Order Code RS21968
Updated February 14March 13, 2008
Iraq: Government FormationReconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many now believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciling Iraq’s communities. This sentiment has grown to
the point where some believe that the United States should seek a decentralized Iraq
with substantial autonomy for each community. However, thereconciliation. The Administration says that,
partly as a result
of the U.S. “troop surge,” it is now seeing some concrete signs of
political accommodation, most notably at local levels. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and signs of national political reconciliation with
the passage of some key laws. Debate remains over whether to continue to try to
reconcile Iraq’s communities and strengthen Baghdad or to promote regional and
communal autonomy. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists in order to ensureto produce 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the
national national
ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the
overall overall
population), perceiving electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats
and very few provincial council seats.. At the
provincial level, Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s
51-seat council. The faction of radical
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr also mostly
boycotted the provincial elections because he was opposingas a sign of
opposition to the U.S.-led political process;
his supporters did not win many seats on , and his supporters are underrepresented on
the provincial councils ofin the mostly Shiite
south. After the elections, an interim national
government was formed that U.S. officials
said was not sufficiently inclusive of said under-represented Sunnis, although it had
Sunnis as Assembly speaker,
deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister,
and five other ministers. The
presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa
leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
CRS-2
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two Sunni Arabs,
although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as advisors. In August
2005, the talks produced a draft that set, including the following provisions: a December 31,
2007, deadline to hold a
referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the
Kurdish region (Article 140); designated
designation of Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict
prohibiting laws from contradicting the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set
setting a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowed
allowing families to choose which
courts to use for family issues such as divorce and inheritance
(Article 41); mademaking only
primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said that the
federal supreme court would includeincluding Islamic law experts and civil law
judges and experts
on the federal supreme court (Article 89). These provisions concernedconcern many women
who fear that too much discretion
was given to males of their families, and many women say the provision is being misused
by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and elsewhereIslamic
extremists in Iraq are purportedly citing these provisions to impose, including through
killings, restrictions against women. Article 126 made all orders of the U.S.-led
occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA), applicable until amended.
Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber with its size and powers
to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continue unresolved — centered on regional versus
central power. The draft permitted The major disputes were — and continue to be — centered on the draft’s allowing
two or more provinces together to form new
autonomous “regions,” which was reaffirmed in an October 2006 law on formation of
regions” and to allocate oil
revenues. Article 117 allowedallows each “region” to organize internal security forces, which
would legitimize legitimizing
the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the
TAL). Article
109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current
fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunnis opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunnidominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields might lie
in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date)
new energy discoveries. These concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation – Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits,
and favor centralized control of the oil industry and revenues. The Kurds want to maintain
maximum regional control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat itthe constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11)
providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December
15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
, to be voted on within another two
months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
) The Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority) in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR, as they had in the January election.
The full term COR was inaugurated on shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and
other opposition caused the UIA to
agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki,
as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president,
and selected his two deputies —
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front. Another
Consensus Front figure, the hardline
Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council
party), was chosen COR speaker.
Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37member37-member cabinet (including himself and
two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not filled permanently
until June 8 because of infighting. Of the
37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19
Shiites; and 1 Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 11028), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15 — was required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The presidentPresident has
indicated intent to use the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by
the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been
achieved, as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of the assessments, as well as
subsequent legislative actions and implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration sees signs of movement,
perhaps attributed to the success of the 2007 “troop surge” in reducing violence. The
February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two significant
laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law, discussed below) and the 2008 national
budget, represented
clear breakthroughs. The effect on reconciliation will depend on
implementation. The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a figure already agreed to
in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds, and the budget apparently does not fund the Kurds’
peshmerga militia, who are now funded from the Kurds’ own regional funds. This
follows the January 12, 2008 passage of the De-Baathification reform law and the
January 22, 2008 adoption (not part of those named in P.L. 110-28 but cited by the Iraqi
themselves) of a law adopting a new national flag. Many Iraqi Arabs say the new flag was
adopted only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it. These
recent steps, to some degree, represent achievement of the steps committed to by signed
by Hashimi, Maliki, Talabani, Abd al-Mahdi, and Kurdish regional president Masoud
Barzani in their August 26, 2007, “Unity Accord”, although the provincial powers law was vetoed by the presidency
council and is being renegotiated. These recent steps, to some degree, represent
achievement of the steps committed to by signed by Hashimi, Maliki, Talabani, Abd alMahdi, and Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani in their August 26, 2007, “Unity
Accord”. On the other hand, the effects will ultimately depend on implementation, and
some believe these legislative moves mask deeper rifts, including growing divisions
between the Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite). The budget had been help
up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17% revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was
too generous – a figure already agreed to in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a
national census to determine long term percentage allocations for the Kurds, and the
budget apparently does not, as the Kurds demanded, fund from government revenues the
Kurds’ peshmerga militia. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a new flag was adopted (January 22,
2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it. The DeBaathification reform law adopted January 12, 2008 could result in the expulsion of more
Sunnis from government than it re-instates.
Others signs point to a political stabilization of Prime Minister Maliki, who was
reeling in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the
CRS-4
Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the secular bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad alAllawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 16 vacant seats out of a 37 seat
CRS-4
cabinet. As of late 2007, Maliki’s government has strengthened somewhat. Maliki
filled filled
two vacancies (agriculture and health ministers) in October 2007 with independent
Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, although he failed in November 2007 to win COR
confirmation for new ministers of justice or communications. At the same time, Minister
of Planning Ali Baban broke with his Consensus Front bloc and rejoined the cabinet,
but
still leaving the cabinet with 13 vacancies. As of February 2008, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
main faction of the Consensus Front, reportedly is considering rejoining the cabinet. All
All blocs, including the Consensus Front, have
ended their 2007 boycotts of the COR.
Another positive development came in December
2007 with agreement by the Kurds to
delay the contentious, constitutionally mandated
referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008;
it was to be held by December 31. On the other hand, demonstrating that new alliances
are forming across sectarian lines, 120 parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction, Allawi’s
faction, and part of the Da’wa Party members signed a statement on January 13, 2008,
opposing Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2 it was to be held by December 31. U.S. officials
say that the Kurds, with mediation from the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI,
further empowered as a mediator by U.N. Resolution 1770) are increasingly focused on
resettling Kurds in traditionally Kurdish cities and might not press the issue of holding
a formal referendum. The Kurds and mainstream Shiite Arab factions remain supportive
of an expansive, long term defense pact being negotiated with the United States, while
Sadr, the Sunni factions, and the secular groups are generally opposed on the grounds that
U.S. forces in Iraq are protecting the Maliki government.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure
of of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents - 30.
30. Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of Patriotic Union of KurdistanPUK and Kurdistan
Democratic Party.
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added someCommunist and other mostly Sunni
parties for Dec. vote
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats). Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
Hardline Sunni group Muslim Scholars Association did not join slate but did
not call for election boycott, as it had in January vote.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
53
40
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
CRS-5
Table 12. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
Administration
Report
satisfactory
GAO
Report
satis.
unmet
Sept. 14
AdministrationAdmin.
Report
satisfactory
unsatisfactory2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
unsatis.
unmet
satisfactory
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
equitable distribution of resources
unsatisfactoryunsatis.
unmet
unsatisfactoryunsatisfact.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semiautonomous regions
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
elections
satisfactory
partially
satis.
partiall
y met
overall
unmet; (a)
met
(a)
met
satis.
satis. on (a)
and (c).
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
GAO
Subsequent Actions
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions do
not allow a
rating
unmet
conditions do not
allow a ratingSame as July
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. Baghdad
“surge”
conditions do
not allow rating
satisfactory
unmet
conditions do not
allow rating
met
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and completing review
2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
satisfactory on
(a) and
unsatisfactory
on the others
met
satisfactory
satisfactory on (a)
and (c).
