Order Code RS22644
Updated February 19, 2008
Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal
Elections: An Overview
R. Sam Garrett
AnalystSpecialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
L. Paige Whitaker
Legislative Attorney
American Law DivisionMay 15, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22644
Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Summary
A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d), allows
political party
committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election
candidates for federal office
and specifies limits on such spending. These “coordinated
party expenditures” are important not
only because they provide financial support to
campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns
may explicitly discuss how the
money is spent. Although they have long been the major source of
direct party financial
support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have recently been
overshadowed by
independent expenditures. S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. 3792 (Wamp), introduced in the
110th Congress, would eliminate existing limits on coordinated party expenditures.
Those who support
In a 1996 ruling, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission (FEC) (Colorado I), the U.S. Supreme Court found that political parties have a
constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Federal campaign finance law
defines an independent expenditure to include spending for a communication that expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in cooperation
or consultation with a candidate or a political party. In a subsequent case, Colorado II, however,
the Court ruled that a political party’s coordinated expenditures—that is, expenditures made in
cooperation or consultation with a candidate—may be constitutionally limited in order to
minimize circumvention of contribution limits. According to the Court, in contrast to independent
expenditures, coordinated party expenditures have no “significant functional difference” from
direct party candidate contributions.
Congress has not recently considered legislation specifically aimed at reducing or eliminating
existing limits on coordinated party expenditures. Nonetheless, the concept remains a component
of the debate over the strength of modern political parties. In the 113th Congress, bills primarily
related to public financing of campaigns (H.R. 20; H.R. 268; H.R. 269; H.R. 270; S. 2023) would
also permit additional coordinated party expenditures. Revisiting coordinated party expenditure
limits might also be relevant following an April 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
McCutcheon v. FEC.
Those who support existing limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the caps reduce
potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that they
and are the limits are
antiquated, particularly because political parties may make unlimited
independent expenditures supporting their candidates. The Senate Rules and
Administration Committee held a hearing on coordinated party expenditures in April
2007, but the topic has not received additional legislative attention during the 110th
Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures?
Federal campaign finance law provides political parties with three major options for
providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) direct
contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. With
direct contributions, parties give money (or in the case of in-kind contributions,
financially valuable services) to individual campaigns, but such contributions are subject
to strict limits; most party committees are limited to direct contributions of $5,000 per
CRS-2
candidate, per election.1 Since the 1996 Colorado I Supreme Court ruling (discussed
below), parties may make independent expenditures, which are not limited, on anything
allowable by law, but may not coordinate those expenses with candidates. Coordinated
expenditures2 allow parties (notwithstanding other provisions in the law regulating
contributions to campaigns) to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to
discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Candidates may request that parties make
coordinated expenditures, and may request specific purchases, but parties may not give
this money directly to campaigns. Because parties are the spending agents, they (not
candidates) report their coordinated expenditures to the FEC.
Coordinated party expenditures are subject to limits based on office sought, state,
and voting-age population (VAP). Exact amounts are determined by formula.3 State
party committees may authorize their national counterparts to make party-coordinated
expenditures on their behalf (or vice versa). This common practice effectively doubles
the amount of coordinated expenditures parties can make. Assuming such an agreement
between state and national parties exists, limits for Senate candidates in 2008, adjusted
for inflation, range from $168,200 in states with the smallest VAPs to approximately $4.6
million in California. Similarly, in 2008, parties can make up to $84,200 in coordinated
expenditures in support of each House candidate in multi-district states, and $168,200 in
support of House candidates in single-district states.4 Parties may also make coordinated
expenditures on behalf of presidential candidates (limited to $19.2 million per party in
2008).
Brief Overview of Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
Buckley v. Valeo.5 In its 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo,6 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),7
striking down expenditure limitations, while upholding reasonable contribution
limitations. Most notably, the Buckley Court determined that the spending of money,
whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of “speech” protected by
1
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a).
2
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations define “coordinated” as “cooperation,
consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s
authorized committee, or a political party committee.” 11 CFR § 109.20.
