European governments have in the
past expressed concern that legislation like H.R. 2194 (passed by the House in December 2009)
and its companion in the Senate, S. 2799 (passed in January 2010), could harm European energy
companies and undermine transatlantic unity. 27
Author Contact Information
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by Kristin Archick, CRS Specialist in European Affairs.
27
For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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