Subsequent Actions
No recent discernible progress. Deadlines for CRC
satis.
unmet
Same as July
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional
powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing constitutional
amendments. Deadlines for CRC recommendations repeatedly extended,
now to May 2008.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by
143 in
COR present.
Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking
Baathists to regain
their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive
pensions instead. But, could allow for
judicial prosecution of all ex-BaathistsexBaathists and to firing of about 7,000
ex-Baathists in post-Saddam
security services, and bars exSaddamex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs.
no passage of oil laws, but
jobs.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. However,
revenue being distributed equitably.
, and 2008 budget adopted February
13, 2008 at least temporarily
maintains existing 17% revenue share for
Kurdish region.
Regions law passed October 2006, but main blocs agreed to
moratorium moratorium
on implementation until April 2008.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted
February 13, 2008, and COR agreed to hold provincial elections
by October 1, 2008. Election law will need to be adopted first.
Some of the nine Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members
to be replaced due to “non-transparent” selection process, despite
passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Crucial to Sunnis who are the overwhelming majority of detainees
in Iraq, the law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by
Iraq passed on February 13, 2008. However, would not affect
25,000 detainees held by U.S, and, depending on implementation,
February
13, 2008, but vetoed over provision that Baghdad can remove provincial
governors. Dispute could jeopardize election law (by May 2008) and
provincial elections (by October 1, 2008). Some of the nine Higher Election
Commission (IHEC) members to be replaced by UNAMI due to “nontransparent” selection process, despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees (almost all Sunnis) held by
Iraq passed on February 13, 2008. Would not affect 25,000 detainees held
by U.S, and might not lead to freedom for other approximately 20,000
detainees held by Iraq.
No progress on disarmament program or related laws
No change
CRS-6
Benchmark
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
make decisions, without political intervention, to
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
Shiite militias
July 12
Administration
Report
satisfactory
GAO
Report
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
partially
met
met
met
No change
satis. on (a) and
unsatis. on the
others
CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
Administration
Report
satis.
GAO
unsatis.
unmet
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
even-handed enforcement of law
unsatisfactoryunsatis.
unmet
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
eliminating militia control of local security
satisfactory
partially
met
Overall mixed.
Satisfactory on
(a) but
unsatisfactory
on (b)
satisfactory
unsatisfactorysatis.
partial
Overall mixed.
Satis.(a);
unsatis. (b)
satis.
unsatis.
unmet
same as July 12
met
unmet
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
satisfactory
partially
met
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
16. Ensuring protection of rights of minority parties
in Iraqi parliament
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
capital budget for reconstruction projects, on an
equitable basis
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against
ISF members
Mixed: satisfactory
to pursue extremists,
but political
interference
continues
overall mixed.
Satisfactory on Iraqi
military,
unsatisfactory on
police
satisfactory
12
met
unmet
satis.
unsatis.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR
satis.
met
satis.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
capital budget for reconstruction projects equitably
satis.
partial.
satis.
About 4.5% of the $10 billion for capital projects spent by August 2007;
another $13.2 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making false
accusations against ISF members
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
No change
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
make decisions, without political intervention, to
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents
and Shiite militias
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
partial
Sept. 14
Admin.
Report
satisfactory
Mixed: satis.
to pursue
extremists, but
political
interference
continues
overall mixed.
Satis. on Iraqi
military,
unsatis on
police
satis
Subsequent Actions
No change
No significant change
No significant change.
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity due to
Sadr six
month suspension (now extended until August 2008) and reported
decline in Iranian
weapons shipments. Sadr might end suspension in later Feb.
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating.
80 90,000 Sunni “Concerned Local Citizens” and 15,000 tribal
“Awakening” fighters
Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
by Maliki government as potential
Sunni militia forces. Only
15% CLC’s have been 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
No change
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say
ISF likely
unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and
against external threats not until 2018-2020.
No change
About 4.5% of the $10 billion spent by August 2007, according
to Iraqi figures. $13 billion more in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted
on February 13, 2008.
No change
not until 2018-2020.
No change