3
Senate limits are based primarily on VAP, whereas House limits are based primarily on a flat
allocation. Specifically, the limits for Senate candidates and House candidates in single-district
states are the greater of 2 cents multiplied by the VAP, adjusted for inflation, or $20,000,
adjusted for inflation. The limit for House candidates in multi-district states is $10,000 (the 1974
base amount) plus adjustments for inflation, which have greatly increased the current limits over
base amounts. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).
4
2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(d)(3), 441a(c).
5
For further discussion of Buckley and Colorado I and II, see CRS Report RL30669, Campaign
Finance Regulation Under the First Amendment: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court
Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
6
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7
2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.
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the First Amendment. However, according to the Court, contributions and expenditures
invoke different degrees of First Amendment protection.8 Recognizing contribution
limitations as one of the FECA’s “primary weapons against the reality or appearance of
improper influence” on candidates by contributors, the Court found that these limits
“serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral
process.”9 On the other hand, the Court determined that FECA’s expenditure limits on
individuals, political action committees (PACs), and candidates impose “direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech” and are not justified by an
overriding governmental interest.10
Colorado I and II. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission (Colorado I),11 the Supreme Court found that FECA’s
“Party Expenditure Provision”12 was unconstitutionally enforced against a party’s funding
of radio “attack ads” directed against a likely opponent in a federal senatorial election.
Specifically, this case concerned the constitutionality of the party expenditure limit as
applied to expenditures for radio ads by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP) that
attacked the likely Democratic Party candidate in the 1986 U.S. Senate election.13 The
Court’s ruling turned on whether CRP’s ad purchase was an “independent expenditure,”
a “campaign contribution,” or a “coordinated expenditure.”14 The Court found that the
CRP’s ad purchase was an independent expenditure deserving constitutional protection.
“Independent expenditures,” the Court held, do not raise heightened governmental
interests in regulation because the money is deployed to advance a political point of view
“independent” of a candidate’s viewpoint and, therefore, cannot be limited.15
The Court’s opinion in Colorado I was limited to the constitutionality of the
application of FECA’s “Party Expenditure Provision,”16 to an independent expenditure
by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP). Later, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee (Colorado II),17 the Court considered a facial challenge18 to the
constitutionality of the limit on coordinated party spending. In Colorado II, the Supreme
Court ruled that a political party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike genuine independent
8
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
9
Id. at 59.
10
Id. at 39.
11
518 U.S. 604 (1996).
12
2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).
13
See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 612.
14
Id. at 614, 615, 618, 622-623.
15
Id. at 614-615, citing Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC), 479 U.S. 238 (1985).
16
2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3).
17
533 U.S. 431 (2001).
18
Generally, when a statute is challenged “facially,” a plaintiff is arguing that under all
circumstances, the statute operates unconstitutionally. By contrast, an “as-applied” challenge
involves a plaintiff arguing that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular
case or to a party.
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expenditures, may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of
FECA contribution limits.
McConnell v. FEC.19 In McConnell v. FEC,20 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld key
portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) against facial
constitutional challenges.21 The Court, however, struck down BCRA’s requirement that
political parties choose between making coordinated or independent expenditures after
nominating a candidate,22 finding that it burdens the right of parties to make unlimited
independent expenditures.23
Recent Financial Overview and Analysis
S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. 3792 (Wamp), introduced in the 110th Congress, would
eliminate existing caps on coordinated party expenditures. On April 18, 2007, the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on S. 1091; it has not received
additional action thus far. H.R. 3792 was introduced on October 10, 2007; it has not
received additional action. The two bills are identical except for a provision in H.R. 3792
that specifies an effective date following the 2008 elections. S. 1091 does not specify an
effective date.
Although coordinated expenditures played a large role in party financial activity
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, recent elections suggest that party reliance on
coordinated expenditures is changing. As Table 1 shows, although the Colorado I
decision permitted parties to make unlimited independent expenditures during and after
the 1996 cycle, those expenditures remained relatively modest through 2002. From 19962002, total party coordinated expenditures outpaced independent expenditures — often
by large amounts. In 2004 and 2006, however, party spending shifted dramatically, with
far more total independent expenditures than coordinated expenditures. In 2004, the two
major parties made more than four times in independent expenditures what they did in
coordinated expenditures. That allocation of resources continued in 2006, with the two
parties making more than six times in independent expenditures than they did in
coordinated expenditures. Specifically, during the 2006 election cycle, both parties made
a total of more than $223.7 million in independent expenditures, compared with slightly
less than $35 million in coordinated expenditures. As the table also shows, at various
points since 1996, each major party has outspent the other in party coordinated
expenditures. For the most part, however, Democrats and Republicans have allocated
similar amounts to coordinated party expenditures.
19
For further discussion of McConnell, see CRS Report RL32245, Campaign Finance Law: A
Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in McConnell v. FEC, by L. Paige Whitaker.
20
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
21
P.L. 107-155.
22
Codified at 2 U.S.C. § 315(d)(4).
23
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 217.
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Table 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures
Election
Cycle
1996
Coordinated Expenditures
Democrat
Republican
Total
Independent Expenditures
Democrat
Republican
$22,576,000 $30,959,151 $53,535,151 $1,495,090 $10,026,541
Total
$11,521,631
1998
18,643,156
15,696,145
34,339,301
1,489,707
263,646
1,753,353
2000
20,989,872
29,598,965
50,588,837
2,310,175
1,556,802
3,866,977
2002
7,057,291
15,951,023
23,008,314
1,701,292
1,944,116
3,645,408
2004
33,113,799
29,101,396
62,215,195 176,491,696
88,032,382
264,524,078
2006
20,694,359
14,156,926
34,851,285 108,100,265 115,646,387
223,746,652
Source: Federal Election Commission, Party Financial Activity Summarized for the 2006 Election Cycle,
March 7, 2007.
Note: Individual party totals include expenditures from the Democratic National Committee, Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local
Democratic committees; and Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee,
National Republican Congressional Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in
the FEC data.
In terms of overall fundraising, the two major parties are now closer to parity than
they historically have been. As Figure 1 (below) shows, local, state, and national
Republican party committees have accumulated more receipts than their Democratic
counterparts since 1990, as has generally occurred since at least the 1970s. Although
Republican party committees still maintain a financial advantage, Democrats fared far
better in overall fundraising in 2004 and 2006 than they had during any other period
shown in the figure. By 2006, Democratic party committees raised 80% as much as
Republicans, although that amount fell slightly from the 2004 number (87%). On their
own, these do not suggest particular outcomes if caps on party coordinated expenditures
were lifted, but they do indicate that one party may not necessarily have a major total
financial advantage over the other if the caps are lifted in the near future.
For those who support lifting the caps on coordinated party expenditures, current
limits impinge on parties’ abilities to communicate with their candidates once parties
meet their coordinated spending limits. Unrestricted coordinated party expenditures
could shift party spending away from independent expenditures, although each option
would retain unique characteristics. Parties might continue to choose independent
expenditures if they wish to distance campaigns from what many political professionals
and some candidates view as necessary, but politically unpopular, purchases (e.g., for
political advertising attacking opponents).24 On the other hand, coordinated expenditures
would be more attractive for parties wishing to communicate freely with campaigns about
24
On relationships between campaign actors, see David A. Dulio, For Better or Worse? How
Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2004); Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and
in Washington (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004); and Robin Kolodny,
Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).
CRS-6
direct financial support. Those expenditures could strengthen arguably weakening ties
between parties and campaigns.
Proponents of limits on party coordinated expenditures contend that the caps reduce
the amount of money in politics. They also potentially prevent circumvention of
individual contribution limits by donors who may seek to indirectly support campaigns
by making contributions to political parties. (However, it should be noted that FECA
already restricts “earmarked” contributions.25) For those who generally support regulating
political money, lifting the caps on party-coordinated expenditures would likely be
objectionable on principle, could appear to undercut similar regulatory efforts adopted
since the 1970s, and could go against public sentiment generally favoring limiting the
amount of money in politics.
Figure 1. Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees
$900.0
782.4
$800.0
678.8
$700.0
602.3
millions in receipts
$600.0
483.1
465.8
$500.0
424.1
416.5
$400.0
264.9
$300.0
$200.0
$100.0
202.0
163.3
78.5
285.0 275.2
244.1
221.6
217.2
160.0
132.8
$0.0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Democratic
2000
2002
2004
2006
Republican
Note: Reflects federal account activity (i.e., hard money) of political party committees at national, state,
and local levels. While soft money represented a large share of party receipts through the 2002 election
cycle (after which it was banned by BCRA), the respective parties raised comparable levels of soft money
in most of the election cycles between 1992 and 2002; hence, the inclusion of soft money receipts in this
figure would not greatly affect the relative overall fundraising ratios of the two parties. (On soft money, see
U.S. Federal Election Commission, Party Committees Raise Over $1 Billion in 2001-2002, press release,
Mar. 20, 2003.) National committees include the Democratic and Republican National Committees, the
Democratic and Republican Senatorial Committees, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
and the National Republican Congressional Committee.
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission, Party Financial Activity Summarized for the 2006 Election
Cycle, press release, March 7, 2007.
25
2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(8).
supporting their candidates. If the caps were lifted and fundraising patterns remained consistent
with those discussed here, it appears that neither party would have a substantial resource
advantage over the other. It is important to note, however, that individual circumstances would
determine particular fundraising and spending decisions.
This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.
Congressional Research Service
Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Contents
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures? .................................................................................... 1
Overview of Relevant Supreme Court Precedent ............................................................................ 2
Independent Spending Limits Found Unconstitutional and Contribution Limits
Upheld: Buckley v. Valeo ........................................................................................................ 2
Independent Party Spending Limits Found Unconstitutional and Coordinated Party
Expenditure Limits Upheld: Colorado I and II ...................................................................... 2
Recent Legislative Activity.............................................................................................................. 4
Financial Overview and Analysis .............................................................................................. 5
Figures
Figure 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures............................................. 6
Figure 2. Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees.................................... 7
Tables
Table 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures .............................................. 5
Table 2. Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees ..................................... 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9
Congressional Research Service
Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures?
Federal campaign finance law provides political parties with three major options for providing
financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) direct contributions, (2)
coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures.1 With direct contributions, parties
give money (or in the case of in-kind contributions, financially valuable services) to individual
campaigns, but such contributions are subject to strict limits; most party committees are limited to
direct contributions of $5,000 per candidate, per election.2 Since the 1996 Colorado I Supreme
Court ruling (discussed below), parties may make independent expenditures, which are not
limited, on anything allowable by law, but may not coordinate those expenses with candidates.
Coordinated expenditures3 allow parties (notwithstanding other provisions in the law regulating
contributions to campaigns) to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to discuss
those expenditures with the campaign. Candidates may request that parties make coordinated
expenditures, and may request specific purchases, but parties may not give this money directly to
campaigns. Because parties are the spending agents, they (not candidates) report their coordinated
expenditures to the FEC.
Coordinated party expenditures are subject to limits based on office sought, state, and voting-age
population (VAP). Exact amounts are determined by formula and updated annually by the FEC.4
Limits for Senate candidates in 2014, adjusted for inflation, range from $94,500 in states with the
smallest VAPs to approximately $2.8 million in California.5 In 2014 parties can make up to
$47,200 in coordinated expenditures in support of each House candidate in multi-district states,
and $94,500 in support of House candidates in single-district states.6 State party committees may
authorize their national counterparts to make coordinated-party expenditures on their behalf (or
vice versa). If such agreements exist, one party could essentially assume the spending limit for
another in particular states, in which case the designated party could spend up to its own limit and
up to the other party’s limit. Parties may also make coordinated expenditures on behalf of
presidential candidates. Limits for the 2016 cycle have not been announced.
1
For a discussion of campaign finance policy generally, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance
Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
2
2 U.S.C. §441a(a).
3
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations define “coordinated” as “cooperation, consultation or concert with,
or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or a political party committee.” 11
CFR §109.20.
4
Senate limits are based primarily on VAP, whereas House limits are based primarily on a flat allocation. Specifically,
the limits for Senate candidates and House candidates in single-district states are the greater of 2 cents multiplied by the
VAP, adjusted for inflation, or $20,000, adjusted for inflation. The limit for House candidates in multi-district states is
$10,000 (the 1974 base amount) plus adjustments for inflation, which have greatly increased the current limits over
base amounts. See 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3).
5
For 2014 limits, see Federal Election Commission, “Price Index Adjustments for Expenditure Limitations and
Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold,” 79 Federal Register 7190-7192, February 6, 2014. If a joint expenditure
designation between state and national parties were in place, the spending party, relying on both parties’ limits, could
spend $189,000 and $5.6 million respectively.
6
2 U.S.C. §§441a(d)(3), 441a(c). If a joint expenditure designation between state and national parties were in place, the
spending party, relying on both parties’ limits, could spend $94,400 and $189,000 respectively.
Congressional Research Service
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Overview of Relevant Supreme Court Precedent7
Independent Spending Limits Found Unconstitutional and
Contribution Limits Upheld: Buckley v. Valeo
In its 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),9 and determined that limits on independent expenditures
were unconstitutional, while it upheld reasonable limits on contributions.10 FECA defines an
“independent expenditure” to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in concert or cooperation with
or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or a political party.11 In contrast, a “contribution” is
generally given to a candidate or party, and is defined to include any gift of money or anything of
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing a federal election.12
Most notably, the Buckley Court determined that the spending of money, whether in the form of
contributions or expenditures, is a form of “speech” protected by the First Amendment. However,
according to the Court, contributions and expenditures invoke different degrees of First
Amendment protection.13 Recognizing contribution limitations as one of FECA’s “primary
weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence” on candidates by contributors,
the Court found that these limits “serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the
integrity of the electoral process.”14 On the other hand, the Court determined that FECA’s
expenditure limits on individuals, political action committees (PACs), and candidates impose
“direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech” and are not justified by an
overriding governmental interest.15
Independent Party Spending Limits Found Unconstitutional and
Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits Upheld: Colorado I and II
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)
(Colorado I (1996)),16 the Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to
make unlimited independent expenditures. The Court determined that FECA’s coordinated party
7
This portion of the report was written by L. Paige Whitaker, Legislative Attorney.
424 U.S. 1 (1976). For further discussion of Buckley and Colorado I and II, see CRS Report RL30669, The
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige
Whitaker.
9
2 U.S.C. §431 et seq.
10
For further discussion, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG909, Campaign Finance Law: What is a “Coordinated
Communication” versus an “Independent Expenditure”?, by L. Paige Whitaker.
11
2 U.S.C. §431(17).
12
2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i).
13
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
14
Id. at 59.
15
Id. at 39.
16
518 U.S. 604 (1996).
8
Congressional Research Service
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
expenditure limit17 was unconstitutionally enforced against a party’s funding of radio
advertisements directed against a likely opponent.
Specifically, this case concerned the constitutionality of the coordinated party expenditure limit as
applied to expenditures for radio ads by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP) that criticized the
likely Democratic Party candidate in the 1986 U.S. Senate election.18 The Court’s ruling turned
on whether CRP’s ad purchase was an “independent expenditure,” a “campaign contribution,” or
a “coordinated expenditure.”19 The Court found that the CRP’s ad purchase was an independent
expenditure deserving constitutional protection. Independent expenditures, the Court held, do not
raise heightened governmental interests in regulation because the money is deployed to advance a
political point of view separate from a candidate’s viewpoint and, therefore, cannot be limited.20
The Court emphasized that the “constitutionally significant fact” of an independent expenditure is
the absence of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure.21
The Court’s opinion in Colorado I was limited to the constitutionality of the application of
FECA’s coordinated party expenditure limit to an independent expenditure by the CRP. Later, in
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II),22 the Court considered
a facial challenge23 to the constitutionality of the limit on coordinated party spending. In
Colorado II, the Supreme Court ruled that a political party’s coordinated expenditures—unlike
genuine independent expenditures—may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize
circumvention of FECA contribution limits. As the Court explained, coordinated party
expenditures have no “significant functional difference” from direct party candidate
contributions.24
Relying on its holding in Colorado I, in a case evaluating the constitutionality of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),25 the Court invalidated a statutory provision that
essentially required political parties to choose between making coordinated or independent
expenditures after nominating a candidate.26 In McConnell v. FEC,27 the Court determined that
the statute burdened the right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures and
therefore, was unconstitutional.28
17
2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3).
See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 612.
19
Id. at 614, 615, 618, 622-623.
20
See id. at 614-615 (citing FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 479 U.S. 238 (1985)).
21
Id. at 617 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46; NCPAC, 479 U.S. at 498).
22
533 U.S. 431 (2001).
23
Generally, when a statute is challenged “facially,” a plaintiff is arguing that under all circumstances, the statute
operates unconstitutionally. By contrast, an “as-applied” challenge involves a plaintiff arguing that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular case or to a party.
24
Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 464.
25
P.L. 107-155.
26
Codified at 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(4).
27
540 U.S. 93, 213 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010) (finding that the
portion of McConnell that upheld BCRA’s restriction on independent spending for “electioneering communications”
relied on an anti-distortion interest that the Court rejected as unconvincing and insufficient).
28
See id. at 217.
18
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
In Citizens United v. FEC,29 the Court overruled a separate portion of McConnell and invalidated
BCRA’s restriction on corporate and union spending for electioneering communications, as well
as the long-standing ban on such spending for independent expenditures.30 As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has found,31 it does not appear that Citizens United affected the
Supreme Court’s holding in Colorado II. In contrast to the coordinated party expenditure limit
addressed in Colorado II, Citizens United evaluated the constitutionality of limits on
independent—not coordinated—spending. Reiterating its holding in Buckley, the Court in
Citizens United found that while large campaign contributions create a risk of quid pro quo
candidate corruption, large independent expenditures do not. Therefore, in Buckley, the Citizens
United Court observed, it determined that limiting independent expenditures fails to serve any
substantial government interest in stemming either the reality or the appearance of such
corruption.32
Recent Legislative Activity
Reconsidering coordinated party expenditure limits is a consistent part of the debate over the role
of political parties compared with other political committees and “outside groups.” However, bills
devoted specifically to altering the limits have not been considered recently. Perhaps most
notably, H.R. 6286 (Cole) during the 111th Congress, and S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. 3792
(Wamp) during the 110th Congress, would have eliminated existing caps on coordinated party
expenditures. On April 18, 2007, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a
hearing on S. 1091; it was not subject to additional legislative action. H.R. 3792 was introduced
on October 10, 2007; it did not receive additional action.
Since that time, most proposals to alter existing coordinated party expenditures have been
components of other bills, particularly those devoted to public financing. Most recently, these
include H.R. 20 (Sarbanes), H.R. 268 (Sarbanes), H.R. 269 (Yarmuth), H.R. 270 (Price, N.C.),
and S. 2023 (Durbin), all introduced during the 113th Congress.
29
558 U.S. 310 (2010). For further discussion of Citizens United, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of
Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, by L.
Paige Whitaker.
30
2 U.S.C. §441b.
31
See Cao v. FEC, 619 F.3d 410, 431 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (holding, among other things,
that in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado II, limits on coordinated party expenditures are
constitutional).
32
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Financial Overview and Analysis33
Although coordinated expenditures played a large role in party financial activity throughout the
1970s and 1980s, recent elections suggest that party reliance on coordinated expenditures is
changing. As Table 1 and Figure 1 (below) show, although the Colorado I decision permitted
parties to make unlimited independent expenditures during and after the 1996 cycle, those
expenditures remained relatively modest through 2002. From 1996 to 2002, total party
coordinated expenditures outpaced independent expenditures—often by large amounts.
Beginning in 2004, however, party spending shifted dramatically, with far more total independent
expenditures than coordinated expenditures. In 2004, the two major parties made more than four
times in independent expenditures what they did in coordinated expenditures. That allocation of
resources continued in 2006, when the parties spent more than six times on independent
expenditures as they did on coordinated expenditures. The trend also continued thereafter, albeit
in some cases less dramatically than in 2004. In 2012, the two major parties spent more than three
times on independent expenditures what they did in coordinated party expenditures
(approximately $254 million versus about $76 million). As the table also shows, at various points
since 1996, each major party has outspent the other in coordinated expenditures. For the most
part, however, Democrats and Republicans have allocated similar amounts to coordinated party
expenditures.
Table 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures
Coordinated Expenditures
Independent Expenditures
Election Cycle
Democrat
Republican
Total
Democrat
Republican
Total
1996
$22,576,000
$30,959,151
$53,535,151
$1,495,090
$10,026,541
$11,521,631
1998
$18,643,156
$15,696,145
$34,339,301
$1,489,707
$263,646
$1,753,353
2000
$20,989,872
$29,598,965
$50,588,837
$2,310,175
$1,556,802
$3,866,977
2002
$7,057,291
$15,951,023
$23,008,314
$1,701,292
$1,944,116
$3,645,408
2004
$33,113,799
$29,101,396
$62,215,195
$176,491,696
$88,032,382
$264,524,078
2006
$20,694,359
$14,156,926
$34,851,285
$108,100,265
$115,646,387
$223,746,652
2008
$37,988,558
$31,952,985
$69,941,543
$156,191,039
$124,682,649
$280,873,688
2010
$24,907,052
$27,135,226
$52,042,278
$107,366,866
$76,138,018
$183,504,884
2012
$39,511,028
$36,307,810
$75,818,838
$113,752,700
$140,306,195
$254,058,896
33
Some of the data in this version of the report may vary from previously released FEC data. This discrepancy is due to
changes in the way in which the FEC calculates various receipts and disbursements in current statistical releases
compared with previous election cycles. In March 2014, the FEC adjusted the cited data table and affixed the following
explanation to the table: “To maintain consistency with how they had been calculated in prior years, the totals in this
table...were revised on March 27, 2014 to include transfers between party committees and transfers between party
committees’ federal and nonfederal accounts that had been inadvertently excluded from the original calculations, and to
exclude sums representing the Levin share of Federal Election Activity that had been inadvertently included in the
original calculations.” CRS takes no position on these changes and will continue to monitor the data for future
amendments.
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Source: CRS analysis of FEC data in files accompanying “Table 1, National Party Financial Activity” in the
respective 24-month national-party financial activity summary for the listed election cycles, http://fec.gov/press/
campaign_finance_statistics.shtml.
Note: Individual party totals include expenditures from the Democratic National Committee, Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local
Democratic committees; and Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee,
National Republican Congressional Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in the
FEC data. The FEC data include only federal activity.
Figure 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures
Republican Expenditures
Coordinated
Independent
$Millions
$200
Democratic Expenditures
Coordinated
Independent
$150
$100
$50
$0
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Election Cycle
2006
2008
2010
2012
Source: CRS analysis of FEC data in files accompanying “Table 1, National Party Financial Activity” in the
respective 24-month national-party financial activity summary for the listed election cycles, http://fec.gov/press/
campaign_finance_statistics.shtml.
Notes: Individual party totals include expenditures from the Democratic National Committee, Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local
Democratic committees; and Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee,
National Republican Congressional Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in the
FEC data. The FEC data include only federal activity.
One potential concern about lifting the caps on party coordinated expenditures could be that one
party would have an inherent advantage over the other. Recent fundraising totals suggest that the
historic fundraising gap between Democrats and Republicans has narrowed, although disparities
between the two parties still exist. As Table 2 and Figure 2 (below) show, local, state, and
national Republican party committees have accumulated more receipts than their Democratic
counterparts since 1996, as has generally occurred since at least the 1970s. Although an 88% gap
between Democratic and Republican receipts existed in 1996 ($416.5 million for Republicans
versus $221.6 million for Democrats), beginning in 2004, the two parties began to raise roughly
similar amounts. Despite a 24% Republican advantage in 2006 ($599 million versus $483.1
million), differences between the parties have been small since 2008. In 2012, the Democratic
and Republican parties both raised about $800 million. On their own, these data do not suggest
particular outcomes if caps on party coordinated expenditures were lifted, but they do indicate
that one party may not necessarily have a major total financial advantage over the other if the
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
caps are lifted in the near future. Although the parties would not choose to spend all those funds
on coordinated party expenditures, the data suggest that they would likely be working with
roughly equal resources.
Table 2. Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees
Election Cycle
Democratic Party Committees
Republican Party Committees
1996
$221,613,028
$416,513,249
1998
$159,961,869
$285,007,168
2000
$275,230,680
$465,840,139
2002
$217,245,185
$424,140,589
2004
$688,767,334
$782,410,369
2006
$483,141,404
$599,008,498
2008
$763,340,182
$792,867,579
2010
$618,065,814
$542,143,412
2012
$800,137,906
$803,531,878
Source: CRS analysis of FEC data in files accompanying “Table 1, National Party Financial Activity” in the
respective 24-month national-party financial activity summary for the listed election cycles, http://fec.gov/press/
campaign_finance_statistics.shtml.
Notes: Individual party totals include the Democratic National Committee, Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local Democratic committees; and
Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional
Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in the FEC data. The FEC data include only
federal activity.
Figure 2.Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees
$Millions
$900
Total Rep. Receipts
Total Dem. Receipts
$600
$300
$0
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Election Cycle
2008
2010
2012
Source: CRS analysis of FEC data. Data for 2006-2012 appear in files accompanying “Table 1, National Party
Financial Activity” in the “2011-2012 Election Cycle Data Summaries through 12/31/12,” statistical summary,
http://fec.gov/press/summaries/2012/ElectionCycle/24m_NatlParty.shtml. Data for 1996-2004 appear in files
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
accompanying “Table 1, National Party Financial Activity” in the respective 24-month national-party financial
activity summary, http://fec.gov/press/campaign_finance_statistics.shtml.
Notes: Individual party totals include the Democratic National Committee, Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local Democratic committees; and
Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional
Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in the FEC data. The FEC data do not count
transfers among committees and include only federal activity.
For those who support lifting the caps on coordinated party expenditures, current limits impinge
on parties’ abilities to orchestrate unified campaigns with their candidates after the limits are
reached. Unrestricted coordinated party expenditures could shift party spending away from
independent expenditures, although each option would retain unique characteristics. Parties might
continue to choose independent expenditures if they wish to distance campaigns from what many
political professionals and some candidates view as necessary, but politically unpopular,
purchases (e.g., for political advertising attacking opponents).34 On the other hand, coordinated
expenditures would be more attractive for parties wishing to communicate freely with campaigns
about campaign-related spending. Raising or eliminating coordinated party expenditure limits
might also provide parties with additional resources to compete against independent expenditures
from super PACs or other “outside” groups.35 Additional coordinated expenditures could,
therefore, strengthen arguably weakening ties between parties and campaigns.
Proponents of limits on party coordinated expenditures contend that the caps reduce the amount
of money in politics. They also potentially prevent circumvention of individual contribution
limits by donors who may seek to indirectly support campaigns by making contributions to
political parties. (However, it should be noted that FECA already restricts “earmarked”
contributions.)36 For those who generally support regulating political money, lifting or raising the
caps on party-coordinated expenditures would likely be objectionable on principle, could appear
to undercut similar regulatory efforts adopted since the 1970s, and could go against public
sentiment generally favoring limiting the amount of money in politics.
Finally, revisiting coordinated party expenditure limits might also be relevant following an April
2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. The McCutcheon case, which
concerned now-invalidated aggregate limits on contributions to political parties, is not centrally
related to coordinated party expenditures. However, post-McCutcheon, some might argue that
providing parties with increased limits (or none) on coordinated party expenditures is a logical
extension of their newfound ability to solicit donors who previously would have been unable to
contribute to as many party committees as they wished. Additional discussion of McCutcheon and
potential party fundraising implications appears in other CRS products.37
34
On relationships between campaign actors, see, for example, David A. Dulio, For Better or Worse? How Political
Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Paul S.
Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington (Washington: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 2004); and Robin Kolodny, Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).
35
For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42042, Super PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for
Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
36
2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(8).
37
See CRS Report R43334, Campaign Contribution Limits: Selected Questions About McCutcheon and Policy Issues
for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG873, Supreme Court Strikes Overall Limits on Campaign
Contributions in McCutcheon, by L. Paige Whitaker; and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG842, McCutcheon and Its Potential
Impact on Campaign Finance Law, by L. Paige Whitaker.
Congressional Research Service
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Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview
Author Contact Information
R. Sam Garrett
Specialist in American National Government
rgarrett@crs.loc.gov, 7-6443
Congressional Research Service
L. Paige Whitaker
Legislative Attorney
lwhitaker@crs.loc.gov, 7-5477
9